THE RISE AND DEMISE OF THE U.N. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION

THE RISE AND DEMISE OF THE U.N. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION*

Gerald Hodge

INTRODUCITON

Administrative enterprises, like other social organizations, are not by nature inherently stable or viable. They continually face the problem of self-preservation. Several factors are prominently involved in the question whether an organization survives or not: pressures from the organization’s environment; the dominance of leadership; the maintenance of goals; intergroup rivalries; the effect of coalitions; and the defence of organizational integrity. It is with the exploration of these factors through the study of an organization which did not survive-the Technical Assistance Administration (TAA) of the United Nations-that t h i s study is primarily concerned.

Further, through this case we may elaborate the distinction made by Philip Selznick between an organization and an institution.1 The former is an “expendable tool, a rational instrument engineered to do a job.” An institution, on the other hand, ‘is more nearly a natural product of social needs and pressures.” All enterprises enter the world as an organization; only when they come to be valued for themselves has institu- tionalization begun. That is, they become “infused with value beyond the technical requirements at hand.” In this study it will be seen that the Technical Assistance Administration was engaged in a struggle to assert its distinctive competence, to have its values sustained, to defend its role-to become institutionalized. This aim was never fully achieved, for it was expendable.

THE UNITED NATIONS CONTEXT

All agencies in the United Nations Organization must operate not only in the context of international affairs but also within the context of the characteristics that are peculiar to the United Nations. The nature of this context stems from the fact that the United Nations is a voluntary association of independent states. As in all international organizations, the nature and extent of the association are defined by treaty, in this case

OThe author gratefully acknowledges the help of Dr. H. L. Keenleyside in the pre- paration of this report, which was an out owth of research for the latter’s Znter- national Aid: A Summu , Toronto: McCl%and and Stewart, 1966.

lphilip Selulick, Lea&xhip In Administration, Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1957, pp. 5 ff.

1

2 CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

the United Nations Charter. In this kind of setting, one seldom finds consensus such as exists in a national legislature. Whereas in the latter a delegate’s presence is based upon representation of an accepted con- gene, if not configuration, of goals, in the international legislature national self-interest is the prime criterion for sustaining membership. Moreover, the binding treaties are notoriously hard to maintain since power is not normally given to invade the domestic jurisdiction of member states. Hence, technical assistance from the United Nations, for example, is only dispensed on request from the recipient country.

Action taken by the “governing bodies” of international organizations manifests itself in resolutions, not laws. The result is a much weaker, more diffuse directive for administrative staffs to implement. Additionally, executive leadership does not stem from the governing body but rather from an appointed “non-political” executive. In this way, linkages between policy-makers and administrators tend to be weak and political power presents a confused picture. The closest parallel to representative voting one finds in a body like the United Nations is that of the various blocs of national delegations.’ But bloc solidarity is often artificial and generally occurs only when an obvious but limited bloc interest is involved, e.g., elections, jobs, budget. Throughout the history of the TAA, blocs representing the major recipients of technical assistance, the underdeveloped nations, often were primarily concerned with the size of program. On the other hand, blocs of the developed nations were more concerned with administrative efficiency in the program.

A context such as this is bound to have consequences for administrative behaviour different from those in national or sub-national situations. Walter Sharp has adverted to this elusive subject and has suggested three broad areas in which differences between national and international administration may be di~tinguished.~ These may be classed roughly as (I) the informal characteristics of an international agency, (2 ) the perception of goals, and ( 3 ) the scope and nature of substantive functions. It will be useful to describe each of these briefly with examples drawn from the United Nations experience.

Informal Characteristics Not only are international organizations composed of sovereign states,

their staffs also have an international composition. International bureau-

2The divisions and alliances may be on the basis of east-west differences, regional differences, cultural groupings, developed and underdeveloped conditions, agricultural and industrial countries, importin and exporting nations, donors and receivers of international aid, totalitarian and fernocratic governments, and so on. See J. G. Had- wen and J. Kaufman, How United Nations Decisions Are M&, Leyden: Sythoff, 1960, p. 64.

3Walter R. Sharp, “The Study of International Administration: Retrospect and Prospect,” World Politics, 11 (October 1958), 102-117.

TME U.N. l“1CAL ASSISTANCX ADMIMSTRATION 3

cracy must, therefore, face problems of cross-culturism in its personnel administration. Tensions can and do result in efforts to meld people of different languages, races, and stages of development into an efficient, d e d force, for they will not likely have been trained in the same traditions nor will they act from the same motives. Communications barriers arise from linguistic, semantic, and ideological factors as well as from the vast change in living and working conditions that many personnel face. The United Nations builds this geographiczil bias into its Secretariat, by Article 101 of the Charter, and often suffers the consequences. In addition, staff composition is made somewhat inflexible by the contractual basis of hiring in the United Nations.

The Perception of Goals An international civil service characteristically works within a frame-

work of “loosely-worded resolutions adopted at periodic conferences.”“ In the United Nations, the administrative staff receive direction from a collection of assemblies, councils, commissions, boards, and committees whose interrelationship is not clear, much less their role in setting goals. There is no clearcut body of legislation to administer nor any permanent executive from which to receive instructions. This, as one observer has suggested, requires administrators in such a situation to face up to orders from above that may well be diffuse, if not contradictory?

The intense political role undertaken by the Secretary-General, especially since the 1956 Suez Crisis, places strains on the Secretariat in terms of day-to-day leadership, for the great amount of time consumed in trying to reconcile political problems draws the Secretary-General away from daily administrative decision-making, thereby depriving the staff of their single source of permanent leadership. Yet the looseness of direction already described would seem to argue that Secretariat members particularly need to feel they are partners in a common task.6 Maintaining a consensus regarding goals is not equally difficult among international organizations. The specialized agencies, with the exception of UNESCO, have the advantage of well defined technical specialties around which to mobilize staff efforts. Whereas the United Nations Secretariat tends to serve more as a political rallying point, there is often found a professional cameraderie among the secretariat and delegates of the respective specialized agencies.

The Predominance of Substantive Functions The following list, compiled by Professor Sharp, of tasks performed 4Peter Langyel, “Some Trends in International Civil Service,” Zntemdiofial Orguni-

5Zbid. SC. Elmore Jackson, “The Developing Role of the Secretary-General,” Znternui%mo.l

&ion, 13 (Fall 1959), 520-537.

Organization, 11 (Summer 1957), 431-445.

4 CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINlSTRATION

by an international secretariat illustrates the emphasis placed on content rather than form, on substantive rather than on operational aspects of their jobs:’

(a) the compilation of information, reporting, and research; (b) provision of information, in the clearing-house sense; (c) planning, constructing, and coordinating programs a t the headquarters level; (d) implementation of such programs in the field; (e) the s t a g and management of field missions in the domain of peaceful settlement and security. . . .; ( f ) assistance in the process of negotiating group decisions and agreements between governments; and (g) reponsibility for facilitating the mediation of diplomatic controversies.

Preponderantly the United Nations Secretariat activities are thus devoted to servicing the principal organs through information-gathering and reporting. The TAA, on the other hand, being primarily an agency oriented to the implementation of field programs, was somewhat of an anomaly among United Nations units. This factor, as will be seen later, contributed to disharmony between the TAA and other Secretariat units.

It was in this administrative milieu that the United Nations initiated its efforts at international assistance in economic and social development. Because there was little precedent or theory as to how this might best be accomplished, the early attempts involved a good deal of experimentation, soul-searching, and criticism. Technical assistance was recognized as one important way of engendering development in an underdeveloped country. Advice, training, and demonstration of technical experience applied to the problems of underdeveloped countries was the approach used in a format that included field demonstrations by experts, seminars, fellowships, conferences, and workshops.

To arrive at a stage where particular devices and approaches could be relied on was a slow process. It took time for the General Assembly to adopt resolutions which would allow programs in technical assistance to begin. By a series of resolutions between 1945 and 1950, the Assembly laid the groundwork for limited programs in economic development, social welfare, and public administration. The money for these services was provided from general purpose funds, and the activities became known as the Regular Program in technical assistance. The Departments of Economic Affairs and Social Affairs were the custodians of the United Nations program. Meanwhile, the specialized agencies had also initiated technical assistance programs in their respective fields.

Thc famous “fourth point” of President Truman’s 1949 inaugural address added further stimulus to an Assembly resolution of a few months earlier which requested the Economic and Social Council ( ECOSOC ) to consider expansion of its technical assistance programs. Within the year, ECOSOC had acted through its Resolution 222 ( IX) to provide a set of principles and operating procedures for what was to

‘Sharp, “The Study of International Administration,” op. cit.

THE U.N. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION 5

become known as the Expanded Program. The General Assembly approved this resolution in November 1949 and, in June of the following year, convened the first United Nations Conference on Technical Assistance for the purpose of accepting financial contributions toward the new program.

The advent of the Expanded Program raised two important administrative questions for the United Nations. The first concerned the division of labour between Secretariat units in administering technical assistance. The second was the old problem of integrating the work of the specialized agencies with that of the United Nations. Both questions played a vital role in the organizational history of the TAA and each deserves brief elaboration here.

The Expanded Program meant quintupling the amount of technical assistance funds to be disbursed by the United Nations. An increase of this scale seemed impracticable for the two departments, Economic Affairs and Social Affairs, to handle in addition to the Regular Program. Thus it was decided to form a separate unit, to be called the Technical Assistance Administration, to administer both United Nations technical assistance programs. The Economic and Social Affairs Departments continued to be charged with providing substantive aid-compiling information, research, and planning-for technical assistance operations, except in the field of public administration which was wholly a TAA undertaking. However, the division between substantive and operating departments was hard to maintain because of the nature of aid for develop ment. As the program was extended, as requests for aid increased, and as more experience led to better theory about the appropriate kind and role of technical assistance in economic development, greater interde- pendence was necessary between the substantive departments and the TAA. Working relationships became more complex and in some cases more strained in the ensuing years.

The relationship of the specialized agencies to the United Nations was also affected by the institution of the Expanded Program. Secretary- General Lie had gone so far as to recommend a single organ within the United Nations Secretariat to administer the program.8 Although the question was resolved at the time with virtually no challenge to the autonomy of the specialized agencies, the issue was to recur again in the history of the TAA.

The extremely elaborate machinery devised to legislate for, supervise, and administer the Expanded Program calls for mention. The Assembly had given ECOSOC the responsibility of establishing the Program’s principles and supervising the operation of the administrative organs. The Council, in turn, established a committee of the whole called the

SPhilip M. Glick, The Administration of Technical Assistance, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957, p. 255.

6 WADW PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Technical Assistance Committee (TAC) to give detailed consideration to policy problems arising from the execution of the program. The Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC), consisting of the Secretary-General of the United Nations as chairman and of his opposite numbers in the specialized agencies, had the task of advancing general coordination between the dozen independent and international agencies involved. ACC, at the request of ECOSOC, set up a coordinating board, the Technical Assistance Board (TAB). There were several anomalies in this framework. TAB, although established by ACC, reported to TAC, while the Executive Chairman of TAB was appointed by the Secretaxy- General but was responsible to ECOSOC, and the U.N. effectively had dual representation on both TAB and ACC.O

Three standing committees of the Second, Third, and Fifth Commit- tees of the General Assembly, and the permanent Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, also entered this picture to confuse it even more. The latter two committees, in particular, took strong positions on the effectiveness of the coordination among agencies, and since they reported directly to the Assembly their role was critical to the performance of the TAA.

Lastly, the objective of the Expanded Program was to promote economic development through technical aid in the fields of activity generally circumscribed by each of the specialized agencies. However, certain residual fields such as public administration, industrial develop ment, and water resources control fell outside its functional areas. While each of the organizations involved in the Expanded Program could be said to have had a primary focus of activity, their frontiers were not sharply defined, Hence, coordination and consultation were forced on them in order to arrive at a suitable division of effort. For the specialized agencies with their clearer technical emphases-e.g., agriculture, labour, health, aviation-the frontiers were much easier to defend. For the TAA, filling the interstices in these specialty fields, the task was much more difficult. It was not aided by the fact that headquarters’ offices were dis- persed in six different cities on two continents, thereby precluding regular personal contact among senior officials. This, then, in broad strokes, was the organizational environment of the TAA.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ADMINETRATION

The Technical Assistance Administration of the United Nations came into being on August 1, 1950 in response to United Nations obligations under the Expanded Program. The United Nations assumed responsibility for technical assistance in the fields of economic development, 9H. L. Keenleyside, “Administrative Problems of the Technical Assistance Adminis-

tration,” Public Administration, 33 (Autumn 1955), 241-268.


social welfare, and public administration. But the TAA also had to provide services for every sphere of activity not “specifically or inferentially” covered by one of the specialized agencies; and so, in the words of the organization’s first (and only) chief officer, it became the “residual legatee” of the Expanded Program.lO

From the beginning, the TAA was conceived of as an operating agency for the United Nations’ technical assistance undertakings, responsible for providing services and facilities for field projects, recruiting expert advisers, organizing missions, awarding fellowships, and organizing seminars, workshops, conferences, and demonstration projects. Except in the case of public administration, the TAA was expected to draw on the resources of other Secretariat divisions for the research, analysis, and planning functions necessary for a well-balanced program of assistance. In carrying out any of its direct tasks, say in the field of economic development, the TAA could be faced with questions ranging from the control of water resources, power transmission, or industrialization to communications and natural resources development. The TAA, in judging the validity of such requests, would call upon the Department of Economic Affairs for a considered opinion. Similarly, in the field of social welfare, requests for technical assistance to set up cooperatives, aid the physically handicapped, deal with child welfare and delinquency, or institute town planning were referred to the Department of Social Affairs. The United Nations Fiscal Division or its Statistical Office were also asked to advise of pertinent activities. In public administration, however, the TAA had the exclusive franchise to develop techniques and programs and to implement these programs.

The evolution of this division of labour within the Secretariat was not without its political implications. In the five years preceding the Ex- panded Program, both the Department of Economic Affairs and the Department of Social Affairs had built up their own sets of interests, loyalties, and procedures while administering functions within their respective fields in the Regular Program. The Department of Social Affairs, it was said, was particularly desirous of safeguarding its interest in the social welfare domain.ll Hence support for a separate administrative unit gained favour in light of these jurisdictional tensions. Addi- tional arguments in favour of a separate unit for technical assistance operations cited the need to insulate basic fact-finding activities from the day-to-day pressures of implementing a program. Moreover a separate unit would have advantages in its relations with the specialized agencies by projecting a more distinctive image of the United Nations in the Expanded Program. Also Secretary-General Lie is known to have

loKeenleyside, “Administrative Problems of UNTAA,” ibid. llWalter R. Sharp, International Technical Assistance, Chicago: Public Administra-

tion Service, 1952, p. 64.

8 CA~VADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

favoured the functional approach to international organization.12 It seems likely, therefore, that he preferred a strong separate agency in the technical assistance field that could acquire the same prestige accorded to most of the specialized agencies.

Thus, the TAA was formed to administer both the Regular and the Expanded Programs. The initial staff numbered forty persons, most of whom had been seconded from the Departments of Economic Affairs and Social Affairs. Within a year, the staff of the TAA had grown to over a hundred persons and had settled into the job of carrying out the following activities:13

1. The provision of over four hundred fellowships and scholarships to persons from over seventy underdeveloped countries enabling them to train in forty-one different countries;

2. The organization of twenty to twenty-five seminars, training or demonstration centres, continuing institutes, and conferences within the underdeveloped countries;

3. The contribution of technical literature and, under controlled conditions, the distribution of equipment for instruction purposes; and most important, 4. The discovery, selection, nomination, recruitment, and briefing of

over five hundred experts from over thirty-eight countries and working in over fifty-two countries.

Personnel and Personalities The TAA was launched into an organizational environment not destined

to provide the maximum security for its growth or, indeed, its survival. Under such circumstances it was necessary that the TAA’s role be clafied, its position asserted; in short, that its existence be justified in its early stages. It was a situation calling for strong and determined leadership.

The person recruited as TAA’s chief officer provided the strength of personality needed in the job and, following some restructuring in the Secretariat, a more solid base of action was possible for him. He was Dr. Hugh L. Keenleyside, a long-time Canadian civil administrator14 who had had an academic career in political science and public administration and had already distinguished himself in the technical assistance field by heading the United Nations field mission to Bolivia in the Spring of 1950.l5 He possessed unquestioned integrity and high principles, was

* T y p e Lie, In the Cause of Peace, New York: Macmihn, 1954, p. 145. l3Figures are for a typical year as noted in a report from the Director-General of

14He was Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources at the time of his secondment

15Cf. Albert Lepawsky, “The Bolivia Mission: New Trends in Technical Assistance,”

the TAA to the Secretary-General, May 1, 1955 (unpublished).

for the Bolivia mission.

International Conciliation, 479 (March 1952), 101-139.


capable of international diplomacy, candid,la and dynamic. His dedica- tion to the aims of the Expanded Program was a constant source of inspiration to his staff.

The title given to the new job was Director-General, a somewhat anomalous title in the United Nations hierarchy where equivalent staff positions were designated as Assistant Secretary-General. On the other hand, this was the title of many of the executive heads of the specialized agencies with whom the new TAA head must participate as an equal. The leadership position in the TAA was further delimited by providing for liaison with the Departments of Social AfFairs and Economic Affairs on a regular basis. After several months of operation, a formal mechanism of interdepartmental coordination in technical assistance was adopted, the Interdepartmental Committee on Technical Assistance, chaired by the Director-General of the TAA.

The staff that the Director-General gathered around him after a year of operation reflected a wide geographical base, a vital condition in United Nations staffing. The nine senior officers below the Director- General came in order of seniority from Mexico, the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, India, Australia, and Brazil. Twenty-seven nationalities were represented in the 52 persons of officer grade. But the distribution of staff talents was not as wide as its geographical base, being drawn dominantly from the ranks of professional public administrators. This is, of course, understandable; the scope of the TAA's activities was so broad that it could not hope to employ the full array of talents necessary to handle the great variety of requests for assistance. And since the TAA was expected to utilize staff resources of the two substantive departments, its need was for personnel who could operate quickly and effectively in a wide range of situations.

Variations in Internal Organization Three key characteristics of the TAA's activities were (1) that it was

responsible for operations in a variety of substantive fields, (2) that it served countries distributed widely over the earth, and (3) that it employed a number of functional procedures (e.g., fellowships, expert advice, conferences). Internal organization could, therefore, be based on geography, substance, or function. It was decided in the beginning, in view of its small size, that TAA did not warrant an organization based on either geographic or substantive grounds. An arrangement reflecting the different functions performed by the agency was thus chosen.

The main components were a series of four (later five) functional

1While on a tour of Asian ca itals for TAA in 1951, Dr. Keenleyside had pro- voked diplomatic ire by reportAy refusing to shake hands with Hjalmar Schacht, Hider's banker, at a reception in Indonesia.


divisions of equivalent status each reporting to the Director-General: a Training Division that dealt with fellowships and scholarships for all countries in the fields of economic development, social welfare, and public administration; a Mission Division that handled all problems related to supplying and providing for the needs of experts in the field; an Information (Special Projects) Division that organized all conferences, seminars, demonstration projects, and related activities; a Screen- ing and Assessment Division that analysed requests and processed reports from experts, fellows, etc.; and a Public Administration Division responsible for framing programs as well as supplying experts in this field.

This monolithic form of organization lasted until late 1952 when it was decided to consider basic changes in it. Over the previous two-year period, the TAA had been accused by other Secretariat units of “too formalistic” methods of operation. The Advisory Committee on Admini- 4trative and Budgetary Questions of the General Assembly also queried the complexity of the TAA‘s ma~hinery.’~ Meanwhile within the TAA some self-examination was going on. The main cause of difEiculties, it seemed, stemmed from variations in the background and viewpoint of the organization’s staff, combined with the newness of the undertaking. That is, the internal structure was probably more suited to a national administration in which all the participants acted from common motives. However, the TAA staff composition had apparently resulted in a somewhat rigid adherence to formal and mechanical procedures such as the use of memos instead of telephoning between divisions and a greater use and demand of hierarchical channels.l* This situation was further complicated by a distortion of the committee system adopted by many members of the Secretariat. Because of national and other sensitivities, it was difEcult to avoid inviting anyone to sit on a committee who might have even a small reason to participate. Compounding all this was the felt need to keep unusually detailed minutes of all meetings.

The internal structure was changed considerably in 1952 by making the base of the administrative pyramid much smaller. The number of divisions reporting to the Director-General was reduced to two-one for a11 program activities and one for public administration. The Program Division was, in turn, divided into three geographical units (Latin America, Asia, Europe/ Middle East/ Africa ), each of which was responsible for its whole program in the field of economic development and social welfare. The TAA’s shift to a “geographical” structure was con- sonant with, if not prompted by, a gradual shift of technical assistance

17As reported in Sharp, International Technical Assistance, op. cit., p. 65. l*It is incongruous in many respects that a charge of “excessive formalism,” not

unusual against administration in underdeveloped countries, should be levelled at an agency designed to solve the problems of such countries; cf. Albert Lepawsky, “Technical Assistance: A Challenge to Public Administration,” Public Administration Reoiew, 16 (Winter 1956), pp. 22-32.


activities under the Expanded Program to a system of ”country programming.”lQ The latter internal structure of the TAA continued for the life of the organization with little or no change.

COALITIONS AND COMPROMISFS

The Necessity of Joint Decision-Making The TAA was conceived as a strictly operational unit. Hence, in ques-

tions about the appropriateness of technical assistance methods or approaches for a particular situation or country, the TAA was required to make decisions jointly with relevant Secretariat units. Final decisions on financial aspects of a country’s request were, however, the exclusive right of the TAA. These interrelationships may be better understood, in their static features at least, by examining the procedures that were followed when putting an expert into the field. The detailed process used by TAA was as

1. A request was examined by the Director-General’s office to deter- mine whether it was within the scope of the Expanded Program and the TAA. Legitimate requests were forwarded to the appropriate specialized agency, if outside the TAA’s scope, or to the TAA’s Program Division.

*2. The Program Division studied the request in relation to previous requests from the applicant state and to available funds. Requests were discussed with the substantive departments at this stage.

3. The Program Division submitted the request with recommendations to a meeting of senior officers of the TAA where a decision was made to accept or refuse the request.

4. Accepted applications were submitted to the Technical Assistance Board for authorization (if they were to be financed under the Expanded Program). After Board approval, the Program Division set up a work plan and procedures for the project.

“5. Recruitment of the expert was initiated upon completion of the work plan. The Personnel Office of the United Nations handled recruitment in collaboration with TAA and the substantive departments. The requesting govenunent was usually asked to choose from among three candidates.

“6. The expert upon proceeding to the field was required to report to Headquarters for briefing on United Nations policies, with the substantive departments providing the briefing in the specialty background regarding recent experience in the country and elsewhere.

19The process of coordinating technical assistance needs and resources on a country- by-country basis was first proposed in the Technical Assistance Committee in its report of May 29,1952, United Nations Document E/2338.

2oAdapted from U.N. Technical Assistance Administration, “Responsibilities, Orga- nization, and Methods d the TAA,” a report to the Secretary-General (revised, unpublished), May 1, 1955. Starred items refer to steps in the p~ocess involving joint decision-making.


“7. The substantive servicing of experts in the field and the study of their reports was carried on by the appropriate Area Office in the Pro- gram Division in consultation with officers of pertinent substantive departments.

8. Physical and business details connected with servicing the expert in the field were the responsibility of the Area Office in question.

9. Experts in the field were to be in direct correspondence with only one officer at Headquarters, the Chief of the Oflice which had jurisdiction over the region of assignment.

In four of the nine steps outlined above, the substantive departments participated in the decision-making. A similar involvement occurred in the case of requests for fellowships, training centres, demonstration projects, or equipment. The extent of this joint decision-making is best seen by summarizing the magnitude of TAA activities. In a typical year, for example, the TAA would receive over six hundred government requests for expert assistance and over fifteen hundred requests for fellowships. After the requests were handled, more than a thousand final reports were processed, and more than four thousand interim reports from experts and fellows.

This “rulebook” description of a key part of TAA activities should be refined in light of the unique configuration of administration, politics, and personalities involved. For instance, many of the problems faced by the TAA in its operations, including intra-Secretariat cooperation, were symptomatic of the larger problem of lack of adequate knowledge about the causes of underdevelopment and the role and impact of technical assistance in helping to correct them. The formative years of TAA were, therefore, largely spent in learning about technical assistance. The need was to accrue a fund of experience upon which a program of action could be reliably based. That need was also shared by the substantive departments of the Secretariat who were expected to provide research and analysis for the Expanded Program. The latter thus required contact with TAA operations in order to gain first-hand knowledge about the effect and effectiveness of technical assistance in the field. More- over, the TAA needed this participation by the substantive departments at least until it had amassed the necessary experience in dealing with the wide array of requests being received.

An illustration of the dynamics of joint decision-making and the tensions it engendered may be seen in the following example of providing substantive backstopping to experts in the field.21

A United Nations technical assistance expert on duty in an underdeveloped country was expected to file interim reports on the progress

21For the outlines of this episode, but not its interpretation, the writer is indebted to S. B. Bapat, Director, United Nations Division for Public Administration, in con- versation, New York, May 4, 1981.


of his mission. Such reports, which by regulation were filed with the TAA area officer in charge, often asked for advice on how to handle an unforeseen situation. The TAA official would then consult the appropriate substantive department. It developed, presumably through the zealousness of persons in the substantive departments to help mitigate problems encountered by experts, that correspondence began to emanate from the latter departments to field missions of the TAA. This only occurred at first in response to pleas from experts. Later unsolicited instructions were sent forth on the basis of new information or new ideas about the particular situation available to people in Economic and Social Affairs. Somewhat piqued, the TAA instituted a procedure that required all correspondence with experts to show its source clearly. This was accomplished by having letters originating outside the TAA accompanied by an authorized TAA routing slip indicating to the expert that the letter had been cleared.

In retrospect, the position of both is defensible. To the TAA, the unsolicited mail was an affront to its authority over the field unit; to the substantive departments, it was not unreasonable to want to expedite the task of the same unit, especially as needs and experience were both increasing.22 Although these differences were eventually solved, they illustrate the tensions present under conditions of joint decision-making. They were probably more acute in an organization striving to assert itself, as TAA was.

Pressures for Administrative Economies Another set of forces to which the TAA had to adapt were the claims

of those arguing for the strictest economies in the administration of technical assistance programs. As it affected the TAA, these arguments came from two quarters. The first was ECOSOC and the Second and Fifth Committees where the concern was over the mounting administrative costs in all agencies participating in the Expanded Program. The second was the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, directed at TAA in particular, regarding the capacity of its administrative structure to provide an economical program.

The first of these pressures did not have to be met directly by the TAA since the Technical Assistance Board was the principal unit reporting on the Expanded Program to ECOSOC and the Assembly. Neverthe- less, the TAA could not afford to disregard such discussions in its “legis- latures.” Thus, one finds the Director-General’s reports to ECOSOC and the Second and Fifth Committees, year after year, anticipating the

=March and Simon indicate that intergroup conflict will be greater between units sharing the same service unit and will centre on the resources provided by that unit, that is technical know-how of the expert in this case; see their Organizations, New York: Wiley, 1958, pp. 122-123.


arguments about administrative costs. This excerpt is from a July 1952 speech before ECOSOC:23

, . . Our own administrative procedures must be kept under constant review in order to improve our servicing of specialists in the field, to strengthen OW briefing procedures, to establish and maintain a reasonable balance between administrative and operating costs . . .

The charges of the Advisory Committee required a different kind of organizational response inasmuch as the committee had the jurisdiction to review the administrative structure of the Secretariat for the Assembly. I t could, therefore, apply much more effective pressures on the TAA. The Advisory Committee’s reactions to TAA operations were biased by its view from the beginning that the United Nations technical assistance program ought to be combined with on-going activities of the substantive departments of the Secretariat. It referred to the separation of units as an “unreasonable organic separation.” The Advisory Committee made almost constant demands for both the merger of TAA with Economic and Social Affairs and greater economies in TAA’s operations, in lieu of a merger.24

In the Fifth Committee the charges of the Advisory Committee could be answered, and it was here that the TAA chose to concentrate its rebuttal. Internally the TAA was also taking cognizance of the charges of overcomplexity and duplication by making the changes in its internal structure already described. Moreover, a genuine attempt was made to reduce overhead costs; indeed, the TAA succeeded in lowering the ratio of administrative expenses from about 14 per cent to 4% per cent. This was by far the lowest ratio in the whole United Nations family (not to mention such national programs as the United States which spent several times more per capita on the recruitment of experts). The efforts of the TAA to reduce overhead costs and to restructure itself were genuine in themselves and as well constituted strategic moves to ensure the survival of the organization.

A Generic Question It has been fairly said of the administrative structure of the Expanded

Program that it was a working compromise with which none of the contending groups was happy.25 This statement, true in 1957 when it was made, also applied to the variety of compromise arrangements to which the TAA was n party both before and after. For the TAA was borne into a situation that had its origins in the decision made at San Francisco to

WJnited Nations Press Release PM/2325, July 22, 1952. 24The advisory Committee’s first reaction to the TAA can be seen in its report to

the Sixth General Assembly, just a year after the TAA had been formed, United Nations Document A/1853, 1951.

25Glick, The Administration of Technical Assistance, op. cit., p. 249.

THE U.N. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION 15 allow the specialized agencies to remain largely independent international organizations and not to become operating divisions of the United Nations Secretariat.

The organizational debate was reopened when the United Nations was considering how to expand its technical assistance program. Secretary- General Lie, it was reported, proposed a single unit within the United Nations framework to administer the entire Expanded Program and con- tract with the specialized agencies for services on a project basis. The specialized agencies, of course, strongly resisted the proposal and pressed instead for merely a special account from which funds could be appor- tioned according to stipulated percentages, and their position prevailed until 1954. Under the arrangement the TAA was allocated the second largest portion of Expanded Program funds, 23 per cent. The Food and Agriculture Organization received the largest amount, 29 per cent, and the World Health Organization followed the TAA with 22 per cent.

Criticism grew in several countries, notably the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada, the major contributors to the program at the time, over the manner of allocating funds. ECOSOC’s Tech- nical Assistance Committee voted down a Technical Assistance Board compromise recommendation that only 80 per cent of the first twenty million dollars contributed to the program be distributed on the basis of the established percentages. The Committee recommended that the auto- matic allocations apply only to the first ten million dollars.26 As the political atmosphere grew even more tense over this issue, the Director- General of the TAA warned his colleagues in the specialized agencies of the possibility that the entire program might be stagnated if they could not reach agreement among themselves?’

It seems to me that it would be inviting catastrophe to go before TAC or ECOSOC at this time to tell the Governments that we cannot agree among ourselves and that some of us want to change the rules that they set up less than a year ago. In my opinion, it is imperative that we should overcome our difficulties, if not by concession, at least by compromise. Any other procedure at this time may lead to disaster.

But the compromise TAA advocated-the strengthening of the Technical Assistance Board’s position as a coordinating agency and the disbursing of program funds by it on a country basis-was not forthcoming from the agencies. Rather it was forced on them by ECOSOC and the Advisory Committee.”*

The details of this episode in the history of the Expanded Program 2Wnited Nations Document E/2108, August 1951. 27From “Approximate Text of Statement to ACC,” by the Director-General of the

Wee United Nations Documents E/TAC/32, January 11, 1954 and Add. 1, March TAA, Geneva, May 26, 1953 (unpublished).

22, 1954; and A/2861, June 25, 1954.


have been well d o c ~ m e n t e d . ~ ~ It is only necessary to note that, from 1955 until very recent years, with two-year programming, the administrative structure of the program was not further modified. There was a gradual refinement in procedures which reflected a greater autonomy for the Technical Assistance Board in allocating funds and programming projects on a country basis. While the various proposals did not deal directly with the issue of centralization, it is true, as Glick points out, that the contending parties were certainly aware that the new structure would decrease the autonomy of the agencies, the TAA included, and strengthen the Technical Assistance Board, the Technical Assistance Committee, and ECOSOC. The effects on the TAA were contradictory. On the one hand, the TAA’s position regarding centralized administration of program funds was vindicated. On the other hand, the ascendancy of the Board, a sister United Nations unit in the same field, could be seen as foreshadowing the ultimate downgrading of the TAA.

EXPENDABILITY OF THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION

Above all, the continued existence of any unit in the United Nations Secretariat depends upon the judgment of the Secretary-General as to the unit’s distinctive competence to perform its task and thereby promote the United Nations’ goals. The Secretary-Genera1 must assess the demands being made on the United Nations both internally and externally. He must be able to judge when a balance has been struck such that the energies of contending internal interest groups are neither disruptive of the organization nor stifled in their creativity. Externally he must be aware of the demands generated by the rapidly changing political, economic, and cultural milieu in which the United Nations operates. More- over, his perception of his own role in dealing personally with external pressures is closely related to the question of how best to mobilize the resources of the Secretariat.

The administrations of Trygve Lie and Dag Hammarskjold were notice- ably different in their attitude toward the Secretariat’s role and organization. The TAA, in its relatively “exposed position, was affected by the change in viewpoint that occurred with the resignation of Lie. In general terms, Lie advocated extensive delegation of administrative power within the Secretariat along with the need for a separate and distinct image of the Secretary-General. In contrast, Hammarskjold advocated personal and direct responsibility for administration and an image of the Secretary- General closely tied to the resources of the Secretariat.

The essence of Trygve Lie’s approach to the post of Secretary-General can be gleaned from the following statement in his memoirs.30

BCf. Glick, op. cit. 30Lie, In the Cause of Peace, op. cit., p. 51.


The group of Assistant Secretaries-General was to be my official “cabinet,” available for advice on all matters-not least on questions relating to their respective home areas. I delegated them broad administrative authority from the beginning.

Lie’s Assistant Secretaries-General were few in number, seven or eight. Each headed a major department of the Secretariat. Below them was a level of Directors of principal bureaus and divisions of these departments whose rank was supposedly equivalent to an Assistant Secretary- General. This level of what came to be known as the double echelon system was characterized as being “coordinate with rather than subordi- nate to” their department heads. In fact, a real gulf existed between the two levels. This, however, was Lie’s way of spreading responsibility down through the Secretariat ranks while maintaining a small number of top- level advisers. With this administrative structure he felt free to attend personally to the pressing matters of peace and security that so dominated the early years of the United Nations-Palestine, Kashmir, Korea. Lie’s views on technical assistance generally favoured strong, functional bodies, but with the United Nations in the position of as~endancy.~l The resignation that was forced on Lie came about largely because he overextended his position in political matters.

Dag Hammarskjold, no less than his predecessor, saw the United Nations in a prime position among international organizations. He was no less disposed to use his personal position to ameliorate international disputes such as in the Suez and the Congo. The major difference between the two lay in the greater degree to which the resources of the Secretariat were integrated into Hammarskjold’s decision-making. He desired a close-knit Secretariat, closely controlled by himself, that could be mobi- lized quickly to fill unique operational voids that occurred in international crises. To do this he embarked, from his first year in office, on a reorganization of the Secretariat at the senior level. He terminated the “double echelon” of Directors and Assistant Secretaries-General and replaced them, where possible, with a single level of Under-Secretaries, a total of seventeeen reporting directly to him.=

Hammarskjold also merged the Departments of Social Affairs and Economic Affairs, in the summer of 1954. From his statement to ECOSOC regarding this merger an insight can be gained into his view of the Secretariat.

I look towards a shift of emphasis away from certain of the existing information services and clearing-house activities; a more limited framework for the prosecution of the work requested of the Secretariat in order to bring it within the proper sphere of the Secretariat’s competence; the reconsideration of certain low- priority projects by the organs concerned; and the recognition of the specialized

31Lie, op. cit., p. 145. =As reported in United Nations Document A/C.5/728, Nov. 7, 1957.


agencies for particular tasks clearly withm their mandate. . . . These changes are designed to ensure closer integration of social and economic activities, stronger policy direction, greater coherence in internal programming, more logical grouping of functions and responsibilities, simplification of lines of authority, and staff economy.33

He added at the time that there seemed to be an advantage in maintaining a separate Technical Assistance Administration. Hammarskjold’s statement about an independent TAA is difEcult to interpret either as an espousal of the integrity of the TAA in which Secretary-General Lie believed or as a mere acknowledgment of an existing situation.34 His view of a highly integrated secretariat would not, however, preclude the possibility of an eventual amalgamation of TAA with other Secretariat units.

For several years, starting in 1951, the Advisory Committee had been advocating the consolidation of the independent departments of Econo- mic Affairs and Social Affairs and the TAA. After only a year’s operation of the Expanded Program, it raised the following questions :36

1. whether the continued operation of the Departments of Economic Affairs and Social Affairs is administratively sound and economical in view of the establishment of the TAA; and

2. whether an effective coordination of the activities of the three units as a whole can really be achieved within the existing structure.

Secretary-General Lie agreed to the amalgamation of the two substantive departments, but he maintained the belief that technical assistance operations would not become any more efficient by being consolidated with units of a different character.

The arguments for amalgamation became more pronounced in the Advisory Committee, although they found little support in the Fifth Com- mittee or the General Assembly. Moreover, it was known that within the Committee there were grave doubts about the advisability of the amalgamation proposals. Nevertheless, the Advisory Committee continued to press the new Secretary-General, as in its 1954 report statement: “the Committee trusts that within two years the Technical Assistance Adminis- tration will be amalgamated with Economic and Social Affairs.’’36 Again, in 1955, they commented that the Committee “anticipated the Secretary- General’s report on how the Technical Assistance Administration might be amalgamated.”37

In this regard, it should be noted that Hammarskjold was engaged in a continuous dispute with the Advisory Committee over his proposals for reorganization of the Secretariat’s senior level. The TAA was an impor-

33United Nations Document E/2598, Ma 13, 1954. 34Dr. Keenleyside related to the writer Eis belief that Hammarskjold did not feel

35United Nations Document A/1853, 1951. WJnited Nations Document A/2688, 1954. 37United Nations Document A/2921, 1955.

strongly about either the TAA’s independence or its amalgamation.

TI33 U.N. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION 19

tant point at issue, for it incorporated a double echelon of a Director- General and his Deputy, both at the present rank of Under-Secretary. Hammarskjdd had made no move to change this arrangement. The Advisory Committee espoused two somewhat contradictory views on the reorganization. It deplored the double echelon system and sought simpler lines of authority while it also opposed the large number of Under- Secretaries reporting directly to the Secretary-General. At the same time, the Advisory Committee was advocating a wider geographical distribution of top-level jobs and demanding the amalgamation of the TAA which would result in the loss of possibly two top-level jobs to allocate geographi~ally.~~

The Secretary-General could not ignore the pressures for amalgamation or the tensions within the Secretariat regarding technical assistance operations. He responded, in late 1955, to the Fifth Committee:*O

After renewed deliberation, I have reached the conclusion that, for the time being at least, a formal merger of TAA with the recently reorganized Depart- ment of Economic and Social Affairs would offer little, if any, advantage in terms of either administrative economy or, more importantly, of the more efficient and expeditious prosecution of technical assistance programs.

I am convinced, on the contrary, that any arrangement that would result in greatly enlarging the already extensive and complex responsibilities carried on by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs would be bound to create difficulties and delays to the detriment of technical assistance activities.

The Secretary-General saw the problem of improving the prosecution of technical assistance activities as involving greater integration between the functions of the substantive departments and the TAA and not as a con- fict of goals between the units, as a move toward amalgamation would have implied.*O

In an effort to attain a greater integration of the TAA and Economic and Social Affairs, the Secretary-General appointed a survey group composed of four senior members of his executive staff to study the question. They recommended the outposting of small staff units of the TAA to the secretariats of the regional economic commissions, in particular ECLA and ECAFE, that were maintained by Economic and Social Affairs. This, the Secretary-General contended to the Fifth Committee, would enable both units to be brought into closer relationship as well as to allow the regional commissions fuller access to the TAA’s The Advisory

3sThe vexatious nature of the Advisory Committee was well known throughout the U.N. See, for example, the less than sanguine comments in J. David Singer, Financing International Organization: The United Nations Budget Process, The Hague: Mar- tinus Nijhoff, 1961, pp. 96 ff.

Whited Nations Document A/3041, November 23, 1955. 4 O T h i g response corresponds with March and Simon’s “prediction” that the initial

reaction to intergroup conflict i s to see it as the need for greater coordination in problem-solving; see their Organizations, op. cit., pp. 129-131.

4lUnited Nations Document A/3041, November 23, 1955.


Committee, also reporting to the Fifth Committee on this matter, advised against the outposting of TAA staff on the grounds of possible delays in handling requests for aid and in recruiting and servicing experts. They noted that this might “parallel Economic and Social Affairs activities; and that recipients might still wish to deal with top TAA officers,” as was often the case then.-” As a rejoinder, the Advisory Committee noted that they were “still inclined to believe that the normal arrangement should be a merger of TAA with Economic and Social Affairs.” The Fifth Com- mittee finally gave limited approval to the outposting, but only on a trial basis of one year and only to the Latin American region (ECLA).

Senior TAA officials were opposed to the notion of outposting on the grounds that it would not only weaken a critically overloaded headquarters staff but also lead to administrative confusion. Walter Sharp’s field observations of this arrangement show that the TAA’s contentions were substantially correct.43 It proved to be a very expensive experiment and was discontinued in 1959.

In addition to the discussion of the outposting arrangement, the debate in the Fifth Committee also produced some forcible statements in opposi- tion to the Advisory Committee’s view on amalgamation of the TAA and the substantive departments. Representatives of the underdeveloped countries were especially vociferous in this regard. The strongest support for the Advisory Committee’s view came from the Soviet bloc countries; they held that the merger would result in considerable economies. How- ever, the Secretary-General possessed no such evidence of possible economies and, besides, the TAA had by that time pared its administrative costs to a remarkably low level.

Secretary-General Hammarskjold reported to the Fifth Committee some two years later, in November 1957, that he considered “strong reasons of principle and logic exist for an early integration of the technical assistance activities within the United Nations Se~retariat .”~~ He made this proposal to amalgamate the TAA and Economic and Social Affairs in conjunction with overall proposals for reorganizing the Secretariat’s senior level officers, for, with the dissolution of the TAA, two Under-Secretary posts would be eliminated out of five he hoped to delete. His reasons of “principle and logic” were never elaborated, although he was to use this phrase many times more in connection with the TAA amalgamation. Neither were the “practical considerations” which he stated would delay the amalgamation ever spelled out, although they were probably related to the disposition of the two top officers of the TAA. It is known that the Secretary-General had hoped to use the Director-General to launch the

42United Nations Document A/3050, December 2, 1955. 43Walter R. Sharp, Field Administration in the United Nations System, London:

44United Nations Document A/C.5/728, November 7, 1957. Stevens and Sons, 1961, pp. 277 fF.


proposed OPEX program but this project had not been approved. And elimination of the Deputy Director-General’s job posed the problem of losing a “Latin American post” and was bound to be debated hotly.

Two days before the Secretary-General made his proposal to the Fifth Committee, Dr. Keenleyside petitioned him to support the existing administrative framework. He put forward the following arguments:

Amalgamation would not result in any appreciable savings, it would invite difficulties with the regional economic commissions, it would lower the level of contact with Governments, it would adversely affect the morale of our present staff, it would not result in any closer or more harmonious relationship with the Economic Affairs staff than presently exists, and, especially in light of immediate financial prospects of the Expanded Program, it might be widely interpreted as a downgrading of the whole technical assistance program of the

He also told the Secretary-General that he was not opposed to the deletion of the post of Deputy Director-General of the TAA and would resign if it would ease Hammarskjolds position in respect to the Latin American incumbent in the Deputy’s post.

In the normal course of things, the Advisory Committee received the Secretary-General’s pledge of merger of the TAA in order to review it for the Fifth Committee. The Committee’s reaction was mild in comparison to previous statements; it confined itself to noting receipt of the report?6

When both reports were received by the Fifth Committee, spirited discussions on the amalgamation arose. Meetings covering two days, December 10-11, 1957, concentrated on the TAA merger, although the meetings were originally convened to consider the overall reorganization of the Secretariat’s senior level. Delegates to the Fifth Committee had been expertly canvassed, on the one hand by officers of Economic and Social Affairs who approved the merger, and on the other hand by a senior officer of the TAA who had presented his resignation to the Secretary-General?’ Thus the Committee members came prepared to examine the proposal with critical eyes.

For the most part, the argument against the amalgamation was led by representatives of the underdeveloped countries, particularly the Latin American nations. In essence, their arguments were that, if Economic and Social Affairs were already beset with a heavy workload, it seemed unreasonable to add further burdens, that two units with essentially dis- similar functions should not be amalgamated, that no considerable saving would be made, and that the whole technical assistance program might

United Nati0m.45

45Letter from H. L. Keenleyside to Dag Hammarskjold, Nov. 6, 1957. 46United Nations Document A/3762, December 3,1957. 47Presumably, although there is no verification, this man was the Deputy Director-

General of the TAA; the indication is that he thorou hly briefed the Latin Americans at least, for they used arguments identical to those ffat had emanated from the TAA on previous occasions.


be downgraded by this move.4* The proponents, primarily the Soviet bloc at this time, stressed the greater efficiency of effort from amalgamated departments and the savings from the several posts that would be eliminated. Sweden, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States seemed to see some merit in the merger but did not press the matter at the time. Hence, the decision taken by the Fifth Committee consisted in postponing the matter for another year. The vote to postpone was 45 to 2, with 16 abstentions.

Following deferral of action on the merger, the Director-General of the TAA made two tactical moves in an effort to stave off the merger entirely, First, he approached the Under-Secretary of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs to discuss the differing views affecting their units. His hope is summed up in a few sentences of his memorandum: Having studied any such ideas we might find that even under present circumstances we could do some or all of the things that they think of as benefits to be derived only from amalgamation. An objective study might also make it possible for us to agree on a joint submission for the consideration of the Secretary-General.4B

No apparent success followed upon these discussions. Then he approached the Secretary-General directly with a compromise proposal. He suggested that the Public Administration Division of the TAA be transferred to some other department so that TAA could confine itself exclusively to operations activities.w This move was prompted in part by the recognized contradiction of mixing operational and substantive functions which the TAA had once used in its own defence. But Dr. Keenleyside felt able to commend his suggestion on the following grounds as well:

By taking this step you would satisfy those governments that have argued against amalgamation by recognizing the strength of, and accepting in part, their views; you would offer some satisfaction to the Russians and the British; and you would be working on a perfectly sound basis of logic and principle- the clear definition and appropriate division of function. As far as TAA is concerned we would be streamlined for our proper task yet the esprit de corps of the staff-which is a very real thing-would not be adversely affected.

The Secretary-General reported to the Fifth Committee in October 1958 that “the time has come for the establishment of a un6ed department.”jl The advantages would be, he claimed, a lightening of administrative machinery, a reduction in the volume of correspondence, and a simplification of substantive staff used in field assignments. Technical assistance activities were not to be submerged; a “clearly identifiable entity” would be preserved under a Commissioner for Technical Assis- tance. A bureau of Technical Assistance Operations would be established

@United Nations Document A/C.5/SR.641, 642, December 12, 13, 1957. 4BLetter from H. L. Keenleyside to Philip DeSeynes, Dee. 12, 1957. MMemorandum from H. L. Keenleyside to Dag Hammarskjold, January 6, 1958. 5lUnited Nations Document A/C.5/752, October 16, 1958.

THE U.N. TECHNICAL ASSISTAN(=E ADMINISTRATION 23

in the enlarged department of Economic and Social Affairs to be run by a Director under the Commissioner. In addition, a Planning Board of senior officers would be established to coordinate policies for technical assistance activities. The Advisory Committee now supported the Secretary- General and recommended approval to the Fifth Committee.62 The Advi- sory Committee in reaching this decision had submitted a series of questions to the Secretary-General on the merger. The answers he supplied to the Committee avoided much commitment on matters of economy or even of efficiency; the Secretary-General implied that the move is rather a new alternative to administering U.N. technical assistance activities and not just a remedy of past administrative ills.68

Although by no means wholly of one mind, the Fifth Committee voted to approve the Secretary-General’s plan for unifying the TAA and the Economic and Social Affairs Departments.s4 The vote was 33 to 0, with 26 abstentions. On January 31, 1959, the TAA ceased to exist.

Aftermath Upon the dissolution of the TAA, its substantive activities in the field

of public administration were transferred to a new Office for Public Administration. The former Director-General of the TAA was put in charge of this OfEice with the rank of Under-Secretary. The Primary activities, besides the substantive servicing of public administration experts in the field, consisted of inaugurating the recently approved program for supplying personnel to fill high-level executive and operational tasks (OPEX). Dr. Keenleyside had “fathered” this program, in many respects, so it is natural that he should head this unit from the outset.

After one year, the Office for Public Administration was downgraded in status but not in function to a Division within Economic and Social Affairs. The move coincided with Dr. Keenleyside’s resignation from the United Nations in order to take a position in Canada. The Latin American post that was lost with the deletion of the Deputy Director-General’s job in the TAA was retrieved by giving the new post of Commissioner of Technical Assistance to a Latin American.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE DEMISE OF THE TAA

While this paper traces the growth of an organization within the United Nations, the United Nations itself over the same period was growing and changing rapidly. It was striving to sustain and crystallize its image in the eyes of the world. It suffered similar growing pains as a parent to those of its offspring, the Technical Assistance Administration.

Whited Nations Document A/4038, December 8, 1958. 53See also his comments in United Nations Document A/C.5/167, November 20,

54United Nations Document A/4070, December 11,1958. 1958.


Undoubtedly, this considerably aggravated the organizational environment into which the T,4A was launched. It was, indeed, not an environment that could offer the possibility of a quiet evolution of function for a new organization. It was, first of all, an environment of Secretariat units concerned with protecting their vested interests and fearful of administrative empire-building by a new and distinctly operational unit in their midst. Heretofore, the strictly projects agencies of the United Nations, such as UNRAA, had been almost entirely field operations. Second, it was an environment of successful, independent specialized agencies, which were likely to be unsure of a unit with such diffuse responsibilities as the TAA. Third, it was a highly demanding environment in terms of the fond hopes held out for the Expanded Program. For this was an undertaking on which many eloquent words had been expended but for which there was little or no practical precedent.

That the TAA gained even a small foothold in this environment is perhaps remarkable. Its failure to thrive for long may be due to a number of reasons, not the least of which revolve around the dynamic concept of the United Nations and its Secretariat evolved by Dag Hammarskjold. As Walter Sharp has so well summarized this trend, it has meant an expansion of United Nations administration further afield, a magnifica- tion of the importance of headquarters-field relationships, a complication of staffing and budgetary problems, and the need for considerable internal reorganizati~n.~~ In other words, it can be fairly asked whether the TAA would be an appropriate unit through which to manage United Nations technical assistance activities today and in the future, given these trends. Could the TAA, as it was structured and related to other units, be effective in the kind of highly integrated task-force approach to international problem-solving that seems to have characterized the approach of the Secretary-General in recent years?

Furthermore, the nature of technical assistance itself tends to militate against any organization attaining a distinctive competence in the field. Such international aid has a cumulative quality with seemingly limitless dimensions. As technical assistance grows in volume so does its demand for research and fact-finding activities and for program planning. As other facets of economic developments are introduced into the picture-capital investment, technical assistance, community development, political development-the need for an integrated approach to international aid is warranted. The TAA may have been part of a necessary but passing phase in international aid. It certainly did much to promote a good image for the United Nations in dark days, and for this if nothing else it deserves to be remembered.

5jWalter R. Sharp, “Trends in United Nations Administration,” International Orga- nization, 15 (Summer 196l), 393-407.

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