THE ROHINGYA: Calcutta and Brookings Institution Project ... · regard for the homogeneity of...

Forced Migration in the South Asian Region: Displacement, Human Rights and Conflict ResolutionSunday, 27 April 2008 09:31 -

THE ROHINGYA:FORCED MIGRATION AND STATELESSNESSChris Lewa[i],

Paper submitted for publication in a book edited by Omprakash Mishra on "ForcedMigration in South Asian Region", Centre for Refugee studies Jadavpur University,Calcutta and Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement.

28th February 2001In the eyes of the media and the general public, whether in Bangladesh orfurther afield, the situation of the Rohingya from Burma [ii] is usuallyreferred to as a “refugee problem”. Over the last two decades, Bangladesh has born the bruntof two mass exoduses, each of more then 200,000 people, placing them among the largest inAsia. Each of these massive outflows of refugees was followed by mass repatriation to Burma. Repatriation has been considered the preferred solution to the refugee crisis. However, this hasnot proved a durable solution, since the influx of Rohingyas over international borders has neverceased. And it is unlikely that it will stop, so long as the root causes of this unprecedentedexodus are not effectively remedied. The international community has often focussed itsattention on the deplorable conditions in the refugee camps in Bangladesh, rather than on theroot causes of the problem, namely the denial of legal status and other basic human rights tothe Rohingya in Burma. This approach doubtless stems from the practical difficulty ofconfronting an intractable military regime which refuses to recognise the Rohingya as citizens ofBurma, and of working out solutions acceptable to all parties involved. The actual plight andcontinuous exodus of the Rohingya people has been rendered invisible. Though they continueto cross international borders, they are also denied the right of asylum, being labelled“economic migrants”. The international community has preferred to ignore the extent of thismassive forced migration, which has affected not only Bangladesh, but also other countriessuch as Pakistan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, etc. Images Asia, Thailand

This paper attempts to examine the root causes as well as theextent of the forced migration of the Rohingya people fromBurma, the “refugee problem” being only the visible part of thisexodus. In order to understand the dynamics of the Rohingyaissue, this paper first touches on the geopolitical position ofArakan and the historical origin of the underlying situation. Itthereafter studies the context in which forced displacement hasand is still taking place -- i.e. the policies implemented by theBurmese government towards the Rohingyas -- and looks at the

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http://burmalibrary.org/docs/Rohingya.F-M&Statelessness.htm#_edn2


problem of statelessness which is a central factor of their flight. It then highlights the consequences of these policies, and theextent of the out-migration of Rohingyas throughout the region. Finally, it analyses the international community’s response andthe role of UNHCR.

Historical background Arakan, now incorporated into Burma, finds itself at thecrossroads of two continental entities, South Asia andSouth-East Asia -- between Buddhist Asia and Muslim-HinduAsia and between the Mongoloid and the Indo-Aryan races. The border between Bangladesh and Burma was delimitedarbitrarily, carved out by the British colonial power with littleregard for the homogeneity of cultural groups. Geographically,the whole Arakan region is cut off from the rest of Burma by amountain range, the Arakan Yoma, which has also acted as anatural obstacle to permanent settlement by people from India.“These geographical facts explain the separate historicaldevelopment of that area [...] until it was conquered by theBurmese Kingdom at the close of the eighteenth century” asMoshe Yegar says. [iii] At the intersection of two worlds, thegeopolitical position of Arakan has retained a strategicimportance throughout history. Arakanwas an independent kingdom until 1784, encompassing attimes the southern part of today’s Bangladesh, and was famousas a land of economic opportunities, on the shipping routesbetween Asia and the Persian Gulf. Since early historical times,Arakan has been inhabited by the Rakhine people, believed tobe a mixture of an indigenous Hindu group and the Mongols

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who invaded in the ninth century. The Rakhine people today areBuddhist and speak a language often considered as a dialect ofBurmese. They constitute the ethnic majority in Arakan. Both the Chittagong region of south-eastern Bangladesh andthe neighbouring Arakan region came into contact with MuslimArab merchants in the 9th Century. The Rohingyas, as anethnically distinct group, claim to be descendants of those firstMuslims, and were racially mixed with Bengalis, Persians,Moghuls, Turks and Pathans who came to the area later.[iv]Persian was the main language of the Rakhine court until thelate eighteenth century. They share many similarities inlanguage, customs, and religion with the Chittagonian Bengalis,and constitute an ethnic minority in Arakan, mostlyconcentrated in the northern part bordering Bangladesh. Under British colonial rule, during the 19th Century and untilBurma Independence in 1948, there was a massive immigrationof male workers to Arakan, many of whom came from theChittagong area as seasonal agricultural workers. Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists have thus co-existedin the region for many centuries. Until World War II, the twocommunities did not show any sign of strong animosity. However, in 1942, the Japanese conquest sparked the flight ofthousands of Indians from Central Burma trying to reach BritishIndia via Arakan, and at the same time the evacuation of theBritish from Arakan created a political vacuum which gave roomfor the accumulated tensions to explode. Communal riots broke

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out in Arakan between Rakhine Buddhists and RohingyaMuslims. During the Japanese occupation of Burma, theRohingyas remained loyal to the British. In 1947 someRohingya leaders approached President Jinnah of thenewly-created Pakistan and requested him to incorporatenorthern Arakan into East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). It wasundoubtedly this move more than any other which determinedthe present-day governmental attitude towards the Rohingyas:they had threatened Burma's territorial integrity in the eve ofindependence and could never be trusted again[v]. After Independence, some Rohingya leaders formed aMujahid movement and demanded autonomy. The Rohingyas’ claim to be an ethnic group of Burma wasnevertheless recognised by the democratic government of U Nuin the 1950s, though most observers consider this movepolitically motivated. However it has been denied consistentlyfollowing the military take-over in 1962[vi]. Since that time, the Rohingyas have become subject torestrictions and harsh treatment by the state authoritiesdesigned to encourage them to leave the country. At the end of 1977, the Burmese government launched anoperation called Nagamin (Dragon King) aimed at curtailingillegal infiltration into Burma. While the program wasnation-wide, in Arakan it degenerated into brutal attacks onRohingyas by both the army and local Rakhines. Thisprecipitated a mass exodus of Rohingyas out of Arakan, and by

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May 1978, over 200,000 Rohingyas had fled to Bangladesh.Within 16 months, they were repatriated under a bilateralagreement between the Governments of Bangladesh andBurma. Subsequently in 1982, the military junta enacted amendmentsto the Citizenship Law, clearly targetting the Rohingyas andmaking it almost impossible for them to be recognised ascitizens. Neglect by the central government in Arakan was marked by alack of development projects, and exacerbated by the absenceof planning to integrate the refugees who returned in 1978 and1979, many of whom remained landless and withoutdocumentation[vii]. Surprisingly, the Rohingyas were not only allowed to vote in theMay 1990 elections but were represented by two parties whichcaptured 80 percent of the votes cast in their constituencies. By 1991, the government needed a scapegoat, a distraction orcommon enemy to unite a populace disillusioned and angry atthe regime’s failure to implement the election results. Theychose the Rohingyas[viii]. Forced labour, rape and summary executions followed adramatic increase in the army presence in northern ArakanState and caused a new mass exodus of Rohingyas to

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Bangladesh. By March 1992 over 270,000 refugees werescattered in camps along the Cox's Bazar/Tefnak region ofBangladesh. However, to justify the military build-up in Maungdaw andButhidaung, the SLORC gave another reason: Rohingyainsurgents. The insurgents, they claimed, were Islamic"extremists" who had been stirring up the localpopulation, making them leave and then telling lies to theinternational press in order to encourage Islamic countries tosupport the rebels.[ix] While the Rohingya insurgencies have a long history, they donot appear to have much support from the local Rohingyapeople they claim to represent. In 1991, "impartialobservers" said that they only had a combined strength of800 men[x]. Predictably, the military regime first denied there were anyproblems in Arakan State at all, and later consistentlyunderplayed the scale of the problem. However, in April 1992, following a move by Bangladesh to takethe matter of the refugees and the Burmese military build-upalong the border to the Security Council, a UN Envoy, SwedishAmbassador Jan Eliasson, was sent to the region. The result ofhis mediation was that Burma agreed to the repatriation ofthose "Myanmar residents" who wished to return"to their homes".

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[xi] The two Governments called on UNHCR to assist in therepatriation process which would "facilitate the reductionof international concern". That the SLORC still did not recognise the Rohingyas asBurmese citizens is clear from a statement in December 1992,by then Minister for Foreign Affairs, U Ohn Gyawto the UN Special Rapporteurthat: "it is a rubbish thing that people have left Myanmar.These people who are in the refugee camps in Bangladesh areperhaps from Dhaka, but not one single person has leftBurma."[xii] The Context of Displacement: The Policiesof the Burmese Government Since Burmese Independence in 1948, the Rohingyas havehad a history of exodus and forced migration, resulting from thepolicies of exclusion imposed on them by successive Burmesegovernments. These policies have acted as push-factors forforced migration to other countries whether as refugees ormigrants. They can be summarised as follows: 1) Denial ofcitizenship: Lt-Gen. Khin Nyunt, Secretary-1 of the State Peace and

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Development Council, stated in a letter to former UN HighCommissioner for Refugees, Mrs Sadako Ogata, that: “Suffice itto say that the issue is essentially one of migration, of peopleseeking greener pastures. These people are not originally fromMyanmar but have illegally migrated to Myanmar because ofpopulation pressures in their own country. … They are racially,ethnically, culturally different from the other national races inour country.”[xiii] However, an historical analysis of the settlement pattern of theRohingya people in Northern Arakan reveals that nationalityrights are for most of them a legitimate aspiration. Followingamendments in the Citizenship Act in 1982, they foundthemselves deprived of the rights inherent to citizenship. Theirpresent legal status amounts, in international law, to de factostatelessness. Burma’s 1982 Citizenship Law was promulgated shortly afterthe Rohingya refugees of 1978 were repatriated, and wasclearly designed to exclude them from citizenship rights. ThisLaw distinguishes between three categories of citizens: fullcitizens, associate citizens, and naturalised citizens. Fullcitizens are those belonging to one of 135 “national races”among which the Rohingyas do not feature, or those whoseancestors settled in the country before 1823, the start of theBritish colonisation of Arakan. Very few could be includedunder any of these categories, due not only to their individualhistories, but also to the difficulty of providing evidence.

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[xiv] After UNHCR’s intervention in the mid-1990s, the vast majorityof Rohingya were only granted a temporary registration card,which clearly states that it does not constitute evidence ofcitizenship. Their status as foreigners restricts their freedom ofmovement, their right to education, health, employment in thecivil service, and land ownership. Citizenship, or nationality, is a fundamental human right thatfacilitates the ability to exercise other human rights. Burma,however, continues to treat the Rohingya as foreign residents,on the basis of their ethnic origin. The Rohingyas’ lack ofcitizenship, being integral to the discrimination and humanrights abuses they suffer, lies at the heart of why they fled toother countries and why most cannot return to Burma. According to Human Rights Watch, “[w]here an entire group isarbitrarily denied this basic right on the basis of ethnicity, thisconstitutes discrimination rising to the level of persecution”[xv]. 2) Restrictions on freedom of movement: As a direct consequence of the denial of legal status,Rohingyas in Northern Arakan are not granted the samefreedom of movement as other citizens/residents of Burma,regardless of their documentation. They are virtually confinedto their village tracts. In order to travel to a different area, they

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need a pass from several levels of authorities, which they haveto pay for. Restrictions on movement also have directeconomic implications for the community. Most cannot affordregular travel permits, and for others, the burdensomeprocedure limits their access to health facilities, to highereducation, to employment opportunities, and to markets. Thelack of mobility also results in obstacles to trade, reducing therange of goods available and thus increasing the costs of basiccommodities. 3) Forced labour: Although forced labour is a nation-wide practice, Rohingyashave been especially targeted for compulsory labour in theconstruction and maintenance of military camps, portering forthe army, on military-owned shrimp farms and plantations, inthe establishment of villages for new settlers, etc. The amountof work largely depends on the proximity of the differentauthorities and their resulting needs, as well as on governmentdevelopment projects. However, exaction of labour for roadbuilding purposes decreased somewhat after UN agenciesbecame involved in road building. Since the demand for labouris often uncoordinated among the various authorities, theaccumulation of work can reach up to 12 days a month, withdisastrous consequences for the economic survival of thepoorer strata of the community, who rely on a hand-to-mouthexistence. Compulsory labour is very rarely paid. Moreover,the labourers are often at risk of abuses by the soldiers if theydo not perform their assignment in a satisfactory manner.

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4) Land confiscation and forced relocation: In Arakan, land confiscation and forced relocation are generallyto provide land for the building or expansion of military camps,the construction of Buddhist religious edifices, and for theimplantation of “model villages” for new Buddhist settlers fromothers parts of Arakan State, Yangon, and even fromBangladesh[xvi]. The establishment of “model villages” to resettle RakhineBuddhists onto Muslim land has been ongoing since the 1950s. It is a policy of demographic engineering designed to alter theethnic composition of the region, specifically to dilute theRohingya ethnicity. By 1997, 100 such new villages werecreated. In 1999, another 15 were established, while existingones are being extended. After having their land confiscatedwithout compensation, Rohingya farmers are compelled to buildhouses for the new settlers. Not only land confiscation, but alsoforced labour is directly related to these programmes, whichespecially affect small landowners, and contribute tolandlessness. The letter from Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt to Ms Sadako Ogata alsostated: “At the same time, these people, by using all sorts ofmeans including violence, had driven away the Rakhine peoplewho were previously living in those areas. To cite an example,

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Buthidaung and Maungdaw were previously inhabited byRakhines, but now the population of these townships iscomposed almost entirely of people from outside.” TheGovernment discourse seems to legitimise such policies byinvoking the communal violence of 1942. 5) Compulsory contributions and informal taxes: Compulsory food procurement, extortion and arbitrary taxationare common practices and have serious consequences for theeconomic viability of the community. These informal taxes canrange from vegetable and poultry taxes to cattle registrationfees. Moreover, a private brokerage system has been institutedwhereby licences for fishing, woodcutting or prawn breedinghave to be obtained at high cost. This does not include themultitude of ad-hoc donations to be made to the authorities inkind or in cash[xvii]. 6) Government control on rice production and trade: The rice tax, based on a pre-set quota of baskets per acrerather than on yield, is especially burdensome for small farmersand can represent up to 40% of their paddy production. Moreover, a general rice deficit in Northern Arakan combinedwith tight restrictions on imports has resulted in high rice prices,nearly double those of the state capital Sittwe. Government

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control on rice production as well as on trade has promptedfood shortages and is another reason for the exodus of peopleto Bangladesh[xviii]. 7) General neglect in providing public services: Apart from the restrictions faced by the Rohingyas in accessingeducation and health services, there is a general neglect of thefacilities available. Rohingya children are generally allowed toattend primary schools, but secondary education is reserved forcitizens only. Health care is almost non-existent outside thetowns and large villages. UNHCR has attempted to improvethe educational and health delivery system by rehabilitatinggovernment-run schools and health centres, and providingtraining to teachers and health workers. However, obstacleswere encountered as Rohingyas cannot apply for anygovernment posts, and there are very few Muslim teachers andhealth staff. The majority are Rakhine. In principle, there areenough trained teachers and health personnel, but it provesdifficult to attract Rakhines to isolated, rural areas dominated byRohingyas. Some of the newly built facilities therefore remainunused[xix]. The realities in which the Rohingyas live in Arakan are a resultof the policies listed above, and demonstrate that there is no

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willingness on the part of the Burmese government to recogniseand integrate this population. As long as these policies remainin place, any attempt at development of these communities isbound to fail, and the cycle of exodus will not be stemmed. Consequences of Exclusion These policies have led to dramatic forced migrations by theRohingyas, especially from the lower socio-economic strata ofthe population, from Arakan to other countries. Bangladesh hasbeen the principal country affected, and has to bear the mainburden of this exodus. These forced migrations over severaldecades can be viewed in two categories, even though theyhave identical root causes: (1) highly visible refugeemovements, which have prompted programmes of repatriation,and (2) massive irregular migrations, which remain invisible andare generally not even acknowledged. The visible – the “refugees”: At the height of the two outflows, the refugee movementnumbered over 200,000, both in 1978 and 1991/92. Thisrepresents between a quarter and a third of the total currentRohingya population of northern Arakan. These forcedmigrations across an international border became recognisedas “refugee flows” because they were mass exoduses triggeredby specific operations conducted by the Burmese militaryregime: the Nagamin operation in 1978; and the sudden militarybuild-up of 1991/92. These led to gross human rights abuses,which spread fear and rumours. Because of their sudden and

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large-scale nature, the Bangladesh government could notignore these influxes, and lacking adequate resources, wascompelled to appeal for assistance to the internationalcommunity. These two refugee situations promptedprogrammes of repatriation, negotiated under bilateralagreements between the governments of Bangladesh andBurma, the latter repatriation under the supervision of UNHCR.However, the voluntary character of such programmes wasseriously put into question. Since basic conditions which wouldguarantee a safe return were not achieved, these solutionshave proved not to be durable. Moreover, about 22,000refugees remain today in two camps in Cox’s Bazar district. The invisible – the “illegal migrants”: However, the mass refugee movements were preceded,accompanied and followed by even larger flows of irregularmigration whose extent is unknown, but which could be as highas one million individuals[xx]. This invisible exodus has primarily affected Bangladesh. Estimates of the number of those undocumented Rohingyas inBangladesh, often referred to as “new arrivals” (although not allare new in the strict sense of the term), vary between 100,000according to UNHCR, to 250,000 as reported in the Bangladeshpress[xxi]. Even though the reason for their flight is in most casesidentical to those recognised as refugees, and took place undersimilar conditions, they have been labelled as “economic

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migrants”, and have been denied any form of protection orhumanitarian assistance. Moreover, an equally massive forced migration took place toPakistan, especially in and around Karachi. In a report datedMarch 1994, the Sindh police[xxii]estimated the number of illegal Burmese living in and aroundKarachi in 1993 at around 200,000, an increase of 700% fromtheir previous survey of 1988. The police records also indicatethat Burmese (who are all Rohingyas) comprise 14%, andBangladeshis 80%, of the total undocumented immigrantpopulation in Karachi.[xxiii] However, the real number of Rohingyas in Karachi is likely tobe much higher since many of them would conceal their originto the police in fear of deportation to Burma. Rohingyacommunity leaders in Karachi speak of a total Rohingyapopulation of over 300,000. The Rohingya population inPakistan is mostly concentrated in the suburbs of Karachi,including Korangi, Orangi and Landhi. In these areas, thenames of some of the Rohingya settlements reflect themigrants’ place of origin, for example, “Arakanabad”, “BurmiColony”, “Arakan Colony”[xxiv]. The migratory movement of Rohingya Muslims to Pakistanstarted in the ‘50s, but took off in the early ‘60s when themilitary grabbed power in Burma. Since then, there have been

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two major increases of population in the settlements of Karachi,in the late ‘70s and the early ‘90s, which are clearly linked to thetwo mass influxes of refugees into Bangladesh. At present theflow of newcomers seems to have slowed down, but stillcontinues. Most of those have transited through Bangladesh,and been smuggled or trafficked across the Indiansubcontinent. About 8,000 Rohingyas fled to Malaysia, mostly at the time ofthe mass refugee exodus to Bangladesh in 1991/92. Althoughmany applied for asylum, they were not accepted as refugeesfleeing persecution, but considered as aliens subject todetention and deportation. Since the Burmese governmentrefuses to take them back, they are usually deported toThailand. They were informally tolerated in the early 1990s, buttheir situation has deteriorated significantly in recent years[xxv]. In India, their number is unknown. In addition, Rohingyaleaders claim that there are about 50,000 Rohingyas in theUnited Arab Emirates, and that another 2-300,000 Rohingyashave migrated to Saudi Arabia, especially to Jeddah andMedina. These irregular migrants include those who did not settle in therefugee camps at the height of the influx, those who weredenied access to the camps after the repatriation started, andthose who continue to trickle out of Burma. They haveremained invisible because being stateless, they are afraid of

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deportation and do not wish to draw attention to themselves.Their invisibility is increased by the failure of the internationalcommunity to recognise their status and provide them with theinternational protection to which, as stateless persons, they areentitled[xxvi]. However, it should be noted that many of the countries to whichthey migrated have managed to some extent to absorb theinflux. Although they have not been provided with any legalprotection, they have often been tolerated on humanitariangrounds. They usually provide cheap labour, sometimes insituations tantamount to slavery. Because of their conditions ofstatelessness, the Rohingya migrant population has avoideddrawing attention to their plight and has tried to keep invisible. However, the political circumstances prevailing in the hostcountries put them at risk. Rumours of official crackdownscirculate regularly, and many Rohingyas are held indefinitely injails in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and most likely other countries,after serving their terms for illegal entry. Therefore, we can saythat this migratory movement has been largely ignored and hasgenerally not even been acknowledged. Response by the international community The two highly visible refugee movements triggered aresponse by the international community, and the adoptedsolution was repatriation to Burma. However, this response did

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not provide any durable solution and, as the continuousirregular migration indicates, it has only helped to conceal thepredicament. Following the implementation of theseprogrammes, considerable pressure was put on the refugees torepatriate, even though basic conditions for safe return had notbeen achieved and the fundamental situation in Burma had notimproved. In both cases, the Burmese government feltcompelled to take back the refugees under external pressure. However, by accepting them back, it has also implicitlyrecognised them as having a genuine and effective link withMyanmar, therefore making void its claim that the Rohingyasare illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. In 1978,the repatriation was negotiated under a bilateral agreementbetween Bangladesh and Myanmar governments. Theexercise took place with a good deal of coercion to the refugeesto return and within 16 months, the repatriation was concluded.UNHCR was involved in the camps providing humanitarianassistance but did not play any active role of protection in therepatriation itself. In 1991, the Bangladesh government initially accepted the newmass influx of Rohingya refugees, seeing it as a short-termproblem. In April 1992, the two governments again signed abilateral Memorandum of Understanding for repatriation. Basedon that agreement, 50,000 Rohingya refugees were repatriated,most of them forcibly and without UNHCR supervision. UNHCRhad started providing assistance in the refugee camps but theagency withdrew in December 1992, in protest against theforcible return. In May 1993, Bangladesh agreed to UNHCR’sinvolvement in the registration of volunteers for repatriation, and

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in November 1993, UNHCR signed another agreement withMyanmar to establish a presence in the returnees’ areas inArakan. The monitoring role of UNHCR However, after gaining access to Arakan, the UNHCRabandoned the system of individual interviews in favour of amass registration programme in which thousands of Rohingyasreturned each week. At that time, NGOs providing services inthe refugee camps questioned the voluntary nature of therepatriation programme [xxvii] . A majority of the refugees whorepatriated did so under intimidation or with insufficientinformation. UNHCR's monitoring role in Burma should beassessed against this backdrop.

The UNHCR monitoring programme in northern Arakan Statewas intended to ensure "... through a continuous dialoguewith the Burmese authorities, that the basic rights of returneesare respected", and to "... provide socio-economicinterventions to stabilise the population and provide a basis forongoing reintegration and development" [xxviii] .

However, some factors hampered the ability of UNHCR to carryout an effective monitoring programme. Important protectionissues such as denial of citizenship, compulsory labour, forciblerelocations, and restrictions on freedom of movement were notplaced in the context of the nation-wide human rights situationin Burma. Under these circumstances, notwithstandingUNHCR’s public statements about "unhindered access to

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returnees" who are able to freely "approach theUNHCR offices ... to discuss any issue, problems orconcerns", the agency could not fulfil its mandatesuccessfully [xxix] .

Moreover, the presence of UNHCR in Arakan State has beenhaving a negative influence on the protection of Rohingyaasylum-seekers in Bangladesh. Soon after UNHCR gainedaccess to the Burmese side of the border, new Rohingyaarrivals were no longer allowed to take shelter in the existingrefugee camps in Cox’s Bazar District. The UNHCR has neverstrongly challenged the restrictive policies of the Bangladeshgovernment in labelling all Rohingya newcomers as “economicmigrants”. The claim to protection of new asylum-seekers inBangladesh has been secondary to the goal of maintaining themomentum of repatriation, and this has deliberately kept therelentless outflow of Rohingya out of Burma invisible [xxx] .

The other major objective of the UNHCR presence in Myanmarwas to anchor the population and prevent a future exodus.However, this proved difficult to accomplish in view of social,economic and political factors beyond the control of UNHCR. Inspite of positive intervention by the World Food Program andNGOs, the root causes of the exodus have not been eliminated.A serious constraint to reintegration and development isundoubtedly the lack of willingness on the part of the

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government of Myanmar to improve the conditions of theRohingyas. [xxxi]

The assessment of other international actors UNHCR’s assessment of the situation in Arakan appears tocontradict those of other international actors. The UN SpecialRapporteur on Myanmar, the International Labour Organisation,the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance and the USState Department, among others, – have adopted a humanrights approach. Their reports have focussed on the humanrights situation in Burma, which resulted in forced migration ofthe Rohingyas. The UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmarstated in his report to the 2000 UN Commission of HumanRights that: “As an ethnic group, it is said that the Rohingyascontinue to suffer from the consequences of discrimination andgross abuses” and they are denied citizenship.[xxxii]More recently, his report to the General Assembly refers to thesituation in Arakan: “The Special Rapporteur has at the lastmoment also received reports of, among other complaints, anumber of killings, rapes, disappearances, forced labour, forcedrelocation and extortion by members of the border securityforce (Na Sa Ka) and SPDC soldiers in Arakan state”[xxxiii]. In July 1998, the ILO Commission of Inquiry on labour practicesin Burma declared: “Finally, the situation in the northern part ofRakhine State appears to be more severe in all respects thanthat prevailing in most other parts of the country. Most of the

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witnesses questioned on this subject, who were members of theRohingya ethnic group, and who had left the country veryrecently, claimed to have been subjected to systematicdiscrimination by the authorities; the discrimination took theform, in so far as work on the roads is concerned, of anoverwhelming workload. […]Working conditions are excessivelyarduous; tasks must be performed in an atmosphere whereinsults, abuse, ill-treatment and torture are commonplace.”[xxxiv] The 2000 report of the US Department of State has listed‘severe legal, economic, and social discrimination’ against theminority Rohingya community. The report agrees with theassessment that the 21,000 Rohingya Muslims in Bangladeshcamps could be subjected to human rights abuses, includingreligious persecution, on their return. In fact, returnees have“complained of severe government restrictions on their ability totravel and to engage in economic activity.”[xxxv] Conclusion

If human rights abuses are the cause for departure, respect forhuman rights must be the basis for return [xxxvi] . The solutionto the Rohingya problems lies in changing the policies of theBurmese Government that lead to human rights violations. Inthe event that a democratic government would replace thecurrent military dictatorship, there is no guarantee that policies

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towards the Rohingya will be positively affected. The RakhineBuddhist population as well as the pro-democratic opposition inBurma is not favourably disposed toward recognising thedistinct ethnic identity of the Rohingyas. Until policies thateradicate their statelessness and respect their fundamentalhuman rights are put in place, many Rohingyas will continue toseek protection abroad. Until then too, Bangladesh and othercountries in the region will have to bear the burden of theexodus. Under these conditions, assistance and protection tothe unfortunate victims of forced migration is both a moral andlegal obligation of the international community and theneighbouring states.

NOTES

[i] The author is thankful to David Arnott, Director of the BurmaPeace Foundation, for his comments and suggestions.

[ii] In this paper, Burma and Myanmar have been usedinterchangeably.

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http://burmalibrary.org/docs/Rohingya.F-M&Statelessness.htm#_ednref2


[iii] Moshe Yegar, The Muslims of Burma: A Study of a MinorityGroup, 1972.

[iv] Human Rights Watch, “The Rohingya Muslims: Ending aCycle of Exodus?”, Sep 1996.

[v] Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics ofEthnicity, Zed Books 1991. [vi] Martin Smith, Burma:Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, Zed Books 1991.

[vii] Human Rights Watch, “The Rohingya Muslims: Ending aCycle of Exodus?”, Sep 1996.

[viii] Bertil Lintner, “Diversionary Tactics: Anti-Muslimcampaign seen as effort to rally Burmans”, Far EasternEconomic Review (Hong Kong), 29 August 1991.

[ix] Human Rights Watch, “The Rohingya Muslims: Ending aCycle of Exodus?”, 1996.

[x] Bertil Lintner, "Diversionary Tactics...." FarEastern Economic Review, 29 August 1991.

[xi] Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of Bangladeshand Myanmar Issued at the Conclusion of the Official Visit of

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the Myanmar Foreign Minister to Bangladesh from 23 - 28 April,1992.

[xii] UN document E/CN.4/1993/37, para 41.

[xiii] Letter from Lt Gen Khin Nyunt, Secretary 1 of SPDC toMrs Sadako Ogata dated 5 February 1998.

[xiv] For a full discussion, see Human Rights Watch, “TheRohingya Muslims: Ending a cycle of Exodus?”, 1996.

[xv] Human Rights Watch, “Living in a Limbo, BurmeseRohingyas in Malaysia”, July 2000.

[xvi] The Rakhines, and their ethnic cousins, the Marmas, areindigenous minorities of Bangladesh practising Buddhism, andhave been encouraged through incentives to settle in Arakan.

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[xvii] UNHCR, Myanmar – “Reintegration programme at acrossroads, Note on Issues of Concern to UNHCR”, 1997.

[xviii] Lisbeth Garly Andersen, “Analysis of the livelihoodsituation of the Muslim population in Northern Rakhine State”,Consultant UNHCR, 31 July 1997.

[xix] Lisbeth Garly Andersen, “Analysis of the livelihoodsituation of the Muslim population in Northern Rakhine State”,Consultant UNHCR, 31 July 1997.

[xx] Human Rights Watch, “The Rohingya Muslims: Ending aCycle of Exodus?”, 1996.

[xxi] Daily Purbakone, Dhaka, 7 October 2000 (in Bengali)

[xxii] In 1993, the Sindh police conducted a comprehensivesurvey on illegal immigration. Their findings reveal that overone million Bangladeshis and 200,000 Burmese were living inKarachi without proper documentation.

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[xxiii] Lawyers for Human Rights and Legal Aid (LHRLA),“Trafficking of women and children in Pakistan, The flesh Tradereport, 1995-1996”, Karachi.

[xxiv] Chris Lewa, Images Asia, “Trafficked from Hell to Hades,The plight of the Rohingya women from Burma trafficked toPakistan”, November 1999.

[xxv] Human Rights Watch, “Living in Limbo, BurmeseRohingyas in Malaysia”, July 2000.

[xxvi] The UNHCR has a statutory responsibility to provideinternational protection to stateless persons.

[xxvii] Medecins sans Frontieres, MSF France, “TheRohingyas: Forcibly Repatriated to Burma”, 22 Sep 1994, andMSF Holland, “Awareness Survey: Rohingya Refugee Camps,Cox’s Bazaar District, Bangladesh”, 15 March 1995.

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[xxviii] UNHCR in Myanmar, Programme Briefing Paper, 1January 1997.

[xxix] David Petrasek, “Through Rose-Coloured Glasses:UNHCR's Role in Monitoring the Safety of the RohingyaRefugees Returning to Burma”, May 1998.

[xxx] David Petrasek, Ibid.

[xxxi] Lisbeth Garly Andersen, “Analysis of the livelihoodsituation of the Muslim population in Northern Rakhine State”,Consultant UNHCR, 31 July 1997.

[xxxii] Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar to the56th Session of the UN Commission of Human Rights,E/CN.4/2000/38, 24 January 2000, para. 51. [xxxiii]Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar to the 55thSession of the General Assembly, A/55/359, 22 August 2000,para. 56. [xxxiv]Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed under article 26of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization toexamine the observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labour

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Convention, 1930 (No. 29) Geneva, 2 July 1998 – para. 435. [xxxv]2000 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom:Burma, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,and Labor, U.S. Department of State, September 5, 2000.

[xxxvi] David Petrasek, Ibid.

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