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8/17/2019 The Role of Cognition in Marital Relationships
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Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology
1989, Vol. 57, No. 1,31-38
Copyright 1989 by the American Psychological
Association,
Inc.
0022-006X/89/S00.75
The Role of Cognitions in Marital Relationships: Definitional,
Methodological, and Conceptual Issues
Donald
H
Baucom
University of
North Carolina
at
Chapel Hill
Norman
Epstein
University of Maryland, College Park
Steven Sayers and
Tamara
Goldman Sher
University of
North Carolina
at
Chapel Hill
Although
there
have
recently been numerous investigations exploring the role of
couples'
cognitions
in
an attempt to understand marital distress, at present there is little cohesion and direction in the
study of how couples think about their relationships. The current article asserts that this lack of
direction results from at
least
three
factors:
(a) a lack of delineation of the important cognitive
variables to be considered in marital functioning, (b) conceptual and methodological difficulties that
arise
in
attempts
to operationalize
cognitive variables,
and (c) a
dearth
of
models
of
marital function-
ing that incorporate cognitions in a detailed manner. These three factors are discussed, along
with
a
review of empirical investigations supporting the importance of cognitions in intimate relationships.
The
role
of
cognitions
in
intimate relationships
has
gained
in-
creasing
attention in recent
years.
Most
work
has focused on the
area
of
causal attributions,
and
numerous investigations have
demonstrated empirical relations between various types of attri-
butions
and level of marital maladjustment (see Baucom, 1987,
and Thompson & Snyder, 1986, for recent reviews of this work).
However, the study of cognitions in intimate relationships has
little coherent direction
of
movement, either
from a
research per-
spective or in
terms
of the
treatment
of
marital distress.
This lack of
focus
and direction probably stems from at least
three
factors:
(a) insufficient
delineation
of
important
catego-
ries
of
marital cognitions other than attributions (with
the
work
on relationship beliefs by Eidelson & Epstein, 1982, being one
exception), (b) methodological and conceptual problems in op-
erationalizing cognitive variables
and
comparing disparate
measures used in different studies, and (c) few descriptions of
explicit models to direct future research and to clarify the roles
that
cognitions play in intimate relationships (with the models
proposed by Bradbury & Fincham, 1987, and Doherty, 198la,
198
Ib,
being
the
exceptions). Consequently, this article focuses
on three related issues:
(a) a
proposed classification
of
cogni-
tions that are potentially important in intimate relationships,
along with
a
review
of the
empirical status
of
these variables
as
they
are related to intimate relationships; (b) important meth-
odological and conceptual issues to be considered in the opera-
tionalization of
these variables;
and (c) a
discussion
of
what
should be included in cognitive models of intimate relation-
ships and relationship maladjustment.
Cognitive Variables in Intimate Relationships
Derived largely from Beck's
(1976)
and Ellis'
(1962)
cognitive
theories
of
maladaptive behavior, five categories of interrelated
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Donald H. Baucom, Psychology Department, Campus Box 3270, Davie
Hall,
University of
North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina
27514.
cognitive
phenomena can be delineated that appear to play im-
portant roles
in the
development
and
maintenance
of
marital
maladjustment. The first of these involves the perceptual pro-
cess of
selective attention.
The
other four categories involve
the
outcomes of
cognitive processes: attributions (about
why
events
occur), expectancies (predictions of what events will occur in
the future), assumptions (about the nature of the world and cor-
relations between events
and
characteristics),
and
standards
(about
what "should" be). Although empirical investigations
are only beginning in most of these areas, much more is already
known
about
the
outcomes
of the
cognitive
processes
than
is
known about
the
cognitive processes themselves.
For
example,
as
will
be discussed, a
fair
amount is
known
about the content
of
couples' attributions and their relation to marital discord.
Yet,
little is known about the processes by
which
these attribu-
tions
are
made; that
is, are
couples
lay
scientists advancing
hypotheses
and evaluating data? Are they cognitive opportun-
ists who
advance self-serving attributions,
or are
they simply
responding to classically conditioned associations
between
emotion
and thought?
Cognitions vary in how appropriate they are and, thus, in
how much they might contribute
to marital distress. The
appro-
priateness
of a
cognition
can
involve
(a) its
validity
as a repre-
sentation
of
reality
or (b) its
reasonableness
as a
standard
or
explanation for
relationship events when there
are not
objective
criteria available for determining reality. Individuals do not
commonly question their own moment-to-moment thoughts
about events in their lives (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979)
or
their long-standing assumptions and
standards
about the na-
ture of the world (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Consequently, a major
task
of
cognitively oriented marital therapy
is to
help spouses
become
more active observers
and to
help them evaluate their
own cognitions so that their emotional and behavioral re-
sponses to one another
will
be minimally affected by distorted
cognitions (Epstein, 1982, 1986).
The following are descrip-
31
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32
BAUCOM, EPSTEIN, SAVERS,
AND SHER
lions
of the five categories of cognitions that are
likely
to play
roles in marital maladjustment and are potentially important
foci for
treatment.
Assumptions
and
Standards
Spouses develop long-standing cognitions about the nature
of the
world, including both
the way
that they think
the
world
actually is and the way that they think that the world should be,
which we respectively label assumptions and standards. These
classes of cognitions are important because, together, they serve
as the templates by which an individual processes the ongoing
events in his or her
marriage. These cognitive
structures,"
knowledge structures, or "schemata" (Nisbett & Ross, 1980;
Seller, 1984)
are an
individual's internalized representations
re-
garding rules for categorizing objects and events, for solving
problems, for evaluating the appropriateness of events, and for
taking actions to achieve certain goals. Seller (1984) noted that,
beginning
in
infancy,
the
individual's repeated experiences
in
the world produce complex concepts about the characteristics
of classes
of
objects
and how one
relates
to
them. Once estab-
lished, cognitive structures are hypothesized to
have
vital sur-
vival value by allowing people to understand and interact
adap-
tively with the complexities in their lives.
Assumptions. Of relevance to marital interaction, an individ-
ual
develops assumptions about
the set of
characteristics
of a
person who fills the role of husband or wife (or comparable roles
in a
nonmarital
relationship) as well as assumptions about how
the members of a couple relate to one another. The
former as-
sumptions focusing on characteristics of persons are commonly
labeled
personae, and the
latter assumptions, which focus
on
events
or
chains
of
events,
are
referred
to as
scripts (Nisbett
&
Ross, 1980). (This is a restricted use of the term
script,
which
at
times has been used by other theorists to include standards
and expectancies as
they
are
defined
in this article.) A persona
about a person who fills a particular role includes not only a
set of characteristics but also a set of correlations among the
characteristics.
For
example,
an
individual
may
assume that
wives
tend to be loving, emotionally sensitive, cooperative, and
responsible. Also, the individual may assume that the degree to
which
a wife is cooperative is
highly
associated with how re-
sponsible a person she is.
An individual's personae can easily
influence
other cogni-
tions and are probably related to marital discord. For example,
the
assumption that men
are
only interested
in
sex could
re-
sult in a
wife
making biased attributions for her husband's be-
havior
and
inaccurate expectancies about
his
future behavior
and could also lead to marital discord.
The scripts relevant to marriage involve sequences of events
that
an
individual assumes typically occur between spouses.
An
individual's script
for an
argument with
his or her
spouse might
include
a
sequence
of
events such
as, We
begin debating
a
point. Then she tells me that I
don't know
what I'm talking
about. Then I
defend myself,
and then she
leaves
the room or
the house."
Personae (e.g.,
the
henpecked husband)
and
scripts (e.g.,
the
exploits of Archie and Edith Bunker) can be widely shared in a
culture,
or
they
can be idiosyncratic to an individual (e.g., a
husband's
fairly
unique
script about
how he and his wife behave
in order to respect each
other's
privacy). Accurate assumptions
allow individuals' past experiences to guide their current under-
standing and
interaction
with
their spouses,
but
inaccurate
as-
sumptions
may produce dysfunctional responses to marital
problems. Unfortunately, very little empirical research has in-
vestigated the importance of distorted assumptions in marital
discord,
so
their importance
in
marital distress
has not yet
been
demonstrated.
However,
Epstein and Eidelson (1981) found
that the more distressed spouses assumed that their partners
could
not
change
a
relationship and
that
overt disagreement
was
destructive to a relationship, the more they preferred individual
therapy
to marital therapy and the lower were their estimates
that therapy would
benefit
their
own
marital problems.
Standards. In contrast to the assumptions that a person
makes about the way relationships are, standards involve the
characteristics that
the
individual believes
a
partner
or
relation-
ship should
have.
As
emphasized
by
rational-emotive therapists
(Dryden,
1985; Ellis,
1962), an
individual may
hold an
extreme
or irrational standard about intimate relationships that no real-
life
relationship could match. For example, one spouse might
cling to the standard that "\bu should be able to read my mind,
and I should not have to tell you what I want or
need."
In addi-
tion,
he
or she
might also apply
an
extreme negative evaluation
when that standard is not met (e.g., It is awful if you do not
know what I want intuitively; I
can't
stand it ).
Standards per se are not dysfunctional; ethical and moral
standards
are
commonly quite functional guides
for
human
re-
lationships. They become problematic when they are extreme
or
rigid or when they detract from other aspects of an individu-
al's life (e.g., the person who strives to do the best I can in
everything I do may
suffer exhaustion
and may
alienate
ne-
glected
family
members).
As
in the area of assumptions, investigation into the role of
extreme
standards
in
marital discord
is
only beginning.
The
few
existing studies
have
typically distinguished between extreme
standards for individuals and extreme standards for intimate
relationships.
For
example, Epstein
and
Eidelson (1981) found
that spouses' marital distress and low involvement in marital
therapy were more strongly correlated with
a
measure
of
unre-
alistic assumptions
and
standards about intimate relationships
(Eidelson & Epstein, 1982) than with
Jones's (1968)
measure
of irrational
beliefs (extreme standards) about individual func-
tioning described by Ellis (1962). Similarly, Jordan and McCor-
mick (1987)
found
that unrealistic assumptions and standards
about relationships were more predictive of general marital dis-
tress than were extreme standards about sexual relationships.
These findings indicate the importance of assessing the content
of
assumptions and standards
focal
to relationships in order to
understand marital adjustment.
Selective Attention, Attributions, and Expectancies
Spouses' perceptions and
inferences
about each other's be-
havior
can contribute to marital distress independent of any
extreme
standards
and
evaluations because they
can
serve
as a
distorted and dissatisfying version of reality. That is, a spouse
might not violate standards about how a partner should behave,
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SPECIAL SERIES: COGNITIONS AND MARRIAGE
but his or her behavior might be perceived or interpreted as be-
ing inconsistent with what brings the other person pleasure,
thus leading to dissatisfaction.
Selective
attention. Consistent with the idea that perception
is an active process rather than a passive reception of informa-
tion (Kelly, 1955),
we
define
perceptions as
those aspects
of the
information available
in a
situation that
an
individual notices
and
fits into cognitive structures (e.g., personae, scripts) that
have meaning to him or her. Social cognition researchers (cf,
Nisbett & Ross, 1980) and clinical writers (e.g., Beck et
al.,
1979;
Weiss,
1980)
have described how perceptions are suscep-
tible to selective attention because of factors such as emotional
states, fatigue, and preexisting cognitive structures. Perceptual
biases can
have powerful effects
on marital interaction because
spouses are normally unaware that the information they per-
ceive
is only a subset of the data available in any situation.
Two
types of related behavioral investigations
have
implica-
tions for the
issue
of selective attention. First, the extent to
which the two members of a married couple share a common
perception
of
what
has
occurred
in
their relationship provides
information
regarding the selective abstraction of information.
Several
investigations
have
demonstrated that married partners
have relatively different perceptions of what behaviors have oc-
curred
in the
marriage during
a given
24-hr period;
the
kappas
calculated between husbands' and wives' reporting of behavior
have averaged approximately .50
(Christensen
& Nies, 1980;
Christensen, Sullaway, & King, 1983; Jacobson & Moore,
1981). Jacobson and Moore (1981) concluded that two partners
in a marriage agreed less than half of the time about whether or
not a
certain event
had
occurred during
the
past day.
In
addi-
tion, all three of these investigations, as well
as
a study by Chris-
tensen
and
Wallace (1976), indicated that more satisfied cou-
ples evidenced a higher rate of agreement than more distressed
couples. Thus, although a certain degree of
differential
percep-
tion of marital events appears to be a way of
life
for most if
not all couples, couples who are more distressed seem to attend
selectively
in different ways to a greater extent.
Other investigators
have
compared a spouse's report of mari-
tal events with a trained rater's report of the couple's behavior.
The
logic
underlying such investigations is that a trained rater
will
have
less reason to ignore certain events and will be sensi-
tized to the full
range
of
behaviors under investigation.
For ex-
ample, Robinson and Price
(1980)
trained observers to rate the
behaviors
of both distressed and nondistressed couples in their
own homes. The couples also rated their own behaviors. A com-
parison
of the
raters' observations with
the
couples' observa-
tions
revealed results consistent with the findings of
differential
perception.
The
level
of
overall agreement between raters
and
spouses
was
low, with correlations
of
approximately .50. Also,
there was greater agreement between raters and nondistressed
spouses than between raters and distressed spouses. In fact,
dis-
tressed couples underestimated the frequency of pleasurable
events
by 50%.
Attributions. As noted earlier, a rapidly growing body of liter-
ature
has examined the attributions or causal explanations that
spouses provide
for
events in their relationships. The most com-
mon marital attribution dimensions investigated have been the
global-specific,
stable-unstable, and internal-external dimen-
sions
borrowed from
the
reformulated learned helplessness
the-
ory (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). This is a logical
link because
of the
many cognitive
and
behavioral similarities
between depression and marital maladjustment (Epstein,
1985).
In spite of several methodological issues to be discussed,
there have been some common findings across studies (e.g.,
Baucom,
Bell,
&
Dune, 1982;
Fincham,
Beach,
&
Baucom,
1987;
Fincham & O'Leary, 1983; Holtzworth-Munroe
&
Ja-
cobson, 1985; Jacobson, McDonald, Follette,
&
Berley, 1985;
Kyle &
Falbo,
1985). Distressed spouses tend to rate causes of
negative partner behaviors
as
more global
and
stable than
do
nondistressed individuals, whereas nondistressed spouses rate
causes
of positive behavior of the partner as more global and
stable. In addition, distressed spouses have a tendency to blame
their partners for negative marital events. These
attributional
tendencies serve to accentuate the positive in nondistressed re-
lationships and the negative in distressed relationships.
Recent studies have investigated other attributional dimen-
sions that focus on the characteristics and motives of the part-
ner, such as positive versus negative intent, blameworthiness,
selfish motivation, and lack of love (Epstein, Pretzer, & Fleming,
1987;
Fincham, Beach, & Nelson, 1987; Fincham & Bradbury,
1988;
Pretzer, Epstein,
&
Fleming, 1985). These studies have
consistently
found
strong associations between such attribu-
tions and
indices
of
marital maladjustment, again indicating
that distressed spouses explain their partners' behavior in ways
that
focus on
negative aspects
of the
partner.
As
with almost all of the studies on cognitions and intimate
relationships, the investigations of attributions and marriage
are correlational, and conclusions about cause and
effect
rela-
tionships cannot
be
drawn (see Fincham
&
Bradbury,
1987, for
an exception). Also, because there are no criteria for assessing
the validity of the attributions, it is unclear whether distressed
spouses are offering distorted attributions or whether their part-
ners
actually
do
behave with negative motivations.
Expectancies. Social learning theorists such as Rotter (1954)
and
Bandura
(1977)
have described
how
people learn
to
antici-
pate probable consequences of their behavior and alter their
be-
havior accordingly.
For
example,
an
individual
may
develop
an
expectancy that behaving assertively will elicit intense criticism
from
his or her
partner and, consequently,
the
individual will
choose a submissive response. Expectancies can be situation-
or
relationship-specific, or they can be more generalized (e.g.,
applied to a range of relationships, not only marriage, or ap-
plied across a
wide
range of situations within a marriage).
Bandura (1977) distinguished between an outcome
expec-
tancy
(a prediction that a particular action will produce
partic-
ular consequences
in a
certain situation)
and an efficacy
expec-
tancy (an
estimate
of the
probability that
one
will
be
able
to
carry
out the
particular action needed
to
produce those conse-
quences).
Individuals' expectancies about interactions between
spouses tend to take an "if-then" form and can involve predic-
tions about reactions of the partner to one's own
behavior,
reac-
tions
of the self to the
partner's behavior,
and
outcomes
of a
joint event (e.g.,
"If we argue in
front
of the
children, they will
be harmed psychologically").
As with some of the other cognitions described previously,
there is scant research on the role of expectancies in intimate
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BAUCOM, EPSTEIN, SAVERS,
AND
SHER
relationships. Crossing two dimensions of expectancies—gen-
eralized versus specific
by
outcome expectancy
versus
efficacy
expectancy—results
in at least
four
different types of expectan-
cies that can be explored. Pretzer et
al.
(1985) conducted one of
the
only
studies in this area, and it focused solely on generalized
efficacy
expectancies. Their results supported Doherty's
(1981a,
1981b)
hypotheses that spouses'
low
efficacy
expecta-
tions regarding their ability to
solve
their marital problems are
associated with marital distress and depression and with attri-
butions of causality for relationship problems to their partner's
behavior, stable personality, malicious intent,
and
lack
of
love.
Operationalizing
Terms
To evaluate a model of marital
functioning
that primarily
considers cognitive factors, these cognitive variables must
be op-
erationalized.
Although there has been considerable attention
given to the role of causal attributions in marital functioning,
few attempts have been made
to
operationalize
the
other cogni-
tive variables previously discussed. Yet, even when attributions
have been considered alone, a number of unresolved conceptual
and methodological issues
have
surfaced. Several of these issues
will
be
considered because they
will
probably resurface when
attempts are made to assess the other categories of cognitions.
One
general issue that has arisen in assessing attributions is
the extent to which the assessment strategies mirror the attribu-
tional processes that occur in the
day-to-day
lives of couples.
This rather broad concern incorporates several
specific
issues.
First, the extent to which the individual is asked explicitly to
make attributions is
important.
That is, individuals do not
make attributions about every event;
to do so
would result
in
an
extreme amount
of
cognitive processing that
would
severely
curtail the
person's
ability to proceed through
even
uncompli-
cated events. Consequently, although most self-report invento-
ries
of attributions concerning marital interaction explicitly
ask
the respondent to explain why an event or behavior occurred,
it is
unclear whether
the
person would have provided
an
attribu-
tion for the event in the natural environment (e.g., Pyszcynski
&Greenberg, 1981). Holtzworth-Munroeand Jacobson (1985)
both directly
and
indirectly
probed
for
attributions regarding
marital events. They found that, although
the two
methodolo-
gies
resulted in attributions that were statistically
significantly
correlated,
the
correlations were
all
modest
in
magnitude.
Thus, the manner in which attributions are elicited probably
influences
what is
obtained,
and at present the relative merits
of the various strategies are unclear. Similarly, the extent to
which the assessment strategy directs the respondent's thoughts
is pertinent when cognitions other than attributions are consid-
ered.
The representativeness of the cognitive assessment strategy
for understanding
the
couple's marital
functioning is influenced
by a second factor whose relationship is
focused
on in the as-
sessment. Some inventories
ask
respondents only about their
cognitions regarding their own marriages (Baucom & Sayers,
1987; Pretzer et
al., 1985),
yet other self-report measures ask
respondents about their cognitions regarding marriages in gen-
eral
as well as their own marriages
(Eidelson
& Epstein, 1982).
Asking
about both types of relationships is appropriate, but
items
have
typically been combined into a single score, al-
though the two foci may yield very different information. For
example, clinical experience suggests that
many
distressed cou-
ples
hold different standards for their own marriage than for
marriages in general. To combine these two pieces of informa-
tion into a single score could result in misleading or confusing
results.
The extent to which the assessment strategy mirrors cogni-
tions in
day-to-day living
is
also
influenced by the specific
stim-
uli,
behaviors,
or
events with which
the
individual
is
presented.
Attributional assessment strategies can be divided according to
whether
they
ask
couples
to
consider hypothetical
or
real events
in their
relationships
(e.g., Madden
&
Janoff-Bulman, 1981;
Orvis,
Kelley, &
Butler, 1976). Hypothetical events have
the as-
set that all couples will be responding to the same set of stimuli,
which
allows
for easier comparison across couples; the liability
is that the events may not be representative of the couples' own
behavior.
Using actual events from
the
couples' lives ensures
that the events
have
relevance to them; however, comparison
across couples becomes more complex. Findings to date
have
been similar
when
attributions
for
both
actual
and
hypothetical
marital events
have
been considered; yet, only one study has
compared
the
equivalence
of
hypothetical versus actual events,
and then only for wives (Fincham & Beach, in press). Their
findings
revealed that similar attributions were provided
for the
two types
of
stimuli. Whether
to use
real
or
hypothetical events
must
also be addressed when the other classes of
cognitions
are
operationalized.
As stated previously, one major reason for using hypothetical
marital events is that all spouses are thus providing cognitions
about the same set of stimuli. To maximize the representative-
ness
of the stimuli and yet provide a set of questions or state-
ments to which all couples can
respond,
some investigators have
taken a different approach. They
have
constructed statements
that ask about the relationship in a very general way (e.g., Burns
& Volpicelli,
1987; Pretzer el al., 1985). Thus, in assessing ex-
pectancies, a
respondent might
be
asked
the
extent
to
which
he
or she agrees with the following statement, "No matter what I
do, my partner
will
not change." Such global expectancies
might be an
important part
of
marital adjustment. However,
marital discord also seems to involve cognitions about very spe-
cific situations and aspects of the relationship, and the spouses'
thoughts
about these specific components
of the
marriage also
need to be assessed.
In part,
the
relevance
of
obtaining cognitions about global
aspects or specific content areas of the relationship depends on
whether
or not individuals have global cognitive
styles
that in-
volve thinking about many aspects
of the
relationship
in the
same way. For example, if a spouse makes similar attributions
for marital events regardless
of the
specific content under con-
sideration (i.e., has a strong attributional
style),
then the content
provided
is of
less importance. Some marital investigators have
apparently assumed that spouses have an attributional style re-
garding
their marriage (e.g., Doherty, 1982). However, Baucom,
Sayers, and Duhe (in press)
found that,
whereas some spouses
do provide consistent attributions across marital situations,
other
spouses offer attributions that appear
to be
situation-spe-
cific.
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SPECIAL SERIES: COGNITIONS AND MARRIAGE
35
Persons with individual
psychopathology often
have
distorted
and
extreme cognitions that should alert marital investigators
from a
methodological perspective.
For
example, ample evi-
dence exists that depressed individuals have negativistic attribu-
tions,
expectancies,
and so forth.
Therefore, when investigating
the
cognitions
of
maritally
distressed
couples, researchers must
also evaluate whether
the
individuals
are
depressed. Then, fac-
torial designs
can be
used
or the level of
depression
can be
co-
varied
to insure
that
extreme or
distorted
cognitions are a
func-
tion of the
marital distress
per se
rather than
a function of the
individual's
depression. Whereas depression
is one
variable that
should
be
considered
in
evaluating
spouses'
cognitions, marital
researchers must also take into account any other disorder or
phenomenon that
is likely to
confound
the relationship
between
marital functioning and
cognitions.
A
final
important issue
in operationalizing
cognitive vari-
ables relevant
to
marriage
is
whether
to focus on the
actual con-
tent
of
cognitions,
on
broader dimensions presumed
to be im-
portant within certain categories
of
cognitions,
or on
some
inte-
gration
of
the
two.
For
example,
in
assessing attributions
within
marriage, almost no investigators
have focused
on the actual
content
of the
attributions (see Pretzer
et al.,
1985,
for an excep-
tion). Respondents
are
typically asked
to offer
attributions
for
why
some marital
event occurred. Next, the
respondent
or
out-
side raters evaluate
the
attribution
on
several dimensions
such
as locus of control, globality, and stability.
Almost invariably,
these dimensions become the
foci
of the investigation. Thus,
the
content (e.g., whether
the respondent
believes that problems
result because the partner is stupid or lazy, etc.) is lost. Other
investigators have
focused on content but have not been as care-
ful
in
delineating
the
categories
of
cognitions under consider-
ation. For example, Burns and
Volpicelli's
scale (1987)
assesses
a broad range of content areas that cognitive theorists believe
are relevant to marital
distress
(e.g., partner is unwilling or un-
able to change). Whereas some of these areas are assessed with
questions focusing
on
assumptions
and
expectancies, other con-
tent areas are assessed by asking about standards and assump-
tions.
At times, it is unclear why a
given
content area is assessed
in
terms of certain
categories
of cognitions.
In future
attempts to investigate couples' cognitions and
marital
functioning, a
consideration
of
both content
and
type
of
cognition
could
be a
fruitful strategy.
That is,
investigators
might select
what
appear
to be the
important varieties
of
con-
tent
in
couples' cognitions
and
might then systematically
ask
questions about the couples' perceptions, attributions, assump-
tions,
expectancies, and standards in each particular content
area. Such systematic exploration
would allow
for a determina-
tion of how these different types of cognitive variables, such as
attributions and expectancies, interrelate in a
given
content
area. Certain patterns
across
cognitive variables might
well be
related to marital
distress.
For example, a spouse might (a)
have
a clear set of assumptions about a content
area,
make attribu-
tions about past behavior consistent
with
these assumptions,
and
similarly provide expectancies about
future
behavior
in
light
of these assumptions and attributions but (b)
have
stan-
dards as to how the relationship
should
be that are in conflict
with
these assumptions, attributions, and expectancies. As a re-
sult,
this
conflict
between
(a) how the
relationship
is
perceived
to be
versus
(b) how the
relationship should
be in this
content
area
might be a source of distress to the couple.
Thus, attempts
to
operationalize cognitions
and to
deal with
the methodological and conceptual complexities inherent in as-
sessing
couples' cognitions relevant
to
their marriages
are only
beginning. However, even as these issues become resolved, theo-
reticians and investigators must continue to
focus
on an even
broader
issue:
how
these cognitive variables
are to be
used
in
building a
model
of
marital
functioning.
Building
Models of
Marital
Functioning
Whereas new
research might
be
pursued based
on the defini-
tional
and
methodological issues already discussed, clear and
concise theoretical models of marital adjustment are needed to
embrace cognitive constructs
and to
provide direction
for
this
research.
If
models
of
marital adjustment
are to be
constructed
that include cognitions,
the
relations among
the
various catego-
ries
of
cognitions must
be
made explicit.
In
addition, relations
among
cognitions
and
other variables such
as
behavior
and
affect
must be integrated into a model of marital
functioning,
and
theoreticians must be explicit about the causal relations
that are hypothesized to exist
among
these constructs.
A potential source
of confusion
regarding causal models con-
cerns the
general
statement by investigators that cognitions,
affect, and
behavior interact
in influencing the
couple. Although
the
meaning
of
this statement seems
to be
self-evident,
a diffi-
culty
arises concerning
the
potentially different connotations
for the
term interact. Buss (1977) described these
different
meanings in his discussion of the trait-situation controversy in
predicting
and
understanding behavior.
In the first
meaning,
two
variables such
as
environment
(E) and
person
(P) are
used
to predict and explain a third variable, such as behavior (B);
these relations
can be
characterized
by the function, B = f(E,
P).
This
has
been labeled
the
analysis
of
variance
(ANOVA)
model because, conceptually,
E
and
P
variables are used as fac-
tors or as independent variables
whose
interaction is used to
predict B, the
dependent variable. Quite appropriately,
ANOVA
statistical techniques
have
been used
to
test this model.
(In
con-
sidering
marital
functioning,
other variables, including cogni-
tions, can be
substituted
for E, P, and B.)
This
is
generally
re-
garded
as a mechanistic
model
in that it embodies unidirec-
tional
causality from environment
and
person
to
behavior.
The
model
allows
for investigating whether two or more variables
are additively or interactively related to a dependent variable.
Interaction
in
this model means that
the
independent variables
need
to be
considered simultaneously
in
order
to
understand
their relation to the dependent variable.
Jacobson et al.
(1985)
utilized
this
meaning
when
examining
the effects of negative behavior and
level
of marital distress on
the
types
of
attributions made
by couples. The
investigators
asked spouses
to
participate
in a
conflict resolution task
with
their partners.
Before the
task,
the
experimenter
privately in-
structed one spouse to
behave
either positively or
negatively.
Both
distressed
and
nondistressed couples
were
included
in
this
procedure, yielding a 2 X 2 (Behavior X Couple Type) design.
The results
indicated
an
interaction
effect
such that distressed
spouses
were
more internal in their attributions concerning the
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36
BAUCOM, EPSTEIN,
SAVERS, AND SHER
partner's behavior when that partner was instructed to behave
negatively and were more external when the partner was to be-
have positively. Conversely, nondistressed spouses were more
internal in their attributions for positive behavior and external
in their attributions for negative behavior. The investigators ap-
propriately noted that this type of design does not examine
whether there are reciprocal causal relations among the vari-
ables.
In
the second meaning of interaction, there is a reciprocal
relationship between person
(F)
and environment (E), which is
construed as bidirectional or cyclical between these two sets of
variables (E •* » f). Each variable is considered to be simulta-
neously both
a
dependent
and
independent variable,
and
this
is referred to as an organismic model.
Thus,
in
considering
a
married
couple, a spouse's cognitions may
influence
that per-
son's emotions toward the partner, and those emotions might
then
influence future
cognitions which that individual experi-
ences. This example
focuses on
reciprocal causality within
a
single individual; the model becomes much more complex
when
attempting
to
explain reciprocal causality between
two
persons
in a
relationship.
Thus, in the first instance, the concept of interaction focuses
on the
manner
in which two
variables combine
in a
unique
way
in relation
to a
third variable,
and the
causality
is
often
viewed
as unidirectional.
However,
in the second case, causality is
clearly
bidirectional,
and
interaction refers
to the way in
which
two (or more) variables mutually influence and change each
other.
The difficulty
arises
when
researchers espouse
a
model
that defines interaction from
one
perspective
but
then empiri-
cally investigate the concept using a methodology appropriate
for
the
other meaning
of
interaction.
Consequently,
in building models of marital distress that give
a
significant
role to couples' cognitions, the theoretician must
be attuned to several issues. Cognitions must not be described
in
a
general way; instead,
the
various types
of
cognitions must
be differentiated, and the relations between these cognitive vari-
ables and marital distress must be made clear (e.g., Fincham &
Bradbury, 1988). The relations among various cognitions and
among
cognitions and other important constructs such as emo-
tions and behavior should also be specified. In doing so, the the-
oretician must go beyond the self-evident yet potentially confus-
ing general statement that these variables interact. Instead, the
two meanings of interaction,
from ANOVA
and reciprocal in-
fluence
perspectives,
must be considered. At present, our
efforts
in these directions
have
just begun. Investigators
have
estab-
lished with some consistency that attributions are related to
level of
marital discord,
and the few
studies that exist confirm
a relation between standards or
beliefs
and
level
of marital ad-
justment. If these findings are to
have
maximal impact on our
understanding
of relationships, it is important that they be inte-
grated into more complete models of marital functioning incor-
porating the guidelines outlined here.
Intervening
in
Marital Discord
Given
that several of the previous categories of cognitions
have rarely been discussed by marital investigators, that opera-
tionalization of the constructs is only beginning, and that
models
of
marital functioning that incorporate cognitions
are
at an early stage of development, it is not surprising that at-
tempts to intervene with distressed couples' cognitions have
rarely been evaluated. Three investigations have implemented
cognitive restructuring alone without other interventions
(Em-
melkamp, 1985; Epstein, Pretzer, & Fleming, 1982; Huber &
Milstein, 1985), and two other investigations have explored
whether behavioral marital therapy (BMT) could be strength-
ened by
adding
a
cognitive component (Baucom, 1985; Bau-
com &
Lester, 1986).
The
results
of
these investigations
have
indicated that cognitive restructuring with distressed couples
can produce meaningful cognitive
changes,
particularly in rela-
tionship standards, assumptions, and expectancies. Selective at-
tention has rarely been investigated, and the potential for alter-
ing
attributions is unclear. Cognitive restructuring has also
al-
tered couples' attitudes toward therapy itself. Huber and
Milstein (1985) found that brief cognitive therapy increased
couples' expectancies that marital therapy would
benefit
them
and
increased their desire
to
improve their relationships.
In ad-
dition, the
treatments
were effective in
increasing marital
ad-
justment.
However,
as is consistent with other outcome studies,
cognitive restructuring in isolation or in combination with
BMT
appears
to be no
more effective than
BMT
alone
when
couples are randomly assigned to treatment conditions (see
Baucom &
Hoffman, 1986,
for a
review
of
marital outcome
re-
search).
Thus, the findings indicate that cognitive therapy can alter
distressed couples' cognitions and increase their levels of mari-
tal adjustment. Yet, to be maximally effective, these treatment
interventions must draw on basic research. At the least, this
means that the constructs must be operationalized and the
many methodological issues resolved. In addition, treatment
interventions involving cognitions can benefit from well-devel-
oped
models
of
marital
functioning
that incorporate cognitions.
Such
models
can
provide guidelines regarding which couples
will benefit most from cognitive restructuring
and how to im-
plement these interventions. Once these findings and theories
are available, there is an increased likelihood that cognitive in-
terventions will maximally
benefit
distressed couples.
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Received March 7,1988
Revision received March
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Accepted March
21,1988
Mineka Appointed Editor
of
Journal
of Abnormal Psychology, 1990-1995
The Publications and Communications Board of the American Psychological Association an-
nounces the appointment of Susan Mineka, Northwestern University, as editor of the
Journal
of Abnormal
Psychology
for a
6-year term beginning
in
1990.
As of
January
1,
1989, manu-
scripts should
be directed to
Susan
Mineka
Northwestern University
Department
of
Psychology
102
Swift
Hall
Evanston, Illinois
6Q208