The role of media actors in reframing the media discoursein the decision to reject relicensing the Vermont Yankeenuclear power plant

Richard Watts & Jonathan Maddison

Published online: 31 January 2012# AESS 2012

Abstract This paper examines 8 years of news media dis-course on the operation of the Vermont Yankee nuclear powerplant leading up to a 2010 vote byVermont legislators to rejectrelicensing the facility. Nuclear power license decisions areusually solely under the purview of the Nuclear RegulatoryCommission; but Vermont legislators required the facility toalso seek approval from the Vermont Legislature, presenting aunique case where state legislators have a direct vote on anuclear power plant. Over the 8 years of the case study, wefind that opposition narratives highlighting an aging, unsafefacility managed by an untrustworthy corporation increasedwhile pro-Vermont Yankee narratives of reliable energy, tech-nical competence, and economic progress decreased. We an-alyze the changes in the media discourse through examiningchanges in media frames, the media actors, their sponsorshipactivities, and the narrative integrity of the frames. Thesefindings are instructive in understanding the factors contrib-uting to changes in the media culture around news coverage ofnuclear power.

Keywords Nuclear power .Media discourse . Vermont

The role of media actors in reframing a public debateon relicensing the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant

In early 2010, the Vermont Legislature rejected extendingthe license of the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant, aplant that has provided on average about 30% of the state’selectricity since 1973. The legislature’s move in 2010 was atodds with earlier expectations that the plant would be reli-censed (Galbraith 2008; Klein, personal communication).Relicensing decisions are the purview of the Federal Nucle-ar Regulatory Commission. However, in Vermont, theplant’s owner agreed to also seek state review giving theVermont Legislature unique authority in the decision-making process. We seek to understand here how a plantthat was seen as likely to be relicensed was rejected by statepolitical leaders.

Generating electricity from nuclear power is a contestedissue in the USA—an issue that will be only more contestedin the context of the accident at the Fukushima nuclearpower plant in Japan (Cooper and Sussman 2011; Palfreman2006). In this study, we focus on one aspect of the nuclearpower debate, decisions to extend operating licenses at exist-ing plants in the USA. Since 2000, the Nuclear RegulatoryCommission (NRC) has approved operating license exten-sions for 71 nuclear reactors in the USA. An additionalthirty-two operating licenses are either presently under reviewor have filed notice with the NRC, indicating that debates overlicense extension decisions will continue at the NRC and inthe states that host these plants (Nuclear Energy Institute2011; United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2011).

To examine the Vermont Legislature’s 2010 vote to rejectVermont Yankee, we analyze changes in the media dis-course. In particular, we focus our attention on the role of

R. Watts (*)Transportation Research Center & CommunityDevelopment and Applied Economics, University of Vermont,208 Morrill Hall,Burlington, VT 05405, USAe-mail: rwatts@uvm.edu

J. MaddisonFarrell Hall, University of Vermont,Burlington, VT 05405, USA

J Environ Stud Sci (2012) 2:131–142DOI 10.1007/s13412-011-0066-4

policy actors, their frame sponsorship activities, and thenarrative integrity of the frames they promote. The mediadiscourse provides a window into a knowledge constructionprocess that can parallel changes in public opinion andpolicy outcomes (Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Iyengar1990; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Steensland 2008). Themedia is a key resource from which individuals drawmeaningabout policy debates, as well as a forum where the principleactors in these debates appear (Carragee and Roefs 2004;Gamson 1992, 2005). In this case study, we examine therelationship between the media and policy actors in whichpolicy actors utilize unfolding events to influence media dis-course and the media discourse in turn influences policyactors’ actions and public opinion.

A short history of Vermont Yankee and the state’sdecision to reject the license extension request

The Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant has been a fixtureof Vermont’s electric power landscape since it started oper-ating in 1972, providing approximately one third of thestate’s electricity for almost 40 years (Vermont Departmentof Public Service 1996). The plant was built and operated bya group of regional utilities, led by two Vermont utilities,until its sale to Entergy in 2002. Located on the banks of theConnecticut River, in the southeast corner of Vermont, theplant is more than 100 miles from the state’s capitol and 140miles from the state’s most populated county. The plant isthe state’s fifth largest private employer with 620 full-timeworkers, hundreds of temporary employees, contributingmore than $15 million annually in state and local taxes(Entergy 2011a).

In the early 2000s, the Vermont utility owners put theplant up for sale due to concerns about the complexity ofmanaging a nuclear power plant and the future uncertaintyinvolved in closing the plant and paying the decommission-ing costs (Dutton, personal communication; Young, person-al communication). In 2002, Entergy Nuclear, a subsidiaryof the Louisiana-based Entergy Corporation, purchased theplant for $180 million. Entergy is a large diversified energy-holding company with $11 billion in sales and 15,000employees (Entergy 2011a). Entergy Nuclear is the secondlargest nuclear generator in the USA, operating 13 reactorsand ten nuclear power plants in eight states. In the 2000s,Entergy bought five nuclear power plants, mostly in thenortheast, operating them as for-profit merchant power plants,with plant output sold directly to utilities or into wholesalepower markets (Entergy 2011b).

When Entergy purchased Vermont Yankee, companyofficials made it clear that their intention was to file for alicense renewal to operate the plant beyond its March 2012scheduled closing date. License extensions for nuclear

power plants fall under the purview of the Nuclear Regula-tory Commission. However, Entergy also agreed to seek apermit from the Vermont Public Service Board to operatethe plant beyond 2012, signing an agreement with stateregulators and testifying under oath to that intention (Ver-mont Public Service Board 2002). Through this agreement,Entergy committed to state oversight in the license exten-sion process. Entergy also negotiated a 10-year contract tosell a portion of the plant’s output to the Vermont utilities ata rate less than what the utilities would have expected to payif they retained ownership—reducing electric rates for mostVermonters (Vermont Public Service Board 2002). Stateregulators, electric utilities, and political leaders welcomedthe sale (Robinson 2002).

During the 8 years the company owned the plant, Entergywon a series of legislative and regulatory approvals to increasethe plant’s capacity by 20% (2005), to store radioactive wastein concrete casks outside of the plant (2006) and rejectedlegislative attempts to increase plant taxes to add money tothe decommissioning fund (2008, 2009) (Gram 2006a, b;2008a, b, c, d, e, f, g; 2009).

In January 2006, Entergy filed for the 20-year licenseextension with the NRC. In February 2008, as it had agreedto do, Entergy also filed a license extension request with theVermont Public Service Board—the state agency chargedwith regulating electric utilities.

The story described here took an added twist in 2006when the Vermont State Legislature required a legislativevote before state regulators could finish reviewing the licenseextension request. The bill passed the Vermont House ofRepresentatives 130–0 and the Vermont Senate 20–6 andwas signed into law by Republican Governor James Douglas.At the time, Entergy opposed the bill, calling it “redundant”but once approved Entergy publicly supported the legislation(Gram 2006a, b; Associated Press 2006). Most observersthought Entergy would eventually win legislative approvalbut that legislators might extract additional financial conces-sions (Dostis, personal communication; Dutton, personalcommunication; Klein, personal communication). Then,Vermont Senate President Peter Welch characterized the votethis way: “giving the Legislature authority over the relicensingmight give lawmakers clout to demand an additional returnfrom Vermont Yankee, such as an extension of the inexpen-sive power now provided to the state” (Gram 2006a, b).

Despite efforts by Governor Douglas and Entergy’s sup-porters, the legislature did not schedule a vote in the 2008and 2009 legislative sessions (usually January into May). InJanuary 2010, Governor Douglas again urged legislativeleaders to allow the Public Service Board to make thedecision (Douglas 2010). The NRC had already signaledthat it was likely to award the permit (Gram 2008a, b, c, d, e,f, g). Two days after Douglas’s speech to legislators,Entergy announced a leaking radioactive substance, tritium,

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in underground pipes at the facility. The leak became front-page news, and news coverage only increased as legislatorsdiscovered Entergy officials had provided misleading testimo-ny to state regulators on the existence of the undergroundpipes. At the end of January, Entergy announced the removalof the plant’s top executive and disciplinary actions againstfour other executives (Gram 2010a, b, c, d, e, f). Three weekslater, the Vermont State Senate voted 26–4 against forwardingthe relicensing application to the Vermont Public ServiceBoard, essentially requiring the plant to close in March 2012(Gram 2010a, b, c, d, e, f).

Although the controversy swirling around the plant inJanuary and February contributed to the plant’s rejection, weargue that examining changes in the media discourse overtime provides a more complete understanding of the 2010policy decision. We illustrate how plant opponents “reframed”the media discourse, capitalizing on unfolding events to chal-lenge the narrative integrity of Entergy’s story of technicalcompetence and economic progress. We combine our analysisof changes in media frames with an analysis of the promi-nence of policy actors and the prominence of their preferredframes. We seek to show how changes in the media discourse,influenced by the policy actors, in turn influence the policyactors, contributing to the eventual rejection of the plant bystate legislators.

Methods

This study relies on two principle methods, interviews withkey informants and an analysis of 346 news articles from theAssociated Press State & Local Wire service. The leadresearcher interviewed 25 case study participants andobservers from state agencies, environmental interestgroups, and the news media. We chose interviewees basedon their ability to provide core understandings and thecentral role that many of them played in the case study.We used a semi-structured interview format, focused onunderstanding the events leading up to the Vermont Senate’s2010 vote. Interviews were taped and transcribed and readmultiple times by the lead researcher to identify key themes(Patton 2002).

The second part of our analysis relies on 346 AssociatedPress news stories written between January 2003 and 1March 2010 collected from the Lexis-Nexis database. Newsstories selected for analysis had to contain three or moresentences directly related to the Vermont Yankee nuclearpower plant, be longer than 200 words and originate fromwithin Vermont. We tested a variety of keyword searchterms finding that “Vermont Yankee” captured all relatedarticles. We chose the time period 2003 to 2010 to coincidewith the time the plant operated under the ownership of theEntergy Nuclear Power Corporation. The number of news

articles ranged between 41 and 54 annually for 2003 to2008, declined to 22 in 2009, and increased to 22 for thefirst 2 months of 2010 leading up the Vermont Senate vote.Examining the articles over time allows us to examinechanges in the media discourse.

We chose the Associated Press because of the norms ofnewspaper reporting the wire service represents, e.g.,“objectivity” and “balance” (Tuchman 1978). The widespreaduse of the Associated Press by Vermont newspapers (Gram,personal communication), other media outlets, and pol-icymakers makes it an acceptable measure of the massmedia information available to policymakers and thegeneral public (Fan and Holway 1994; Fan and Tims1989). The Associated Press submits stories written bytheir own staff of Vermont-based reporters and recircu-lates news stories from member newspapers. Many ofthe recirculated stories originated with the BrattleboroReformer, a paper published within ten miles of theplant. Of the Associated Press stories, about 80% werewritten by the AP’s veteran news reporter, Dave Gram.

Within this set of news articles, we coded every occur-rence of a quote or a paraphrase that was attributed to apolicy actor by the journalist. We use the term sponsor torefer to the policy actors promoting their preferred frames(Carragee and Roefs 2004; Gamson 2005).We groupedsponsors into four categories: government officials (federal,state, and town), legislators (federal and state), environmentalinterest groups, and Vermont Yankee and its allies (businessinterest groups and other electric utility companies). Thereporters attributed comments to sponsors 1,746 times in the346 articles analyzed.

In addition to coding for sponsors, we coded eachsponsor citation for their dominant frame. We conceptualizeframes as interpretive packages that define problems, providecausal analysis, and promote particular solutions (Entman2007; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Gamson 2005).We identified six frames that clearly conveyed a position foror against the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant and theproposed license extension. The six frames draw from previ-ous research that has identified frames in nuclear powerand energy policy discourse (Gamson 1992; Greenberg2005; Jasper 1997). In frame attributions not cited tosponsors, we coded as journalist frame to trace thepresence of the reporters in the evolving media discourse.Including journalist frames, we coded 707 frames in the mediacoverage.

We used Krippendorf’s coefficient to measure intercoderreliability (Krippendorff 1980). The second author coded arandom sample of 15% of sponsor statements from thepopulation to assess intercoder reliability. Krippendorf’scoefficient was 0.81 for frames and 0.91 for sponsors,meeting the standards for intercoder reliability (Riffe et al.2005).

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Media frames as a tool to understand policy outcomes

Why use media analysis to understand policy debates? Themass media is an important forum where sponsors competewith each other to gain legitimacy and construct core mean-ings about societal issues (Carragee and Roefs 2004; Gamson2005; Carragee and Ryan 1998). Individuals and policy-makers draw on the general audience media as a publiclyavailable source of information for individual sense-making.How the media influences individual sense-making is an areaof much debate (Scheufele 1999) but there is agreement thatthe media is a critical forum for policy actors attempting toinfluence policy outcomes (Gamson 2005). Sponsors can“win” a media contest by institutionalizing interpretations inthe media that are beneficial to their interests and detrimentalto opposing sponsors (Entman 2003) increasing their chanceat achieving desirable policy outcomes (Callaghan andSchnell 2001; Entman 2003). To examine the media contestand construction of meaning about Vermont Yankee, we mea-sure the prominence of sponsors in the media discourse intandemwith the prominence of the sponsors’ preferred frames(Steensland 2008; Gamson 2005).1

Researchers have found that policy elites, often govern-ment and industry sponsors, dominate domestic policydebates (Callaghan and Schnell 2001; Tuchman 1978).News reporters and their editors “index” their stories to theprevailing elite policy discourse, confining the conversationto the current level of the debate among those sponsors(Bennett 1990). For journalists, indexing functions to capturethe range of debate within the government and other officialcircles in an attempt to balance media coverage and informreaders about policy (Bennett 1990). While journalistic normsof objectivity and balance require opposition voices to beincluded, their appearance can be marginalized if there is littleor no official support for their position (Gitlin 1980; Tuchman1978). These “indexing” patterns can be disrupted by episodicevents, and through the skill of outside organizations to takeadvantage of these events and “reframe” the narrative (Iyengar1990; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Greenberg 2005; Ben-ford and Snow 2000; Tuchman 1978; Throgmorton 1996). Webuild on this research by illustrating the use of episodic events

by plant opponents to disrupt the plant owners’ core narrativeof technical competence and economic progress.

Examining the frames embedded in the news storiesillustrates which policy actors are achieving success in pro-moting their chosen interpretations (Entman 2003; GamsonandModigliani 1989; Gamson 1992; Iyengar 1990; Scheufele1999; Steensland 2008). Framing is the process of collectingpieces of perceived reality and assembling a narrative thatconnects those pieces to promote a particular interpretation.From a social constructionist perspective, events and activitiescan embody multiple meanings and definitions and be inter-preted in multiple ways (Albrecht and Amey 1999; Greiderand Garkovich 1994). How issues are framed is a “powerfulform of social control” that can focus policy debates andconstrain and circumscribe the policy outcomes that emerge(Iyengar 1990). In this study, examining the change in newsframes over time illustrates the changing policy debate and thechange in policy outcomes.

This work builds on previous research examining newsand public discourse around nuclear power (Benford 1993;Eckstein 1997; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Gamson1992; Jasper 1997; Palfreman 2006; Throgmorton 1996;Winner 1986). Here, we particularly draw from the workof Gamson and Modigliani (1989) who examined thecareers of interpretive packages or frames on nuclear powerbetween 1945 and 1989. They found that the only frameavailable in the media discourse until the 1970s was aneconomic progress package linking nuclear power to eco-nomic growth. Prior to the Three Mile Island accident in1979, other frames began to appear, an energy independenceframe that stressed the role of nuclear power in addressingthe dependence on other countries for fuel, a soft pathsframe arguing for lower impact, decentralized energy sour-ces, a not cost effective frame that criticized the increasingcost of building nuclear power plants, a runaway frame thatraised the concerns of nuclear power as unsafe and out ofcontrol, and lastly a public accountability frame promotedby Ralph Nader’s Critical Mass organization critical of theindustry and its regulators. Following Three Mile Islandand, again the Chernobyl accident in 1986, the runawayframe spiked, but unfavorable public opinion towards nuclearpower had already started to grow. The authors argue that theavailability of frames skeptical of nuclear power can explainthese changes in public opinion prior to the Three Mile Islandaccident (Gamson and Modigliani 1989). We relied on thisprevious research to develop the frames reviewed in this study.

Another means to understand how actors achieve successis to examine the frame’s narrative integrity to understandwhy certain frames may resonate more than others. A framehas to have coherence, be able to “hang together”, and becapable of explaining unfolding events (Fisher 1987; Gamson2005; Throgmorton 1996). Frames are social constructs em-bedded in cultural contexts (Gamson 1992); however, they

1 Journalists and news editors are also key actors; functioning as gate-keepers and interested policy actors themselves. The production ofnews is influenced by a complex interaction between: (1) journalisticnorms; (2) dependency on sources; (3) desire of the news industry toearn profits; (4) adherence to public preferences; and (5) the valuepreferences of journalists (Callaghan and Schnell 2001). The resultsreported in this study are certainly influenced by these biases in newsproduction. However, the results still serve as a valid reflection of theconstruction of meaning about Vermont Yankee within the mediadiscourse. The mass media is a central institution in the constructionof meaning about policy issues. Studying the media coverage aboutVermont Yankee tells an important part of the story of how VermontYankee was socially constructed.

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also draw meaning and legitimacy from external events. Aframe that fits with unfolding events is strengthened while apoor narrative fit undercuts the integrity of the frame (Gamson2005; Greenberg 2005; Reese 2007; Benford and Snow2000). In a case study of nuclear power plant decision-making in Chicago, Throgmorton (1996) found that the elec-tric utility’s preferred frame of progress and technical compe-tence faltered as the utility repeatedly missed plant deliverydates and costs ballooned—undercutting the narrative integrityof the utility’s story. We argue here that the narrative integrityof Entergy’s core frames also stumbled in the context ofunfolding events. Opponents capitalized on those events inthe media discourse, leading to changes in the discourse andultimately to changes in the policy outcome.

Findings

Frames in the media discourse

Our analysis shows that between 2003 and 2010, mediaframes and sponsor attributions in opposition to the plantincreased. Opponents capitalized on plant operational issuesand Entergy’s public missteps to portray an untrustworthycompany managing an unsafe power plant. Changes in themedia discourse illustrated by these changing frames, influ-enced by the policy actors, in turn influenced the policyactors and public opinion contributing to the eventual rejec-tion of the plant by state legislators in 2010. To illustratethese changing frames over time, this study examines 8 yearsof media discourse. We start with a short description of theframes and summarize their appearance. We then presentfindings on the narrative integrity of the frames, and then,present information on the change in sponsor citations andchanges within individual sponsor groups.

We identified three frames in support of continuingVermont Yankee’s operation; economic progress which em-phasized the value the plant provides to Vermont in terms oflow-cost electricity, employment, and as a steady and reliablesource of electric power; environmental progress, promotingthe environmental attributes, particularly the lower GHGemissions associated with nuclear power; and fair processwhich underscored the role of independent technical andregulatory third parties such as the NRC and the VermontPublic Service Board in verifying safety and other claims.

The dominant frame promoted by Entergy and the com-pany’s allies was economic progress, as in this sponsorstatement: “because of Vermont Yankee’s dependable andlow-cost power, Vermonters have the lowest electric rates inthe region, approximately 21% lower than elsewhere in NewEngland” Gram (2008a, b, c, d, e, f, g).

The company also promoted an environmental progressframe: “If we replaced Vermont Yankee with the mix (of

power sources) in New England, our carbon footprint wouldincrease to something like 320,000 tons, more than 10 timesgreater than what it is now” (Gram 2007a, b).

Fair process promotes regulatory decision-making pro-cesses over legislative and “political” processes as in thiscitation to Entergy’s Brian Cosgrove: “Legislative action inthis case is unnecessary…The Public Service Board process isdesigned to handle this kind of case, which is highly complexand politically charged” (Gram 2008a, b, c, d, e, f, g).

The two primary frames in opposition to Vermont Yankee’scontinued operation we identified are public accountability,stressing the lack of accountability and trustworthiness of theplant’s out-of-state owners and biased federal and stateregulatory processes, and runaway, which presents VermontYankee as an aging, unsafe nuclear power plant. Issues such asthe disposal of nuclear waste, radiation issues, emergencymanagement procedures, warm water discharges into theConnecticut River, equipment failure, and unplanned shut-downs all underscore the runaway frame. A third frame thatrarely appeared in the debate, we called alternatives, promot-ing the concept of cleaner, safer, local, and often decentralizedalternatives to the nuclear power plant.

Here is a citizen at a public meeting displaying therunaway frame: “It’s dangerous, and the thing that bothersme most is the terrible nuclear waste that they’re generatingevery year that’s going to be radioactive for thousands ofyears,” (Gram 2003).

Vermont Senate President Peter Shumlin, who returned tothe legislature in 2007, frequently displayed the public ac-countability frame: “It’s pretty unfortunate when the com-missioner of public service becomes a wholly ownedsubsidiary of Entergy Louisiana. He fights for the raw dealbeing given Vermonters harder than Entergy” (Gram 2008a,b, c, d, e, f, g).

Figure 1 illustrates that runaway is the dominant opposi-tion frame through the case study time period. However,there is an increase in displays of the public accountabilityframe, starting in 2007. As public accountability increases,Vermont Yankee’s economic progress frame decreases. Ver-mont Yankee’s chosen frames of economic progress, environ-mental progress, and fair process all declined in prominence in2010 as the story became dominated by the debate aboutEntergy management practices and safety issues related tothe tritium leak.

In 2003, about half of the frames displayed fell evenlybetween support and opposition to Vermont Yankee. In 2005and 2006, Vermont Yankee captured the majority. Starting in2007, opposition frames surpassed pro-Vermont Yankeeframes, and by 2010, opposition frames outnumbered supportframes more than 2:1 (68% to 31%) (see Fig. 1).

One way to illustrate the changing frames over time inthe media discourse is to look at the frames chosen by thenewspaper reporters. In 2003 through 2007, reporters’

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display of public accountability never topped 8%. In 2008through 2010, displays of public accountability coded toreporters averaged 36% of all the journalist’s displayedframes.

The use of unfolding events to underscore the narrativeintegrity of the frames

Both our media analysis and our interviews reveal thatbetween 2003 and 2010, opponents were able to reframethe debate by using unfolding events to underscore thenarrative integrity of their preferred frame. Plant supportersand opponents told two competing stories about the plantduring the time period of the case study. Supporters of theplant argued that it was a well-managed facility providingsafe, reliable, low-cost electricity and was an economicboon to the state. Opponents argued the plant was an aging,unsafe, and unreliable facility managed by an untrustworthyout-of-state corporation motivated by profit.

We highlight two events here to illustrate how opponentsused unfolding events to reframe the debate and undercutthe narrative integrity of Entergy’s preferred storylines.Interviewees pointed frequently to these two events as keyto understanding the Senate’s 2010 vote.

2007 Cooling tower collapse Vermont Yankee’s coolingtowers are not the iconographic towers of the Three MileIsland nuclear power plant, but instead a system comprised

of 22 60-ft towers, each with a large fan and a series of waterholding tanks and pumps and heat exchangers. Dependingon the mode the plant is operating in, the time of the year,and conditions set in the plant’s permit, cooled water isdischarged back into the river. In August 2007, one of thecooling towers collapsed when an internal support beamgave way. An anonymous worker at the plant emailed aphoto of the collapsed tower to the local newspaper and toplant opponents (see Fig. 2).

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Fig. 1 Distribution of framesby percent in Associated PressVermont Yankee news coveragebetween 1 January 2003 and 2March 2010

Fig. 2 Water-cooling tower collapse photograph taken by an anonymousphotographer. www.vermontdailybriefing.com. Accessed 26 Mar 2010

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Plant opponents seized on the incident, circulating thephoto to news organizations, sending it to policymakers, andposting it on various web sites (Burns, personal communica-tion; Moore, personal communication; Hofmann, personalcommunication). Over the next 3 years, opponents continuedto develop materials and campaign communications leverag-ing off of the cooling tower collapse (Peterson, personalcommunication, 2011). For example, the Vermont PublicInterest Research Group (VPIRG) distributed a brochure withthe “collapse” photo displayed in their door-to-door canvassoperations in 2008 and 2009. VPIRG and other environmentalactors in opposition to the plant used the event to highlight astory of an aging and unreliable nuclear plant (Fig. 3).

Although the NRC determined the cooling tower collapseto be of “no safety significance”, media reports character-ized it differently: “Safety has been a major concern thisweek. On Tuesday, a huge section of the 50-foot tall housingthat surrounds a bank of 11 ‘cells’ in a cooling towercollapsed suddenly in a shower of water, wood, plastic andasbestos, forcing the plant to cut power in half” (Gram2007a, b). And for the first time since Entergy purchasedthe plant, news stories focused on the plant’s age. Nine daysafter the cooling tower collapse, a second incident led to anews story headlined “Is Vermont Yankee Showing ItsAge?” The story continued: “Two mishaps within 10 daysat the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant have given am-munition to its critics, prompted questions from regulators andhave the plant’s owners working to reassure the public aboutits safety” (Gram 2007a, b).

References to the incident occurred frequently in opposi-tion statements and media stories in the following years. TheAssociated Press cited the cooling tower “collapse” 121times following the August incident. Journalists also con-tinued to cite the event as an example of an aging facility,leading up the Senate vote in 2010: “Vermont Yankee hasbeen showing its age…at least since 2007, when a cooling

tower collapse produced spectacular photos of a jagged,broken, 6-foot-wide pipe spewing thousands of gallons ofwater onto a pile of rubble below” (Gram 2010a, b, c, d, e, f).

When problems at a second Vermont Yankee coolingtower occurred in July 2008, opponents jumped on the story.In a press conference 2 days after this incident—also citedas non-safety by the NRC—VPIRG’s Director Paul Burnssaid: “It’s not overstating things to say this plant is fallingapart. It needs to be retired.” Added another environmentalgroup leader, “This plant is failing before our very eyes… Ifthese folks can’t catch a water leak, Heaven help us if theyhave a radiation leak at this plant” (Perron 2008). Theincident, and later ones, also spurred a rebroadcasting of theoriginal photo.

Underground vs. buried pipes A second example illustrat-ing changes in the narrative integrity of the competing corenarratives is the news discourse around underground pipesat the facility. For several years, plant opponents and legis-lators had expressed concerns that Vermont Yankee mighthave underground pipes that could leak radioactive substan-ces. When the oral testimony started in the license extensionproceeding before the Vermont Public Service Board in thespring of 2009, regulators directly asked about undergroundpipes. Entergy’s lead official on the license application,Vice-President of Nuclear Operations Jay Thayer, wasasked, “Does Vermont Yankee have any underground pipingthat carries radio nuclides?” Thayer responded; “I can dosome research on that and get back to you, but I don’t believethere are active piping systems containing contaminated fluidstoday” (Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP 2010). In a separatetestimony and in emails to state officials during the spring andfall of 2009, Entergy officials said the plant did not haveunderground pipes carrying contaminated materials. On 10January 2010, just as the 2010 legislative session commenced,Entergy announced they had found tritium in monitoring

Fig. 3 Postcard distributed byVPIRG in summer 2008door-to-door canvass.Source: VPIRG

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wells—a leak later traced to underground pipes at the plant.Legislators, environmental groups, and the state’s Republicangovernor all joined in the subsequent media furor. An inves-tigation later found that Entergy had not deliberately lied,instead plant officials interpreted “underground pipes” tomean pipes buried in direct contact with soil and not pipesbelow ground but encased in concrete trenches—the source ofthe contamination (Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP 2010).

Opponents seized on Entergy’s statements as an exampleof a company that could not be trusted. As VPIRG’s DuanePeterson said; “We played up our message; the plant wasold, dangerous and irresponsible. Old and dangerous wereunderscored by the thing falling apart. Irresponsible wasunderscored by their lying. So we just kept hammering onthem” (Peterson, personal communication).

Changing frame sponsorship in the media discourse

Our analysis demonstrates that the media view of VermontYankee moved from seeing the plant as a fixture of Vermont’selectrical system (strongly entwined with the Vermont econo-my and supported by its political elite) to seeing it as a riskyliability; and that this shift in view was crucial to the 2010vote. In addition to changes in frames, we argue here thatchanges in the news media sponsors also contributed to thechanged outcome. There are three changes that we highlightbelow: greater prominence of legislators in the news media,changes within legislative actors, and changes within environ-mental actors although percent attributions to environmentalgroups remained constant.

Over the 8 years of the study, the most prominent actorswere government officials at town, state, and federal agencies(39%), Entergy officials and the company’s allies (29%) fol-lowed by legislators (14%), and environmental groups (13%).Citizens (2%) and non-affiliated organizations/independentscientists (3%) barely registered in the debate.

Examining the frames promoted by sponsors shows astrong consistency in positions towards the continued oper-ation of the plant (Fig. 4). Not surprisingly, Entergy and thecompany’s allies in other Vermont electric companies and

business organizations consistently supported the plant(95%) as did government generally (70%). In oppositionto the plant, environmental interest groups (99%) and Vermontlegislators, including the congressional delegation were alsoconsistent (86%) (see Fig. 5 below). A close review of spon-sors indicates two notable changes over the 8-year case studytime period—a change in the actors within the environmentalgroup category and an increase in citations to legislators as the2010 vote approached.

Environmental groups Environmental groups in oppositionto the plant accounted for, on average, 13% of all quotes andcitations in the news coverage each year, ranging from a highof 20% in 2004 to a low of 9% in 2010. However, organiza-tional actors within the environmental group category changedstarting in 2007. Since 1971, the New England Coalition onNuclear Pollution (NEC) based in southern Vermont has ledenvironmental interest group opposition to Vermont Yankee.The organization has pursued a regulatory strategy, focusingresources on intervening in federal and state regulatory pro-cesses, with its organizing presence primarily confined tosouthern Vermont (Gram 2006a, b). Through 2006, the NECis the most frequently cited opponent to the plant, receiving themajority of the environmental interest group attributions. Start-ing in 2007, different environmental interest groups joined thediscourse, including the Citizens Awareness Network, Green-peace, and Citizens for a Nuclear Free Vermont. But the mostprominent andmost frequently cited organization in oppositionbecomes the VPIRG, a statewide organization headquarteredin Montpelier, the state’s capital. Between 2003 and 2006, theNEC received 86% of the attributions cited to an interest groupin opposition to Vermont Yankee. In 2007, the two organiza-tions split the citations. By 2009, VPIRG is cited three times asoften as NEC.

VPIRG pursued a different approach in its opposition to thepower plant. The group eschewed the regulatory process,leaving that to NEC and others, and instead allocated resourcesto grass-roots organizing, legislative lobbying, and media ad-vocacy (Paul Burns, personal communication). Starting in2007, organizational resources allocated to opposing Vermont

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50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

AP 2003

AP 2004

AP 2005

AP 2006

AP 2007

AP 2008

AP 2009

AP 2010

Per

cen

t of c

itat

ion

s p

er y

ear

State and federal legislators

Citizens and Other

Federal, State and Local Government

Environmental Interests

Vermont yankee and Other Business Interests

Fig. 4 Distribution of sponsorcitations 2003–2010

138 J Environ Stud Sci (2012) 2:131–142

Yankee increased sharply, growing more than fivefold andpeaking in the 4-month period leading up to the vote to rejectthe plant in 2010 (Paul Burns, personal communication). Be-cause of its focus on the regulatory process, the NEC reportedno spending on lobbying or legislative activities in 2007(Vermont Secretary of State 2011). VPIRG, on the other hand,reported spending $86,000 in 2007, $133,000 in 2008, and$274,000 in 2009 and 2010 (Vermont Secretary of State 2011).

To win the legislative vote, these opponents believed thatthey had to broaden the media debate beyond southernVermont and underscore issues of public accountabilityand trust to win legislative votes in areas distant from theplant. As Citizen Awareness Network Director Deb Katzsaid: “We made the decision that being in the southern partof the state would not win us the vote…. We had to move tonorth and central Vermont to win a vote on this. And we hadto make it real to them that there were issues. In fact, notsafety issues. Issues about reliability. Issues about misman-agement. Issues about trustworthiness. Issues about system-ic mismanagement that could have meaning to other people”(Katz, personal communication).

Legislators A second key change illustrated in the mediadiscourse is the increased prominence of legislators startingin 2007. Legislators comprised about 5% of citations in2003. By 2009, 26% of all cited comments are attributedto legislators. As legislative sponsor attributions grew in themedia, key legislative actors changed, with a legislatorcritical of Entergy’s ownership of Vermont Yankee takingover as Senate President in 2007 and a legislator opposed tonuclear power becoming Chair of the House Energy andNatural Resources Committee in 2008—the key legislativecommittee reviewing Vermont Yankee issues.

Discussion

The analysis of the media discourse illustrates how VermontYankee moved from a fixture of Vermont’s electric system

to rejection by the state’s political leaders in the 8 years itoperated under the management of Entergy Nuclear. Threetrends are evident in the media discourse, starting prior tothe announcement of the tritium leaks in 2010—changes inmedia frames, changes in the prominence of certain policyactors, and changes within policy actor categories.

Starting with the sponsors in the discourse, there is anincrease in attributions to legislative leaders in the 3 yearsfollowing the 2007 cooling tower collapse and leading intothe Vermont Senate 2010 vote to reject the plant. Legislativeleader’s increased emphasis on public accountability is aprime driver in the increase in the prominence of that frame.Prior to 2007, legislative leaders’ position towards theplants’ continued operation can be characterized as grudg-ing acceptance. For example, in 2006, Entergy requested anapproval to store high-level radioactive waste in concretebunkers outside the facility, commonly called “dry caskstorage.” Safety issues are the purview of the NRC, butthe waste storage request required a vote of the legislature.Legislative approvals came following concessions byEntergy to create a “Clean Energy Development Fund” withtotal appropriations of $25 million (Gram 2007a, b). As onekey legislator said during the debate “permission for dry-caskstorage would then come in exchange for financial invest-ments in future energy sources” (Associated Press 2005).

The following year, the legislature’s move to acquireauthority in the relicensing decision was characterized in asimilar vein by then Vermont Senate President Peter Welch(D-Windsor), as previously noted. After 2007, there was anincreased prominence of legislator’s use of the public ac-countability frame. For example, here is Senate PresidentPeter Shumlin in 2008, “The Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion is a wholly owned subsidiary of the nuclear industry”(Associated Press 2008).

At the heart of the public accountability frame is a con-cern about the lack of accountability of Vermont Yankee’sowner, Entergy Nuclear. Opponents increasingly illustratedthis by talking about the company as “out-of-state” or put-ting the word Louisiana or New Orleans in front of Entergy

Support

Oppose

Vermont Environmental Government Legislators Citizens/Yankee Interests Other

150

100

50

0

50

100

150

Fig. 5 Number of citations tosponsors in Associated PressVermont Yankee news coveragebetween 1 January 2003 and 2March 2010 and their positionon continued operation of theplant. (n0579)

J Environ Stud Sci (2012) 2:131–142 139

when they spoke of the company. Vermont’s electric utilitiesare small-scale, Vermont-based entities very tied into theircustomer base (Young, personal communication). Oppo-nents contrasted Vermont utilities and Vermont Yankee withEntergy to underscore narratives of trust and integrity(White, personal communication). Here is Shumlin in2009 “It’s my judgment that the Douglas Administrationand the Governor has lost their objectivity when it comesto Entergy Louisiana. Clearly, as evidenced by the vetoes,they will stand up for Entergy Louisiana stockholders atthe expense of Vermont ratepayers and Vermont voters”(emphasis added) (Gram 2009).

The replacement of the southern Vermont-based NewEngland Coalition and its emphasis on the regulatory pro-cess with the statewide, grass-roots-oriented, and mediasavvy VPIRG underscores the role of sponsorship activitiesin reframing the debate. The skill of these groups to useunfolding events depends on their resources, knowledge ofjournalistic practices, and organizing abilities (Carragee andRoefs 2004; Gamson 2005; Lawrence 2010). VPIRG andother environmental groups brought a new approach to thecontest, avoiding participation in state and federal regulato-ry processes and instead focusing on media and grass-rootsorganizing (Paul Burns, personal communication). In late2009 and into the spring of 2010, VPIRG poured more than$175,000 into public opinion surveys, paid advertising, andstepped up organizing and legislative lobbying (Paul Burns,personal communication). These resources allowed the or-ganization to refine media messaging strategies, taking ad-vantage of outside events to underscore their preferredframes.

Turning to the concept of narrative integrity, this studyillustrates how events at the plant undercut plant supporter’spreferred frames and allowed opponents an opportunity topromote their chosen frames. The collapse of the water-cooling tower in 2007 highlighted opposition narratives ofan aging, unsafe, and mismanaged nuclear power plant andundercut Entergy’s preferred frames of economic progressand fair process emphasizing expert knowledge and rationalplanning. The continuing news stories in 2008 and 2009about shortfalls in the decommissioning fund promptedefforts by Entergy to create a new corporation to potentiallyavoid some of the plant’s future liabilities and the 2010stories about tritium leaks and plant officials misleadingstatements all further undercut Entergy’s preferred frames.Policy entrepreneurs look for episodic events and “policywindows” that allow them to promote their chosen narra-tives in the media (Kingdon 1984; Lawrence 2010). VPIRGand other plant opponents seized on the August 2007 cool-ing tower collapse to underscore the narrative of an agingand unsafe plant, broadcasting the image through the mediaand through the organization’s various communication andorganizing activities. Evidence of the success of these policy

entrepreneurs is seen in the changed media discourse in theyears leading up to the senate vote.

In early 2010, the announcement of a tritium leak andlater evidence that Entergy officials had mislead state regu-lators about the existence of underground pipes underscoredopposition narratives of untrustworthy utility executives.Senate President Shumlin summarized the opposition argu-ments this way on the day of the senate vote “Vermontersdeserve better than an aging, unreliable nuclear power plantowned by an untrustworthy out-of-state corporation” (Gram2010e).

However, the public accountability frame had alreadystarted to increase in 2008, as the media discourse illustrates.Journalists also adopted this frame over time, becoming in-creasingly critical. By 2010, journalists were displaying publicaccountability in 31% of their unattributed frames, such as thisstatement: “The state’s lone nuclear plant had a tough day inthe capital Wednesday, getting reprimanded by utility regula-tors in the morning for misleading statements and getting callsfrom the governor later in the day for a management shake-up” (Gram 2010a, b, c, d, e, f). The increased displays ofpublic accountability were also driven by the increasing roleof legislators in the news media—from 4% of citations in2006 to 26% in 2009—and increasing legislative referencesto the plant’s out-of-state owners.

Conclusion

This case study underscores the value of examining mediadiscourse to understand changes in public opinion and pub-lic policy (Gamson and Modigliani 1989). We find thatexamining the media discourse in the years leading up tothe Senate vote confirms that opposition narratives towardsthe plant had already started to gain traction, starting in 2007with the water-cooling tower collapse. The change in mediaactors and their skill in taking advantage of exogenousevents to promote their preferred frames contributed to thechanges in media frames over time.

This study set out to understand the Vermont Legislature’s2010 vote to reject Vermont Yankee, a plant that had earlierbeen seen as likely to be relicensed. The study demonstratedthat there was a confluence of events, strategic framing, andinvigorated policy actors that helped plant opponents “win”the policy debate. The water-cooling tower collapse and thetritium leaks provided “policy windows” (Kingdon 1984)which allowed opponents to develop a credible narrative thatquestioned the safety, reliability, and accountability ofVermont Yankee. The story of Vermont Yankee is theoreticallyinteresting because it demonstrates the intersection betweenthe social construction of reality and real-world events. Morespecifically, it illustrates that strategic framing can be success-ful when policy actors weave a narrative that employs ideas

140 J Environ Stud Sci (2012) 2:131–142

and symbols that resonate and fit with real-world events. Theseobservations are applicable beyond Vermont Yankee to broaderenvironmental policy and policy in general. These findings areinstructive in understanding the factors contributing to changesin the media discourse around news coverage of nuclear powerand how those changes can influence and be influenced by thepolicy actors, contributing to changed policy outcomes.

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