U N C L A S S I F I E D

U N C L A S S I F I E D

LA-UR-09-04261LA-UR-09-04261

1Operated by the Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

The Role of the IAEA

Safeguards Inspector

Brian D. BoyerBrian D. BoyerNonproliferation Team Leader/ Project Leader International Safeguards

Los Alamos National LaboratoryLos Alamos National Laboratory

Nuclear Nonproliferation DivisionNuclear Nonproliferation Division

July 21 2009July 21 2009

ORNL Global Nuclear Security Technology Division

Nuclear Nonproliferation Summer Seminar Series

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Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

• Negotiations Concluded in 1968

• Entered into Force in 1970

• 189 States Including 5 Declared Nuclear Weapon States (USA, Russia, U.K., France, China) plus Taiwan (China) * DPRK signed but withdrew

• INFCIRC/153 agreements / Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA)

• Trust but verify!

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INFCIRC 153 (Corr.) Para. 28: The Safeguards Technical Objective The Key Goal of the Safeguards Inspector

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Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA)“Traditional Safeguards”

INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) Para. 28: The Safeguards Technical Objective

… the objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection…

The Inspector is the person in charge on making this happen:• Timeliness• Significant Quantities• Deterrence by Risk of Early Detection

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The Inspector’s Journey - Day One

Flughafen Wien - VIEThe Safeguards Inspector’s Future Home Away From HomePersonal Data….139 days spent here in 5 years for duty travel

ARRIVAL IN VIENNA

Flughafen Wien (June 2006)

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IAEA Headquarters-ViennaLearning the Ropes of the Agency and Wien

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ICAS - Introductory Course on Agency Safeguards

39th ICAS (Spring 1997) - Rear- Araujo (Brazil), Yanez Carrera (Cuba), Derrough (France), Ayers (USA), Ajjeh (Jordan), Pellechi (USA)Front - Alexandrian (Armenia), Tsvetkov (Belarus), Boyer (USA), Ochiai (Japan)

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ICAS Provides the Inspector His RolesRoles for the Novice SG Inspector

1. Introduction to IAEA Safeguards2. Nuclear Material Accountancy3. Inspections of Item Facilities4. Inspection Documentation Package5. Containment and Surveillance6. Non-Destructive Assay (NDA)7. Inspections of Bulk-Handling Facilities8. Administrative MattersFIELD EXERCISE - Comprehensive Inspection Exercise Training – CIET

Since 1997

The Additional Protocol – INFCIRC/540 (Corr.)

The Accountant Inspector

}The Investigative Inspector

}

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Introduction to IAEA Safeguards

• The safeguards system– Significant Quantity– Timeliness– Material Goals

• Safeguards approaches• Safeguards criteria• Inspector activities

– Initial inspection– Ad Hoc inspection– Routine inspection– Special inspection

• Legal aspects• Strengthened Safeguards System

SAFEGUARDS APPROACH FOR LWR

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“Material and Timeliness Goals” Guidance to IAEA Graded Safeguards

Nuclear Material SQ in KG

Pu (<80% Pu-238) 8 kg Pu

U-233 8 kg U-233

HEU (=>20% U-235) 25 kg U-235

LEU (<20% U-235 including natural U and depleted U)

75 kg U-235 (or 10 t nat. U or 20 t depleted U)

Thorium 20 t Thorium

Nuclear Material Material Form Conversion

Time IAEA Timeliness Goals

Pu, HEU or U-233 Metal few days (7-10) 1 MONTH

Pure Pu components

Oxide (PuO2) few weeks (1-3)

Pure HEU or U-233 compounds

Oxide (UO2) few weeks (1-3)

MOX Non-irradiated fresh fuel

few weeks (1-3)

Pu, HEU or U-233 In scrap few weeks (1-3)

Pu, HEU or U-233 In irradiated fuel few months (1-3) 3 MONTHS

LEU and Th Unirradiated Fresh Fuel

order of 1 year 1 YEAR

MaterialGoals

TimelinessGoals

Probability of Detection

Random Low (20%)

Random Medium (50%)

Random High (90%)

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Nuclear Material Accountancy

• Concepts of accountancy– Declarations – basis of everything– The principle of independent verification

Started as a marriage of principles and practices borrowed from Property accounting Statistical quality control Financial accounts auditing

• Code 10 Reporting - drudgery– PIL = Physical Inventory Listing– ICR = Inventory Change Report– MBR = Material Balance Report

Karl-Heinz CzockIn memoriam to a good friend d. 27.09.2008

The Inspector Doing his Accountancy

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Inspections of Item Facilities

• Reactors – inspectors spend lots of time at reactors– Light Water Reactors (LWRs)

PWR, BWR, VVER– On-Load Reactors (OLRs)

CANDU RBMK (Ignalina, Chernobyl)

– Other Types of Reactors Fast Breeder PBMR GEN IV concepts

– Research Reactors and Critical Assemblies (RRCAs)• Storage facilities – Spent Fuel storage (AFRS)

LWR Spent Fuel Safeguards

Boyer (SGOC) and Akilimali (SGOA) at CLAB (Sweden)-ICVD Training 1999

LWR Fresh Fuel – Item Form

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Inspection Documentation Package

• The IDP – documentation– Details!

• Verification methods– PIL, ICR, MBR – declarations must be verified

• CIR - Computerized Inspection Report– The Logsheet– Statement on Inspection Results - 90a Statement– Statement on Conclusions - 90b Statement– Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR)

• Statistics– MUF = PB + R – S – PE– Random sampling concepts

The Inspector Doing Verification

Statistical Sampling of FF Population

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• Maintain “Continuity of Knowledge” (CoK)

– Use Containment

– Use Surveillance

Containment and SurveillanceComplementary Measures to MC&A

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Non Destructive Assay (NDA)

• Agency must verify State’s declaration

• NDA - Means of material verification– Radiation signals

Gamma Rays Neutrons

– Materials of interest U Pu

• Sampling plans – Random basis with Detection Probability – Random Low (RL) = 20%– Random Medium (RM) = 50%– Random High (RH) = 90%

• Three levels of defects to detect:– Gross defect – Partial defect– Bias defect

NeutronsHLNC (Pu)

Gamma RaysGe detector (U or Pu)

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Inspections of Bulk Handling Facilities

• Bulk Handling Facilities – Categories– Natural and LEU Conversion and Fuel Fab Plants– Fabrication Plants Handling Direct-Use Material– Reprocessing Plants– Enrichment Plants

• Material in bulk– More challenging inspection regime– More effort for IAEA

• MUF = PB + R – S – PE ≠ 0

Gamma Ray Measurement of UF6 Cylinder

UF6 – Bulk Form

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Administrative Matters

• Travel – Designation for country– Laissez-Passer– Visas– Travel procedures

• Occupational health and safety– Radiation worker qualification and rad limits– Medical certificate – needed for travel

Physicals Whole Body Counting Urinalysis – for radiation exposure

– Dosimetry• Security of safeguards information

SGOA Director – D. Perricos (Greece)SGOB Director – D. Schriefer (Germany)

39th ICAS Being Briefed by Directors on…The Life of an Inspector – May 1997

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Key to Transparency and TrustSafeguards Confidential = Protection of Information

• What Needs to be Protected?– Design of a nuclear facility– Nuclear material information

QuantityLocationCompositionMovement of nuclear material

– Safeguards approach or goals for a specific facility– Results of a specific inspection

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Comprehensive Inspection Exercise Training

39th ICAS- June, 1997 - Loviisa, Finland - Twin VVER440 reactors

Exercise - Practice LWR Physical Inventory Verification (PIV)

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Strengthened Safeguards SystemPost 1991 Gulf War – SSS Inspection Role

THE UPDATED OBJECTIVES

“the safeguards system should be designed to provide credible assurances that there has been no diversion of declared nuclear material and that there is no undeclared nuclear material and activities (BOG, March 1995)”

• Consequences– Additional Protocol / Complementary Access – Emphasis on information based safeguards– Increased transparency measures– The Investigative Inspector

The Investigative Inspector

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The Inspector’s Key RoleAccess to Facilities – Travel and Inspections

• Interim Inspections

• Physical Inventory Verification

• Design Information Verification

• Random Inspections– LFUA– ELFUA– SNRI

• AP Complementary Access

• Special Inspections

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KEY SGOA SGOB SGOC

Tokyo(SGOA)

Toronto(SGOB)

Vienna(HQ)

IAEA Dept. of Safeguards Operational Divisions (Circa 1997) – Inspection Destinations

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Roles - IAEA Country Officer / Facility Officer B. Boyer Country Officer 2001- Poland

FACILITY TYPE MATERIAL

Ewa (Swierk) Thermal research reactor (shutdown) Spent fuel

Anna & Agatha (Swierk)

Thermal critical facility (shutdown) Closed

Maria (Swierk) Thermal reactor (30 MWth MTR HEU)

HEU (Fresh fuel, core fuel and spent fuel) Various items for research stored in basement

Institute of Nuclear Research (Swierk)

R & D Facility Minimal

Misc. Locations LOF Small quantities

Institute for Nuclear and Chemistry and Engr. (Warsaw)

R & D Small quantities

B. Boyer – SGOC1.2 Country Officer Facility Officer for all Polish Facilities Additional Protocol Activities State Level Issues of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Activities

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Personal Note: The Inspector’s Trail’s End Last Inspection December 2001

89 trips - 469 days in the field

Co-ordinated 38 inspections

Received 5.99 mSv radiation doseApproximately twice one year’s background

Received a lifetime of education

FRANCE – Last Inspection

Cape La HagueNext Stop BNL

Dec 2001

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Auf Wiedersehen - February 2002The Inspector – Int’l Civil Servant/Diplomat

IAEA HQ - Vienna (Feb 2002)

The best word to know in all languages:

Danke, Dziękuję, Hvala, СПАСИБА, Merci, Dêkuji, Köszi, Dekui, Multumesc, Dank U, Kiitos, Grazie, Gracias, Blagodarya, Dakujem

Thanks!