The Role of the Rural Development in Peace Building

8/6/2019 The Role of the Rural Development in Peace Building

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Afghanistan: What Kind of Peace?

The Role of Rural Development in Peace-Building

Dr. Omar Zakhilwal and Jane Murphy ThomasKabul, Afghanistan

Working paper, November 2005What Kind of Peace is Possible? project

Final version to be published in a bookWith other WKOP papers in mid-2006

Co-funded by theCanadian International Development Agency (CIDA)International Development Research Centre (IDRC)

Ford FoundationNorwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD)

Dr. Omar Zakhilwal

Omar Zakhilwal is an Afghan Canadian Economist. He is the founder of Afghanistan ofAfghanistan Center for Policy and Development Studies (ACPDS). Prior to his currentjob as the President of Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA), Dr. Zakhilwalserved as the Chief Policy Advisor at the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation &Development (MRRD). However, this paper reflects the independent research of theauthors and is not an MRRD position paper. Over the course of his stay in Afghanistan,Dr. Zakhilwal has been part of the two Loya Jirgas that elected the president for theAfghanistan Transitional Government (June 2002) and ratified AfghanistansConstitution (Dec 2003), served as an author of Afghanistans First National HumanDevelopment Report (2004); and has been part of many other rural development iniatives.

Jane Murphy Thomas

Jane Murphy Thomas is a Canadian social anthropologist and independent consultantspecializing in Afghanistan, community development and participatory developmentsince 1984. Currently she is engaged by the Government of Afghanistans Ministry forRural Rehabilitation and Development to conceptualize the Afghanistan Institute forRural Development. [[email protected]]


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1. Introduction

Afghanistan is often depicted as being in a post-conflict situation, but questions remain ifthis is an accurate description. While peace could be on the horizon, the distance to thathorizon is unclear. Overall, conditions are considered to have improved since the fall of

the Taliban in 2001, however, insecurity is widespread. What fragile peace exists is bothdetermined and threatened by numerous complex factors. As this papers title suggests,development in rural areas where most of Afghanistans citizens live, could perhaps bethe most critical issue in determining the future.

In seeking to best understand the role of rural development in sustainable peace-building,we address several key questions throughout this paper: What is the background that ledto the present situation and what implications does this have for todays policy makers?What factors or conditions will determine or threaten peace? What roles are foreignmilitary playing in peace building? What efforts are underway to rebuild the statestructures and create conditions that at least make peace feasible? What are the lessons

learned elsewhere in participatory rural development that can now be applied inAfghanistan? What lessons can be drawn from Afghanistans history and the NationalSolidarity Programme and applied to Afghanistans rural development as a whole?

This paper is set out in five sections. Following this introduction, Section Two gives areview and background to provide historical context, examining how past ruraldevelopment policies, or lack of them, contributed to the cause of war and howdrastically different rural policies are needed now. Section Three, focuses on todaysstate-building and peace-building process, its threats and determinants, with an emphasison the links to rural development. Afghanistan where most citizens live in rural areas,rural development, especially participatory rural development, and peace building are

largely dependent on each other. Section Four looks at the broad, international subject ofparticipatory rural development and within that framework, examines the largest suchprogramme underway in Afghanistan, the National Solidarity Programme (NSP). SectionFive draws conclusions about rural development and peace, and what lessons from thehistory of Afghanistan and the NSP has for Afghanistans rural development as a whole.

For this paper, information was collected from primary and secondary sources. Athorough literature review was conducted, including both published and grey literature,along with field work. Twenty nine villages in five provinces of Afghanistan were visited.The five provinces, Ningahar, Logar, Wardak, Parwan and Herat. In each of theprovinces, villages were randomly selected. On the first visit to each of the villages,

surveyors conducted a survey using a questionnaire. One of the authors and his researchassistants then re-visited the same villages, collecting qualitative data through participantobservation, attending meetings, conducting interviews with key informants includingfacilitating partners; leaders, members and non-members of CDCs, in the villages and onCDC project sites, as well as with NSP officials.

Although the five provinces represent a diversity of ethnic groups, topography, economic,security and other conditions, it was noted that the problems, weaknesses or strengths in


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NSP activities across the 29 villages visited was relatively similar. Although no attemptwas made to rigorously compare villages, four villages with NSP problems and strengthsat least roughly representative of those observed in all the villages visited were chosen ascase studies. As shown below, this range of strengths and weaknesses was similar tothose identified in the national conference Community Development Councils in July

2005. See Endnotes for a list of all the villages visited.

2. Historical Background

Afghanistan presents a striking example of the connections among rural development,war and peace. One constant in the country has been relations between Kabul and the restof the country, relations that at best have hardly existed, and at worst have caused socialunrest and war. While the majority of the population, roughly 70%, remains rural,development infrastructure and services historically have been concentrated in the cities,especially Kabul (ANHDR: 2004:168). This trend began in the 1950s, strengthened

through to the 1990s with the politicization of aid from western countries and the USSR,and the decades of war.

A major turning point in Kabul-rural relations came in 1978, with a coup detat thatplaced Nur Mohammad Taraki in power. Taraki and his communist party governmentimmediately began introducing and rapidly enforcing eight major reforms which weredirected at rural populations. While all the reforms were unpopular to varying degrees,the land reform and literacy programmes are remembered as the most severe andunacceptable. In its attempt at land reform, Tarakis government sent representativesbacked by government troops to the villages to confiscate land and re-distribute it. Anation-wide literacy programme was also imposed by Takakis government. It was

compulsory for everyone who could not read or write, and treated villagers and the ruralway of life with contempt. Even old people, who are held in high respect by Afghans,where forced to attend. Literacy programme text books illustrated that being a farmer wasa backward way of life, while working in a factory or office was superior.

All these reforms, were enforced by the military and soon met with up-risings around thecountry, leading to the 1979 invasion by the USSR to prop-up the Afghan regime it hadcreated. A full decade later, after millions were killed or fled as refugees and thecountrys education, health and infrastructure destroyed, the USSR withdrew its troops in1989. For over another decade, the Mujahideen and Taliban added their own chapters ofconflict and destruction.

A new crossroads was reached in 2001. In response to the terrorist events in the USA onSeptember 11, the US launched a military invasion into Afghanistan which resulted in thecollapse of the ruling Taliban regime. This military intervention was coupled with a UN-mediated political framework, the Bonn Agreement, signed on December 5, 2001. Whilere-building of the Afghan state has begun, the countrys security remains unsettled.


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In this paper we outline what has happened since the 2001 Bonn Agreement, pointing outthe challenges and links among them for state building, peace building and ruraldevelopment. In a country where rural development policies have meant either almost nogovernment services, or the opposite extreme - unwanted reforms forced on the peopleleading to uprisings and war - drastically different rural policies are needed, ones that are

sensitive, sustainable, and participatory.

Out of the Bonn agreement and unprecedented pledges and involvement of manycountries to help in the rebuilding of Afghanistan, many programmes and projects haveemerged. One of those, the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), was designed for rapidbuild-up of rural development on a country-wide basis. In this paper we examine the NSPand what lessons can be extracted from it for Afghanistans rural development as a whole.Throughout the paper, we explore what is needed in rural development for it to be acatalyst in peace-building and state-building?

3. Todays State Building and Peace Building Process

The 2001 Bonn Agreement set into action a number of steps in state-building. Mostsignificantly, it established an interim authority and transitional government. In January2004, a new constitution was established. In October 2004, national presidential electionswere held in which Hamid Karzai became the first elected president of Afghanistan.Parliamentary elections were held in September 2005.

Other hopeful results in building and stabilizing the state include the voluntary return ofover three million Afghan refugees from Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere; the return of atleast four million children to school, one third of them girls; and the successful launch ofseveral major development and reconstruction initiatives, among them the NSP.

From the Bonn agreement, specific commissions were established either to directlyfacilitate the political processes, or to lay the foundations for specific tasks: legal reformand rule of law, the observance and protection of human rights and the future publicadministration and its needed reforms. The Bonn Agreement also addressed the need tofill the security vacuum by requesting the deployment of International SecurityAssistance Force (ISAF) and specified the role of the United Nations in supporting thestate-building processes. Other critical elements in state building and peace building are:participation by Afghan civil society; improvements in Kabul-rural relations, the statesown capacities to govern, provide services and to have the financial resources to do so.

Civil society, its integration, empowerment, buy-in and sense of ownership in buildingpeace and sharing responsibility for a strong, accountable state is essential. Afghanistandoes have various institutions (eg. shuras-village councils), traditional mechanisms, (eg.jirgas-dispute resolution bodies) and religious networks; more recently emergedindigenous NGOs; and a wide range of other institutions and groups with strong potentialfor playing roles. From 2001 to the present there are a number of indications of increasedcivil society involvement, not the least being a high voter turn-out in the first-everpresidential elections.


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Great challenges continue and Kabuls relations with the rest of the country remainuncertain. While a careful balance is clearly articulated in the new constitution,translating this balance into reality represents a formidable challenge. The centralgovernment has established a basic presence in all the provinces and districts but thecapacities are weak. In those locations, under the present conditions personnels loyalty

to government has taken higher precedence than competency. In some areas, powerfullocal leaders still dominate. They raise and keep revenues, handing over only a fraction,but growing, amount to central authorities. Due to the limited capacities, the centralgovernments attempts to bring about the needed changes in both governance anddevelopment in the provinces have thus far had only limited success.

Warlordism which has maintained divisiveness and insecurity throughout the country.The central government has attempted to rein in warlordism through a strategy to includesome warlords in the interim government structures as a means of gaining their co-operation. The risk of this strategy may soon be tested however, as several of thewarlords were recently elected into the parliament drawing sharp criticism of human

rights groups and Afghan citizens alike. In their campaigns, they used the wealth andpower theyve gained through intimidation and their frequent connections with thenarcotics trade, and now have been legitimized as leaders by the democratic process ofelection. In the past they have ruled by the gun, in future the dangers could even be more,as the vote entrenches and legitimizes them long term, a scenario that could be even moredivisive and add to any new parliaments vulnerability.

The states finances and capacity to carry out its roles are also a major issues. At theApril 2005 donors conference in Kabul, President Karzai and his representativesexpressed concern about the tenuous position they see themselves in. While the statemust have the finances to build its own capacity and offer services, only about 23% ofinternational assistance is being channeled through the central government. Accusationsand counter-accusations by government, donor government representatives and NGOsregarding waste or poor use of existing funds by the Afghan government and NGOs havebeen rampant (New York Times: 2005:1).

While some waste and misuse is undoubtedly occurring, what is clear is the lack ofgovernments own administrative capacities. Many senior managers were killed bysuccessive regimes during and since the 1978 coup detat or fled abroad as refugees. Thecountry now, as in the past, has very few people with higher education: probablysignificantly less than 10% of the population has university education. Complicating thisscenario is the job placement of the most skilled Afghans. Most educated Afghans arehighly sought after and are currently employed with the UN and other internationalagencies which can pay far higher than the Afghan government. To illustrate, governmentcivil servants are paid an average of US$60 per month, while Afghans working in UNagencies, donors and NGOs earn and average of $1,000 per month (NHDR:2004:170).

The extreme shortage of highly skilled Afghans in the civil service has resulted in theengagement of an increased number of foreign advisors to work in the ministries,primarily to increase the Afghan governments aid absorbency. However, the result is


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that the Afghan governments capacities are being enhanced rather than being built.(Suhrke:2004:9). Probably exacerbating the problem is that by 2005, it is widelyobserved that the scale of capacity building needed within government, while apparentlyplanned, has hardly begun. Why this is occurring should be questioned. As one analystnoted, the transition from humanitarian aid to national institution reconstruction has

been conspicuous by its absence, not only in Afghanistan but across the gamut ofhumanitarian/security crises, in which the United Nations, military coalitions and smallarmies of non-government aid agencies of varied agenda have sought to intervene (Mills:DATE:01).

4. What Kind of Peace in Afghanistan?

What is the status of peace in Afghanistan? One report calls it conflictual peace,possibly the most accurate way to describe the transitory and uncertain nature of thepresent situation. The authors explain that conflictual peace refers to gaps or built-inelements of conflict that were either ignored or deliberately set aside in the Bonn process

(Suhre:2004:3) . Among the most obvious of the missing elements, was that the UN didnot bring together warring parties to make peace (Rubin: undated:3). Solutions to thisproblem however, have been initiated by the government of Afghanistan since the BonnAgreement, with the introduction of an amnesty for former Taliban. However it ismeeting with limited success, attributed to lack of suitable incentives.

Another study considers the extreme complexities of the conflict and its root causes, andhow this calls for going beyond simplistic formulations such as peace or ending warto conflict transformation: an emphasis on transforming institutions, regionally,nationally and locally. (ANHDR:2004:8) . This transformation means addressinglinkages among scarcity, inequality and institutional weaknesses.

When the status of peace is already so unsettled, what kind of peace is possible is evenmore difficult to speculate.

5. Underlying Determinants and Threats

Despite the early successes in state-building that have led to the drafting of a constitution,elections and the re-establishment of ministries and commissions, secured peace inAfghanistan is far from guaranteed. As indicated above, one of the main threats ordeterminants of peace is the dialogue and relations to be built between the state and ruralareas: especially through rural development policies and programmes. As pointed out

below, however, these developments are themselves complex and interdependent andinclude security arrangements; human security; inclusive balanced development; localvalues, social and cultural issues; a supportive international community, a co-operativeregional agenda and other factors, all discussed below in more detail.


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5.1 Security Arrangements

As indicated earlier, the central government is beginning to show some presence in ruralareas but security problems in Afghanistan can be seen as linked either directly orindirectly to the inability of government to extend its full authority outside Kabul. In the

provinces, control has often been in the hands of warlords and the central government byitself lacks the means to control these destabilizing figures. This tense mix is the maincontext for rural development.

To improve security, since late 2001, two sets of international military forces have beenpresent in Afghanistan to carry out different roles: at mid-2005, roughly 20,000 personnelunder the US-led coalition Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), whose main goal is stillto route out Al Quaida and its Taliban base which are located mainly in the south and east.The second force, is the UN mandated, NATO led, International Security AssistanceForces (ISAF), which number about 8,500 personnel from 29 countries, who arestationed mainly in Kabul and whose role is to secure the capital, main airports, train the

Afghan National Army (ANA) and National Police Force and provide ProvincialReconstruction Teams (PRTs). PRTs in particular are controversial as they playcontradictory roles: being soldiers or intelligence officers operating in rural communitiesas aid workers, rebuilding schools or carrying out other humanitarian-type works. WhileNGOs play the main roles in implementing rural development programmes throughoutthe country, they have made repeated calls to ISAF and the PRTs for increased securityarrangements. At the same time, NGOs have taken a unified stance against the dual rolesof the PRTs (ACBAR:2003:2) through the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief(ACBAR), the main umbrella group of NGOs, pointing out that soldiers involved indevelopment activities adds to the confusion, putting real humanitarian workers more atrisk. As a result by mid-2005, some changes are occurring in the PRT roles, butcontroversy remains.

Training the planned 70,000 member Afghan army to take over the security role isunderway and seen by many as essential. Yet analysts have pointed out many problemsbeing encountered with building up the army including the slow pace of training, failureto get the multi-ethnic mix needed, and a high rate of desertion by recruits. In particular,there is concern that the 70,000 member ANA could be outnumbered by the illegalmilitias anyway. Even three years after the toppling of the Taliban regime, and thecompletion of the UN-backed Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of ex-combattants programme, there is still an estimated 1,800 illegal armed bands of mencomprised up to 100,000 individuals who pose a major security concern in many parts ofthe country (IRIN:2005:__). As one analyst noted, Operation Enduring Freedom andISAF forces are essentially buying time (Maloney: 2004:3) to see what happens. If theISAF and OEF forces withdrew before needed resolutions and transformations occur,many fear that Afghanistan would revert to the post-Soviet, pre-Taliban internal conflictperiod of the 1990s (Maloney: 2004:3).


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5.2 Human Security

What is most alarming is how the already poor conditions in Afghanistan deterioratedfurther over the last decades. As stated in Afghanistans first ever National HumanDevelopment Report (UNDP: 2004), conditions in child and mother mortality rates, low

literacy rates and lack of access to health care and safe drinking water have putAfghanistan in 169th position out of 174 countries. War damage to infrastructure,subsequent plunge in agricultural production and the countrys main exports, allagriculture based (fruit, nuts, carpets, etc.), rendered further poverty.

Often neglected in the dialogue on security in Afghanistan has been the human securityneeds of the people, but these may be the most crucial to national stabilisation. This isespecially true as expectations of the people have grown over the years, starting at least16 years ago with the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and now may be increased furtherwith the formation of a government.

5.3 Inclusive, Balanced Development

The rural areas of Afghanistan represent a diversity of cultures, topography, histories andaccessibility from the capital city. Rural development strategies, therefore must bebalanced and inclusive, based on addressing inequalities of gender, regions, religions,ethnicities and locations. Otherwise, the strategies are unlikely to work and couldpotentially be cause of renewed conflict.

While rebuilding physical infrastructure is important, a kind of reconstruction of thesocial damage of war is perhaps an even bigger determinant of peace or conflict. Thismeans institution re-building or building on what institutions already exist. In this casewe mean institution in two senses: 1)an organization or administration; 2)an establishedpractice, custom, law or rules that exist to govern or regulate the behavior of individuals(Pain:2004:1) at the national, regional, local and village levels.

Other major subjects which are essential to address are imbalances of assistance to urban-rural areas and both stable and unstable areas. Another of the biggest threats anddeterminants of peace may be to overcome what the Bonn agreement did not attempt:how to include those who were excluded from the peace-building effort at that time, theTaliban. Since the Bonn agreement, an amnesty programme introduced by the Afghangovernment to draw-in former Taliban has met with limited success, at least partly due tono incentives (eg. jobs or material goods) being offered.

Afghan women have historically been victims of imbalanced development, oftenexcluded from decision-making that affects them and under-represented in education,health and in many other areas. While major constitutional steps have been taken toensure inclusion and representation of women in decision-making in the political spheres,applying these changes successfully will depend on many factors, not the least of whichis how the international community chooses to support the changes Afghans wish to


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make. It is especially important in re-building the countrys institutions at all levels, toensure women as well as men are included in the capacity building and hiring.

The fall of the Taliban finally brought to world attention the situation of Afghan womenbut the problems are long standing and made even more complex from at least the time of

the Soviet invasion, 25 years ago. However, even by 2005, it is questionable if anyconditions for women have dramatically improved. For example, one of the earliestreports on the mortality rates of Afghan mothers during the war, one published by theAmerican Center for Disease Control in 1986, placed Afghanistan as having the highestbirthing related mortality rate in the world (Thomas:1990:34). By 2004, the UNDPsAfghanistan National Human Development Report, shows Afghanistan still having theworlds highest mortality rate of mothers, 1,600 per 100,000. Other conditions indicatemany complex inter-connected challenges: life expectancy of both men and women isestimated at only 44.5 years, while the literacy rate of men is 16% , with women it is12.7%. Such low conditions for both men and women, suggests that inclusive, balanceddevelopment needs several considerations especially to include both women and men.

As well, there are other divides to be bridged: one between rural and urban women, andwomen with and without formal education. In a society where purdah is the norm,conditions for rural women are unlikely to change unless the educated women who tendto be in urban areas, are able, willing and supported to take the leadership for change.

Essential, of course, are Afghan women doctors, health personnel, teachers, entrepreneurs,policy makers, planners, managers, social mobilisers, and women as legislators and otherleadership positions. However, even with constitution guarantees for women, andnumbers of seats reserved for women in the 2005 parliamentary elections, it isquestionable how so many obvious needs can be addressed. The situation also raisesmany questions about the international communitys actual commitment. As one reportstates, Twenty three years of conflict Soviet occupation, civil war, the Taliban, andfinally the US-led bombing campaign-have taken a toll on women in Afghanistan. Sincethe fall of the Taliban in 2001, Afghan women have been the focus of much internationalattention and the cornerstone of the largest gender-focused aid intervention. Yet today,many people in Afghanistan believe that there is less funding for women and for genderprograms that there was three years ago because we think we have solved the problems(Abirafeh:2005:3).

The above report and its title, Lessons from Gender-focused International Aid in Post-Conflict AfghanistanLearned? is possibly the most comprehensive critical analysis onthis subject and indicative of the challenges. It places many of the problems for Afghanwomen in the aid communitys lack of understanding of Afghan culture; lack ofrecognition of indigenous capacities; how gender in Afghanistan has been treated asonly women and not included men which further divides Afghan men and women; theneed to match rhetoric with political will and funding, and several other shortcomings.


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5.4 Local Values and Social and Cultural Issues

The events of 1978, attempted to force reforms on the rural people, reforms that rejectedAfghan social and cultural values. Yet is it within some of these local values thatdevelopment and peace building could be strengthened. In particular, international

assistance in Afghanistan has suffered from a lack of understanding and dialogue on therole of culture and religion (Maley: 1998). Yet to be developed are strategies to translateAfghan cultural or religious values into governance and assistance issues to avoidpolarizing domestic and international actors (Karim: 2001:5). From now into the future,the success of rural development policies and programmes will heavily depend on respectfor these foundations.

5.5 Supportive International Community, International Aid and Intervention

Long term support by the international community is necessary to strengthenAfghanistans development, rural development, peace and conflict prevention efforts and

economic recovery. However, while Afghanistan needs large amounts of aid to rebuild,it is questionable whether the large amounts needed can bring lasting peace and stability.As Afghanistans history has already shown in the lead-up to the Soviet invasion,inappropriate or ill-conceived aid can tilt the balance toward peace or war (Karim:2001:2). Moreover, assistance strategies that bypass the central government, and its sub-national levels, miss very important opportunities for state building. This paperemphasizes the need for more bottom-up government approaches, but these also requirestrengthening at the top.

For many Afghans international commitments and assistance pledged now is a dj vufrom the 1989 era, when the Soviets withdrew their troops and the internationalcommunity made large pledges for assistance, most of which were not realized. Despitewhat has been learned internationally since then about the risks of abandoning failedstates, there still is Afghan anxiety and mis-trust over what is happening with the presentinternational assistance promises, whether they will last or if they will disappear as theyhave done once before when the international community grows tired of unsettledsituations.

Within the international context, narcotics needs special mention, not only in relation tothe usual issues of health, well-being and criminal activity, but in particular on how thenarcotics trade helps sustain conflict and the vicious cycle of poverty in some rural areas.Opium growing in Afghanistan is a major issue of power. The growers, most of whomare the smallest farmers, get locked into indebtedness to the powerful traders whose questto maintain control fuels conflict. This often makes legitimate rural development far moredifficult. As part of peace-building, a multi-dimensional approach to the opium trade isneeded: government policies; international controls and programmes to lessen demand ofnarcotics; and efforts to create better understanding of the power structures that trap thesefarmers, then offer realistic options at the farm level, both short term and long term.


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5.6 Peaceful, Co-operative Regional Agenda

The political environment of the region is also critical for progress in peace building.Although alignments have been considerably altered since September 11, most actors ofthe region maintain and cultivate their networks in Afghanistan. There has been partial

progress towards converting harmful interference into constructive engagement for therebuilding of the country. At present, the involvement of Afghanistans neighbors seemsto be aimed as much at maintaining options in case of renewed conflict as it does atcontributing to peace-building and reconstruction.

6. Rural Development in Peace Building

6.1: Participatory Rural Development

Not only is rural development essential to peace-building in Afghanistan, participatoryrural development needs to be seen as a main vehicle for peace-building among the

people and between the people and government. In many ways the war in Afghanistancan be attributed to past rural development policies, or lack thereof.

What do we mean by rural development? Although an enormous body of literature existson rural development, and different theories, trends and concepts of it have evolved, forthe purpose of this paper we refer to it in two ways. First in the general way to meaningassistance being provided in efficient quantities to rural areas. In Afghanistan even thisalone is a major change from the past. Second rural development can be defined as theprocess whereby rural communities progress from given situations to more desirablesituations in terms of quality of life. It depends on the utilisation of local, physical andhuman resources, supplemented by investment, technology and services with full

participation of the local people in decision making. (INASP: 2004: 1).

Rural development services such as health, education, agriculture, and physicalinfrastructure seen to be provided by a government to its populations are, of course,extremely important both to poverty alleviation and in establishing and buildinggovernment credibility in the eyes of the population.

What do we mean by participation? One definition is that it is a process through whichstakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives, decisions andresources which affect them (Narayan: 1998: 4). During the years that Afghanistan hasbeen at war the participation paradigm has come into existence in other countries. This

paradigm evolved out of NGO work in Latin America, Africa and Asia, largely becauseof dissatisfaction with how top-down aid programmes were not achieving what they weremeant to do. Theories and practices such as those of Paulo Friere, the Brazilianeducationist, the liberation theology movement in Latin America, and the co-operativemovement in India and Bangladesh provided poignant examples of more effectivelyaddressing poverty by working directly with the people at the grass roots to design andimplement policy and programs. By the 1980s, specific attitudes and methodologies had


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emerged for working with the poor to put them in charge of analysis and decision-making,with their empowerment as the intended goal.

Robert Chambers, Rural Development: Putting the Last First, was a milestone in thismovement and argued for putting those who are usually left out or the last ones to be

considered in development the poor- directly into analysis and decision-making roles.This approach suggested that aid programmes adjust their own thinking and recognize thestrengths and priorities of the aid recipient. Today, social mobilization for ruraldevelopment is carried out by various NGOs and governments, using attitudes andmethods such as Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA), Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) andParticipatory Learning and Action (PLA). These tools are intended to help enableagencies to draw the target population, even the most vulnerable and voiceless, into aprocess to do their own analysis, prioritization, planning, organizing, implementation,monitoring and evaluation.

In this time, there have been an increasing number of analyses of development projects

showing that participation is one of the critical components of success in irrigation,livestock, health, water, sanitation and agriculture projects. All the evidence pointstowards long-term economic and environmental success coming about when peoplesideas and knowledge are valued, and power is given to them to make decisionsindependently of external agencies (Pretty:1995:60). Donor agencies, including theWorld Bank, Asian Development Bank, United Nations agencies, and donor governmentshave for the last decade placed new emphasis on reconstruction and development that, atleast in rhetoric, required, beneficiary participation in virtually every project.

The trouble is that while participation in theory has become accepted in the broaddevelopment field, there is far less common understanding about participation orempowerment in practice. Amongst specialists, many lessons have been learned andbest practices developed but in many places applying these consistently is stillenormously challenging. Looking internationally, some of the best practices include: theneed for clear concepts, methodologies and tools for participation, motivation andempowerment; realistic time and resources; political will and the buy- in by allstakeholder groups to share power; instilling local ownership; the need to recognize localsocial contexts; the need for high levels of training, supervision and support of socialmobilisers; capacity building and long-term follow-up in communities to help avoid thebreak-down of groups formed which often happens when groups are introduced fromoutside; tools for targeting the poor and empowering them while dealing with the elites;identifying and addressing root causes; avoiding dependence; setting up sustainability;managing expectations; creating and maintaining linkages among villages, governmentand other stakeholders. These best practices are more likely to be achieved whenspecifically targeted beneficiaries and/or the whole community is involved, not just theusual leaders and powerful people.

In Afghanistan, clarity about best practices in participatory rural development and sharingof such information is very limited. Compared to many other conflict zones,Afghanistan has received limited attention from researchers and analysts (Atmar:


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2001:12). This is especially true about the subject of development and aid. Publicly, therehas been little written critical analysis of international aid policies or programmes, withalmost no analysis of participatory programmes in Afghanistan. However, based on theauthors direct observation over most of the last 20 years, aid programmes have virtuallyall involved different degrees of outside, top-down imposition. By default, having no

recognized central authority for many years, aid programmes have been parachuted- inwith little to no local consultation. The UN, donor governments and NGOs have decidedwhat is needed and to the extent possible, tried to provide it, usually to targeted parts ofthe population, especially the most vulnerable. Thus community development, involvingthe whole community participating in the decisions that affect them, is very new. Withfew exceptions, such attempts have been made only in the last four years.

Best practices in participatory development, which evolved in other countries during theyears Afghanistan has been at war, should now be drawn on for Afghanistan. Genuineparticipation means dialogue among the people and between government and the people,as well as government being responsive to the needs and priorities as identified by the

people. It is the basis for dialogue, transparency, accountability, building commonunderstanding and trust that can substantially contribute to peace building, state buildingand community building. From lessons learned in other countries, participatorydevelopment needs to be multi-dimensional. It is not only community-led or onlygovernment-led, instead it means all levels working together and reflecting each other.

Including rural Afghans in the development analysis, design and implementation is a wayto counter the tensions between perceptions of a modern state with its modern, urban eliteand a conservative, rural tribal people. Such dialogues and processes are especiallyimportant in rural Afghanistan as fast paced change is often understood by conservativerural Afghans as influence from the West, change they perceive as anti-Islamic and arequick to reject (ANHRD:2004:194).

Moreover, careful consideration should also be given to working with traditional bodiessuch as councils of elder and dispute resolution bodies (shuras and jirgas), even if thesebodies are not themselves inclusive. While these bodies are not without problems, insome cases these institutions may have played an extremely important role in providingsupport networks to villages during the last 20 years, when state institutions have beenseverely weakened or damaged (Pain/AREU: 2004:1).

When we look at how consultative or participatory practices have been neglected inAfghanistan to date, it is unsurprising that almost all the major state-building elementscoming out of the Bonn Agreement have been seriously criticized for their lack of broad-based participation, as until now, broad participation in central governance was neithervalued or practiced in Afghanistan. However, the new Afghan constitution takes a boldstep in officially recognizing and requiring local level participation. Article 140 states, Inorder to organize activities and provide people the opportunity to actively participate inthe local administration, a council shall be set up in districts and villages in accordancewith the law. Members of these councils shall be elected by the local people through free,general, universal, secret and direct elections for a period of three years.


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While there now is the constitutional basis for participation from the bottom-up, putting itinto practice is another matter. As lessons learned elsewhere show and are confirmedbelow in our case studies, having elected leaders does not guarantee equal or justparticipation. Amongst the many needs in Afghanistan is the need to have a clearlydefined vision of participation. It must be inclusive, to draw in those traditionally

excluded, namely women and girls, the landless, marginalized ethnic minorities and themost poor. While this is challenging work anywhere, to be inclusive in Afghanistanrequires being aware of and dealing with many complexities.

With a central Afghan government at least partly in place, a newly elected leader andupcoming parliamentary elections, the central government has begun some work in ruralareas. Most rural-focused programmes are financed by the international financialinstitutions including World Bank and the Asian Development Bank and many donorgovernments. Roughly $4.5 USD billion is targeted for several National PriorityProgrammes, including the National Rural Access Programme, the National SkillsDevelopment Priority Programme, National Agriculture Priority Programme, and other

national programmes for drinking water, irrigation and power, transportation, education,health, and so on.

One of these national priority programmes, the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), isparticularly relevant to explore and critically analyze to consider what it might suggestfor the countrys rural development as a whole.

7. National Solidarity Programme

At present, the most complicated and high stakes IFI-financed program in Afghanistan isthe World Bank-financed National Solidarity Programme (NSP)(Carlin:2003:8).

Introduced in 2003 by the Afghan governments Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation andDevelopment (MRRD), the NSP by the end of May 2005, had approximately $207 USDmillion from the World Bank and donor countries to cover what was originally estimatedat 20,000 qualifying villages, but has since been revised to 15,000 villages (NSP: 2005:1)in three years. The NSPs main goal is for the government to introduce community-baseddevelopment, a crucial step for the countrys stability.

As the first of its kind, the NSP may have major implications for the future ofAfghanistans rural development as a whole. This paper looks at the NSP and whatlessons it might have for the countrys rural development in the broadest sense.

Government documents refer to the NSP as its flag ship programme. It is by far thelargest government programme in the country in terms of finance, scale and geographicreach. NSPs mandate is to implement community-supported development programs innearly every Afghan village in only three years, making the scale and speed of the projectperhaps unprecedented in the world. As the NSP is many rural Afghans first contact withand assistance from the new government, the importance of results of the NSP can not beover-stated. In particular, it has been envisioned that the NSP could play a role in helpingto secure at least the existing central fledgling government and at the same time, reduce


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or at least effectively deal with the influence of destabilizing, divisive figures in theprovinces. However, its speed, scale, unsecured funding and other factors make it a highrisk programme. At mid-2005, half way through the project, while there are some signsof success, some of these risks are already apparent, as our case studies below illustrate.

Overall, many of NSPs pitfalls are directly linked to its rushed preparation. While bestpractices in widespread participatory development indicate that the most successfulprojects normally have gone through many months, if not years, of preliminary study,analysis and design phases, often involving pilot projects, the NSP for Afghanistan didnot pass through any of these stages of preparation. Instead, it was adapted from thedesign of similar World Bank projects in East Timor and Indonesia and initiated at fullscale on a very short timeline in Afghanistan. Introduced at its present scale in December2002, NGOs held workshops in February and March 2003, to try to overcome the projectdesign flaws, but the main in-built risks remained: the scale and speed. Adequate timewas not allowed for many activities needed, most especially for the range of crucialcapacity building needed by the FPs and government. Although a very new approach in

Afghanistan, necessary skills in participation and broad community development wereassumed to exist in each FP. Within only a few more months, by September 2003 NGOswere already implementing the programme on a large scale.

The NSP rush was part of the run-up to the Afghan presidential elections to follow thenext year. Careful programme preparation was given far less priority than the perceivedneed to make visible things happen quickly and on a very large and wide scale. Possibleadditional roles, such as peace-building and poverty alleviation were not clearlyintegrated into the NSP as planned strategies, rather these major roles may have beenassumed only as possible consequences.

Now in its second year of operation, the NSP is implemented for the governmentsMRRD by the UN Habitat and about 20 international and Afghan NGOs, all of whom arereferred to as the facilitating partners (FPs). The FPs were selected based on theirexisting expertise in Afghanistan and capacities to expand operations, and include suchinternational NGOs as: CARE, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, Aga KhanFoundation, Oxfam, and Actionaid. FPs are responsible for approaching communities andletting them know about the NSP, its eligibility requirements, what it has to offer andhelp the village through the whole NSP process. In September 2003, an OversightConsultant was appointed: GTZ, an agency of the German government, along with DAI,an American consulting firm.

NSP documents (NSP:1383:3) describe itself as consisting of four core elements: 1) afacilitated participatory planning process at the community level to assist with theestablishment and strengthening of community institutions; 2)a system of direct blockgrant transfers to support the rehabilitation or development activities for such institutions;3)capacity development to enhance the competence of communities for financialmanagement, procurement, useful technical skills and transparency; 4) activities whichfacilitate links to other institutions and programmes with available services and resources.


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The block grants are allocated to villages comprised of over 50 families at $200 USD perfamily up to a maximum of $60,000 USD (NSP:2003:6) per village. These block grantsare to provide resources for public infrastructure, community assets, revolving funds,social services and training identified as priority needs through an inclusive, participatoryvillage planning process. The village is to manage the block grants including preparation

of project proposals with technical assistance from the MRRD.

In the villages, the NSP is introduced and facilitated by a total of about 3,500 socialmobilisers employed by the FPs. Many of the FPs social mobilisers who were fieldworkers in other projects have been diverted to the NSP, while due to the scale of theproject FPs also have had to hire many more people. As there is an extreme shortage ofAfghans with community development experience, many of those hired had to be givenbasic training to act as social mobilisers. The FPs themselves have trained the socialmobilisers with input from NSP, with training focusing mainly on NSP management andlogistical matters. Thorough training on community development is largely missing.

To be eligible for a development grant from the NSP, communities are required to elect aCommunity Development Council (CDC) which should be a representative, decision-making body with both women and men on the council, or out of cultural sensitivity, menand women could organise separate councils. The CDC is to hold a series of communitymeetings to make decisions on development priorities, final choice of projects, size andcomposition of community contributions, use of project funds, project implementationand management, transparency arrangements, and arrangements for the operation andmaintenance of completed projects.

Each FP was given minimal NSP guidance on how to guide villages to hold elections soeach FP did it according to their own judgment. Under pressure to get the villageprojects identified and underway, elections were held but village constitutions or bylawswere not introduced. Without bylaws, there is no village agreement on matters such aswho can run for office, the obligations of elected leaders, how they can be removed ifthey fail to meet the obligations, participation of women or minority sub-groups, or othernormal subjects of agreements made through bylaws. In most cases such formalised self-regulation is yet to be introduced.

7.1 What has Happened?

Under the NSP, Afghanistans first CDCs were elected from August 2003 onwards andthe first block grant disbursements began in December 2003. By the end of May 2005,about 9,000 villages had elected CDCs, and nearly 8,000 village project proposals hadbeen approved and first installments disbursed. The projects are divided into those fordrinking water, irrigation, reconstruction of schools, clinics, community centers; transport;and energy with a smaller number pertaining to livelihoods and income generation(MRRD:2005:4). Villages that are able to successfully implement projects during the firstyear are to receive additional small block grants during their second year and third years(NSP:2005/1). After this time, the CDCs and the villages are to sustain the projectsthemselves.


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7.2 Case Studies: Introduction and Rationale

With such a large number of villages involved, each with its own NSP activities, a widevariety of undertakings and results are occurring, as seen in 29 villages visited for this

study. To illustrate some of these activities and outcomes, below are presented casestudies from four of the villages. These four were selected in an attempt to presentqualitative data on the NSP and of course make no claim of being representative of theover 9,000 villages participating in the NSP. However, observations made even in thesefew villages, raise important issues for the NSP to consider as it moves forward and alsosuggests the kinds of problems to be prevented in rural development as a whole.

7.3 NSP CASE STUDIES:

Case Study 1: Upper Nawach Village, Parwan Province

The Nawach villages are located about 150 km north of the capital city of Kabul in theDistrict of Salang of Parwan Province. The Lower Nawach is across the main road thatcrosses the Hindukush Mountains at the Salang Pass connecting the north of the countrywith the south. Between the village and the road flows the Salang river. The UpperNawach is about 5 km or 2 hours uphill walking distance from the Lower Nawach. Eachvillage is made up of about 100 families. The villagers come from a single ethnic andtribal group and most are related by inter-marriage.

When the NSP came to the two villages in the fall of 2003, the choice of what could bedone with the money was obvious for upper Nawach and not so clear for the LowerNawach.

When community mobilizers of the MRRD came to our village and told us about NSPwe first didnt believe anything they were saying says Abdul Habib, the Chair of theUpper Nawach Community Development Council (CDC).Never in the history ofAfghanistan had the central government taken people into confidence and put them incharge of a development project, so how could we believe it now? he reasoned.However, when they realized that the programme was real they elected a CDC. Theproject they selected for their allotted NSP fund through a village wide consultation was atertiary road to connect them to the main road.

The villagers of Upper Nawach did not wait for the NSP money to arrive before theystarted work on the road. Indeed, the road was 80 percent complete before they got theirfirst 20 percent of the $25,000 block grant. The NSP was sort of a trigger. For years weknew the road to be of need but we just couldnt get ourselves organized to go aboutbuilding it the NSP pushed us in that direction, Mr. Habib explained. And we dontsee this as just a road, he said, it is way more. It is access to health, to school to themarket and to information.. An engineer from UN Habitat, the FP in Parwan, said thatthe estimated cost of the road is over $50,000 if carried out by an NGO but the villagepeople completed it for half the amount.


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The CDC believed that the road would make higher education more accessible, and helpwith other village problems as well. To continue studying past grade four offered in thevillage, it is necessary for the children to walk to and from the upper school each day, atotal of four hours walking per day. With a road and vehicle transport it would become

more realistic to make that journey and there was hope that both girls and boys would beencouraged to go to school and stay in school. Others also looked forward to being ableto reach a hospital for critical illnesses.

Prior to the CDC, Upper Nawach had never had a village development shura (council).Every villager knew what the villages needs were but never sat down to discuss them,they explained. The NSP provided that opportunity for them. The CDC is now not only adevelopment council but an authoritative dispute resolving body as well. One elder whois a member of the villages CDC said, The power of decision making was transferred topeople, therefore whoever designed NSP made the right decision. This is bringing unityto people.

There was however, a major problem with the road. It took many months of hard work tobe built through difficult terrain. The road was finished all the way from the UpperNawach to the upper edge of the Lower Nawach. It then had to go through the LowerNawach to get to the river, at which point a bridge on the river is needed to connect to themain road. The problem is that the villagers of Lower Nawach will not allow the road togo through it because they will lose scarce agriculture land and the bridge, yet to be built,requires much more money who will pay for it?

Why didnt they ask us first, before they built the road, if we would allow them to gothrough our village?, an elder from Lower Nawach stated. And without the bridge thiswhole road is useless why didnt they think of that first either?

Case Study 2: Lower Nawach Village, Parwan Province

Lower Nawach is an internally divided village. Unlike Upper Nawach, which is made upof closely knit families, Lower Nawach was divided long before the presence of the NSP.They have chosen a micro- hydro plant for their block grant.

The first day when NSP facilitators came to explain to us the program, I said we wantedto do electricity for our village, the CDC chairman said. The reason we picked this isbecause every other village along the river is doing the same we dont want to bedifferent from the other villages.

But did you discuss this in comparison to other things you could do with the money?the researcher asked.

There was no need to do that this was it, the Chairman responded.


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Other villagers in private conversations with the researcher said that they had requested adrinking water facility but the Chair didnt listen because he had his personal interests inthe project.

What interests? the researcher asked.

The Chair contracted out the project to himself, a villager responded. He claims thatnobody else stepped forward so what else could I do?

When asked about this, the Chairman replied, I am actually losing money on this project but I am doing it because I as the Chair am responsible for the successful conclusion ofthis project.

When the researcher went to see the project he heard a noise two farmers, a father and ason were protesting (knowing that someone from Kabul was visiting the project) thatthe MRRD had damaged their land. Two more farmers joined in claiming the same. The

researcher saw that their land, indeed, was vulnerable to the water intake for the project.

But this is your project, you as a village picked it, so why complain about it? theresearcher asked.

No this is the Chairmans project. We were not consulted we dont want this thefarmers replied raising their voices. But you need to resolve this through your CDC theresearcher advised.

The CDC is not a council (shura) that can resolve things I want you to resolve this!one of the farmers demanded of the researcher.

Case Study 3: Zakhil Village, Nangarhar Province

Zakhil is a village located about 20 km to the South East of Jalalabad city, the capital ofNangarhar province. It is inhabited by about 350 households, comprised of five or sixextended families. The village has never had a shortage of family quarrels and disputes,which in return result in two or three rival blocks each one with its own Malik (leader)and its own program and function for social occasions and gatherings. The number ofMaliks in a village usually represents the number of divisions in the village, with moreserious divisions leading to separate mosques.

Such divisions often have a greater impact on male-to-male relationships in a village,with women and their relationships not as greatly affected. This is for two reasons. First,unless the disputes are serious the men usually do not put pressure on the women tofollow. Second, women often socialize amongst themselves more then men, they assisteach other with numerous domestic tasks and thus establish bonds. In Zakhil, asthroughout the eastern provinces the point that brings women together and where theyoften socialize is called a Gudar.


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Gudar is a water-point (a kariz, a water spring, or stream) from where women carrydrinking water or do their laundry. In the morning when men are away working in thefields, women and girls put their pitchers or laundry on their head and walk to the Gudar.There they spend an hour or the whole day working and sitting with other women, talking,doing the laundry together, helping others with theirs, asking for advice or simply sharing

their latest stories and news. The Gudar is also known as a place for young people towatch for and attract suitors attention as they come and go. Interested young men makesure they cross by somewhere between home and Gudar. Although chores at the Gudarare hard work, in many villages, it is a popular place with women. Importantly in aconservative culture where they spend their time inside the family compound rarelyventuring in to town, the Gudar is a space for women to get outside and socialize often.

Zakhil, like many such villages, had a Gudar for as long as the villagers the researchersspoke with could remember. While over the years there were many village disputes thesedid not affect Gudar. That is until the NSP came.

Given the divided state of the village, it is not surprising that the village reflected thosesame divisions. While the CDC held many village meetings members could not come toagreement on what they could do with the NSP money. For every project idea discussedthere were some who would benefit more than others and that was unacceptable for thecouncil as a whole. After many months of quarrels, two members of the CDC pushed fora well in front of their home compounds. The rest of the villagers and theirrepresentatives would accept it only if there was a well in front of every compound. Theagreement was finally settled for 18 wells, one for every compound in the village. These18 wells were in addition to only one functioning well already in the village and threewells not functioning due to lack of maintenance. Such an increase in the number ofwells, in a location known to have seasonal water shortages, and where wells alreadyhave a history of not being maintained, should have raised questions about this villagesproject choice. Not only were the wells of questionable choice, the wells put an end toGudar an important part of the village culture and social life.

We incorporated womens needs in our decisions in fact we did the wells for womenbecause they dont have to leave their house for drinking water and laundry respondedMaeen Khan, chairman of the CDC. But when the researchers interviewed some of thevillage women, they said they missed the Gudar and so did some male bachelors.

Notably, three kilometers to the north of Zakhil is Kan- a village of over 1,000 families.According to the NSP facilitator the exact same thing happened in that village as well.

Case Study 4: Char Kabutarkhan Village, Herat Province

Char Kaburtarkhan is located in the District of Guzara in Herat Province. It is located 15km to the south of Herat city and about 4 km off the main road. According to the NSPvillage file, there are 735 families inhabiting the village. The village was located at thefront line during the Soviet presence and was heavily damaged during the war. After thedefeat of the Communist Regime in 1992, many of the villages exiled residents returned


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and rebuilt their homes. Many of the villagers are farmers. The village lies by a river ,and has fertile land and is therefore very green. According to Abdul Wahab, the Chair ofChar Kabutar Khan, when NSP came to the village in the fall of 2003, We already werea united village but we did not have a structure and therefore could not take advantage ofour unity for development. What NSP did was to give us that needed structure through

the formation of CDC Abdul Qudus a member of the village CDC and Said Shiragha avillager agreed. We did form Shuras off and on but only for dispute resolutions, wenever attempted or probably never thought of putting one together for development Mr.Qudus explained. Our CDC now does both, the traditional dispute resolution and also itstasks under NSP.

Mr. Sher Agha also pointed out that after the NSP had arrived the incidence of disputeshad fallen. He believes that NSP probably strengthened unity amongst the villagers andhence the fall in disputes. For their NSP entitlement (about $60,000) the village built aschool building, repaired the villages public bath and also built a number of culverts.All these were the villages priorities and we would not change them if they were to start

all over again, Mr. Wahab said. For example, our school did not have a building andtherefore it was not conducive for studying. The closest school with a building was some7 km from here. That was too far for our children. So the school was our top priority.

Now that the NSP projects are concluding in the village, what will happen to the CDCand its status? The villagers were of the view that it would continue functioning. Theyhad already taken steps for the sustainability of the body. For example, the villagers haveagreed to use the NSP account as the villages trust fund and have encouraged thevillagers to contribute donations to it. In addition, the CDC would act, as it already has onnumerous occasions, as the villages representative body to inform the government,NGOs and international organizations of their problems and to ask them for developmentassistance.

The women of this village have their own CDC and are very active, which may be aidedby the already high female literacy rate in the village. The school the village built withthe NSP block grant was in fact pushed by the women. The womens CDC also serves asthe focal group for other organizations that are interested in women-related issues. Forexample, it meets regularly with the regional office of the Afghanistan IndependentHuman Rights Commission (AIHRC) to discuss womens rights. The womens CDC hasalso received training from AIHRC and other organizations.

The villagers claimed that NSP so far has been the best government project they haveseen. It delivered on what it promised [referring to block grants]. It created jobs for thepoor. Its money was also spent within the village. It produced projects that shape up thefuture of our village, Mr. Wahab explained. However, he added that it could further beimproved. For example NSP could pay the installments in a more timely manner. Rightnow there are delays that affect the continuity of our work Mr. Qudus complained.Another male villager contended that there could also be more emphasis on womentraining that goes beyond NSP. They need to know about their role, their options andalso their rights.


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7.4 Observations from case studies

Given the lack of normal preparation and rushed start-up of the NSP and its scale andscope, it is not surprising that problems are arising in NSP villages. Our case studiesillustrate a number of areas where problems are occuing and improvements are needed.

To begin, there was a lack of CDC linkages with other CDCs in the areas where projectsmight overlap (as in the Upper and Lower Nawach villages). There were questions ofgenuine community participation and empowerment (as in Lower Nawach), in particular,the lack of womens meaningful participation was noted throughout (as in Zakhil village).Indeed, researchers found that in only one of the case study villages (Char Kabutarkhan)was there clear participation by women in decision making in the villages NSP project.

Other observations include little to no NSP connection with other assistance programmesor government ministries and almost no involvement of government people. In none ofthe case study villages had the CDCs been linked up with other services. In this regard,the NSP is not living up to its plan to link CDCs with local institutions, especially district

and provincial administrations which function now. These opportunities are being missedand many district administrations perceive themselves as sidelined. The recently electedprovincial councils and the yet to be elected district councils, will be other importantlinks for CDCs. Moreover, the NSP is building capacities almost entirely in the FPs, andnearly not at all in the local government institutions.

Capacity building at the village level was also observed as weak. None of the villagesvisited had received training or resources needed to assist them for future villagedevelopment when the NSP ends. None had received training on group management,drafting of bylaws, resource mobilization or participatory, inclusive approaches todecision-making or linking with others. There was almost no evidence of planning aheadfor village financial resources beyond the NSP block grant.

The villages visited including those which became case studies, highlight concerns aboutthose who were elected into CDC leadership positions. Often those elected were the samepowerful, influential and relatively well-off people who have been in charge all along (eg.school master, imam, landowner, elders, etc.). In the four case study villages, thoseelected as CDC leaders include some traditional leaders, the members of the shura orjirga. In some cases outright elite capture of NSP projects occurred (as in the LowerNawach case study). Clearly, more attention appears to have been paid to the novel actof elections than to whom got elected. While it may not be surprising in such first-everelections that the usual suspects would be elected, such development programmesrequire strong built-in plans to include and raise the voices of the poor, but in NSP suchempowerment is so far rhetoric. Such realities, or lack thereof, should raise manyquestions about inclusivity, whose interests are represented by NSP village projects, CDCsustainability (discussed below) and other issues.

In the villages visited, as indicated in the case studies, it was apparent that there is widevariation in the level of skills of FPs and their social mobilisers. While relatively wellbriefed on NSP requirements and logistics, social mobilisers often lack skills in


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community participation, a likely cause of many of the problems faced within the NSPprojects.

Some village NSP projects raised questions of sustainability. Some projects chosen byvillages clearly could lead to problems (Lower Nawachs micro-hydrel plant and whether

villagers could afford it and carry our operation and maintenance. What would happen toZakhils water supply with the sudden, large increase in wells?) Monitoring andevaluation was late or non-existent. Had M&E been introduced in a timely fashion,problems could have been caught before getting out of hand (such as wells at Zakhil anda neighboring village).

Finally, there is some concern that the NSP projects could negatively impact socialcapital (as in the Gudar at Zakhil) as well as the customs of hashar-where communitymembers voluntarily contribute labor and resources. Village NSP construction projectspay villagers to do labor they would normally have given for free as a communityobligation. Community contributions to projects, required by the NSP, were often only

tokens. This problem did not start with the NSP, but it is important to be aware of thelong term negative impacts of any programme that undermines customs of self-help andpooling community resources.

At the same time, there were a number of positive benefits that appear linked with NSPprojects, as shown in the case studies. Where unity already existed before the arrival ofthe NSP, the NSP and the money and organizing it brings appears to compliment or evenincrease such unity (as in Upper Nawach and Char Kabutarkhan). The downside was thatthe same money and organizing coming from outside may exacerbate strife and dis-unitywhere it already existed (as in Zakhil and Lower Nawach). Other benefits includeencouragement to villages to develop further skills and resources for further development,and opportunities taken by some villages such as Char Kabutarkhan has taken to promotewomens rights.

7.5 Risks and Constraints

As stated above, the NSP has implications for the future and for rural development as awhole, hence peace-building as a whole in Afghanistan. For this purpose it is useful toidentify what may be the priority risks and constraints for the NSP, which may also bethe greatest challenges to the broader rural development. These include: the sustainabilityof the CDCs, the lack of genuine womens participation; the need for long term follow-up;government capacity building and the financing to sustain all these needs.

Sustainablity of the present CDCs could be the biggest risk to community-baseddevelopment. Within the international aid community and MRRD there is high hope forthe CDCs but their futures depend on many complex realities. If these CDCs fail it willtake a very long time to build up trust for such efforts to work again. One key aspect ofthe CDCs that is not being yet acknowledged and being engaged with to the extentnecessary are the local political contexts and the effects these have, and will have on thefuture on the CDCs. Especially important are the realities of long-standing power


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relations and traditional decision-making bodies which continue to dominate in eachvillage. Specifically, given the current attention on building what are seen as moredemocratic village organizations, as exemplified by the NSP, attention must be given tothe existing rules that structure social relations at the village level. The superimpositionof new organizations into a village does not mean that existing norms will necessarily

change (Pain/AREU:2004:1). Based on lessons learned from other experience andstudies on similar issues inside and outside Afghanistan, such realities could have beenpredicted and realistic plans to address them, but this is a process that takes many years,time not included in the NSP as presently planned.

As stated above, as a general observation in the case study villages, those who wereelected as leaders tend to be the relatively well off, the powerful or influential. Perhapsthe biggest misunderstanding about electing leaders of CDCs was the assumption thatelections, especially by secret ballots would automatically lead to freely chosen leaders.Such a supposition is highly unlikely in traditional societies comprised of indeliblehierarchies based on inter-dependencies and patronages forged over decades or even

centuries between families, ethnic/tribal (qaum) groups. In many instances these allianceswere further strengthened during the years of war. In cases where the people have electedthe usual suspects, their decisions to do so could be out of respect, loyalty or fear ofindividual or collective reprisals should they do otherwise, or simply from lack ofalternative candidates.

Sustainability of the CDCs will be heavily dependent on them directly addressing povertyalleviation, a factor almost overlooked while more emphasis was put on having leaderselected. Without motivation or skills to do otherwise, those elected are likely to continuewith the status quo, acting according to their own priorities, reverting to their own trickledown approach. If they do not address the top priority needs of the villagers, the vastmajority who are very poor, there will simply be amongst villagers no interest to supportor sustain the CDC. It will take years of follow-up and skills building, for the poor tohave the voice needed to get into the leadership, if they indeed can.

Sustainablity of the projects undertaken by CDCs will also a large part of the credibilityand life expectancy of a CDC. Although NSP guidelines require plans for operation andmaintenance, many factors make meeting these requirements questionable. If the projectfalls apart, what happens to the CDC? For example, in the Herat village what willvillagers think of the CDC if the school they built is not operating? What problems arelikely to occur among people in Upper Nawach when they have a road that comes to adead end? Can the people in Lower Nawach afford the micro-hydrel plant and is it beingmaintained? Will the disunity in Zakhil get worse if the poorly chosen wells dry up?Failed projects can not only mean the end of the CDC, they can bring tension and moremis-trust between the villages and others.

Womens meaningful participation is another key concern. While the NSP is toencourage community participation and womens participation in the CDC is a conditionof NSP, in most places only half the community the men- are participating. In most ofthe 9,000 CDCs formed, it has been reported that women are part of the overall CDCs or


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that they form separate womens councils but in most villages their inclusion has beenobserved as only nominal. Womens participation beyond their inclusion in the CDCs,has also been very low. Most of the projects are male-selected with little or no input fromwomen. For example, in Zakhil village the men argued that they did a service for womenin providing wells, while to the women the wells meant shrinking of their social space,

constraining and dis-empowering them. Realizing this problem, MRRD has set aside aportion of the NSP block grants specifically for womens groups (about $6000/village)and are increasing efforts to ensure more women are mobilized.

To ensure womens participation, better and longer term strategies are needed. Thesestrategies need to deal sensitively with several factors: cultural practices that separatemen and women; lack of female social mobilisers to work with the women, weak FPcapacities to recruit women as social mobilisers, better training and gender sensitizationof both men and women decision-makers, so they can then raise gender awareness withsocial mobilisers who in turn raise the awareness and get results in the villages inculturally sensitive and productive ways. More gender know-how and community

animation skills in general are needed.

Long-term follow-up will be necessary for the sustainability of CDCs. Over the lastdecades NGOs in many countries have implemented their work by forming groups. Fromsuch group formation experience, many lessons have been learned, most importantly forthis paper, is that it is common for groups to fold once the outside assistance orleadership is withdrawn. For groups to survive, they require long-term follow-throughcomprised of social mobilization and advocacy, while at the same time input to keepbuilding and renewing their own skills, resources and other capacities to deal with thelocal power structures and more development. However, the NSP is presently planned toend in 2006, meaning that villages will have received only a maximum of three years ofsuch outside contact and assistance. To date they have received little to no training onhow to manage their community organization and so far all financial emphasis has beenon spending the block grant, with no planning at all to set up the villages own financialresources (ie. savings, credit, revolving fund, etc.). These two factors, the short contacttime and villages that will still be left without their own financial resources, make ithighly questionable if any of the CDCs will last. Its also doubtful if the NGOs can carrythis weight of villages forward on their own. Before the NSP, NGOs were operating inonly a small percentage of villages that the NSP is to reach. Post-NSP, it is unlikelyNGOs can maintain the NSP planned scale, due to funding and other limitations. .

Capacity building of local government, including approaches in bottom-up development,is essential and may be almost urgent. But an important question, and a highly sensitiveone about sustainability is who should be responsible to assist in sustaining the CDCs?Will NGOs, especially international NGOs, continue as the sole providers of services inrural areas which has been the case for many years by default, or will central and localgovernment start playing at least some of these roles? While NGOs and their specializedservices and resources will likely be needed for many years to come, for state-buildingpurposes it appears necessary for government administrations and line agencies to starttaking their own development initiatives at the provincial, district and village levels. For


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this to work, NGO and government roles need better delineation and extensive capacitybuilding is needed in government at the national, provincial and district levels. Severalprojects for this capacity building are being planned by donors.

Financing is another of the main risks. The NSP puts a major obligation on the

government which it could have difficulty sustaining, both financially and from humanresource angles. Given that the NSP has been publicized nationally as going to everyvillage with money, another risk is that the NSP remains without guaranteed funding.For the planned level of activity and funding, from the time the NSP began early in 2003,not enough funding had been secured. Even by the end of May 2005, when about $207million had been secured from World Bank and donor countries for the NSP, this is still along way from the amount estimated by MRRD as needed -$800 million to carry theprogramme to the whole country. Funds are allotted year-by-year by donors, instead ofput into a secured pot of money needed, which leaves the NSP vulnerable. Any majornational or international security event, or even simple changes in policy, could renderthe NSP broke.

With such high expectations built around the country, any faltering of NSP funding canhave highly negative impacts on central government. As worrisome, when not nearlyenough funds are fully guaranteed even to implement the present programme (3 years ineach village) hope for the needed long term follow-through is questionable. A recentreport presenting an Exit Strategy for the Oversight Consultant, speculates about an NSPII (NSP: 2005/1), and planning is underway for a next phase, but it appears this wouldnot be an entirely new phase of the NSP. It would essentially be the time needed tocomplete the project as already planned

7.6 Overall Analysis of the NSP

The following section draws largely on the authors knowledge of the NSP process aslong time observers, managers and consultants in Afghanistan aid programmes, includingthose of the ministry responsible for the NSP. The analyses and conclusions are drawnfrom formal and informal interviews with other actors involved in the NSP as well asfrom observation of the unfolding of the process.

The NSP has made significant strides. Only a few years ago, such a programme wouldhave been impossible due to the political conditions. Now, in an attempt to engage ruraldevelopment on a scale hereto unprecedented in Afghanistan even in unsettled securityconditions, the NSP has so far reached 9,000 of the 15,000 qualifying villages orapproximately 164 of the 360 districts throughout the country, a major strength. This isalso significant in that it represents some sort of presence of the central government, or atleast MRRD, in many villages of Afghanistan. At the same time, having received widepublicity in the media nationally, not surprisingly this has established new andwidespread expectations in the same and remaining rural areas.

Some earlier doubts have been dispelled, while others were confirmed. Concern wasexpressed by some stakeholders at the beginning of the NSP about the public


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acceptability of a standardized procedure for the establishment of CDCs by communitiesthroughout the country and, and specifically to what extent womens participation wouldbe effectively addressed in the process. However, about the standardized procedures, FPsand various other sources have reported that not only were communities willing to adoptthe prescribed election and secret-ballot voting procedures, to date these leadership

selection methods have generally been greeted with enthusiasm in villages. However,womens participation, compared to mens, was typically low and continues to be a majorchallenge. It will take much more time, resources and skills to build-up the voices andparticipation of women and the poor to become part of the leadership.

Nonetheless, CDC elections served as the first-ever experience of local participation invoting. On one hand, this was an unprecedented event for the majority of rural Afghanwomen, where at least in theory they participated in decision-making on par with men.Some observers have noted that experience gained by villagers through their own secretballot CDC elections may have contributed to the higher than expected voter turn-out ofboth men and women in the presidential elections of October 2004.

The NSP may have also contributed to community participation in national development.One example includes the first ever jirga or conference of village representatives held inKabul in July 2005, attended by the authors. This Jirga brought together 350 select CDCrepresentatives, a third of whom were women, from every province, where they wereaddressed by President Karzai and several other officials and given prominence in thenational media. During the weeks proceedings, delegates were also asked to evaluate theNSP and their village roles in it, discussion that produced results applicable to aidagencies. Similar to the researchers own findings, delegates concluded that the NSP hadseveral strengths, especially that it was helping to build relations and trust between thecentral government and the rural people and transferred responsibility and skills tocommunities.

Importantly, the CDC representatives also identified areas in need of improvement.Divided into twenty discussion groups, delegates identified weaknesses as: the lowinvolvement of women; the lack of a long term strategy; the undo influence of powerfulpeople in communities; lack of plan for sustainability; lack of formal links with districtadministration; late arrival of block grants, and the occurrence of some weak projects. Toovercome these weaknesses delegates suggested legal recognition of the CDCs by thecentral government; assistance in developing bylaws for the CDCs; linking CDCs todistrict administrations where they could play advisory roles; improved financialsustainability of the CDCs by creating financial resources and systems, training of CDCs,continued technical and financial support to the CDCs; separate CDCs for men andwomen as it is culturally preferable and so both can more freely express themselves;training for both men and women on development and womens rights, etc.(NSP:2005/2).

The villagers own overall analysis of the NSP indicates of the value of having them do it.The opinions and observations expressed by villagers themselves are most important tobuild on by the NSP and in rural development in general.


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8. Conclusions and Recommendations:

8.1: General:

1. The status is not yet peace, it is an unsettled situation that despite the positive signs,

could still go either way: to gel into a permanent peace or slide back into anarchy.2. Many factors could threaten or determine the countrys security and need addressingsimultaneously.3. One of the most important challenges in peace-building and state building is for thegovernment to overcome the historic volatile mistrust of the rural people.4. One of the most effective ways to build these relations is through participatory ruraldevelopment approaches and programmes.

8.2: For Rural Development as a whole:

The NSP is one of many programmes underway in rural areas, although it is by far the

largest. As it is the central governments first such community-based developmentprogramme, it has major implications for the future. Looking ahead, say five or ten yearsfrom now, how will the NSP be viewed? How will it affect Afghanistans ruraldevelopment as a whole? Will it be mocked by villagers as a failure that brought moreunfulfilled promises and have left a trail of derelict projects? Or will it be seen as aturning point in relations between the Afghan government and rural areas?

What Afghanistans history and the NSP have to teach about Afghanistans ruraldevelopment as a whole is the need to go back to the basics and to put into practice majorlessons already known in the development field. Following are some of these points:

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The Role of the Rural Development in Peace Building

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