The Rumanians and the Habsburg Monarchy

8/13/2019 The Rumanians and the Habsburg Monarchy

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The Rumanians and the Habsburg Monarchy by STEPHEN

FISCHER-GALATI *

The endless and frequently meaningless disputes involving thecontribution of one or another nationality group to the maintenance

or dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy have obscured the

essential question: was the multinational empire viable? Different

answers have been provided, usually on the basis of the historian's

individual national prejudices, whether Hungarian, Yugoslav, Polish,

Ruthenian, Italian, or Rumanian. The ranks of the disputants have

been swelled by "volunteers" of non-East European origin ever

ready to champion, on sentimental or ideological rather than

historical grounds, whatever causes may have been appealing at a

given time

It is perhaps fortunate that the role of the Rumanians as an

"integrating or disintegrating force" has not been as much discussed

as that of the other nationalities of the Habsburg monarchy. Thisshould at least make it a less difficult subject for historical

reappraisal.1It is also fortunate for the purpose of discussion that

the Rumanians' problems were almost entirely connected with those

of the Hungarians and Austrians and thus did not become involved

in the extremely complex interrelationships of the South Slavs. On

the other hand, historians and polemicists have generally given only

perfunctory consideration to the part played by the Rumanian

minorities of Bukovina, the Banat, Criana, and Maramure in the

process of integration or disintegration and to the relationships

between the Rumanians of these provinces and those of

*Austrian History Yearbook, vol. III, pt. 2, 1967, pp. 430-449.

1 Detailed bibliographical references on the Rumanian problem in Transylvania, the Banat, Criana,and Maramure can be found in Andrei Veress, Bibliografia romno-ungar [Rumanian-HungarianBibliography] (3 vols., Bucharest: Cartea Romaneasc, 1931-35); Ioachim Crciun, Bibliographic de la

Transylvanie roumaine 1916-1936 (Cluj: Revue de Transylvanie, 1937); and Constantin Daicoviciuand Miron Constantinescu, Brve histoire de la Transylvanie (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1965),pp. 427-435. No comparable surveys are available for Bukovina. However, a satisfactory bibliographic


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Transylvania. More serious, they have failed to define clearly the

criteria for viability of the empire and the nature of the constructive

or erosive forces exerted 'by the Rumanians.

No matter what the errors of omission or commission, the

conclusions reached by various writers on the Rumanian nationality

question in the Habsburg empire have been, as a rule, categorical.

If Rumanian or pro-Rumanian, they agreed that the dissolution of

the monarchy was inevitable and that their conationals' greatest

historical contribution was the acceleration of the process of

disintegration. If Hungarian or pro-Hungarian, they concluded that

even if the empire was not salvageable in its traditional form, it

could have been pre served in its post-Ausgleichformat had it not

been for the destructive attitude of certain non-Hungarian

minorities, particularly the Rumanians.2 Few historians have

regarded the Rumanians as a force tending to stabilize the empire.3

On balance, the evidence would favor the thesis that, al

though the Rumanians were among those forces that were most

instrumental in bringing about the ultimate dissolution of the

empire, prior to the final debacle they were among the most active

supporters of the imperial order. This apparent anomaly will

surprise only those who believe that nationalism per se is a

destructive force which makes impossible com promise or

coexistence with other nationalities in a multi national framework.

This interpretation hardly applies to the Rumanians of the Austro-

Hungarian empire, as a review of their problems and actions will

show.

survey can be found in Erich Prokopowitsch, Die rumnische Nationalbewegung in der Bukowina undder Dako-Romanismus (Graz: Bohlau, 1965), pp. 171-175.2The classic statement of both positions is in Eugene Horvth, Transylvania and the History of theRoumanians(Budapest; Srkny, 1935).3Although clearly a work a these, Constantin Daicoviciu et al., Din Istoria Transilvaniei[The History ofTransylvania] (2nd ed., 2 vols., Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1961), provides the best analysis ofthe contribution of the Rumanians to the stability of the Habsburg monarchy.


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The origins of the controversy regarding the aspirations of the

Rumanian minority in the Habsburg empire may be traced to the

Supplex libellus Valachorum.4This petition, which was submitted by

a group of Rumanian intellectuals to Leopold II toward the end ofthe eighteenth century, sought for the Rumanians of Transylvania

rights equal to those enjoyed by the privileged nations of the

province - the Magyars, Saxons, and Szeklers. Considered for a long

time as a manifestation of Rumanian nationalism, disruptive and

anti- Hungarian in character, the Supplex libellus has recently been

reinterpreted by Rumanian Marxists and other historians.5 The

conclusions reached vary in detail but agree essentially on the

document's conservative purpose: the attainment by the Rumanian

intellectuals and rising- middle class of the same status of a

medieval natio which the Magyars, Saxons, and Szeklers had

enjoyed since 1437.

The justification of the petitioners' arguments in terms of the

historic primacy and continuity of the "Rumanian nation" is notsurprising considering the cultural background of the principal

authors of the Supplex libellus, Georghe incai, loan Molnar, Samuil

Micu, and loan Budai-Deleanu. Their appraisal of the "historic

rights" of the Rumanians was remarkably modest. Their trump card,

Latinity, was used mostly for identification purposes and as

evidence of longevity of residence. The Supplex libellus did not per

se entail the restoration of whatever rights and privileges the oldestinhabitants of the province had enjoyed prior to their arrogation by

new comers. The status and rights of the existing three nations

were not contested. The Supplex libellus was essentially a plea for

the gradual and limited incorporation of the Rumanian bourgeoisie

4 The text of the Supplex libellus Valachorum can be found in David Prodan, Supplex libellusValachorum(Cluj, 1948), pp. 243-2735The most comprehensive Marxist interpretation is in Istoria Rominiei[The History of Rumania], Vol.

Ill (Bucharest: Academia Republicii Populare Romine, 1964), pp. 492-513. Consult also the excellentstudy by Keith Hitchins, "Samuel Clain and the Rumanian Enlightenment in Transylvania," SlavicReview, Vol. XXIII, No. 4 (December, 1964), pp. 660-675.


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and "bourgeois intellectuals" into the Magyar- dominated oligarchy

and for meaningful Rumanian representation in Transylvania's

political institutions. The suppliants' concern with the problems of

the Rumanian serf was minimal. Far from regarding Horea, Cloca,and Crian as representative of the Rumanian nation and its socio-

economic desiderata, they condemned the revolt of 1784 as the

illegal work of savages. Only the brutality of the repression was

condemned, and this on humanitarian rather than political grounds.

If any thing, the authors of the Supplex libellus, in that document

and in related writings, questioned the wisdom of Joseph IIs social

reformism and asked his successor Leopold II not to repeat Joseph's

errors but to exercise his authority and influence on behalf of

themselves as the representative segment of the Rumanian

population. No threats or even intimations of political action in case

the petition were denied by the emperor or rejected by the

privileged nations were made in the Supplex libellus Valachorum.

The petitioners had no thought of making common cause with the

Rumanians of Moldavia and Walachia; their principal argument was

that both Transylvania and the Habsburg monarchy would be

strengthened by making the local diet representative of the

interests of all the nations and by ending discriminatory socio-

economic practices against the Rumanian commercial and

intellectual elite.

The narrow scope of the aspirations of the Rumanianintellectuals was typical of the representatives of the so-called

"coala Ardelean" (Transylvanian School).6 No matter how

extravagantly the writings of Micu, incai, or Maior have been

interpreted, they were nationalist only in the sense that they

stressed the ethnic and historical differences between the

6 On the nature and message of the "Scoala Ardeleana" consult Vasile Maciu et al., Outline of

Rumanian Historiography until the Beginning of the 20th Century (Bucharest: Editura Academiei,1964), pp. 30-36. It is an original interpretation. See also coala ardelean [The TransylvanianSchool] (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1959).


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Rumanians and the other inhabitants of Transylvania.7 With one

notable exception, loan Budai-Deleanu's iganiada (The Gypsy

Epic), these writings were fundamentally linguistic exercises. The

iganiadaalone contained novel political ideas.8

This poem has beenacclaimed by Marxist historians as the initial formulation of a

common political goal for all Rumanians of Transylvania - social and

national emancipation.9 Such an interpretation of Budai-Deleanu's

work may be correct, but it must be noted that his concept of social

reform was far more developed than that of other champions of

national liberation. Actually, the iganiada, is a plea for the political

emancipation of all the inhabitants of the monarchy, not just the

Rumanians, from the feudal and medieval order. Budai-Deleanu

does not envisage the establishment of separate nationality groups

in the Habsburg empire or the union of the Rumanians north and

south of the Danube. Instead, he postulates the revolutionary

democratic reorganization of the empire within the existing

geographic and multinational framework.

Similar motifs, in more rudimentary form, are also to be found

in the folk ballads of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth

centuries. However, the tendency of certain nationalist and Marxist

historians to interpret popular demands for reform and expressions

of discontent with the feudal order as nationalist manifestations

seems unwarranted.10 Such interpretations are based on the

simplistic concept of the inherent conflict between Magyar andRumanian or landlord and serf and ignore the fact that, even if a

majority of the latifundiaries were Hungarian and a majority of the

7Compare Hitchins, "Samuel Clain and the Rumanian Enlightenment in Transylvania," pp. 660-675,with Maciu, Outline of Rumanian Historiography, pp. 30-36. See also Daicoviciu, Din IstoriaTransilvaniei, Vol. I, pp. 278-297.8D. Popovici, La littrature roumaine l'poque des lumires(Sibiu, 1945), pp. 109-116 and 448-475.9Most forcefully stated in Daicoviciu, Din Istoria Transilvaniei, Vol. I, pp. 296-297.10 See also Cornelia Bodea, "Preocupari economice si culturale in literatura transilvan dintre anii1786-1830" [Economic and Cultural Preoccupations in Transylvanian Literature between 1786 and1830], Studii, Vol. IX, No. 6 (1956), pp. 87-104.


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encouraged only such national self-assertion or social reform as was

authorized by Vienna. The Church was indeed a pillar of strength for

the Habsburg emperors.12

Admittedly, this situation changed in the 1840's, primarily

because of the socio-economic and political attitudes of the

Hungarian aristocracy. As has been pointed out recently by

Rumanian historians of Transylvania, the demands of the Rumanian

bourgeoisie were forced into a nationalist mold because they were

rejected by the Magyar aristocracy on the basis either of medieval

prerogative or modern nationalist doctrine.13 Indeed, it was the

"aristocratic nationalism" of the Hungarians, with its crass

intolerance of the rights and aspirations of national minorities, that

led to the equating of socio-economic reform with national rights

and the acceptance of this formula by the Rumanian population at

large. It mattered relatively little whether Hungarian nationalist

intransigeance was a reflection of the magnates' conservatism or of

the lesser nobility's chauvinism, since, whatever the source, itinvariably stressed the primacy of the Hungarians.

It is true that the reformist nobility favored the emancipation

of the bourgeoisie, but their plans for the creation of a "landlord-

bourgeois" Hungary excluded the Rumanian middle class and would

thus have perpetuated its political and socio- economic inferiority. It

is not surprising, therefore, that the Rumanian bourgeoisie feared

Kossuth more than the Hungarian traditionalists and relied on the

emperor to prevent the victory of the "reformists." As Victor

Cheresteiu and other serious students of Transylvanian history

have correctly recognized, the majority of the Rumanian

bourgeoisie' preferred reform within the existing framework or even

12 The significance and influence of the conservative forces has been reassessed in recent years. A

comprehensive summary of the latest findings and current interpretations can be found in IstoriaRomniei, Vol. IV (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1964), pp. 25-35.13Daicoviciu, Din Istoria Transilvaniei, Vol. I, pp. 318-350.


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the maintenance of the status quo to any change that would have

jeopardized the stability of the imperial order.14But the number of

those favoring a more comprehensive assertion of the Rumanians'

rights than that contained in the Supplex libellus through theinclusion of an emancipated peasantry in an enlarged Rumanian

natio or perhaps even through the establishment of a Rumanian

region directly subordinated to the emperor was increasing.

Nevertheless, the historian should be ware of current exaggerations

concerning the importance of the minority viewpoint, since the

broader doctrine of "national" and "social" change was formulated

and accepted only by a very small segment of intellectuals of

bourgeois origin.15It is also noteworthy that even among the most

vociferous exponents of "bourgeois nationalist" views few

contemplated common action with the Moldavians and Walachians,

and none favored the establishment of a Greater Rumania. The

generation of 1848 was aware of the similarities in the several

Rumanian doctrines, but the Transylvanian Rumanians were

concerned primarily with the attainment of their own goals on the

basis of an "objective" analysis of historical conditions in

Transylvania alone. They were basically bourgeois social (not

national) revolutionaries who were ready to collaborate with fellow

bourgeois liberals of Hungarian, Saxon, and Szekler origin for the

attainment of a common end: the pro motion of the interests of the

enlightened bourgeoisie, threatened, on the one hand, by traditional

Magyar feudal conservatism and, on the other, by a nationalistic,

aristocratic-led bourgeois revolution. No matter whether it was

strictly class, class nationalist, social, or "social" and "national"

oriented, on the eve of 1848 the "bourgeois nationalism" of the

14Victor Cheresteiu,A magyarorszgi romn sajt politikai vezreszmi s munkja a szabadsgharceltti vtizedben [The Principal Political Ideas and the Activity of the Rumanian Press in Hungary inthe Decade before the War for Independence] (Budapest, 1917), pp. 3-33; Victor Cheresteiu,"Luptatorul revoluionar Eftimie Murgu" [The Revolutionary Eftimie Murgu], Studii, Vol. IX, No. 1

(1956), pp. 65-86; Nicolae lorga, Istoria romnilor din Ardeal i Ungaria [The History of theRumanians of Transylvania and Hungary] (Bucharest: Gutenberg, 1915), pp. 136-148.15Daicoviciu, Din Istoria Transilvaniei, Vol. I, pp. 340-349.


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Rumanians militated in favor not only of the maintenance but

actually of the strengthening of the empire and imperial authority.16

The frequent characterization of the revolution of 1848- 1849

as either a nationalist or a "social" and "national" movement does

not bear rigorous critical analysis.17 It was nationalist or national

only in a very narrow sense. The elements of social revolution,

which were most manifest in Transylvania proper, were generally

devoid of national identification. The issues were simple: for the

peasant, emancipation from serfdom; for the middle class,

economic and political equality with the other natios. In 1848 only

the intellectuals debated the degree to which Rumanian national

and social aspirations should be pressed.

The nationalism of the Transylvanian bourgeoisie was as

modest as their program for social reform. The extremists among

them asked for nothing more than the recognition of the Rumanian

nation as a political entity enjoying national autonomy under the

direct jurisdiction of the court in Vienna.18 Their nationalism was

anti-Hungarian in character only to the extent to which the interests

of the Rumanian bourgeoisie were in conflict with those of the

Hungarian aristocracy. The Transylvanian bourgeoisie identified

their interests with the Hungarian, Saxon, and Szekler merchant

class far more than with the Rumanian peasantry. In fact,

emancipation of the Rumanian masses was a sentimental idea

rather than a political requirement. The bourgeoisie shied away

from collaboration with the intellectual "extremists," leaders of

separate revolutionary movements like Avram lancu, peasant

16La Transylvanie, pp. 370-378.17The standard "nationalist" interpretation is by I. Moga, "Luttes des Roumains de Transylvanie pourlmancipation nationale," La Transylvanie, pp. 379-451. The standard Marxist interpretation is inDaicoviciu, Din Istoria Transilvaniei, Vol. II, pp. 1-132.18Simion Barnuiu, Romnii i ungurii [The Rumanians and the Hungarians] (Cluj, 1924). This workhas valuable annotations by G. Bogdan-Duica. See also Silviu Dragomir, Studii i documente privitoare

la revoluia romnilor din Transilvania in anii 1848-1849 [Studies and Documents concerning theRevolution of the Rumanians of Transylvania in 1848-1849] (4 vols., Cluj, 1944-46); and G. Bogdan-Duica, Viaa si ideile lui Simeon Bnuiu [The Life and Ideas of Simeon Brnuiu] (Bucharest, 1924).


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meutes, and the Moldavian and Walachian rebels, whether active

or in exile. They gave national identification to their socio-economic

and political goals only for the purpose of differentiating themselves

from the anti-imperial Magyar revolutionaries and, to a lesserextent, the conformist Szeklers and Saxons. The abolition of the

medieval nations in Transylvania by imperial action and the granting

of equality to all subjects in 1849 generally satisfied their

"nationalist" yearnings.

It is also erroneous to overemphasize the nationalism - or

national aims - of the more radical revolutionaries, particularly

Iancu's.19It must not be forgotten that lancu was basically a social

revolutionary who collaborated with his Magyar counterparts for the

attainment of the radical aim of emancipation of the peasantry and

bourgeoisie and "democratic rule" in a multinational Hungarian

state. His estrangement from the Hungarians and subsequent

turning to the Habsburgs for protection of Rumanian interests

occurred only after the Hungarian revolutionaries had rejected hispolitical principles, or rather, had denied the need for Rumanian

national identification in social revolutionary movements. Iancu's

position thus was very close to that of the Rumanian intellectuals of

the Banat, Criana, and Maramures who had initially sup ported the

Hungarian "democratic revolution" in the expectation that a united

yet multinational Hungary would be ruled by and for the benefit of

all its nationalities and who turned to the emperor in 1849 onlybecause of the intransigeance and dogmatism of the Magyar

revolutionary leaders.20 It must be recognized, however, that like

lancu and other Transylvanians, the "radical" Rumanian intellectuals

were conscious of the incompatibility of their aims with those of the

19 Avram Iancu's views are best expressed in his Raportui lui Avram lancu [The Report of Avramlancu] (Sibiu, 1884). Silviu Dragomir, Avram lancu (Bucharest, 1924), is still the most authoritativestudy of lancu.20Silviu Dragomir, Tratativele romno-maghiare din vara anului 1849 [Rumanian-Magyar Negotiationsin the Summer of 1849] (Cluj, 1947), pp. 1-35; Cheresteiu, "Lupttorul revoluionar Eftimie Murgu,"pp. 65-86.


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conservative monarchy, as well as of the advantages that might

eventually be derived from linking social discontent with national

discrimination. At the same time, they were aware of the fact that

their position was not shared by most Rumanian cultural andspiritual leaders and the peasantry whose cause they sought to

promote.

The majority of the intellectuals and clergy in all parts of the

monarchy were mainly concerned with cultural autonomy.21 They

remained loyal to the emperor throughout the crisis and regarded

him as their protector against Magyar, Serbian, or Ruthenian

domination. Their political formulae also reflected their

unquestionable Kaisertreue. Most of them were sympathetic to the

aspirations of the peasantry, but they opposed social violence as a

means of securing emancipation. They were generally successful in

steering the masses away from radical influences and actions and

exploited the fundamental faith of the peasants in the Church and

the emperor.

22

By 1849, they, like all Rumanians whose desideratawere at least superficially satisfied by the emperor, were among the

staunchest supporters of imperial rule.

A controversy persists over the nature of Rumanian

nationalism in the Habsburg monarchy between the end of the

1848-1849 revolution and the Compromise of 1867.23Neither the

nationalist historians outside Rumania nor the Marxist school has

been prepared to accept the fact that during this period "bourgeois

21. See the summary statement in Daicoviciu, Din Istoria Transilvaniei, Vol. II, pp. 36-62. See also asimilar statement on Bukovina in Prokopowitsch, Die rumnische Nationalbewegung in der Bukowina,pp. 39-45. In addition, see loan Lupa, Mitropolitui Andreiu aguna (Sibiu, 1911), pp. 48-67; and N.Popea, Memorialul arhiepiscopului i metropolitului Andreiu baron de aguna [The Memorial ofArchbishop and Metropolitan Andreiu aguna], Vol. I (Sibiu, 1889), pp. 248-249.22 See the summary statement in Victor Cheresteiu, "Contribuiii la istoria micrilor raneti nTransilvania n anul revoluionar 1848" [Contributions to the History of Peasant Movements inTransylvania in the Revolutionary Year 1848], Studii i referate privind istoria Romniei[Studies andReports concerning the History of Rumania], Vol. II (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1954), pp. 1159-1199.23See Daicoviciu, Din Istoria Transilvaniei, Vol. II, pp. 133-186; and Moga, "Luttes des Roumains deTransylvanie pour l'mancipation nationale," pp. 403-423. An interesting interpretation may also befound in Istoria Romniei, Vol. IV, pp. 398-440.


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nationalism," or the "social" and "national" struggle of the

Rumanians, was largely checked, first by the absolutist methods

employed by Vienna between 1849 and 1860, and after 1860 by the

"liberal regime."

It may, of course, be argued that the socio-economic and

political changes that occurred between 1849 and 1867 paved the

way for the Ausgleich and subsequent nationalist manifestations.

One of the merits of Marxist historians is that they have analyzed

the Rumanian "social" and "national" movement on that basis. On

the other hand, the contention that the political consciousness of

the Rumanian population at large increased during those years and

in the process veered toward the idea of union with Walachia and

Moldavia is inaccurate. The post-revolutionary solutions propounded

by Rumanian political exiles such as the national integration of all

Rumanians or the international union of all social and national

revolutionaries represented the views of a tiny and non-influential

minority.

24

The overwhelming majority of the population, it must be

recognized, either favored the acceptance of Habsburg reform and

political patronage or else sought the improvement of their status

through channels leading directly to the imperial court. Even the

intellectuals, the most outspoken critics of the inequities inherent in

both the absolutist system- and the brief period of liberal rule, were

seeking only equality of rights with the Saxons, Szeklers, and

Magyars and the introduction or maintenance of the Rumanian

language in the ad ministration, courts, and schools. It is true that

men such as loan Maiorescu, August Treboniu Laurian, George

Barium, and Ioan Raiu aspired to attain more equitable political

24Representative arguments may be found in Cornelia C. Bodea, "Lupta pentru unire a revoluionari lorexilai de la 1848" [The Struggle for Union on the Part of the Exiled Revolutionaries of 1848], Studii

privind Unirea Principatelor [Studies concerning the Union of the Principalities] (Bucharest: EdituraAcademiei, 1960), pp. 129-133; and in Dan Berindei and Vasile Curticpeanu, "Revoluia de la 1848-1849" [The Revolution of 1848-1849], Studii, Vol. XV, No. 6 (1962), pp. 1592-1593.


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representation in the diet or political rights in general for the

Rumanians of Transylvania and the Banat, but, like' those who

expressed their gratitude to Vienna for political and socio-economic

largesses, they were concerned only with effectuating a changewithin the post-1849 framework.25For them the main victory was

gained with the general recognition of the equality of rights of all

inhabitants of the empire, relative and theoretical though this

equality may have been in practice, and the specific recognition of

the status and rights of the Rumanian nation by the Transylvanian

diet of 1863.26

It is incontestable, however, that the devotion of the

Rumanians to Vienna declined somewhat in the 'sixties. The

deterioration of the economic position of the Rumanian peasantry

after emancipation caused some dissatisfaction and unrest among

the masses. Even though the peasants' discontent was essentially

directed against the Hungarian landlords rather than the benevolent

emperor, Francis Joseph himself was not absolved from blame forthe Magyars' defiance of the principles of imperial reform. Yet it

would be inaccurate to depict the Rumanian peasant as a radical

nationalist or a "national" or "social" revolutionary favoring political

independence under Rumanian rule, whether in Transylvania alone

or in a Greater Rumania.27

Also questionable is the recent contention that the Rumanian

peasantry of the Habsburg monarchy applauded the political

support given Alexandru Ion Cuza by the Walachian and Moldavian

masses at the time of the union of the principalities, both per se

and in anticipation of social reform and the national unification of all

25Characteristic is Gheorghe Bariiu, Pri alese din istoria Transilvaniei[Excerpts from the History ofTransylvania], Vol. II (Sibiu, 1890), pp. 128-133 and 154-164. See also Enea Hodo, Dincorespondent lui S. Brnuiu i a contemporanilor si [The Correspondence of S. Brnuiu and His

Contemporaries] (Sibiu, 1944), pp. 8-45.26V. Moldovan, Dieta Ardealului din 186S-1864[The Diet of Transylvania of 1863-1864] (Cluj, 1932).27For an excellent summary, see Daicoviciu, Din Istoria Transilvaniei, Vol. II, pp. 135-164.


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"oppressed" Rumanians.28 In the 'sixties the peasant's Kaisertreue

still transcended any other political or national allegiance.

Similarly, the Rumanian middle class, although somewhat

disappointed with "imperial liberalism," entertained neither

animosity toward the emperor nor a desire for political autonomy or

union with Moldavia and Walachia. The bourgeoisie's dissatisfaction

with Habsburg economic policies was not so great as to blind them

to the fact that their status and prosperity were comparable to that

of all but the Austrian mer chants and capitalists in the empire and

certainly superior to that of their counterparts in Moldavia and

Walachia. Al though a complete reconciliation between their socio-

economic interests and those of Vienna appeared Utopian, the

modus vivendi made possible by imperial reform was acceptable

enough in the 'sixties and, for that matter, half a century later.

In fact, any objective assessment of the attitudes of all the

Rumanians in the monarchy even after the Ausgleich leads to some

rather startling conclusions. The most important is that the

opposition of the Rumanians, regardless of social status, to the

discriminatory and chauvinistic policies of the Hungarians was much

less pronounced and certainly more apolitical than the nationalist

historical school would have us believe. It was also less "national"

and "social" in character than is claimed by the Marxists. Of equal

importance, perhaps, is the fact that the growing disenchantment

with Vienna did not diminish the Rumanians' fundamental loyalty to

the emperor. Moreover, their refroidissement was based on

disapproval of the encouragement and support which the imperial

government gave to the Hungarians' discriminatory economic

policies and practices rather than on the court's toleration of

Hungarian political excesses. Finally, no real unionist sentiments

were voiced by the Rumanians in Transylvania, however disaffected

28Ibid., p. 146.


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they may have been with Magyar and imperial rule, nor, for that

matter, by those in the Banat and - for a long time - Bukovina.

The most striking aspect of the history of the Rumanians of

Transylvania and the Banat after the Ausgleich was the

improvement in economic status of all classes except the peasantry.

Rumanian Marxist historians have rendered' a major service to

students of the dual monarchy and at the same time have

undermined their own arguments by describing and analyzing the

vast economic progress made by the bourgeoisie and the rapidly

growing landlord class in the closing decades of the nineteenth

century.29The development of capitalism favored the growth of a

wealthy industrial, commercial, and, above all, financial bourgeoisie.

Even if on a comparative basis the Rumanians were no longer as

well off as their Austrian or Magyar counterparts, the evidence does

not support the theory that their inferior economic status increased

their "social" and "national" revolutionary ardor. On the contrary,

Rumanian merchants, industrialists, and financiers chose to adopt amost moderate attitude toward the several Hungarian regimes

beginning with Klmn Tisza's, despite the obvious "national" and

"social" humiliations to which they were subjected. It is indeed

noteworthy that the so-called "passivists" were primarily merchants

and businessmen and that their own National Party, at least under

Ilie Mcelariu's leadership, took refuge in the negative but safe

formula of non-participation in Hungarian political life.30

29See ibid., pp. 189-231, for a good summary. See also Ludovic Vajda, Despre situaia economic isocial-politic a Transilvaniei n primii ani ai secolului al XX-lea" [The Economic and Socio-PoliticalSituation in Transylvania in the First Years of the Twentieth Century], Studii i referate privind istoriaRomniei, Vol. II (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1954), pp. 315-320; and losif Kovcs, "Date nlegatur cu descompunerea rnimii din Transilvania dup desfiinarea iobagiei din anul 1848"[Information concerning the Decomposition of the Peasantry after the Abolition of Serfdom in 1848],Studii si cercetari de istorie[Historical Studies and Researches], Academia R. P. R., Cluj, Vol. VIII, No.1-4 (1957), pp. 244-251.30The classic and most explicit account is still T. V. Pcean, Cartea de aur sau luptele politice aleRomnilor sub Coroana Ungariei [The Golden Book, or the Political Struggles of the Rumanians underthe Hungarian Crown], Vol. IV (Sibiu, 1906).


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This abstention, nominally based on the refusal of the

Rumanians to recognize Transylvania's incorporation into Hungary,

was not, however, an expression of implacable hostility to the

Hungarians. It merely reflected the de facto, if not de jure,acceptance of a status quo which did not rule out an improvement

of relations with them. The "passivists" were prepared to tolerate

all the restrictions imposed upon the Rumanians by successive

Hungarian regimes as long as their enforcement could be

circumvented by tacit acquiescence or, inconspicuous imperial

intercession. The National Party of Transylvania was thus essentially

an unofficial intermediary between the Rumanian middle class, and

by extension the peasantry, and the still unrecognized Magyar

governments. It also served as an official link with the Rumanians'

only legitimate" ruler, the Habsburg emperor.

It has been correctly pointed out that the attitude of the

members of the National Party of Transylvania differed from that of

the "activist" Rumanian National Party of the Banat and Hungary.

31

However, even though the landowning class and the more

belligerent intellectuals who formed the hard core of the "activists"

advocated a more determined anti- Hungarian, and, in this sense,

nationalistic line, they still sought coexistence rather than conflict

with the Magyar power elite. For however critical of the Hungarian

order "activist" leaders like Alexandru Mocioni or Vinceniu Babe

might have been, they shied away from drastic political action.Neither the leaders themselves nor the various newspapers and

journals published under the party's auspices sought active imperial

intervention in behalf of the Rumanians or even so much as

threatened mass demonstrations or economic boycotts against the

Magyar "oppressors" or waved the flag for a Greater Rumania.32

31 lorga, Istoria romnilor din Ardeal i Ungaria, Vol. II, pp. 221-225; Daicoviciu, Din Istoria

Transilvaniei, Vol. II, pp. 232-251.32 On these points, consult loan Lupa "Inceputurile i epocele istorice ale ziaristicii romneti -transilvane" [The Beginnings and the Historical Periods of Transylvanian-Rumanian Journalism], Studii


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Their moderation may be ascribed, at least in part, to their "class"

interests and inherent conservatism, but it is also connected with

their growing mistrust of Vienna and contempt for the Old Kingdom.

Mocioni's National Party was in fact more anti-Habsburg and anti-Hohenzollern than anti-Hungarian, since it operated on the

assumption that the Magyars would respect and even extend the

rights of the nationalities in return for acceptance of the dual

system and Magyar primacy in their half of the Austro-Hungarian

empire. Only when the expectations of the "activists" were

frustrated after the enactment of the odious Trefort Law, which

magyarized the educational system, did their organization seek a

rapprochement with the Transylvanian National Party, which

eventually resulted in the joining of the two groups in 1881.33This

union, to be sure, reflected an increase in anti-Hungarian

sentiment, but it did not represent an irreparable break with either

Budapest or Vienna.

As recent Rumanian writers have correctly pointed out, theunion of 1881 was as much anti-Habsburg as anti-Magyar. The

growing realization by the bourgeoisie, the landowners, and the

intellectuals that the Ausgleich was not only a com promise between

the emperor and the Austrian and Hungarian aristocracies, but also

a means for furthering the interests of the Austrian and Hungarian

bourgeoisie was a determining factor in the formation of a united

National Party.34

Although the Rumanians may have been aware in1881 of the "landlord- bourgeois" alliance and the exploitation of

other nationalities in "social" and "national" terms, their immediate

reaction and subsequent political behavior were not characteristic of

militant "nationalist" or "social" and "national" revolutionaries or

istorice[Historical Studies], Vol. V (Sibiu-Cluj, 1945-46), pp. 325-332; and loan Lupa, Contribuiunila istoria ziaristicei romnesti ardelene [Contributions to the History of Transylvanian RumanianJournalism] (Sibiu, 1&26),pp. 19-52.33 The political program of the Rumanian National Party can be found in Eugen Brote, Chestiunearomna n Transilvania i Ungaria[The Rumanian Question in Transylvania and Hungary] (Bucharest,1896), pp. 208-209.


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reformers. That their Kaisertreue was not too rudely shaken in 1881

can be seen in the fact that the new party looked to Vienna for

redress of grievances. Their continued efforts to reach an

accommodation with the Magyar regime also indicate that theiranti-Hungarian positions had still not crystallized. Not even the

emperor's rejection of the party's famous Memorandum of 1892 and

the virulent Magyar reaction to it resulted in anything but a tactical

readjustment of their modest program for "national" and "social"

reform.

In view of the exaggerated significance attached to the

Memorandum by Rumanian historians, past and present, it seems to

be necessary to emphasize its conservative character and the

moderation of* the petitioners' reaction to the negative response of

the Austrians and Hungarians.35 The reasons for the "landlord-

bourgeois" attitudes of the petitioners, as Marxist historians have

pointed out, are to be found in the search by the "dominant classes"

among the Rumanians for a Rumanian Ausgleich with eitherBudapest or Vienna, or even with both. It is, however, just as

erroneous to claim that the Memorandum was an expression of

militant nationalism as to view the moderation of the petitioners as

a betrayal by the propertied classes of the "social" and "national"

desiderata of the Rumanian masses. The document itself refutes the

former interpretation, while the latter presupposes the existence of

an acute class struggle among the Rumanians, which, in fact, didnot exist, and the prevalence of "national" and "social" sentiments

34Daicoviciu, Din Istoria Transilvaniei, Vol. II, pp. 263-259.35 See ibid., pp. 269-264, for a concise summary of contemporary Marxist interpretations.Characteristic of earlier interpretations is Moga, "Luttes des Roumains de Transylvanie pourl'emancipation nationale," pp. 441- 451. See also Z. Pclianu, "Guvernele ungureti i micareamemorandist a Romnilor din Ardeal" [The Hungarian Governments and the Memorandum Movementof the Rumanians of Transylvania], Revista, Fundaiilor Regale, Vol. I (1934), pp. 343-347; I. P. Papp,Procesul Memorandului Romnilor din Transilvania, [The Memorandum Trial of the Rumanians ofTransylvania] (2 vols., Cluj, 1932-33); tefan Pascu, Din rsunetul procesului memorandist n maselepopulare [The Echo of the Memorandum Trial among the Popular Masses] (Sibiu, 1944); and M.

Danciu, "Din frmntrile maselor populare n timpul procesului memorandist" [The Unrest of thePopular Masses during the Memorandum Trial], Studia Universitatis Babe-Bolyai. Historia, Vol. IV,No. 1 (1959), pp. 107-122.


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among the peasantry and working class that were irreconcilable

with the selfish "class interests" of the landlords, middle class,

churchmen, and "bourgeois" intellectuals.

The available evidence fails to reveal the existence of a clearly

defined national sentiment among the peasantry and workers

beyond an awareness of being Rumanian or of any thing more than

elementary social antagonism toward landowners, merchants, and

industrial entrepreneurs. The reason why the "propertied classes"

sought an accommodation with the Habsburgs and even the

Hungarians was ultimately rooted t, in their own prosperity and lack

of confidence in the Rumanians of the Old. Kingdom. To them, life

with Francis Joseph and Tisza was still preferable to life with Carol,

Carp, or Brtianu. This was also true of the peasantry and the

proletariat, for whom the very notion of union with their Rumanian

"brethren" was alien in the 'nineties and became ever more

distasteful when they became acquainted with the conditions which

prevailed in Rumania proper during and after the great peasantrevolt of 1907. If anything, mass identification with the National

Party and support of its policies, which was already strong- in the

'nineties, increased in the decade ante dating the First World War.

Thus, the majority of Rumanians, though dissatisfied with the

existing order and disappointed by Austro-Hungarian indifference to

their pleas, contemplated no radical movements and sought no

change outside the imperial framework.36

Recent historians of Transylvania and the Banat have accused

the leaders of the Rumanian National Party of selling out the true

"national" and "social" interests of all Rumanians to the Habsburgs

in the years preceding the First World War. Such arguments are as

questionable as those of the nationalist historians who depicted the

36 In addition to the references provided in note 35, see also Traian Lungu and Anastase lordache,"Romnia la nceputul secolului al XX-lea" [Rumania at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century], Studii,Vol. XV, No. 6 (1962), pp. 1639-1651.


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same leaders as champions of national unification. The "bourgeois"

leaders, tefan Pop, Iuliu Maniu, Alexandra Vaida, Teodor Mihali,

Aurel Vlad, and even the much-maligned "federalist" Aurel Popovici,

acted in good faith and with the support of their constituents.37

Aslong as the emperor and the Hungarians held out some hope of

compromise, as long as the prosperity of the Rumanians seemed to

be increasing, as long as the political actions and propaganda

emanating from the Old Kingdom held out little promise of an

improvement of existing conditions, the party's course of action was

acceptable on both "national" and "social" grounds, at least to the

Rumanians of Transylvania, the Banat, Criana, and Maramures.

Even the Marxists have not been able to demonstrate that the

dissatisfaction of the peasants and workers with their worsening

economic condition and the related "demonstrations" and minor

"revolutionary manifestations" implied a rejection of the policies of

their leaders or of the imperial order.38

Even more erroneous is the notion that in those years the,supreme goal of the National Party and of the Rumanians of

Transylvania, the Banat, Criana, and Maramure was the

establishment,, of a Greater, Rumania.39 It ignores the generally

apathetic response to the unionist propaganda from Bucharest,

particularly after the peasant revolts of 1907. This lack of

correlation between propaganda and political action has been

recognized in Marxist historiography, but its meaning has beendistorted to comply with the thesis of "social" and "national" dualism

37The most detailed summary of contemporary views can be found in Constantin Daicoviciu and MironConstantinescu, Destrmarea Monarhiei Austro-Ungare 1900-1918 [The Dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy] (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1964), pp. 93-189. A summary of pre-Marxistpositions may be found in loan Lupa, "La dsagrgation de la monarchie austro -hongroise et laliberation de la Transylvanie," La Transylvanie, pp. 453-468.38Daicoviciu and Constantinescu, Destrmarea Monarhiei Austro-Ungare 1900-1918, pp. 11-92 and231-262.39Clopoel, Revoluia din 1918 i Unirea Ardealului cu Romania[The Revolution of 1918 and the Unionof Transylvania with Rumania] (Cluj, 1926); Daicoviciu and Constantinescu, Destrmarea MonarhieiAustro-Ungare 1900-1918, pp. 175-189.


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in mass movements.40 It is claimed that Rumanian nationalist

propaganda in Transylvania and the other provinces failed because

the conservative regime in Rumania and the king himself were

opposed to the dismemberment of the Habsburg monarchy andnational union. This explanation fails to take into account the

absence of a powerful unionist movement and of "social" and

"national" manifestations in Transylvania and the Banat which, on

the whole, aspired to anything more than the mere reorganization

of the Rumanian nation in a manner compatible with the principles

of the Memorandum and the preservation of the Habsburg

monarchy. The idea of union with the Old Kingdom became

acceptable to the population at large only when the defeat of the

Austro-Hungarian empire seemed probable, and it became

genuinely appealing only when the monarchy was on the verge of

collapse.

It is perhaps paradoxical that the unionist propaganda

disseminated by the Rumanian government was more effective inBukovina than in Transylvania and the Banat in the decade before

the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy.41 This phenomenon is,

however, indicative of the commitment to the Habsburg monarchy

on the part of the leading classes and political organizations of the

more prosperous (and more Rumanian) provinces. In Bukovina the

intellectuals and peasantry, lacking comparable vested interests and

resentful of economic domination by foreign landlords, merchants,and "capitalists," were far more susceptible to the crude,

chauvinistic,, and often anti-Semitic propaganda emanating from

the Old Kingdom. Are we then to regard Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, loan

Grmad or Lazr Gherman as more imbued with the "nationalist"

spirit or more convinced of the need for "social" and "national"

40Daicoviciu and Constantinescu, Destrmarea Monarhiei Austro-Ungare 1900-1918, pp. 105-116 and

131-136; Lungu and lordache, "Romnia la nceputui secolului al XX-lea," p. 1649, n. 5.41 A lucid summary will be found in Prokopowitsch, Die rumnische Nationalbewegung in derBukowina, pp. 130-158.


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Justice than Maniu, Pop, or Vaida? Hardly, it seems to me, unless

we equate nationalism with chauvinism and regard its supreme goal

as the creation of a national state regardless of its political and

economic viability.

The criteria of viability differed from province to province in

the monarchy. Enjoyment of political rights and cultural autonomy

did not prevent the Rumanians of Bukovina from harkening to the

siren song promising them a better national life in a Greater

Rumania. It is noteworthy, however, that, historically, neither the

intellectuals nor the peasantry of that province doubted the viability

of the Habsburg monarchy or expressed resentment over their

status in any degree com parable to that of the Transylvanians or

the inhabitants of the Banat, Criana, and Maramure.42 Their

"Twelve Points" of 1848 were, after all, accepted and provided the

framework for peaceful coexistence with Vienna and their Ruthenian

neighbors. Although the Rumanians of Transylvania, the Banat,

Criana, and Maramure had more serious doubts about thestability of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy than those of Bukovina,

they persisted to the end in their search for a compromise. Even as

late as the First World War they believed that the reshuffling of the

empire's assets and liabilities could still produce a stronger state in

which the conflicting but not irreconcilable interests of all its

inhabitants could be accommodated. The attainment of the "social"

and "national" goals of the Rumanians within the imperial framework seemed quite feasible to them.

The problem of the viability of the Habsburg empire in the

twentieth century is still unresolved. As far as the Rumanians of the

monarchy were concerned, the answer was generally positive. Their

42 See, for instance, the penetrating contemporary account by G. Bogdan-Duica, Bucovina. Notie

politice asupra situaiei ei [Bukovina. Political Notes on Its Situation] (Sibiu, 1895). The "TwelvePoints" may be found in Ion Sbiera, O pagin din istoria Bucovinii din 1848-1850 [A Page from theHistory of Bukovina in 1848-1850] (Cernaui, 1899), pp. 9-10.


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appraisal of the problem and the solutions which they offered may

have been unrealistic, unhistorical, and/or class-oriented and may

have reflected the views of ignorant, scared, or selfish men; but the

attainment of a political and socio-economic utopia in a GreaterRumania was not necessarily the ideal of the majority of the

Rumanian in habitants of the Habsburg monarchy before 1918.

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