THE SYRIAN-ISRAELI BORDER CONFLICT, 1949-1967

David Bowen and Laura Drake

he origins of the 1967 war in the Middle East are often thought to lie somewhere in the sands of the T Sinai Peninsula. The truth, we

believe, is that they really lie more than 200 miles to the north, just below the Golan Heights. Long before U Thant removed U.N. Emergency Force troops from the Sinai, long before Egypt moved two divi- sions into the Sinai, long before Egypt announced a blockade of the Tiran Straits, the seeds of war were being sown 17 years earlier in the plowed fields of 66.5 square kilometers of the demilitarized zone on the Syrian-Israeli border (see map below).

At the conclusion of the 194748 Pales- tine war, Israel acquired a state which contained 5,791 square kilometers more than the 1947 U.N. partition plan for the new State of Israel. The question cannot be resolved here of whether that war began as a result of “ethnic cleansing” activities by the three Zionist militias-Haganah, Irgun and Lehi-directed against Palestinian towns and villages in late 1947 and early 1948 (such as Deir Yassin, where 254 were massacred on April 9, 1948) or as a result of the intervention of military forces from six Arab states following the establishment of the State of Israel on May 15, 1948 (with

20,000 Arab troops opposing 67,000 Israeli troops in the three militias, which then became the Israel Defense Forces-r whether Israel should have been allowed to keep the new territory it conquered.

Instead, what follows is an examination of three small patches of land along the Syrian-Israeli border, the only territory in what would have been Israel under the U.N. partition plan that the Israelis did not succeed in occupying at the time of the armistice. Although Israel expanded its ter- ritory elsewhere by 40 percent over the U.N. partition plan as a result of the war, it lost four-tenths of one percent-66.5 square kilometers-of what the United Na- tions had intended for Israel by that same plan. The loss of these small parcels on the Syrian border was a source of great distress to the Israelis, though they ended up with 77 percent of Mandatory Palestine, com- prising all the territory inside the Green Line. They were determined to acquire this land, inhabited by both Arabs and Jews, one way or another.

The 1949 Syrian-Israeli Armistice was intended to freeze in place the troops on both sides as they stood on April 13, 1949, the date of the cease-fire that ended the war. The new U.N. mediator, Dr. Ralph

Mr. Bowen is a former congressman from Mississippi and executive director of the Council for the National Interest, a Middle East policy organization in Washing- ton, D.C. M s . Drake is director of research of the Council for the National Interest.

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MIDDLE EAST POLICY

Bunche,’ was able to gain Israel’s signature on July 20, 1949, only by incorporating those 66.5 square kilometers of land into an Israeli-Syrian demilitarized zone over which neither side would exercise legal sovereignty-to be resolved at some later date-and into which neither side was to reintroduce its armed forces. The zone was to be supervised by the U.N. Truce Super- vision Organization (UNTSO) and the Syr- ian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC).

Trouble appeared on the Syrian-Israeli border the next year, in October 1950, when Israel began a project to drain Lake Huleh, adjacent to the demilitarized zone, and its surrounding marshes for farmland. This involved Israeli encroachment on Ar- ab-owned farmland in the DMZ, and the farmers resisted the settlers with small- arms fire. Israeli border police and armed settlers both inside and outside the DMZ intervened, and the conflict escalated dur- ing the next six months.

The Syrian government filed a complaint with the MAC, which ordered a cease-fire and cessation of further work by Israel on Arab-owned land. In March 1951, during discussions in the MAC, Israel unilaterally declared it claimed exclusive sovereignty over the entire demilitarized zone, ignoring the Armistice Agreement it had signed less than two years before. Israel emphasized its point by expelling the approximately 2,000 Arab residents of three villages- Baqqara, Ghanname, and Khouri-located within the zone, “following this up by raz- ing their houses to the ground with bulldoz- ers.”* Israel then upped the ante again with

‘Dr. Bunche’s predecessor, Count Folke Bema- dotte, had been killed on September 17, 1948, by Israel’s Lehi militia, one of whose leaders was Yitzhak Sharnir.

*Lt. Gen. E.L.M. Bums, UNTSO chief of staff (1954-56), Between Arab and Israeli (New York: Clarke, Irwin, and Company, 1%3), p. 114. Also see

aircraft, bombing the village of El Hamma in April, after which Syrian irregulars en- tered the zone at El Mutilla, just north of where the Jordan River flows into Lake Tiberias.3

U.N. Security Council Resolution 93, passed on May 18, 1951, ordered Israel to comply with the requests of the UNTSO chief of staff, Lt. Gen. William Riley, USMC, and the MAC chairman, Lt. Col. J.P. Castonguay, regarding the Huleh drainage project: “Cease all operations in the demilitarized zone. . . . ” Israel then redesigned the project to avoid Arab prop- erty and was allowed to resume work in August 1953.

Resolution 93 also declared that “the Arab civilians who have been removed from the demilitarized zone by the Govern- ment of Israel should be permitted to return forthwith.” Israel did not comply with this order. No MAC chairman after 1951 was able to obtain cooperation from the Israeli authorities in this matter. Only 350 Arabs returned to live amid the ruins of their villages.

Resolution 93 maintained, in addition, that “aerial action taken by the forces of the Government of Israel. . . constitute[s] a violation of the cease-fire” and is “incon- sistent with the terms of the Armistice Agreement” and the U.N. Charter. The resolution passed by unanimous vote, with the United States voting in favor. The USSR was the only abstention.

Shortly before, Israel began boycotting all regular meetings of the Syrian-Israeli MAC, claiming that it had no jurisdiction over issues affecting the demilitarized zone. The U.N. Security Council held in Resolution 93 that “it is inconsistent with

Gen. Odd Bull, UNTSO chief of staff (1963-70). War and Peace in the Middle East (London: Leo Cooper, 1973). p. 50.

jBurns, p. 113.

18

BOWENIDRAKE: SYRIAN-ISRAELI BORDER CONFLICT

the objectives and intent of the Armistice Agreement to refuse to participate in meet- ings of the Mixed Armistice Commission” (which had two Israeli and two Syrian members and a neutral chairman). Israel ignored the ruling, and the MAC machinery effectively ceased functioning after 1951. The MAC had been established to keep the peace on the border and preserve the terri- torial status quo, pending a negotiated set- tlement. These goals were not consistent with Israel’s plans, and a state of tension and belligerency accelerated across the Syrian-Israeli border.

. . . in September 1953, the Israelis began work inside the demilitarized zone to cut a canal. . . with the intent of unilaterally diverting to the Negev the waters of the River Jordan-to which the Syrians and the Jordanians also had rights.

At one point, in September 1953, the Israelis began work inside the demilitarized zone to cut a canal near Jisr Banat Yaqoub, with the intent of unilaterally diverting to the Negev the waters of the River Jor- dan-to which the Syrians and the Jordani- ans also had rights. Damascus objected, and some shooting resulted. Maj. Gen. Vagn Bennike, Riley’s Danish successor as UNTSO chief of staff, ordered the Israelis to stop work on the ground that it was damaging to Arab farmers and would alter the military balance in the zone.4

obey it. In October 1953 the Security Coun- cil unanimously passed Resolution 100 or- dering Israel to stop work on the project pending further examination, and the Eisenhower administration suspended U.S. economic assistance in a temporarily suc- cessful effort to force Israeli compliance.5 A general water-sharing agreement, how- ever, would have to wait for a wider peace.

On December 8, 1954, a squad of five armed Israeli soldiers entered Syria to re- pair a wire tap they had installed on a Syrian military communication line. The Israelis were caught by the Syrians and imprisoned. The Syrian-Israeli MAC held proceedings on January 12 to discuss the incident and found Israel to be in violation of the Armistice Agreement. The Syrians were ”called upon” to release the prisoners to Israel to prevent an escalation, although UNTSO officials noted that Syria was not required to do so under the terms of the Armistice Agreement. Lt. Gen. E.L.M. Burns, a Canadian and the new UNTSO chief of staff (1954-56), commented as fol- lows: “Perhaps it was wrong policy to try to save the Israelis from the consequences of their illegal act for fear that they would commit further aggressions. However, that is the decision I took at the time, in the hope of avoiding more trouble.”6 After Syria refused, Israel took the matter into its own hands through an attack inside Syria on October 22, 1955, in which three Syrian soldiers were killed, six wounded, and five taken hostage, to be held as bargaining chips to exchange for their captured infil- trators.’ The negotiations, however, were not successful.

the U*N* Security Councill as JFred J . Khouri, The Arab-[srae/j Dilemma (Sym- well as the U.S. government, supported the decision of Gen. Bennike, Israel refused to

cuse: Syracuse University Press, 1976). p. 193. ‘Burns, p. 109. ’Cmdr. E.H. Hutchison, UNTSO military observer

(1951-55) Violent Truce (New York: Devin Adair, 1956). p. 109. ‘Ibid, p. 1 I I .

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MIDDLE EAST POLICY

On several occasions, the Israeli army launched full-scale attacks against villages and military positions in Syrian territory beyond the demilitarized zone. One such action on December 11,1955, was launched after the Israelis claimed a Syrian guard post had opened fire on an Israeli police boat on Lake Tiberias the day before. This was one of many incidents in which Israel used armored landing craft with machine guns and cannons, described as “police boats,” on Lake Tiberias in order to deny Syrian fishermen access to the lake.8 The Israelis routinely followed the practice of sending these boats close to shore in order to emphasize their claim to exclusive sov- ereignty over the lake, a claim rejected by the United Nations.9The Syrians found this Israeli action provocative and responded by firing on the boats. In this instance, the Syrians claimed the Israelis fired first, and the fact that they complained about this incident first to the U.N. lends some cre- dence to their assertion. The MAC, how- ever, was never able to determine for cer- tain who fired first on December 10.10

The next day several companies of Israeli troops crossed the demarcation lines into Syria to the north and south of Lake Tibe- rias and across it, attacking Syrian positions at Buteiha and Koursi. The attacking forces were covered by mortar and heavy machine- gun fire and equipped with armored cars. This large-scale attack launched by Israel resulted the next day in 56 Syrians dead, seven wounded, and 32 missing.

UNTSO chief of staff Bums, who had just returned from a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, wrote of this attack: “No one with any knowledge of military affairs would believe that such an elaborate, coordinated attack had not been

“Khouri, p. 195. ’Burns, p. 118. “Hutchison, p. 109.

planned well before. . . and probably re- hearsed. Certainly it was not improvised in a few hours. . . . The reasons given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ statement were only an excuse, and not a very good one.””

U.N. Military Observer Commander E.H. Hutchison, USNR, assigned to UNTSO, related a similar observation: “It does not take extensive military training to realize that the Israeli raid, carried out as a three-pronged attack by land and sea, was the product of prolonged planning and training. There is every evidence to indi- cate that the raid was rehearsed and timed to perfection prior to execution.” He went on to call the Israeli attack “a premeditated raid of intimidation, motivated by Israel’s desire to test the strength of the Egyptian- Syrian mutual defense pact. . . to bait the Arab states into some overt act of aggres- sion that would offer them the opportunity to overrun additional territory without cen- sure. . . .

Cmdr. Hutchison’s assertion is reflected in Israel’s own media. Consider, for exam- ple, this excerpt from a Jerusalem Post editorial of December 14, 1955: “Most cer- tainly an element in the comparatively early raid was the fact that the Syrian and Egyp- tian fronts are now considered an indivisi- ble unit by the Israeli security authorities. Since the signing of the military pact be- tween these two countries. . . Egypt must be considered as operating out of Syria as well as through the Gaza Strip and Sinai.””

Gen. Burns observed: “It would seem that part of the reason for the Tiberias action was to convey to the Syrians that they would do well not to link themselves too closely to Egypt, which did not have the

”I2

”Burns, p. 108. ‘’Hutchison, p. 109-1 10. “Jerusalem Post, December 14, 1955, cited in

Burns, p. 119.

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BOWEN/DRAKE: SYRIAN-ISRAELI BORDER CONFLICT

power to defend Syrian territory.”l4 The Syrians, however, needed Egypt as a deter- rent, given their own military weakness and inability to fend off Israeli attacks. The UNTSO chief of staff described the attitude of his Syrian counterpart, the Syrian chief of staff, Gen. Shawkat Shuqair: “His pol- icy as regards Israel was to avoid incidents and situations which might involve Syria in active hostilities, for he realized his Army’s weakness in the face of the Israelis’ supe- rior armament, training, and organiza- tion.””

On January 19, 1956, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 11 1, which, not- ing the report of the UNTSO chief of staff, stated that “this Israeli action was a delib- erate violation of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement between Is- rael and Syria, including those relating to the demilitarized zone, which was crossed by the Israeli forces which entered Syria.” The resolution condemned Israel’s action as a “flagrant violation” of the terms of the cease-fire provisions and the Syrian-Israeli armistice agreement.

The Security Council resolution carried the threat to consider “further measures” if the situation did not improve, but no fol- low-up occurred. The UNTSO chief of staff, Gen. Burns, commenting later, said: ‘‘I felt that the Security Council should have taken more positive action to restrain the aggressive Israeli policy, which seemed to me to constitute the greatest danger to peace at that time.’’I6 Later that same year, 1956, Israel launched its first invasion of Egypt and occupied the Sinai, along with the British and the French, until forced out by American President Dwight D. Eisen- hower.

‘‘Burns, p. 119. ‘>Ibid, p. 110. ‘“lbid, p. 119.

Starting in 1957, trouble appeared in the villages of Lower and Upper Tawafiq, lo- cated in the southern sector of the demili- tarized zone.” Late that year, Israeli set- tlers and border police arrived in Lower Tawafiq with the intention of building an irrigation ditch through the village and be- gan cutting through the wire erected by the villagers to protect their property. The Is- raelis abandoned this project under U.N. pressure but less than a year later began work on another irrigation ditch in the same area. Israel had promised UNTSO that the new project would not encroach on the village, but it did so nonetheless.

Israel had promised UNTSO that the new [irrigation] project would not encroach on the village, but it did so nonetheless.

Arab farmers from Tawafiq attempting to cultivate their land near the ditch Israel was building were repeatedly and forcibly pre- vented from doing so by Israeli border police. In the latter part of 1959, tensions intensified because of this, and Arab villag- ers opened fire upon Israeli border police with rifles and automatic weapons. The fire was returned by the Israelis.

According to Gen. Burns: “The frontier police in Israel are more than an ordinary police force, concerned with the enforce- ment of the internal laws of the state. They are a paramilitary force. . . . They have pistols and rifles, which is normal arma- ment for police in the Middle East, but they also have machine guns and mortars, which

”The Tawafiq incident is described in detail in Maj. Gen. Carl von Horn, UNTSO chief of staff (195643). Soldiering for Peace (London: Cassell, 1966), pp. 128-38.

21

MIDDLE EAST POLICY

they frequently deploy and use. They are all trained soldiers. Hence their introduc- tion into the demilitarized zone was essen- tially a violation of the demilitarized princi- ple, although not perhaps one easy to dem- onstrate with legal precision.’: 18

A cease-fire between the Israeli settlers and the Arab villagers was achieved after four hours, but U.N. attempts to get the kibbutz residents to sit down with the Arab villagers and work things out were refused by the Israelis. Less than a month later, a U.N. observer posted at Upper Tawafq saw Israeli border police, and in one in- stance an Israeli armored personnel carrier (forbidden under the armistice agreement), turning Tawafiq’s Arab farmers away from their fields and Israeli tractors plowing the land in their place.19

The Arab villagers were determined and returned once more, now accompanied by three Syrian national guardsmen armed with rifles, to try again to plow their fields. This time, they were fired upon by Israeli border police, and return fire came from the village. The Tawafiq villages, however, which had no fortifications other than a trench and some barbed-wire entangle- ments, were being overwhelmed by Israeli heavy artillery fire from the kibbutz and other fortified positions, mainly Porya, to the west of Lake Tiberias. Syrian gunners atop the Golan Heights came to the aid of the besieged villagers, directing mortar fire to the area west of the ditch, where the Israelis had been turning away Arab farm- ers.

On the night of January 31, 1960, the Israelis launched a major offensive in com- pany strength and occupied the entire vil- lage of Lower Tawafiq. They then pro- ceeded to blow up each of the homes in the village. Only those villagers who were

‘‘Burns, p. 114. 19v0n Horn, p. 131.

armed remained to attempt resistance, until even they were overcome by Israeli tanks breaking through the wire. Syrian forces on the Golan, who could see the explosions in the night sky, opened up on the Israeli troops with heavy artillery and 120mm mor- tar fire, finally forcing Israel to withdraw its troops from the village.

When U.N. observers finally reached the decimated village of Lower Tawafiq, they found that only six or seven homes in the northern end of the village were left stand- ing. “The roofs had been scattered and the walls blown outward by heavy explosive charges .”20 The S yrian-Israeli MAC, with only U.N. and Syrian representatives pre- sent, met formally for the first time in years and condemned Israel for its assault on Lower Tawdiq and its violation of Syrian airspace as another “flagrant violation” of the Armistice.2’

. . . the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 171, which determined that the [Israeli] attack constituted a “flagrant violation” of U.N . Security Council Resolution 111 of 1956.

Hostilities had developed in another sec- tor of the Syrian-Israeli DMZ back in 1958, when Israel began digging yet another canal in the demilitarized zone. The Syrians re- sponded by opening fire on the Israeli irri- gation teams, claiming the project would prejudice the future ownership of the zone. Major clashes resulted, and the UNTSO chief of staff sent a strongly worded letter to the Israelis ordering them to stop work

*‘lbid., p. 134. ”U.N. Document S/4270, cited in Khouri. p. 223.

22

BOWEN/DRAKE: SYRIAN-ISRAELI BORDER CONFLICT

until a U.N. survey team could investigate the Syrian complaint. After inspecting the maps, it was discovered that the Israelis had been exploiting a sinking waterline of a small lake to adjust the frontier to their advantage. Other incidents had been re- ported in the past where the Israelis had moved trees to advance their frontier. The issue was decided by UNTSO in favor of the Syrians, and Israel complied.22

Shooting erupted in the Lake Tiberias area once more in March 1962 between Israeli patrol boats and Syrian military po- sitions near the northeastern shore of the lake, with both sides claiming the other fired first. Israeli troops then, on March 16-17, launched a major attack inside Syr- ian territory against Arab villages and mili- tary positions, leaving casualties on both sides. The UNTSO chief of staff con- demned Israel’s action as a violation of the armistice, and on April 9, the U.N. Secu- rity Council unanimously passed Resolu- tion 171, which determined that the attack constituted a “flagrant violation” of U.N. Security Council Resolution 11 1 of 1956.

Later that year, on December 4, 1962, Israeli tractors moved onto Arab-owned land in the southern sector of the demilita- rized zone. Syrian soldiers not only fired at the tractors but also began to shell three Israeli settlements nearby. This led Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to threaten a major assault against Syria if it persisted in shooting at Israeli settlements. After quick action by the United Nations and Western diplomats, this crisis was de- fused.23

In May 1964 Israel’s Jordan River diver- sion project was complete, and Israel uni- laterally began drawing off water from the river and pumping it to the Negev in south- ern Israel. As no water-sharing agreement

had ever been worked out between the parties, the Arabs responded to Israel’s action with a plan to draw off water for their own use from two streams that feed into the Jordan, the Hasbani in Lebanon and the Baniyas in Syria, both located inside their own territories. Over the next two years, as the Syrians and Lebanese attempted to construct the necessary facilities, the Israe- lis fired on their buildings, bulldozers, and other equipment with artillery. On July 14, 1966, Israeli warplanes strafed Arab trac- tors and earth-moving machinery eight miles inside Syria.24 As a result, the work was never completed.

Lesser incidents took place in 1964 over Israel’s insistence on constructing a patrol road, one section of which the Syrians claimed entered their territory. Unfortu- nately, it was difficult for UNTSO to ascer- tain the validity of the Syrian claim, since the Israelis had always prevented the U.N. from marking out the Syrian-Israeli demar- cation lines on the ground, in this case, the border separating Israel and Syria.25 UNTSO attempted to persuade Israel to stop work until it could study the issue, but Israel refused. Syrian gunners then opened fire on the bulldozers from the Golan to protect what they claimed as their own territory, and major clashes resulted.26

The situation heated up again in Novem- ber 1964, when Israel once more attempted to dig a drainage ditch on disputed terri- tory, this time at the Israeli-Syrian-Leba- nese border on territory the Syrians claimed was located inside Syria. UNTSO ordered Israel to halt the project until it could send out a survey team to determine the exact location of the boundary in that particular sector but was unsuccessful in stopping the project.

"van Horn, pp. 87-8. 23Kho~ri , p. 223.

23

24Bull, p. 77, and Khouri, pp. 229-31 zJBull, p. 74 2”lbid, pp. 75-6.

MIDDLE EAST POLICY

On November 13, Israel sent a military patrol into the area, and Syria reacted by firing on the patrol. Major clashes followed, and heavy fire was directed at military and civilian targets on both sides. Syrian mor- tars atop the Golan Heights were put into action, and Israel's air force bombed Syrian villages, roads and military positions, re- sulting in casualties on both sides. UNTSO chief of staff Gen. Bums again asked Israel to cease all activities in this sector until the investigation was complete, and to end its boycott of the MAC. He asked the Syrians not to shoot and to take their complaints to the MAC instead.27 But incidents of this kind continued to occur.

On August 15, 1966, a major battle with artillery, warplanes and patrol boats took place between the Israelis and Syrians in the Lake Tiberias area. Both sides claimed the other fired first. Israel claimed that Syrian positions on the shore opened up on an Israeli police boat, while Syria held that an Israeli gunboat had opened fire on a Syrian outpost onshore. U.N. officials managed to obtain a cease-fire, but the atmosphere be- came increasingly belligerent.

Accordingly, a rare meeting of the Syrian- Israeli MAC was arranged on January 25, 1966, the first since 1960, just inside Syria near Jisr Binat Yaqoub. It resulted in a joint statement with both sides agreeing to refrain from any further aggressive action. During the next two sessions, on January 29 and February 2, however, no common ground could be found. Israel claimed sovereignty over the entire demilitarized zone, and Syria demanded that Israel remove the armed forces and fortifications which it contended had been illegally deployed inside the zone. The Syrians also called for the return of the Arab inhabitants of the zone expelled by Israel, and held that the status of the zone should be resolved. The session broke up

~

271bid, p. 75. Also see Khouri, p. 228.

with the two sides caught in deadlock, and consequently the next session, planned for February 9, was postponed indefinitely.28

Again in January 1967, Arab farmers try- ing to cultivate their land in the central sector of the demilitarized zone were met with Israeli warning shots, to which the Syrians responded by firing on Israeli set- tlements in the southern sector of the DMZ. The situation escalated, with heavy artil- lery and armored cars employed by both sides. The UNTSO chief of staff tried to stop the fighting, without success.29

Egypt was censured in the Arab world for not coming to Syria's aid, and it was becoming clear to the Arabs that Israel could conduct major military operations with impunity.

On April 3, 1967, the Israeli press re- ported that the government had decided to cultivate all parts of the demilitarized zone, since they claimed it all as Israeli.30 On April 7 an armored Israeli tractor crossed into and began plowing Arab-owned land. The Syri- ans fired on the tractor, although the driver was not injured.3' General fighting then broke out with light weapons but soon esca- lated, with both sides using artillery, mor- tars, tanks and aircraft. Israeli aircraft bombed and strafed Syrian border villages and military positions in the Golan Heights, causing heavy casualties on the Syrian side.32 Syria sent up its own aircraft to meet

2nKhouri, p. 238.

'"Andrew and Leslie Cockburn, Dangerous Liuison

'I I bid. '2Khouri, p. 243.

2 g B ~ l l , pp. 101-2.

(New York: Harper Collins, 1991). p. 136.

24

BOWEN/DRAKE: SYRIAN-ISRAEL1 BORDER CONFLICT

them, but the Syrian air force was no match for Israel’s, and six Syrian planes were lost in the fighting to none for Israel.33 Egypt was censured in the Arab world for not coming to Syria’s aid, and it was becoming clear to the Arabs that Israel could conduct major military operations with impunity. The addi- tion of Syrian-based Palestinian guerrillas to the equation, operating mainly from Jordan, also served to heighten tensions.

It was at this point that Soviet intelligence reports (which were later discovered to be erroneous) warned that a massive Israeli mil- itary buildup on the Syrian border was under- way. One such report was delivered person- ally by Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin to Anwar Sadat, then the Egyptian National Assembly speaker, on April 29 in Moscow. The Soviets told the Egyptians that they had evidence Israel had massed two brigades on the Syrian border and planned to attack in mid-May.34 Reports such as these raised Egyptian fears that a full-fledged Israeli inva- sion of Syria was imminent.

Because of Egypt’s mutual-defense treaty with Syria, obligating it to intervene if Syria were invaded by Israel, it came under heavy Arab pressure during April and May of 1967 to help what was increas- ingly perceived to be a beseiged ally. On May 13 The New York Times published news of an Israeli threat to resort to “the use of force” against Syria as a result of this border conflict as well as Fatah guerrilla attacks elsewhere.35 Both Syria and Egypt were patrons of Fatah.

To demonstrate the seriousness of his commitment to protect Syria, Nasser placed Egyptian forces on alert and on May 14 began moving troops into the Sinai. In the words of then-UNTSO chief of staff Gen. Odd Bull:

“Presumably his hope was that his gestures of support for Syria would be sufficient to dissuade the Israelis from attacking Syria. ”36

In a 1982 speech to the Israeli National Defense College, Prime Minister Menachem Begin said of this troop movement: “The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him.”37 In 1968, Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli chief of staff during the 1967 war, said: “I do not believe that Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent into the Sinai on May 14 would not have been enough to unleash an offensive against Israel. He knew it, and we knew i t . 9 8

On May 19 Nasser asked the United Nations to redeploy its UNEF forces to new positions, so that Egypt could be in a better position to respond in the event of an Israeli invasion of Syria. U.N. Secretary General U Thant refused to implement a partial redeployment, unwisely, some say, insisting that UNEF troops stay positioned exactly as they were or be withdrawn com- pletely. Nor would Israel accept any UNEF troops on its own territory instead of Egypt’s, claiming this would somehow violate its sovereignty. Had Israel actually feared an Egyptian attack, it might have welcomed the UNEF troops.

Boxed in by this response, Nasser felt politically obligated to call for their depar- ture. Once this occurred, Egyptian forces replaced UNEF troops at, among other places, Sharm al-Sheikh, guarding the Straits of Tiran. Nasser came under imme- diate Arab pressure to reinstitute the block- ade he had applied prior to Israel’s 1956 invasion of the Egyptian Sinai, and he com- plied on May 22. Nasser’s downfall was

”Donald Neff, Wurriors for Jerusalem (Brattleboro,

’‘Neff, p. 59. 35Cockburn, p. 138.

Vermont: Amana, 1988). p. 57, and Bull, p. 104. ’‘Bull, p.104. ”The New York Times, August 21, 1982, cited in

Cockburn, p. 153. ”Cited in Cockburn, p. 154.

25

MIDDLE EAST POLICY

that he did not realize that Israel was look- ing for an appropriate opportunity to go to war with its strongest adversary, and he provided it.

Nasser’s downfall was that he did not realize that Israel was looking for an appropriate opportunity to go to war with its strongest adversary, and he provided it.

On June 5, 1967, Israel, in a surprise dawn aerial assault, destroyed the Egyptian air force on the ground, and the six-day war was underway. Jordan, which also had a mutual-defense treaty with Egypt, began artillery fire against Israel. Within four days, Israel had taken the West Bank and then turned to Syria. The invasion of Syria had to be postponed by one day because of the American communications-intelligence ship U.S.S. Liberty off the Mediterranean coast, in a position to monitor Israeli com- munications about their impending invasion of Syria. On June 8, in an attack lasting three hours, using bombs, napalm, machine guns and rockets, Israel devastated the U.S. vessel, flying an oversized American flag, leaving 34 dead and 171 wounded. The next day Israel invaded Syria and in two days achieved its goal of occupying the Golan Heights.

A cease-fire on all fronts had already been ordered by the U.N. Security Council and accepted by the Arab parties when the invasion of Syria took place. UNTSO chief of staff Gen. Odd Bull noted: “Still the fighting went on. In such a situation it is not difficult for those who want to continue a war to find excuses for doing so. There is

stopped as Israel achieved its objec- tives. * ’39

Israel occupies today I , 176 square kilo- meters of Syrian territory in the Golan Heights from its 1967 War conquest (and its 1973 reconquest). The distance from the new Israeli-Syrian disengagement line to Damascus is now only 25 miles, but, more important, Israel is on top of the Golan plateau rather than 2,000 feet below.

Israel’s desire for the Golan Heights is understandable. Militarily advantageous terrain such as the Golan Heights is to be preferred inside rather than outside one’s borders. The case for seizing it on those grounds, however, was somewhat more dif- ficult than the one they chose: “Syrian ,

gunners shelling Israeli settlements year after year from atop the strategic Golan Heights.”

~~~~~

U.N. observers in the field and U.N. votes in New York are unanimous in holding that principal responsibility for the Syrian-Israeli border hostilities belongs to Israel.

Indeed, some Syrian shells did fall on settlements as well as military positions inside Israel, along with many more inside the demilitarized zone. There is, however, no Security Council resolution condemning Syria for aggressive actions against Israel during this period, nor is there a veto of such a resolution. There are four Security Council resolutions condemning Israel. U.N. observers in the field and U.N. votes in New York are unanimous in holding that principal responsibility for the Syrian-Is- raeli border hostilities belongs to Israel.

no neutral authority on the spot to enforce a cease-fire. In fact the fighting only 3vBull, p. 118.

26

Cmdr. Hdtchison wrote that the Syrian- Israeli border situation was “aggravated by Israel’s constant attempt to exert total con- trol over the demilitarized zones that sepa- rate the two countries in some

According to Gen. Burns: The Israelis claimed sovereignty over the

territory covered by the demilitarized zone. . . . They then proceeded, as oppor- tunity offered, to encroach on the specific restrictions, and so eventually to free them- selves, on various pretexts, from all of them. . . . The Israelis in fact exercised almost complete control over the major portion of the demilitarized zone through their frontier police in the area. This was directly contrary to Article V of the General Armistice Agreement. . . .41

The examples cited in this paper are representative of the hundreds of border encounters over the 18 years from the 1949 armistice to the 1967 war. A typical inci- dent would involve armed Israeli settlers moving onto Arab-owned land inside the DMZ, which Arab farmers would resist by firing at whoever or whatever was trespass- ing on their property, followed by return fire from the settlers, joined by Israeli bor- der police, followed by fire from the Golan Heights, returned by Israeli artillery and aircraft, and on into a major or minor clash.

Historical revisionism is a familiar art, often practiced by military victors, and the Israelis are no exception. “Syrian firing from the Golan Heights” represents only a portion of what was recorded by U.N. observers as “major exchanges of fire on both sides.” None of the U.N. observers in reports or memoirs focused upon the Golan Heights as “a base for Syrian shelling of Israeli settlements” because no one re- garded that as an issue at the time. Their primary concern was how the clashes be-

40Hutchison, p. 107. 41Burns, pp. 1 I 3 4

gan. The fact that both Syria and Israel fired from their own territory in mutual exchanges of fire and that one side hap- pened to have higher ground than the other was not seen as relevant-and appropri- ately so. The Golan Heights became an issue only after its occupation by Israel in 1967 and its reoccupation in 1973, followed by a long and effective campaign to estab- lish in the eyes of the world, especially the United States, a justification for retaining the Golan.

BOWEN/DRAKE: SYRIAN-ISRAELI BORDER CONFLICT

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The Golan Heights became an issue only after its occupation by Israel. . . , followed by a long and effective campaign to establish in the eyes of the world, especially the United States, a justification for retaining the Golan.

Under the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement of 1974, Israel withdrew from the Golan town of Quneitra, which was the Syrian regional capital, with a population of 37,000 before the 1967 war. During three days in May of that year, Israeli troops systematically destroyed the town, includ- ing churches, mosques, shops and 80 per- cent of the dwellings. Explosive charges were set against support pillars and walls, and bulldozers with chains pulled down others. Window frames and doors were removed before demolition for use in Is- rael. Homes, shops, churches and mosques were looted, and tombs were broken open and jewelery stolen. Israel has claimed the town was destroyed during the 1973 com- bat, but a live British television news report from the city just 17 days prior to Israel’s

MIDDLE EAST POLICY

withdrawal clearly showed Quneitra intact and standing.42

On December 14, 1981, Israel officially “extended Israeli law over the Golan Heights,” the equivalent of annexation. Today there are 14,000 Israeli settlers in the Golan, compared with 230,000 in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and 3,000 in Gaza. While the Israeli attachment to the West Bank has a religious and ideological character, their desire for the Golan Heights is purely strategic. The Golan is valuable for security purposes, both defen- sive and offensive. In the unlikely event that Syria should invade Israel, the task would be far more difficult with the Golan

42British Independent Television news report of May 12, 1974.

in Israel’s hands. If Israel should invade Syria, a more likely option given the mili- tary balance between the two, no geo- graphic obstacle would lie in the path of the Israeli forces.

In any peace negotiation, Israel would clearly like to achieve a separate peace with Syria, as it did with Egypt. But Syria, now the strongest Arab confrontation state, with a special leadership responsibility in the Arab world, is, understandably, unwilling to make peace with Israel without a Palestinian solution. This will be a much more difficult proposition than a resolution of the long- standing Syrian-Israeli border problem, which will have to be based on “total with- drawal” from the Golan in exchange for “total peace.” In the final analysis, how- ever, the Arab-Israeli conflict is not about the Golan Heights. It is about Palestine.

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