The Thirtieth of September Movement

8/7/2019 The Thirtieth of September Movement

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KELOMPOK 4

NAMA KELOMPOK:

DWI SETIAWAN

DIANDRA APRIDITA

FERY SETIAWAN

M.DANAYASA RIANTAMA

SELLA FITRIANTI


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The Thirtieth of September Movement (Indonesian:

Gerakan 30 September, abbreviated as G30S) was a self-

proclaimed organization of Indonesian National Armed

Forces members who, in the early hours of 1 October

1965, assassinated six Indonesian Army generals in an

abortive coup d'tat. Later that morning, the organization

declared that it was in control of media and

communication outlets and had taken President Soekarno

under its protection. By the end of the day, the coup

attempt had failed in Jakarta at least. Meanwhile in

central Java there was an attempt to take control over an

army division and several cities. By the time this rebellion

was put down, two more senior officers were dead.


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In the days and weeks that followed, the armyblamed the coup attempt on the Indonesian

Communist Party (PKI). Soon a campaign ofmass killing was underway, which resulted inthe death of hundreds of thousands of allegedcommunists.

The group's name was more commonlyabbreviated "G30S/PKI" by those wanting toassociate it with the PKI, and propagandawould refer to the group as Gestapu (for itssimilarity to "Gestapo", the name of the Nazisecret police).


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Kidnappings of generals


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The Army General Staff at the time of the coup attempt. The generals whowere killed are shown in grey.

At around 3:15 A.M. on 1 October, seven groups of troops in trucks and

buses comprising soldiers from the Tjakrabirawa (Presidential Guard) theDiponegoro (Central Java) and Brawijaya (East Java) Divisions, left themovement's base at Halim Perdanakusumah Air Force Base, just south ofJakarta to kidnap seven generals, all members of the Army General Staff.Three of the intended victims, (Minister/Commander of the ArmyLieutenant General Ahmad Yani, Major General M. T. Haryono andBrigadier General D.I. Panjaitan) were killed at their homes, while three

more (Major General Soeprapto, Major General S. Parman and BrigadierGeneral Sutoyo) were taken alive. Meanwhile, the main target,Coordinating Minister for Defense and Security and Chief of Staff ofIndonesian Armed Forces, General Abdul Harris Nasution managed toescape the kidnap attempt by jumping over a wall into the Iraqi embassygarden, but his personal aide, First Lieutenant Pierre Tendean, wascaptured by mistake after being mistaken for Nasution in the dark.

Nasution's five-year old daughter, Ade Irma Suryani Nasution, was shotand died on 6 October. The generals and the bodies of their deadcolleagues were taken to a place known as Lubang Buaya near Halimwhere those still alive were shot, and the bodies of all the victims werethrown down a disused well.


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Takeover in Jakarta


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Key locations around Merdeka Square (now Monas) on 30September 1965.[5]

Later that morning, around 2,000 troops from two Java-based divisions (Battalion 454 from the DiponegoroDivision and Battalion 530 from the Siliwangi Division)occupied what is now Lapangan Merdeka, the park aroundthe National Monument in central Jakarta, and three sidesof the square, including the RRI (Radio Republik Indonesia)building. They did not occupy the east side of the square location of the armed forces strategic reserve (KOSTRAD)headquarters, commanded at the time by Major General

Suharto. At some time during the night, D.N. Aidit, theIndonesian Communist Party (PKI) leader and Air Vice-Marshal Omar Dhani, the Air Force commander both wentto Halim.


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Following the news at 7AM, RRI broadcast a message fromLieutenant-Colonel Untung Syamsuri, commander ofCakrabirawa, Presidential guard, to the effect that the 30

September Movement, an internal army organization, hadtaken control with the help of other units of strategiclocations in Jakarta to forestall a coup attempt by a 'General'sCouncil' aided by the Central Intelligence Agency, intent onremoving Sukarno on 5 October, "Army Day". It was also

stated that President Sukarno was under the movement'sprotection he traveled to Halim after learning that therewere troops near the Palace on the north side of LapanganMerdeka. Sukarno later claimed this was so he could be nearan aircraft should he need to leave Jakarta. Further radio

announcements later that day listed 45 members of the G30SMovement and stated that all army ranks above LieutenantColonel would be abolished.


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The end of the movement in Jakarta

At 5.30AM, Soeharto was woken up by his

neighbor and told of the disappearances of the

generals and the shootings at their homes. He

went to KOSTRAD HQ and tried to contact other

senior officers. He managed to contact the Naval

and Police commanders, but was unable to contact

the Air Force Commander. He then took commandof the Army and issued orders confining all troops

to barracks.


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Because of poor planning, the coup leaders had failed to provideprovisions for the troops on Lapangan Merdeka, who were becoming hotand thirsty. They were under the impression that they were guarding thepresident in the palace. Over the course of the afternoon, Suharto

persuaded both battalions to give up without a fight, first the Brawijayatroops, who came to Kostrad HQ, then the Diponegoro troops, whowithdrew to Halim. His troops gave Untung's forces inside the radiostation an ultimatum and they also withdrew.By 7PM Suharto was incontrol of all the installations previously held by the 30 SeptemberMovement's forces. Now joined by Nasution, at 9PM he announced overthe radio that he was now in command of the Army and that he would

destroy the counter-revolutionary forces and save Sukarno. He thenissued another ultimatum, this time to the troops at Halim. Later thatevening, Sukarno left Halim and arrived in Bogor, where there wasanother presidential palace.

Most of the rebel troops fled, and after a minor battle in the early hours

of 2O

ctober, theA

rmy regained control of Halim,A

idit flew toYogyakarta and Dani to Madiun before the soldiers arrived.[15]


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Most of the rebel troops fled, and after a

minor battle in the early hours of 2 October,the Army regained control of Halim, Aidit

flew to Yogyakarta and Dani to Madiun

before the soldiers arrived.[15]


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Events in Central Java

Following the 7AM radio broadcast, troops from theDiponegoro Division in Central Java took control offive of the seven divisions in the name of the 30

September movement .[16] The PKI mayor of Soloissued a statement in support of the movement.Rebel troops in Yogyakarta, led by Major Muljono,kidnapped and later killed Col. Katamso and his chiefof staff Lt. Col. Sugijono. However, once news of the

movement's failure in Jakarta became known, mostof its followers in Central Java gave themselvesup.[15]


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Anti-communist purge

Main article: Indonesian killings of 196566

Contemporary anti-P

KI literature blaming the party for the coup attempt


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Theories about the 30 September Movement

A PKI coup attempt: The "official" (NewOrder) version

The Army leadership began making accusations of PKI involvement at an earlystage. Later, the government of President Suharto would reinforce thisimpression by referring to the movement using the abbreviation "G30S/PKI".School textbooks followed the official government line[22] that the PKI,

worried about Sukarno's health and concerned about their position should hedie, acted to seize power and establish a communist state. The trials of keyconspirators were used as evidence to support this view, as was thepublication of a cartoon supporting the 30 September Movement in the 2October issue of the PKI magazine Harian Rakyat (People's Daily). According tolater pronouncements by the army, the PKI manipulated gullible left-wingofficers such as Untung through a mysterious "special bureau" that reported

only to the party secretary, Aidit. This case relied on a confession by thealleged head of the bureau, named Sjam, during a staged trial in 1967. But itwas never convincingly proved to Western academic specialists, and has beenchallenged by some Indonesian accounts.[23]


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The plotters

The reason given by those involved in the 30

September movement was that it was to

prevent a planned seizure of power by a

"Council of Generals" (Dewan Jenderal). They

claimed to be acting to save Sukarno from

these officers allegedly led by Nasution and

including Yani, who had planned a coup onArmed Forces Day 5 October.


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Internal army affair

Main article: Cornell Paper

In 1971, Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey wrote an article which came to beknown as the Cornell paper. In the essay they proposed that the 30 SeptemberMovement was indeed entirely an internal army affair as the PKI had claimed.They claimed that the action was a result of dissatisfaction on the part of juniorofficers who found it extremely difficult to obtain promotions and because ofhostility toward the generals because of their corrupt and decadent lifestyles.They allege that the PKI was deliberately involved by, for example, bringing Aidit

to Halim: a diversion from the embarrassing fact the Army was behind themovement.

RecentlyAnderson expanded on his theory that the coup attempt was almosttotally an internal matter of a divided military with the PKI playing only aperipheral role; that the right-wing generals assassinated on 1 October 1965were, in fact, the Council ofGenerals coup planning to assassinate Sukarno andinstall themselves as a military junta. Anderson argues that G30S was indeed a

movement of officers loyal to Sukarno who carried out their plan believing itwould preserve, not overthrow, Sukarno's rule. The boldest claim in the Andersontheory, however, is that Suharto was in fact privy to the G30S assassination plot.


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Central to the Anderson theory is an examination of a little-known figurein the Indonesian army, ColonelAbdul Latief. Latief had spent a career intheArmy and, according to Anderson, had been both a staunch Sukarno

loyalist and a friend with Suharto. Following the coup attempt, however,Latief was jailed and named a conspirator inG30S. At his military trial inthe 1970s, Latief made the accusation that Suharto himself had been aco-conspirator in the G30S plot, and had betrayed the group for his ownpurposes.

Anderson points out that Suharto himself has twice admitted to meetingLatief in a hospital on the 30 September 1965 (i.e. G30S) and that his two

narratives of the meeting are contradictory. In an interview withAmerican journalist Arnold Brackman, Suharto stated that Latief hadbeen there merely "to check" on him, as his son was receiving care for aburn. In a later interview with Der Spiegel, Suharto stated that Latief hadgone to the hospital in an attempt on his life, but had lost his nerve.A

nderson believes that in the first account, Suharto was simply beingdisingenuous; in the second, that he had lied.


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Further backing his claim, Anderson cites circumstantial evidence

that Suharto was indeed in on the plot. Among these are:

That almost all the key military participants named a part ofG30Swere, either at the time of the assassinations or just previously,close subordinates of Suharto: Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, ColonelLatief, and Brigadier-General Supardjo in Jakarta, and ColonelSuherman, Major Usman, and their associates at the DiponegoroDivisions HQ in Semarang.

That in the case of Untung and Latief, their association with Suhartowas so close that attended each others' family events andcelebrated their sons' rites of passage together.

That the two generals who had direct command of all troops inJakarta (save for the Presidential Guard, who carried out the

assassinations) were Suharto and Jakarta Military TerritoryCommander Umar Wirahadikusumah. Neither of these figures wereassassinated, and (ifAnderson's theory that Suharto lied about anattempt on his life by Latief) no attempt was even made.


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That during the time period in which the assassination plotwas organized, Suharto (as commander ofKostrad) hadmade a habit of acting in a duplicitous manner: whileSuharto was privy to command decisions in Confrontation,the intelligence chief of his unit Ali Murtopo had beenmaking connections and providing information to the hostilegovernments of Malaysia, Singapore, United Kingdom, andthe United States through an espionage operation run byBenny Moerdani in Thailand. Murdani later became a spy

chief in Suharto's government.

Anderson's theory, for all the exhaustive research it hasentailed, still leaves open a number of questions ofinterpretation. If, as Anderson believes, Suharto did haveinside knowledge of the G30S plot, this still leaves openseveral possibilities: (1) that Suharto had truly taken part inthe plot and defected; (2) that he had been acting as a spyfor the Council ofGenerals; or (3) that he was uninterestedcompletely in the factional struggle ofG30S and Council ofGenerals.Given that Suharto has since died these questions

are unlikely to be answered e


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Suharto with CIA support

Professor Dale Scott alleges that the entire movement wasdesigned to allow for Suharto's response. He draws attention to thefact the side of Lapangan Medeka on which KOSTRAD HQ wassituated was not occupied, and that only those generals who mighthave prevented Suharto seizing power (except Nasution) were

kidnapped. He also alleges that the fact that the generals werekilled near an air force base where PKI members had been trainedallowed him to shift the blame away from the Army. He links thesupport given by the CIA to anti-Sukarno rebels in the 1950s to theirlater support for Suharto and anti-communist forces. He points outthat training in the US of Indonesian Army personnel continuedeven as overt military assistance dried up. Another damagingrevelation came to light when it emerged that one of the mainplotters, Col Latief was a close associate of Suharto, as were otherkey figures in the movement, and that Latief actually visited Suhartoon the night before the murders (Wertheim, 1970)


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British psyops

The role of the United Kingdom's ForeignOffice and MI6 intelligenceservice has also come to light, in a series of exposs by Paul Lashmar andOliver James in The Independentnewspaper beginning in 1997. Theserevelations have also come to light in journals on military andintelligence history.

The revelations included an anonymous ForeignOffice source statingthat the decision to unseat Pres. Sukarno was made by Prime MinisterHarold Macmillan then executed under Prime Minister Harold Wilson.According to the exposs, the United Kingdom had already becomealarmed with the announcement of the Konfrontasi policy. It has beenclaimed that a CIAmemorandum of 1962 indicated that Prime Minister

Macmillan and President John F. Kennedy were increasingly alarmed bythe possibility of the Confrontation with Malaysia spreading, and agreedto "liquidate President Sukarno, depending on the situation andavailable opportunities." However, the documentary evidence does notsupport this claim.


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To weaken the regime, the Foreign Office's

Information Research Department (IRD)

coordinated psychological operations inconcert with the British military, to spread

black propaganda casting the PKI, Chinese

Indonesians, and Soekarno in a bad light.

These efforts were to duplicate the successes

ofBritish Psyop campaign in the Malayan

Emergency.


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Of note, these efforts were coordinated from the

British High Commission in Singapore where the

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC),Associated

Press (AP), and New York Times filed their reports onthe Indonesian turmoil. According to Roland Challis,

the BBC correspondent who was in Singapore at the

time, journalists were open to manipulation by IRD

because of Sukarno's stubborn refusal to allow them

into the country: "In a curious way, by keeping

correspondents out of the country Sukarno made

them the victims of official channels, because almost

the only information you could get was from the

British ambassador in Jakarta."


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These manipulations included the BBC reporting thatCommunists were planning to slaughter the citizens

of Jakarta. The accusation was based solely on aforgery planted by Norman Reddaway, a propagandaexpert with the IRD. He later bragged in a letter tothe British ambassador in Jakarta, Sir AndrewGilchrist that it "went all over the world and back

again," and was "put almost instantly back intoIndonesia via the BBC." Sir Andrew Gilchrist himselfinformed the Foreign Office on 5 October 1965: "Ihave never concealed from you my belief that a little

shooting in Indonesia would be an essentialpreliminary to effective change."


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In the 16 April 2000 Independent, Sir Denis Healey,Secretary of State for Defence at the time of the war,confirmed that the IRD was active during this time.He officially denied any role by MI6, and denied"personal knowledge" of the British arming the right-wing faction of the Army, though he did commentthat if there were such a plan, he "would certainlyhave supported it."

Although the British MI6 is strongly implicated in thisscheme by the use of the Information ResearchDepartment (seen as an MI6 office), any role by MI6itself is officially denied by the UK government, and

papers relating to it have yet to be declassified by theCabinet Office. (The Independent, 6 December 2000)


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Sukarno's plot

In a book first published in India in 2005, which drawsextensively on the evidence presented at the trials of theconspirators, Victor Fic claims that Aidit and the PKI decidedto mount a preemptive strike against the senior army generals

to forestall an army takeover. He alleges that Sukarno had metwith representatives of the Chinese government and hadagreed to retire in exile in China. Following the purge of thegenerals, the president would appoint a Mutual Cooperation(Gotong Royong) cabinet and then retire on grounds of ill-

health. Should he not agree to do so, he would be"dispatched" under the protection of the PKI.


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Incompetent plotters; the army takes advantage

In a 2007 book on the 30 September Movement,

Professor John Roosa dismisses the official version of

events, saying it was "imposed by force of arms" and

"partly based on black propaganda and torture-induced confessions." He points out that Suharto

never satisfactorily explained away the fact that most

of the movement's protagonists were Army officers.

However, he does concede that some elements ofthe PKI were involved.


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Similarly, he asks why, if the movement was

planned by military officers, as alleged in the

"Cornell Paper", was it so poorly planned. In

any case, he says, the movement's leaderswere too disparate a group to find enough

common ground to carry out the operation.


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He claims that US officials and certain

Indonesian Army officers had already outlined

a plan in which the PKI would be blamed foran attempted coup, allowing for the party's

suppression and the installation of a military

regime under Sukarno as a figureheadpresident.Once the 30 September Movement

acted, the US gave the Indonesian military

encouragement and assistance in the

destruction of the PKI, including supplying listsof party members and radio equipment.


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As to the movement itself, Roosa concludesthat it was led by Sjam, in collaboration with

Aidit, but notthe party as a whole, togetherwith Pono, Untung and Latief. Suharto wasable to defeat the movement because of heknew of it beforehand and because the Army

had already prepared for such a contingency.He says Sjam was the link between the PKImembers and the Army officers, but that thefact there was no proper coordination was a

major reason for the failure of the movementas a whole.


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The Thirtieth of September Movement

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