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The U.S. in Vietnam Part II. William C. Westmoreland William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor Maxwell...

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The U.S. in Vietnam The U.S. in Vietnam Part II Part II
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Page 1: The U.S. in Vietnam Part II. William C. Westmoreland William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor Maxwell Taylor.

The U.S. in VietnamThe U.S. in Vietnam

Part IIPart II

Page 2: The U.S. in Vietnam Part II. William C. Westmoreland William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor Maxwell Taylor.

William C. William C. WestmorelandWestmoreland

Maxwell TaylorMaxwell Taylor

Page 3: The U.S. in Vietnam Part II. William C. Westmoreland William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor Maxwell Taylor.

U.S. troops in VietnamU.S. troops in Vietnam

1964, year end:1964, year end: 24,00024,000 1965, year end:1965, year end: 184,000184,000 1966, year end:1966, year end: 385,000385,000 1967, year end:1967, year end: 490,000490,000 Total troop strength will exceed Total troop strength will exceed

500,000 in 1968.500,000 in 1968.

Page 4: The U.S. in Vietnam Part II. William C. Westmoreland William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor Maxwell Taylor.

Aspects of the build-up Aspects of the build-up

LBJ: did not call out the reserves or LBJ: did not call out the reserves or the National Guard.the National Guard.

Army had to rely upon volunteers Army had to rely upon volunteers and draftees to meet personnel and draftees to meet personnel needs.needs. Field forces in Vietnam: about half Field forces in Vietnam: about half

volunteer, half drafted.volunteer, half drafted. Manpower issues complicated by Manpower issues complicated by

one-year tours of dutyone-year tours of duty Issues of class and race?Issues of class and race?

Page 5: The U.S. in Vietnam Part II. William C. Westmoreland William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor Maxwell Taylor.

Limiting the War: 1965-68Limiting the War: 1965-68

Army: not allowed to attack NVA Army: not allowed to attack NVA bases on Cambodia, Laos, or north of bases on Cambodia, Laos, or north of DMZ.DMZ.

Air Force/Navy: Target and Air Force/Navy: Target and engagement restrictions placed on engagement restrictions placed on Rolling Thunder.Rolling Thunder.

LBJ – does not impose any economic LBJ – does not impose any economic constraints.constraints.

Page 6: The U.S. in Vietnam Part II. William C. Westmoreland William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor Maxwell Taylor.

Regions:Regions:

Northern Northern provincesprovinces

Central Central highlights & highlights & coastcoast

Northwest of Northwest of SaigonSaigon

Mekong River Mekong River deltadelta

Page 7: The U.S. in Vietnam Part II. William C. Westmoreland William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor Maxwell Taylor.

U.S. strategy: 1965-68U.S. strategy: 1965-68

U.S. combat forces given primary U.S. combat forces given primary responsibility for locating & responsibility for locating & eliminating large NVA/VC units.eliminating large NVA/VC units.

GVN + various U.S. civil and military GVN + various U.S. civil and military agencies pursue pacification effort.agencies pursue pacification effort.

Air Force & Navy maintain bombing Air Force & Navy maintain bombing of North Vietnam (Rolling Thunder). of North Vietnam (Rolling Thunder).

Page 8: The U.S. in Vietnam Part II. William C. Westmoreland William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor Maxwell Taylor.

Westmoreland’s planWestmoreland’s plan

First defend South Vietnam, defeat First defend South Vietnam, defeat Communist offensives, secure bases Communist offensives, secure bases for additional troops.for additional troops.

Then launch offensives to destroy Then launch offensives to destroy enemy units.enemy units.

Ultimately hoped to attack Ultimately hoped to attack Communist sanctuaries, shift effort Communist sanctuaries, shift effort of U.S. troops to pacification.of U.S. troops to pacification.

Page 9: The U.S. in Vietnam Part II. William C. Westmoreland William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor Maxwell Taylor.

U.S. combat operationsU.S. combat operations

Unpopulated areas: “Search & Unpopulated areas: “Search & destroy” operations relied upon destroy” operations relied upon helicopter mobility and superior helicopter mobility and superior artillery and air support.artillery and air support.

Populated areas: U.S. troops Populated areas: U.S. troops employed patrols and helped employed patrols and helped provide security for roads and provide security for roads and villages.villages.

Page 10: The U.S. in Vietnam Part II. William C. Westmoreland William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor Maxwell Taylor.

Air SupportAir Support

Helicopter Helicopter gunshipsgunships

Air Force/Marine Air Force/Marine sorties with high sorties with high explosives or explosives or napalm.napalm.

Operation ARC Operation ARC LIGHTLIGHT

Page 11: The U.S. in Vietnam Part II. William C. Westmoreland William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor Maxwell Taylor.

Ia Drang, November 1965Ia Drang, November 1965 First large First large

engagement engagement between U.S and between U.S and NVA troops.NVA troops.

77thth Cavalry Cavalry prevails, but takes prevails, but takes high casualties.high casualties.

Demonstrates Demonstrates effectiveness of:effectiveness of: U.S. air supportU.S. air support NVA/VC close NVA/VC close

infantry tactics.infantry tactics.

Page 12: The U.S. in Vietnam Part II. William C. Westmoreland William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor Maxwell Taylor.

PacificationPacification Marines: pursue “combined action Marines: pursue “combined action

program.”program.” Elsewhere MACV relies upon GVN efforts.Elsewhere MACV relies upon GVN efforts.

U.S. assistance complicated by bureaucratic U.S. assistance complicated by bureaucratic confusion.confusion.

1967: U.S. aid efforts centralized under the 1967: U.S. aid efforts centralized under the Office of Civil Operations and Rural Office of Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS).Development Support (CORDS). Launched OPERATION Phoenix to eliminate, Launched OPERATION Phoenix to eliminate,

capture, or co-opt VC cadres.capture, or co-opt VC cadres.

Page 13: The U.S. in Vietnam Part II. William C. Westmoreland William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor Maxwell Taylor.

Restrictions on Rolling Restrictions on Rolling ThunderThunder

Page 14: The U.S. in Vietnam Part II. William C. Westmoreland William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor Maxwell Taylor.

Problems bombing the DRVProblems bombing the DRV Objectives.Objectives. Effectiveness?Effectiveness?

Subsistence–level economy.Subsistence–level economy. DRV has manpower to operate air DRV has manpower to operate air

defenses and repair bombing damage.defenses and repair bombing damage. DRV able to maintain flow of supplies DRV able to maintain flow of supplies

and men to support operations in the and men to support operations in the South.South.

Cost?Cost? 900 aircraft and >1,000 crewman lost 900 aircraft and >1,000 crewman lost

Rolling Thunder to 1968.Rolling Thunder to 1968. $10 of expense to inflict $1 damage?$10 of expense to inflict $1 damage?

Page 15: The U.S. in Vietnam Part II. William C. Westmoreland William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor Maxwell Taylor.

Assessment of U.S. efforts 1965-Assessment of U.S. efforts 1965-67:67:

PositivesPositives South Vietnam South Vietnam

defended (still exists).defended (still exists). More stable GVN:More stable GVN:

Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky come Nguyen Cao Ky come to power in 1965.to power in 1965.

NVA on defensive.NVA on defensive. VC insurgency VC insurgency

checked.checked.

Page 16: The U.S. in Vietnam Part II. William C. Westmoreland William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor Maxwell Taylor.

Assessment of U.S. efforts 1965-Assessment of U.S. efforts 1965-67:67:

NegativesNegatives NVA able to raise troop levels, NVA able to raise troop levels,

resulting in escalating U.S. forces.resulting in escalating U.S. forces. Pacification:Pacification:

Ties of rural population to GVN still Ties of rural population to GVN still tenuous.tenuous.

VC organization still functioning.VC organization still functioning. Large displacement of rural Large displacement of rural

population.population.

Page 17: The U.S. in Vietnam Part II. William C. Westmoreland William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor Maxwell Taylor.

Communists develop a plan:Communists develop a plan:“General Offensive – General “General Offensive – General

Uprising” Uprising” NVA to first launch attacks in central NVA to first launch attacks in central

highlands & near DMZ area to draw off highlands & near DMZ area to draw off U.S. reserve troops.U.S. reserve troops.

VC cadres to infiltrate towns and cities VC cadres to infiltrate towns and cities & capture GVN/ARVN installations, & capture GVN/ARVN installations, which would precipitate a general which would precipitate a general revolt.revolt. U.S. posts to be assaulted to sow confusion, U.S. posts to be assaulted to sow confusion,

& for psychological effect.& for psychological effect. NVA units to reinforce VC forces & NVA units to reinforce VC forces &

“liberated” citizens in urban areas.“liberated” citizens in urban areas.

Page 18: The U.S. in Vietnam Part II. William C. Westmoreland William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor Maxwell Taylor.

The Siege of Khe SanhThe Siege of Khe Sanh Isolated U.S. base Isolated U.S. base

near DMZ near DMZ surrounded.surrounded.

NVA attacks began NVA attacks began January 21, 1968.January 21, 1968. Lasted 77 daysLasted 77 days

Page 19: The U.S. in Vietnam Part II. William C. Westmoreland William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor Maxwell Taylor.

The Tet The Tet OffensiveOffensive

Began January Began January 30, 1968.30, 1968.

Violence erupts Violence erupts in more than 200 in more than 200 villages, towns & villages, towns & cities.cities.

About 80,000 About 80,000 Communist Communist troops troops participated.participated.

Page 20: The U.S. in Vietnam Part II. William C. Westmoreland William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor Maxwell Taylor.

Tet: Communist military Tet: Communist military defeatdefeat

No urban uprisings occurred.No urban uprisings occurred. U.S. and ARVN troops prevailed in U.S. and ARVN troops prevailed in

urban battles.urban battles. NVA reinforcements checked by air NVA reinforcements checked by air

strikes and counterattacks.strikes and counterattacks. Of 80,000 men, Communists lost half Of 80,000 men, Communists lost half

(including numerous VC cadres).(including numerous VC cadres).

Page 21: The U.S. in Vietnam Part II. William C. Westmoreland William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor Maxwell Taylor.

Tet: Communist political Tet: Communist political victoryvictory

Tet destroyed LBJ’s will to continue Tet destroyed LBJ’s will to continue the conflict.the conflict.

Also shocked in the U.S. public, Also shocked in the U.S. public, greatly expanded popular greatly expanded popular disaffection with the war.disaffection with the war.

Page 22: The U.S. in Vietnam Part II. William C. Westmoreland William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor Maxwell Taylor.

The U.S. domestic sceneThe U.S. domestic scene

Growing anti-war Growing anti-war movement.movement.

Sympathetic Sympathetic coverage by news coverage by news media.media.

How mainstream?How mainstream?

Page 23: The U.S. in Vietnam Part II. William C. Westmoreland William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor Maxwell Taylor.

LBJ after TetLBJ after Tet

Sends another 20,000 troops to Sends another 20,000 troops to Vietnam, but rejects Westmoreland’s Vietnam, but rejects Westmoreland’s request for 206,000.request for 206,000. Authorized a limited call-up of reserves.Authorized a limited call-up of reserves.

Announced on March 31, 1968:Announced on March 31, 1968: Would stop Rolling ThunderWould stop Rolling Thunder Would seek talks to end the war (no Would seek talks to end the war (no

preconditions).preconditions). Would not seek re-election.Would not seek re-election.


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