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Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: 30718 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (IDA-31850 TF-29645) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 9.0 MILLION TO THE KINGDOM OF NEPAL FOR THE BASIC AND PRIMARY EDUCATION PROJECT 2 February 4, 2004 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
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Document of The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No: 30718

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT(IDA-31850 TF-29645)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 9.0 MILLION

TO THE

KINGDOM OF NEPAL

FOR THE

BASIC AND PRIMARY EDUCATION PROJECT 2

February 4, 2004

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective November 18, 2004)

Currency Unit = Nepalese Rupees (NPR) 100 NPR = US$ 1.39

US$ 1 = 72 NPR

FISCAL YEARHMG/N Fiscal Year (FY) July 16 - July 15

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

APL Adaptable Program Loan MOES Ministry of Education and SportsASIP Annual Strategic Implementation Plan MTR Mid-Term ReviewBPEP Basic and Primary Education Project NCED National Center for Education DevelopmentCBO Community Based Organization NER Net Enrollment RatioCAS Country Assistance Strategy NFEC Non-Formal Education CenterCDC Curriculum Development Center NGO Non-Governmental OrganizationDANIDA Danish International Development

AssistanceQAG Quality Assurance Group

DCA Development Credit Agreement PIP Project Implementation PlanDEO District Education Office PIU Project Implementation UnitDEP District Education Plan PEP Primary Education ProjectDOE Department of Education PSR Project Status ReportECD Early Childhood Development PTA Parent Teacher AssociationEFA Education for All SERDP Seti Education for Rural Development

ProjectEMIS Education Management Information

SystemSIP School Improvement Plan

GER Gross Enrollment Ratio SMC School Management CommitteeGPI Gender Parity Index SWAp Sector Wide ApproachHMG/N His Majesty's Government of Nepal VEC Village Education CommitteeICR Implementation Completion Report

Vice President: Praful PatelCountry Director Kenichi OhashiSector Manager Michelle Riboud

Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Rajendra Joshi

NEPALBasic and Primary Education Project 2

CONTENTS

Page No.1. Project Data 12. Principal Performance Ratings 13. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 24. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 55. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 96. Sustainability 117. Bank and Borrower Performance 138. Lessons Learned 179. Partner Comments 1810. Additional Information 19Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 21Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 23Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 25Annex 4. Bank Inputs 26Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 28Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 29Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 30Annex 8. Government Final Evaluation Project Report 31

Project ID: P040612 Project Name: Basic and Primary Education ProjectTeam Leader: Rajendra Dhoj Joshi TL Unit: SASHDICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: February 4, 2005

1. Project DataName: Basic and Primary Education Project L/C/TF Number: IDA-31850; TF-29645

Country/Department: NEPAL Region: South Asia Regional Office

Sector/subsector: Primary education (48%); Sub-national government administration (15%); Central government administration (15%); Tertiary education (12%); Pre-primary education (10%)

Theme: Education for all (P); Gender (P); Participation and civic engagement (P); Decentralization (S); Social analysis and monitoring (S)

KEY DATES Original Revised/ActualPCD: 07/10/1996 Effective: 10/19/1999 10/19/1999

Appraisal: 09/04/1998 MTR: 03/01/2002 03/17/2002Approval: 03/30/1999 Closing: 07/15/2002 07/15/2004

Borrower/Implementing Agency: His Majesty's Government of Nepal/Ministry of Education and SportsOther Partners: Denmark, European Union, Finland, Norway

STAFF Current At AppraisalVice President: Praful C. Patel Mieko NishimizuCountry Director: Kenichi Ohashi Hans M. RothenbuhlerSector Manager: Michelle Riboud Ralph W. HarbisonTeam Leader at ICR: Rajendra Joshi Grant SinclairICR Primary Author: Mark LaPrairie

2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

Outcome: S

Sustainability: L

Institutional Development Impact: SU

Bank Performance: S

Borrower Performance: S

QAG (if available) ICRQuality at Entry: U

Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

3.1 Original Objective:The goal of Phase 1 of the proposed three-phase Adaptable Program Lending (APL) approach for the Basic and Primary Education Project in Nepal was to develop institutional capacity for qualitative and quantitative improvement of the five-year primary education system at the national, district and school levels. This strategy underpinned His Majesty's Government of Nepal's (HMG/N) plan to deliver more efficient and better quality education services throughout the country. In turn, this was expected to lead to increased levels of learning resulting from improved student retention (especially for girls and socially disadvantaged groups), more effective teacher performance and more efficient teacher deployment practices.

Specific project goals under Phase 1 of the APL were to: (i) strengthen the Ministry of Education (MOE) and establish a Department of Education (DOE) to become the MOE's technical wing to delivery primary and secondary education programs; (ii) introduce performance-based district planning and budget processes; and (iii) pilot school improvement planning.

The objectives of the Basic and Primary Education Project-2 (BPEP2) were realistic insofar as they accurately reflected the status of the education sector in Nepal where there were major issues related to: (i) institutional capacity; (ii) teachers and teaching practices; and (iii) access, especially for disadvantaged communities. HMG/N was responding to a situation characterized by low student learning outcomes at both the primary and secondary education levels, poor communities as the most educationally disadvantaged, a difficult physical environment in which to make education more accessible, low system efficiency and ineffective use of resources. The key issues set forth in statements on educational priorities and strategies articulated by HMG/N in its 'Sub-Sector Policy Statement', agreed at project negotiations, were effectively reflected in BPEP2's objectives.

Reducing poverty and strengthening a weak human capital base through investment in the provision of basic services were priorities of the Nepal Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), reviewed by the Board on December 15, 1998. Of particular pertinence to BPEP2, the CAS identified two key strategies to poverty alleviation: (i) bringing resources closer to beneficiaries, where they are most likely to be productively used; and (ii) collective donor action to foster stronger governance needed to reduce waste and mismanagement of resources. The project is assessed to have effectively supported both these strategies, and was consistent with the CAS's overall objectives and approach.

The project's objectives were clear and well understood by the Borrower. The complexity of the project is assessed to have been adequate in terms of the range of institutional improvements, the number of institutions involved, the number of project components and the number of partners participating through parallel financing for the first phase of the ten-year APL.

3.2 Revised Objective:The project's objectives were not formally revised during the life of the project.

3.3 Original Components:The total project costs for the Core Investment Program (CIP), funded by Denmark, Finland, European Commission, HMG/N, IDA and Norway were estimated at US$55.7 million equivalent for Phase 1 of the APL, of which the contributions from IDA, other donors and the Government were US$ 12.5, 40.9 and 2.2 respectively. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) provided funding and technical support outside the basket

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funding mechanism. Total cost of the CIP over the three phases of the APL was estimated at US$226.6 million equivalent, with IDA expected to contribute US$50.0 million equivalent.

The project comprised three main components and several sub-components:

Component 1: Strengthening Institutional Capacity (US$18.8 million equivalent, or 33.8 percent of total base cost). This component aimed to strengthen institutional capacities at the national, district and community/school levels. At the national level, the component was designed to: (i) institute MOE/DOE staff development and training programs; (ii) develop information systems and skills to manage a decentralized school system; (iii) develop manuals and formats for implementation plans and budgeting; (iv) conduct policy research, evaluation and monitoring; (v) provide technical support for district planning; (vi) establish criteria and provide technical assistance for the development of School Improvement Plans (SIPs); and (vii) provide technical and logistical support to manage the project. At the district level, the component was designed to: (i) institute district-level staff development and training programs; (ii) develop funding mechanisms for Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) to carry out training and monitoring, and institute early childhood development (ECD) and out-of-school literacy programs; and (iii) construct District Education Offices. At the community/school level, the component was designed to: (i) provide technical support and training to head teachers, School Management Committees (SMCs) and Village Education Committees (VECs) in SIPs; (ii) develop funding mechanisms for SIPs; (iii) provide books and materials to schools based on SIPs; and (vi) provide in-service teacher training. Component 2: Raising Learning Achievement (US$14.0 million equivalent, or 25.1 percent of total base cost). This component aimed to: (i) improve teaching-learning processes through curriculum review, development of supplementary learning materials, action research to develop multi-grade strategies and materials, increase textbook availability through a coupon system, develop methods and materials for the use of local languages, and institute a system of continuous assessment; and (ii) expand teacher professional support systems and improve teacher quality through instituting annual school-based in-service teacher training, provide professional support to teachers in their classrooms, expand a school cluster-based professional support system, construct multipurpose rooms at resource center schools, piloting a pre-service teacher training certificate program, and develop a distance education teacher upgrading program.

Component 3: Increasing Equitable Access (US$22.9 million equivalent, or 41.1 percent of total base cost). This component aimed to increase access and retention through: (i) developing funding mechanisms to utilize NGOs and CBOs to deliver ECD and primary education programs targeting children and adolescents in disadvantaged circumstances; (ii) providing incentives targeted at disadvantaged families through the provision of free textbooks, scholarships for needy girls and an innovation fund to promote girls' participation in school; (iii) increasing the number of classrooms through the construction and rehabilitation of classrooms; and (iv) providing community mobilization programs through training of Village Development Committees (VDCs) and SMCs, conducting participatory planning exercises at the district level, and providing an annual support grants to participating VDCs.

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Appraisal Estimate Total Cost (US$ million)ComponentTotal IDA Bilateral

DonorsHMG/N

1. Strengthening Institutional Capacity

18.8 4.2 13.9 0.74

2. Raising Learning Achievement

14.0 3.1 10.4 0.55

3. Increasing Equitable Access

22.9 5.2 16.8 0.90

55.7 12.5 41.1 2.2

The quality of the project's design is rated as satisfactory as it adequately reflected the Borrower's priorities and capacities at the time of preparation and those anticipated over the implementation period. BPEP2 targeted the major requirements of the education system in Nepal when the project was conceived, and was drawn from the Basic and Primary Education Master Plan (1997-2002) which outlined national priorities for the sub-sector. It built upon strategies and experience from two previous IDA-supported primary education projects which supported curriculum and textbook reform, a school cluster-based teacher training model, and targeted strategies to increase participation of girls and disadvantaged groups. 3.4 Revised Components:The project's components were not formally revised during the life of the project. However, the project's implementation period was extended twice, each time for one year. The first extension, from July 16, 2002 to July 15, 2003, was granted to take into consideration the late effectiveness of the project and delays in obtaining donor approval of the Year-1 work plan and budget. A second extension, from July 15, 2003 to July 15, 2004, was granted in order to synchronize donor support with the HMG/N program, which was of five years.

3.5 Quality at Entry:Unsatisfactory. BPEP2 responded to an HMG/N request to the Bank to assist Nepal in its efforts to reform the education system. The project benefited from a long history of collaboration between the World Bank and HMG/N in basic and primary education. As a result of the positive experience of the Primary Education Project (PEP) and the Seti Education for Rural Development Project (SERDP) initiated in the early 1980s, and subsequent emphasis on basic education through the 1990 Jomtien "Conference on Education for All" (jointly sponsored by the World Bank, UNICEF and UNESCO), HMG/N launched BPEP1 in 1992. BPEP1 yielded a number of important lessons which were incorporated into the design of BPEP2, namely:

to ensure quality enhancement it is necessary to give adequate attention to classroom practices and 1.student learning together with the supply of quality inputs;centralized planning and programming cannot address local needs and conditions nor does it generate 2.ownership on the part of parents and other stakeholders;nationwide implementation of BPEP2 will require a strong technical institution at the central level to 3.provide support to districts having responsibility for the planning, implementation and monitoring of basic and primary education activities; anda longer-term vision and strategy is required to make marked improvements in the processes and 4.outcomes of primary education and that capacity building is a prerequisite in achieving these two goals.

The aims and design of the project took into consideration both global and regional priorities in education,

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particularly the provision of education opportunities for girls and disadvantaged groups in Nepalese society. The specific content of the project was decided upon and designed jointly by the World Bank, HMG/N and other donor partners participating in the basket funding mechanism. HMG/N demonstrated its commitment and willingness to move forward with BPEP2 through a number of actions completed at the time of its request to the World Bank for financing, chief among which was the Cabinet approval on the establishment of the Department of Education (DOE). The project's development objective was relevant insofar as it aimed to address the country's serious poverty of human resources, with only approximately 35 percent of the population literate (18 percent of females), and an estimated less than eight percent of the post-school age population having completed secondary education at the time of project preparation.

Despite the overall appropriateness of the project's design and the identification and targeting of specific issues related to the performance of the education system, problems were encountered early during implementation. While some donor partners believed that the project was 'over-prepared' (as measured against their own preparation criteria), if evaluated against standard IDA project preparation criteria, there were significant gaps in project preparation. These constitute the rational for according an unsatisfactory rating for quality at entry. Specifically, impediments to ensuring more complete implementation readiness included:

• key DOE staff had not been identified and the organizational structure had not been firmly established; • absence of personnel with sufficient experience in handling financial management and procurement

activities of Bank-funded projects;• a supervision structure with multiple donors which, while innovative and with long-term benefits, was

initially a major burden for both development partners and HMG/N; • difficulty with the rollout of planning tools at the district and school levels, the use of pilot tests, and

monitoring and evaluation activities; • absence of a procurement plan.

The project was rated as Category C for environmental impact (i.e. no significant impact expected). Arsenic testing of tubewells constructed through the project was carried out during the project period. About 3 percent of tubewells were found to have arsenic content beyond permissible levels, and mitigation measures were undertaken under the project. The project had no negative impact on indigenous communities. Rather, it targeted indigenous and low caste communities to improve their access to education.

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs

4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:Satisfactory. Overall achievement of objectives is rated satisfactory based on specific achievements and the status of outcome indicators as reported in Annex 1. Achievement of the outcomes is more significant when assessed in the context of:

the stage of development in Nepal, particularly in rural areas, at the time of project preparation;lthe insurgency and civil strife which prevailed during the latter part of the project's implementation lperiod;the prevailing system of education throughout Nepal characterized by a lack of planning, particularly lat the district and school levels, low status of teachers, unequipped schools and poor infrastructure, and the use of rote teaching-learning methodologies; IDA’s strategy on education in Nepal and throughout South Asia which, at the time of preparation, lshifted from discrete, input-orientated projects to an increased emphasis on institutional development, strengthened management at all levels (central, district, local), improved governance, and an emphasis

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on education for girls and marginalized groups in society;learning achievemnt targets for the global Education for All (EFA) agenda set at 60 percent, whereas lBPEP2 established achievement targets at 75 percent.

BPEP2 succeeded insofar as it achieved important gains with respect to:a) increasing access to primary education, as reflected by increased gross enrollment rates (GER) and net

enrollment rates (NER), and improving equity, including increased gender balance in enrollments, as evidenced by a rise in the share of girls in the total enrolment increased from 42.6 percent to 46.3 percent;

b) raising awareness of the educational requirements of under-served social groups in Nepal through targeted interventions to ensure greater participation in primary schooling -- the number of disadvantaged children completing grade 5 grew by 24 percent, including a 25 percent increase in the number of disadvantaged girls completing the full primary cycle and more dalit (low caste) children attending school than before;

c) a second round of national assessment at grade 3 showed marginal improvement in learning achievement, while a similar exercise at grade 5 revealed more marked improvement -- between 1999 and 2003, mean learning achievement in Mathematics rose from 27 to 33 percent, in Nepali from 51 to 55 percent and in Social Studies from 42 to 61 percent; and

d) an inventory of teacher positions was completed in all districts, and limited redeployment was carried out using this inventory; HMG/N undertook three significant steps to discourage uneven deployment of teachers: (i) annulling the authority of DEOs to transfer teachers on a discretionary basis (now requiring consent from schools); (ii) passage and implementation of the Education Act shifting authority for hiring teachers from Government to schools, and (iii) funding of teachers through block grants to schools instead of funding government-recruited teachers.

In assessing the project’s progress in the context of the development of the educational system at the time of project launch, one may conclude that BPEP2 helped change the mindsets of education planners, policy makers, administrators and service deliverers at all levels. This was achieved through the introduction of educational concepts and practices which are essential for the longer-term development and improvement of education service delivery in Nepal.

4.2 Outputs by components:Component 1: Strengthening Institutional CapacitySatisfactory. The main areas for institutional capacity building under BPEP2 were: (i) development of organizations (e.g. DOE, NFEC, MOE); (ii) development of systems (e.g. EMIS); (iii) development of processes (e.g. DEPs, SIPs); and (iv) development of capacities for groups and key players (e.g. SMCs, VECs, head teachers).

The most significant capacity building achievement of BPEP2 was the establishment of the new DOE, allowing the merging of the majority of regular program activities under one administrative umbrella. Institutional strengthening inputs under BPEP2 yielded enhanced capacity of both MOES and DOE to manage inputs of various development partners, and coordinate/communicate with a range of stakeholders at all levels. A second key achievement was the building of local capacity to improve school effectiveness through the preparation of school improvement plans. At the district level, this included capacity building for DEOs, preparation of District Education Plans (DEPs), and the strengthening of district level Education Monitoring and Information System (EMIS) functions. At the school level, about 6,000 SIPs have been prepared and local capacity has improved in areas such as planning, management, implementation, data collection and reporting. At the district level, the capacity building inputs resulted in improvements in

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planning, data collection and reporting, and strengthened program implementation and financial management. One of the key successes of BPEP2 was that it initiated a process which has subsequently led to a movement for the transfer of public schools to communities. This reform measure, and the accompanying policy dialogue and close working relationship with HMG/N to achieve it, would not have been undertaken without BPEP2 which laid much of the necessary groundwork. A key strategy of BPEP2 was the introduction of regular in-service teacher training through enhancement of the capacities of the National Center for Education Development (NCED) and Curriculum Development Center (CDC). Despite an increased number of teachers attaining some qualifications under BPEP2, a large gap remains between the number of trained and untrained teachers at the primary level. Available data indicated that just over 50 percent of primary teachers have some form of training, with less than 20 percent considered to be fully-trained. However, this should be assessed in the context of both the enormous need at the beginning of the project, and an understanding that this can only be addressed over a period of time extending well beyond the scope of a single project.

BPEP2’s inputs toward improving the performance of teachers in the classroom had some beneficial impact. They reinforced – and in some areas introduced – the idea that in-service teacher training is important for teachers’ continual professional development, and succeeded in raising the individual skill levels of a number of teachers. More crucial to the long-term success of these inputs, however, is the paucity of the environment in which teachers are expected to use their newly-acquired skills, characterized by a lack of adequate textbooks, teaching materials, supplies and poor infrastructure. Component 2: Raising Learning AchievementUnsatisfactory. BPEP2 made important investments, totaling roughly 30 percent of the total investment, for improving the quality of education and, thus, raising learning achievement through:• curriculum and textbook development and distribution;• student assessment;• teacher training; and• resource center development.

Although a second round of national assessment showed marked achievement for grade 5 (as noted earlier), and gains were achieved through the introduction of multi-grade teacher training and increased availability of use of in-service teacher training programs, factors which constrained achievement under this component were:a) uneven patterns of the quality of physical infrastructure;b) overcrowded classrooms;c) frequent teacher absences;d) inadequate supply of texts, paper and instructional materials;e) administrative burdens of head teachers;f) lack of accountability of teachers to parents and students; andg) problems in supervision and oversight by school supervisors and resource persons due, in part, to a

lack of physical access to schools and, more recently, dangers posed by the Maoist insurgency.

Many teachers entering in-service training lacked the skills to understand and integrate the new teaching-learning materials and methodologies into their teaching, thus signaling the need to better assess the actual needs and competencies of teachers prior to training. School visits revealed that many classrooms lack a proper physical layout and appropriate furnishings for teachers to use child-centered, activity-based teaching-learning methodologies, limiting the use of skills and approaches taught in training. Efforts to

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improve the quality of instruction in Nepal face similar challenges on a global level where achievement in terms of the delivery of inputs does not necessarily translate into gains toward raising learning achievement.

Notable successes have been BPEP2’s efforts to demonstrate the importance and effectiveness of ECD programs and centers, and an increased focus on ‘inclusive’ education through increased use of group work, local materials as teaching-learning aids and peer learning.

Component 3: Increasing Equitable Access and Improving RetentionSatisfactory. EMIS enrollment statistics indicate that, during BPEP2 implementation, there was a consistent improvement in equitable access to primary education in Nepal. NER increased from 70.5 percent in 1998 to 84.4 percent in 2004. This represents an average annual increase of approximately two percent (consistent with similar programs in other developing countries). An increasing percentage of girls now attend primary schools, the sahre of girls in total enrolment has increased from 42.6 percent in 1998 to 46.3 percent in 2003, and the gender parity index (GPI) has increased from 0.77 in 1998 to 0.87 in 2000, after which girls’ and boys’ enrollment increased at the same rate, thus keeping the GPI constant. Promotion, repetition and dropout rates for grades one to five showed modest improvement (see Annex 1). Under BPEP2, all 75 districts in Nepal began preparing district education plans. Districts with less than GER of 100% and girls' NER of less than 60% were targeted for increasing access with more elaborate targeting criteria introduced. The project aimed to rehabilitate a total of 10,800 classrooms and construct 5,400 new ones. At the end of the project, a total of 10,800 classrooms had been rehabilitated and 5,412 classrooms constructed, representing achievement of 100 percent each. It should be noted, however, that EMIS data have not been proven to be consistent over time and, as such, the scale of gains may be more modest than EMIS data indicate. A Joint Evaluation evaluation team which carried out a full scale review of the project just prior to BPEP2's closure found evidence of: (i) systemic incentives which encourage over reporting of attendance; (ii) errors in the verification of school-level data; and (iii) higher levels of classroom over crowding (based upon site visits and classroom observations) than reflected by EMIS data. There is also evidence that some children who register for school at the start of the academic year do not attend on a regular basis, and household surveys suggested lower attendance than that reported in the EMIS.

It has been difficult to assess the extent to which BPEP2’s efforts to use social mobilization and communications and incentives (e.g. scholarships) resulted in increased education access by marginalized groups due to:

difficulty in determining the actual enrollment ratio of Dalit (low caste) and Janjati (indigenous lpeoples) children;the number of disabled students participating in inclusive education programs was small compared to lthe actual needs in districts and was compounded by supply problems (e.g. unavailability of Braille texts beyond grade 3);problems of intermittent teacher attendance, heightened by Maoist insurgency; andllack of priority accorded the non-formal education sub-sector by both HMG/N and development lpartners.

4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:n/a

4.4 Financial rate of return:n/a

4.5 Institutional development impact:

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BPEP2 has significantly contributed to institutional development in the education sector. These include:a) reform of institutional arrangements and increased operational efficiency of central-level institutions

responsible for education planning and policy formulation;b) introduction of annual and longer-term (i.e., five-year) plans at the district level;c) introduction of school improvement plans with the full participation of school management committees;

andd) increased donor-donor and donor-HMG/N collaboration under the Government leadership through a

basket funding mechanism which required consensus among development partners on priority needs and strategies to address them.

Capacity building was a key objective of BPEP2, and important gains were achieved in a relatively short time. Establishment of the DOE effectively merged most regular program activities into one institution and provided the basis upon which the quality enhancement and increased access objectives were to be achieved. The Joint Evaluation identified significant increases in capacity in the key institutions involved in BPEP2 implementation, including DOE, MOES and NCED. Other improvements were found to have been made in the physical infrastructure for education planning, in the systems and processes used to implement, manage and monitor the delivery of primary education, and in the skills and abilities of staff. Building local capacity to improve school effectiveness was the second most important priority with regards to institutional strengthening. In districts, the project enhanced the capacities and effectiveness of DEOs, supported capacities to prepare DEPs, and strengthened the EMIS.

Factors which limited institutional development were: (i) insufficient attention paid to building technical capacities in basic education; and (ii) poor governance, including a lack of incentives for key staff responsible for quality enhancement in basic education (e.g., resource persons) to promote the use of new skills and teaching methodologies at the school level.

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome

5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:a. Maoist Insurgency: A key factor which impeded implementation of BPEP2, and has affected the functioning of the education sector and all other aspects of Nepalese society and economy has been the Maoist insurgency. An uncertain security environment in many parts of the country, particularly in rural areas of the hill and mountain zones, impeded the transport of materials for school construction and rehabilitation, and limited the movement of education personnel, ranging from district authorities to heads of schools, teachers and students.

b. Public Support to Public Education: A lack of control by communities over schools with the introduction of a centralized, more bureaucratically-founded system of public education has worked as a disincentive for them to contribute to schools' betterment. This has in particular made it difficult togenerate funds from communities to full resource gaps. The experience of purely community schools and those that have been transferred and experienced huge increases in community involvement seem to be evidence that the innate willingness to contribute has been there. In fact, the spirit of the Seventh Amendment to the Education Act was unleashed the energies of communities that once, at an earlier time, was responsible for the establishment of most of primary schools in Nepal (i.e.before 1972).

c. Attitudes Toward the Status of Women: Prevailing cultural and societal norms governing gender relations and the role and status of women can also be understood to have impeded project implementation. While this issue does not neatly fit into the category of 'factors beyond the control of government or implementing agency' (as there are actions that can be taken at the institutional and/or individual levels to

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support increased gender equity and balance), the strong cultural and social pressures governing the role of women and, in particular, women's integration into the world of work and education, can be considered to be factors influencing the implementation of activities under BPEP2. For example, enrollment increases of girls in public primary schools are attributed, in part, to the fact that parents prefer to enroll male children in private schools which are perceived to offer a higher quality of instruction. Case studies carried out as part of the Joint Evaluation revealed that attendance at some private boarding schools was heavily weighted in favor of boys, almost to the exclusion of girls.

5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:a. Component-wise Allocation of Resources: The allocation of resources according to specific, predefined component and sub-component categories did not allow for sufficient flexibility to address needs at the local level. While districts and schools were able to employ the tools of five-year district and annual school improvement plans, the project’s approach of allocating funds per component was a constraining factor which worked counter to the goal of fostering decentralized decision-making and resource allocation.

b. Frequent Transfers of Staff: HMG/N’s Civil Service Act of 1999 bars the transfer of civil servants prior to the completion of two years’ service in a given position. In practice, however, many staff are appointed in an ‘acting’ capacity and exempt from this rule. This has been the case of many District Education Officers (DEOs), resulting in the frequent transfer of DEOs from one district to another. The resultant sense of uncertainty for individuals carrying out these jobs limits their motivation to embark upon substantial work programs, particularly involving reforms which require time and careful monitoring to achieve results.

5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:a. Procurement: Initial construction delays were encountered as a result of lack of procurement capacity at the DOE. On the insistence of the Bank, MOES hired an individual Procurement Consultant who assisted in the preparation of detailed procurement plans for all units/departments, including procedures for each procurement action. The absence of a core procurement group for coordinating procurement actions across all MOES units and departments constituted an additional constraint.

b. Hiring of Consultants: The hiring of consultants was generally slow, leading to delays in the implementation of some activities for which technical assistance inputs were required. The processes for preparing terms of reference, seeking interested candidates through solicitation and advertising, the vetting of applicants and preparation of contracts were protracted and led to undue slowdowns and missed timeline targets for planned activities.

5.4 Costs and financing:The total project cost at appraisal was US$55.7m. External financing was provided through a basket funding mechanism, with funds provided by IDA (US$12.5m), Denmark (US$17.6m), Finland (US$3.4m), Norway (US$10.7m) and the European Commission (US$9.1m). HMG/N contributed 4.1 percent in counterpart funding. The Japan International Development Cooperation Agency and UNICEF supported the program through direct funding outside the basket, with the Asian Development Bank providing support through a separate project to strengthen teacher training. By closure, project costs had risen to US$70.3m, attributable to: (i) the project being extended twice; and (ii) the fact that BPEP2 was a five-year program, rather than a three-year IDA APL. From IDA's perspective, BPEP2 was a three-year project, later extended to five years; from the perspective of other donors and HMG/N, BPEP2 was a five-year project by design. Thus, expenditures for five years have been taken as the final project cost, exceeding appraisal estimates.

The basket funding mechanism has been judged successful insofar as it provided flexibility in making

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disbursements and fostering transparency with regular auditing by HMG/N. At the central level, however, IDA procurement rules for international tendering may have encouraged overly-centralized procedures which, combined with a complex financial reporting system, led to burdensome processes overall. At the district and local levels, procedures for the allocation and distribution of financial resources were judged to be well-defined and in-line with HMG/N systems. However, weak linkages between financial allocations and the quality of interventions resulted in a disjuncture between financial performance and the achievement of program results.

One of the key strengths of the basket funding approach was that it allowed for a consolidated approach for reaching agreement between all donors and HMG/N on annual priority activities and allocations to fund them. This was achieved through a budget planning process based on joint HMG/N-donor review missions each March. These missions were a follow-up to program progress reviews held earlier in the fiscal year, and allowed for the development of a program plan for the upcoming fiscal year and for pledges of specific levels of support.

6. Sustainability

6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:Likely. Overall sustainability is rated as likely. This was also the conclusion of a QAG panel which reviewed the project in October 2002. The review concluded that sustainability is likely, primarily as a function of the decision by Government to take the lead in terms of donor coordination and implementation, and in particular, the decision to make the DOE responsible for managing implementation, rather than instituting a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) structure. This represents an important change on the part of HMG/N. The assessment noted, however, that sustainability was most likely if donors were willing to maintain a high level of financing for the foreseeable future in the absence of adverse political events.

A sustainability rating of ‘likely’ is applicable more to certain inputs and achievements under BPEP2 than for others. It is most likely for those features of the education system which were introduced under BPEP2 that were not present prior to the project. These include: (i) increased capacity to plan and monitor activities, particularly at the district and school levels; (ii) introduction of a system of regular in-service teacher training; (iii) establishment of the DOE with a more clearly defined role for education system policy and planning; (iii) increased interest among parents to educate their children, particularly girls; and (iv) improved dialogue and consensus between development partners and HMG/N on sector-wide needs and strategies.

Overall sustainability is rated as being likely as many of the essential features of an effective education system have been introduced through BPEP2, and are expected to remain as part of the system over the long term. Sustainability of BPEP2 will depend on whether the investment made in human resources translates into tangible growth in the country’s economy which, at best, depends only partially on the achievements of BPEP2. Thus, the proxy for evaluating sustainability of BPEP2 is progress in establishing an improved policy environment for the more effective functioning of the primary education sub-sector. In this regard, as described elsewhere in this ICR, Nepal has made respectable progress.

6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:BPEP2 was followed by the 'Education for All (EFA) Program' in July 2004, financed by the Bank and other development partners. Drawing on experience gained through BPEP2, the EFA Program introduces the following arrangements as a means of improving and building upon the work of BPEP2 and constitute sound transition arrangements:• Focus on schools to improve service delivery: An increased focus on schools for improved service

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delivery aims to address both the need to rationalize the number of project components -- a key outcome of BPEP2's mid-term review -- and to institute a more holistic and decentralized planning and implementation process focusing on schools.

• A decentralized service delivery system centered on schools and the communities they serve is at the heart of improving service delivery. Decentralized service delivery is also critical for managing risks arising from the conflict situation insofar as it makes schools more resistant to insurgency. A recommendation of the BPEP2 mid-term review was that the use of school grants be expanded to empower schools and make them more accountable for learning outcomes.

• Need for a comprehensive approach: The real value of moving to a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) is two-fold. First, it reduces the transaction cost to HMG/N. Second, in the current context of Nepal (i.e. dominance of donors and consequent stifling of true capacity development), the SWAp is a tangible recognition of the quality of reforms which the education sector has achieved and which, in turn, strengthens the confidence and commitment of those in HMG/N who are leading reform efforts. Additionally, the EFA Program, in using a SWAp, introduces: (a) the pooling of donor and government funds; (b) reliance on government rules and procedures for disbursing, monitoring and reporting program expenditures; and (c) a common and simplified monitoring framework for program outcomes, which is endorsed by all donors to the sub-sector.

Preparation of the EFA Program accounted for the BPEP2 experience in all major areas of BPEP2's functioning. Transition arrangements beyond BPEP2 are considered to be solid insofar as they bring HMG/N an increased level of ownership and responsibility for all aspects of education system functioning. As the partnership between HMG/N and donors established under BPEP2 worked well, it will be further strengthened through the more comprehensive SWAp for the EFA program.

7. Bank and Borrower Performance

Bank7.1 Lending:Unsatisfactory. In preparing the project, the Bank embarked upon the challenging, but necessary agenda of bringing together a large number of donors to reach consensus on the main problems facing the education sector and agreeing on a strategy to address them. While joint donor project preparation was both cumbersome and time-consuming, it was deemed wholly worthwhile in light of the importance of achieving effective donor coordination in this key sector. This is considered one of the strongest features of the preparation process for which the Bank may take an significant share of the credit. Additionally, the transition from a project mode to a more programmatic approach with an understanding among donors of the importance of adopting a more sector-wide approach, establishment of the DOE, preparation of a well-crafted project implementation plan and the Basic Education Master Plan, and delineation of an innovative basket funding mechanism represented important achievements which merit special note. Preparation of the project is also deemed to have been successful overall insofar as:

it identified the major issues to be addressed;lit established a strong alliance of donors working in concert with HMG/N, placing districts, lcommunities and schools at the center of the strategy to achieve education system improvement;management reviews at the time of preparation emphasized the importance of learning from previous lIDA primary education projects in Nepal, and from country experience generally;it highlighted corruption issues as warranting high priority, particularly to address the challenges and lnew dynamics of a decentralization process; and its emphasis on carrying out reviews of institutional demands at the national, district and school levels land the identification of realistic and achievable benchmarks for implementation as key objectives for project appraisal.

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However, an unsatisfactory rating for Bank performance at preparation stems from assessment of implementation readiness vis-à-vis organizational structures and technical preparations. These are judged to have been lacking, as evidenced by gaps in these key areas which made the project vulnerable during its initial years. Problems not sufficiently addressed during preparation included:• key DOE staff had not been identified and the organizational structure had not been firmly established; • many of the successive Directors-General (DGs) were public servants on the verge of retirement and

could not provide the long-term direction and guidance the project required;• absence of personnel with sufficient experience in handling f procurement activities of Bank-funded

projects;• a supervision structure with multiple donors which, while innovative and with long-term benefits, was

initially a major burden for both development partners and HMG/N; and• project categories were designed for an investment operation, but in reality BPEP2 operated much like

a SWAp. Shortcomings in project preparation were effectively countered by the high quality supervision inputs which followed (as discussed in the following section). There was recognition that efforts to get the project 'off the ground' risked being lost if project effectiveness did not take place when it did. To that end, the project's shortcomings at effectiveness were understood and subsequently accounted for through the identification of appropriate supervision actions. Risks associated with readiness and commitment were fully acknowledged in the Project Appraisal Report.

Project identification was initiated in July 1996, with appraisal undertaken in September 1998. The project became effective on October 19, 1999. The lag between development of the project concept document, preparation steps, and effectiveness was 25 months. The total time for preparing the project was somewhat beyond regional- and Bank-wide norms, due to the need to marshal the support and coordination of a large number of development partners. The DCA was amended thrice – once, to revise procurement thresholds, another, to correct minor references pertaining to procurement agreements and processes, and a third time to reduce the share of IDA in the basket in the last year of implementation.

7.2 Supervision:Highly Satisfactory. A QAG review conducted midway during project implementation judged the quality of supervision as highly satisfactory, particularly in terms of the timely identification of implementation problems, technical assistance, appropriateness of advice and proposed solutions to the Borrower, appropriateness and speed of Bank follow-up actions, supervision of fiduciary aspects, and the skill mix of staff used for supervision tasks. During the first years of the project, the supervision strategy focused on improving donor coordination, simplifying implementation arrangements and strengthening the role and capacity of the implementing agency, the DOE. This approach was judged to be highly successful in addressing quality at entry problems, and in establishing a high degree of credibility for both donors and HMG/N for implementing a successful project. Supervision teams were deemed to have kept a strong focus on the achievement of development objectives throughout the supervision process. The QAG review identified this as a ‘best practice’ in supervision. As noted above, shortcomings in the project's preparation were effectively countered through the strong supervision accorded the project.

The Mid-Term Review (MTR) in FY02 yielded a number of actions aimed at simplifying implementation and improving donor coordination. This was preceded by a complex MTR preparation process which included an independent review by external experts, a technical review, and a two-stage donor review process to agree on recommendations and approve a revised implementation plan. This last set of tasks was

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carried out to ensure sufficient consensus among donor partners and support for consolidation of the 17 separate components of the MOES Annual Strategic Implementation Plan into five thematic ones.

7.3 Overall Bank performance:Satisfactory. During its preparation and throughout implementation of BPEP2, and despite a relatively complex project design, a cumbersome structure for donor coordination, and implementation delays early on in the project, the Bank’s performance is judged to have been good overall. The Bank played a crucial role in providing inputs for: 1. establishing an effective model of donor coordination and engaging the Borrower agency in a

partnership relationship;2. taking the decision to rotate donor leadership of supervision tasks on an annual basis; and 3. producing clear, well-crafted and complete supervision documents.

A local donor coordination group played a key role in providing on-going monitoring and technical support to the implementation agencies. The continuity of task team members based in the Bank's Nepal Country Office for procurement and financial management matters (although support for procurement was transferred to the Regional Procurement Hub in Delhi during the second half of the project), semi-annual supervision missions and regular communication between donor partners and HMG/N ensured seamless monitoring of the project. Management comments in PSRs succinctly identified issues for priority attention by the task teams. There were only two TTLs during the life of the project, with the exception of a brief period (i.e. six months) between the TTL who prepared the project and the one who saw the project to closure (who was also a supervision team member throughout). In this manner, the project had remarkable continuity in team leadership and composition. Two supervision missions were conducted annually.

The most important contribution that the Bank team made in the process of BPEP2 -- and the platform for broader engagement which it established and maintained -- has been to facilitate the emergence of a truly HMGN-owned education reform vision and a core team within HMG/N to lead it. Implementation of the Seventh Amendment to the Education Act was a key step in allowing this to happen. Early success in the transfer of public primary schools to community management, in turn, solidified this vision, and bolstered reform leaders' confidence in their own ideas and efforts. In this manner, the 'Community School Support Project', which is funded by the Bank through a Learning and Innovation Loan (LIL) and is currently under implementation, is seen as an integral part in a series of Bank interventions in the primary education sector, and a key bridge between BPEP2 and EFA. While this may not be narrowly related to implementation of BPEP2, it is useful to see the whole package of Bank efforts as supporting BPEP2 implementation insofar as BPEP2 had the broad objective of improving the quality of primary education. Through BPEP2 and associated work, the Bank team effectively focused on the most important set of changes that underpin any sustainable reform required for improving the system of public education in Nepal. Additionally, the broader Bank team is credited with bringing the weight of the Povery Reducation Support Credit (PRSC) behind the key reform of initiating the transfer of public schools to community management. This brought the focus of reform to schools and created a sustainable local dynamic for reform. Without this the reform vision and strategy would not have been complete.

Borrower7.4 Preparation:Unsatisfactory. The MOES, other ministries and entities of HMG/N involved in the preparation phase effectively collaborated with the Bank to define the project. MOES completed a number of key tasks prior to project effectiveness:• establishment of a Change Management Group to oversee the transition from BPEP1 to BPEP2;• formation of the Technical Support Advisory Group to guide the MOES on the introduction of key

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skills to support the core program; • development of proposed common operational procedures for donors; • cabinet approval for the establishment of the DOE; and• agreements with the Bank and other donors with respect to adopting a program approach, funding of

the CIP by five donors, including IDA, through a basket funding approach, and the importance of ensuring that donor coordination be carried out by the MOES to ensure full ownership of the project on the part of HMG/N.

However, as noted in a Quality of Supervision Assessment carried out in 2002, despite the fact that establishment of the DOE had been agreed, key staff had not been identified and the organizational structure had not been established by the time of project effectiveness. This led to significant gaps in readiness to implement, and which made the project vulnerable to failure during its initial period. This constitutes the primary rationale for an unsatisfactory ICR rating. It should be noted, however, that the range of important achievements made during the course of preparation on the part of HMG/N, the Bank and other donor partners, as described earlier in this report should, in effect, warrant a rating of only 'marginally unsatisfactory' for both HMG/N and the Bank.

7.5 Government implementation performance:Satisfactory. The most important aspect of the Borrower performance has been its full ownership of the reform process which BPEP2 supported. This has allowed for a meaningful transition from a state in which HMG/N demonstrated little collective commitment to primary education reforms, and where donors supported their favorite projects, to one in which HMG/N has been strongly committed to reforms, has developed a reform vision and strategy, and donors have come together to support HMG/N's own approach, largely through HMG/N's own implementation system. BPEP2 is credited with establishing an environment conducive to this change. During BPEP2, the Borrower regularly provided counterpart funds and carried out a number of actions to support successful implementation of the project, among which were:• promulgation of the Seventh Amendment to the Education Act to empower schools and communities

paving the way for transferring school management responsibility to communities represented by School Management Committees elected by parents;

• grouping 17 BPEP2 components into five as an effort to avert fragmentation of the program;• redefining the role of the DOE as the technical wing of the MOES and facilitator of the program;• simplifying fund flow mechanisms; and • improving the monitoring and evaluation system by ensuring that objectives are achieved by focusing

on the process, output and outcome monitoring.

HMG/N adopted some actions that negatively affected project implementation, including the frequent transfer of key senior personnel (especially during the early phases of project implementation) and allowing a significant amount of technical assistance to fall outside the national planning processes. On this last point, donor partners who provided financial and/or human resource support for technical assistance must share responsibility for allowing this to happen.

7.6 Implementing Agency:Marginally satisfactory. Implementation was difficult in the initial 18 months of the project as a result of implementation readiness problems. Closer attention to specific features of the procurement and financial management arrangements, especially the implementation agency’s overall capacity to carry out these functions, could have stemmed the implementation delay at the outset. Review of Project Status Reports

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(PSRs) indicates that implementation performance improved thereafter. By the third supervision mission, five months after effectiveness and nearly one year after Board approval, staffing of both the DOE and other line agencies within the new organizational structure and preparation of district plans and the Annual Strategic Implementation Plan (ASIP) had been carried out. Within eight months of effectiveness, all 75 districts in Nepal had prepared five-year plans for BPEP2, budgets for FY01 and agreed monitoring indicators for that year.

Implementation progress was later downgraded because of insufficient procurement progress, slow disbursement and noncompliance with a covenant relating to staff transfers -- this constituted the only time during the project's life that implementation progress was rated 'unsatisfactory'. HMG/N and donors agreed on a staff transfer policy to ensure continuity of staff in key positions, and the implementation rating was again upgraded to ‘satisfactory’. This rating remained for the rest of the project’s duration, attributable mainly to overall strengthened capacities within DOE for planning, resource allocation and financial management.

7.7 Overall Borrower performance:Satisfactory. Borrower implementation performance is rated satisfactory for the following reasons:• overall level of HMG/N support to education, evidenced by its commitment to the project as a key

instrument for instituting important institutional reforms and quality improvement measures;• near complete achievement of project targets and objectives, despite initial implementation delays and

frequent discontinuity in staffing;• establishment of the DOE;• concerted focus on decentralized planning and management of education activities, strengthening the

role of district and local bodies to plan for and manage their own education activities and progress; and• increased openness to a heightened role for civil society organizations, demonstrated by marked

changes in the levels of networking and partnership relationships at the national level and the fact that most NGOs were consulted and their positions integrated into preparations for the new EFA national program.

8. Lessons Learned

Risks of de-linking core functions from development inputs: If core issues, such as teacher deployment, teacher absenteeism or poor teacher management, are not adequately dealt with, then development inputs, such as improved planning and education system monitoring, are less effective. BPEP2 showed insufficient attention to problematic areas of core education system functioning reduces the impact of introducing improved teaching methodologies. While BPEP2 introduced numerous elements which comprise a well-functioning education system (e.g. annual district plans, SIPs, improved monitoring and evaluation, etc.), changes at the classroom level were less apparent.

Importance of ensuring sufficient financial support for non-salary recurrent costs: This was lacking under BPEP2 and limited the impact of some quality-enhancement measures, such as the role of resource centers and the use of improved teaching methodologies. While there was sufficient money for development inputs, there was not enough for schools’ basic needs. This partly accounts for the shift to a sector-wide financing approach under the EFA Project which aims to provide sufficient focus on both.

Ensuring accountability to beneficiaries is key: BPEP2 was implemented in the context of widespread public loss of confidence in the capacity of government to provide quality education services, combined with widespread perceptions of elite capture of government and poor governance overall. It was important that BPEP2 instill mechanisms and processes to ensure accountability of public officials to beneficiaries.

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This did not sufficiently take place. Only late in the project did SMCs become accountable to parents rather than to DEOs. However, BPEP2 succeeded in fostering public debate which led to the Seventh Amendment to the Education Act, increasing the autonomy of school, village and parent-teacher education bodies and giving them more say in school management.

Adopting a holistic view of education system development over a drive to meet targets: BPEP2 suffered from a tendency to place too much focus on the attainment of component targets without maintaining a broader picture of the holistic development of the education system. For example, teacher training targets where largely met in respect to the number of teachers trained, yet less attention was paid to the impact of teacher training on improving teaching practices. Similarly, BPEP2’s funding was not linked to the achievement of systemic benchmarks, thus component managers could not be held accountable for simply aiming to deliver implemented components, regardless of their effect on improving education system functioning.

The importance of practical training approaches: Much of the teacher training under BPEP2 was deemed to be too abstract. This underscores the importance of on-site training where teachers can learn about and practice new techniques in their own classroom environments, as is being carried out under the new IDA-funded Community School Support Project in Nepal.

Donor coordination – having government in the driver’s seat: Keeping overall responsibility for BPEP2 donor coordination in the hands of HMG/N reduced potential levels of tension, complexity and duplication of efforts which can result from each donor striving to achieve its own objectives, impose its own processes and make its own ‘stamp’ on the project and education system overall.

Better quality assurance of input data supports enhanced education system monitoring: While under BPEP2, the system and structure for quantitative monitoring of school-level data was in place, the quality of input data was given limited priority. This resulted in large amounts of data being collected which were of questionable accuracy and reliability. Good quality input data are needed to give an accurate picture of the status of the education system and guide decision-making at all levels.

9. Partner Comments

(a) Borrower/implementing agency:The Implementation Completion Report by the World Bank provides an objective analysis of the overall implementation of the Basic and Primary Education Project 2 (BPEP2, 1999-2004) based on data and principal performance ratings. It provides an account of progress towards the key performance indicators and outputs of components.

The experience of BPEP2 clearly concludes that good quality in education (in schools, ECD and alternative schooling and literacy and teacher training programs) should motivate children in the acquisition of knowledge, skills and attitudes that have intrinsic value and also help in addressing important human and social goals. The lesson learnt is that despite improvements in annual district education plans, school improvement plans, teacher deployment, and improved monitoring and evaluation, the question of improving the quality of education focusing on positive changes in classroom practices continue to remain a challenge.

The purpose of this report is not to establish links between program inputs and outputs/outcomes. BPEP2 was implemented in a most critical situation. However, the resulting experience of program implementation has been most satisfactory in view of the progress achieved in the areas of intended objectives such as net

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enrolment, survival and completion rates and learning outcomes.

The implementation of BPEP2 provided grounds for the initiation of ‘Education for All’ (EFA), which attempts to further implement policies that secure and improve the quality of schooling, and other forms of organized learning focusing on the determinants of education quality.

A basket funding modality was successfully initiated as an innovative mechanism during the period of the BPEP2 and the Government took lead roles in its effective and efficient implementation. Moreover, donor harmonization was instrumental to support the Ministry of Education and Sports, and the Department of Education to initiate the 'Education for All' 2004-2009 under a joint financing agreement (JFA).

(b) Cofinanciers:The information on progress is largely in accordance with the findings of the 2004 Joint Government Donor Evaluation Report, lead by a Steering Committee in which all BPEP2 donors participated. While impressive quantitative progress has been documented, the qualitative progress is less satisfactory. Less satisfactory is also the limited improvement in access to excluded groups, including girls, ethnic minorities, dalits, disabled and the poorest.

The establishment of the DOE as the technical wing of MOES has contributed to capacity building at central level, and to some degree at district and school level, but the tendency to centralization of authority has limited the effectiveness of capacity development.

Government leadership improved considerably, aided by the introduction of the “Foreign Aid Policy, 2002”. Government has now established itself firmly in the driver’s seat and leads all donor coordination in the sub-sector. Although donor coordination and harmonisation was gradually improved, coordination of technical assistance (TA) was not satisfactory, as also pointed out by the Joint Evaluation Report, in spite of several attempts during the BPEP2. The Code of Conduct prepared for the EFA Programme is intended to remedy this problem.

Most of the basket donors and the other BPEP2 donors provided direct funding, either in terms of projects or TA. Although most of the TA has been provided through some type of umbrella agreement between HMG/N and the contributing partner, proper coordination was lacking. Initially a major part of the TA resources made available were channeled outside of regular government budgets and planning processes. However, increasingly donor partners ensure that resources provided outside the basket fund are reported a part of the Government Red Book. The lack of effective TA coordination has had occasional negative impacts on BPEP2, including occasional duplication of efforts in areas such as development of teacher training curriculum.

(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):

10. Additional Information

Financial ManagementAn innovative financial management system attempted to align itself with the government system. A core principle from the outset was the need for flexibility and adaptability as demanded by the circumstances and to adjust to implementation progress. Development of an Accounts Manual was a key task prior to project negotiations, as a basis for effective financial management in the project. A financial management information system was also developed at the outset to record and monitor expenditures. An internal control system in the form of regular monitoring and review of accounts formed a part of the project design.

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Training of accounts staff was also a key activity, with a minimum of one training session per year for all project accountants. During implementation, DOE encountered some challenges which were later rectified through discussions with IDA and subsequent amendments made to the Development Credit Agreement (DCA):• Lack of clarity in charging several activity costs under certain charge categories as these were not

adequately defined; • Non-alignment of certain expense categories to the government chart of accounts; and • Procurement thresholds which required contract documents to be submitted to IDA for no objection for

small expenses.

Financial management and procurement staff in the DOE were highly motivated and dedicated. As a result of their intensive efforts, many of the issues that were observed during implementation were rectified in close consultation with IDA. As expenditure categories and the government chart of accounts for certain expenses were not closely aligned, the DOE failed to submit the Project Management Reports (PMRs), as per the financial covenant. The format for PMRs was mutually agreed without a clear understanding of how the innovative 'basket' modality would operate. Consequently, on an exceptional basis, IDA relaxed the need for PMRs. In the third year of the project, all alignment problems were resolved. There were no major problems with audit reports, which were submitted on time.

Payments were made through the established control system of HMG/N. Before any transactions took place, they were verified and cross examined by senior DOE staff. Because of a weak internal control system, donors commissioned periodic reviews to identify weaknesses and offer advice for strengthening the system FM. DOE developed a project-specific Accounts Manual detailing internal control measures. Training, including periodic courses abroad, was provided regularly to project accountants in both cost centers and at the DOE. The FM information system was developed in the DOE and used at the center based on manual reporting by cost centers.

Audit reports were not received within the required six-month time frame, yet generally within the 90-day grace period. In light of the project’s national coverage, financial statements were not received in a timely manner from remote districts, affecting the on-time consolidation of accounts. At project closure, there was no backlog of audit reports and most were unqualified. Most audit reports usually included management letters recommending improved internal control measures, improved contract monitoring systems and timely monitoring of district expenses. These were followed-up by Bank teams through written communication and during supervision missions.

ProcurementIn the first two years of the project construction delays were encountered due to administrative reasons -- e.g. lack of designated staff, lack of delegation of authority requiring all procurement related decisions to be referred to the DG or Minister level, and the absence of a core procurement group for coordinating procurement actions across all MOES units and departments. Initially, MOES and DOE officials were largely unfamiliar with International Competitive Bidding procedures. Contract monitoring, in general, was weak.

On the advice of the Bank, DOE hired an Procurement Consultant who was instrumental in preparing the detailed project procurement plans embracing all units/departments including procedures for each procurement action, and assisted in the development of suitably amended bidding documents. Procurement functions under the project received close supervision, characterized by a constant flow of dialogue, feedback and guidance from the procurement advisor. This resulted in procurement being carried out

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smoothly over the life of the project, despite the fact that there was limited capacity in the DOE to undertake procurement activities which, consequently, they found to be overly complex.

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Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

Outcome / Impact Indicators:

Indicator/Matrix

Projected in last PSR1

Actual/Latest Estimate

Percentage increase in grade 5 completion rates, particularly girls and children from socially disadvantaged groups.

75 percent by 2004 Primary completion rate increased from 41 percent in 1998 to 54 percent in 2000, and to 59 percent in 2001. Between 1999 and 2003 the number of disadvantaged children completion Grade 5 grew by 24 percent while the number of disadvantaged girls increased by 25 percent.

Percentage increase in learning achievements at grades 3 and 5.

Raise average score to 75 percent in all subjects by 2004.

A second round of national assessment showed little improvement at Grade 3 but marked achievement for Grade 5. Between 1999 and 2003, mean learning achievement for grade 5 in Mathematics rose from 27 to 33 percent, In Nepali from 51 to 55 percent and in Social Studies from 42 to 61 percent.

Number of districts successfully implementing investment plans targeting disadvantaged groups.

All 75 districts to prepare district education plans; districts less than 100 GER and 60% NER for girls to be particularly targeted for access participation; and districts with higher GER. NER to be targeted for higher efficiency and learning.

All 75 districts preparing district education plans. Districts with less than GER of 100% and Girls' NER of less than 60% were targeted for access till MTR. Subsequently more elaborate targeting criteria was introduced. Overall, NER increased from 70.5 percent in 1998 to 84.2 percent in 2004. The share of girls in total enrolment increased from 42.6 percent in 1998 to 46.3 percent in 2003. The gender parity index oimproved from 0.77 in 1998 to 0.87 in 2000.

Number of schools/VDCs successfully implementing school improvement plans (SIP).

About 2,500 schools to prepare SIPs by July 2004

About 6,000 SIPs prepared. Local capacity has improved in areas such as planning, management, implementation, data collection and reporting.

Output Indicators:

Indicator/Matrix

Projected in last PSR1

Actual/Latest Estimate

National institutions prepare annual policy and performance based work plans and budgets.

All national institutions to prepare annual policy and performance based work plans and budgets.

All national institutions prepared annual policy and performance based work plans and budgets. Operational efficiency in planning and policy formulation increased at central level.

Districts preparing and implementing annual work plans based on budgets for regular activities.

All 75 districts preparing and implementing annual work plans based on budgets for regular activities.

All 75 districts preparing and implementing annual work plans based on budgets for regular activities. Districts are now able to prepare annual as well as five-year plans.

Districts prepare and implement annual work plan based on budgets for regular activities plus investment plans based on targeting priorities.

30 districts preparing and implementing annual work plan based on budgets for regular activities plus investment plans based on targeting priorities.

All 75 districts preparing and implementing annual work plan based on budgets for regular activities plus investment plans based on targeting priorities.

Schools and VDCs prepare and effectively carry out SIPs.

800 schools and VDCs are carrying out SIPs.

Over 6,000 schools carrying out SIPs.

Teacher competency to help children learn in grades 1-3 and multi-grade classes.

No targets set. Multi-grade teaching training being provided. Limited use of multi-grade teaching. Studies on classroom instruction indicate that knowledge acquired in training is being poorly

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used in classrooms.

Number of children, especially those from socially disadvantaged groups completing grade 5 compared to the baseline in 1999.

Not set. See above for percentage increases for these groups.

Physical Facilities: 10,800 classrooms to be rehabilitated and 5,400 new classrooms to be constructed

A total of 10,800 classrooms were rehabilitated and 5,412 new classrooms were constructed, exceeding original the targets.

1 End of project

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Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent)AppraisalEstimate

Actual/Latest Estimate

Percentage of Appraisal

Component US$ million US$ millionStrengthening Institutional Capacity 18.80 21.37 113Raising Learning Achievement 14.00 21.11 151Increasing Equitable Access 22.90 27.85 122

Total Baseline Cost 55.70 70.33Total Project Costs 55.70 70.33

Total Financing Required 55.70 70.33

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)

Expenditure Category ICBProcurement

NCB Method

1

Other2 N.B.F. Total Cost

1. Works 0.00 6.30 3.80 0.00 10.10(0.00) (1.20) (0.60) (0.00) (1.80)

2. Goods 4.40 2.50 1.00 0.00 7.90(1.00) (0.80) (0.50) (0.00) (2.30)

3. Services 0.00 0.70 5.40 0.00 6.10(0.00) (0.10) (1.20) (0.00) (1.30)

4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 31.60 0.00 31.60(0.00) (0.00) (7.10) (0.00) (7.10)

5. Miscellaneous 0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

6. Miscellaneous 0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

Total 4.40 9.50 41.80 0.00 55.70(1.00) (2.10) (9.40) (0.00) (12.50)

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)

Expenditure Category ICBProcurement

NCB Method

1

Other2 N.B.F. Total Cost

1. Works 0.00 4.40 10.23 0.00 14.63(0.00) (0.78) (1.39) (0.00) (2.17)

2. Goods 10.24 0.86 3.30 14.40(1.82) (0.15) (0.64) () (2.61)

3. Services 0.00 0.55 0.16 0.71(0.00) (0.00) (0.13) () (0.13)

4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 40.59 0.00 40.59(0.00) (0.00) (7.25) (0.00) (7.25)

5. Miscellaneous

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0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

6. Miscellaneous 0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

Total 10.24 5.81 54.28 0.00 70.33(1.82) (0.93) (9.41) (0.00) (12.16)

1/ Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies.2/ Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff

of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units.

Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent)

Component Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest EstimatePercentage of Appraisal

IDA Govt. CoF. IDA Govt. CoF. IDA Govt. CoF.Strengthening Institutional Capacity

4.21 0.76 13.81 3.70 0.88 16.80 87.9 115.8 121.7

Raising Learning Achievement

3.14 0.56 10.25 3.65 0.87 16.59 116.2 155.4 161.9

Increasing Equitable Access to Quality Education

5.15 0.92 16.75 4.81 1.14 21.89 93.4 123.9 130.7

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Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits

Enhanced primary education is strongly correlated with poverty reduction, economic development and productivity growth. HMG/N aims to provide quality primary school education to the children of Nepal to put them on the road towards better employment and income-earning possibilities. Challenges to enhance educational quality and increase access to the disadvantaged can be classified into three types: (a) Demand side - those that prevent children from going to school or from benefiting from the educational services provided by the school e.g. poverty, direct costs of schooling, opportunity costs; (b) Supply-side - factors that limit their capacity to provide adequate quality education opportunities for children living in the area, e.g. inaccessible schools (this is going to be a significant issue given the insurgency), inadequate facilities, lack of teaching and learning resources, teacher absenteeism; and (c) Institutional - policies and administrative arrangements that can keep the system from performing at an acceptable level, e.g., weak organizational capacity, centralized management, and inadequate funding arrangements. HMG/N aims to address these constraints by increasing primary school access, participation and completion; and through improving the quality of student learning and performance outcomes.

Preliminary rates of return have been computed on the basis of alternative assumptions regarding the internal and external efficiency of the system. Based on these assumptions, HMG/N's current education program yields an Internal Economic Rate of return of 16 percent. Sensitivity analysis using alternative assumptions on the external and internal efficiency of the system demonstrate that the rate of return will vary between seven percent in the low case scenario to 24 percent in the high case – these figures will, of course, be affected depending on how education services are affected due to the insurgency.

Financial: Sustainability is dependent on two key factors: (a) the availability of revenues to meet the additional costs that will arise inevitably from the adoption of HMG/N's overall education strategy; and (b) the willingness of HMG/N to meet those new costs at the possible expense of secondary and tertiary education (or at the expense of allocations to other sectors). In its Medium-term Macroeconomic Framework (MTMF), HMG/N has made it clear that it regards the successful development and continuance of high-quality primary education as one of its highest priorities. Preliminary analysis shows that for the current education program to be sustainable when it ends in 2008/2009, the economy needs to grow at around 4.5 percent per annum, and around 18 percent of government expenditures will have to be committed to education (as compared to about 15 percent currently) with 55 percent going to the primary education sub-sector (roughly the same as at present).

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Annex 4. Bank Inputs

(a) Missions:Stage of Project Cycle Performance Rating No. of Persons and Specialty

(e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.)Month/Year Count Specialty

ImplementationProgress

DevelopmentObjective

Identification/Preparation11/28/1997 3 Education Specialist (Team

Leader); Education Specialist; Operations Officer

Appraisal/Negotiation09/08/1998 10 Senior Implementation

Specialist/Team Leader; three Education Specialists; one Economist; one Operations Analyst; two Architects; one Finance Specialist; and one Procurement Specialist

12/14/1998 5 Senior Implementation Specialist/Team Leader; three Education Specialists; and one Operations Analyst

Supervision05/30/1999 4 Sr. Implementation

Specialist; and three Education Specialists

S S

11/29/1999 6 Team Leader; two Education Specialists; Procurement Specialist; Financial Management Specialist; and Architect/ consultant

S S

05/19/2000 5 IDA Coordinator; Education Specialist; Financial Management Specialist ; Procurement Specialist; Architect/consultant

S S

11/24/2000 7 Team Leader; Lead Education Specialist; two Education Specialists; Senior Financial Management Specialist; Senior Procurement Specialist; and Architect/consultant

U S

04/05/2001 2 Team Leader and Education Specialist

S S

12/14/2001 8 Team Leader; Senior Education Specialist; Education Specialist; two Financial Management Specialists; Senior Procurement Specialist; Education Planner; and Architect/consultant

S S

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03/22/2002 5 Team Leader; Education Specialist; Senior Procurement Specialist: Architect/consultant and Implementation Specialist/consultant

S S

03/28/2003 5 Two Team Leaders; Financial Management Specialist; Procurement Specialist and Architect/consultant.

S S

3/24/2004 5 Team Leader; Education Specialist: Financial Managment Specialist; Financial Management Assistant; and Architect/ consultant

S S

ICR9/28/2004 3 Team Leader, Senior

Education Specialist; Principal Author, Education Specialist; Program Assistant

S S

(b) Staff:

Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest EstimateNo. Staff weeks US$ ('000)

Identification/Preparation 110 321Appraisal/Negotiation 62 190Supervision 204 480ICR 18 40Total 394 1,031

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Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)

RatingMacro policies H SU M N NASector Policies H SU M N NAPhysical H SU M N NAFinancial H SU M N NAInstitutional Development H SU M N NAEnvironmental H SU M N NA

SocialPoverty Reduction H SU M N NAGender H SU M N NAOther (Please specify) H SU M N NA

Private sector development H SU M N NAPublic sector management H SU M N NAOther (Please specify) H SU M N NA

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Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bank performance Rating

Lending HS S U HUSupervision HS S U HUOverall HS S U HU

6.2 Borrower performance Rating

Preparation HS S U HUGovernment implementation performance HS S U HUImplementation agency performance HS S U HUOverall HS S U HU

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Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

Bank preparation and legal documents

Pre-Appraisal Terms of Reference, May 15, 1998lPre-Appraisal Aide-Memoire, June 1, 1998lPre-Appraisal Back-to-Office Report, June 1, 1998lAppraisal Terms of Reference, September 1, 1998lAppraisal Aide-Memoire, October 10, 1998lAppraisal Back-to-Office Report, October 10, 1998lPost-Appraisal Terms of Reference, November 10, 1998lPost-Appraisal Aide Memoire, December 20, 1998lPost Appraisal Back-to-Office Report, December 3, 1998lAppraisal Follow-Up Terms of Reference, December 14, 1998lAppraisal Follow-Up Aide Memoire, January 28, 1999lEnvironmental Data Sheet, August 31, 1998lSummary of Negotiations, March 3, 1999 lProject Appraisal Document. World Bank. March 3, 1999lDevelopment Credit Agreement, Credit Number 3185-NEP, April 23, 1999l

Bank project implementation documents

Project Status Reports (PSRs). World Bank. 1999-2004lAide-Memoires of supervision missions. HMG/N, World Bank, other donor partners. 1999-2004l

Other Bank documentsProject Appraisal Document, Nepal Education for All Project. June 2, 2004l

Main documents prepared by the Borrower and donor partners during implementation and at project closure

Joint Government-Agency Evaluation of Basic and Primary Education Programme II (for Nepal). l

Volumes 1 and 2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Danida). May 14, 2004.

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Additional Annex 8. Government Final Evaluation Project Report

1. In line with the Jomtien declaration on “Education for All” (EFA, 1990) and the summit goals of the Convention on the Rights of Children (1990), His Majesty’s Government, Ministry of Education and Sports reconfirmed its commitment to achieve universal primary education (UPE) of good quality by introducing the Basic and Primary Education Project (BPEP I) 1992-1998 to consolidate reform activities initiated during the Primary Education Project (PEP) 1984-1992. The primary objective of launching the project was to give an impetus to the coordinated development and continuous improvement of primary education in Nepal. The project aimed at:

(i) improving the quality of primary education,(ii) increasing the equitable access to primary education, and (iii) strengthening the management of the formal and non-formal primary education delivery system.

2. In consonance with the above-mentioned objectives, the project had several components. Improving the quality of primary education incorporated curriculum and textbook development, provision of supplementary reading materials, recurrent in-service teacher training and continuous assessment. Increasing equitable access to primary education included school construction and rehabilitation, non-formal primary education, special education, women education, early childhood development and compulsory primary education. The purpose of institutional development was sought to be achieved through program management, primary school design capacity development, school facilities construction and management training.

3. The project covered forty districts by 1998 and its overall achievements were highly satisfactory. The achievement ratio vis-a-vis quantitative targets ranged from 60% to 100%. The project had significant achievement in reducing the proportion of underage children, dropout and repetition rates and enhancing the completion rate of the primary education cycle from 27% in 1991 to 41% in 1997. However, the overall impact of the project inputs, especially in classroom practices and the whole school atmosphere as demonstrated by the students’ achievement level, which was less than 50 percent of the total possible score, was not as expected.

4. The BPEP I impacted upon Government policies resulting in the adoption of the Resource Center (RC) structure, provision of 10 days recurrent teacher training to every teacher each year, placement of at least one female teacher in each primary school, inclusion of ECD component, introduction of liberal promotion policy, introduction of coupon system for the distribution of free textbooks and gradual introduction of the compulsory primary education (CPE) in all districts.

5. In spite of progress in delivering curriculum materials, providing training to teachers and allocating financial resources to the districts, the BPEP I could not be successful in sustaining systemic efforts to achieve qualitative changes and to ensure an acceptable level of quality for all children by improving their learning outcomes. It proved to be a testing ground for many new ideas and interventions such as the introduction of the compulsory primary education without proper and adequate preparation.

6. BPEP I was implemented in a project approach and most of its activities had a very small coverage. Its overall management of implementation and monitoring of impacts remained weak. Above all, it lacked a full vision of primary education and failed to undertake reform measures in a unified direction.

7. Following the experiences of the project approach and considering sustainability imperative into

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account, the BPEP II was successfully implemented between 1999 and 2004 as a program approach. It adopted the basket funding modality and was an integral part of the total national program. While the World Bank, NORAD, Finland, the European Commission and DANIDA supported the basket; the UNICEF, JICA and the ADB had separate agreements to provide earmarked support to the basic and primary education program.

8. Despite the fact that the BPEP II was implemented at a very critical time of our history, it demonstrated significant progress in both program and performance indicators. Most of the program targets had more than 90% achievement and there were marked progress in performance indicators as demonstrated by improvement in the net enrolment, survival and completion rates. The following tables conclude the achievement of the BPEP II in respect to program and performance indicators.

Table 1: Achievement of BPEP II in key program indicators, 1999/00 – 2003/04

SN Activities Unit Total Target Progress plan period

%

1 School Physical Facility

1.1 Classrooms Rehabilitation Classroom 10800 10794 100

1.2External Environment Improvement

1.3 Toilets School 5400 5231 97

1.3.1 Drinking Water School 5400 5093 94

1.3.2 Fencing School 5400 5226 97

1.3.3 Classroom Construction and Furniture Classroom 5400 5392 100

1.4 Feeder Hostel Hostel 18 18 100

1.5 District Education Office Building and Furniture

Building 15 15 100

1.6 Resource Centre Construction and Furniture RC 200 141 71

1.7 Department of Education Building and Furniture

Building 1 1 100

2Access and Retention

2.1Alternative Schooling

2.1.1 Out-of-school program (OSP) I Centre 3904 3897 100

2.1.2 Out- of-school program (OSP) II Centre 2318 2271 98

2.1.3 School Outreach Program Centre 1026 1008 98

2.1.4 Flexible Schooling Program Centre 1013 962 95

2.2 Girls' Education

2.2.1 Piloting of incentive for primary school girls Person 91712 92522 101

2.2.2 Primary girls' scholarship @ 250 per annum Person 240746 214045 89

2.2.3 Secondary girls' scholarship Person 12500 10928 87

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2.2.4 Feeder Hostel Program Number 18 18 100

2.2.5 Incentive for top ten girls in Grade V Person 3750 3408 91

2.3Education for Special Focus Group

2.3.1 Piloting of incentive for focus group children Person 74288 87648 118

2.3.2 Scholarship for dalit children @ 250 per annum

Person 549696 359120 65

2.4Special Education

2.4.1 Residential Resource Classes Centre 309 309 100

2.4.2 Residential facility for special needs children Person 10944 10335 94

2.4.3 Integrated education for physically handicapped children

Person 2266 2040 90

2.4.4 Integrated education for blind/low vision/hard of hearing/and mild MR children

Person 8165 7572 93

2.4.5 Assessment Centers with Technical Committees

District 35 35 100

2.5Early Childhood Development

2.5.1 Conduction of ECD centers Centre 5700 5750 101

2.6Community Mobilization

2.6.1 Awareness workshop Centre 12136 12137 100

2.6.2 Street drama Centre 1279 1370 107

2.6.3 Folksong competition Centre 2489 2487 100

2.6.4 Video demonstration Centre 2138 2024 95

2.6.5 Mother gathering Centre 6187 6039 98

2.6.6 Speech competition Centre 5438 5414 100

2.6.7 Children's rally Centre 4420 4355 99

2.7Literacy Program

2.7.1 Women Literacy I Class 7835 7767 99

2.7.2 Women Literacy II Class 6705 6457 96

2.7.3 Income Generation Program Centre 115 101 88

2.7.4 Community Learning Centre Centre 20 16 80

3Learning Achievement

3.1 Curriculum and Textbook Reform Local Language

12

3.2 Continuous Assessment District 5 5

3.3Recurrent Teacher Training

3.3.1 Whole School Approach Teacher Training Person 51108 53626 105

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3.3.2 Module-Based Teacher Training Person 181500 176471 97

3.3.3 English Language Teacher Training Person 25836 21150 82

3.3.4 Math Teacher Training Person 33103 26551 80

3.4 Certificate Teacher Training

Distance Education Centre3.4.1 Certificate Teacher Training II Package Teacher 18250 15479 85

3.4.2 Certificate Teacher Training III Package Teacher 19995 20693 104

3.4.3 Interactive Radio Instruction Teacher 13050 6584 50

National Centre for Educational Development

3.4.4 Certificate Teacher Training I Package Teacher 4725 3796 80

3.4.5 Certificate Teacher Training IV Package Teacher 14175 12120 86

4Capacity Building

4.1Strengthening DOE and Centre level Agencies

4.2.1 District Education Plan District 75 75

4.2.2 School Mapping District 75 75

4.2.3 Computer Training District 600 733 122

4.2Local Capacity Building

4.2.1 Head Teacher Management Training Person 46574 43643 94

4.2.2 Training on School Improvement Plan including EMIS

Person 172376 146059 85

4.2.3 Funding through SIP

Funding A School 19856 13546 68

Funding B School 3702 3231 87

Funding C School 1343 1305 97

5SIP Based Development

5.1 Funding School Improvement Plans on per child allocation (Rs. 150/170/200 for tarai and valley, hill and mountain districts respectively) for quality improvement

Child 460918

5.2 Partnership with VDC/VECs for universal access within its catchments area. (607 VDCs and 18 Municipalities in 12 districts and 252 VDCs in 63 districts)

VEC/Municipality

446

5.3 Grade 1 reform for each school in 5 districts Class 1431

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Table 2: Achievement of BPEP II in key performance indicators, 2004

AchievementSN Indicators 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

1 Gross Enrolment Rate of Early Childhood/Pre School

- - 13.0 12.8 19.8 19.9 39.4

2 Percentage of New entrants at Grade 1 with ECD

- - - 7.8 9.6 13.7 10.9

3 Gross Intake Rate at Grade 1 - - - 122.9 101.3 117.1 125.94 Net Intake Rate at Grade 1 - - - - 74.0 76.1 -5 Gross Enrolment Rate 123.9 127.7 119.8 124.7 118.4 126.7 130.76 Net Enrolment Rate 70.5 72.0 80.4 81.1 82.4 83.5 84.27 Percentage of Gross National Product

channeled to Primary education sub sector1.5 1.7 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3

8 Percentage of Total Education Budget channeled to Primary education sub sector

48.7 55.1 58.4 55.6 59.0 63.5 61.8

9 Percentage of teachers with required qualification and training

- - - - - 17.4 30.5

10 Percentage of teachers with required Certification

- - - - - 80

11 Pupil Teacher Ratio 39 38 37 39.9 35.7 35.8 39.712 Repetition Rate12.1 Grade 1 38.7 36.7 41.8 38.7 36.8 34 NA12.2 Grade 5 14 12.7 10.8 9 11 13.5 NA13 Survival rate to Grade 5 NA 49.7 63.1 65.8 67.6 60.0 76.214 Coefficient of Efficiency NA 47.9 55.0 60.0 57.2 NA NA15 Percentage of Learning Achievement at Grade

5 60

15.1 Nepali - - - - 55.8 - -15.1 Mathematics - - - - 33.3 - -15.2 Social Studies - - - - 61.1 - -15.3 English - - - - 44.8 - -15.4 Environmental Science and Health Education - - - - 67.3 - -16 Literacy Rate16.1 Age Group 15-24 - - - - 70 70 7016.2 Age Group 6+ years - - - - 54 54 5417 Adult Literacy Rate (15+ years) 45 45 45 48 48 4818 Literacy Gender Parity Index (15+ years) - - - - 0.6 0.6 0.6

9. When evaluated from the perspective of its policy framework in the Program Implementation Plan (PIP), the following pictures emerge illustrating its fundamental contribution towards giving a definite future direction to shaping the education system of the country.

(i) The medium-term development objectives of BPEP were to strengthen institutional capacity at the national and community levels to plan and deliver more efficient and better quality basic and primary education services thereby raising learning achievement and increasing equitable access, especially for girls and under-served communities.

The key performance indicators of the program were:

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Preparation and implementation of annual operational and expenditure plan at national and ldistrict levels;Number of months of staff development and training for education managers;lLearning achievement based on national assessment at Grades 3 and 5;lGross enrolment ratios;lPrimary school completion rates;lCycle costs;lTeacher deployment;lTeachers' performance as measured by changes in classroom practices;lTeacher quality based on the percentage of total primary teachers with certificate of lprimary school teaching; andPhysically adequate schools by targeted locations.l

In addition, four indicators were recommended by the Joint Review Mission (Aide Memoire, 10-19 May, 2000), which were the following:

No new publicly funded schools are established; no primary schools upgraded to lower lsecondary schools without government approval.Number of classrooms rehabilitatedlTargeting criteria apply - GER less than 100 and girls NER less than 60.lNew classrooms on the basis of targeting criteria, community participation processes and lschool physical improvement plan (SPIP)

In order to bring the program in line with the 'Education for All' (EFA), the above 14 indicators were adjusted to the 18 EFA indicators on the recommendation of the Mid-Term Review of the BPEP II, March 2002. Hence, this Report as illustrated in table 2 has focused on assessing the outcomes of the program based on the 18 EFA indicators.

10. In addition to the achievement in relation to 18 EFA indicators, the following policies were implemented with wider implications for future planning and program implementation with a view to achieving the EFA policy objectives and Millennium Development goals.

Objective 1: Strengthen institutional capacity at national, district and community level to deliver more efficient basic and primary education services

The Annual Strategic Implementation Plan (ASIP) was introduced and developed as a powerful ltool for accessing and monitoring resources. All 75 districts prepared their District Education Plan and formed it a base to prepare the district level ASIP from 2002 onward. In addition, the process of school improvement planning (SIP) also began and in the final year of BPEP implementation it was piloted in five districts (Jhapa, Chitwan, Syangja, Bardiya and Dadeldhura) and one Resource center (RC) of all districts. The district and school level planning formed the basis of 80% allocation to the districts and schools.The MOES was restructured to formulate sound policies, set standards, perform system analysis land give overall direction for educational development in the country. The DOE was established as a technical arm of the MOES. It played very effective role in the implementation of basic and primary education as well as secondary education programs. Besides, the NFEC was also strengthened to carry out critical responsibility in the area of non-formal and alternative education, skills development and income generating activities to contribute to poverty reduction by raising

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the level of literacy in the country. The number of public primary school teachers remained at the level of 1998 ceiling i. e. 83000. lThe temporary female teachers, 2399 in number, were regularized. The recruitment of female teachers in vacant positions was given priority resulting in 30% of the total teaching force. The policy of one female teacher was updated by two female teachers in schools with more than four teacher positions. This is supposed to play critical role in ensuring universal access to girls and raising the overall quality of education by improving the status of female teachers. The Education Act and Regulation were amended and the School Management Committee was lrepresented by parents including its chairperson. Management training with a view to build their overall capacity and strengthening the bottom-up planning process was provided to the three members of each committee – chairperson, head teacher and woman or dalit member of the SMC. The involvement of I/NGOs and CBOs was encouraged.

Objective 2: Raise learning achievement, especially in grades 1 to 3

National level assessment of Grade 5 was conducted in 2003. This showed improved achievement lin Social Study and Environmental Science (average marks 61 and 67 respectively) and 6 points gain in Mathematics (average mark 33) and 4 points gain in Nepali (average mark 51) as compared to the 1999 national assessment results. It also established baseline in English with average mark 45. In consonance with the principle of imparting primary education in the mother tongue, curriculum land textbooks were prepared in 12 local languages. Recurrent training included the elements of whole school approach, module based training, multi-grade teaching and bilingual teaching. Liberal promotion policy was piloted in five districts – Ilam, Chitwan, Syangja, Surkhet and lKanchanpur with mixed experiences. The experiences of ECD for increasing net enrolment, reducing dropout and repetition rates and lenhancing learning outcomes were most encouraging as demonstrated by the study findings of the “Save the Children, Norway in the district of Siraha. However, bilingual teaching approaches for minority linguistic groups’ children could not be developed.

Objective 3: Increase equitable access to basic and primary education especially for girls and disadvantaged children

Alternative approaches such as outreach classes for Grades 1-3 for disadvantaged children in lremote areas, flexible classes for Grades 1-5 for working children in the form of condensed courses and out of school programs targeting out-of-school children between 10 and 14 years age group were implemented successfully. Special education program for children with four types of disabilities, integrated education and inclusive education approaches, assessment centers, residential resource classes benefited over 21,000 children with disabilities.

Objective 4: Upgrade the quality of school physical environment through community management

School physical facilities based on schools’ needs and demands analysis and targeting schools with llowest GER of girls and disadvantaged children marked nearly 100% progress in respect to rehabilitation and construction of classrooms and external environment improvement. Community participation was most satisfactory in school physical facilities improvement.

10. Thus the BPEP II was accomplished successfully and it had most useful lessons learnt, especially in the areas of policy formulation, improved ownership of the government, decentralized planning and

- 37 -

management, enhanced capacity at central and district levels and comprehensive approach to school education for moving into sector financing in education.

11. However, the compartmentalization of programs into 17 components (later grouped into five broad categories after the Mid-Term-Review) and the supply driven approach without taking into consideration the willingness and preparedness of the stakeholders at the grassroots level could not address effectively the learning needs of all children, especially girls and ethnically, socially, economically, geographically and physically marginalized groups.

12. The experiences of the BPEP II clearly conclude that good quality in education (in schools, ECD and alternative schooling and literacy and teacher training programs) should motivate the children in the acquisition of knowledge, skills and attitudes that have intrinsic value and also help in addressing important human and social goals. The lesson learnt is that despite improvements in annual district education plans, school improvement plans, teacher deployment, and improved monitoring and evaluation, the question of improving the quality of education focusing on positive changes in classroom practices continue to remain a challenge.

13. The purpose of this Report is not to establish links between program inputs and outputs/outcomes. BPEP II was implemented in most critical situation. However, the resulting experience of the program implementation has been most satisfactory in view of the progress achieved in the areas of intended objectives such as net enrolment, survival and completion rates and learning outcomes.

14. The implementation of BPEP provided grounds for the initiation of ‘Education for All’ (EFA), which attempts to further implement policies that secure and improve the quality of schooling, and other forms of organized learning focusing on the determinants of education quality.

15. Basket funding modality was successfully initiated as an innovative mechanism during the period of the BPEP and the Government took lead roles in its effective and efficient implementation. Moreover, donor harmonization was instrumental to support the Ministry of Education and Sports, and the Department of Education to initiate the 'Education for All' 2004-2009 under joint financing agreement (JFA).

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