Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnational Ism

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Towards a Political Theory of Migrant TransnationalismAuthor(s): Rainer BaubckSource: International Migration Review, Vol. 37, No. 3, Transnational Migration: InternationalPerspectives (Fall, 2003), pp. 700-723Published by: The Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30037754

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Towardsa Political Theory ofMigrant TransnationalismRainerBaubockAustrian Academyof Sciences,Vienna

Political transnationalism covers a wide range of phenomena and can bestudied using a variety of approaches. In migration research the focus ismostly on migrants' networks and activities that involve them in politicsoriented towards their country of origin. The article argues for a widerconception of political transnationalism from a political theory perspec-tive. It proposes a terminological distinction between international,multinational, supranational and transnational relations and phenomena.What is specific about migrant transnationalism is that it creates over-lapping memberships between territorially separated and independentpolities. In this understanding, political transnationalism is not onlyabout a narrowly conceived set of activities through which migrantsbecome involved in the domestic politics of their home countries; it alsoaffects collective identities and conceptions of citizenship among thenative populations in both receiving and sending societies. Within thisgeneral framework the article suggests a set of hypotheses for an explana-tory and normative analysis of sending country relations to their emi-grants, a task that has hitherto been neglected in political theory.

Migration researcherswho have studied political transnationalism have gener-ally focused on emigrants'political involvement with their countries of origin.I will argue that this agenda should be broadened by examining how migrationimpacts on conceptions of membership and rights in the sending as well as thereceiving polity. Such a focus on 'transnational citizenship' (Baubdck, 1994)takes us beyond merely descriptive analyses towards questions raised by nor-mative theories of democracy.Traditionally,political theories have worked withmodels of 'closed societies' (e.g., Rawls 1971, 1993) and exclusive loyalties ofcitizens towards a single state. Migrant political transnationalism challengesboth presuppositions. Political theorists who want to develop more adequateconceptions of democracy for globalized societies can learn a lot from compar-ative researchand casestudies of the kind presented in this special issue of IMR.However, normative political theory also has its own agenda and confronts theresults of empirical analyseswith its own questions. It is not merely interestedin describing and explaining how transnationalism impacts on conceptions ofcitizenship, but also in prescribing from a democratic perspective how govern-ments ought to respond to this challenge.

2003 by the Center for MigrationStudiesof New York.All rightsreserved.0198-9183/03/3703.0143IMR Volume 37 Number 3 (Fall 2003):700-72300


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TOWARDS A POLITICALTHEORY OF MIGRANT TRANSNATIONALISM

With many authors in this special issue, I share a skeptical attitudetowards what Robert Smith calls a "globalist and strong transnationalist per-spective" (Smith 2003:328). In this view, globalization not only underminesthe salience of national sovereignty and citizenship, but creates at the sametime deterritoralized and postnational communities as an alternative to terri-torially bounded national polities (Glick Schiller et al., 1992, 1994; Soysal,1994). Instead of constructing such a contrast between national and transna-tional politics, we ought to be aware how the latter depend on the former.Political activities of migrants are strongly oriented towards sending andreceiving states. Conversely, these states are also actively involved in shapingthe emergent "transnationalsocial fields" (Faist, 2000:ch. 7) through attemptsto exercise political control or as providers of entitlements.

If we theorize migrant transnationalism as a challenge to the nation-state system itself, we are likely to exaggerate its scope and to misunderstandits real significance (Portes et al., 1999; Portes, 2001). However, it is stillimportant to ask not only how we can best describe and explain transnation-al political activities, but also to consider how they transcend politics as usual.In my comments I want to discuss some analytic tools and concepts for inter-preting transnational relations, practices and projects. I will also considerfrom a normative perspective whether political transnationalism contributesto a more inclusive form of democracy or whether it undermines democraticstandards of representation and accountability.WHAT IS SPECIALABOUT POLITICAL TRANSNATIONALISM?The term "transnational" applies to human activities and social institutionsthat extend across national borders. The very definition of transnationalismrefers therefore to states as bounded political entities whose borders arecrossed by flows or people, money or information and are spanned by socialnetworks, organizations or fields. Transnational political practices, accordingto Eva 0stergaard's definition in this volume, include "various forms of directcross border participation in the politics of their country of origin by bothmigrants and refugees, as well as their indirect participation via the politicalinstitutions of the host country."

It seems to me that this standard conception of political transnational-ism is still too narrow and ought to be broadened in two ways. First, it shouldnot only refer to politics across borders but ought to consider also how migra-tion changes the institutions of the polity and its conception of membership.Second, migrant transnationalism affects both the institutions of the country

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INTERNATIONALMIGRATION REVIEW

of origin and of the receiving state. Thus it is not only about direct or indi-rect participation in sending states from outside their borders, but also aboutthe impact of migrants' external political ties on the political institutions ofthe host country.

Most studies of economic, social and cultural transnationalism equatestate and nation and regard the state only as a politically defined territory.Transnational practices and structures in these social fields need not involvethe state as an agent or the nation as an imagined political community. Thus,migrants who set up enterprises specializing in trade between their sendingand receiving countries (Landolt, 2001) or religious congregations whosemembers belong simultaneously to communities in both locations (Levitt,2001a:ch. 6) engage in transnational activities across political borders with-out questioning them directly. This is different with political transnational-ism that ultimately affects the very definition of the entity whose borders arecrossed. A candidate who carries his or her electoral campaign abroad chal-lenges the traditional assumption that domestic politics is exclusively decidedwithin the internal arenas of the nation-state. The same is true for migrantswho lobby the government of their host country to adopt a certain stancetowards their country of origin. Both act as if the political communityextended beyond the state territory.

In a broad sense it is, of course, true that all international migration hasthis effect of creating a mismatch between territorial and personal boundariesof polities. Before they naturalize, migrants remain citizens of their countryof origin but are subject to the territorial jurisdiction of their country of res-idence. Under norms of international law, their external affiliation to thesending state entails a right to return and to diplomatic protection in the hostcountry. Most states allow their emigrants to pass on their nationality to atleast the first generation born abroad and many permit them to retain it evenwhen they naturalize in their state of residence. Emigrant citizens can usual-ly vote at home if they return on the day of the election. A few countries granttheir expatriateselectoral participation from abroad through absentee ballots.These various forms of extending the sending polity into the territory of thereceiving state aremirrored by a parallel development in democratic receivingcountries that includes foreign citizens into a wider definition of the politicalcommunity. Permanent resident foreigners nowadays usually enjoy extensivecivil liberties, including the right to political association and activity, and theyoften have a right to return to their host country after staying some timeabroad. In a number of European states they enjoy voting rights in local elec-

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tions, and there is a general tendency towards broader toleration of dualnationality, not only when it is acquired at birth but also in case of natural-ization (see Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2002 for a comprehensive overviewand political evaluation of citizenship policies in democratic receiving states).

The Maastricht Treaty of the European Union, which came into forcein 1993, has introduced the local franchise for Union citizens residing inother member states. Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and theNetherlands grant a residence-based local franchise to all foreign nationals. InBritain, Portugal and Spain privileged groups of foreign nationals can vote ineither local or national elections. In New Zealand, all permanent residentshave enjoyed voting rights in national elections since 1975 but not the rightto be elected. In the Swiss cantons Neuchitel and Jura foreign residents canvote in local or regional elections but again cannot be elected. In recent years,France and Italy passed legislation to introduce the local franchise for thirdcountry nationals but constitutional and political obstacles have blockedthese moves (see Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2002:48-49; Waldrauch, 2003).Among European immigration countries only Austria and Luxemburg havestill relatively strict requirements of renunciation of a prior citizenship beforenaturalization. In Germany, retaining a second nationality is now tolerated innearly half of all new naturalizations (Stahl, 2002). A recent policy change inthis area is the new Swedish nationality law of 2001 that has abolished a pre-vious renunciation requirement.

I suggest, then, that political transnationalism is more than politicalactivity across territorial borders and also refersto these changing and increas-ingly overlapping boundaries of membership in political communities. Thisinterpretation enables us to answer critics who maintain that transnational-ism is neither so new nor so significant that we need to invent a new term forthese phenomena (for a thorough discussion of what is old and what is newabout transnationalism, see Portes et al., 1999). What is new is not so muchthe political orientation of first-generation migrants towards their homecountries but their increasing opportunities to combine external and internalstatus and affiliations.INTERNATIONAL, MULTINATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL ANDTRANSNATIONAL RELATIONSThis proposition differs somewhat from a classification of cross-border activ-ities recently suggested by Alejandro Portes (2001) who distinguishes them

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INTERNATIONALIGRATION EVIEW

according to the type of actors involved. For Portes, international activities areconducted by states or nationally-based institutions; multinational activitiesare carried out by formal institutions whose purpose and interests transcenda single nation-state; whereas transnational activities are initiated and sus-tained by non-institutional actors across national borders. As Portes pointsout, there is nothing sacrosanct about such definitions. Any attempt to turnconcepts that areoften loosely used as synonyms into analytically distinct cat-egories will violate some common understanding of these terms. For exam-ple, in his typology, the United Nations and international NGOs are charac-terized as multinational and transnational organizations respectively ratherthan, as usual, international ones.In this categorization, as in most of the sociological literature, politicaltransnationalism is understood as a "site for political engagement" (Vertovec,1999), a public space in which political action extends across state borders.Political theorists are likely to point out that such spaces of transnational civilsociety cannot emerge independently of state-based systems of citizenship,which attribute to individuals a status of membership in particular politicalcommunities and endow them with liberties and rights guaranteed by politi-cal institutions (Benhabib, 2001). The new challenge for political theory is togo beyond a narrow state-centered approach by considering political com-munities and systems of rights that emerge at levels of governance above orbelow those of independent state or that cut across international borders.

My alternative interpretation of the terms international, multinationaland transnational takes as a starting point the dual meaning of the term'national,' which is an attribute of a territorially bounded state as well as ofcommunities that aspire for, or exercise, comprehensive self-government. Wecan distinguish four basic types of relations. State and polity may coincide,severalpolitical communities can be nested within a larger state, several statescan be nested within a larger political community, or such communities canoverlap between separate states. The label international is the proper one forthe first of these relations. It is commonly used for external relations betweenindependent states and for organizations in which these states are represent-ed by their governments, such as the United Nations. The second type char-acterizes multinational states, such as Canada, Spain, Belgium or the UnitedKingdom, and the internal relations between their historic communities whoenjoy substantial political autonomy (Maclver, 1999; Gagnon and Tully,2001; Keating 2001). The third type are supranational relations betweenindependent states that have pooled their sovereignty by forming a largerfed-

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eral polity. Since free trade zones or military alliances are international orga-nizations rather than supranational ones in this sense, the European Union is,for the time being, the only case in this category. Finally, political institutionsand practices that transcend the borders of independent states are transna-tional if they involve simultaneous overlapping affiliations of persons to geo-graphically separate polities.

TABLE1RELATIONS AND PHENOMENA INVOLVING DISTINCT POLITIESRelationsbetweenpolities PoliticalphenomenaInternational Externalrelationsbetween Internationalawandindependent states international rganizations

Multinational Severalpolitieswithin an Autonomyfor nationalindependentstate minoritiesSupranational Several ndependentstates Political ntegration n thewithin a largerpolity EuropeanUnionTransnational Overlappingpolitiesbetween Externaland dualcitizenshipindependent states for migrants

In contrast with Portes' typology, mine is narrowly construed to coverpolitical relations only. It cannot account for other uses such as in the expres-sion 'multinational corporation,' which refers to multiple states where thesecorporations are active rather than to nations as distinct political communi-ties within a state. In my scheme 'transnationalcorporations' is the more ade-quate description because these companies are involved in simultaneousactivities in the jurisdictions of severalindependent states (although they can-not be properly called 'members' of political communities). It is also impor-tant to emphasize that the distinctions I suggest are analytical rather thanempirical. A certain phenomenon may be subsumed under different labelsdepending on how we describe it. Thus, Romania could be characterized as amultinational state, but its Hungarian minority in Transsylvania is alsoinvolved in transnational relations with its 'external homeland' (Brubaker,1996:ch. 3). In contrast with this example, contemporary immigration nor-mally does not transform the receiving state into a multinational polity whoseminorities pursue separate nation-building projects within the same territory(Kymlicka, 1995:ch. 2). Migration is basically an international phenomenoninsofar as it involves a movement of persons between the territorial jurisdic-tions of independent states; it becomes transnational only when it createsoverlapping memberships, rights and practices that reflect a simultaneousbelonging of migrants to two different political communities.

In a strongly assimilationist perspective there is no place for transna-tionalism - migration itself is regarded as international, whereas the process

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of settlement and integration of immigrants is exclusively determined by thereceiving country. The final transformation of immigrants into full membersof the receiving nation resolves the merely temporary discrepancy betweenformal citizenship and territorialjurisdiction. The opposite approach is a seg-regationist perspective that is just as strongly opposed to transnationalism. Itis illustrated by the situation in Arab Gulf states, where migrants remain notonly tied to their nationality origin but are also excluded from access to citi-zenship rights in their country of residence. In this constellation, the bound-ariesof national membership arerigidly maintained against any possible tran-scendence through migration. The phenomenon of transnationalism is thenproperly related to a third perspective that involves transformations of polit-ical institutions at both the origins and the destinations of migration.

As Portes et al. (1999:219) have pointed out, transnationalism becomesa rather meaningless idea when it is used as a catch-all term for any migra-tion-related matter. A focus on overlapping and changing relations of mem-bership in political communities allows to avoid this danger by demonstrat-ing not only the salience but also the limited scope of transnationalism.Transnational political practices are, in most cases, a concern of the first gen-eration only, and they are quite exceptional even among these populations.Transnational political membership and rights are much more widespreadand may still persist among their children if they acquire dual nationality atbirth, but they will eventually fade away over subsequent generations ofimmigrant descent. However, even if transnationalism remains a transientphenomenon for each migration cohort, the emergence of new legal andpolitical conceptions of membership signifies an important structural changefor the polities involved.MULTILEVEL TRANSNATIONAL POLITICSThe framework of four basic relations between state and political communi-ty that I have sketched can be further extended and refined. Multinationaland supranational polities arenested communities with two levels of self-gov-ernment. It may be useful to extend the analysis to more complex multilevelsystems and to consider the relevance of levels below the sovereign state formigrant political transnationalism. Instead of focusing exclusively on the rela-tion to sending states and their central governments, studies should also con-sider transborderactivities at local and regional levels of government. A num-ber of projects have explored local-to-local relations. Immigrants from specif-ic ruralor urban areaswith high concentrations in certain U.S. cities have set

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up hometown associations that promote cultural ties and economic develop-ment back home (Levitt, 2001b:208-209). Often, these long distance localrelations are regarded as paradigmatic examples of transnational civil societyor grassroots transnationalism that bypass the government of the sendingstate. However, municipalities and provinces of federal states are also institu-tions of government, and migrants are not only members of national polities,but also of local and regional ones. We may then consider how these substatepolitical communities become involved in transnational relations.

Robert C. Smith (2003) compares migrants from the Mexicanprovinces of Zacateca and Oaxaca, mainly in order to highlight differentdegrees and modes of transnational involvement. Implicitly, his analysis alsoillustrates a significance of regional politics that has so far been rarelynoticed.First, regional politicians compete alongside national ones for money, politi-cal support and sometimes also for the votes of emigrant populations. Sec-ond, disparities in development and political incorporation between regionsin the sending country are frequently reflected within the emigrant commu-nity as distinct identities of regional origin. Third, the shared experience ofdemocratic incorporation in the receiving state may feed back into transna-tional activities that aim at democratizing regional politics at home.

In these three types of transnational relations, regions or municipalitiesappear to be like national polities writ small, with the same mechanisms atwork at both levels. However, substate polities are also in important ways dif-ferent from, and constrained by, national governments. They generally haveno control over immigration and formal citizenship and their transnationalactivities are not necessarily driven by the same ideologies of extra-territorialnation-building.1 It could therefore often be the case that local and regionallevels of government and politics are more responsive to migrants' transna-tional interests and identities than institutions and actors at the independentstate level (Baub6ck, 2003).

This conjecture is even more plausible for receiving countries than forsending ones. Most migrants' real destinations are cities rather than nation-states, but it is states that control migrants'movements and access to legal sta-tus. This discrepancy fuels conflicts of interest between local and national lev-1This is different with provincial governments that represent minority nations within the larg-er state. Quebec, for example, has quite extensive powers in immigration policy and uses theseto promote its own project of maintaining a Francophone community in Northern America.The Catalan government has recently sought similar powers to set up immigration officesabroad, but these demands were rejected by the Spanish central government as unconstitu-tional (El Mundo, Catalunya, January 31, 2002).

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els of government in receiving countries. Instead of subordinating municipaland regional government to national monopolies in immigration and foreignpolicy, it might be a good idea to emancipate them to some degree from theseconstraints (Ford, 2001). Where immigrants from a certain local origin con-centrate in sufficient numbers, they could, for example, not only set up theirown hometown associations in cooperation with local governments backhome, but they might also lobby their municipality of residence to invest indevelopment projects there. Transnational activities of local governments canalso involve forms of political protest. For example, city administrations inthe receiving state may become engaged in political campaigns againstauthoritarian regimes from where their immigrant communities originate.Conversely, municipal governments in sending countries might protestagainst policies of forced return migration that burden their capacities forhousing, health and other reintegration services. In such ways, transnationalpolitics proliferate across multiple levels and involve not only individuals andpolitical organizations but also government agencies.EXTRA-TERRITORIALNATION-BUILDING -THE EXPLANATORYTASKWhile it is important to broaden the study of migrant political transnation-alism by focusing on changing conceptions of citizenship in the receivingcountry and on substate actors and institutions, the attitude of sending coun-try governments is still a crucial factor for explaining transnational identitiesand activities among migrant communities. While there is a growing empir-ical literature on the involvement of sending countries with their emigrantgroups, there have been few theoretical efforts to explain sending countrybehavior or to discuss it normatively in terms of political legitimacy. This gapbecomes all the more obvious if we compare the paucity of political theoriesfocusing on emigration with the huge literature on immigrant integration inthe receiving societies.

The theoretical challenge to explain sending country attitudes is in cer-tain respects even greater because the possible and observed variation is alsogreater. Countries of destination may welcome immigration or fight againstit. They can attempt to return immigrants to their countries of origin, to keepthem segregated from the native population, or to promote their integrationinto the larger society. But they cannot choose to simply ignore large-scaleimmigration. By contrast, sending states exhibit a broader repertoire of atti-tudes. They may prevent them from leaving or force them to go. In between

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these two extreme policies of state coercion, sending countries may also oper-ate with various incentives to encourage or discourage voluntary departure.In its relations with those who have left and settled abroad, the sending coun-try may attempt to control their activities, to retain their loyalties or to lurethem back home, but it may also denounce them as traitors and preventthem from returning or regard them more neutrally as lost populations whohave cut the ties to their origins.

Sending country transnationalism implies that states take an activeinterest in their emigrant communities, which need not always be the case.In the present world, we should probably assume disinterest as the defaultposition both for practical and normative reasons. Before the industrial anddemocratic revolutions, states were primarily interested in controlling out-migration because they considered their subjects as their essential economicresourceand as bound to their rulersby perpetual allegiance. Today, the focushas clearly shifted towards controlling entry, and theories of democracy agreethat the freedom of citizens to leave is an essential requirement for govern-ment based on popular consent (Dowty, 1987).

Why do so many sending country governments or political elites thenstill regardtheir citizens abroad as a population that they need to control andstay connected with? There seem to be three instrumental reasons: humancapital upgrading, remittances, and the political lobbying of receiving-coun-try governments. I would like to suggest that these three motivations partlyconflict with each other and are linked to broader ideological orientationstowards emigration.

Human capital upgrading is a development strategy of sending coun-tries that supports not only emigration as a safety valve against poverty andsocial protest but must also sponsor return migration that imports usefulskills and accumulated savings. The second interest sending countries have inemigration is in remittances sent to family members back home. Remittanceswill cease to flow under two opposite circumstances: with permanent returnmigration and with family reunification and full integration in the receivingcountry. Remittances will then be maximized if emigrants move back andforth or if they stay for good but retain a strong 'myth of return.' Finally,sending states may consider emigrants as a domestic political force within thereceiving country that can advance the former states' economic and foreignpolicy interests. Portes concludes from policy reforms in a number of LatinAmerican countries "that sending governments do not want their immigrantsto return, but rather to achieve a secure status in the wealthy nations to

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which they have moved and from which they can make sustained economicand political contributions in the name of patriotism and home town loyal-ty" (Portes 1999:467). On the one hand, this third type of interest impliesnot only the acceptance of permanent emigration, but also the promotion ofpolitical integration in the host society. The ethnic vote can only be instru-mentalized for sending country interests if emigrants are encouraged to nat-uralize. On the other hand, this strategy will only work as long as an ethnicminority retains a diasporic identity and broadly accepts the political author-ity of that country's government.

When discussingthese strategicinterests we must bear in mind that todaysending countries tend to have much less control over migration patterns thanreceiving states. Some authoritarianregimes still try to control the exit of theircitizens, but once migrants have left the country, the admission control and theintegration policies of receivingstates become the strongest structuraldetermi-nants for the processof settlement, for upward social mobility, for family reuni-fication, for naturalization,or for return migration. Rather than designing emi-gration policies that maximize a given interest, sending stateswill tend to adapttheir own perceived interests to the migration and identity patterns that haveevolved over time. Instead of creating transnationalism for strategic reasons,sending states will more often modify their strategies in response to changes inthe migrants' orientations. This conjecture is strengthened by Portes'observa-tion that "grass-roots ransnationalismis seldom initiated by governments fromthe sending countries, but that governments enter the picture as the importanceof the phenomenon becomes evident" (Portes 1999: 466-7). The new respon-siveness of Mexican and Turkish governments towards their largest emigrantgroups in the United States and in Germany respectively is also a reaction topatterns of ethnic community formation in both countries that combine polit-ical integration in the host state with persistent transnational outlooks.At this point, however,we should remember that political transnational-ism is not only about the activities of governments and organized interests insociety, but involves the idea of a political community that stretchesacross ter-ritorialboundaries. Even if sending country governments can rarely nitiate theformation of such communities, the nature and historic stages of domesticnation-building projects in countries of origin may be causally relevant forexplaining different attitudes towards expatriates as well as the persistence oftransnational political practicesamong certain immigrant populations.

In newly formed or nonconsolidated nation-states, radical nationalistideologies are a strong political currency. These can shape two attitudestowards emigrants. They may either be regarded as traitors who have aban-

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doned their homelands, or as missionaries in the serviceof their nation. Insteadof canceling each other out, these opposite views tend to polarize public atti-tudes towards emigrants. The prevalence of such extreme attitudes will preventa more relaxedand detached stance that regardsemigrants as retaining a large-ly passive affiliation to their home countries, which will be articulated through'symbolic ethnicity' rather than through transnationalpolitical activism.

Nation-building processes in the homeland also go a long way towardsaccounting for variations in transnational political activities between migrantgroups of different origins that otherwise show similarpatterns of immigrationand settlement. While transnational political practices n most caseswill be lim-ited to the first generation of immigrants, diasporic identities can persist overgenerations among descendants of nations fighting for independence and inter-national recognition. They can sometimes even be reactivated among groupsthat originally emigrated as labor migrants. In 1998-99, political mobilizationsamong Kosovo Albanians who had left their country during the 1960s and early1970s as Yugoslavguestworkers provided a striking illustration.EXTRA-TERRITORIALNATION-BUILDING -THE NORMATIVE CHALLENGE

A political theory of migrant transnationalism need not limit itself to explain-ing the phenomenon, but should also consider its normative evaluation froma democratic perspective. There are two reasons for this. First, in receivingstates there are widespread fears that homeland-oriented political activitieswill import violent ethnonational and religious conflicts or that migrants maybe manipulated by a foreign government to act against the national interest.Second, from the perspective of sending countries, migrants who demand avoice in the political process at home can be accused of imposing their inter-ests from the outside without sharing any responsibility for the outcome.

The first of these objections has been addressed by a number of politi-cal and legal theorists. There is now a rather broad consensus among writersin these fields that democratic states are obliged to grant foreign residents thesame civil, political and cultural liberties as are enjoyed by native citizens; thatafter some time of legal residence immigrants acquire a right to naturalizationthat should not depend on renouncing their previous citizenship; and thatmost immigrants, once they are offered integration on fair terms, are morelikely to export democracy to their countries of origin rather than to importauthoritarian political ideologies from there (Walzer, 1983:ch. 2, Carens,1989; Baub6ck, 1994; Spiro, 1997; Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2002). How-

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ever, surprisingly little attention has been devoted to the second objection. Inthis regard, normative political theory has almost exclusively focused on thereceiving polity and still needs to catch up with sociological and anthropo-logical researchon transnational practices. I will not attempt to fill this gapbut will merely sketch a few initial questions and arguments for a broader the-oretical agenda.

What kinds of rights and obligations should be included in external cit-izenship? For immigrants, the rights of native citizens provide a relevantbenchmark against which the rights of foreign residents ought to be mea-sured. Deviations from this standard that are not justified by some com-pelling interest can then be regarded as discriminatory. For emigrants, it ismuch more difficult to define such a normative guideline. As I have men-tioned above, the right to return and to diplomatic protection abroad are thetwo core elements of external citizenship. These rights respond to the specif-ic situation of emigrants. Beyond this, there are both practical and normativelimits for providing them with the same rights as the sending country's resi-dent citizens. Outside their territory, even wealthy democracies cannot guar-antee the freedom of speech and association, access to public education, orsocial welfare benefits in areassuch as health, housing and employment. Theywill generally not be able to tax their citizens' income2 or to draft them formilitary service, although some countries try to enforce such obligations bythreatening to denationalize those who do not comply, or by refusing torelease them from their nationality when they want to naturalize abroadbefore they have fulfilled their obligations.

Normative concerns about unfairness arise in the case of cumulativerights and obligations assigned by the sending and the receiving states. I willfocus here only on those two elements of external citizenship that are mostimmediately relevant for transnational political practices and membership.These are external voting rights and the right to retain and to pass on one'snationality of origin.External Voting RightsMost democracies require that citizens who cast a vote in elections must alsohave a residence in the country. Many grant their citizens living permanent-ly abroad a right to political participation if they travel home on election day.Some countries go further than that in introducing absentee ballots that canbe filled in abroad. Until summer 2002 Austrian citizens had to visit their2The United States is quite exceptional in taxing income from foreign sources of its citizens liv-ing abroad.

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country's consular offices, but in recent elections the procedure was facilitat-ed considerably so that after registering voters can now send their ballots bymail with an attached confirmation signed by a citizen witness. Some gov-ernments of sending states, among them the Mexican and Dominican ones,have recently committed themselves to introduce absentee ballots (Levitt,2001b:206). A more far-reaching scheme of democratic representation forexternal citizens has been introduced by Italy in September 1999. Italians cannow not only vote from abroad, they even have their special parliamentaryrepresentatives; there are 24 seats in parliament set aside for the emigrant con-stituency. Colombia has similar entitlements for its citizens abroad.

From the perspective of theories of democracy two basic objections canbe raised against all such rights of external political participation. Those whotake part in collectively binding decisions and in the election of representa-tives should have, first, some ongoing involvement and, second, some futurestake in the polity. Recent theories of deliberative democracy have empha-sized that democratic decisionmaking is not about the aggregation of isolat-ed individual preferences but requires a willingness to argue, to listen, and toaccept the force of better reasons (Bohmann, 1996; Benhabib, 1996; Gut-mann and Thompson, 1996; Dryzek, 2000). These may be somewhat ideal-istic assumptions, but they provide a powerful argument against includingvoters whose extra-territorial position puts them squarely outside a nationalpublic sphere. Instead of being exposed to the candidates and the issues atstake, these voters would have to make special efforts to acquire the relevantinformation. The second objection is about future involvement in the polity.Citizens will only vote responsibly with a view towards the implications oftheir choices for the common good if they know that they will have to bearthe consequences of the outcome. This argument is certainly not strongenough to justify restrictions on emigration. Liberal democracies combine therights of voice and exit (Hirschman, 1970), that is, they must allow dissentto be articulated in domestic political protest and free elections as well asthrough emigration. However, it is not obvious that those who have alreadyexited should still retain a voice in deciding a future that will no longer betheirs.

These areprima facie reasons for a residentialqualification of the right tovote.3 I think that these principled objections can be sometimes overcome by3The same reasons count in favor of voting rights for immigrants either through extending thefranchise to noncitizens or through a right to naturalization (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer,2002:45-54).

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contextual arguments.Technologies of information and cheap travel that haveboosted the emergence of transnational social fields facilitate also the involve-ment of emigrants in electoral campaigns. With satellite TV and the internet,access to first-hand information about politics in the homeland has becomemuch less costly and time consuming. Furthermore, the few emigrants whobother to cast their votes (especially if they have to take an effort to travel to aconsulate or to recruit witnesses) are more likely to have acquired the relevantinformation. Such a mechanism of self-selection means that emigrant votersmay be no less well informed than averagecitizens at home.

This argument holds for isolated groups of emigrants whose vote willmake little difference to the electoral outcome anyway. Somewhat differentconsiderations apply to largeconcentrations of migrants from a particular send-ing country in a single receiving state such as Mexicans, Haitians and Domini-cans in the United States or Turks in Germany. In such contexts, where theemigrant vote can be decisive in close contests, candidates have sufficient incen-tives to carrytheir electoral campaigns abroad, which means that absentee vot-ers will then be no less exposed to candidates and issues than the electorate athome.

Transnationalnetworks arealso relevant for overcoming the second objec-tion about emigrants' lack of stakes in the political future of the homeland.Migrants who move back and forth between countries of origin and immigra-tion, who send remittances or invest their earnings in their hometowns, andwho are committed to returninghave obviously strong interests in the future ofthe community and assume a fair amount of responsibility for the outcome ofthe collective decisions in which they participate.The objection stands, howev-er,with regardto second or later generations. While the children of immigrantsought to be able to acquire their parents' citizenship alongside that of theircountry of birth, there is no good reason to grant them voting rights in theirparents' country of origin. As a general rule, extra-territorial voting rightsshould expire with the first generation, and the transmission of formal mem-bership itself should be stopped in the third generation.

Apart from these responses to the two basic objections, one could alsoconsider a positive reason for emigrant voting rights. Because most receivingcountries do not grant voting rights to foreign residents, these populations willbe deprived of any opportunity for democratic participation unless they canvote in their home countries. Such an unspecified human right of adults to ademocratic vote provides, however, not a convincing argument why it is thesending state ratherthan the receiving one that should be the primary addressee

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of the corresponding obligation to enfranchise migrants. Moreover, if the send-ing state does grant its emigrants externalvoting rights this can hardly exemptthe receiving country from its special obligation to give immigrants accessto itsown citizenship.4

I believe that these arguments can overcome most objections againstexternal voting rights from concerns about the integrity of the democraticprocess in the sending country. Electoral participation from abroad shouldthereforebe seen as permissible. I do not think, however, that these rights mustbe granted to emigrants as a basic requirement of democratic inclusion. Themain reference point for such inclusion must be the resident population thatlives permanently in a territorial urisdiction. For a normative theory of democ-racy the extension of voting rights to emigrants is therefore not mandatory,whereas diplomatic protection, re-admission from abroad, and the right toretain or renounce one's nationality of origin should be seen as basic elementsof external citizenship for which all countries of emigration ought to provide.Dual CitizenshipDual citizenship appears to be a formal recognition of transnational mem-bership. One of the most important long-term changes in state attitudestowards political transnationalism is the growing tolerance for multiplenationality. An increasing number of receiving and sending states no longerinsist on singular membership. Multiple citizenship can be acquired at birth(from mixed-nationality parents or through a combination of jus soli and jussanguinis) or through naturalization (if the state of origin does not expatriatethose who naturalize and the receiving state does not require renunciation ofa previously held citizenship). No matter how it is acquired, dual nationalityis an enabling device for transnational practices. The most important benefitfor migrants is that it gives them an unconditional right of entry in both theirstate of origin and in the country of immigration. Usually this is combinedwith a right to bring in family members, which removes legal constraints forfree movement within transnational kinship networks.

However, apart from the right to return, most of the other external cit-izenship rights of dual nationals can be deactivated.5 This helps to explain4This example illustrates my general point that transnational rights cannot be fully derivedfrom universal rights of personhood (Soysal, 1994) but should rather be understood as exten-sions of state-based citizenship.5One important external citizenship right that is generally deactivated for dual citizens is diplo-matic protection. A person who is a national of the state where he or she resides cannot be pro-tected by another state that also recognizes him or her as a national. This can turn dual nation-

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why so many receiving states are now willing to tolerate dual nationality. Farfrom recognizing it as a legal expression of transnational membership, theysimply choose to ignore the fact that many immigrants hold on to their sec-ond passports. For the purpose of domestic jurisdiction, dual citizens are notdifferent from other native citizens. For example, under private internationallaw, court decisions about divorce or child custody involving foreign nation-als must take into account legal norms of countries of origin, whereas theymay ignore these for dual nationals. In receiving states, dual nationality isoften interpreted as the legal expression of hyphenated identities, such asMexican-American, in which the first part signifies an ethnic and the secondpart a political membership. The tolerant attitude of receiving countriestowards dual nationality recognizes a symbolic value of the membership oforigin as an expression of ethnic belonging, but it largely ignores its instru-mental value as a bundle of rights and generally denies its political value forthe sending state as a link to its citizens abroad.

It is interesting that many sending states, too, have considerable reser-vations about dual citizenship. The present Mexican law allows emigrantswho naturalize abroad to retain their nationality, but not their active citizen-ship. Mexican nationals living in the United States have the right to return toMexico and can hold land property in areas where there are restrictions forforeign nationals. However, unless they travel home, they cannot vote inMexican elections (Ramirez, 2000).

Studying transnational political practices and membership shouldprompt us to question such restrictions. Certain migrant groups are involvedin homeland and receiving country politics at the same time. Transnationalpolitical elites activate their citizenship of origin in the country of immigra-tion. This conflicts with the dominant view that regards the external citizen-ship of dual nationals as dormant. If dual citizenship is the legal expression ofoverlapping memberships between independent polities, then legal and polit-ical theorists ought to consider the possibility that in certain respects bothmemberships may be simultaneously active.ality into a severe disadvantage for political refugees when they visit their home countries.Often refugees are dual nationals not because they have chosen to retain their previous nation-ality but because their country of origin does not permit renunciation. Being deprived of diplo-matic protection is, however, not an inevitable consequence of dual nationality. It has beenavoided in some cases through international treaties, while in others the country of primaryresidence has successfully asserted a right to provide diplomatic protection against another statewhose citizenship the protected person holds alongside that of the first state (Aleinikoff andKlusmeyer, 2002:33-4).

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Dual voting rights in the country of origin and of present residence pro-vide a test case. A democratic receiving country has no power to prevent dualnationals from voting in foreign elections. However, as the debate aboutAmerican-Mexican dual nationality shows, the mere possibility that they maydo so in large numbers could trigger a backlashagainst tolerating multiple cit-izenship. Once we lay aside largely irrational fears about the impact of exter-nal voting on national security and foreign policy interests, there is also ademocratic objection that dual voting violates a principle of one person/onevote. I think that this argument is mistaken. One person/one vote is a stan-dard for aggregating individual votes in determining the outcome of an elec-tion. A migrant who casts separatevotes in elections held in two independentstates is counted only once in each of these decisions. As long as these votesare not aggregated at a higher level, the principle of one person/one vote hasnot been infringed. This leads to the surprising conclusion that dual citizen-ship and dual voting rights are a negligible problem in international relationsbetween independent states, but should be constrained within the suprana-tional European Union. The EU is an emerging federal polity and needs toexclude multiple voting across its constituent units for the same reasons as afederal democratic state. Votes in European Parliament elections are aggre-gated across countries to elect a single body of delegates and therefore noUnion citizen should be able to cast a vote in both her country of nationali-ty and of current residence. The citizens of the Union are also represented inthe European Council through their national governments. The legislativepowers of the Council go far beyond those of any international body and havedirect effects on the citizens of the Union. It is therefore also problematic ifcitizens have two votes in national elections in different Member States.

Different considerations apply, however, to eligibility. The possibilitythat a dual national may hold an elective or other high public office in twostates simultaneously cannot be easily reconciled with the idea of democraticrepresentation and accountability (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2002:41).6 In aliberal democracy electoral votes may legitimately be cast with a view towardsrepresenting special interests of all sorts, as long as these do not manifestlyundermine the integrity of the polity. A democratic mandate, however, entailsa much stronger commitment to representthe citizens of the candidates' con-stituency as well as to pursue the common good of the larger polity. Votershave a right to expect from their delegates full commitment in this regard,6This consideration justifies the Australian policy of generally accepting dual nationality butrequiring Members of Parliament to renounce a second citizenship.

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just as a company denies its top managers the right to work simultaneouslyfor another firm. A parliamentary mandate or high elective office can there-fore hardly be reconciled with retaining another citizenship.THE LEGITIMACY OF EXTRA-TERRITORIALNATION-BUILDINGA last transnational topic I would like to put on the agenda of normativepolitical theory is the general legitimacy of external nation-building efforts bysending states. Severalscholars have argued that nation-building projects thatrespect some essential liberal constraints may be compatible with, or evennecessary for, democracy and social justice (Tamir, 1993; Miller, 1995; Kym-licka, 2001). Most of these theories apply only to territorial nation-building.The primary challenge they face is to explain how a general right of self-deter-mination can be reconciled with the fact that territorial nation-building pro-jects necessarily conflict with each other. In response to this dilemma, someauthors advocate a stronger right to secede while others defend territorialdevolution and multinational federalism. These theories tend to regardimmigrants only as prospective members of the receiving nation rather thanas external members of the sending one.7 Therefore, they pay little attentionto ideas such as the building of a 'global Mexican nation.'

Such claims are indeed suspicious. Nation-building is always an inter-generational project, but transnationalism generally is not. As I have pointedout above, the claim that second and third generations born abroad shouldstill regard themselves as participating in a nation-building project of theirparents' and grandparents' homeland makes only sense for diasporic groupsengaged in an ongoing struggle for national self-determination. Calls forenlarging a well-established nation beyond a sending state's territory throughmobilizing its emigrants are in most cases empty nationalist rhetoric. Thedanger is that they provide fuel for nativist propaganda in the receiving statethat portrays immigrant communities as a fifth column manipulated fromabroad.

Against these anxieties one should emphasize that external citizenshipfor emigrants does not amount to deterritorialized - let alone global - nation-hood. A 'nation-building project' across borders in the context of Mexican7Chaim Gans (2000) is an exception. He defends a sub- and inter-statist right of national self-determination that would also apply to diaspora groups who have an individual right to returnto their national homeland and to participate in those political decisions that concern mattersof national identity.

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migration to the United States is very different from territorialclaims of statesto regions in neighboring countries that are inhabited by an ethnic kin group.Nazi Germany's annexation of the Sudetenland or the claims of Hungariannationalists to Transsylvania illustrate the very real danger that some transna-tional minorities may be mobilized for irredentist movements in order toexpand the territory of their national homeland. When defending immi-grants' political transnationalism, it is important to specify the territorial ref-erence of their claims. In the receiving country, migrants' claim to citizenshiprights and citizenship status is territorial in the sense that it is derived fromtheir residence in the state's territory, while their demands for multiculturalrecognition and accommodation are nonterritorial in the sense that they donot involve establishing their languages or religion in an autonomous politi-cal territory.Finally, transnational migrants' relations towards their country oforigin are extraterritorial because they do not imply any territorial claim ofthat country towards the receiving state.

This does not mean that sending states have no obligations towardstheir emigrants. Just as it is imperative for receiving countries to develop apositive national identity as societies of immigration, it is also important forsending states to develop an identity as countries of emigration. The reasonfor turning a critical spotlight on sending countries' attitudes towards thosewho have left is specifically related to migrant transnationalism. If all emi-gration were voluntary, unidirectional and permanent, then nobody would behurt when the sending country regardsthose who leave as lost populations.In a transnational context, however, the exclusion of emigrants from mem-bership status and rights at home humiliates them and diminishes their lib-erties and opportunities in social arenas in which they participate actively.Transnational migrants may then have a moral right to be regardedand treat-ed as citizens abroad rather than as "pochos"Smith, 2003:306).CONCLUSIONSPolitical theory is a latecomer to the field of migrant transnationalism. Yet itmay still be able to introduce some new perspectives that broaden theresearchagenda. I have discussed two main ideas that applied political theo-ry might contribute.

The first is a wider conception of political transnationalism. All transna-tional studies refer to states as the basic entities that distinguish transnation-al flows or activities from those occurring in domestic arenas. What is specif-ic about the study of political transnationalism is that it regards the bound-

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aries of polities not merely as a demarcation of territorial jurisdictions, butalso as contested sites for determining political identities. I have suggestedthat the basic characteristicof transnational political relations, which distin-guishes them from international, multinational and supranational ones, isthat the former create overlapping memberships between territoriallyseparat-ed and independent polities. In this understanding, political transnationalismis not only about a narrowly conceived set of activities through whichmigrants become involved in the domestic politics of their home countries; italso affects collective identities and conceptions of citizenship among thenative populations in both receiving and sending societies. Studies of politi-cal transnationalism in migration contexts need not be confined to relationsbetween independent states, however, and should be extended to regional andlocal levels of government. City polities are in many ways more open fortransnational affiliations than nation-states.

The second contribution, which has so far hardly been developed in theapplied political theory literature, is an attempt to explain the variation ofsending country attitudes towards their emigrants and to evaluate these poli-cies of external citizenship within a normative theory of democratic legitima-cy. I have argued that sending countries have different instrumental reasonsfor regarding their emigrants as a resource, such as an interest in upgradinghuman capital, in attracting remittances, or in using immigrant communitiesto promote economic and foreign policy goals. These various interests pro-duce divergent and shifting attitudes towards emigrant populations. Yet exter-nal communities cannot be easily controlled and manipulated to maximizesome preconceived interest of the sending state. A transnational perspectivethat focuses on overlapping memberships can help to explain how patterns ofintegration into the receiving polity and unfinished projects of nation-build-ing in the homeland shape migrants' attitudes towards countries of origin.

From a normative perspective, an ongoing involvement of expatriates inthe democratic representation and decisionmaking of sending states posessome problems of legitimacy. I have suggested that transnational connectionscan weaken the objection against political participation of outsiders who arenot exposed to public debates and to the consequences of political decisions.External voting rights and dual citizenship should be considered legitimatemeans for involving those migrants who have strong social and political stakesin their political communities of origin. These considerations do not, howev-er, justify discourses or projects of extra-territorial nation-building. A pru-dential objection is that such political rhetoric is likely to arouse nativist fears

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in the receiving country. This would be detrimental to the migrant commu-nities as well as to friendly relations between sending and receiving state gov-ernment. There is also a more principled objection from a normative per-spective of what democracy entails in transnational relations. Overlappingmemberships of migrants create different kinds of claims towards both coun-tries involved. Migrants' rights in the receiving country are derived from res-idence and thus territorially-based; their affiliation to the society of origingives them a right to be readmitted to this country's territory, but it does notgive the sending state any claim to the territoryof the receiving country. Thisis what separates transnational migration from colonialism and irredentistnationalism. Political theory must therefore carefully distinguish the chal-lenge of multinational and international conflicts, which are about thedemarcation of territorial jurisdictions and the allocation of political powersbetween self-governing polities, from the challenge of transnational migra-tion, which concerns the permeability of international borders for geograph-ic mobility and the resulting overlap of political statuses, rights and identitiesbetween the sending and the receiving polity.REFERENCESAleinikoff, T. A. and D. Klusmeyer2002 Citizenship Policiesfor an Age ofMigration. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace and Migration Policy Institute.Baubick, R.1994 TransnationalCitizenship. Membership and Rightsin International Migration. Aldershot:

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Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnational Ism

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