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South African Instit
ute of Inte
rnat
iona
l Affa
irs
African perspectives. Global insights.
Governance of Africa's Resources Programme
O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N O 1 4 6
Towards Understanding South Africa’s Differing Attitudes to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the Open Governance Partnership
M a y 2 0 1 3
W R N a d è g e C o m p a o r é
A b o u t S A I I A
The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) has a long and proud record
as South Africa’s premier research institute on international issues. It is an independent,
non-government think tank whose key strategic objectives are to make effective input into
public policy, and to encourage wider and more informed debate on international affairs
with particular emphasis on African issues and concerns. It is both a centre for research
excellence and a home for stimulating public engagement. SAIIA’s occasional papers
present topical, incisive analyses, offering a variety of perspectives on key policy issues in
Africa and beyond. Core public policy research themes covered by SAIIA include good
governance and democracy; economic policymaking; international security and peace;
and new global challenges such as food security, global governance reform and the
environment. Please consult our website www.saiia.org.za for further information about
SAIIA’s work.
A b o u t t h e G o v e r n A n c e o f A f r I c A ’ S r e S o u r c e S P r o G r A m m e
The Governance of Africa’s Resources Programme (GARP) of the South African Institute
of International Affairs (SAIIA) is funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The
programme contributes to policy governing the exploitation and extraction of Africa’s
natural resources by assessing existing governance regimes and suggesting alternatives
to targeted stakeholders. GARP examines the governance of a number of resource-rich
African countries within the context of cross-cutting themes such as environmental change
and sustainability. Addressing these elements is critical for Africa to avoid deepening the
challenges of governance and reducing its vulnerability to related crises, including climate
change, energy security and environmental degradation. The programme focuses on the
mining, forestry, fisheries and petroleum sectors in select African countries.
Programme head: Oladiran Bello, [email protected]
© SAIIA May 2013
All rights are reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or utilised in any form by any
means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information or
storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Opinions expressed are
the responsibility of the individual authors and not of SAIIA.
Please note that all currencies are in US$ unless otherwise indicated.
A b S t r A c t
The paper undertakes a critical assessment of the various motivations behind South Africa’s
active participation in the Open Government Partnership (OGP), as a contrast to the
country’s notable absence from the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Indeed,
although the South African government is one of the eight pioneering states to have
officially launched the OGP on 20 September 2011, it is not a signatory to the EITI, which
celebrates its 10-year anniversary in 2013. How has the South African government justified
its absence from the EITI so far, and what do these justifications mean for its participation in
the OGP? The paper focuses specifically on developments regarding access to information
in South Africa – namely the Promotion of Access to Information Act – and their implications
for the country’s attitudes towards global transparency initiatives. The paper also considers
the ways in which the South African government’s discourses, practices and contrasting
approaches vis-à-vis these two multilateral transparency frameworks hold relevance for
access to information in the country’s extractive resource sector. It suggests that the South
African government may be more responsive to EITI-membership appeals if it perceives
that its aspirations as an emerging power, both regionally and globally, are better
acknowledged.
A b o u t t h e A u t h o r
WR Nadège Compaoré is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Studies at
Queen’s University, Canada. Her research interests include international relations, global
political economy, global governance, resource governance, business ethics, and African
politics. Her doctoral project investigates the political economy of transparency in the oil
sectors of Gabon, Ghana and South Africa. A student from Burkina Faso, Nadège holds a
BA in international political economy from Trent University, Canada, and an MA in political
studies from Queen’s University, Canada.
4
S A I I A O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N U M B E R 14 6
G O v E R N A N C E O f A f R I C A ’ S R E S O U R C E S P R O G R A M M E
A b b r e v I A t I o n S A n d A c r o n y m S
ATI AccesstoInformation
BRICS Brazil,Russia,India,ChinaandSouthAfrica
CSO civilsocietyorganisation
DMR DepartmentofMineralResources
EITI ExtractiveIndustriesTransparencyInitiative
MPRDA MineralandPetroleumResourcesDevelopmentAct
MSG multi-stakeholdergroup
NGO non-governmentalorganisation
OBI OpenBudgetIndex
OGP OpenGovernmentPartnership
PAIA PromotionofAccesstoInformationAct
PoSIB ProtectionofStateInformationBill
PWYP PublishWhatYouPay
R2K Right2KnowCampaign
SADC SouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity
SAHA SouthAfricanHistoryArchives
SAHRC SouthAfricanHumanRightsCommission
SSA sub-SaharanAfrica
TI TransparencyInternational
S O U t h A f R I C A ’ S d I f f E R I N G A t t I t U d E S t O t h E E I t I A N d t h E O G P
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S A I I A O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N U M B E R 14 6
I n t r o d u c t I o n 1
Recentfiguresfromgloballyestablishedindicesrevealdivergingperceptionsabout
thestateoftransparencyandcorruptioninSouthAfrica.Forinstance,SouthAfrica
ispositionedsecondintheOpenBudgetIndex(OBI)Survey2012,whichwasreleased
inJanuary2013bytheOpenBudgetPartnership.2SouthAfricawasonlysurpassedby
NewZealand,withascoreof93outof100,whichsuggeststhatSouthAfricadiscloses
extensiveinformationonitsbudget,andthereforehasaverytransparentbudget.South
Africa’sOBIscoreisespeciallyimportanttonote,giventhatthe2012OBIaveragescore
was52outof100forthe100participatingcountries,andgiventhatSouthAfricafared
betterthancountriesgenerallyreputedtobehighlytransparent,suchasSweden(fourth
withascoreof84outof100)andNorway(fifthwithascoreof83outof100).3In
contrast,SouthAfricarankedpoorlyontheTransparencyInternational(TI)Corruption
PerceptionsIndex2012;atjust69thoutof176countriesandterritoriesworldwide,with
alowscoreof43outof100.4OnemaypointtothefactthattheOBIisspecifictobudget
transparency,whereastheTI’sindex,inadditiontobeingmorecomprehensiveinnature,
focusesnotontransparencyitself,butalsooncorruption.Thesedifferentfocusesmay
appeartocomplicatethecomparisonbetweenbothindices.However,byemphasising
corruption(asenabledbyalackoftransparency)ratherthanfocusingontransparency
itself,theTI’sindexallowsananalyticalbridgebetweenbothindices.Thisanalytical
bridgeinturnreflectstheexpectedroleoftransparencyregimesinmanagingresources
suchasmining,oilandgas,andprovidesahelpfulcontextforthepaper.
In this regard, the paper asks whether South Africa is justified to invoke the
transparencyframeworks(bothlocalandglobal)thatthecountryhasadoptedandwhich
aregeneralinnature,asanalternativetojoiningtheExtractiveIndustriesTransparency
Initiative(EITI).Specifically,theanalysisreferstonationaldiscoursesthatdirectlyand
indirectlypresentthePromotionofAccesstoInformationAct(PAIA)No2of2000atthe
locallevel,andtheOpenGovernmentPartnership(OGP)atthegloballevel,aseffective
andsufficientalternativestotheEITI.Thepaperseekstoinvestigatetheimplications
of South Africa’s absence from the EITI for transparency measures in the country’s
extractivesector.Itisdividedintothreesections.Thefirstdiscussesthesignificanceof
theEITIasaglobalinitiative,andcontextualisesitsimplicationsforresource-richAfrican
countries,andforSouthAfricainparticular.Thesecondsectionexploresthenatureof
localandglobaltransparencyframeworksadoptedbySouthAfrica,tounderstandtheir
relevancefortheSouthAfricanextractivesector.Indoingso,thepaperseekstoidentify
whetherSouthAfricacurrentlyholdssubstantialalternativestotheEITI.Thefinalsection
discussespossibilities forSouthAfrica’s adherence to theEITI,bypresentingpolicy
recommendationsbasedontheprecedingsections.
t h e e I t I : A ‘ G L o b A L ’ f r A m e W o r K f o r t r A n S P A r e n c y ?
TheEITI isamulti-stakeholder initiative involvinga tripartite relationshipbetween
states,civilsocietyandmultinationalcorporations.Itisaimedatincreasingtransparency
andaccountabilityinthemining,oilandgassectors.Althoughannouncedbyformer
Britishprimeminister,TonyBlair,attheWorldSummitonSustainableDevelopmentin
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S A I I A O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N U M B E R 14 6
G O v E R N A N C E O f A f R I C A ’ S R E S O U R C E S P R O G R A M M E
Johannesburgin2002,itwasnotuntiltheEITI’sfirstplenaryconferencein2003that
theinitiativewasofficiallylaunched,withtheestablishmentofthe12EITIPrinciples.5
OfficiallyendorsedbytheWorldBankandmanyresource-richcountriesintheglobal
North,suchasAustralia,Canada,andtheUS,theEITIemergedfromaglobalcivilsociety
initiative–namelyaPublishWhatYouPay(PWYP)campaignledbyGlobalWitness,
aninternationalnon-governmentalorganisation(NGO).Yetdespiteitsglobalrootsand
reach,theinitiativenowmostlyincludesresource-richcountriesfromtheglobalSouth,
particularlyfromAfrica.
Indeed,theEITIhasseenthestrikingabsenceofresource-producingcountriesfrom
theglobalNorthasimplementingcountries,suchasAustralia,Canada,theUKandtheUS.
WiththeexceptionofNorway,whichbecameacompliantcountryin2011,otherresource-
richgovernmentsintheglobalNorthhavelongshownareluctanceinimplementingthe
initiative,thoughthisisbeginningtochangeinafewcases.OnesuchcaseistheObama
administration,whichofficiallyconfirmedinSeptember2011thattheUSwillsignon
totheEITI;astatementthatwasrevealinglymadeat the launchof theOGPinNew
York,inthepresenceofotherOGP-foundingmemberssuchasSouthAfrica.6Almost
twoyearsafter thisannouncement, theUS isnowmuchcloser tobecominganEITI
candidatecountry.Thegovernmentisclosertomeetingoneofthemaincandidacycriteria,
namely‘theformationofamulti-stakeholdergroup(MSG)comprisedofrepresentatives
from government, industry, and civil society to oversee the implementation of EITI
anddevelopa fully-costedworkplan’,having inaugurated the firstUSEITIAdvisory
CommitteemeetinginFebruary2013,whichwillserveasthefirstUSEITIMSGmeeting.7
TheAustraliangovernmenthasalsoshownastrongercommitmenttowardstheinitiative
followingtheUSmove–thoughithasproceededmorecautiously,announcinginOctober
2011thatitwouldimplementanEITIpilot.8InFebruary2013AustraliapublishedaPilot
Progress ReporttotheEITIBoard,whichshowsthatthedatacollectionphaseofthepilotis
underway,andwillincludefiguresforthefinancialyear2011–12.9DespiteitsEITIpilot,
AustraliahasstillnotcommittedtoimplementingtheEITI.10
AnotherinterestingcaseistheUK,which,likemanyrichcountries(excludingthe
USandAustralia),hasexpressedapossibleinterestinjoiningtheEITIinitiativebuthas
yettomakeanyformalcommitments.PrimeMinisterDavidCameronrecentlycalled
onG-8leaderstonotsimplypledgefinancialsupporttotheEITI,buttoinsteadseekan
implementationoftheinitiative.11Thisstancereflectsanearlierrecommendationfroma
UKparliamentarycommitteethattheUKimplementEITIbackinAugust2012.12Thus
criticsrightlywonderwhether,orwhen,theBritishgovernmentwillmovefromrhetoric
topracticeregardingitspositionontheEITI.Canada,ontheotherhand,hasconsistently
declinedinvitationstojointheEITI,bothinrhetoricandinpractice,pointinginsteadto
itslargefinancialcontributiontotheinitiativeasasignificantcontribution,andusingits
domestictransparencymechanismsasjustifiablealternativestotheEITI.13
ThisrelativereluctancefromtheglobalNorthtoembracetheEITIpartiallyexplains
why, as of March 2013, in the year that marks its ten-year milestone, the initiative
comprisedonly37implementingcountries:20compliantcountriesand17candidate
countries.Notably,21outof37oftheseimplementingcountriesareAfrican.14Thatthe
EITImembershipislargelyAfricanreflectsthatitisperhapsthecontinentmostconcerned
withtheparadoxofbeingsimultaneouslyabundantinnaturalresources,yetpoor.Some
analystshaveexplainedthisparadoxtobearesultofresourcerevenuesbeinglostto
S O U t h A f R I C A ’ S d I f f E R I N G A t t I t U d E S t O t h E E I t I A N d t h E O G P
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S A I I A O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N U M B E R 14 6
corruption,particularlywhenitcomestohighlylucrativeresourcessuchasoil.15Itisthis
argumentthatunderpinscivil-societymovements,suchasthePWYPcampaign,whichcall
ongovernmentsandcompaniestodiscloseinformationonpaymentsandrevenuesfrom
themining,oilandgassectorsasameanstofightcorruptionandbuildamoreaccountable
extractivesector.16ThePWYPcampaignandtheresultingEITIareidealinstrumentsfor
addressingtheaforementionedparadoxintheAfricanresourcesector.However,giventhat
issuesoftransparencyandcorruptionarerampantworldwide,thusexplainingtheglobal
targetoftheEITI;andgiventhattheperpetuationofcorruptpracticesinAfrica’sresource
sectorinvolvesnotonlytheparticipationofAfricangovernmentsbutalsothatofother
actorssuchasmultinationalcorporations,mostofwhichcomefromtheglobalNorth
andthereforemustabidebylawsfromtheirhomegovernments,itispertinenttoaskwhy
growingpressuretoimplementtheEITIcontinuestobeunevenlytargetedatregionsin
theglobalSouth,suchassub-SaharanAfrica(SSA).Insodoing,onecanbegintobetter
understandwhySouthAfricamayormaynotbeamenabletojoiningtheinitiative,and
thepolicyimplicationsforboththeEITIaswellasforSouthAfrica.
TherecentemergenceoftheOGPrepresentsacompellingcontrasttotheEITI,asit
isamultilateraltransparencyinitiativewithaglobalplatform.TheOGPwaslaunched
on20September2011byeightfoundingcountries,namelyBrazil,Indonesia,Mexico,
Norway,thePhilippines,SouthAfrica,theUKandtheUS.17UnliketheEITI,theOGP
incorporatestheparticipationandleadershipofimportantglobalNorthplayers,suchas
theUSandtheUK.Interestingly,AfricanpresenceintheOGPisminimal.Dominated
byEuropeancountries,ithasonlyfiveAfricancountries(SouthAfrica,Ghana,Liberia,
Tanzania,Kenya)amongits58members.18ItisthereforesignificantthattheSouthAfrican
government,whichisabsentfromtheEITI,isnotonlyanactivememberoftheOGP,but
alsooneoftheeightfoundingmembers.Givensimilarconcernsheldbybothinitiatives,
SouthAfrica’schoicetobeapartoftheOGPandnottheEITIappearspuzzling.Providing
astrikingresonancetotheEITI’sfocusontransparencyandaccountability,theOGP’s
objectiveisto‘secureconcretecommitmentsfromgovernmentstopromotetransparency,
empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to strengthen
governance’.19ThusthecoredifferencebetweentheEITIandtheOGPcentresaroundthe
factthat,unliketheEITI,theOGPisgeneralinnatureandnotspecifictotheextractive
sector.Assuch,theOGPdoesnotmakedirectprovisionsforcorporatecommitmentto
transparency.Inthislight,adheringtotheprinciplesoftheEITIcouldcomplementSouth
Africa’scommitmenttotheOGP,asdoingsowouldhelpaddressthegapsintheOGPas
farasaddressingtransparencyissuesintheextractivesectorisconcerned.Moreover,given
thattheEITIandtheOGParedominatedrespectivelybyAfricanandEuropeancountries,
perhapsanefficientwayforSouthAfricatobepartofatrulyglobalconversationwould
betoseekadherencetotheEITI,untilclaimsofbothinitiativestobe‘global’arerealised
throughawider,moreglobalmembership.
S o u t h A f r I c A ’ S A L t e r n A t I v e t r A n S P A r e n c y m e A S u r e S A n d t h e I r r e L e v A n c e f o r t h e e X t r A c t I v e S e c t o r
DominantofficialdiscourseshaveattributedSouthAfrica’sabsence fromtheEITI to
existingtransparencyframeworksinthecountry.20Arecentinterviewwithagovernment
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S A I I A O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N U M B E R 14 6
G O v E R N A N C E O f A f R I C A ’ S R E S O U R C E S P R O G R A M M E
official from theDepartmentofMineralResources (DMR) confirms this view.With
respecttotheEITI’saimofensuringthattherevenuescollectedfrommineralextraction
areaccountedfor,thefollowingstatementfromtheDMRrepresentativemaintainsthat
SouthAfricaalreadyhasmeasuresinplacetothiseffect: ‘[W]edon’treallyseeavery
compellingargumentorneedtobesignatoryoftheEITI[…]Wethinkwearetransparent
enoughintermsofhowweaccountforthemineralresourcesrevenuesthatcometo
us’.21Moreover,andatthecoreofthisemphasisonexistinglocalframeworks,isastrong
denunciationofwhatappearstobeadoublestandardonthepartofcountriesintheglobal
North.For instance, theDMRrepresentativenotesthatsomeNortherngovernments
continuetopushtheEITIagendaontoSouthAfrica,whileremainingreluctanttojoin
theinitiativethemselves.22AnotheroftencitedexampleisthatoftheUKgovernment’s
continuedabsencefromtheEITI,whichcommentatorsfromcivilsocietyorganisations
(CSOs)suchasPWYPcharacteriseasadoublestandardsattitude,giventhatformerUK
primeminister,TonyBlair,wascentralinannouncingthelaunchoftheinitiativein2002;
andmostimportantly,giventhattheUKcontinuestosupporttheimplementationofthe
EITIincountriesintheglobalSouth.23Themainimplicationofthesedenunciationsis
thatifresource-richcountriesintheglobalNorthareabletodirectlyorindirectlyjustify
theirabsencefromtheEITIbasedontheirowndomestictransparencyframeworks,South
Africacanalsodoso,giventhatthecountryhastransparencyframeworksinplace,such
asPAIA.However,theSouthAfricangovernment’sreluctancetojointheEITIsuggestsa
similardesiretoabstainfromtheOGP,sincethesamejustificationsofalternativelocal
transparencyframeworksapply.ThisisespeciallysosincetheOGP,muchlikePAIA,is
generalinnature,andmustthereforerepresentaredundantframeworkaccordingtothe
aforementionedrationale.Inthiscase,theEITIwouldappeartobeacomplementary
frameworktoPAIA,giventhatitisfocusedspecificallyontheextractivesector,afocus
thatdoesnotexistwithinSouthAfrica’sdomestictransparencymechanismssuchasPAIA.
Assuch,theabovejustificationsforSouthAfrica’sabsencefromtheEITIcanbelargely
understoodaspoliticalandideologicalrhetoricthatarenotsubstantiated.Itbecomes
thereforeimportanttomovebeyondmerediscourse,andtoexaminetowhatextentthe
establishmentofalocaltransparencyframeworksuchasPAIAcanaccountforthefactthat
thegovernmentisnotpartoftheEITI.
ThepassingofPAIAin2000theoreticallysuggeststhatSouthAfricahasastronglegal
frameworkthatfacilitatesAccesstoInformation(ATI)inthecountry.PAIAreflectsthe
entrenchmentofATIinSouthAfrica’sConstitution(No108of1996),withsection32
(1)(a)oftheBillofRightsprovidingfor‘accesstoanyinformationheldbythestate’.24
However,section32doesnotprovideforaccesstoinformationdirectlyheldbyentities
suchascorporations,unlesssuchinformationcanbeaccessedthroughthestate.Inthis
case,theobjectiveofreconcilingtheextractivesector’srevenuesandpaymentsasbuilt
withintheEITIframeworkcannotbemetwithinthePAIAframework,sinceonecannot
seekinformationheldbyextractivemultinationalsindependentlyfromthestate.This
meansthatstateinformationonrevenuesmadefromminingandoilcompaniescannot
beverifiedagainstcompanyinformationonpaymentsissuedtothegovernmentthrough
PAIA;unlessoneseeksotheravenuesprovidedbycompaniesthemselvesonthiskindof
information.
Furthermore,despitetheeffectiveexistenceofPAIA, its implementationis facing
manyhurdles thatneed tobeaddressedbefore it canserveasa strongplatform for
S O U t h A f R I C A ’ S d I f f E R I N G A t t I t U d E S t O t h E E I t I A N d t h E O G P
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S A I I A O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N U M B E R 14 6
addressingtransparencyissues,withinoroutsidetheextractivesector.Discussionswith
localCSOs,suchastheOpenDemocracyAdviceCentreandtheSouthAfricanHistory
Archives(SAHA),aswellaswiththeSouthAfricanHumanRightsCommission(SAHRC),
suggest thatwhenitcomesto the implementationofPAIA, theaveragecitizen faces
anumberofobstaclesintermsoflocating,accessing,andmakingsenseofrequested
information ina timelymanner.25Experiences and studies from theseorganisations
reportthatmanyrequestsforATIgounansweredorrefused,wherethepossibilityfor
appealisoftendifficult.Moretroubling,inthewakeoftheProtectionofStateInformation
Bill(PoSIB),alsoknownastheSecrecyBill,whichcriminalisesunlawful dissemination
ofsomestateinformation,manyanalystsandactivistsfearthatprogressonaccessto
informationmaybejeopardised.26Inthecontextoftheextractivesectorparticularly,given
thatalotofcorporateinformationregardingresourceextractioncanbetiedtosecret
stateinformation,thepassingofthebillmayindeedcontributetokeepingimportant
informationsafelyguarded,ultimatelyimpedingthepublic’sabilitytoholdthestateand
extractivecorporationsaccountable.
Finally,giventhegeneralfocusofPAIA,itisimportanttoexaminetheextenttowhich
theMineralandPetroleumResourcesDevelopmentAct(MPRDA),alegislationpassedin
2002andtargetedatthemanagementofmineralandpetroleumresourcesinSouthAfrica,
maybeatoolforenhancingtransparencyintheextractivesector.TheMPRDAseeksto
‘makeprovisionsfortheequitableaccesstoandsustainabledevelopmentofthenation’s
mineralsandpetroleumresources;andtoprovideformattersconnectedtherewith’.27
Withthisobjectiveinmind,althoughtheactspeakstomattersofgoodgovernance,it
doesnotdirectlyprovidetoolsthatthepubliccanusetoaccessinformationrelatedto
theextractivesector.Sofar,accordingtoonecommentator,theimplementationofthe
MPRDAhasbeenmoresuccessfulinillustratingthepowerofthestatetoaccessextractive
companies’information,andtousesuchinformationaccordingly,suchastherevokingof
corporatelicences.28Althoughagreattoolforgovernmenttoregulatecorporatebehaviour
withregardstoresourceexploitationinthecountry,theMPRDAdoesnotdoenoughto
increasetransparencyintheextractivesector.ThisisbecausetheMPRDAfocuseson
regulatingcorporations,withnoequalchecksontheroleofthestate;andtheroleofcivil
societyisrelativelyabsent,withCSOs,workersandlocalcommunitiesnotbeingprovided
withthemeanstoaccessrelevantinformationonextractivecompaniesoroncorporate–
stateactivities in theextractivesector. Inotherwords, in termsofbeingapotential
alternativetotheEITI–especiallyoneofamandatorynature–inpracticetheMPRDA
doesnotrepresentaviablealternativethroughwhichthepubliccanholdgovernmentand
companiesaccountablewhenitcomestoresourceexploitationandrevenueflows.
ThissuggeststhatthereisnoalternativetotheEITIatthenationallevelinSouth
Africa.AlthoughPAIAmaybeusedtoaccessgovernment-heldinformation(keeping
inmind theaforementioneddifficultiesdiscussed),onecannotuse it to requestkey
information from the corporate sector. Yet corporate information from mining and
petroleumcompaniesarevitalinprovidingcivilsocietywiththemeanstoholdboth
statesandextractivecompaniesaccountable.Insum,whetherlegalorvoluntary,thereis
nosingleco-ordinatedmechanisminthemining,oilandgassectorsthatpromotesthe
proactive and timelydisclosureofinformationonstate–companypaymentsorrevenuesto
thepublic,whichistheaimoftheEITI.
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S A I I A O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N U M B E R 14 6
G O v E R N A N C E O f A f R I C A ’ S R E S O U R C E S P R O G R A M M E
P o L I c y I m P L I c A t I o n S : L e S S o n S f r o m , A n d f o r , t h e e I t I
Giventhediscussionsofar,andinlightofcurrentdiscourseemanatingfromgovernment
circlesinSouthAfrica,therearenosolidjustificationsforthecountry’sabsencefromthe
EITI.However,werecommentatorstofocusonquestioningtheeffectivenessoftheEITI
asatransparencymechanisminitself,thedebatesregardingSouthAfrica’sabsencefrom
theinitiativewouldbemoreproductive.Inatellingadmission,anofficialfromtheDMR
revealedthatbeyondtheoverallperceptionofskepticismconcerningtheEITI,thereis
currentlynohomogenisedpositionfromtheSouthAfricangovernmentonthematter.As
heputit,therehasnotbeenaconcerteddepartment-wide,norinterdepartmental,meeting
toaskwhattheEITImeansforSouthAfrica:‘Wehaven’tevensatdowntoaskwhatdoes
thisthingmeantous,howcanweberelevanttoit,howcanitberelevanttous?’The
DMRofficialalsopointedtotheexistingconfusionwithinthegovernmentonwhether
leadershipovermattersrelatedtotheinitiativebelongstotheDMR,theNationalTreasury
(DepartmentofFinance),ortheDepartmentofInternationalRelationsandCooperation
(DIRCO).29Fromthisrevelation,itissafetoassumethatthereiscurrentlynoserious
dialoguebetweendifferentdepartmentsofthegovernmentregardingtheEITI;inother
words,itisnotapolicypriority.Moregenerally,thisscenarioreflectsthelackofanofficial
governmentpositiononissuesrelatedtotransparencyinSouthAfrica’sextractivesector.
Thisultimatelysuggeststhattransparencyissuesintheextractivesectorarenotprioritised
atpolicylevelinSouthAfrica.
Theimmediatepolicyrecommendationistheneedformoreseriousandsystematic
discussionsoftransparencyissuesintheSouthAfricanextractivesectoratthegovernment,
corporateandcivilsocietylevels.Thiswillbeanecessaryfirststepininvolvingallrelevant
actorstothedebate,inordertomeaningfullyengagewiththeissueoftransparencyin
SouthAfrica’sextractive sector.Second,policydebates shouldengagewithpractical
aspectsofhowtransparencymeasuresintheextractivesectorwilltranslateintoenhanced
accountability.Finally,discussionswithkeySouthAfricangovernmentofficialshighlight
thatthegovernmentseekstoassertitspositionnotonlyasaregionalpowerbutalsoas
anemergingpowerglobally.Assuch,growingcallsforSouthAfrica’simplementationof
theinitiativewillnotbeseriouslyconsideredunlesstheglobalNorthfirstshowsabetter
recordofimplementingtheEITI,aspreliminarymovestowardsUSEITIcandidacynow
indicate.MovesliketheUSonewillgiveabetter incentiveforthe ‘emergingmiddle
power’30 toreconsider its reluctance to join the initiative.This ideologicalargument
stressestheneedtotakenoteoftherelevanceofpowerrelationswhenpromotingthe
initiative,ratherthanseekingtopresentitinadepoliticisedstance.AsofApril2013,
theonlySouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity(SADC)countriesintheEITIwere
Mozambique,Tanzania,Zambia(compliantcountries)andtheDemocraticRepublicofthe
Congo(whichhasbeensuspendedtemporarilyasof24April2013).31Thecontinuedpush
forSouthAfricatojointheinitiativeisthereforeespeciallystrategic,asitisalsousedasa
politicalmeanstoexertpressureoncountriesintheSADCregion–includingimportant
resourceproducerslikeBotswana–tojoin.Perhapsdisclosingthisobjectivefromthe
onsetwouldprovidebetteravenuesforSouthAfricatogenuinelyassessitsdecisionto
adheretotheinitiativebasednotonlyonitsownlocalconditionsbutalsooninterstate
dynamics,bothattheregionalandgloballevels.
S O U t h A f R I C A ’ S d I f f E R I N G A t t I t U d E S t O t h E E I t I A N d t h E O G P
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S A I I A O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N U M B E R 14 6
These recommendations will only be possible with the active prioritisation of
transparencyissueswithintheextractivesector.Tellingly,duringthefieldworkcarriedout
inSouthAfricaforthisstudyfromJanuarytoMarch2013,discussionswithanumberof
peoplefromCSOsandthemediarevealedthatmanywithinthesegroupsknewlittleornot
enoughabouttheEITI.Thissituationinturncreatesanatmosphereinwhichmeaningful
debatesonthetopicof transparencyintheextractivesectorremainat theperiphery
of policy discourse, thus ensuring that the arguments for or against South Africa’s
participationintheEITIarenotadequatelyaddressed.Inthiscontext,itisimportant
torecallthattheEITIitselfwasestablishedasaresultofpressurefromCSOssuchas
GlobalWitness,highlightingthecentralroleofCSOsinthisrespect.Withtheimpressive
advocacyworkontransparencythat isbeingdonebyCSOs inSouthAfrica through
theRight2KnowCampaign(R2K),32aspecificfocusontransparencyintheextractive
sectoriswellwithinreach,butonlyifarealneedisperceivedandclearlyarticulatedby
thecampaign.
c o n c L u S I o n
Thepapersubmitsonemainrecommendationtotheagendaofstakeholderswhoview
transparencyinthemining,oilandgassectorsaskeytoacountry’sdevelopment.The
debateonwhetheragivencountryshouldjointheEITIshouldnotrevolveonideological
anddiplomaticarguments,butrathershouldfocusonpracticalwaysinwhichtousethe
initiativeasafirststeptowardssecuringtransparencyandaccountabilityintheextractive
sector.Afterall,thesectorisarguablyoneofthemostsusceptibletocorruption.Whether
thisfirststepwillactuallyleadtoareformoftheinitiativeortoaradicalalternativeis
unknown,butfocusontheextractiveindustriesmustnotbeabandonedaltogetherin
favourofageneraldebateontransparency.InthecaseofSouthAfrica,althoughlessons
canbelearnedfromvarioussectorsthroughageneralstandardfortransparencysuchas
PAIA,thisframeworkisnotenough.Sectorssuchastheoil,gasandminingindustries
holdparticularitiesasfaraslicensingrightsandcontractagreementsareconcerned,which
requirespecialisedattentionthroughtheestablishmentofadditionalframeworks,whether
locallyorglobally.CurrentlytheglobalroutecouldbeakeyplatformforSouthAfrica,
whichcouldbeusedasameanstoreinforceandlegitimiseitsstatusasaregionalpower
withinAfrica;andperhapsasameansofassumingaleadershiprolewithintheBRICS
(Brazil,Russia,India,ChinaandSouthAfrica)platformasfarastransparencyinthe
extractivesectorisconcerned.TodatenoneoftheBRICScountriesisasignatorytothe
EITI.ThisanalysissuggeststhatthepotentialmembershipofSouthAfricaintheEITIwill
probablybenefittheinitiative,inthesensethatthecountrymaysharelessonslearned
withtheinitiativeregardingATIlegislation,particularlywithregardstotheprospectsand
challengesoflegalframeworksforenhancingtransparency.
12
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e n d n o t e S
1 ThepaperisinformedbyfieldresearchconductedinSouthAfrica,andfundedbytheStudents
forDevelopmentProgram,aCanadianInternationalDevelopmentAgencyproject.Theauthor
wouldparticularlyliketothankSAIIAresearchersfromtheGovernanceofAfrica’sResources
Programme, aswell asotherprogramsat the institute, foroffering insightful comments
followingherpresentationsinJohannesburgandCapeTowninFebruaryandMarch2013.
2 IBP (International Budget Partnership), ‘Open budget index 2012 rankings’, http://
internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI-2012-Rankings-English.png, accessed
28March2013.
3 Ibid.
4 TI(TransparencyInternational),‘Corruptionperceptionsindex2012’,http://www.transparency.
org/cpi2012/results,accessed28March2013.
5 EITI(ExtractiveIndustriesTransparencyInitiative),‘TheEITIprinciplesandcriteria’,http://
eiti.org/eiti/principles,accessed10March2013.
6 EITI,‘PresidentObama:TheUSwillimplementtheEITI’,20September2011,http://eiti.org/
news-events/president-obama-us-will-implement-eiti.
7 US,DOI(DepartmentoftheInterior),‘USExtractiveIndustriesTransparencyInitiative’,http://
www.doi.gov/eiti/index.cfm.
8 EITI,‘AustraliatopilottheEITI’,27October2011,http://eiti.org/news-events/australia-pilot-eiti.
9 EITI,‘ExtractiveIndustriesTransparencyInitiative:Australia’sPilotProgressReport,February
2013’,http://eiti.org/files/Australia%20Pilot%20Progress%20Report%20February%202013_0.
pdf.
10 EITI,‘OtherCountries’,http://eiti.org/countries/other.
11 UK,Government,‘PrimeMinister’slettertoG8leaders’,2January2013,https://www.gov.uk/
government/news/prime-ministers-letter-to-g8-leaders.
12 EITI,‘UKparliamentarycommittee:UKshouldimplementEITI’,23August2012,http://eiti.
org/news-events/uk-parliamentary-committee-uk-should-implement-eiti.
13 Dion-OrtegaA,‘EITIandthepushforglobaltransparency:IsCanadaignoringitsleadership
roleintheextractiveindustries?’CanadianInstituteofMining,MetallurgyandPetroleum,
August2012,https://magazine.cim.org/en/August-2012/Upfront/EITI-and-the-push-for-global-
transparency.aspx?page=3.
14 EITI,‘EITICountries’,http://eiti.org/countries,accessed29March2013.
15 MagrinG&GvanVliet,‘TheuseofoilrevenuesinAfrica’,inLesourneJ&WCRamsay
(eds),Governance of Oil in Africa: Unfinished Business.Paris:InstitutFrançaisdesRelations
Internationales,2009,pp.103–164.
16 PWYP(PublishWhatYouPay),‘Aboutus’,http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/about.
17 OGP(OpenGovernmentPartnership),‘About’,http://www.opengovpartnership.org/about.
18 For a complete list of current members, including countries that have delivered their
commitmentstotheOGPmandateandthosestilldevelopingtheircommitments,seethe
‘Countrycommitments’pageathttp://www.opengovpartnership.org/country-commitments.
19 OGP,‘About’,op. cit.
20 BenkensteinA,‘SouthAfrica:Miningrevenue,transparencyandtheEITI’,DiplomaticPouch.
Johannesburg:SAIIA,2011,http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/south-africa-mining-
revenue-transparency-and-the-eiti.
21 Personalinterview,DMRrepresentative,CapeTown,4February2013.
S O U t h A f R I C A ’ S d I f f E R I N G A t t I t U d E S t O t h E E I t I A N d t h E O G P
13
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22 Ibid.
23 O’HareS,‘UKrefusestosignuptooil,miningandgastransparencyinitiative’,Telegraph,21
September2011,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/expat-money/8779905/
UK-refuses-to-sign-up-to-oil-mining-and-gas-transparency-initiative.html.
24 SouthAfrica,Governmentinformation,‘Chapter2–BillofRights’,http://www.info.gov.za/
documents/constitution/1996/96cons2.htm,accessed28March2013.
25 Personalinterviews,CapeTown(ODAC)andJohannesburg(SAHAandSAHRC),Februaryto
March2013.
26 Freedominfo.org,‘SouthAfricanAssemblyOksProtectionofInformationBill’,26April2013,
http://www.freedominfo.org/2013/04/south-african-assembly-oks-protection-of-information-
bill/,accessed28April2013.
27 South Africa, Government Gazette, ‘No. 28 of 2002: Mineral and Petroleum Resources
DevelopmentAct,2002’,448,23922,CapeTown,10October2002,p.5.
28 Personalinterview,CapeTown,4February2013.
29 Ibid.
30 SchoemanM,‘SouthAfricaasanemergingmiddlepower’,African Security Review,9,3,2000,
pp.47–58.Theterm‘emergingmiddlepower’exemplifiesSouthAfrica’saspirationtobean
importantplayerattheglobalstage.ItalsoreferstoSouthAfricaasarisingpowerfromthe
globalSouth,especiallywithintheBRICScomplex,andasanemergingpowerglobally.
31 EITI,‘EITIcountries’,http://eiti.org/countries.
32 R2Kisacivil-societyplatforminSouthAfrica,whichwaslaunchedinAugust2010,and
regroupsorganisationsandpeople responding to thePoSIB.TheR2K’smissionhasnow
broadenedtoincludemattersrelatedtofreeexpressionandaccesstoinformation.Formore
onthiscoalition,seeR2K,‘Whatwedo’,http://www.r2k.org.za/about/what-we-do.
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