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ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212...

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JLM 20060212 14:16 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli [email protected] [email protected] Portions ' 2004-2005, John Manferdelli. This material is provided without warranty of any kind including, without limitation, warranty of non-infringement or suitability for any purpose. This material is not guaranteed to be error free and is intended for instructional use only.
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Page 1: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

1

AE

S a

nd A

ttack

s on

Cry

ptog

raph

ic H

ashe

s

John

Man

ferd

elli

jlm@

cs.w

ashi

ngto

n.ed

ujm

anfe

r@m

icro

soft.

com

Por

tions

© 2

004-

2005

, Joh

n M

anfe

rdel

li.

This

mat

eria

l is

prov

ided

with

out w

arra

nty

of a

ny k

ind

incl

udin

g, w

ithou

t lim

itatio

n, w

arra

nty

of n

on-in

fring

emen

t or s

uita

bilit

y fo

r any

pur

pose

. Th

is m

ater

ial i

s no

t gua

rant

eed

to b

e er

ror f

ree

and

is in

tend

ed fo

r ins

truct

iona

l use

onl

y.

Page 2: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

2

AE

S H

isto

ry�

Cal

l for

DE

S s

ucce

ssor

1/9

7�

Squa

re b

eget

s R

ijnda

el(1

998)

�R

ijnda

elD

esig

ners

:Vin

cent

Rijm

enan

d Jo

an D

aem

en�

Nin

e S

ubm

issi

ons

�C

AS

T-25

6, C

RY

PTO

N, D

EA

L, D

FC (c

iphe

r), E

2, F

RO

G, H

PC

, LO

KI9

7, M

AGE

NTA

, MA

RS

, RC

6, R

ijnda

el, S

AFE

R+,

Ser

pent

, and

Tw

ofis

h.�

Fina

lists

�M

AR

S, R

C6,

Rijn

dael

, Ser

pent

, and

Tw

ofis

h�

FIP

S 1

97 p

ublis

hed

11/2

001

Page 3: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

3

AE

S

Pla

inte

xt

Cip

herte

xtr Rou

nds

k 1 k 2

k r

Key

Sch

edul

e

Key

Page 4: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

4

AE

S R

equi

rem

ents

�12

8, 1

92, 2

56 b

it ke

ys�

Algo

rithm

s w

ill b

e ju

dged

on

the

follo

win

g fa

ctor

s:

�A

ctua

l sec

urity

of t

he a

lgor

ithm

com

pare

d to

oth

er s

ubm

itted

alg

orith

ms

(at t

he s

ame

key

and

bloc

k si

ze).

�Th

e ex

tent

to w

hich

the

algo

rithm

out

put i

s in

dist

ingu

isha

ble

from

a

rand

om p

erm

utat

ion

on th

e in

put b

lock

. �

Sou

ndne

ss o

f the

mat

hem

atic

al b

asis

for t

he a

lgor

ithm

�s s

ecur

ity.

�O

ther

sec

urity

fact

ors

rais

ed b

y th

e pu

blic

dur

ing

the

eval

uatio

n pr

oces

s, in

clud

ing

any

atta

cks

whi

ch d

emon

stra

te th

at th

e ac

tual

secu

rity

of th

e al

gorit

hm is

less

than

the

stre

ngth

cla

imed

by

the

subm

itter

.

�C

laim

ed a

ttack

s w

ill b

e ev

alua

ted

for p

ract

ical

ity.

�Ke

y ag

ility

(NS

A):

�Tw

o bl

ocks

enc

rypt

ed w

ith tw

o di

ffere

nt k

eys

shou

ld n

ot ta

ke m

uch

mor

e tim

e th

an tw

o bl

ocks

enc

rypt

ed w

ith th

e sa

me

key.

Page 5: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

5

Mar

s (M

ultip

licat

ion,

Add

ition

, Rot

atio

n an

d S

ubst

itutio

n)

Bas

ic S

truct

ure

1.W

hite

n2.

8 ro

unds

of k

ey in

depe

nden

t mix

ing

3.16

roun

ds o

f key

ed F

eist

el tr

ansf

orm

s (2

S-b

oxes

)4.

8 ro

unds

of k

ey in

depe

nden

t mix

ing

5.W

hite

n

Page 6: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

6

RC

6 D

esig

n P

hilo

soph

y

�Le

vera

ge o

ur e

xper

ienc

e w

ith R

C5:

use

dat

a-de

pend

ent r

otat

ions

to a

chie

ve a

hig

h le

vel o

f se

curit

y.�

Adap

t RC

5 to

mee

t AE

S re

quire

men

ts

�Ta

ke a

dvan

tage

of a

new

prim

itive

for i

ncre

ased

se

curit

y an

d ef

ficie

ncy:

32x

32 m

ultip

licat

ion,

whi

ch

exec

utes

qui

ckly

on

mod

ern

proc

esso

rs, t

o co

mpu

te

rota

tion

amou

nts.

Slid

e by

Ron

Riv

est (

Sec

ond

AE

S C

onfe

renc

e)

Page 7: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

7

Est

imat

e of

num

ber o

f pla

inte

xt p

airs

requ

ired

to m

ount

a

diffe

rent

ial a

ttack

.

(Onl

y 212

8su

ch p

airs

are

ava

ilabl

e.)

Rou

nds

Pai

rs8

256

12211

7

16219

0

20

RC

6223

8

24229

9

Sec

urity

aga

inst

diff

eren

tial a

ttack

s

Infe

asible

Slid

e by

Ron

Riv

est (

Sec

ond

AE

S C

onfe

renc

e)

Page 8: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

8

Rijn

dael

Ove

rvie

w

�Inp

ut �p c

onsi

stin

g of

Nb

wor

ds�k

with

Nk

wor

ds (N

k= 4

,6,8

)�S

tate �4

row

s, N

bco

lum

ns�K

ey �4 ro

ws,

Nk

colu

mns

�Out

put

�c c

onsi

stin

g of

Nb

wor

ds

All

tabl

es fi

lled

first

col

firs

t s0,

0, s 1

,0, s

2,0,

s 3,0, s

0,1,

Page 9: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

9

Rijn

dael

Ove

rvie

w

�Des

ign

Phi

loso

phy

�Wid

e Tr

ails

�32

bit w

ord

oper

atio

ns�N

on-li

near

sub

stitu

tion

uses

arit

hmet

ic o

ver G

F(2)

�Mix

ing

uses

pol

ynom

ial a

rithm

etic

mod

(x4 +

1)

Page 10: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

10

Rijn

dael

Rou

nd S

truct

ure

Nr=

max

(Nk,

Nb)

+6

1414

14N

k=8

1412

12N

k=6

1412

10N

k=4

Nb=

8N

b= 6

Nb=

4N

r

Page 11: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

11

Rijn

dael

Sta

te L

ayou

t

Sta

te: s

i,j, i

= N

b (m

od 4

), j=

[Nb/

4], N

b=4j

+i

For N

b= 4

s 1,3

s 1,2

s 1,1

s 1,0

s 2,3

s 2,2

s 2,1

s 2,0

s 3,3

s 3,2

s 3,1

s 3,0

s 0,3

s 0,2

s 0,1

s 0,0

Page 12: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

12

Rijn

dael

Key

Lay

out

Key

s: k

i,j, i

= N

k (m

od 4

), j=

[Nk/

4]

For N

k= 4

k 1,3

k 1,2

k 1,1

k 1,0

k 2,3

k 2,2

k 2,1

k 2,0

k 3,3

k 3,2

k 3,1

k 3,0

k 0,3

k 0,2

k 0,1

k 0,0

Page 13: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

13

Rijn

dael

Alg

orith

m

Rijn

dael

(p, k

, Nb,

Nk)

{C

ompu

teR

ound

Key

s(K

, W[0

�N

r])st

ate=

pA

ddR

ound

Key

(0, s

tate

)fo

r (i=

1, i<

=Nr,

i++)

{fo

r eac

h by

te, b

in s

tate

Byte

Sub(

b)S

hiftR

ow(s

tate

)if(

i<N

r) Mix

Col

(sta

te)

Add

Rou

ndK

ey(i,

sta

te)

}c=

sta

te}

Page 14: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

14

Inve

rse

Rijn

dael

Alg

orith

m

InvR

ijnda

el (c

, k, N

b, N

k) {

Com

pute

Rou

ndK

eys(

K, W

[0�

Nr])

stat

e= c

for (

i=0,

i<N

r, i+

+) {

Add

Rou

ndK

ey(N

r-i,

stat

e)if(

i>0) In

vMix

Col

(sta

te)

InvS

hiftR

ow(s

tate

)fo

r eac

h by

te, b

in s

tate

InvB

yteS

ub(b

)}

Add

Rou

ndK

ey(0

, sta

te)

p= s

tate

}

Page 15: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

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6021

2 14

:16

15

Rev

iew

: Arit

hmet

ic o

f GF(

2n )

�S

uppo

se m

(x) i

s an

irre

duci

ble

poly

nom

ial o

f deg

ree

n ov

er G

F(2)

: m(x

)= x

n

+ m

n-1

xn-1

+ �

+ m

0.

�Le

t a(x

) and

b(x

) be

poly

nom

ials

of d

egre

e <n

. Th

ey fo

rm a

vec

tor s

pace

of

dim

ensi

on n

ove

r GF(

2).

Coe

ffici

ents

of l

ike

expo

nent

�add

�: (a

n-1

xn-1

+ �

+ a 0

)+ (b

n-1

xn-1

+ �

+ b 0

)= (a

n-1+

b n-1

)xn-

1+

�+

a 0 +

b 0)

�E

uclid

ean

algo

rithm

: for

a(x

), b(

x) p

olyn

omia

ls o

f deg

rees

mc

n, th

ere

are

poly

nom

ials

q(x

), r(x

), de

g r(x

) <n

such

that

a(x

)=q(

x)b(

x)+r

(x)

�P

olyn

omia

ls o

ver G

F(2)

mod

ulo

m(x

) for

m a

fiel

d (w

ith 2

nel

emen

ts).

M

ultip

licat

ion

is m

ultip

licat

ion

of p

olyn

omia

ls m

od m

(x).

�In

vers

es e

xist

by

follo

win

g th

eore

m:

If a(

x) a

nd b

(x) a

re p

olyn

omia

ls th

eir

grea

test

com

mon

den

omin

ator

d(x

) can

be

writ

ten

asd(

x)=

a(x)

u(x)

+b(x

)v(x

) for

som

e u(

x), v

(x).

Page 16: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

16

Exa

mpl

e of

mul

tiplic

atio

n an

d in

vers

e

�In

par

ticul

ar if

a(x

) and

b(x

) are

co-

prim

e: 1

= a(

x)u(

x)+b

(x)v

(x) f

or

som

e u(

x), v

(x).

�Ex

ampl

e�

m(x

)= x

2+x

+1.

m(x

) is

irred

ucib

le (o

ther

wis

e it

wou

ld h

ave

a ro

ot in

G

F(2)

�x+

(x+1

) =1,

1+(

x+1)

= x

�(x

+1)(

x+1)

= x2

+2x+

1=x2

+1=

(x) +

(x2

+x +

1)=

x (m

od m

(x))

�(x

+1) a

nd m

(x) a

re c

o-pr

ime

in fa

ct,

1= (x

+1) (

x) +

(x2

+x +

1)(1

)�

So

�x�i

s th

e m

ultip

licat

ive

inve

rse

of �x

+1�i

n G

F(4)

.�

Usu

ally

ele

men

ts o

f GF(

2n) a

re w

ritte

n in

pla

ce n

otat

ion

so x

5 +x3

+x2

+1=

10

1101

.

Page 17: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

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:16

17

Byt

eSub

Prim

itive

Byt

eSub

(b)

if b=

=0 t= 0

else

t= b

-1

retu

rn(M

t + a

)

M=

circ

(1,0

,0,0

,1,1

,1,1

)a=

(1,1

,0,0

,0,1

,1,0

)TA

rithm

etic

ove

r GF(

2) w

ith m

(x)=

x8 +

x4+x

3 +x+

1.

Page 18: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

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:16

18

Byt

eSub

Dat

aM

:a:

11

11

10

00

01

11

11

00

00

11

11

10

00

01

11

11

10

00

11

11

11

00

01

11

11

10

00

11

11

11

00

01

01100011

Page 19: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

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:16

19

Byt

esub

s 1,3

s 1,2

s 1,1

s 1,0

s 2,3

s 2,2

s 2,1

s 2,0

s 3,3

s 3,2

s 3,1

s 3,0

s 0,3

s 0,2

s 0,1

s 0,0

t 1,3

t 1,2

t 1,1

t 1,0

t 2,3

t 2,2

t 2,1

t 2,0

t 3,3

t 3,2

t 3,1

t 3,0

t 0,3

t 0,2

t 0,1

t 0,0

Page 20: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

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:16

20

Rijn

dael

Prim

itive

sS

hiftR

ow(s

tate

)sh

ift ro

w 1

by

0.

shift

row

2 b

y 1.

sh

ift ro

w 3

by

2 if

Nb<

8, 3

oth

erw

ise.

sh

ift ro

w 3

by

3 if

Nb<

8, 4

oth

erw

ise.

Mix

Col

(sta

te)

m

ultip

ly e

ach

colu

mn

of s

tate

by

c(x)

(mod

x4

+1)

c(x)

= 0x

03 x

3+

0x01

x2

+ 0x

01 x

+ 0

x02

InvM

ixC

ol(s

tate

)

mul

tiply

eac

h co

lum

n of

sta

te b

y d(

x) (m

od x

4+1

)d(

x)=

0x0b

x3

+ 0x

0d x

2+

0x09

x +

0x0

e

Add

Rou

ndK

ey(i,

stat

e)st

ate=

sta

te +

W[i]

Page 21: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

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:16

21

Shi

ftRow

s 1,3

s 1,2

s 1,1

s 1,0

s 2,3

s 2,2

s 2,1

s 2,0

s 3,3

s 3,2

s 3,1

s 3,0

s 0,3

s 0,2

s 0,1

s 0,0

s 1,2

s 1,1

s 1,0

s 1,3

s 2,1

s 2,0

s 2,3

s 2,2

s 3,2

s 3,1

s 3,0

s 3,3

s 0,3

s 0,2

s 0,1

s 0,0

Page 22: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

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6021

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:16

22

Mix

Col

s 1,3

s 1,3

s 1,1

s 1,0

s 2,3

s 2,3

s 2,1

s 2,0

s 3,3

s 3,3

s 3,1

s 3,0

s 0,3

s 0,3

s 0,1

s 0,0

s 1,3

s 1,3

s 1,1

t 1,0

s 2,3

s 2,3

s 2,1

t 2,0

s 3,3

s 3,3

s 3,1

t 3,0

s 0,3

s 0,3

s 0,1

t 0,0

t 0,0x

3 +t 1,

0x2 +

t 2,0x

+t3,

0=

(0x0

3x3 +

0x01

x2 +0x

01x+

0x02

) x(s

0,0x

3 +s 1

,0x2 +

s 2,0x+

s 3,0)(m

od x

4 +1)

Page 23: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

23

Rou

ndK

eys

Com

pute

Rou

ndK

eys(

K[4

*Nk]

, W[N

b*(N

r+1)

]) {

for(i

=0; i

<Nk;

i++)

W

[i]=

(K[4

i], K

[4i+

1], K

[4i+

2], K

[4i+

3])

for(

i=N

k; i<

Nb*

Nr+

1); i

++) {

t= W

[i-1]

if((i

mod

Nk)

==0)

t= S

ubB

yte(

Rot

Byt

e(t))

+ R

Con

(i/N

k)el

se if

(Nk>

6 &

& (i

mod

Nk)

==0)

t=

Sub

Byt

e(t)

W[i]

= W

[i-N

k] +

t}

}

Page 24: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

24

Rou

ndK

eys

Prim

itive

s

Sub

Byt

e(w

= (a

,b,c

,d)))

w=

(Byt

eSub

(a),

Byt

eSub

(b),

Byt

eSub

(c),

Byt

eSub

(d))

retu

rn(w

)

Rot

Byt

e(w

= (a

,b,c

,d))

w=

(b,c

,d,a

)re

turn

(w)

RC

on[i]

= (R

C[i]

, 0x0

0, 0

x00,

0x0

0);

RC

[1]=

0x0

1R

C[i+

1]=

RC

[i]*�

0x2�

[m

ultip

ly b

y �x

�]

Page 25: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

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:16

25

AE

S F

inal

ist B

akeo

ff

Sco

re: 1

(low

) to

3 (h

igh)

. Fr

om N

IST

repo

rt 2

Oct

200

0.

31

21

2D

esig

n fe

atur

es

23

32

1H

W P

erf

23

31

1S

mar

t Car

d Pe

rf

11

32

2S

W P

erf

23

31

1Im

plem

enta

tion

33

22

3G

ener

al S

ecur

ity

Twof

ish

Ser

pent

Rijn

dael

(AE

S)

RC

6M

AR

S

Page 26: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

26

Alg

ebra

ic A

ttack

s -P

revi

ew

�X

SL,

Cou

rtois

, Pie

przy

k, M

urph

y, R

obsh

aw1.

Gen

erat

e eq

uatio

ns o

f hig

her d

egre

e th

an th

e or

igin

al e

quat

ions

by

mul

tiply

ing

equa

tion

of a

n ac

tive

S-b

ox b

y pa

ssiv

e S

-box

equ

atio

ns2.

Sol

ve th

e eq

uatio

ns in

the

form

al te

rms

of th

e eq

uatio

ns�

Estim

ate

of li

near

ly in

depe

nden

t equ

atio

ns is

nec

essa

ry�

Cla

im th

at s

olvi

ng th

e eq

uatio

ns fo

r AE

S w

as p

ossi

ble

beca

use

the

estim

ated

num

ber o

f lin

early

inde

pend

ent e

quat

ions

was

ade

quat

e ge

nera

ted

exci

tem

ent.

�C

oppe

rsm

ith c

ast d

oubt

on

the

num

ber o

f lin

early

inde

pend

ent

equa

tions

.

Page 27: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

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6021

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:16

27

Stre

am C

iphe

rs

�Sy

nchr

onou

s st

ream

cip

hers

�Th

e ke

ystre

am is

gen

erat

ed in

depe

nden

tly o

f the

pl

aint

ext a

nd th

e ci

pher

text

�U

sing

Key

ed P

RN

G�

Asyn

chro

nous

stre

am c

iphe

rs�

The

keys

tream

is g

ener

ated

as

a fu

nctio

n of

the

key,

K, a

nd a

t mos

t tpr

evio

us c

iphe

rtext

sym

bols

.

Page 28: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

28

Stre

am C

iphe

r Enc

rypt

ion

and

PR

NG

s

Pla

inte

xt:

PR

NG

(see

d):

Cip

herte

xt:

Enc

rypt

ion

Equ

atio

n: c

j=p j

⊕k j

Page 29: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

29

Syn

chro

nous

Stre

am u

sing

Lin

ear

Feed

back

Shi

ft R

egis

ter (

LFS

R)

s t+L

�2s t

+L�1

s t+1

s t

a 1a 0

a L-2

a L-1

. . .

. . .

. . .

a i, s

j∈F q

Rec

urre

nce:

sj+

L= S

j=0,

1 �

L-1

ajs

j+L-

1

Pol

ynom

ial:

f(x)=

Sj=

0, 1

� L

-1 a

jxj -

xL

Page 30: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

30

LFS

R-b

ased

key

stre

am g

ener

ator

�N

onlin

ear c

ombi

natio

n ge

nera

tors

�N

onlin

ear f

ilter

gen

erat

ors

Page 31: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

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:16

31

RC

4

Initi

aliz

atio

nS

[0..2

55] =

0,1

,�,2

55K

[0..2

55] =

Key

,Key

,Key

,�fo

r i =

0 to

255

j = (j

+ S

[i] +

K[i]

) mod

256

swap

S[i]

and

S[j]

i=j=

0

Itera

tion

i = (i

+ 1

) mod

256

j = (j

+ S

[i]) m

od 2

56sw

ap S

[i] a

nd S

[j]t =

(S[i]

+ S

[j]) m

od 2

56O

utpu

t S[t]

Page 32: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

32

RC

-4 F

acts

�RC

4 im

plem

ents

a p

erm

utat

ion

of th

e 2N

, N=2

n , w

here

n=8

is w

ord

size

.

�RC

4 ca

nnot

ent

er s

tate

s s:

i= a

, j=a

+1, S

[a+1

]=1.

The

re a

re N

-2of

thes

e.

�Not

atio

n�S

r, i r,

j ran

d t r

deno

te th

e R

C4

stat

e du

ring

initi

aliz

atio

n af

ter u

sing

key

w

ords

[0, 1

, �, r

].�I

(S),

J(S)

, T(S

), Z(

S) a

re th

e st

ate

indi

cies

, out

put i

ndex

and

first

ou

tput

wor

d of

RC

4 (i.

e.-j

ust a

fter i

nitia

lizat

ion

is c

ompl

ete)

. �T

(S)=

S[1]

+S[S

[1]],

Z(S

)= S

[T(S

)].�K

ey is

l-w

ords

long

�R

efer

ence

s�F

luhr

er, M

antin

and

Sha

mir.

Atta

cks

on R

C4

and

WE

P.

�Man

tin, M

aste

r�s T

hesi

s.

Page 33: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

33

Atta

cks

on R

C4

and

FSR

s

�Si

mpl

e xo

r atta

ck o

n st

ream

with

out M

AC

or h

ow to

sw

indl

e yo

ur b

ank.

�R

epro

duce

inte

rnal

sta

te�

Solv

e fo

r �ta

ps�

�Lo

ok fo

r sho

rt cy

cles

�Al

lege

d R

C4

resi

sts

thes

e.

�R

C4

is a

goo

d st

ream

cip

her i

f you

thro

w a

way

firs

t bun

ch o

f by

tes

Page 34: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

34

Bia

s in

Sec

ond

Byt

e of

RC

4

Let S

ibe

the

stat

e at

tim

e i a

nd le

t <z i>

be

the

outp

ut s

eque

nce.

Theo

rem

: P(z

2=0)

= 2/

N. (

roug

hly

twic

e w

hat w

e ex

pect

from

a ra

ndom

ci

pher

)

Pro

of: S

uppo

se S

0[2]=

0, S

0[1] =

X∫2,

S0[X

]= Y

.R

ound

1:

i=1,

X=S

0[1]+

0. E

xcha

nge

S0[1

] and

S0[Y

].

Rou

nd 2

:i=

2, j=

X+S

1[2]=

X.

Out

put S

1[S1[2

]+S 1

[X]]=

S1[X

]= 0

. S

o P

(zj=

0) ~

1/N

+ 1

/N (1

-1/N

) ~ 2

/n.

By B

ayes

, if z

2= 0

, we

can

extra

ct b

yte

of s

tate

with

pro

babi

lity

1/2.

Page 35: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

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6021

2 14

:16

35

Cry

ptog

raph

ic H

ashe

s

A c

rypt

ogra

phic

has

h (�

CH

�) is

a �o

ne w

ay fu

nctio

n,� h

, fro

m a

llbi

nary

st

rings

(of a

rbitr

ary

leng

th) i

nto

a fix

ed b

lock

of s

ize

n (c

alle

d th

e si

ze

of th

e ha

sh) w

ith th

e fo

llow

ing

prop

ertie

s:1.

Giv

en y

=h(x

) it i

s in

feas

ible

to c

alcu

late

a x

� ∫x

such

that

y=h

(x�).

(�O

ne w

ay,�

�non

-inve

rtibi

lity�

or �

pre-

imag

e� re

sist

ance

). F

unct

ions

sa

tisfy

ing

this

con

ditio

n ar

e ca

lled

One

Way

Has

h Fu

nctio

ns (O

WH

F)2.

Giv

en u

, it i

s in

feas

ible

to fi

nd w

suc

h th

at h

(u)=

h(w

). (w

eak

collis

ion

resi

stan

ce, 2

ndpr

e-im

age

resi

stan

ce).

3.It

is in

feas

ible

to fi

nd u

, w s

uch

that

h(u

)=h(

w).

(stro

ng c

ollis

ion

resi

stan

ce).

Not

e 3!

2. F

unct

ions

sat

isfy

ing

this

con

ditio

n ar

e ca

lled

Col

lisio

n R

esis

tant

Fun

ctio

ns (C

RFs

).

�Ju

st li

ke S

ymm

etric

cip

hers

ratio

of w

ork

fact

or fo

r com

puta

tion

of

hash

vs

wor

k fa

ctor

to b

reak

has

h sh

ould

be

very

hig

h.�

Adve

rsar

y ha

s co

mpl

ete

info

rmat

ion

on c

ompu

ting

hash

and

(o

bvio

usly

) can

com

pute

as

man

y ha

shes

from

the

targ

et a

s sh

e w

ants

.

Page 36: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

36

Obs

erva

tions

on

Cry

ptog

raph

ic H

ashe

s

�H

ashe

s ar

e a

stro

ng �c

heck

sum

��

OW

HF

and

CR

F co

nditi

ons

mak

e C

Hs

satis

fy m

any

of th

e pr

oper

ties

of �r

ando

m fu

nctio

ns�

�Sm

all c

hang

es s

houl

d cr

eate

larg

e ch

ange

s (o

ther

wis

e th

e pr

e-im

age

of n

ear n

eigh

bors

are

nea

r nei

ghbo

rs m

akin

g co

llisi

ons

easy

to

find

)�

Smal

l inp

ut c

hang

es s

houl

d be

sta

tistic

ally

unr

elat

ed (u

ncor

rela

ted)

to

cha

nges

in a

sub

set o

f the

has

h bi

ts�

Anal

ysis

of C

Hs

very

sim

ilar t

o S

ymm

etric

Cip

her t

echn

ique

sP

opul

ar p

ract

ical

cry

ptog

raph

ic h

ashe

s�

MD

4, M

D5

(now

�bro

ken�

)�

SH

A-1

, SH

A-2

24, S

HA

-256

, SH

A-3

84, S

HA

-512

(las

t 4 a

re �S

HA

-2�)

�R

IPE

MD

Page 37: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

37

Obs

erva

tions

�C

ollis

ion

Res

ista

nce !

2nd

pre-

imag

e re

sist

ance

�Le

t f(x

)= x

2 -1

(mod

p).

f(x) a

cts

like

a ra

ndom

func

tion

but i

s no

t a O

WH

F si

nce

squa

re

root

s ar

e ea

sy to

cal

cula

te m

od p

.

�Le

t f(x

)= x

2(m

od p

q).

�f(x

) is

a O

WH

F bu

t is

neith

er c

ollis

ion

nor 2

ndpr

e-im

age

resi

stan

t

�If

eith

er h

1(x)

or h

2(x)

is a

CR

HF

so is

h(x

)= h

1(x)

|| h

2(x)

MD

C+s

igna

ture

& M

AC+u

nkno

wn

Key

requ

ire a

ll th

ree

prop

ertie

Page 38: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

38

Wha

t are

Has

h Fu

nctio

ns G

ood

for?

�M

odifi

catio

n D

etec

tion

Cod

es (M

DC

s): T

his

is a

stro

ng

chec

ksum

(int

egrit

y ch

eck)

. Som

etim

es c

alle

d �u

nkey

ed�

hash

es.

�M

essa

ge A

uthe

ntic

atio

n C

ode

(MA

Cs)

: If s

hare

d se

cret

is

part

of th

e ha

sh,

two

parti

es c

an d

eter

min

e au

then

ticat

ed

inte

grity

with

CH

s. C

alle

d �k

eyed

has

hes�

.

�M

essa

ge D

iges

ts (M

Ds)

: E

ncry

ptin

g (w

ith p

rivat

e ke

y) th

e C

H o

f a m

essa

ge (i

ts M

D) a

cts

as a

cer

tific

atio

n th

at th

e m

essa

ge w

as �a

ppro

ved�

by

poss

esso

r of p

rivat

e ke

y. T

his

is c

alle

d a

Dig

ital S

igna

ture

. [N

ote:

you

cou

ld �s

ign�

the

who

le m

essa

ge ra

ther

than

the

hash

but

this

wou

ld ta

ke

oodl

es o

f tim

e by

com

paris

on.]

Page 39: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

39

Wha

t are

Has

h Fu

nctio

ns G

ood

for?

�Id

entit

y: U

niqu

ely

and

secu

rely

iden

tifie

s bi

t stre

ams

like

prog

ram

s. H

ash

is s

trong

nam

e fo

r pro

gram

.�

Entro

py m

ixin

g: S

ince

CH

s ar

e ra

ndom

func

tions

into

fixe

d si

ze b

lock

s w

ith th

e pr

oper

ties

of ra

ndom

func

tions

, the

y ar

e of

ten

used

to �m

ix� b

iase

d in

put t

o pr

oduc

e a

�see

d� fo

r a

psue

do-r

ando

m n

umbe

r gen

erat

or.

�Pa

ssw

ord

Pro

tect

ion:

Sto

re s

alte

d ha

sh o

f pas

swor

d in

stea

d of

pas

swor

d (N

eedh

am).

�Bi

t Com

mitm

ent

Page 40: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

40

One

-Way

Fun

ctio

ns

Has

hes

com

e fro

m tw

o ba

sic

clas

ses

of o

ne-w

ay fu

nctio

ns�

Mat

hem

atic

al�

Mul

tiplic

atio

n: Z

=X�Y

�M

odul

ar E

xpon

entia

tion:

Z =

YX

(mod

n) (

Cha

um v

P

Has

h)�

Ad-h

oc (S

ymm

etric

cip

her-

like

cons

truct

ions

)�

Cus

tom

Has

h fu

nctio

ns (M

D4,

SH

A, M

D5,

RIP

EM

D)

Page 41: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

41

Cha

um-v

anH

eijs

t-Pfit

zman

n C

ompr

essi

on F

unct

ion

�Su

ppos

e p

is p

rime,

q=(

p-1)

/2 is

prim

e, a

is a

prim

itive

root

in F

p, b

is

rand

om.

�g:

{1,2

,�,q

-1}2!

{1,2

,�,p

-1},

q=(p

-1)/2

by:

�g(

s, t)

= a

sbt

(mod

p)

�N

ot u

sed

in p

ract

ice:

too

slow

.�

Red

uctio

n to

dis

cret

e lo

g:S

uppo

se g

(s, t

)= g

(u, v

) can

be

foun

d. T

hen

asbt

(mod

p)=

au

bv(m

od p

). S

o as

-u(m

od p

)= b

v-t(m

od p

). L

et b

= ax

(mod

p).

The

n (s

-u)=

x(y-

t) (m

od p

-1).

But

p-1

= 2q

so

we

can

solv

e fo

r x, t

hus

dete

rmin

ing

the

disc

rete

log

of b

.

Page 42: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

42

Mer

kle/

Dam

gard

Con

stru

ctio

n

Com

pres

sion

Func

tion

(f)

Has

h V

alue

Pad

ded

n bi

t blo

cks

Hi-1

Gra

phic

by

Josh

Ben

aloh

Inpu

t: x=

x 1||�

||xt

Inpu

t is

usua

lly p

adde

d

H0=

IVH

i= f(

Hi-1

, xi)

h(x)

= g(

h t)

Page 43: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

43

Pad

ding

�St

anda

rd te

chni

que

�Le

t las

t mes

sage

blo

ck h

ave

k bi

ts.

If k=

n, m

ake

a ne

w

bloc

k an

d se

t k=

0.�

Appe

nd a

1 to

last

blo

ck le

avin

g r=

n-k-

1 re

mai

ning

bits

in

blo

ck.

�If

r>=6

4, a

ppen

d r-

64 0

s th

en a

ppen

d bi

t len

gth

of

inpu

t exp

ress

ed a

s 64

bit

unsi

gned

inte

ger

�If

r<64

, app

end

n-r0

�s (t

o fil

l out

blo

ck),

appe

nd n

-64

0�s

at b

egin

ning

of n

ext b

lock

then

app

end

bit l

engt

h of

in

put e

xpre

ssed

as

64 b

it un

sign

ed in

tege

r

Page 44: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

44

Tech

niqu

e fo

r CH

s fro

m B

lock

Cip

hers

Let i

nput

be

x= x

1||

x 2||

� ||

xtw

here

eac

h x i

is n

bits

long

. Le

t g b

e a

func

tion

taki

ng a

n n

bit i

nput

to a

n m

bit

inpu

t. L

et E

(k, x

) be

a bl

ock

ciph

er w

ith m

bit

keys

pace

and

n bi

t blo

ck.

Let H

0= IV

.

Con

stru

ctio

n 1

Hi=

E(g

(Hi-1

), x i)

⊕H

i-1

Con

stru

ctio

n 2

Hi=

E(x

i, H

i-1) ⊕

Hi-1

Con

stru

ctio

n 3

Hi=

E(g

(Hi-1

), x i)

⊕x i

⊕H

i-1

Not

e: B

ecau

se o

f col

lisio

ns n

sho

uld

be >

64.

Idea

lly, m

=n a

nd g

= id

. D

ES

with

n=

64 is

too

smal

l. A

ES

with

n=m

=128

is b

ette

r.

Page 45: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

45

Atta

cks

on C

rypt

ogra

phic

Has

hes

�Bi

rthda

y (Y

uval

) atta

cks

�Pr

obab

ility

of c

ollis

ion

dete

rmin

ed b

y �B

irthd

ay P

arad

ox� c

alcu

latio

n:

�(1

-1/n

) (1-

2/n)

� (1

-(k-1

)/n)=

(n!/k

!)/nk

�Pr

obab

ility

of c

ollis

ion

is >

.5 w

hen

k2>

n.�

Nee

d 280

blo

cks

for S

HA

.�

1+x c

ex , P

i=1i=

k(1

-i/n)

ce-k

(k-1

)/(2n

)

�D

obbe

rtin

Atta

cks

on M

D4

�C

ollis

ion

atta

ck b

ased

on

com

pres

sion

func

tion

wea

knes

s�

Biha

m, C

hen,

Cha

baud

, Jou

x, W

ang

et a

l, D

iffer

entia

l atta

cks

on

RIP

EM

D-1

28, H

AV

AL,

MD

4, M

D5,

SH

A-0

, SH

A-1

Page 46: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

46

Atta

cks

on C

rypt

ogra

phic

Has

hes

�Be

rson

(199

2) u

sing

diff

eren

tial c

rypt

anal

ysis

on

1 ro

und

MD

-5.

�Bo

er a

nd B

osse

laer

s (1

993)

, Pse

udo

collis

ion

in M

D5.

�D

obbe

rtin

(199

6), C

ollis

ions

in c

ompr

essi

on fu

nctio

n. A

ttack

s in

spire

d R

IPE

MD

pro

posa

l.�

Biha

m a

nd C

hen

(200

4), C

ollis

ions

in S

HA

-0.

�C

haba

ud a

nd J

oux

(200

4), C

ollis

ions

in S

HA

-0 .

�W

ang,

Fen

g, L

ai, Y

u, (2

004)

, MD

4, M

D5,

RIP

EM

D�

Wan

g et

al,

(200

4, 2

005)

, SH

A-1

�SH

A-1

has

sto

od u

p be

st:

best

kno

wn

theo

retic

al a

ttack

(11/

05) r

equi

res

264op

erat

ions

.

Page 47: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

47

Pre

fix a

ttack

s, a

nd H

MA

Cs

�Pr

efix

and

suf

fix a

ttack

s�

Has

h(m

1||m

2)=

Has

h(m

2), i

f int

erna

l sta

te c

ollid

es�

To fi

x: h

DB

L(h(

m)||

m)

�H

MA

C: k

eyed

-has

h m

essa

ge a

uthe

ntic

atio

n co

de

�Tw

o po

pula

r con

stru

ctio

ns�

HM

ACK(x

)= H

ash(

k|p|

m|k

), p

is a

pad

�H

MAC

K(x

)= S

HA

-1(K

⊕op

ad ||

SH

A-1

(K ⊕

ipad

)||x)

Page 48: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

48

A C

rypt

ogra

phic

Has

h: S

HA

-1

Com

pres

sion

Func

tion

160-

bit s

tate

512-

bit i

nput

160

bits

of s

tate

Slid

e by

Jos

h Be

nalo

h

Page 49: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

49

SH

A-0

/1

A= 0x67452301, B= 0xefcdab89,

C= 0x98badcfe, D= 0x10325476

E= 0xc3d2e1f0

Ft(X,Y,Z)= (X

∧Y)

∨((

¬X)

∧Z),

t= 0,…,19

Ft(X,Y,Z)= X

⊕Y

⊕Z,

t= 20,…,39

Ft(X,Y,Z)= (X

∧Y)

∨(X

∧Z)

∨(Y

∧Z),

t= 40,…,59

Ft(X,Y,Z)= X

⊕Y

⊕Z, t= 60,…,79

Kt= 0x5a827999, t= 0,…,19

Kt= 0x6ed9eba1, t=20,…,39

Kt= 0x8f1bbcdc, t= 40,…,59

Kt= 0xca62c1d6, t=60,…,79

Do until no more input blocks {

If last input block

Pad to 512 bits by adding 1

then 0s then 64 bits of

length.

Mi= input block(32 bits)

i= 0,…,15

Wt= Mt, t= 0,…,15;

Wt= (Wt-3⊕Wt-8⊕Wt-14⊕Wt-16) <<<1,

t= 16,…,79

a= A; b= B; c= C; d= D; e= E;

for(t=0 to 79) {

x= (a<<<5)+ft(b,c,d)+e+Wt+Kt

e= d; d=c; c= b<<<30;

b=a; a= x;

}

A+= a; B+=b; C+= c; D+= d; E+= e;

}

Abse

nce

of th

is te

rm is

onl

y di

ffere

nce

betw

een

SH

A-0

and

SH

A-1

Page 50: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

50

A C

rypt

ogra

phic

Has

h: S

HA

-1 Pic

ture

from

Wik

iped

ia

Page 51: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

51

A C

rypt

ogra

phic

Has

h: S

HA

-1

Dep

endi

ng o

n th

e ro

und,

the

�non

-line

ar� f

unct

ion

fis

one

of th

e fo

llow

ing.

f(X,Y,Z) = (X

∧Y)

∨((

¬X)

∧Z)

f(X,Y,Z) = (X

∧Y)

∨(X

∧Z)

∨(Y

∧Z)

f(X,Y,Z) = X

⊕Y

⊕Z

Page 52: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

52

A C

rypt

ogra

phic

Has

h: S

HA

-1

Wha

t�s in

the

final

32-

bit t

rans

form

?�

Take

the

right

mos

t wor

d.�

Add

in th

e le

ftmos

t wor

d ro

tate

d 5

bits

.�

Add

in a

roun

d-de

pend

ent f

unct

ion

fof t

he m

iddl

e th

ree

wor

ds.

�Ad

d in

a ro

und-

depe

nden

t con

stan

t.�

Add

in a

por

tion

of th

e 51

2-bi

t mes

sage

.

Page 53: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

53

Bre

akin

g ne

ws

on �C

hine

se� A

ttack

s on

Has

hes

�D

on�t

use

MD

4 or

you

�ll lo

ok re

ally

real

lysi

lly.

�D

on�t

use

MD

5.�

Don

�t us

e R

IPE

MD

-128

�SH

A-1

app

ears

to h

ave

collis

ion

atta

cks

of th

e or

der

264

�U

se S

HA

-2 fu

nctio

ns�

Trun

cate

to p

rovi

de le

gacy

com

patib

ility

if y

ou h

ave

to (i

.e. �

gun

to h

ead)

�R

equi

red

by �S

uite

B� S

tand

ards

Page 54: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

54

SH

A-2

�FI

PS

180

-2, 8

/02.

Def

ines

SH

A-2

56, S

HA

-384

, SH

A-5

12.

�SH

A-2

24 (t

runc

ated

) add

ed 2

/04

�G

reat

incr

ease

in m

ixin

g be

twee

n bi

ts o

f the

wor

ds

com

pare

d to

SH

A-1

.

�U

S P

aten

t 6,8

29,3

55�

Inve

ntor

: Gle

nn L

illy�

Assi

gnee

: NS

A�

Can

obt

ain

sour

ce fr

om

�ht

tp://

en.w

ikip

edia

.org

/wik

i/SH

A-2

Page 55: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

55

Oth

er C

rypt

ogra

phic

Has

hes

and

Per

form

ance

.24

160

RIP

EM

D-1

60

.28

160

SH

A-1

.39

128

RIP

EM

D-1

28

.68

128

MD

5

112

8M

D4

Rel

ativ

e Sp

eed

Blo

ck S

ize

Has

h N

ame

Page 56: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

56

Wha

t to

take

hom

e

�Sy

mm

etric

cip

hers

and

has

hes

prov

ide

key

ingr

edie

nts

for

�dis

tribu

ted

secu

rity�

�Fa

st d

ata

trans

form

atio

n to

pro

vide

con

fiden

tialit

y�

Inte

grity

�P

ublic

key

cry

pto

prov

ides

crit

ical

third

com

pone

nt (t

rust

neg

otia

tion,

key

di

strib

utio

n)�

It�s

impo

rtant

to k

now

pro

perti

es o

f cry

ptog

raph

ic p

rimiti

ves

and

how

lik

ely

poss

ible

atta

cks

are,

etc

.�

Mos

t mod

ern

ciph

ers

are

desi

gned

so

that

kno

win

g ou

tput

of n

-1

mes

sage

s pr

ovid

es n

o us

eful

info

rmat

ion

abou

t nth

mes

sage

.�

This

has

an

effe

ct o

n so

me

mod

es o

f ope

ratio

n.

Page 57: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

57

Gen

eral

Mod

ern

Ref

eren

ces

Bla

ke, S

erou

ssi,

and

Sm

art,

Ellip

tic C

urve

s in

Cry

ptog

raph

y, C

ambr

idge

B

ress

oud

and

Wag

on, C

ompu

tatio

nal N

umbe

r The

ory.

Key

Pre

ss.

Bac

h an

d S

halli

t, A

lgor

ithm

ic N

umbe

r The

ory.

Ber

leka

mp,

Alg

ebra

ic C

odin

g Th

eory

. R

eprin

ted

by A

egea

n P

ark

Pres

s.B

iham

and

Sha

mir,

Diff

eren

tial C

rypt

anal

ysis

of D

ES

. Spr

inge

r.B

oneh

, Tw

enty

Yea

rs o

f atta

cks

on R

SA

. N

otic

es A

MS

.B

uchm

ann,

Intro

duct

ion

to C

rypt

ogra

phy.

Spr

inge

r.C

ohen

, A C

ours

e in

Com

puta

tiona

l Alg

ebra

ic N

umbe

r The

ory.

Spr

inge

r.D

amga

rd, L

ectu

res

on D

ata

Sec

urity

. Spr

inge

r.G

olum

b, S

hift

Reg

iste

r Seq

uenc

es.

Rep

rinte

d by

Aeg

ean

Par

k P

ress

.K

oblit

z, A

Cou

rse

in N

umbe

r The

ory

and

Cry

ptog

raph

y. S

prin

ger.

Kob

litz,

Alg

ebra

ic A

spec

ts o

f Cry

ptog

raph

y. S

prin

ger.

Kon

heim

, Cry

ptog

raph

y: A

Prim

er.

Wile

y.

Page 58: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

58

Gen

eral

Mod

ern

Ref

eren

ces

Land

au, D

ES

, AE

S,

Sur

vey

artic

le.

Not

ices

AM

S.

Mac

Willi

ams

et. a

l., T

heor

y of

Err

or C

orre

ctin

g C

odes

. N

orth

Hol

land

.M

enez

es, v

an O

orsh

ot, V

anst

one,

Han

dboo

k of

App

lied

Cry

ptog

raph

y.

(Onl

ine:

http

://w

ww

.cac

r.mat

h.uw

ater

loo.

ca/h

ac/).

CR

C P

ress

.R

hee,

Cry

ptog

raph

y an

d S

ecur

e C

omm

unic

atio

ns.

Riv

est,

Cla

ss n

otes

on

Sec

urity

and

Cry

pto

onlin

e. (w

eb.m

it.ed

u).

Sch

neie

r, A

pplie

d C

rypt

ogra

phy.

Wile

y.S

imov

its, T

he D

ES

: Doc

umen

tatio

n an

d E

valu

atio

n. A

egea

n P

ark

Pre

ss.

Stin

son,

Cry

ptog

raph

y: T

heor

y an

d Pr

actic

e. C

RC

Pre

ss.

Wel

ch, C

odes

and

Cry

ptog

raph

y. O

xfor

d.

Web

site

s: w

ww

.rsa.

com

, ww

w.c

ount

erpa

ne.c

om, w

ww

.iacr

.org

has

load

s of

pre

prin

ts.

Page 59: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

59

Hom

ewor

k 7

1.W

e sa

w th

at a

typi

cal r

ound

of A

ES

con

sist

ed o

f the

follo

win

g op

erat

ions

:for each byte, b in state

ByteSub(b)

ShiftRow(state)

if(i<Nr)

MixCol(state)

AddRoundKey(i, state)

For t

he 1

28 b

it ke

y, 1

28 b

it bl

ock

size

ver

sion

of R

ijnda

el, u

sing

look

up ta

bles

to

redu

ce th

e co

mpu

tatio

ns re

quire

d an

d as

sum

ing

basi

c op

erat

ions

(32

bi

t loo

kup,

32

bit x

or, e

tc) a

ll ta

ke a

bout

.001

mic

rose

cond

s an

d yo

ur

code

/dat

a bu

dget

is u

nder

16

MB

, des

ign

a im

plem

enta

tion

of th

e ro

und

oper

atio

ns th

at is

fast

er th

an im

plem

entin

g ea

ch o

f the

prim

itive

op

erat

ions

(Byt

eSub

, Shi

ftRow

, Mix

Col

).

How

long

doe

s ea

ch ro

und

take

(abo

ut)?

Cou

nter

mod

e us

e of

AE

S is

use

d by

sel

ectin

g a

nonc

e (n

) and

con

stru

ctin

g ci

pher

blo

cks

AE

S K(n

||ctr)

, AE

SK(n

||ctr+

1), A

ES

K(n

||ctr+

2),�

. Th

e re

sulti

ng b

its a

re x

ored

into

the

plai

ntex

t (as

with

the

stre

am c

iphe

r).

Wha

t pro

perti

es o

f AE

S m

ake

this

saf

e? C

an th

e ke

ystre

ambe

ge

nera

ted

in p

arra

llela

nd s

tore

d fo

r lat

er u

se?

Wha

t per

form

ance

pr

oper

ties

does

this

mod

e ha

ve o

ver E

CB

?

Page 60: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

60

Hom

ewor

k 7

2.S

how

that

f(x)

= x2

(mod

pq)

is a

One

-Way

Fun

ctio

n bu

t is

not

Col

lisio

n R

esis

tant

, whe

re p

and

q a

re p

rime.

3.Li

near

Fee

dbac

k S

hift

Reg

iste

rs C

rypt

osys

tem

: S

uppo

se X

is a

cry

ptos

yste

m im

plem

ente

d by

a 5

el

emen

t lin

ear f

eedb

ack

shift

regi

ster

whi

ch g

ener

ates

a

psue

dora

ndom

stre

am s

0, s 1

, s2,

�so

�s n

+5=

a 4s n

+4 ⊕

a 3s n

+3 ⊕

a 2s n

+2 ⊕

a 1s n

+1 ⊕

a 0s n

If th

e fir

st 1

0 ou

tput

bits

of t

he p

seud

o ra

ndom

gen

erat

or a

re

1110

1000

10, w

hat a

re th

e ne

xt 3

bits

? A

ssum

e n

is th

e re

gist

er

leng

th.

Abo

ut h

ow m

any

cons

ecut

ive

bits

do

you

need

to b

reak

a

LFS

R?

How

doe

s th

is c

ompa

re to

a s

tream

gen

erat

or o

n an

n

bit s

tate

that

is n

ot li

near

?

Page 61: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

61

Hom

ewor

k 7

4.G

iven

i= 6

4, j=

245

and

S is

as

stat

ed b

elow

, wha

t are

th

e ne

xt 4

byt

es o

f out

put o

f RC

4? E

stim

ate

the

spee

d of

enc

rypt

ing

the

next

4 b

ytes

of o

utpu

t of a

n R

C4

ciph

er o

n a

com

pute

r in

whi

ch a

ssig

nmen

t add

ition

and

lo

gica

l AN

D re

quire

s .0

01 m

icro

seco

nds.

5.S

uppo

se tw

o pa

rties

sha

re a

sec

ret k

ey k

and

wis

h to

co

mm

unic

ate

a se

ries

of �y

es/n

o�an

swer

s ov

er a

pub

lic

chan

nel w

ithou

t dis

clos

ing

the

answ

ers.

Des

ign

a pr

otoc

ol to

do

this

usi

ng a

MA

C.

Be

care

ful t

o m

ake

sure

the

adve

rsar

y ca

nnot

figu

re o

ut a

ll th

e an

swer

s if

they

kno

w w

heth

er th

e �c

ode�

for a

few

of t

he y

es/n

o an

swer

s.

Page 62: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

62

Hom

ewor

k 7

S[1

28�

255]

:

0x6d 0x15 0xc2 0xab 0x7a 0xa4 0x3f 0x00

0x48 0xa3 0xd1 0x4a 0x75 0xb7 0x85 0xd8

0xfb 0xfe 0xf2 0xe6 0x13 0x56 0xec 0xa7

0x9a 0xe2 0x64 0x53 0x5f 0x65 0xd3 0xc8

0x68 0x74 0x02 0xdc 0x6f 0x43 0xe1 0x8b

0xbf 0xa2 0x2a 0x80 0xbb 0x6a 0x28 0x78

0x17 0xf6 0xfc 0x67 0xb3 0x9e 0xcb 0x31

0xf9 0xaa 0x9b 0x2b 0xb8 0x1a 0x3e 0xf8

0xd2 0x5c 0x20 0x11 0x4b 0x3b 0x0b 0x6e

0xaf 0xca 0x6b 0x60 0x94 0x5a 0x61 0x27

0xb5 0x7e 0x4d 0xbe 0x57 0x26 0xcf 0xef

0xbc 0x40 0x72 0x14 0x83 0x47 0xf7 0x1b

0x79 0x50 0x1f 0x3c 0x5e 0x0f 0xf5 0x62

0x6c 0x21 0x70 0x4f 0xeb 0xea 0x98 0xfa

0xba 0x46 0x01 0xcd 0x88 0x0e 0x39 0xc1

0xd0 0xdf 0x2f 0x0c 0x29 0x66 0xd6 0xe8

S[0

�12

7]:

0x08 0xa5 0xe9 0x09 0x45 0xc0 0xed 0xf1

0x5d 0xfd 0x34 0xc3 0x4e 0x7b 0x9d 0x96

0x38 0x76 0x7c 0x49 0x8f 0xd9 0x35 0xcc

0x99 0xb0 0x2d 0x97 0xe7 0x1d 0xa9 0x16

0x7d 0x10 0x8c 0x89 0x51 0xa1 0xd7 0x5b

0x3d 0x1c 0x23 0x1e 0xe0 0xb2 0x84 0xa8

0xc5 0x24 0x86 0xb9 0x07 0xac 0xf0 0x52

0x32 0x92 0xda 0x06 0xe4 0xd4 0x82 0xd5

0xdb 0xae 0x04 0x4c 0x36 0xc6 0x19 0x2e

0xb4 0x2c 0x69 0xc7 0xce 0x71 0x91 0xa6

0xde 0x22 0x59 0xf4 0x54 0x25 0x42 0x0d

0xff 0x03 0x0a 0x44 0x87 0x37 0x8e 0x12

0x30 0x33 0x58 0x3a 0x81 0xf3 0x8d 0x9f

0xbd 0xc4 0x95 0x73 0x93 0x55 0x41 0xb6

0x90 0x63 0x9c 0x18 0x77 0xdd 0xe3 0xc9

0x8a 0xb1 0x7f 0xee 0xe5 0xad 0x05 0xa0

Page 63: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

63

Bac

kup

Page 64: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

64

Diff

eren

tial C

rypt

anal

ysis

: Ove

rvie

wLe

t P=(

P L, P

R),

P*=

(PL* ,

P R* )

and

C=

(CL,

CR),

C*=

(CL* ,

CR

* ) be

pai

rs o

f inp

uts

and

outp

uts

with

pre

scrib

ed x

ors

P�=

(PL� ,

PR

� ) =

(PL,

P R) ∆

(PL* ,

PR

* ) C

�=(C

L� , C

R� )

= (C

L, C

R) ∆

(CL* ,

CR

* )

Out

put x

or d

epen

ds n

on u

nifo

rmly

on

key

bits

. Le

t non

uni

form

dis

tribu

tion

�vot

e� o

n se

t co

ntai

ning

key

s.

Use

s ch

osen

pla

inte

xt/c

iphe

rtext

pai

rs to

get

en

ough

com

plia

nt p

airs

by

follo

win

g th

e xo

rof

two

plai

ntex

ts th

roug

h ro

unds

of D

ES

.E

xam

ine

last

roun

d to

dis

cove

r key

∆ ∆

∆∆

PP

*

K

S-b

ox CC

*

C�

S-b

ox

P� ==

Page 65: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

65

Diff

eren

tial P

rofil

e of

sin

gle

S-b

ox

�Fo

r pre

scrib

ed in

put a

nd o

utpu

t diff

eren

ces

x�,y

� set

D

j(x�,y

�)= {u

: Sj(u

∆x�

) ∆S j

(u)=

y�},

then

�N

ote

that

u, u

∆x�

, u∆

k, u∆

x�∆

kw

ill al

l app

ear i

n th

is s

et�

k e

x ∆

Dj(x

�,y�),

if x

is a

n in

put (

pre-

key)

to S

i.

�|D

j(x�,

y�)|

has

non

unifo

rm d

istri

butio

n.�

For g

iven

inpu

t diff

eren

ce a

bout

80%

of t

he o

utpu

t di

ffere

nces

are

pos

sibl

e.�

p =

|Dj(x

�, y�

)| /2

m, m

is th

e di

men

sion

of t

he s

pace

of a

�. .�

Sham

ir an

d B

iham

den

ote

this

as

x� Ø

y� ,

p.

Page 66: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

66

S1

Diff

eren

tial D

istri

butio

nS box 1

In 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f

0 64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1 0 0 0 6 0 2 4 4 0 10 12 4 10 6 2 4

2 0 0 0 8 0 4 4 4 0 6 8 6 12 6 4 2

3 14 4 2 2 10 6 4 2 6 4 4 0 2 2 2 0

4 0 0 0 6 0 10 10 6 0 4 6 4 2 8 6 2

5 4 8 6 2 2 4 4 2 0 4 4 0 12 2 4 6

6 0 4 2 4 8 2 6 2 8 4 4 2 4 2 0 12

7 2 4 10 4 0 4 8 4 2 4 8 2 2 2 4 4

8 0 0 0 12 0 8 8 4 0 6 2 8 8 2 2 4

9 10 2 4 0 2 4 6 0 2 2 8 0 10 0 2 12

a 0 8 6 2 2 8 6 0 6 4 6 0 4 0 2 10

b 2 4 0 10 2 2 4 0 2 6 2 6 6 4 2 12

c 0 0 0 8 0 6 6 0 0 6 6 4 6 6 14

2

d 6 6 4 8 4 8 2 6 0 6 4 6 0 2 0 2

e 0 4 8 8 6 6 4 0 6 6 4 0 0 4 0 8

f 2 0 2 4 4 6 4 2 4 8 2 2 2 6 8 8

10 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 14 0 6 6 12 4 6 8 6

11 6 8 2 4 6 4 8 6 4 0 6 6 0 4 0 0

12 0 8 4 2 6 6 4 6 6 4 2 6 6 0 4 0

Page 67: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

67

S1

Diff

eren

tial D

istri

butio

n: a

noth

er v

iew

S box 1

D1(00, 0d): 0 found

D1(01, 0d): (0a,0b) (0b,0a) (22,23) (23,22) (3e,3f) (3f,3e) 6 found

D1(02, 0d): (08,0a) (0a,08) (29,2b) (2b,29) (35,37) (37,35) 6 found

D1(03, 0d): (14,17) (17,14) 2 found

D1(04, 0d): (13,17) (17,13) (1b,1f) (1f,1b) (2a,2e) (2e,2a) (3b,3f)

(3f,3b) 8 found

D1(05, 0d): (01,04) (04,01) 2 found

D1(06, 0d): (21,27) (27,21) 2 found

… … …

D1(33, 0d): (07,34) (0d,3e) (1a,29) (29,1a) (34,07)

(3e,0d) 6 found

D1(34, 0d): (06,32) (10,24) (16,22) (1c,28) (22,16)

(24,10) (28,1c) (32,06) 8 found

D1(35, 0d): (00,35) (35,00) 2 found

D1(36, 0d): (02,34) (0d,3b) (34,02) (3b,0d) 4 found

Page 68: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

68

Exa

mpl

e: D

iffer

entia

l Cry

ptan

alys

is o

f S1

thro

ugh

a si

ngle

roun

dC

onsi

der i

nput

text

s an

d ou

tput

xor

sfro

m S

1 P

1=

0x01

, P1*

= 0

x35

whi

ch p

rodu

ce o

utpu

t xor

C1�=

0x0d

. (S

o C

1�=

0x34

).P

2 =

0x22

, P2*

= 0

x15

whi

ch p

rodu

ce o

utpu

t xor

C2�=

0x03

. (S

o C

2�=

0x34

).

Then

D1(

0x34

, 0xd

)={0

x06,

0x1

0, 0

x16,

0x1

c, 0

x22,

0x2

4, 0

x28,

0x3

2}.

D1(

0x34

, 0x3

)={0

x01,

0x0

2, 0

x15,

0x2

1, 0

x35,

0x3

6}.

And

(1) k

eP

1∆

D1(

0x34

, 0xd

) (2

) k e

P2∆

D1(

0x34

, 0x3

)

(1) r

educ

es th

e po

ssib

le k

ey s

et to

{0x0

7, 0

x33,

0x1

1, 0

x25,

0x1

7, 0

x23,

0x1

d,

0x29

} (2

) red

uces

the

poss

ible

key

set

to {0

x20,

0x1

4, 0

x23,

0x1

7, 0

x34,

0x0

0}.

The

inte

rsec

tion

(and

act

ual p

ossi

bilit

ies)

are

{ 0x

17, 0

x23}

Page 69: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

69

One

Rou

nd D

iffer

entia

l use

d to

ana

lyze

4

roun

d D

ES

Met

hod

Use

1 ro

und

char

acte

ristic

to ri

ght.

Und

o ef

fect

of p

erm

utat

ion

mat

rix

and

solv

e ea

ch S

box

sep

arat

ely.

Th

is a

llow

s us

to s

olve

for 4

8 ke

y bi

ts.

This

1 ro

und

char

acte

ristic

will

be

used

to e

stim

ate

inpu

t xor

in

subs

eque

nt ro

unds

.

20 0

0 00

00

00 0

0 00

00

20 0

0 00

00

00 0

0 00

00

FA�

= 0

a�=

0p

= 1

Page 70: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

70

Diff

eren

tial C

rypt

anal

ysis

of 4

roun

ds

�D

�=a�

∆ B

� ∆L 4

��

d� =

R4�

�Be

caus

e b�

=L0�,

the

outp

ut x

or

of S

2, S 3

, � ,

S 8in

roun

d 2

is

0. T

his

give

s 28

bits

of B

� and

he

nce

28 b

its o

f D� i

s kn

own.

�Si

nce

B� i

s kn

own,

we

can

calc

ulat

e D

�= B

� ∆L 4

� usi

ng 4

en

cryp

ted

pairs

for e

ach

of th

e 7

rele

vant

S b

oxes

. All

key

cand

idat

es a

re in

this

set

w

hich

giv

es 7

x6=4

2 bi

ts o

f key

w

ith h

igh

prob

abilit

y.

L 0=

20 0

0 00

00

R0=

00

00 0

0 00

L 4R

4FA

�a�

FB

�b�

FD

c�

FC

�∆

d�

Page 71: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

71

Com

putin

g a

sing

le c

hara

cter

istic

�Th

e fir

st a

nd m

ost i

mpo

rtant

di

ffere

ntia

l is

(L�,0

) !(L

�,0),

p=1.

�An

othe

r is

(L�,0

x600

0000

0) !

(L� ∆

0x00

8082

00,0

x600

0000

0),

p=1/

4.�

Con

stru

ctio

n:

�E

(0x6

0000

000)

= E(

0110

000

0 �

000

0)=

0011

00 0

0000

0 �

00

0000

�S

1(00

1100

)� !

0xe

with

p=1

/4,

Sj(0

)� !

0 w

ith p

=1, j

>1 a

nd

P(0x

e000

0000

)=0x

0080

8200

.

L in�

Rin�

L out

� Rou

t�

Fp

a�A

Page 72: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

200

6021

2 14

:16

72

Mul

ti-ro

und

Cha

ract

eris

tics

�Se

quen

ce o

f Diff

eren

tials

with

id

entif

ied

inpu

t and

out

put

xors

. Eac

h ro

und

diffe

rent

ial

occu

rs w

ith p

roba

bilit

y p i

.�

Ove

rall

prob

abilit

y: p

= Pp i

�C

hara

cter

istic

to th

e rig

ht is

a

thre

e ro

und

char

acte

ristic

with

pr

obab

ility

(14/

64)2

�U

sed

to a

ppro

xim

ate

diffe

rent

ials

thro

ugh

mul

tiple

ro

unds

. �

Each

pai

r fol

low

ing

the

char

acte

ristic

at e

ach

roun

d is

ca

lled

a �r

ight

pai

r�.

Oth

er

pairs

are

�wro

ng p

airs

.��

Wro

ng p

airs

get

dis

tribu

ted

unifo

rmly

; rig

ht p

airs

follo

w

over

all c

hara

cter

istic

pr

obab

ility.

WP=

00 8

0 82

00

60 0

0 00

00

WC=

00 8

0 82

00

60 0

0 00

00

FA

�= 0

0 80

82

00a�

= 60

00

00 0

0

FB�

= 0

b�=

0∆

FC

�= 0

0 80

82

00c�

= 60

00

00 0

0∆

p =

14/6

4

p =

14/6

4

p =

1

Page 73: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

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:16

73

Thre

e R

ound

Cha

ract

eris

tic

�Th

is c

hara

cter

istic

occ

urs

with

pr

obab

ility

p=1

/16

and

form

s an

est

imat

e fo

r the

diff

eren

tial

inpu

t of t

he 4

thro

und

of th

e 6

roun

ds.

�(0

0 20

00

08

00 0

0 00

04)

!(0

0 00

04

00 0

0 20

00

08)

with

p=1

/16

is a

noth

er s

uch

char

acte

ristic

.

40 0

8 00

00,

40

00 0

0 00

40 0

8 00

00,

40

00 0

0 00

F F∆

F∆

Page 74: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

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:16

74

Diff

eren

tial C

rypt

anal

ysis

of 6

roun

ds

�Su

ppos

e (L

i-1, R

i-1),

k iar

e th

e in

puts

to ro

und

i. P L

= L 0

, PR=

R0.

�L 6

= R

4∆

f(k 6

, R6)

= L 3

∆ f(

k 6, R

6) ∆

f(k 4

, R3)

�L 6

�= L

3� ∆

f(k 6

, R6)

∆ f(

k 6, R

6*) ∆

f(k 4

, R3)

∆ f(

k 4, R

3*)

�L 6

� = C

Lan

d R

6 =C

Rar

e kn

own.

�Es

timat

e L 3

� = 4

0000

000,

R3�

= 40

0800

00, u

sing

the

diffe

rent

ial.

�Se

t S=

P-1(C

L ∆

400

0000

0)=

f(k6,

CR) ∆

f(k 6

, CR

*) ∆

f(k 4

, R3)

∆ f(

k 3, R

3*)=

S 1

(E1)

|| S

2(E

2) ||

� ||

S8(

E8)

whe

re E

1|| E

2|| �

|| E

8 ar

e th

e bi

ts o

btai

ned

by a

pply

ing

E to

400

8000

0.

�E 1

|| E 2

|| �

|| E

8 =0

0100

0000

0000

0000

1010

00..0

=08

||00|

|01|

|10|

|00|

|00|

|00|

|00.

�Si

nce

the

inpu

t Xor

s to

S2,

S5,S

6,S

7,S

8 ar

e 0,

f(k 4

, R3)

∆ f(

k 4, R

3*) i

s 0

in

the

corr

espo

ndin

g ou

tput

bit

posi

tions

and

we

are

left

with

the

sim

ple

diffe

rent

ial:

P-1

(CL ∆

400

0000

0)=

f(k6,

CR) ∆

f(k 6

, CR

*) fo

r S2,

S5,

S6,

S7,S

8.

Page 75: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

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75

Diff

eren

tial C

rypt

anal

ysis

of 6

roun

ds

�Fi

rst c

hara

cter

istic

yie

lds

30 b

its o

f key

. S

econ

d on

e ad

ds

anot

her 1

2 bi

ts o

f key

.�

Rec

all P

-1(C

L ∆

400

0000

0)=

f(k6,

CR) ∆

f(k 6

, CR

*)

for S

2,S

5,S

6,S

7,S

8�

This

occ

urs

with

p=

1/16

.�

Stra

ight

forw

ard

impl

emen

tatio

n yi

eldi

ng 3

0 ke

ybits

:�

Set u

p 230

coun

ters

�Bu

mp

coun

ter f

or s

ugge

sted

key

for e

ach

pair

of n

cho

sen

text

s�

Cor

rect

key

be

will

�vot

ed� a

t lea

st 1

/16

n tim

e (�r

ight

pai

rs�)

�In

corre

ct k

eys

will

be v

oted

rand

omly

eac

h w

ith p

roba

bilit

y 1/

230

Page 76: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

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:16

76

Diff

eren

tial C

rypt

anal

ysis

of 6

roun

ds

�Im

prov

ing

the

�sig

nal t

o no

ise�

ratio

by

�filte

ring�

pai

rs�

For e

ach

of S

2, S

5, S

6, S

7, S

8 w

ith in

put x

or x

� and

out

put x

or y

�, lo

ok a

t x ∆

Dj(x

�,y�).

�If

this

is e

mpt

y, th

is m

ust b

e w

rong

pai

r.�

For a

ny g

iven

S b

ox th

e, th

is h

appe

ns w

ith p

roba

bilit

y .2

.�

The

prob

abilit

y th

at a

ll 5

S b

oxes

hav

e no

n-em

pty

cand

idat

e ke

y se

ts is

(.8)

5 =.3

3. C

all t

his

set o

f pai

rs R

P a

nd th

e co

mpl

emen

t W

P.

�R

P c

onta

ins

1/3

of th

e pa

irs, W

P c

onta

ins

2/3

�In

RP

, the

pro

babi

lity

of a

�cor

rect

vot

e� is

3/1

6

Page 77: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

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77

Alg

ebra

ic A

ttack

s

�As

we�

ve s

een,

cip

herte

xt c

an b

e ex

pres

sed

as a

lgeb

raic

func

tion

of

keys

and

pla

inte

xt (L

agra

nge

Inte

rpol

atio

n Th

eore

m).

�So

met

imes

key

bits

are

exp

ress

ible

as

func

tions

of p

lain

and

cip

her

text

s�

Thes

e ar

e ea

sy to

sol

ve if

the

equa

tions

are

line

ar e

ven

for v

ery

larg

e ke

y sp

aces

.�

Thes

e ar

e ve

ry h

ard

to s

olve

if th

e eq

uatio

ns a

re e

ven

quad

ratic

(NP

-ha

rd in

fact

, see

�Gen

eral

Sys

tem

of Q

uadr

atic

Equ

atio

ns�s

lide)

.�

Gen

eral

pro

blem

is �F

ind

one

solu

tion

of a

sys

tem

of m

equa

tions

in n

varia

bles

of b

ound

ed d

egre

e, D

, ove

r K (u

sual

ly fi

nite

): Σ

ba b

xb

+ c i

= 0,

xb

= x 1

b 1x 2

b 2...

Xnb n

, Σib

i cD

�W

e re

fer t

o th

is p

robl

em a

s S

olve

Alg

ebra

ic(K

,D,m

,n) a

nd o

ften

abbr

evia

te e

quat

ions

as

l j(x)

= 0.

Page 78: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

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78

Sol

ving

Sol

veA

lgeb

raic

(K,D

,m,n

)

�C

lass

ic T

echn

ique

is G

robn

er B

asis

, see

�La

uritz

en,

Con

cret

e A

bstra

ct A

lgeb

ra.

Cam

brid

ge.

�C

ox, L

ittle

, O�S

hea,

Usi

ng A

lgeb

raic

Geo

met

ry.

Spr

inge

r.�

Gro

bner

use

s B

uchb

erge

r�s A

lgor

ithm

whi

ch is

dou

bly

expo

nent

ial t

ime

in th

e w

orst

cas

e si

nce

the

mon

omia

l gro

w v

ery

rapi

dly

and

sing

ly

expo

nent

ial t

ime

on a

vera

ge.

�Th

is is

not

pra

ctic

al fo

r n>1

5.�

How

ever

, we

can

do b

ette

r with

an

over

defin

ed s

et o

f equ

atio

ns (m

>n).

�N

ote

first

that

if w

e pi

ck m

rand

om e

quat

ions

m>n

they

will

like

ly b

e in

cons

iste

nt.

�Le

t�s s

ee h

ow w

e m

ight

sol

ve o

verd

eter

min

ed s

yste

ms

by s

olvi

ng th

em

as w

e do

line

ar e

quat

ions

afte

r we

prov

e th

at s

olvi

ng e

ven

quad

ratic

sy

stem

s of

equ

atio

ns is

NP

har

d.

Page 79: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

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79

SH

A-0

Stra

tegy

(Cha

baud

and

Jou

x)

�Ba

sic

idea

is to

look

for s

mal

l diff

eren

ces

that

can

be

track

ed th

roug

h ro

unds

like

diff

eren

tial c

rypt

anal

ysis

.�

Con

side

r thr

ee a

ppro

xim

atio

ns to

the

SH

A-0

com

pres

sion

fu

nctio

n.�

SHI-1

�U

se X

or in

stea

d of

Add

�M

ake

f(i)lin

ear

�SH

I-2�

Use

Xor

inst

ead

of A

dd�

Res

tore

f(i)to

orig

inal

val

ues

�SH

I-3�

Res

tore

Add

�M

ake

f(i)lin

ear

Page 80: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

JLM

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:16

80

SH

I-1 F

indi

ng C

ollis

ions

�As

sum

e th

e W

(i)ar

e un

rela

ted

and

follo

w p

rogr

ess

of a

cha

nge

to W

(1) .

RO

L 30(

W1 +

RO

L5(A

)+f(B

,C,D

)+E

+K)

5

W6 +

� -

fixes

W1

pertu

rbat

ion

64

RO

L 30(

-)3

W2 +

�2

DC

RO

L 30(

B)

AW

1 +R

OL 5

(A)+

f(B,C

,D)+

E+K

1

ED

CB

A

Page 81: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

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81

SH

I-1 E

rror

Pro

paga

tion

in H

ash E(i+

5)E 3

1(i+4)

E(i)

D(i+

5)D

31(i+

3)D

(i)

C(i+

5)C

31(i+

2)C

(i)

B(i+5)

B 31(i+

1)B(i)

A(i+5)

A(i+4)

A(i+3)

A(i+2)

A(i+1)

A 1(i)

A(i)

W31

(i+5)

W31

(i+4)

W31

(i+3)

W1(i+

2)W

6(i+1)

W1(i)

D

Stat

e

Per

turb

atio

nO

n bi

t 1C

orre

ctio

ns d

efin

ing

mas

ks

Page 82: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

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82

Mes

sage

Exp

ansi

on

�Pr

oces

s of

exp

andi

ng fr

om 1

6 32

bit

wor

ds to

80

32 b

it w

ords

in th

e co

mpr

essi

on fu

nctio

n is

cal

led

mes

sage

exp

ansi

on�

MD

5�

Per

mut

atio

ns�

SH

A-0

�Li

near

cod

e (L

FSR

)�

SH

A-1

�Li

near

cod

e w

ith ro

tatio

n

�H

as p

rofo

und

effe

ct o

n po

ssib

le d

istu

rban

ce v

ecto

rs in

Diff

eren

tial

atta

cks

�Be

ing

stud

ied

to p

rovi

de g

reat

er p

rote

ctio

n�

Rep

lace

xor

with

mod

ular

add

ition

to p

reve

nt c

odew

ord

diffe

renc

e pr

opag

atio

n�

Con

ditio

ns o

n ch

aini

ng v

aria

bles

for l

ocal

col

lisio

n (P

rob

betw

een

2-39

and

2-42 )

Page 83: ty 1 AES and Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes John Manferdelli … · 2006. 2. 14. · JLM 20060212 14:16 2 AES History Ł Call for DES successor 1/97 Ł Square begets Rijndael (1998)

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83

End


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