Uncovering High-Level Corruption: Cross-National Corruption Proxies Using Government Contracting Data Mihály Fazekas Government Transparency Institute and University of Cambridge, mf436@ cam.ac.uk 2016.02.14. 1 Workshop: Indicatori rischio corruzione nel ciclo del contratto pubblico: problemi di identificazione e potenzialità di analisi e valutazione della spesa 4/2/2015; ANAC, Rome, Italy This project is co-funded by the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development of the European Union
Transcript
This project is co-funded by the
Seventh Framework Programme for
Research and Technological
Development of the European Union
Uncovering High-Level Corruption:
Cross-National Corruption Proxies Using
Government Contracting Data
Mihály Fazekas
Government Transparency Institute and University of Cambridge, [email protected]
2016.02.14. 1
Workshop: Indicatori rischio corruzione nel ciclo del contratto pubblico: problemi
di identificazione e potenzialità di analisi e valutazione della spesa
In public procurement, the aim of [institutionalised] corruption is to steer the contract to the favored bidder without detection. This is done in a number of ways, including:
– Avoiding competition through, e.g., unjustified sole sourcing or direct contracting awards.
– Favoring a certain bidder by tailoring specifications, sharing inside information, etc.
See: World Bank Integrity Presidency (2009) Fraud and Corruption. AwarenessHandbook, World Bank, Washington DC. pp. 7.
2016.02.14. 8
This project is co-funded by the
Seventh Framework Programme for
Research and Technological
Development of the European Union
‚Red flags’ for measuring corruption risks in PP
2016.02.14. 9
1. Single bid submitted
2. Procedure type
3. Call for tenders not published in official journal
4. Weight of non-price assessment criteria
5. Length advertisement period
6. Length of decision period
A lot more available, but data source dependent
This project is co-funded by the
Seventh Framework Programme for
Research and Technological
Development of the European Union
Number of bidders predicts prices
• Price savings by the number of bidders
• 543,705 contracts, EU27, 2009-2014
2016.02.14. 10
This project is co-funded by the
Seventh Framework Programme for
Research and Technological
Development of the European Union
2016.02.14. 11
Single bidding correlates with perceptions
ATBE
BG
CY
CZ
DE
DK
EE
ES
FI
FR
GR
HU
IE
IT
LT
LU
LV
NL
PL
PT
RO
SE
SI
SK
UK
y = -0.0047x + 0.4822R² = 0.4621
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
35 45 55 65 75 85 95
Shar
e o
f si
ngl
e b
idd
er t
end
ers
(20
09
-20
13
)
TI - Corruption Perception Index (2013)
This project is co-funded by the
Seventh Framework Programme for
Research and Technological
Development of the European Union
Regional differences - EU
2016.02.14. 12
Single bidding is
also confirmed by
perceptions on the
regional level
This project is co-funded by the
Seventh Framework Programme for
Research and Technological
Development of the European Union
Limitations
• Data scope
• Data quality
• Sophisticates can avoid detection
• Reflexivity
• Law enforcement capacity
2016.02.14. 13
This project is co-funded by the
Seventh Framework Programme for
Research and Technological
Development of the European Union
Anticorruption tools
Combining Big Data analytics with collective
action (DIGIWHIST)
Data publication&citizen monitoring portal
• Countless global examples: Bangladesh,
Brazil, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Equador, Hungary, Slovakia, UK...
2016.02.14. 14
This project is co-funded by the
Seventh Framework Programme for
Research and Technological
Development of the European Union
2016.02.14. 15
www.tendertracking.eu
This project is co-funded by the
Seventh Framework Programme for
Research and Technological
Development of the European Union
2016.02.14. 16
This project is co-funded by the
Seventh Framework Programme for
Research and Technological
Development of the European Union
2016.02.14. 17
This project is co-funded by the
Seventh Framework Programme for
Research and Technological
Development of the European Union
2016.02.14. 18
This project is co-funded by the
Seventh Framework Programme for
Research and Technological
Development of the European Union
Further readings: digiwhist.eu & govtransparency.eu
Fazekas, M. and Tóth, I. J. (2016). From corruption to state capture: A new analytical framework with empirical applications from Hungary. Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming.
Fazekas, M., Tóth, I. J., & King, L. P. (2016). Anatomy of grand corruption: A composite corruption risk index based on objective data. European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research, forthcoming
Charron, N., Dahlström, C., Fazekas, M., & Lapuente, V. (2015). Carriers, connections, and corruption risks in Europe. 2015:6, Quality of Government Institute, Gothenburg.
Fazekas, M., & Kocsis, G. (2015). Uncovering High-Level Corruption: Cross-National Corruption Proxies Using Government Contracting Data. GTI-WP/2015:02, Government Transparency Institute, Budapest.
Fazekas, M., Lukács, P. A., & Tóth, I. J. (2015). The Political Economy of Grand Corruption in Public Procurement in the Construction Sector of Hungary. In A. Mungiu-Pippidi (Ed.), Government Favouritism inEurope The Anticorruption Report 3 (pp. 53–68). Berlin: Barbara Budrich Publishers.
Czibik, Ágnes; Fazekas, Mihály; Tóth, Bence; and Tóth, István János (2014), Toolkit for detecting collusivebidding in public procurement. With examples from Hungary. GTI-WP/2014:02, Government TransparencyInstitute, Budapest.
Fazekas, M., Chvalkovská, J., Skuhrovec, J., Tóth, I. J., & King, L. P. (2014). Are EU funds a corruptionrisk? The impact of EU funds on grand corruption in Central and Eastern Europe. In A. Mungiu-Pippidi(Ed.), The Anticorruption Frontline. The ANTICORRP Project, vol. 2. (pp. 68–89). Berlin: Barbara BudrichPublishers.
Fazekas, M., Tóth, I. J. (2014), Three indicators of institutionalised grand corruption using administrative data. Budapest: U4-Policy Brief, Bergen, Norway
Fazekas, M., Tóth, I. J., & King, L. P. (2013). Corruption manual for beginners: Inventory of elementary “corruption techniques” in public procurement using the case of Hungary. GTI-WP/2013:01, GovernmentTransparency Institute, Budapest.
