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1 Prior to October 26, 1999, Xcelera was named The Scandinavia Company, Inc. and traded on the American Stock Exchange under the Symbol SCF. Effective December 6. 2000, the Company again changed its name from Xcelera.com to Xcelera. The Company trades on the American Stock Exchange under the symbol XLA. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS IN RE: XCELERA.COM ) CIVIL ACTION NO. SECURITIES LITIGATION ) 00-C V-I 1649 (RWZ) ) THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: ) ALL ACTIONS ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED ) CONSOLIDATED AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, by their undersigned attorneys, allege upon personal knowledge as to themselves and their own acts, and information and belief as to all other matters, based upon, inter alia, the investigation conducted by and through their attorneys, as described in paragraph 10 below, as follows: NATURE OF THE ACTION 1. This is a class action filed on behalf of all persons who purchased the common stock of Xcelera.com, Inc. (Xcelera or the Company) 1 during the period April 1, 1999 through and including August 8, 2000 (the Class Period), to recover damages caused by defendants violations of the federal securities laws. 2. Xcelera is an Internet holding company based in the Grand Cayman Islands. On April 1, 1999, defendants announced Xcelera acquired a majority interest in Woburn, Massachusetts-based, Minor Image Internet, Inc. (Minor Image), an Internet caching company. Defendants failed to disclose, however, that a substantial portion of the funds used to acquire a majority interest in Minor Image, $3.24 million, was contributed by defendants joint venture partners
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Prior to October 26, 1999, Xcelera was named The Scandinavia Company, Inc. and traded on theAmerican Stock Exchange under the Symbol SCF. Effective December 6. 2000, the Company again changed itsname from Xcelera.com to Xcelera. The Company trades on the American Stock Exchange under the symbolXLA.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN RE: XCELERA.COM ) CIVIL ACTION NO.SECURITIES LITIGATION ) 00-C V-I 1649 (RWZ) )

THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: ) ALL ACTIONS ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED )

CONSOLIDATED AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, by their

undersigned attorneys, allege upon personal knowledge as to themselves and their own acts,

and information and belief as to all other matters, based upon, inter alia, the investigation

conducted by and through their attorneys, as described in paragraph 10 below, as follows:

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. This is a class action filed on behalf of all persons who purchased the common

stock of Xcelera.com, Inc. (Xcelera or the Company)1 during the period April

1, 1999 through and including August 8, 2000 (the Class Period), to recover

damages caused by defendants violations of the federal securities laws.

2. Xcelera is an Internet holding company based in the Grand Cayman Islands.

On April 1, 1999, defendants announced Xcelera acquired a majority interest

in Woburn, Massachusetts-based, Minor Image Internet, Inc. (Minor Image),

an Internet caching company. Defendants failed to disclose, however, that a

substantial portion of the funds used to acquire a majority interest in Minor

Image, $3.24 million, was contributed by defendants joint venture partners

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Kahnberget Holding, Ltd. and JAM Investments Ltd. (Kahnberget/JAM).

Defendants failed to disclose that pursuant to the joint venture agreement, as of

April 1, 1999, Kahnberget/JAM was entitled to 50% of all Minor Image stock

claimed to be owned by Xcelera. Defendants failed to disclose that they had

wrongfully converted $3.24 million belonging to Kahnberget/JAM for

defendants use in acquiring Minor Image stock. Finally, defendants failed to

disclose that Kahnberget/JAM had claims against defendants for 50% of the

purchased Minor Image shares, in accordance with the joint venture agreement.

3. Later in April 1999, defendants induced their joint venture partner,

Kahnberget/JAM, to modify the 50%-50% joint venture agreement to a 60%-

40% joint venture agreement with defendants providing 60% of the capital

investment in Minor Image and Kahnberget/JAM providing 40%, and each

party receiving a corresponding equity stake in Minor Image. In exchange for

this modification, defendants agreed to issue 219,000 shares of Xcelera stock

to Kahnberget/JAM. Despite repeated requests by Kahnberget/JAM that

defendants deliver the Xcelera shares as agreed, defendants failed to deliver the

Xcelera shares in accordance with the 60%-40% joint venture agreement. As a

result of stock splits of Xcelera shares since the 60%-40% joint venture

agreement, the original 219,000 shares are now equivalent to approximately

5.2 million Xcelera shares. Thus, the issuance of Xcelera stock to

Kahnberget/JAM pursuant to the 60%- 40% joint venture agreement will result

in substantial dilution of Xceleras shareholders equity.

4. Defendants misappropriation of Kahnbergets/JAMs $3.24 million investment in

Minor Image and the failure to deliver Xcelera shares pursuant to the 60%-

40% joint venture agreement are the subject of litigation initiated on November

15, 2000 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New

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York in JAM Investments, Ltd. and Kahnberget Holdings. Ltd. v. Alexander

Vik and VBI Corp., Civil Action No. 00-CV-8733.

5. It was not until August 4, 2000 more than a year and four months after the

Minor Image transaction and the 60%-40% joint venture agreement that

Xceleras Form 20-F Annual Report for the fiscal year ended January 31, 2000

became publicly available. In the fiscal year 2000 Form 20-F, defendants for

the first time made scant reference to the risk of dilution of Xcelera stock as a

result of defendants misappropriation of Minor Image stock and the 60%-40%

joint venture agreement. However, defendants disclosure was sorely inadequate

considering that on July 31, 2000 defendants entered into an agreement with

Kahnberget/JAM to tender Xcelera shares to Kahnberget/JAM. Investors and

the market were not aware of the July 31, 2000 agreement until November 29,

2000 when Xcelera filed a Form 6-K with the SEC and attached as Exhibit 1

the July 31, 2000 agreement.

6. On August 9, 2000, Bloomberg News reported Xcelera may have to hand

over what looks to be as much as $622 million worth of Xcelera.com stock. At

Xcelera.coms price of about $14 a share, that would require the issuance of

almost 45 million new shares in the company, diluting existing shareholders by

nearly 45 percent. This, too, is something U.S. shareholders are now learning

about from the company for the first time. (Emphasis added.)

7. On March 22,2000, Xcelera sold 15% of its Mirror Image subsidiary to

Exodus CommunicationsTM, Inc. (Exodus), for cash and stock valued at

approximately $637.5 million. At that time, Xcelera intentionally or recklessly

failed to disclose to the investing public that Xcelera met the stock ownership

prong of the Foreign Personal Holding Company (FPHC) rules and risked

having its U.S. shareholders subject to special income tax provisions and

2 All stock prices stated herein have been adjusted to reflect Xcelera's five stock splits during theClass Period, namely the Company's: September 22, 1999 three for two split; October 23, 1999 two for one split;January 8, 2000 two for one split; March 4, 2000 two for one split; and April 29, 2000 two for one split.

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income tax liability. In fact, the truth about the Exodus transaction, the

Companys FPHC classification and the tax ramifications were not revealed until

nearly four months following the announcement of the Exodus deal.

8. During the Class Period, defendants Alexander and Gustav Vik dumped more

than 3 million shares of Xcelera stock on the unsuspecting public, reaping

proceeds of over $250 million.

9. Xcelera's stock price traded as high as $112.50 during the Class Period before

falling to $11.75 at the end of the Class Period when the investing public

learned of the Companys classification as an FPHC and the potential tax

burden imposed on U.S. shareholders as well as the dilutive impact of the

Minor Image transaction in April 1999.2

LEAD PLAINTIFFS’ INVESTIGATION

10. Lead Plaintiffs’ allegations set forth herein are based on a thorough

investigation, conducted by and through their attorneys, of all reasonably

available sources of information, including, but not limited to, publicly available

relevant information, in order to obtain information necessary to plead Plaintiffs

claims with particularity. The nature and scope of Lead Plaintiffs' efforts to

obtain the information needed to plead with particularity included:

(a) Reviewing Xceleras filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange

Commission (the SEC) during the relevant time period, including, but not limited to,

the Companys Annual Reports on Forms 20-F for fiscal years 1997 through 2000; the

Companys Schedule 14A Proxy filed on October 19, 1998, the Companys Schedule

1 3D/A filed on March 10, 2000 and the Companys Forms 6-K filed on November 16,

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1998, September 21, 1999, October 12, 1999, January 27, 2000, February 10, 2000.

June 2. 2000. and November 29, 2000;

(b) Reviewing the Company's press releases and other publicly

disseminated statements made by the Company during the relevant time period;

(c) Reviewing reports, articles, and discussions concerning the Company

and the subject matter of this Complaint contained in the print and electronic media and

computer data bases;

(d) Reviewing reports of securities analysts;

(e) Reviewing pleadings from the action filed in the United States District

Court for the Southern District of New York entitled: Jams Investments. Ltd., et al v.

Alexander Vik. et. al, 00-C V-8733;

(f) Reviewing pleadings from the action filed in the Court of Chancery of

the State of Delaware entitled: Parfi Holding. AB. v. Minor Image Internet, Inc.. C.A.No.

18457NC;

(g) Reviewing the Internal Revenue Code, in particular, provisions relating

to Foreign Personal Holding Companies;

(h) Reviewing the SEC's International Disclosure Standards; and

(i) Interviewing former employees of Mirror Image and Exodus.

11. Except as alleged in this Complaint, the underlying information relating to

defendants misconduct and the particulars thereof are not available to Lead

Plaintiffs and the public, and lie exclusively within the possession and control of

defendants and insiders of Xcelera, thus preventing Lead Plaintiffs from further

detailing defendants' misconduct.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

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12. The claims alleged herein arise under Sections 10(b), 20(a) and 20A of the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b),

78t(a), and 78t- 1. and SEC Rule 1 Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 Ob-5

promulgated thereunder.

13. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to

Section 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

14. Venue is proper in this Judicial District pursuant to Section 27 of the Exchange

Act and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Many of the acts and transactions constituting

the violations of law alleged herein, including the preparation and dissemination

to the investing public of false and misleading information, occurred in

substantial part in this Judicial District. In addition, allegations contained herein

concern Xcelera's Minor Image subsidiary, which maintains its principal place

of business within this Judicial District. Also, on December 18, 2000. January

9, 2001 and January 17, 2001, the Judicial Panel on Multi district Litigation

ordered that all relevant cases stemming from the same set of operative facts as

this Complaint, be transferred to this district. By Order dated January 31,

2001, this Court consolidated all related cases.

15. In connection with the acts, transactions and conduct alleged herein,

defendants, directly and indirectly, used the means and instrumentalities of

interstate commerce, including the United States mails, interstate telephone

communications and the facilities of the national securities exchanges.

THE PARTIES

16. By Order of the Court dated January 31, 2001, Doug Horan, Dana Kender,

Bernard and Miriam Raizner and Bahram Zamanian were appointed Lead

Plaintiffs in this action to represent the interests of the Class. Lead Plaintiffs

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acquired shares of Xcelera common stock at artificially inflated prices during

the Class Period and were damaged thereby.

17. Additional plaintiffs in this action include: Tom Atkin, Barry Family L.P., Gerald

Broder, Mingzhe Chen, Discovery International Association, Mitchell Z.

Grossman. Jerold Hoffman, Jeffrey Jaskol, Katy P. Kitchin, Herman Krangel,

Leonard Ladenheim. Scott Thomas Larson, David Lipshutz, Moses Mayer,

Glover Powell, Aree J. Rand. Brian Reed, Alex Steubler, and Peter

Wasserman. These additional plaintiffs purchased shares of Xcelera common

stock at artificially inflated prices during the Class Period and were damaged

thereby, as set forth on the Certifications annexed to their individual complaints

on file with this Court.

18. Plaintiffs W.E. Barnette, Ruth A. Benner, Mark Berger, Amer Chughtai,

Michael Conn. Ken Delfini, Jose Luis Enriquez. David Finkelstein, Troy Giles, Sarah J. Hall.

Jim Hicks. Bich Nguyen, Alan Kintopf, Kenneth Krishan, Suresh Kudipudi, Jack LaDue,

Martin and Grace Lamorena, Xia Li, Mitchell Orazvi, Hitesh Patel, Keither Shimizu, Michael

Slape, Prechapom Suwatnodom, Keri Sweeten, Beverly Tamashiro, Thian Keat Tay, James

VonAllmen and Claudette Zelkha all purchased shares of the Company's common stock

contemporaneous with the Individual Defendants' sales of shares.

19. Defendant Xcelera is an Internet holding company incorporated and

headquartered in the Cayman Islands. Xcelera's principal subsidiary, Minor Image, is based in

Woburn Massachusetts. According to its press releases, Xcelera is an Internet holding

company, focused on "European Internet companies, Internet infrastructure companies. B2B

companies and companies that provide their complete service and value proposition digitally on

the Internet." The Company has a controlling interest in Minor Image, and several other

Internet-based companies. The Company is controlled by VBI Corporation, which as of July

14, 2000, owned 73% of the Company's outstanding voting securities. VBI Corporation has

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only three beneficial owners, Alexander, Gustav and Erik Vik. Alexander Vik is a director and

officer of VBI Corporation.

20. Defendant Alexander M. Vik ("Alexander Vik") was at all relevant times the

Company's controlling shareholder, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. In addition,

Alexander Vik was, at all relevant times, the Chairman of Minor Image. According to Xceler&s

website, Alexander Vik "maintains his office in Greenwich, Connecticut." Upon information and

belief, Alexander Vik also resides in Greenwich, Connecticut. Alexander Vik was quoted in

and/or responsible for the preparation, approval or release of each statement plaintiffs allege

was false and misleading, including all press releases, interviews and regulatory filings. In

addition, by virtue of his position as Chief Executive Officer, Alexander Vik was under a

continuing duty to direct and control the operations of Xcelera, to exercise due care and

diligence in those operations, and to oversee and review all corporate operations, including the

filing of documents with the SEC and the making of public statements. According to Xcelera's

website, Alexander Vik "has spearheaded the company's move to acquiring interests that focus

on the movement of information across the Internet."

21. Defendant Gustav M. Vik ("Gustav Vik") was the Company's

secretary/treasurer during the Class Period, and is a resident of Princeton, New Jersey. Gustav

Vik was a director and secretary of Minor Image at all relevant times. GustavVik was also a

beneficial owner of VBI Corporation, together with his brothers Alexander and Erik Vik.

22. Defendants Alexander and Gustav Vik are sometimes referred to herein as the

"Individual Defendants" or "the Vik Brothers."

23. By reason of their positions with the Company, the Individual Defendants had

access to internal Company documents, reports and other information, including the adverse

non-public information concerning the Company's services, financial condition, and future

prospects, and attended management and/or board of directors meetings. As a result of the

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foregoing, they were responsible for the truthfulness and accuracy of the Company's public

reports and releases described herein.

24. Xcelera and the Individual Defendants, as officers and directors of a publicly

traded company, had a duty to promptly disseminate truthful and accurate information with

respect to Xcelera and to promptly correct any public statements issued by or on behalf of the

Company that had become false or misleading.

25. Each of the defendants knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that the

misleading statements and omissions complained of herein would adversely affect the integrity

of the market for the Company's stock and would cause the price of the Company's common

stock to become artificially inflated. Each of the defendants acted knowingly or in such a

reckless manner as to constitute a fraud and deceit upon plaintiffs and the other members of the

Class.

26. Defendants are liable, jointly and severally, as direct participants in and co-

conspirators of, the wrongs complained of herein.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

27. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a class consisting of all persons who purchased

Xcelera common stock during the period from April 1, 1999 through and including August 8,

2000 (the "Class Period"), and who suffered damages thereby (the "Class"). Excluded from the

Class are the defendants, any entity in which the defendants have a controlling interest or is a

parent or subsidiary of or is controlled by the Company, and the officers, directors, affiliates,

legal representatives, heirs, predecessors, successors and assigns of the defendants.

28. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is

impracticable. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to the plaintiffs at this time

and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, the plaintiffs believe there are, at a

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minimum, thousands of members of the Class who traded during the Class Period. The

Company had in excess of 105.8 million shares of its common stock outstanding as of January

31, 2000.

29. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and

predominate over any questions affecting solely individual members of the Class. Among the

questions of law and fact common to the Class are:

i) whether the federal securities laws were violated by defendants' acts asalleged herein;

ii) whether the defendants issued false and misleading statements duringthe Class Period;

iii) whether defendants acted knowingly or recklessly in issuing false andmisleading statements;

iv) whether the market prices of the Company's securities during the ClassPeriod were artificially inflated because of the defendants' conductcomplained of herein; and

v) whether the members of the Class have sustained damages and, if so,what is the proper measure of damages.

30. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as

Plaintiffs and members of the Class sustained damages arising out of defendants' wrongful

conduct in violation of federal law as complained of herein.

31. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the

Class and have retained counsel competent and experienced in class actions and securities

litigation. Plaintiffs have no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with those of the Class.

32. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient

adjudication of the controversy since joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable.

Furthermore, because the damages suffered by the individual Class members may be relatively

small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for the Class members

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individually to redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of

this action as a class action.

FRAUD ON THE MARKET PRESUMPTION

33. Plaintiffs will rely, in part, upon the presumption of reliance established by the

fraud-on-the-market doctrine in that:

i) defendants made public misrepresentations or failed to disclose materialfacts during the Class Period;

ii) the omissions and misrepresentations were material;

iii) the securities of the Company traded in an efficient market;

iv) Xcelera traded on the American Stock Exchange and was followed byanalysts, including, Lazard Freres & Co., LLC. The price of Xcelera’sstock reflected the effect of news disseminated in the market;

v) the misrepresentations and omissions alleged would tend to induce areasonable investor to misjudge the value of the Company’s securities;and

vi) plaintiffs and members of the Class purchased their Xcelera stockbetween the time the defendants failed to disclose or misrepresentedmaterial facts and the time the true facts were disclosed, withoutknowledge of the omitted or misrepresented facts.

34. Based upon the following, plaintiffs and members of the Class are entitled to the

presumption of reliance upon the integrity of the market.

NO STATUTORY SAFE HARBOR

35. The statutory safe harbor provided for forward-looking statements under

certain circumstances does not apply to any of the false statements pleaded in this Complaint,

because none of the statements pleaded herein were identified as "forward-looking statements"

when made. Nor did meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that could

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cause actual results to differ materially from those in the statements accompany those

statements. To the extent that the statutory safe harbor does apply to any statements pleaded

herein deemed to be forward-looking, the defendants are liable for those false forward-looking

statements, because at the time each of those statements was made the speaker actually knew

the forward-looking statement was false and/or the statement was authorized and/or approved

by an executive officer of the Company, who actually knew that those statements were false

when made.

BACKGROUND

36. Xcelera was initially incorporated under the name "The Scandinavia Company,

Inc." and focused almost exclusively on hotel operations until 1999. In fact, from 1993 to 1999,

the Company's primary operating assets were confined to certain Spanish hotel properties.

37. On April 26, 1999, however, the Company announced its planned transition

from a hotel operating company into an international Internet holding company. On October 26,

1999, the Company changed its name to Xcelera.com Inc. "to better reflect [the company's]

Internet holdings."

38. Currently, Xcelera purports to be a European Internet technology company that

focuses on founding, developing, operating and financing technology companies in the Internet

infrastructure market. According to the Company's SEC filings, the Company's strategy is to

leverage its "core competencies in content management, content distribution, caching, storing,

searching and streaming by continuing to develop the Minor Image Content Access Point TM

system and to acquire interests in technology,

products, services, people and companies that augment or benefit from Mirror Image’s

technology system.”

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39. As part of the Company's changed business plan, on January 30, 2000, the

Company sold its Spanish real estate operations to concentrate solely on its Internet

investments. As of July 2000, the Company had investments in the following companies:

Minor Image, MNW Records Group, deo.com, e-game, Corechange, Active ISP, Dynamic

Imaging, HelpInHand, MarineProvider, Wideyes, i/o Publishing and Suntail (Xcelera's

"portfolio companies"). Xcelera's investments in the above-listed company's ranged from 5%

to 30% during the Class Period, with the exception of Minor Image.

40. Xcelera’s principal strategy during the Class Period was to develop and take

public its portfolio companies. The Company sought to induce shareholders to purchase

Xcelera stock with the promise of ground floor access to potential initial public offerings

("IPOs"). For example, on March 6, 2000, the Company announced a policy of granting its

public shareholders a preemptive right to subscribe for a portion of IPO shares, at the IPO

price, of each of its portfolio companies when, and if, the respective portfolio company has an

IPO of common stock.

41. The first test of Xcelera' s new business strategy involved the Company s

subsidiary. Minor Image.

Mirror Image Subsidiary

42. As discussed more fully below, in March 1999, Xcelera acquired control of

Minor Image. As described in the Company's Fiscal 2000 Form 20-F, Minor Image is a

Woburn, Massachusetts based company, that "is developing global content distribution services

that address the 'world wide wait' problem on the Internet, by providing Internet download

speed, quality to delivery and scalability through its massive architecture for content

distribution." The key to Minor Image's business is the development and expansion of its

production platform, the Content Access Point TM ("CAP") regional servers and system that

"store and deliver content within major Internet user basins, bypassing Internet congestion and

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reducing speed-of-light latency.” According to the Company's Fiscal 2000 Form 20-F, Minor

Image purports to "install CAPs at key Internet exchange locations worldwide, in proximity to

user populations. From such locations the CAPs serve content directly to Internet users and are

able to connect to thousands of ISP and corporate networks."

43. Minor Image's business strategy is to generate revenue based on data served

through the CAP System, specifically, through three main instaDeliverysrn services:

instaContentsrn, instaStreamsm, and instaSpeedsrn. Minor Image's instaContentsrn service is

intended to provide content distribution for customer's Web sites. In theory, Minor Image

would store a customer’s Web site at Minor Image CAP sites around the globe, so that

endpoint users could more rapidly access the customer’s content. Minor Image’s

instaStreamsrn service is intended to provide streaming media (audio and video) for Web sites.

Essentially, Minor Image customers could upload their media content to the Minor Image

regional CAPs, allowing their users to access the media directly from a closer CAP, rather than

through the customer's own remote, host site. Minor Image’s instaSpeedsrn service is

essentially a data caching service for Internet Service Providers ("ISPs"). In theory, ISPs

would pay Minor Image to store frequently requested data on a regional CAP, thus, reducing

the amount of outbound traffic and bandwidth costs for the

ISP.

44. A February 15, 2000 Internet World article concerning Mirror Image’s new

CEO Cosmos Santullo described Xcelera’s Mirror Image subsidiary as the “linchpin” of

Xcelera, in the Company’s transformation from a “loose conglomerate of hotels and real estate

holdings into a mini-CMGI.”

45. For the year-ended January 31, 2000, Xcelera generated its operating

revenues “primarily from Mirror Image’s services...” In total, the maximum revenue attributable

to Minor Image during Xcelera’s fiscal 2000 was only $37,135. In fact, in its fiscal 2000 Form

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20-F the Company acknowledged, “During the year ended January 31, 2000, Minor Image

was in the process of building out its system and did not generate significant revenues.”

46. In its Fiscal 2000, Form 20-F, the Company also stated that it expected a

“significant portion” of its post-January 31, 2000 revenues to come from Minor Image. The

potential for substantial revenue from Minor Image, however, was unlikely given the fact that

throughout the Class Period the majority of Minor Image’s instaDelivery services were not

commercially available. As of July 31, 2000, Minor Image had only launched its instaSpeed

service commercially, and, that service had only two to four major customers. A February 15,

2000, Internet World article reported that Minor Image “ha[d] signed up only a couple of

paying customers so far” while a July 2000 Lazard Freres analyst report noted that Minor

Image only had four majority ISP customers:

Canierl, PSINet London, C&W and Nildram. By comparison, Minor Image competitor

Akamia had approximately 1,000 customers. Moreover, the instaSpeed service was only

expected to generate, at most, twenty-five percent of Minor Image’s total revenues. According

to a July 2000 Lazard Freres Analyst report, as of July 2000, “Management

believes the instaContent and instaStream product will make up 75% to 80% of the business

going forward, despite the fact that they do not have a publicly released customer..."

Meteoric Stock Price Rise

47. Despite the fact that Minor Image’s CAP technology was not widely or

commercially available, and despite the fact that Minor Image had few, if any, customers or

revenues, Xcelera began a campaign of aggressively hyping the company and its potential, and

the market responded.

48. Xcelera has been described as a “zero-to-hero Internet darling” due to the

Company’s sky rocketing stock price gains during the Class Period. From an opening price of

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$0.208 per share on April 1, 1999. Xcelera’s stock price steadily climbed to a Class Period

high of $112.50 on March 22, 2000, a staggering gain of over 74,000 percent.

49. “From April 1, 1999, to March 23. 2000— a period just shy of one year — this

Cayman Islands based company that almost no one had previously heard of, with audited

financials a year-and-a-half out of date, had risen by 74,333 percent in value to $223 per share

[unadjusted for splits], putting an $1 1.7 billion market valuation on the company on the basis of

nothing but a deluge of self-serving press releases and the enthusiastic writings of two people on

the Web.” Christopher Byron, “Here’s A Wild Rise: Xcelera’s Increase Only 74,000

Percent!,” The New York Observer Aug. 8, 2000.

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XCELERA’S AND KAIINBERGET/JAM’S JOINT ACQUISITIONOF MIRROR IMAGE

50. Defendant Alexander Vik was introduced to the prospect of investing in Minor

Image AB, the parent company of Minor Image, in or about August 1998 by longtime friend

and business relation Tryggwe Karlsten (“Karlsten”). Karlsten was an agent of Kahnberget

Holding, Ltd. (“Kahnberget”), a private investment company owned by Karlsten’s wife, Kerstin

Karlsten. Kahnberget is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of, and with its

principal place of business in, the British Virgin Islands. At all times relevant to this action,

Karlsten was also an agent of JAM Investments Ltd. (“JAM”), a subsidiary of Kahnberget.

51. Throughout their nearly 20-year friendship and business relationship, Karlsten

and Vik engaged in numerous business ventures together on behalf of their various family-

controlled businesses. Among these joint business dealings was the joint acquisition, in or about

1986, of a controlling interest in the Scandinavia Fund (“Scandinavia”), the predecessor

company to Xcelera.

52. In approximately October 1987, Karlsten sold the Karlsten family- controlled

business’ shares in Scandinavia to VBI Corporation (“VBI”). Karlsten remained on the board

of directors of Scandinavia. however, until his resignation in or about April 1999.

Karlsten Family Purchases Approximately $1 MillionWorth of Mirror Image AB Shares

53. In or about June 1998, an investment broker (the “Broker”) approached

Karlsten about a potential investment in Minor Image AB, a privately owned Swedish

Internet technology company. Karlsten became interested in the prospect of a Karlsten family-

controlled business investment in Minor Image AB.

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54. On approximately July 30, 1998, Kerstin Karlsten purchased approximately $1

million worth of shares of Minor Image AB and subsequently sold the shares to Kahnberget.

Following this transaction, in August 1998, Karlsten and the Broker met with Sverker Lindbo

(“Lindbo”), Minor Image AB’s founder, and with David Wu (“Wu”), the company’s second

highest ranking officer just below Lindbo, to discuss Minor Image AB’s need for additional

financing and the possibility of further investment by Karlsten family-controlled businesses.

55. Following the August 1998 meeting, in late summer of 1998, during one of

Karlsten’s frequent telephone conversations with Alexander Vik, Karlsten spoke to Vik for the

first time about Minor Image AB. Karlsten told Vik about the investment that Kahnberget had

already made in Minor Image AB and told Vik that Kahnberget and other Karlsten family-

controlled businesses were considering investing additional funds in Minor Image AB. During

these same conversations, Karlsten discussed with Vik the possibility of Vik and Vik’s family-

controlled businesses investing in Minor Image with the Karlsten family-controlled businesses

on an equal joint venture and investment partnership basis, as they had done in previous

business ventures together.

56. Following Karlsten’s conversations with Vik, Karlsten arranged and attended a

number of business meetings with Lindbo, Wu and Vik. A number of these meetings took place

in Vik’s home in Greenwich, Connecticut, in or about September 1998. Although Vik

continued to express interest in Minor Image AB, he indicated at that time that he was not yet

prepared to invest in Mirror Image AB and wished to continue investigating the company.

-19-

Karlsten Family Purchases Additional 3.6 Million Shares of Mirror Image AB

57. Karlsten, meanwhile, maintained frequent contact with Lindbo throughout the

fall of 1998. Lindbo continued to inform Karlsten that Minor Image AB was in need of

financing, and that in fact its need for capital was becoming desperate. Minor Image AB

subsequently held a $2.5 million stock offering, of which Kahnberget purchased 1.2 million

shares, for approximately $175,000, and of which Vik and Vik’s family- controlled business

purchased 500,000 shares for approximately $80,000.

58. Subsequently, Karlsten and Vik agreed that Kahnberget would purchase an

additional 2.4 million shares at a cost of $350,000, but that it would be held in the name of Vik

Europe Holdings, Ltd. for an agreed upon time and then transferred to Kahnberget. Karlsten

agreed to this arrangement under the premise that it would permit Vik to represent both

Karlsten’s and Vik’s businesses in the on-going negotiations with Lindbo and Mirror Image

AB.

59. The 2.4 million Mirror Image AB shares were transferred by Vik to

Kahnberget on or about June 23, 1999, pursuant to their agreement. Kahnberget’s stock

holdings in Mirror Image AB at that point totaled approximately 4.8 million shares, while Vik

family-controlled businesses held approximately 500,000 shares.

60. Throughout the fall and winter of 1998. Karlsten and Vik continued to discuss

their interest in a joint venture investment in or acquisition of Mirror Image AB, and spoke on

numerous occasions with Lindbo regarding Mirror Image AB’s continuing need for additional

financing. During this same time, Lindbo and Mirror Image AB began to take steps to

restructure Mirror Image AB’s operations in an effort to consolidate Mirror Image AB’s assets

in its Massachusetts-based subsidiary, Mirror Image.

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Karlsten and Vik Enter into Joint Venture Agreementto Acquire a Controlling Interest in Mirror Image

61. In January 1999, Karlsten and Vik agreed to and entered into a joint venture

agreement to attempt to acquire an equal share controlling interest in Minor Image. It was

agreed that the Scandinavia Fund, Xcelera’s predecessor company, would be used as the

vehicle for the acquisition of Minor Image from its parent company, Mirror Image AB. The deal

was structured such that Scandinavia would issue 2.5 million new shares and exchange these

for outstanding and issued shares of Minor Image. Karlsten and Karlsten’s family-controlled

businesses would then purchase exactly one- half of the Scandinavia shares that Vik and Vik

family-controlled businesses held.

62. In a carefully structured joint venture agreement, it was agreed that in the end

Scandinavia would own 100% of Mirror Image. Kerstin Karlsten would own 30% of

Scandinavia and the Vik family would own an equal 30% share. Mirror Image AB would own

approximately 30% of Scandinavia as a result of the stock swap, and approximately 10%

would be owned by public shareholders of Scandinavia. It was also agreed that Scandinavia

would divest itself of all properties and holdings so that Mirror Image became its only asset.

63. In February 1999, Mirror Image AB and Lindbo rejected Karlsten’s and Vik’s

proposal. However, Karlsten and Vik continued their efforts to acquire or invest in Mirror

Image on an equal basis. Karlsten and Vik agreed that their family-controlled

businesses would collectively purchase Mirror Image shares directly in a private placement so

as to enable the family-controlled businesses to acquire a controlling interest in Mirror Image.

The Mirror Image shares would be purchased in equal numbers by the Karlsten and Vik

family-controlled businesses, and registered separately in their respective family-controlled

businesses’ names.

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64. Karlsten entrusted Vik to act on behalf of the Karlsten family-controlled

businesses, JAM and Kahnberget, in his discussions and negotiations with Lindbo. Vik, in turn,

communicated with Lindbo as a representative of both Vik and Karlsten business interests. For

example, in an e-mail communication with Lindbo, Vik stated “we [meaning Vik’s and the

Karlsten family-controlled businesses] are the largest shareholders in the company.” At that

time, Kahnberget still owned at least 4.8 million shares of Minor Image AB and Vik businesses

owned approximately 500,000 shares. Vik had frequent direct communications with Lindbo,

and Vik forwarded these communications and business documents to Karlsten.

65. Meanwhile, Lindbo and Wu caused Minor Image to acquire the business and

substantially all of the assets of its Swedish parent, Minor Image AB.

Vik Negotiates to Acquire Controlling Interest of Mirror Image on Behalf of Vik Family Businesses and on Behalf of Karlsten Family Businesses: Kahnber~et and JAM Investments

66. In March 1999, Vik continued to negotiate with Mirror Image and Mirror

Image AB to acquire a controlling interest in Minor Image. Vik continued to represent to

Lindbo and others that he was negotiating on behalf of his and Karlsten’s family-controlled

businesses. An initial private placement was prepared pursuant to Karlsten’s and Vik’s joint

venture agreement which provided for Karlsten’s and Vik’s family-controlled businesses to

each purchase, as direct signatories to the private placement agreement, an equal number of

Mirror Image shares to be registered in their respective family-controlled businesses’ names,

resulting in the Karlsten and Vik family-controlled businesses collectively acquiring a controlling

interest in Mirror Image.

67. Karlsten was on vacation on March 29, 1999 when the Minor Image Private

Placement Agreement was signed. Without Karlsten’s knowledge, Vik deleted the name of

Karlsten’s family-controlled business from the agreement, leaving only Scandinavia as the

apparent participant in the $2 million private placement, and creating the appearance that only

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Scandinavia would acquire a minimum of 51% of Minor Image’s outstanding shares. Vik

telephoned Karlsten to tell him that “we” have done the deal. Karlsten expressed concern and

surprise to Vik that the private placement did not provide for a Karlsten family-controlled

business to purchase the shares of Mirror Image directly. Vik assured Karlsten that the

omission of a Karlsten family-controlled business as a direct purchaser of Minor Image shares

and a signatory to the Private Placement Agreement was only a formality and that a Karlsten

family-controlled business would receive its share of the Mirror Image shares offered in the

Private Placement Agreement.

68. After Vik’s reassurances, Karlsten permitted Vik to cause, through a series of

wire transfers, $1,436,850 of Kahnberget funds to be transferred from a Morgan Stanley

Account on behalf of JAM to Mirror Image in Massachusetts between April 1999 and

September 1999. Approximately $1,808,000 was transferred to Mirror Image from a separate

JAM account between July 15, 1999 and August 11, 1999, bringing JAM’s investment in

Mirror Image to a total of approximately $3,244,850.

69. It was Karlsten’s understanding at all times that these funds would be used to

acquire Mirror Image shares in JAM’s name in accordance with the parties’ joint venture

agreement. Unbeknownst to Karlsten, Kahnberget and JAM, however, Vik and VBI instead

used the money to acquire Minor Image shares only in Scandinavia’s/Xcelera’s name. As a

result of this misappropriation, Vik and VBI acquired a controlling interest in Mirror Image

under their name only, that did not reveal that the acquisition was executed on

Kahnberget’s/JAM’s and Scandinavia’s/Xcelera’s joint behalf.

70. Furthermore, in April 1999, Vik induced Karlsten to modify the previous 50%-

50% joint venture agreement to a 60%-40% agreement in which Vik and Scandinavia would

provide 60% of the capital investment and Karlsten 40%. In exchange for this modification,

Vik agreed to issue to Kahnberget 219,000 shares of Scandinavia stock for the price of $3.00

per share. Karlsten accepted this offer on behalf of Kahnberget.

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71. Although Karlsten, Kahnberget and JAM repeatedly requested that VBI and

Vik deliver the shares as agreed, Vik and VBI failed to deliver the shares in accordance with

the 60%-40% agreement.

72. Vik’s and Xcelera’s misappropriation of Kahnberget’s/JAM’s substantial

investment in Mirror Image is now the subject of litigation in the United States District Court for

the Southern District of New York in Jam Investments, Ltd. and Kahnberget Holding. Ltd., v.

Alexander Vik and VBI Corn., Civil Action No. 00-C V-8733.

DEFENDANTS’ FALSE AND MISLEADING STATEMENTSAND MATERIAL OMISSIONS REGARDING THEDILUTION OF THE VALUE OF XCELERA STOCK

73. On April 1, 1999, defendants issued a press release (the “April 1, 1999 Press

Release”) announcing Scandinavia’s/Xcelera’s acquisition of a majority interest in Mirror

Image. The April 1, 1999 Press Release extolled the benefits of Mirror Image’s technology and

predicted that the caching market was expected to grow to in excess of $4 billion in the next

three years and that “Mirror Image is well positioned in that space.” In particular, the April 1,

1999 Press Release stated:

Following nine months of investments and work TheScandinavia Company (AMEX: SCF) now owns a majorityinterest in a leading Internet caching company, Mirror ImageInternet, Inc.

The amount of the investment and ultimate ownershippercentage of The Scandinavia Company, Inc., cannot bedetermined at this time, but has been funded out of the TheScandinavia Company’s cash holdings. The ScandinaviaCompany is discussing arrangements whereby it would obtainfull ownership of Minor Image.

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74. The April 1, 1999 Press Release was false and misleading for the following reasons:

a. defendants failed to disclose that a substantial portion of the funds used to

acquire a majority interest in Mirror Image, $3,244,800, was Kahnberget/JAM money, not

“Scandinavia Company’s cash holdings”;

b. absent the Mirror Image shares defendants misappropriated from

Kahnberget/JAM, Scandinavia/Xcelera lacked a controlling interest or a majority interest in Mirror

Image;

c. defendants failed to disclose that they had wrongfully converted

$3,244,800 belonging to Kahnberget/JAM to their own use; and

d. defendants failed to disclose that Kahnberget/JAM had claims against defendants for 50% of

the purchased Minor Image shares, in accordance with the joint venture agreement between

defendants and Kahnberget/JAM.

75. The April 1, 1999 Press Release was the beginning of a campaign of press releases

issued by defendants declaring the value of Mirror Image’s technology to the Internet, and designed

to draw investors’ attention to Mirror Image.

76. On August 6, 1999, defendants issued a press release providing further information

relating to the acquisition of Mirror Image. Alexander Vik was listed as the contact person on the

August 6, 1999 press release which stated:

The company started working with Mirror Image about a year agotaking a major role in the company pursuant to an agreement datedMarch 24. (the “Agreement”), [sic] The Company acquired a 54.5%equity interest in Mirror Image Internet, Inc., a Delaware corporation(“Minor Image”). Since the date of the agreement, the company hasacquired an additional 32.0% of the outstanding equity of MirrorImage, such that, as the date hereof, the Company holds 86.5% ofthe issued capital stock of Mirror Image. The purchase price for theshares represented by the additional 32.0% interest is to bedetermined based upon the fair market value of Minor Image at dateswhich are 6 months, 12 months, and 18 months from the date of suchpurchase. To the extent that the fair market value of Mirror Imagemay increase over such 18-month period, the company may be

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required to make significant additional investments in Mirror Image inthe future. To date, the company’s total investment in Mirror Image isequal to $5.95 million.

77. The August 6, 1999 press release was materially false and misleading for the

following reasons:

a. the representations concerning the percentage ownership of Mirror

Image failed to disclose that pursuant to the April 1999 60o4~40% joint venture agreement

between Kahnberget/JAM and defendants, Kahnberget/JAM owned 40% of the Mirror Image

stock claimed to be owned by ScandinavialXcelera;

b. the representations concerning monies invested in Minor Image were

false and misleading because the $5.95 million included $3.24 million of Kahnberget’s/JAM’s

funds which defendants misappropriated to buy Mirror Image shares for themselves rather than

Kahnberget]JAM pursuant to the joint venture agreement.

c. absent the Minor Image shares defendants misappropriated from

Kahnberget/JAM, Scandinavia/Xcelera lacked a controlling interest in Mirror Image; and

d. defendants failed to disclose that pursuant to the 60%-40% joint

venture agreement in April 1999 they had agreed to issue 219,000 shares of

Scandinavia/Xcelera stock to Kahnberget/JAM, an amount constituting slightly less than 5% of

Scandinavia/Xcelera, thereby substantially diluting investors’ equity.

78. In August 1999, when Xcelera’s Form 20-F Annual Report for the fiscal year

ended January 31, 1999 became publicly available, Xcelera again stressed to the investing

public and Xcelera shareholders only the positive aspects of the Minor Image acquisition.

Xcelera failed to warn investors, however, that Xcelera shares would be significantly diluted

pending distribution of new Xcelera shares to Kahnberget/JAM as a result of

Kahnberget’s/JAM’s contributions to the Mirror Image acquisition.

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79. With respect to the structure of the transaction with Mirror Image, Xcelera’ s

1999 Annual Report stated:

Pursuant to the Agreement [between Xcelera and Minor Image datedMarch 24, 1999], the Company acquired a 54.5% equity interest inMirror Image. Since the date of the Agreement, the Company hasacquired an additional 32% of the outstanding equity of Mirror Imagesuch that, as of August 3, 1999, the Company holds 86.5% of theissued capital stock of Minor Image.

The Company’s total investment in Mirror Image, as of August 3,1999, is equal to $5.95 million, $3 million of which has beenadvanced to the Company by affiliated entities.

80. The above-referenced statements in Xcelera’s 1999 Form 20-F were

materially false and misleading for the following reasons:

a. defendants stated monies were “advanced by affiliated entities” when

in fact defendants knew these funds were a capital investment by Kahnberget/JAM

— defendants’ partner in the 60%-40% joint venture agreement not an Xcelera “affiliated

entity”;

b. as a result of the 60%-40% joint venture agreement and

Kahnberget’s/JAM’s $3.24 million investment, Kahnberget/JAM in fact owned at least 40% of

the Mirror Image stock claimed to be owned by Xcelera;

c. as a result of the 60%-40% joint venture agreement, defendants were

obligated to issue to Kahnberget/JAM as much as 5.2 million shares of Xcelera stock, thereby

substantially diluting investors’ equity; and

d. defendants failed to reveal their scheme to misappropriate control of

Mirror Image from Karlsten and Kahnberget/JAM.

81. Defendants made materially false and misleading statements and intentionally or

recklessly failed to disclose material information relating to the issue of stock dilution which

existed as a result of the acquisition of Minor Image and defendants 60%-40% joint venture

agreement with Kahnberget/JAM.

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THE TRUTH RELATING TO THE DILUTION OFSHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY BEGINS TO EMERGE

82. Not until more than a year after the Minor Image transaction, when Xcelera’s Form

20-F Annual Report for the fiscal year ended January 31, 2000 became publicly available on

August 4, 2000, did Xcelera even refer to the risk of dilution of Xcelera stock as a result of

Kahnberget’s/JAM’s investment and defendants’ misappropriation of Minor Image stock.

Regarding the dilution of shareholder equity as a result of the Mirror Image acquisition and the

60%-40% joint venture agreement, the August 4, 2000 Annual Report stated the following:

We are also involved in another matter that may have a material adverseimpact. In connection with our acquisition of Minor Image commonstock during the year ended January 31, 2000, we may be required toissue new shares of our common stock to certain third parties.The amount of shares would be calculated based on approximately 32%of the value of Minor Image common stock at December 31, 1999. Wecannot, at this time, estimate the number of shares that we may berequired to issue. Although we are currently negotiating with such thirdparties to determine the valuation methodologies, there can be noassurances that any amount of shares that would be issued would notresult in material dilution to the number of outstanding shares ofour common stock and a corresponding material reduction in thevalue of our common stock, or have a material effect on ourconsolidated financial statements.... We have not included anyprovision for any liability that may result from the issuance of ourshares in our consolidated financial statements.

(Emphasis added.)

83. Publicly available a year and four months after the April 1999 Mirror Image

acquisition, defendants finally revealed that Xcelera may be required to issue new shares of its

common stock to “certain third parties.” One year and four months after the Mirror Image

acquisition, defendants finally divulged that this issuance of new shares of Xcelera could have a

material effect on Xcelera’s consolidated financial statements.

84. A Bloomberg News article on August 9, 2000 noted that Xcelera “may have to

hand over what looks to be as much as $622 million worth of Xcelera.com stock. At

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Xcelera.com’s price of about $14 a share, that would require the issuance of almost 45 million new

shares in the company, diluting existing shareholders by nearly 45 percent. This, too, is

something U.S. shareholders are now learning about from the company for the first time.”

(Emphasis added.)

85. Xcelera’s stock price fell from a closing price of $14.00 on August 8, 2000 to

$11.75 on August 9,2000, a 16% decline.

86. On November 29, 2000, more than three months after the publication of Xcelera’

Year 2000 Form 20-F, the Company filed a Form 6-K with the SEC and defendants revealed

more extensively the severity of the dilution of Xcelera shareholders’ equity. The November 29,

2000 Form 6-K disclosed that defendants had reached an agreement on July 31, 2000 to tender

to Kahnberget/JAM the shares of Xcelera common stock to which Kahnberget/JAM were entitled

in exchange for their $3.24 million investment used by Xcelera to acquire Mirror Image.

Defendants acknowledged that Kahnberget/JAM had invested more than $3.2 million in Mirror

Image, that such funds were used by Xcelera to purchase Mirror Image shares, and that

Kahnberget/JAM had not received any shares for its investment. Kahnberget’s/JAM’s more than

$3.2 million investment in Mirror Image constituted a 32.7% ownership interest in Mirror Image.

87. The July 31,2000 agreement between defendants and Kahnberget/JAM was

attached as Exhibit I to Xcelera’s November 29, 2000 Form 6-K and stated as follows:

Agreement, by and between Xcelera.com Inc., a publicly traded(AMEX) Cayman Islands corporation having an address of P.O. Box309, Ugland House, South Church Street, Grand Cayman, CaymanIslands (“Company” or “Xcelera”), and JAM Investments Ltd., andKahnberget Holding, Ltd., both British Virgin Islands corporations, withtheir addresses at Unit 18, Mill Mall, Wicharns Cay, P.O. Box 3339Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin, (collectively called herein “JAM”).

WITNESSETH

WHEREAS, JAM has invested $3,244,850 in aprivate placement, which funds were used by the Company to acquire

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shares of common stock of Mirror Image Internet, Inc. (“Mirror ImageInternet”) in an aggregate private placement representing 3 2.7% of alloutstanding shares of common stock (the “Mirror Image Shares”) ofMirror Image Internet as of December 31, 1999;

WHEREAS. JAM has not received delivery of anyshares for its investment of $3,244,850;

WHEREAS, JAM agrees to accept shares of commonstock of Xcelera for its investment in full settlement of this matter;

* * *

The parties agree that JAM for its investment and in satisfaction of thepurchase price obligation of Xcelera created hereby, Xcelera will issueto JAM shares of common stock of Xcelera valued as of December31, 1999 (“Xcelera Shares”) equal to the value of the 32.7% shareinterest in Mirror Image as of December 31, 1999.

* * *

As good faith collateral for performance of the obligations of theCompany to deliver the Xcelera Shares to JAM upon determination ofthe valuation of the Mirror Image Shares, Xcelera shall deliver, orcause to be delivered, within five (5) business days from the date hereof... that number of shares of Xcelera Common Stock which have anaggregate value of $100 million based on the closing price of Xcelera’spublicly traded common stock on December 31, 1999.

XCELERA SELLS 15 PERCENT OF MIRROR IMAGETO EXODUS COMMUNICATIONSFtM, INC.

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Xcelera’s Location In A Tax Haven

88. Xcelera is based in the Cayman Islands, a tax haven. Neither the Company nor

its U.S. shareholders are subject to taxation by the Cayman Islands government. According to

the Company’s Forms 20-F for the years ended January 31, 1998 through 2000: “There is

presently no taxation imposed on the income of a Cayman Islands’ company by the government

of the Cayman Islands. If any form of taxation were to be enacted, the Company has been

granted an exception thereupon to the year 2008.”

89. Companies, like Xcelera, that are primarily owned by United States investors

but organized in foreign tax havens, have attracted the attention of the Internal Revenue Service

and Congress. To prevent the situation where a U.S. taxpayer avoids or delays the tax

consequences of gains on certain investment assets, merely because the assets are technically

held by a foreign company, Congress passed several statutes setting forth rules for when U.S.

shareholders of foreign corporations will be directly taxed by the U.S. government for the

foreign company’s earnings. 26 U.S.C. §§ 55 1-558.

Foreign Personal Holding Companies

90. The key provisions of the Internal Revenue Code’s (“IRC”) anti-deferral rules

relate to foreign personal holding companies. The FPHC rules apply to foreign companies that

are predominately owned by five or fewer U.S. taxpayers and whose income is largely derived

from passive sources. Bloomberg News reported on August 9, 2000 in the article,

“Xcelera.com Holders Get a Surprise,” that the FPHC “special and restrictive rules” are

designed “to prevent the people who set such companies up from escaping taxes via the artifice

of letting the profits from stock deals, real estate transaction and so forth pile up abroad, in

foreign-based companies that are not subject to U.S. tax laws.”

91. Under the IRC, Congress has established a two-part test for determining

whether a foreign corporation is an FPHC:

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(1) Gross income requirement

At least 60 percent of [the corporation’s] gross income.., for the taxable year isforeign personal holding company income as defined in section 553; ... then, for eachsubsequent taxable year, the minimum percentage shall be 50 percent in lieu of 60percent, until a taxable year during the whole of which the stock ownershiprequirement by paragraph (2) does not exist, or until the expiration of threeconsecutive taxable years in each of which less than 50 percent of the gross incomeis foreign personal holding company income....

(2) Stock ownership requirement

At any time during the taxable year. not more than 50 percent of (A) the totalcombined voting power of all classes of stock of such corporation entitled to vote,or (B) the total value of the stock of such corporation, is owned (directly orindirectly) by or for not more than 5 individuals who are citizens or residents of theUnited States.”

26 U.S.C. § 552(a). The IRC definition of “foreign personal holding company income,”

includes gain on stock or securities transactions. 26 U.S.C. § 553(a).

92. Classification as a foreign personal holding company results in severe tax

consequences for any U.S. shareholder of such FPHC. Namely, a U.S. shareholder of an

FPHC will be required to include in their gross income the proportionate share of undistributed

foreign personal holding company income. 26 U.S.C. § 551. Thus, any U.S. taxpayer that

holds stock in an FPHC must declare as a dividend his or her pro rata

share of the FPHC’s taxable income, whether or not that income was actually paid out in the

form of a dividend.

Xcelera’s Tax Classification

93. At the time the Company announced the Exodus deal in March 2000, Xcelera

met the stock ownership prong of the FPHC rules and risked being classified as an FPHC if

more than 60% of the Company’s income came from passive sources.

94. As admitted by the Company, at all relevant times less than five individuals

owned more than 50% of Xcelera. In fact, VBI Corporation owned over 70% of Xcelera

throughout the Class Period. VBI was owned by and for the benefit of Alexander, Gustav and

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Erik Vik. Thus, under constructive ownership provision of the FPHC rules, more than 50% of

Xcelera was owned by Alexander, Gustav and Erik Vik, satisfying the stock ownership

requirement of the FPHC rules.

95. At the time of the Exodus deal, defendants knew or recklessly disregarded the

fact that Xcelera had little or no revenues from operations, no non-passive income. In fact, the

only revenue producing assets had been sold on January 30, 2000. Defendants also knew the

Exodus transaction resulted in a tremendous amount of passive income to Xcelera and

generated a purported gain of $385.1 million to the Company according to Exodus’s SEC

filings. On May 12, 2000, Exodus filed with the SEC its Form 10-Q for the quarter ended

March 31, 2000. In that filing, Exodus disclosed information concerning its investment in Mirror

Image, and stating:

In April 2000, the Company closed its investment in the commonstock of Mirror Image Internet, Inc. (“Mirror Image”), a privatelyheld company and provider of content distribution services. $75.0million of the investment was paid in cash, with the balance of theconsideration consisting of 7,516,536 shares of the Company’scommon stock. The total value of the investment on the closing datewas approximately $385.1 million, plus certain professional feesassociated with the investment. The Company holds less than 20%ownership and does not exert significant influence over operations.The investment is accounted for under the cost method.

96. At the time of the Exodus deal, defendants knew that they had only four major

customers as of the first quarter of 2000, Carrierl, PSINet London, C&W and Nildram and

only $37,135 in revenue for the entire fiscal year ending January 31, 2000. Defendants knew

that they were entirely dependant on Mirror Image for revenue, after the sale of their hotel in

Spain. Defendants knew that the products under development by Mirror Image,

instaContentsrn, instaStreamsrn, were still incomplete, and were not expected to be in existence

and available for sale to the public until the fourth quarter of the year. Defendants knew that

there was no possibility that they would be able to sell even $50 million of Mirror Image’s

products and services before the end of the fiscal year. In fact, however. Xcelera would need

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to generate over $120 million [40% of $300 million gain from Exodus transaction] of non-

passive income in order to avoid classification as an FPHC. According to a January 20, 2000,

Bloomberg News, article, Mirror Image’s CEO, Cosmo Santullo. stated that Mirror Image

would generate approximately $10 million in revenue in calendar year 2000.

97. At the time the Company entered into and announced the Exodus transaction,

the defendants knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that Xcelera satisfied the stock

ownership prong of the FPHC rules. Defendants also knew or recklessly disregarded the fact

that a $300 million gain from the Exodus transaction made it a certainty that over 60% of

Xcelera’s income for the year would be from passive sources in satisfaction of the income

prong of the FPHC rules, resulting in an onerous, undisclosed tax burden on all U.S.

shareholders. The Company belatedly admitted in its Forms 6-K and 20-F (for the year ended

January 31,2000) SEC filings, filed with the SEC on June 2, 2000 and July 31, 2000,

respectively, that as a result of the Exodus transaction, Xcelera “expect[s] to meet” the test for

an FPHC for fiscal year 2001.

98. In addition to the onerous tax burden for U.S. stockholders as a result of Xcelera’s

classification as an FPHC for the year ended December 31, 2000, the sting of an FPHC

classification continues to affect U.S. shareholders for years to come. Under FPHC rules, the

passive income requirement drops from 60 to 50 percent after the first year, making it more

likely that a company will be classified as an FPHC in subsequent years.

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DEFENDANTS’ FALSE AND MISLEADING STATEMENTSAND MATERIAL OMISSIONS

REGARDING THE TAX RAMIFICATIONSOF THE EXODUS TRANSACTION

99. On March 22, 2000, Xcelera and Exodus issued a joint press release (the

“March 22, 2000 Press Release”) announcing that Exodus had entered into a “definitive

agreement to make a $637.5 million equity investment in Mirror Image and will offer Mirror

Image’s content distribution services.” In effect, Exodus made a 15% equity investment in

Mirror Image. In commenting on the Exodus Agreement, Alexander Vik, CEO of Xcelera and

Chairman of Mirror Image, stated, “We are extremely pleased to welcome Exodus as a major

shareholder of Mirror Image and joining our vision for the future of the Internet. The confidence

they have shown us by making this investment in Mirror Image is very gratifying.” This press

release was jointly sent from Wobum Massachusetts and Santa Clara, California.

100. On March 21, 2000, Xcelera stock closed at a price of $87.125 per share. In

reaction to the joint announcement, on March 22,2000 the price of Xcelera stock skyrocketed

to a Class Period high of $112.50, before closing up over 28% at $111.75 per share.

101. On March 23, 2000, the Boston Herald reported on the Exodus deal and

noted that Xcelera would receive $562 million in Exodus stock, then valued at $169.38 per

share, and $75 million in cash. Exodus would receive a seat on Mirror Image’s board of

directors. In commenting on the deal, Alex Benik, an analyst at The Yankee Group noted: “If

I’m Mirror Image, I’m jumping up and down right now. There was a lot of skepticism because

they were owned by an offshore holding company. But this deal validates their technology.

Aligning themselves with such a blue-chip name can only be good for Mirror Image.”

102. Defendants’ statements in the March 22, 2000 Press Release were false and

misleading when made because at the time the Company announced the Exodus transaction,

defendants knew but failed to disclose or recklessly disregarded the facts that:

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a. The Exodus transaction had generated an enormous amount of passive

income to Xcelera during fiscal year 2001;

b. The Company’s non-passive income for fiscal 2001 was miniscule,

given that the Company’s sole non-passive income source, Mirror Image’s products and

services, were for the most part not yet commercially available. Mirror Image had generated

only $37,135 in revenue for fiscal year ended January 31, 2000, and at the time of the Exodus

deal, only one of Mirror Image’s instaDelivery services was available, and Mirror Image had

only two to four possible customers;

c. As a result of the tremendous influx of passive income and the Vik

Brothers’ ownership of more than 50% of Xcelera, the Company risked being classified as an

FPHC for calendar year 2000;

d. As a result of Xcelera’s classification as an FPHC, U.S. shareholders

would be subject to a per share tax on the earnings of the Company;

e. Defendants failed to disclose that a substantial portion of the funds used

to acquire a majority interest in Mirror Image, $3,244,800, was Kahnberget/JAM money;

f. Absent the Mirror Image shares defendants misappropriated from

Kahnberget/JAM. Scandinavia/Xcelera lacked a controlling interest or a majority interest in

Mirror Image;

g. Defendants failed to disclose that they had wrongfully converted

$3,244,800 belonging to Kahnberget/JAM to their own use;

h. Defendants failed to disclose that pursuant to the 60%-40% joint

venture agreement in April 1999 they had agreed to issue 219,000 shares of

Scandinavia/Xcelera stock to Kahnberget/JAM, an amount constituting slightly less than 5% of

Scandinavia/Xcelera, thereby substantially diluting investors’ equity;

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i. As a result of the 60%-40% joint venture agreement, defendants were

obligated to issue to Kahnberget/JAM as much as 5.2 million shares of Xcelera stock, thereby

substantially diluting investors’ equity; and

j. Defendants failed to reveal their scheme to misappropriate control of

Mirror Image from Karlsten and KahnbergetlJAM.

103. On April 26, 2000, Xcelera and Exodus issued a follow-up press release (the

“April 26, 2000 Press Release”) announcing the completion of the “strategic investment” by

Exodus in Mirror Image. Specifically, the April 26, 2000 joint press release stated:

Under the terms of the three-party transaction involving Exodus,Xcelera.com and Mirror Image, Exodus has received a 15% equitystake in Mirror Image in exchange for $75 million in cash and3,758,268 Exodus common shares. When the agreement was signedon March 22, 2000, the Exodus investment in Mirror Image wasvalued at $637.5 million, implying a total valuation of $4.25 billion forMirror Image. Together, Xcelera and Mirror Image now own anapproximately 2.0% equity stake in Exodus. Mirror Image willreceive $50 million of the cash proceeds from the transaction, whichit will use to complete the worldwide build-out of its unique ContentAccess Point TM (CAP) network architecture, to further enhance itsservices and for general corporate purposes. The CAP network isexpected to be completed this year and to be available to more than95% of all Internet users.

104. The April 26, 2000 Press Release quoted Alexander Vik as stating:

This is an important step toward our goal of building a fast operatingsystem for the Internet. This transaction demonstrates the sharedvision of Xcelera, Mirror Image and Exodus to enhance websiteperformance for customers, consumers and e-Business websites bydelivering Internet content up to ten times faster and far lessexpensively than conventional methods. We are extremely pleased towelcome Exodus as a strategic partner in Mirror Image.

105. The statements contained in the April 26, 2000 Press Release were false and

misleading when issued for the same reasons listed above in paragraph 102.

106. On July 6, 2000, John J. Henry of “Team StreetS idelnvestor” interviewed

Alexander Vik. In the interview, Alexander Vik was questioned about the Exodus transaction,

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and provided a short response summarizing the investment and agreement, but not commenting

on the tax consequences. When asked about Xcelera’s profits, Alexander Vik said only, “I

expect that Xcelera will report positive earnings this year.”

107. Alexander Vik’s statements in the July 6, 2000 “Team StreetSidelnvestor”

interview were false and misleading when made because:

a. In discussing the Exodus transaction, Alexander Vik failed to disclose

the material and adverse tax consequences of the Exodus transaction on U.S. taxpayers, as

described above in paragraph 102; and

b. While Alexander Vik stated that Xcelera was poised for “positive

earnings” in fiscal 2001, he failed to disclose that the majority of those earnings would be from

passive sources, i.e., as the Exodus transaction, creating the risk that Xcelera would be

classified as an FPHC, thus, subjecting U.S. taxpayers to a severe tax burden.

THE TRUTH ABOUT XCELERA’S FPHC CLASSIFICATIONSLOWLY EMERGES

108. Xcelera did not reveal the tax ramifications of the Exodus transaction to U.S.

shareholders until several months after the March 22, 2000 announcement. When the Company

finally disclosed information through its non-electronic SEC filings, those filings were not made

publicly available until several days, or even weeks, after the documents were originally filed.

109. The Company’s Form 6-K filed with the SEC on June 2, 2000 was not

publicly available until July 12, 2000, three months after the announcement of the Exodus deal.

Xcelera did not file its SEC documents electronically, therefore, investors and analysts had to

rely upon Disclosure Inc., a public documents retrieval firm, to first obtain copies of all filings.

Investors would then have to pay a fee to Disclosure Inc. in order to

obtain copies of any Xcelera filings. This process made Xcelera’s belated disclosures even

more inadequate. For example, Xcelera’s June 2, 2000 Form 6-K was not retrieved by

Disclosure Inc. until July 12, 2000, over 40 days after the filing, and almost four months after

the announcement of the Exodus deal. Thus, as reported in Bloomberg News on August 9,

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2000, “[T]he investing public knew nothing of the tax cloud over Xcelera.com’s stock until four

months after the fact.”

110. In Xcelera’s Form 6-K made available through Disclosure Inc. on July 12,

2000, the Company admitted that “it is likely that Xcelera will.., be treated as an FPHC for the

current taxable year.” Xcelera explained:

While Xcelera is not subject to United States federal income tax, thegain realized on the sale of Mirror Image common stock to Exodusmust be taken into account in determining the characterization ofXcelera under United States foreign personal holding company(“FPHC”) rules. Under the Internal Revenue Code, a foreigncorporation will be classified as an FPHC if (i) at any time during thecorporation’s taxable year, five or fewer individuals, who are UnitedStates citizens or residents, directly or indirectly (through a series ofcomplex constructive ownership rules) own more than 50% of thecorporation’s stock by either voting power or value (the “ownershiptest”) and (ii) the corporation receives at least 60% of its grossincome (reduced to at least 50% after the initial year of qualification),as adjusted, for the taxable year from certain passive sources (the“income test”). Because of the constructive ownership rules, Xcelerawill meet the ownership test during the current year. and because thegain generated from the sale of Mirror Image common stock issignificant relative to Xcelera’s other income, it is likely that Xcelerawill also meet the income test and, therefore, be treated as an FPHCfor the current taxable year.

(Emphasis added.)

111. Defendants acknowledged the tax consequences to U.S. shareholders for the

first time in Xcelera’s June 2. 2000 Form 6K:

If Xcelera is an FPHC, each [United States] shareholder ofXcelera... who is a shareholder on December 31, 2000, or on thelast day during Xcelera’s taxable year on which the ownership test issatisfied, must include in income, as a dividend subject to tax atordinary income rates, an amount equal to its share of Xcelera’sFPHC income that is not distributed to Xcelera’s shareholders.Xcelera’s FPHC income will generally equal its taxable incomedefined under United States principles, with certain adjustments, andwill include gains and losses from the sale of assets, including the

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Mirror Image common stock. If Xcelera ceases to meet theownership test during the taxable year, then only a percentage (equalto the number of days Xcelera met the ownership test divided by thenumber of days in the taxable year) of the undistributed FPHCincome will be includible as ordinary income to United StatesShareholders.

United States Shareholders must take their pro rata share ofundistributed FPHC into income in their taxable year in which thetaxable year of Xcelera ends. Any amount included in the income of aUnited States Shareholder will increase such shareholder’s basis inthe stock by the same amount. If Xcelera is an FPHC, United Statespersons who acquire their Xcelera shares from decedents will notreceive a “stepped-up” basis in such shares. Instead, such personswill have a tax basis equal to the lower of fair market value or thedecedent’s basis.

Each United States Shareholder who owns more than five percent ofthe outstanding Xcelera stock must also file an information report (asan attachment to its regular tax return) to the Internal RevenueService disclosing the gross income, deductions, credits, taxableincome, FPHC income and undistributed FPHC income of Xcelera.

The Form 6-K was signed by Alexander Vik.

112. On July 31, 2000, the Company issued a press release announcing its fiscal

2000 financial results, for the year ended January 31, 2000 (“Fiscal 2000”). The Company

reported net income of $12.4 million, or $0.11 per basis and diluted share, a 300% gain over

fiscal 1999 income. The rise in income, however, was attributable to gains from the sale of

discontinued real-estate operations. Without that one time gain, the Company would have

reported a loss of $0.06. The July 31, 2000 press release also provided a laundry list of post-

fiscal 2000 events that were in effect a summary of press releases. The list provided a vague

summary of the Company’s April 26, 2000, press release announcing the deal with Exodus. In

addition, Alexander Vik was quoted as stating:

Mirror Image entered into a strategic partnership with Exodus todeliver superior Internet performance through next-generation globalcontent distribution. As part of this strategic partnership, Exodus willoffer its customers the Mirror Image instaContentSM Global

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Distribution Service. Additionally, Exodus and Mirror Image willdeploy some of Mirror Image’s CAPs throughout the ExodusInternet Data Center network.

113. Xcelera’s Form 20-F Annual Report filed with the SEC on July 31, 2000, and

signed by Alexander Vik, was not available from Disclosure Inc., for a fee, until August 4,

2000. The Company’s June 2, 2000 Form 6-K disclosures concerning the tax ramifications of

the Exodus deal were repeated in the July 31, 2000 Form 20-F, which stated:

We expect to be classified as a foreign personal holding company forthe taxable year ending December 31, 2000... [and U.S.shareholders]... would be required, regardless of [their] percentageownership, to include in income, as a dividend, [U.S. Shareholder’s]pro rata share of [Xcelera’s] undistributed foreign personal holdingcompany income — generally, taxable income with certain adjustments— if [they] hold shares on the last day of [Xcelera’s] taxable year or, ifearlier, the last day on which [Xcelera was] a foreign personal holdingcompany.

If [Xcelera is] a passive foreign investment company for any taxableyear during which [U.S. shareholders] hold [its] stock, [U.S.shareholders] will generally be subject to special tax rules withrespect [sic] any “excess distributions” that [U.S. shareholders]receive and any gain. .. from a sale or other disposition, including, apledge of [Xcelera’s] stock.

114. On August 1, 2000, Lazard Freres & Co., LLC (“Lazard Freres”) issued a

report on Xcelera discussing the possible per share tax penalty resulting from the Exodus

transaction. Specifically, the Lazard Freres report stated:

Potential $280 million tax bill for U.S. shareholders: We ran into thistax issue a few weeks ago when Xcelera.com filed its 6K. We faxedthe company a list of questions — this being central among them andwe response. This is our best assessment of the tax consequences forU.S. shareholders of Xcelera.com.... If the full $713 million [from theExodus transaction] is taxable to U.S. Investors, less a negligible taxbasis in the shares, that would mean approximately $700 million innon-cash gains to the public shareholders of XLA. This means that

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each shareholder of XLA would be forced to report a gain ofapproximately $7 per share in ordinary income of ‘undistributedforeign personal holding company income.’ Taxed at a 40% rate, thismeans approximately $280 million in taxes to the shareholders ofXLA from the EXDS [Exodus] transaction alone. As we understandthe filing, these taxes would have to be paid regardless of whether ornot the gains were distributed.

(emphasis in original). Recognizing the poor disclosure and release of information, the Lazard

Freres report “urge[d]” its subscribers who are Xcelera shareholders “to ask for clarification..,

from the company.”

115. On August 9, 2000, at approximately 10:47 a.m., Bloomberg News published

an article by Christopher Byron entitled, “Xcelera.com Holders Get a Surprise,” which, for the

first time, provided widespread dissemination of the fact that Xcelera shareholders were subject

to an onerous tax based on the Company’s tax classification as an FPHC. The Bloomberg

News article reported that due to the Exodus transaction, more that 60 percent of Xcelera’ s

fiscal 2001 income would come from passive sources. Bloomberg News further reported that

the Vik Brothers constructively own more than 50% of Xcelera and, therefore meet the stock

ownership requirement under FPHC rules. As a result, Bloomberg News reported that U.S.

shareholders are required to pay taxes on their pro-rata share of the Company’s taxable

income, regardless of whether or not a dividend is paid out. Bloomberg News reported the

possible per share tax burden at anywhere between $6.18 and $7 per share.

116. Summarizing the tax predicament, Bloomberg News noted:

[Amy investor who bought a round-lot (100 shares) of Xcelera.comwhen the stock was selling in March for $100 a share, would havepaid $10,000 only to see, as of this writing, $8,500 of it disappear inXcelera.com’ s collapse. Of the $1,500 of value that remains, almosthalf of it, or as much as $615 [$6.15 tax per share multiplied by 100shares = $615], may wind up at year’s end being taxed as ordinaryincome even though the investor never received a dime of cash andactually suffered an 85 percent loss on the investment.

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In describing the reason for the gain, Bloomberg News reported:

In the [Exodus] deal itself, Xcelera.com sold roughly 17 percent of itsmore than 90 percent ownership interest in Mirror Image to ExodusCommunications for $75 million in cash and $562.5 million ExodusCommunications stock. Since Xcelera.com had acquired its MirrorImage stake, as of Jan. 31, for less than $17 million, the sale toExodus Communications of 17 percent of that stake for $637.5million represented a stock sale in which almost 100 percent of thepurchase price was a capital gain.

117. Despite the Company’s piece-meal and insufficient statements about the

Exodus deal and its accompanying tax consequences, the market became aware of the tax

implications on August 9, 2000, when Bloomberg News reported on the possible per share tax

liability. In response, the price of Xcelera stock rapidly fell from a closing price of $14.00 on

August 8,2000 to $11.75 on August 9, 2000.

118. On August 9, 2000, CBS MarketWatch.com published an article on Xcelera’s

U.S. stockholder tax liability, noting: “Investors are expected to pay $2.35 a share in taxes at

the end of the year, due to the roughly $300 million in gains that Xcelera recognized after

striking a deal with... .Exodus.” Commenting on the Company’s lack of disclosure. CBS

MarketWatch.com reported:

Xcelera disclosed late last month in a form filed with the Securitiesand Exchange Commission that it likely will be given foreign personalholding company status. The company didn’t issue a press releaseabout the matter. Seemingly, the company left it to analysts andreporters to explain the tax implications to investors.

119. Finally, on August 9, 2000, Xcelera issued a press release to “respond[] to

information being circulated in the marketplace that management believes is inaccurate and may

cause confusion among its shareholders.” The Company disclosed:

Xcelera is concerned about inaccurate statements in the marketplaceregarding the tax implications, if any, for U.S. shareholders

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surrounding the 15% strategic investment by Exodus Communicationsin Mirror Image Internet, Inc. The gain recognized by Xcelera on theExodus transaction was less than $300 million, or less than $2.85 pershare, rather than clearly erroneous reported estimates as high as$7.00 per share.

120. On August 11, 2000, the Company began its damage control campaign by

issuing a press release to announce that Xcelera “intends to declare a special dividend to

shareholders to address income taxes, if any, that may be due by a U.S. shareholder as a result

of Xcelera’s potential classification as a foreign personal holding company for the taxable year

ending December 31, 2000.” The August 11, 2000 press release provided:

Xcelera intends to declare the divided, if necessary, to shareholdersof record on December 31, 2000 or on such other date deemed therecord date for classification as a foreign personal holding company.If a special dividend is declared, it will represent approximately 40%of Xcelera’s undistributed foreign personal holding company incomefor the [calendar] year 2000. The highest marginal U.S. federalincome tax rate is 40% for individuals.

The August 11, 2000 press release also quoted Alexander Vik, who stated:

This action is consistent with our continuous efforts to protect andenhance shareholder value. If the Company is determined to be aforeign personal holding company, the tax treatment of an investmentin Xcelera will be similar to that of a typical U.S. fund. Xceleragreatly appreciates the continued support of its shareholders and willcontinue to look out for their best interests.

121. On December 4, 2000, the Company issued a press release announcing that, at

the Company’s annual stockholders’ meeting, the Board of Directors:

[r]eiterated its intention to declare a special dividend to shareholdersto address income taxes, if any, that may be due by a U.S.shareholder as a result of Xcelera’s potential classification as aforeign personal holding company for the taxable year endingDecember 31,2000. The Company expects that this potentialclassification would only apply for the current tax year. Xceleraintends to declare the dividend to shareholders of record on

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December 31, 2000 or on such other date deemed the record datefor classification as a foreign personal holding company. If a specialdividend is declared, it should represent approximately 40% ofXcelera’s undistributed foreign personal holding company income forthe year 20000. The highest marginal U.S. federal income tax rate is40% for individuals.

122. On December 22, 2000, the Company issued a press release announcing that it

had set December 31, 2000 as the record date for a special cash dividend to shareholders to

address income taxes that may be due by the U.S. shareholders. The press release also stated

“Xcelera will announce the amount of the dividend and the payment date after it calculates the

amount of its undistributed foreign personal holding company income for the year 2000.”

123. Xcelera knew at the time of the Exodus transaction or recklessly disregarded

the fact that the massive gain to Xcelera from the Exodus transaction brought Xcelera within the

definition of an FPHC. This material fact should have been revealed at the time of the

transaction in March 2000.

124. Defendants had a duty to disclose material facts about the tax ramifications of

the Exodus deal in order to make the statements about the transaction, in light of the

circumstances under which they were made, not misleading to the public. The SEC provides

that corporate disclosures of material facts must be disclosed in a timely fashion. SEC Rel. No.

34-8995, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) ¶ 23, 120A, at 17,095, 17 C.F.R. § 241.8995 (Oct.

15, 1970). Specifically, the SEC has stated, “Corporate releases which disclose personnel

changes, the receipt of new contracts, orders and other favorable developments but do not

even suggest existing adverse corporate developments do not serve the public needs and may

violate the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.” Id. The defendants’

disclosures about the tax ramifications of the Exodus deal were not made publicly available until

almost four months after Xcelera’s March 22, 2000 press release. As one commentator noted,

by not disclosing the tax ramifications through a press release, Xcelera “left it to analysts and

reporters to explain the tax implications to investors.” It was not until analysts and news reports

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investigated, that the public became aware of the per share tax penalty. Because these

disclosures were material, because these disclosures were necessary to make the Company’s

statements not misleading, and because these disclosures adversely affected the value of the

Company’s stock, defendants were under a duty to disclosure the tax ramifications as early as

March 22, 2000.

INTERNATIONAL DISCLOSURE STANDARDS

125. During the Class Period, Xcelera, as a foreign private issuer, filed its Annual

Reports on SEC Form 20-F. The instructions to Form 20-F required, in part, that registrants:

“Outline briefly all taxes, including withholding provisions, to which United States security

holders are subject under existing laws and regulations of the foreign country in which the

registrant is organized.”

126. In September 1998, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions

(“IOSCO”) endorsed a core set of standards for non-financial statement disclosures for foreign

companies, entitled, “International Disclosure Standards for Cross-Board Offerings and Initial

Listings by Foreign Issue~s.” The goal of the IOSCO standards was to “enur[ej a high level of

investor protection” and to develop “a generally accepted body of non-financial statement

disclosure standards that could be addressed in a single disclosure document” for foreign

issuers. Under the requirement X, “Additional Information,” the IOSCO expressly lists taxation

as one of nine key disclosure items. Specifically, the International Disclosure Standards provide:

E. Taxation. The Company shall provide information regarding taxes(including withholding provisions) to which shareholders in the hostcountry may be subject....

The IOSCO defines “host country” as the ‘jurisdictions, other than the home country, in which

the company is seeking to offer, register or list its securities.” For Xcelera, the U.S. was the

“host” country. The IOSCO issued the International Disclosure Standards with the

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recommendation that IOSCO members implement similar disclosure requirements in their own

jurisdictions.

127. In the U.S., the SEC responded to the IOSCO’s recommendation and

promulgated Final Rule S7-3-99 concerning “International Disclosure Standards.” In adopting

the IOSCO standards, the SEC commented, “We believe the international disclosure standards

endorsed by IOSCO achieve those goals and that the best way to promote use of the

standards is to incorporate them filly into our existing foreign issuer integrated disclosure

system.” The SEC adopted the disclosure of the ten “core” items identified by the IOSCO,

including taxation disclosures language. Specifically, the SEC added the following disclosure

requirements to the SEC’s Form 20-F, under “Item 10. Additional Information”:

E. Taxation. The Company shall provide information regarding taxes(including withholding provisions) to which shareholders in the hostcountry may be subject....

The SEC first published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on February 2, 1999,

providing a draft of the proposed rule and requesting comments on or before April 12,

1999. Final Rule S 7-3-99 was promulgated by the SEC on September 28, 1999, with an

effective date of September 30, 2000.

128. In adopting Final Rule S7-3-99, as quoted above, the SEC underscored the

importance of taxation disclosures, by rejecting certain commentator suggestions that the

requirements under Item 1 0.E (Taxation) be limited to registration statements and annual

reports relating only to equity securities. The SEC

expressly rejected this suggestion, refusing to water down the tax provision and underscore the

importance of tax disclosures under all circumstances.

129. During the Class Period, defendants had a duty to disclose, under Section

10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 1 Ob-5, the material, non-public tax ramifications of the

Exodus transaction. The IOSQC rules that were in effect throughout the Class Period, as well

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as SEC Rule S7-3-99 that was promulgated in September 1999, merely confirm the obvious

materiality of tax disclosures to the investing public.

ADDITIONAL SCIENTER ALLEGATIONS

130. As alleged herein, defendants acted with scienter in that Xcelera, by and

through the Individual Defendants, knew or recklessly disregarded that the public documents

and statements issued or disseminated during the Class Period were materially false and

misleading; knew or recklessly disregarded that such statements or documents would be issued

or disseminated to the investing public; and knowingly and substantially

participated or acquiesced in the issuance or dissemination of such statements or documents as

primary violations of the federal securities laws.

131. During the Class Period, the Individual Defendants were senior executives

and/or directors of Xcelera, were privy to confidential and propriety information concerning

Xcelera, its operations, its transactions with Mirror Image and Exodus, its finances, its financial

condition, tax situation and business prospects. Alexander Vik was at all relevant times the

Company’s controlling shareholder, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, and was quoted in

and/or responsible for the preparation, approval or release of each statement plaintiffs allege

was false and misleading, including all press releases, interviews and regulatory filings.

Alexander Vik also “spearhead[s]” the company’s Internet strategy. In addition to his role at

Xcelera, Alexander Vik was, at all relevant times, the Chairman of Mirror Image Internet and a

director and officer of VBI Corporation. Similarly, Gustav Vik was the Company’s

secretary/treasurer during the Class Period, and also served as a director and secretary of

Mirror Image at all relevant times. Gustav Vik was also a beneficial owner of VBI Corporation.

By virtue of their positions at both Xcelera and Mirror Image, the Vik Brothers were under a

continuing duty to direct and control the operations of Xcelera, to exercise due care and

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diligence in those operations, and to oversee and review all corporate operations, including the

filing of documents with the SEC and the making of public statements.

132. According to a former senior employee of Mirror Image, the sales development

manager, the reason that the Company had no revenue, at least through the fiscal year ending

January 31, 2000, was that they did not have a viable product. The Company had been

purchasing and reselling equipment purchased from a company named Vixie Enterprises, which

did not work. In about 1999 the Company ended its relationship with Vixie Enterprises and

began to purchase equipment from Cisco Systems for resale.

133. Despite Alexander Vik’s knowledge of the lack of a viable product, he spent a

great deal of time speaking with journalists attempting to convince them to write favorable

articles concerning the Company. According to two former senior employees of the Mirror

Image, the regional sales manager and the sales development manager, Vik furnished options

on Company stock to the journalists in exchange for their attention to the Company. At least

one journalist, George Gilder, published a favorable report on February 17, 2000, and received

stock options in the Company.

Dilution Issue

134. As alleged above, defendants knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that the

Company gained control of Mirror Image through the fraudulent misappropriation of

Kahnberget/JAM funds. Throughout the Class Period, defendants knew that approximately

$3.24 million of the funds used to acquire a “majority” interest in Mirror Image were

Kahnberget/JAM monies, not “Scandinavia Company’s cash holdings.” Defendants knew or

recklessly disregarded the fact that pursuant to the 50%-50% joint venture agreement, as of

April 1, 1999, Kahnberget/JAM was entitled to 50% of all Mirror Image stock claimed to be

owned by Xcelera. Further, defendants knew or recklessly disregarded as a result of the

subsequent 60%-40% joint venture agreement, Kahnberget/JAM was entitled to at least 40%

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of the Mirror Image stock claimed to be owned by Xcelera in various public filings and

statements. Defendants knew or recklessly disregard that as a result of the 60%-40% joint

venture agreement, defendants were obligated to issue to Kahnberget/JAM 219,000 shares of

Xcelera stock which now, split adjusted, is equivalent to as many as 5.2 million shares of

Xcelera stock, thereby substantially diluting investors’ equity. Defendants’ knowledge of the

material facts, contrary to the Company’s public statements, is shown by the direct role

defendants played in the misappropriation of Kahnberget’s/JAM’s funds, including the fact that:

a. defendants entered into a joint venture agreement with

Kahnberget/JAM to acquire an equal controlling interest in Mirror Image;

b. Vik communicated directly with Lindbo, Mirror Image AB’s founder,

on behalf of both himself and Kahnberget/JAM in conversations and via e-mail;

c. Vik routinely forwarded communications and documents to

Kahnberget’JAM concerning their proposed joint venture purchase of Mirror Image;

d. Vik knowing or recklessly deleted the name of Karlsten’s family-

controlled business from the Private Placement Agreement, in order for Scandinavia/Xcelera to

appear to be the sole participant in the $2 million private placement;

e. Following the completion of the Mirror Image deal, Vik telephoned

Karlsten to tell him that “we” have done the deal, meaning Kahnberget/JAM and Vik, despite

the fact that Vik had deleted Karlsten’s family businesses from the Private Placement

Agreement;

f. Vik falsely assured Karlsten that the deletion of KahnbergetlJAM was

a mere formality;

g. Vik caused Kahnberget/JAM funds to be wire transferred from a

Morgan Stanley Account on behalf of Kahnberget/JAM to Mirror Image between April and

September 1999;

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h. defendants later induced KahnbergetlJAM to modify the prior 50%-

50% joint venture agreement to a 60%-40% joint venture agreement, in exchange for

Kahnberget/JAM receiving 219,000 shares of Scandinavia stock, defendants repeatedly failed

to deliver on the 60%-40% agreement.

FPHC Issue

135. The Vik Brothers knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that the publicly

available information about Mirror Image’s earnings and the potential tax consequences of the

Exodus deal were materially false and misleading and!or omitted to state material facts in order

to make the statements not misleading. Namely:

a. Alexander and Gustav Vik knew or recklessly disregarded that

Xcelera, as a foreign based company, was subject to certain special tax provisions, including a

tax to U.S. shareholders given the Company’s classification as a foreign personal holding

company;

b. VBI Corporation owned more than 70% of Xcelera at all relevant

times. The Individuals Defendants knew, or recklessly disregarded the fact that they are the

owners of the VBI shares for legal and tax purposes;

c. By means of their position and roles in Xcelera and Mirror Image,

Alexander and Gustav Vik knew or recklessly disregarded that during fiscal year ended

January 31. 2001, Xcelera did not and would not have material operating revenues, largely

attributable to the fact that Mirror Image’s technology was not widely commercially available.

The Vik Brothers knew or recklessly disregarded that instaSpeed was the only Mirror Image

service available at the time of the Exodus deal, and that Mirror Image had only four major

customers for that service, and generated only $37,135 for the service in the prior fiscal year.

In addition, the defendants knew that the other products and services then under development

were not expected to be ready for sale until the end of the year, and the maximum projected

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sales were only $10 million for the year. Therefore, when the Company entered into the Exodus

deal in March 2000, defendants knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that the sale of 15% of

Mirror Image would trigger the FPHC classification.

136. The Individual Defendants had the opportunity to commit and participate in the

wrongful conduct complained of herein. Each is, or was, a senior executive officer and/or

director of the Company and, accordingly, controlled the information disseminated to the

investing public in the Company’s press releases, SEC filings, and communications with

analysts. Thus, each could falsify, and did falsify, the information that reached the public about

the Company’s business and financial results.

137. The Individual Defendants engaged in such a scheme and course of conduct to

inflate the price of the Company’s common stock in order to, among other things: (a) profit

from insider sales; and (b) to prepare to “spin-off’ Mirror Image.

Insider Trading

138. During the Class Period, Alexander and Gustav Vik, through VBI Corporation,

sold an exorbitant amount of Xcelera common stock at artificially inflated prices prior to the

disclosure of the adverse information revealed to the public at the end of the Class Period. All

totaled, defendants sold 3.2 million shares to the unknowing public at artificially inflated prices

for proceeds of a staggering $250.5 million.

139. VBI Corporation is a private Company owned and controlled for the benefit of

Alexander, Gustav and Erik Vik, as Alexander Vik acknowledged in a February 28, 2000

interview with CNBC’s Mark Haines. Alexander Vik is VBI’s sole director and executive

officer, and signed VBI’s March 7, 2000 Schedule 1 3D/A filing as VBJ’s President.

According to a July 2000 analyst report by Lazard Freres, “VBI Corp.... is synonymous with

Alexander Vik and his two brothers, Gustav and Erik.” As of July 14, 2000, VBI owned

approximately 73.2% of Xcelera’s common stock.

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140. On February 24, 2000, the Vik Brothers, through VBI Corporation, filed with

the SEC a Form 144 indicating their intention to sell 500,000 shares of Xcelera.

141. On March 10, 2000, VBI Corporation filed with the SEC a Form 1 3D/A in

which VBI disclosed that as of March 7, 2000, VBI beneficially owned 40,472,608 voting

shares of Xcelera, or 76.62% of the outstanding shares of the Company. The Form 1 3D/A

also acknowledged “Alexander M. Vik is the sole director and executive officer of VBJ.”

Finally, the Form l3D/A provided a list of VBI’s insider sales of Xcelera stock on February 22,

2000, February 23, 2000, March 6, 2000 and March 7, 2000. These sales represented a total

sale of 1,266,400 split-adjusted shares for gross proceeds of approximately $92,463,982.

Alexander Vik signed the March 10, 2000 Form 13 D/A.

142. On March 16, 2000, the Vik Brothers, through VBI Corporation, filed with the

SEC a Form 144 indicating their intention to sell 500,000 shares of Xcelera. This filing also

disclosed VBI’s prior open market sales from February 22, 2000 through and

including March 9,2000. In that time period, VBI had sold approximately 1,402,200 split-

adjusted shares for gross proceeds of $103,598,911.

143. On April 3, 2000, the Vik Brothers, through VBI Corporation, filed with the

SEC a Form 144 indicating their intention to sell 100,000 shares of Xcelera. This filing also

disclosed VBI’s prior open market sales from February 22, 2000 through and including March

23, 2000. In that time period, VBI had sold approximately 2,402,200 split-adjusted shares for

gross proceeds of $206,096,871.

144. On April 17, 2000, the Vik Brothers, through VBI Corporation, filed with the

SEC a Form 144 indicating their intention to sell 500,000 shares of Xcelera. This filing also

disclosed VBI’s prior open market sales from February 22, 2000 through and including April

7, 2000. In that time period, VBI had sold approximately 2,602,200 split- adjusted shares for

gross proceeds of $220,937,552.

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145. On July 17, 2000, the Vik Brothers, through VBI Corporation, filed with the

SEC a Form 144 with the SEC indicating their intention to sell 1,000,000 shares of Xcelera.

This filing also disclosed VBI’s prior open market sales from April 10, 2000 through and

including June 22, 2000. In that time period, VBI had sold approximately 624,600 split-

adjusted shares for gross proceeds of $29,578,614. The July 17, 2000 Form 144 became

publicly available on July 27, 2000, and was soon withdrawn by the Viks in response to intense

public criticism and shareholder inquiries.

146. The Individual Defendants’ Xcelera stock sales during the Class Period are as

follows:

Transaction Date Split AdjustedShares Sold

Split AdjustedPrice/Share

Gross Proceeds from Sale

2/22/00 464,400 $65.86 $30,584,712

2/23/00 340,000 $64.15 $21,812.479

3/6/00 262,000 $87.42 $22,903,791

3/7/00 200,000 $85.82 $17,163,000

3/8/00 54,200 $79.34 $4,300,292

3/9/00 81,600 $83.76 $6,834,637

3/13/00 248,000 $94.65 $23,472,286

3/14/00 86,000 $96.64 $8,311,275

3/15/00 2,800 $95.40 $267,125

3/22/00 240,000 $105.94 $25,426,668

3/23/00 423,200 $106.38 $45,020,506

4/3/00 31,000 $78.78 $2,442,150

4/5/00 20,000 $66.43 $1,328,500

4/6/00 59,000 $70.59 $4,164,800

4/7/00 90,000 $76.72 $6,905,231

4/10/00 92,000 $73.16 $6,730,989

-54-

4/11/00 48,000 $60.84 $2,920,313

4/13/00 41,200 $56.32 $2,320,200

4/19/00 44,000 $41.41 $1,822,206

4/24/00 30,200 $34.94 $1,055,281

4/25/00 80,000 $37.77 $3,021,775

4/27/00 23,000 $38.94 $895,575

4/28/00 26,000 $44.40 $1,154,494

5/1/00 5,000 $47.51 $237,531

5/2/00 6,000 $48.18 $289,063

5/4/00 18,500 $41.20 $762,194

5/5/00 12,000 $41.23 $494,737

5/12/00 12,100 $38.72 $468,500

5/15/00 28,000 $38,81 $1,086,719

5/16/00 28,000 $41.36 $1,158,000

5/17/00 9,200 $36.58 $336,506

6/6/00 17,100 $42.80 $731,900

6/7/00 6,000 $40.77 $244,625

6/8/00 6,100 $39.93 $243,575

6/9/00 7,000 $39.45 $276,175

6/12/00 8,000 $40.22 $321,750

6/13/00 43,000 $38.92 $1,673,712

6/14/00 20,200 $39.03 $788,481

6/21/00 12,000 $38.96 $467,563

6/22/00 2,000 $38.38 $76,750

TOTALS 3,226,800 $250,516,166

147. Defendants’ stock trades during the Class Period were unusual and suspicious

in timing and amount, because:

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a. The March 22, 2000 announcement of the Exodus transactions, as

well as Alexander Vik’s hyping of a possible Mirror Image initial public offering which the

valued at $20 billion, coincided with some of VBI’s most significant selling, including a $25.4

million block on the date of the announcement; a $45 million block on March 23, 2000, and a

$20 million sale on March 28, 2000.

b. Prior to February 2000, VBI and the Individual Defendants had not

sold any shares of Xcelera.

148. The Individual Defendants’ positions with the Company and Mirror Image

made them privy to confidential, proprietary information concerning the Company’s business,

services, markets, financial conditions and future business prospects.

149. Notwithstanding their duty to refrain from trading Xcelera stock under these

circumstances, or to disclose the insider information prior to trading, defendants sold, prior to

disclosure of the material adverse facts described above, shares of Xcelera stock at prices that

had been artificially inflated by defendants’ materially false representations and material

omissions.

150. The Individual Defendants engaged in a scheme to inflate the price of Xcelera

common stock to enhance the value of their holdings in Xcelera common stock.

Desire to Spin Off Mirror Image

151. A key aspect to Xcelera’s purported business strategy was to purchase,

develop and spin off successful Internet start-ups. The first test of Xcelera’s ability, and the

described “linchpin” to the Company’s Internet strategy, was to be the Company’s plan for an

initial public offering of Mirror Image.

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152. Throughout the Class Period, defendants sought to inflate the price of Xcelera

stock by inducing investors to purchase Xcelera with the promise of permitting them ground-

floor access to the Mirror Image IPO. For example:

a. On March 6, 2000, Xcelera issued a press release announcing its

“shareholders rights policy” that would enable Xcelera shareholders to get allocations at the

IPO price for any IPO of a company in Xcelera’s portfolio. In response to this announcement

Xcelera’s stock soared from $81.25 to $95, before closing at $85.

b. On March 22, 2000, Bloomberg News quoted Alexander Vik

discussing the possible spin-off of Mirror Image as follows: “We don’t have a specific date [to

sell shares in Mirror Image]. We’re certainly planning for it this year. We expect to have a

valuation greater than Akamai [Technologies Inc.].” A separate Bloomberg News article issued

on the same day entitled “Xcelera.com’s Mirror Image IPO to Have $20 Bln Market Value,”

reported:

Xcelera.com Inc.’s Mirror Image Internet... will have a market valueof at least $20 billion after it sells shares later this year, Xcelera.com’schief executive said. The initial public offering of a “small” stake inMirror Image will give it a value greater than that of AkamiaTechnologies Inc., which has a market capitalization of $20 billion,said Alexander Vik.

At the time these comments were made, Xcelera’s market value was approximately $11.5

billion.

153. Upon the defendants’ announcement of the Mirror Image/Exodus transaction,

the stock was trading at an all time high, and public awareness of the Company and Mirror

Image continued to grow.

Xcelera’s Buy Back Program

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154. On July 17, 2000, defendants issued a press release announcing that Xcelera’s

Board of Directors had approved a share repurchase program that gave the Company authority

to buy up to two million shares of its stock from the open market. In commenting on the buy

back plan, Alexander Vik stated:

We believe that Xcelera is undervalued at current prices and view theshare repurchase program as a financial opportunity that is a gooduse of the company’s resources. Xcelera is confident in thetechnology and tremendous potential of the Mirror Image business, inwhich we maintain our approximate 78% ownership stake, and theother companies in our portfolio.

The Company also stated that the “timing of the purchases and the number of shares to be

bought at any one time will depend on market conditions.”

155. The July 17, 2000 press release concerning the buy back program was false

and misleading when made because Xcelera’s stock as not “undervalued” because the market

was still unaware of the severe tax consequences stemming from the Exodus transaction that

was already completed at the time the buy back program was announced. Further, the market

was still unaware of the possible dilution of Xcelera’s stock stemming from litigation over the

Mirror Image acquisition in March 1999.

156. At the time the Company announced its buy back program, defendants failed to

disclosure that insiders, through VBI Corporation, had actually registered to sell Xcelera

shares. On July 10, 2000, Alexander Vik, on behalf of VBI, filed a Form 144 for the sale of 1

million Xcelera shares. The Form 144 was filed with the SEC in paper form and was not

picked up by the news wires until July 27, 2000. Thus, at the time that the Company issued its

July 17, 2000 press release concerning the “buy back” program, Alexander Vik had already

filed to sell 1 million shares. Only after the Form 144 became public and investors began

inquiring about and criticizing the Vik Brothers’ suspicious action, did Alexander Vik withdraw

the original Form 144.

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-59-

COUNT I

(AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS)

VIOLATION OF SECTION 10(b)OF THE EXCHANGE ACT AND SEC RULE lOb-5

157. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in the

foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

158. This Count is asserted against the defendants and is based upon Section 10(b)

of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). and SEC Rule lOb-S promulgated thereunder.

159. During the Class Period, the defendants directly engaged in a common plan,

scheme, and unlawful course of conduct, pursuant to which they knowingly or recklessly

engaged in acts, transactions, practices, and courses of business which operated as a fraud and

deceit upon plaintiffs and the other members of the Class, and made various deceptive and

untrue statements of material facts and omitted to state material facts in order to make the

statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading to

plaintiffs and the other members of the Class. The purpose and effect of said scheme, plan, and

unlawful course of conduct was, among other things, to induce plaintiffs and the other members

of the Class to purchase Xcelera common stock during the Class Period at artificially inflated

prices.

160. During the Class Period, the defendants, pursuant to said scheme, plan, and

unlawful course of conduct, knowingly or recklessly issued, caused to be issued, and/or

participated in the preparation and issuance of deceptive and materially false and misleading

statements to the investing public as particularized above.

161. As a result of the dissemination of the false and misleading statements set forth

above, the market price of Xcelera common stock was artificially inflated during the Class

Period. In ignorance of the false and misleading nature of the statements described above and

the deceptive and manipulative devices and contrivances employed by said defendants,

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plaintiffs and the other members of the Class relied, to their detriment, on the integrity of the

market price of the stock in purchasing Xcelera common stock. Had plaintiffs and the other

members of the Class known the truth, they would not have purchased said shares or would not

have purchased them at the inflated prices that were paid.

162. Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class have suffered substantial damages

as a result of the wrongs herein alleged in an amount to be proved at trial.

163. By reason of the foregoing, defendants directly violated Section 10(b) of the

Exchange Act and SEC Rule lOb-S promulgated thereunder in that they: (a) employed devices,

schemes, and artifices to defraud; (b) made untrue statements of material fact or omitted to

state material facts in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under

which they were made, not misleading; or (c) engaged in acts, practices, and a course of

business which operated as a fraud and deceit upon plaintiffs and the other members of the

Class in connection with their purchases of Xcelera common stock during the Class Period.

COUNT II

(AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS)

VIOLATION OF SECTION 20(a)OF THE EXCHANGE ACT

164. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in each of the

foregoing paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

165. The Individual Defendants, by virtue of their positions, stock ownership and

specific acts described above, were, at the time of the wrongs alleged herein, controlling

persons within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.

166. The Individual Defendants had the power and influence and exercised the same

to cause Xcelera to engage in the illegal conduct and practices complained of herein.

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167. By reason of the conduct alleged in Count I of the Complaint, the Individual

Defendants are liable for the aforesaid wrongful conduct, and are liable to plaintiffs and to the

other members of the Class for the substantial damages which they suffered in connection with

their purchases of Xcelera common stock during the Class Period.

COUNT III

(AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS)

VIOLATIONS OF §20AOF THE EXCHANGE ACT

168. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege all preceding paragraphs as if

fully set forth herein.

169. This Count is asserted against the Individual Defendants for violations of § 20A

of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t- 1, and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder

for insider trading. This Count is asserted by all persons who purchased Company common

stock contemporaneously with the insider sales of the Individual Defendants, through VBI

Corporation, which took place on and between February 22, 2000 and June 22. 2000.

170. During the Class Period, as detailed above, the Individual Defendants sold over

3.22 million shares of Xcelera common stock to the public in amounts set forth at paragraph

146 herein while in the possession of material, non-public information as set forth above. At the

time of their insider sales, the Individual Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded that they

possessed materially adverse non-public information regarding the Company’s ownership of

Mirror Image, the adverse tax consequences of the Exodus deal, and that they had acquired

Mirror Image as part of a scheme to attract public interest in their internet subsidiary, inflate the

Company’s stock price and sell their own shares to the public, and that this information had not

been disclosed to the investing public. The Individual Defendants each violated Section 10(b) of

the Exchange Act and SEC Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder, as alleged hereinabove. As a

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direct and proximate result of these violations, the Individual Defendants’ stock sales violated

Section 20A of the Exchange Act.

171. During the Class Period, the Individual Defendants, while in possession of

material, non-public information, sold, through VBI, Xcelera common stock while certain

members of the Class, including Lead Plaintiffs Kender and Raiz.ner, as well as named Plaintiffs

W.E. Barnette, Barry Family L.P., Ruth A. Benner, Mark Berger, Amer Chughtai, Michael

Conn, Ken Delfini, Discovery International Association, Jose Luis Enriquez, David Finkelstein,

Troy Giles, Sarah J. Hall, Jim Hicks, Bich Nguyen, Alan Kintopf, Kenneth Krishan, Suresh

Kudipudi, Jack LaDue, Martin and Grace Lamorena, Xia Li. David Lipshutz, Mitchell Orazvi,

Hitesh Patel, Aree J. Rand, Brian Reed, Keither Shimizu. Michael Slape, Alex Steubler,

Prechaporn Suwatnodom, Ken Sweeten, Beverly Tamashiro, Thian Keat Tay, James

VonAllmen and Claudette Zelkha, contemporaneously purchased shares of the Company~s

stock, as summarized in the following chart:

VBI Sale Date Contemporaneous Plaintiff Purchaser

2/22/00 Kintopf

2/23/00 Lead Plaintiff Kender and Raizner, DiscoveryInternational Association

3/6/00 Lead Plaintiff Kender, Rand

3/7/00 Lead Plaintiff Kender

3/8/00 Lead Plaintiff Kender

3/9/00 Lamorena

3/13/00 Conn, Hall

3/14/00 Hicks

3/15/00 Lead Plaintiff Kender, Hicks

3/22/00 Lead Plaintiff Kender, Lipshutz

3/23/00 Lead Plaintiff Kender, Barnette

4/3/00 Delfini, Sweeten

-63-

4/5/00 Barnette, Sweeten, Patel

4/6/00 Kintopf, Tamashiro, Giles

4/7/00 Barnette, Kintopf, Li, Tamashiro, Sweeten

4/10/00 Barry Family, L.P.

4/11/00 Li

4/13/00 Lead Plaintiff Raizner, Sweeten

4/19/00 Barnete, Sweeten

4/24/00 Barnete

4/25/00 Benner

4/27/00 Zelkha

4/28/00 Suwatnodom, Sweeten

5/1/00 Benner

5/2/00 Barnette, Reed

5/4/00 Delfini

5/5/00 VonAllmen

5/12/00 Bener, Discovery International Association

5/15/00 Sweeten, LaDue, Orazvi

5/16/00 Berger

5/17/00 Patel, Kudipudi, Krishan, Nguyen

6/6/00 Kudipudi

6/7/00 Enriquez

6/8/00 Berger, Tay

6/9/00 Benner

6/12/00 Li

6/13/00 Slape, Shimizu, Chaughtai

6/14/00 Finkelstein

6/21/00 Reed

6/22/00 Steuble,r Suwatnodom, Enriquez

-64-

172. As a result of the foregoing, the Individual Defendants have violated Section

20A of the Exchange Act and plaintiffs and other members of the Class have suffered

substantial damages.

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs, on their own behalf and on behalf of the Class, pray

for judgment as follows:

A. Declaring this action to be a proper class action and certifying plaintiffs

as class representatives under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

B. Awarding compensatory damages in favor of plaintiffs and the other

members of the Class against the defendants for the damages sustained as a result of the

wrongdoings of the defendants, together with interest thereon;

C. Awarding plaintiffs the fees and expenses incurred in this action,

including reasonable allowance of fees for plaintiffs’ attorneys and experts;

D. Granting extraordinary equitable and/or injunctive relief as permitted by

law, equity and federal and state statutory provisions sued on hereunder, including attaching,

impounding, imposing a constructive trust upon or otherwise restricting the proceeds of

defendants’ trading activities or their other assets so as to assure that plaintiffs have an effective

remedy; and

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E. Granting such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and

proper.

PLAINTIFFS DEMAND A TRIAL BY JURY

Dated:


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