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A PLAN FO R THE REDUCTION OF U.S. GROUNDAN D AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

A thesis p r e s e n t e d to th e F a c u l t y o f th e U.S. ArmyCommand an d Gene ra l Staff C o l l e g e in partial

fulfillment o f th e r e q u i r e m e n t for th edeg ree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AN D SCIENCE

by

HENRY M. ST-PIERRE, MAJ, USAB.A., Virginia Military Institute, 1979

DTIC~ -- "7-.tNO::•,'V 2 4 1993

F o r t Leavenwor th , Kansas1993

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A Plan fo r the Reduction of U.S. Ground and Air Forces

in Europe6. AUTHOR(S)

Major Henry M. St-Pierre, USA.7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

REPORT NUMBER

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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

For the past forty years, th e threat posed by th e Soviet Union and it s a l l ies on our national securi ty

had forced th e U.S. to take a direct role in th e defense of Europe. This commitment required the U.S.

to permanently stat ion large numbers of ground and a ir forces in Europe to deter against th e threat of

a Soviet led invasion of Western Europe. Since 1989, the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the dis-

solution of the Soviet Union has changed th e security paradigm which governed ou r military posture

since 1949. American focus has now turned inward to devote time and resources to th e domestic agenda

foreseen by th e Clinton Administration. This turning inward has forced military planners to relook th

need to stat ion a large number of forces overseas. A major point of this look is ou r need to stat ion

large number of forces in Europe. This thesis will study the feasibi l i ty of reducing ou r ground forces

from one full up Corps to one Corps headquarters with selected CS and CSS assets intact, one divis ion

and one air assault brigade. In addition, Air Force strength would be reduced to tw o composite ai r

wings. The total number of combat forces stationed in Europe would be between 70,000 and 75,000

personnel.

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES

Force reduction, NATO, Forward presence, Forward Deployed 104

forces 16. PRICE CODE

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A PLAN FO R THE REDUCTION OF U.S. GROUNDAND AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

A thesis p r e s e n t e d to th e F a c u l t y o f th e U.S. ArmyCommand and G e ne ra l Staff C o l l e g e in partial

fulfillment o f th e r e q u i r e m e n t for th edegree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AN D SCIENCE

by

HENRY M. ST-PIERRE, MAJ, USAB.A., Vi rg i n i a Military Institute, 1979

F o r t Leavenwor th , Kansas

1993

Approved for p u b l i c release; distribution is u n l i m i t e d .



MASTER OF MILITARY AR T AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Henry M. St-Pierre

Thesis Ti t le : A PLAN FOR THE REDUCTION OF U.S. GROUND AND AIRFORCES IN EUROPE

Approved By*

X .W i ll iam M. Connor,-M.A.

LTC Kenneth W. Osmond, B.A.

/ •'-'- , Member, Consul t ing Facu l tyT. James E. Swartz, Ph.D.

Accepted th is 4th day of June 1993 by:

A"•O _, Direc tor, Graduate DegreePhip Brookes, Ph.D. Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of th es tudent author and do not necessari ly represent th e views ofth e governmental agency. (References to th i s study shouldinclude th e foregoing statement.)

ii



ABSTRACT

A PLAN FO R THE REDUCTION OF U.S. GROUND AN D AIR FORCES INEUROPE by MAJ Henry M. St-Pierre, USA, 99 page s .

F o r th e past forty y e a r s , th e threat posed by th e Sov ie tUnion and its allies on our n a t i o n a l security ha d f o r c e dth e U.S. to t ake a direct role in th e d e f e n s e of Europe .Thi s commitment r e q u i r e d th e U.S. to pe rmanen t ly stationl a rg e numbers o f g r o u n d an d air f o r c e s in Europe to de te ragainst th e threat o f a S o v i e t le d i nvas ion of WesternEurope .

Since 1989, th e de mise o f th e Warsaw P a c t an d th e dis-solution o f t h e S o v i e t Union h as changed th e securityparadigm which governed ou r military p o s t u r e s i n c e 1949.Amer ican f o c u s has now t u r n e d inward to devo te t ime an dr e s o u r c e s to th e domes t i c agenda f o r e s e e n by th e C l i n t o nA d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Thi s t u r n i n g inward has f o r c e d militaryp l a n n e r s to r e look th e need to station a l a rg e number off o r c e s o v e r s e a s . A majo r p o i n t of this look is o ur need tostation a l a rg e number o f f o r c e s in Europe .

Thi s thesis w i l l s tudy th e feasibility o f r educ ing ou rground f o r c e s f rom one full up C o r p s to one Corpsh e a d q u a r t e r s with selected CS an d CSS assets intact, onedivision an d one air assault b r i g a d e . In addition, AirFo rce strength would be reduced to tw o compos i t e a irwings . The total number o f combat f o r c e s stationed inEurope would be between 70,000 and 75,000 pe r sonne l .

Accesion For

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This t hes i s would not have been poss ib le w i t h o u t th ehelp of John W. Douglass, Brig Gen, USAF (Ret), formerDeputy United Sta t e s M il ita ry Representa t ive to th e NATOM il ita ry Committee who, during many long d i scus s ions ,plan ted th e seed fo r this t hes i s in my head.

Equal ly respons ib le a re Mr. William Connor,LT C Ken Osmond, an d LT C James Swartz without whose help,time and fo rebearance , this t hes i s would never have gonebeyond th e idea s tage .

iv



TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

APPROVAL PAGE ......................................... ii

ABSTRACT ............................................. iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................... iv

CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION .............................. .... 1

2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE .......................... 8

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .......................... 34

4. ANALYSIS ................ ..................... 39

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................. 68

ENDNOTES ............................................. 85

FIGURES .............................................. 91

BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................... 93

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ............................ 99



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The r i se o f the Sovie t Union as a superpower and as

our ch i e f pos t -war r iva l s sparked, perhaps what has been,

up to 1991, one of th e g r e a t e s t and most d iv i s ive m i li ta r y

deba tes facing Pentagon strategists. The quest ion was, who

would be respons ib le fo r s t r ik ing the Sovie t Union with

n u c l e a r weapons in th e even t of war? Would it be th e Air

Force with its large fleet o f s t r a t e g i c bombers and

miss i l e s o r th e Navy with powerful strike fo r ce s and

ballistic miss i l e submarines? This argument pi t ted th e

Navy aga ins t th e A ir Force in compet i t ion fo r l im i t ed

do l l a r a requ i red to bui ld th e eventual winners ' expensive

weapon systems. An answer to this debate was found in th e

compromise t h a t gave us our deter rence s t r a t egy.

Since then, events such as the promise of th e

complete withdrawal of th e Sovie t forces to its own borders

by 1995, the s ign ing of th e Conventional Forces in Europe

Treaty, the breakup of th e Warsaw Pact , and th e d i s so lu t ion

of th e Sovie t Empire have confirmed t ha t th e t h r e a t of

immediate war between th e two blocs has regressed ever more

to un l ike l ines s .

1



These new and unprecedented events have, once again,

anchored th e cruc ib le of deba tes within th e defense

es tab l i shment . At s take a re th e do l l a r s t h a t wil l be used

to build th e mi l i t a ry s t ruc tu re which wil l safeguard our

na t i ona l interest into the 21s t cen tury.

Unlike th e prev ious debate with its u l t ima te

ques t ion of how to bui ld up th e mi l i t a ry to face th e

growing Sovie t t h rea t , this debate cen t e r s on how to reduce

th e mil i t a ry s t ruc tu re and still meet our na t i ona l secur i ty

ob jec t i ve s and t rea ty commitments in a world which has no

c l e a r - c u t t h rea t aga ins t which to judge a need fo r a large

mi l i t a ry es tab l i shment .

Like all deba tes , this one has two s ide s . On one

hand, th e Chairman, J o i n t Chiefs of Sta ff an d th e former

Secre ta ry of Defense argued t ha t , in sp i t e o f a ll th e

changes t h a t have occurred in th e pas t th ree years , th e

remaining r i sks more than justify th e cos t incur red to

main ta in a l a rge m i l it a ry presence overseas and a world-

wide s t r a t e g i c deployment capab i l i t y. These forces ,

represen ted by th e four se rv i ce s on permanent or temporary

overseas deployment, would serve to reassure our f r i ends of

our cont inued commitment to stability, to suppor t of those

f r iendly governments and convince our po ten t i a l enemies

t h a t th e U.S. is still a poten t force with which to

contend. These large deployments also would insure our

inf luence overseas , thereby continuing to suppor t our

2



national security needs. Further, these deployments would

provide for forces close to potential trouble spots. In

the event of t rouble, these forward deployed forces could

be moved quickly to enter nations which require our

help--recent examples are Somalia and Saudi Arabia. These

capab i l i t i e s are seen by th e Chairman as key to safeguard

th e nat ion 's national secur i ty requirements in th e future.

The threat as it existed before 1989, and th e need

to protect Western European democracies from th e Eastern

threat , was th e basis by which th e U.S. designed i ts force

structure. It was also NATO's "raison d 'e t re . " Now th e

s i tuat ion has changed--many say i rrevocably. Western

leaders and NATO s t ra teg is t s have admitted that th e Soviet

Union, and i ts successor state , th e Confederation of

Independent States (CIS), no longer poses a threat to th e

survival of a free and viable Western Europe.

The counterpoint team in this debate, using th e

logic of th e reduced threat , is of th e opinion that , in

view of th e decline of th e worldwide threat and th e small

residual risks, we should now reduce our overseas presence

by bringing home th e major i t l , or even all , of our overseas

deployed forces and deactivate them. The resources freed

by th e reduction in defense spending could be used tofinance the domestic programs envisioned by th e new

administrat ion and, of course, contribute to th e reduction

of th e defici t .

3



In view of these dramatic changes, withdrawal of

forward deployed U.S. forces , an d reducing th e s ize of

those forces , appears to be an easy solu t ion to reduce th e

f i nanc i a l s t r a in fac ing th e U.S. today. General ly, such a

move probably makes sense from a f i sca l p o i n t of view. It

ca n probably be done quick ly and w i t h o u t adverse e f f e c t on

read iness . What would be th e U.S. risk by such a move,

however?

This lack of t h rea t br ings up th e t h i rd p o i n t in th e

debate- - the i s sue of U.S. involvement in NATO and European

affairs. The ques t ion is : s ince th e Al l i ance ' s role of

prevent ing a Sovie t - led invasion o f Western Europe has been

fulfilled and its fo r ty year mission has been complete, has

NATO ou t l i ved its usefu lness? Do the pre sen t domestic

i s sues justify th e withdrawal of a ll or pa r t of th e forward

deployed force?

Direc t ly t ied with th e preceding ques t ion is why, if

th e reason fo r s t a t ion ing U.S. forces overseas has

essen t i a l ly disappeared , should th e United Sta t e s maintain

a forward deployed corps and separa te air force permanently

s t a t i oned in Europe? The nex t ques t ion , in this case th e

cen t r a l one fo r this study, is : what should a new,

res t ruc tured , forward deployed force look l ike , and whatshould it be capable of doing?

4



Nowhere else in th e world does th e resolution of

this d e b a t e affect ou r o v e r s e a s commitment more t han it

does in our relationship wi th our NATO allies.

Because t h e r e is no definitive answer, th e

resolution to th e d e b a t e lies, like m o s t t h i n g s when

d e a l i n g in th e political a r e n a , in th e midd le ground. The

d i scovery o f that compromise is, in effect, th e purpose of

this s t u d y. Th e basis for answer ing th e main q u e s t i o n , a

q u e s t i o n that may wel l d e t e r m i n e th e U.S. f o r c e structure

in to th e n e x t cen tu ry, is based , in part, in f o u r gene ra l

a r e a s in t roduced earlier. They a r e : What a re th e n a t i o n a l

security interests of th e Uni t ed States for th e n e a r term

vis-a-vis Europe? T h a t is, shou ld we let our NATO allies

fend for t h e m s e l v e s when d e a l i n g with their security needs

o r shou ld we s t a y i nvo lved in he lp ing them s o l v e th e risk

i s s u e s which f ace them t oday an d in th e future--in short,

w h a t is in it fo r us if we do? Second, w h a t a re th e risks

and threats that m i g h t require th e involvemenL of U.S.

f o r c e s in Europe? Thi rd , a re NATO's traditional roles and

f u n c t i o n s still v i a b l e in view o f th e e m e-g ing risks? If

th e Alliance's p r e s e n t structure is i n a d e q u a t e to meet

t hose tasks, m i g h t it evo lve in to some structure better

suited to m e e t future needs? Finally, in view of th e

a l r e a d y a n n o u n c e d U.S. f o r c e r e d u c t i o n s , w h a t would be th e

b e s t U.S. contribution to an e v o l v i n g A l l i a n c e ? Should th e

U.S. c o n t i n u e to station f o r c e s o v e r s e a s based on its own

5



need to pro jec t fo rce without taking NATO in to

cons idera t ion , or should it tailor its fo rce r ep re sen ta t i on

to a force b e t t e r sui ted to deal with a new NATO with an

evolving mission based on a new s t r a t eg ic concept?

Central to this study is th e cont roversy of how much

America con t r i bu t e s to NATO, th e deployment of forces to

overseas bases , th e mi l i t a ry budget deba tes , and th e i s sue

o f c los ing domestic mil i t a ry bases whi le main ta in ing a

l a rge number of overseas bases . This study, then, may show

a way in which we can maintain fewer t roops overseas and

still meet our mission an d t rea ty requirements . Such a

plan would have th ree purposes : it would demonstra te our

wil l to remain engaged in European affairs to suppor t our

European allies; it would allow us to maintain enough of a

presence in Europe to maintain our inf luence, thus

protec t ing our i n t e r e s t in t h a t area ; and f i n a l l y, we could

maintain a headquar te rs t h a t could suppor t a rapid

expansion should th e need occur.

In conc lus ion , th e purpose of this t hes i s then, is

to recommend a new combat s t ruc tu re which wil l be

permanently s ta t ioned in Europe. This new force is to be

based on the fo l lowing concerns: (1) th e need to secure

our nat iona l i n t e r e s t in Europe; (2) th e r i sks which face

NATO; (3) th e fu ture miss ions NATO might take up ; and (4)

th e forces which wil l remain in th e U.S. force s t r u c t u r e

a f t e r expected cuts .

6



The f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r s o f this thesis will

c o n c e n t r a t e on investigating t h e s e conce rns .

7



CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this chapte r is to survey literature

and determine what th e literature revea ls about th e

ques t ions out l ined in th e prev ious chapte r. These sources

inc lude official government documents, semi -o ff i c i a l

documents, in te rv iews , works publ i shed by sub j ec t exper t s ,

and per iodica l articles.

Off i c i a l documents surveyed inc lude nat iona l

secur i ty documents publ i shed by th e adminis t ra t ion in 1991

and 1993, mi l i t a ry s t ra tegy documents, and Sta te Department

dispa tches .

Semi-off ic ia l documents inc lude Congressional

tes t imony taken as evidence to suppor t th e feasibility of

reducing th e defense budget in l i g h t of the reduced t h r ea t

aga in s t our nat iona l i n t e res t s world wide as well as those

facing our NATO allies. Congressional tes t imony taken as

p a r t of th e Senate confirmation hear ings fo r Secre ta ry

Aspin wil l also be surveyed to help determine th e new

adm in i s t ra t i on ' s d i r ec t ion on nat iona l secur i ty and defense

i s sues . This study also wil l survey Speeches by th e new

Pre s i d e n t fo r th e same purpose.

8



Following semi -o ff i c i a l documents a re th e w r i t t e n

produc ts and in te rv iews o f sub jec t mat te r expe r t s . These

produc ts include Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n s and monographs

produced fo r conferences on nat iona l secu r i ty i s sues .

Sources also inc lude persona l in te rv iews conducted to help

c l e a r up any unanswered ques t ions . These in te rv iews a l so

provide updates in th e field o f na t iona l secu r i ty and

s t ra teg ic force planning which could a f f e c t th e outcome of

this paper. A ll th e wri t t en produc ts from th e exper t s

helped provide background on th e sensitivities involvedwhen deal ing with i s sues which involve our European Al l i e s .

The last major source used to do research was

newspaper and magazine articles. These articles, much l ike

th e wri t t en products d iscussed above, are helpfu l in

prov id ing background in format ion . Because they are more

recent ly wr i t t en , they help provide a b e t t e r source of

information as to th e spec i f i c problems o f force reduct ion

and al ly concern with those po ten t i a l U.S. reduct ions .

The first ques t ion t h a t must be answered in

developing a fu ture force s t ruc tu re is what wil l be th e

na t iona l secu r i ty needs o f this nat ion in th e fu tu re? That

is, is it in our interest to withdraw in to i so la t ion i sm

much th e same way we withdrew after th e two previous

excurs ions in to European affairs during this cen tury or

must th e U.S. remain an act ive p a r t i c i p a n t in bui ld ing th e

"New World Order" envisioned by former Pres iden t Bush?

9



During th e he igh t of th e Cold War, th e na t iona l

secur i ty goals of th e Reagan and Bush adminis t ra t ions had

been to cont inue deterrence and rontainment agains t an

overwhelming Sovie t t h r e a t worldwide. This policy mandated

a strong and ac t ive U.S. par t i c ipa t ion in European affairs.

The downfall of communist governments in Central and

Eastern Europe (C&EE) and th e break up of the Sovie t Union

were c l ea r ind ica t ions t h a t new po l i c i e s deal ing with C&EE

nat ions would be needed. In pa r t P res id en t Bush's National

Secur i ty S t ra tegy document in 1993 recognized this change

when he s ta ted t h a t th e goa l s fo r our nat iona l s e c u r i t y

s t ra tegy would be th e s u p p o r t of growing democracies,

main ta in ing f ree markets , compet i t ion with our economic

par tners , and preven t ion of and con t ro l l i ng m il it a ry

confronta t ion which charac ter ize reg iona l conf l i c t s . '

These goa ls recognized t ha t , unl ike the p rev ious years when

U.S. surv iva l was based on th e need to conta in communist

aggress ion , our new focus would be to safeguard our economy

by insur ing the safe ty of our markets and th e acqu i s i t i on

o f po ten t i a l new ones in th e emerging C&EE democracies.

These goa ls c l ea r ly ind ica te th e need to remain

engaged in European affairs. This view was th e bas is fo r

th e Bush admin i s t r a t i on ' s recommendation of a

European-based U.S. force s t ruc tu re of no less than 150,000

personnel.

10



Since January 1993, however, a new admin i s t r a t ion

has taken th e re ins of pol icy formula t ion . It is usefu l to

examine this new view on nat iona l secu r i ty goa ls and

s t ra teg ies .

In a speech delivered to th e Foreign Policy

Asso c i a t i on in Apr i l 1992, Pres iden t Clin ton s t a t ed tha t

th e U.S. policy should be to redesign its armed fo r ce s to

meet changing needs, to encourage democracies abroad to

succeed, and to " re s to re Amer ica ' s economic l eadersh ip at

home andabroad."2

Pres iden t C l i n t o n ' s views on th e importance o f th e

domest ic economy were echoed by Secre ta ry o f Defense Aspin

during h is conf i rmat ion hear ings when he s t a t ed , "In th is

new era , ou r first fore ign priority an d our first domestic

p r i o r i t y are one and th e same .. . "3 These s ta tements

c lea r ly i nd i ca t e t h a t th e focus o f th e Cl in ton

admin i s t r a t i on , l ike its predeces so r ' s later goals , would

focus on improving th e U.S. economy. The major d i ff e rence

is th e method to be used to achieve th e goal.

Whereas th e Bush adminis t ra t ion would have focused

on th e ability to in .1uence fore ign markets through d i r ec t

par t i c ipa t ion , th e Cl in ton phi losophy wil l rely less on

d i r e c t par t i c ipa t ion in fore ign markets and more on

government in f luence on domest ic markets . Such means will

include in fus ion of funds on th e domest ic scenes and

sanc t i ons and du t i e s on imports .

11



The ques t ion , then, is how to promote th e

development of overseas democracies and maintain our

influence over our overseas markets?

On this ques t ion , David Abshire, former Ambassador

to NATO, s t a t e s t h a t th e way to insure th e growth of

democracy is " to ensure coopera t ion and cohesion among th e

l eaders of th e th ree democrat ic centers . " 4 These

democrat ic centers , he states, are the U.S., Germany, and

Japan. In h is opin ion , th e way to maintain t h a t inf luence

is by main ta in ing forward deployed forces in Europe and

Asia.

Ambassador Abshire is not th e only one who

recommends main ta in ing strong t roop presence in Europe.

Franco is Huisbourg, Direc tor of the In t e rna t iona l Institute

fo r St ra t eg i c Studies in London, s t a t e s tha t , even though

U.S. v i t a l i n t e res t s are no longer th rea tened by an

overwhelming and obvious t h rea t from th e Eas t , there may be

a tendency to want to disengage from di rec t pa r t i c ipa t ion

in European affairs in th e fu tu re . Huisbourg bel ieves th i s

should no t occur. He ou t l ines four spec i f i c reasons why it

is in th e U.S. nat iona l i n t e r e s t to remain engaged in

European affairs. He s t a t e s t h a t th e res idua l presence of

Russian forces in Germany, our ability to quick ly r eac t to

any crisis which might occur t ied with our need to maintain

th e ability to inf luence western European economic affairs,

and th e need to maintain economic and p o l i t i c a l liberalism

12



in western Europe makes it imperat ive t h a t we remain

engaged in Europe. 5

Huisbourg a lso po in t s ou t t h a t th e ability to react

to crisis s i t u a t i o n is no t the only reason to maintain

in f luence in Europe. The r i se o f th e European community as

on e market with on e voice and monetary system makes it

v i t a l t h a t th e U.S. be able to maintain some in f luence in

th e development of European affairs.$ He states t ha t ,

should th e U.S. withdraw its fo r ce s completely from th e

Al l i anc e , the interest of the na t ion would n ot be well

served. He caut ions , however, t h a t such a presence should

be smal le r and t a i l o r e d fo r a d i f f e r e n t mission than what

the force , even in a sma l l e r form we have today, is

designed to do- - f igh t a major land war in Europe. 7

Alexander Gerry, Ass i s t an t Secre ta ry General o f th e

Interallied Confedera t ion of Reserve Off i ce r s , a NATO body

r e spons ib l e fo r th e formula t ion of pol icy dea l ing with

reserve o ff i c e r augmentat ion to th e NATO and SHAPE staff,

s t a tes in an article o f th e Reserve Off i ce r s Associa t ion

Nat iona l Secur i ty Report t h a t : "the North At lan t i c Trea ty

Organizat ion remains th e founda t ion fo r a cont inuing

American secu r i ty ro le in Europe." 8'

Johann Hols t , a fore ign affairs specialist with th e

Rand Corpora t ion , s ta tes t h a t n ot only does th e U.S. need

NATO to keep itself in the European arena ; as long as t he re

are r i sks NATO needs the U.S. to remain engaged. 9

13



The urge to remain involved in Europe through NATO

is th e only way to keep th e U.S. engaged in Europe.

Obviously, th e argument fo r maintaining a s t rong m i li ta r y

presence in NATO is ne i the r unanimous nor should it be our

only vehic le fo r contac t ing and in f luenc ing our European

allies. Many sugges t t h a t g r e a t e r par t i c ipa t ion in such

forums a l ready in place would give us a g r e a t e r voice. One

such body, fo r example, is th e Conference fo r Secur i ty and

Confidence in Europe (CSCE). This body was es t ab l i shed to

discuss secu r i t y i s sues invo lv ing European spec i f i c

secu r i t y i s sues . The problem with this forum is t ha t ,

unl ike NATO an d the UN, it is n o t a l awfu l ly c o n s t i t u t e d

body b u t only a forum fo r discuss ion . As such, it has

n e i t h e r formal au tho r i t y nor power to enforce an y o f its

decis ions .

Clear ly, all of the above sources r ea l i ze th e

importance o f a cont inued U.S. presence in Europe. What

these c i t ed i nd iv idua l s do no t discuss , however, is th e

roo t i s sue fo r our need to main ta in in f luence in

Europe- -s tab le an d growing markets fo r our goods.

As s t a t ed in th e in t roduct ion to this paper, th e

fall of the Berl in Wall, th e d i s so lu t ion o f th e Warsaw

Pact , and th e subsequen t t ransformat ion of th e a l l -powerfu lSovie t Union into a confedera t ion have forever changed th e

defense needs of western Europe. In designing a new force,

th e second problem planners must examine is th e

14



Confederat ion of Independent Sta t e s and its po ten t i a l to

reemerge as a t h rea t aga ins t the Al l iance . Those planners

must a lso examine o th e r sources of r isk in th e region.

The first r i sk to be examined is th e CIS. One of

th e be t t e r desc r ip t ions of th e t h rea t posed by th e former

Sovie t Union was presen ted by Zbigniew Brezenski, former

National Secur i ty Advisor to P re s iden t Car te r. He descr ibed

the Sovie t Union as having suffered a complete col lapse of

n ot only its political system but a lso of its economic

system. As such, it is a nation "wi thout th e s l i g h t e s thope o f redemption."10

The ques t ion many ana lys t s as k themselves , then, is

what o f the t h r e a t of the former S o v i e t t roops remaining in

Germany? What is th e possibility of CIS sen io r mil i t a ry or

civilian l eadersh ip stopping th e t ide of change? Also,

what is th e mil i t a ry po ten t i a l of th e force t h a t remains

between th e Urals and western Russian borders?

In answer, NATO i n t e l l i gence planners see ro chance

t h a t th e CIS o r Russia wi l l stop its planned withdrawal

from German territory. As fo r th e senior m i li ta r y

l eade r sh ip ' s ability to h a l t th e changes, John

Ste inbrunner, Direc tor, Foreign Pol icy Studies Program, at

th e Brookings Institution, testified before Congress, "For

th e foreseeable fu tu re , the Sovie t m i l it a ry l eadersh ip will

not be in an y pos i t i on to initiate d e l i b e r a t e

agg r e s s ion . "1"

15



Fina l l y, of th e force remaining s t a t i oned between

th e Russian western border an d th e Urals , former Secre ta ry

o f Defense Cheney sta ted in Congressional tes t imony that

th e remaining force wi l l be cu t from 115 d iv i s ions to 60

d iv i s ions . The reduc t ion of these forces by a lmos t half

would make it imposs ib le fo r them to launch any off ens ive

moves aga ins t th e West without mobi l iza t ion o f the i r

reserves . Such re in forcements would then prov ide warning

time fo r the Al l iance to r e in fo rce its own efforts.1 2 He

a lso testified t h a t c i rcumstances which could lead to asu rp r i se a t t ack aga ins t th e West have c lea r ly changed. He

expla ined that th e d i s so lu t ion o f th e Warsaw Pact , coupled

with th e s ign ing o f th e CFE t r ea ty has removed th e op t ion

o f th e CIS changing their plans by s topping withdrawal of

its forces from Germany and cen t r a l Europe u n i l a t e r a l l y.

The CIS would now have to deal with nat ions , namely Poland,

th e Czech and Slovak Republ ics , and Hungary who, a t worse,

would be neu t r a l o r perhaps even f r i end ly to th e West.

This neu t ra l i ty would make cove r t movement of t roops

westward imposs ib le . Indeed, NATO planners no longer judge

Russia o r Ukraine capable o f launching an "unwarned" a t t a c k

on th e West.' 3

The second issue in terms of t h rea t s aga ins t NATO is

th e r e l a t ionsh ip of th e All iance an d its C&EE neighbors .

This r e l a t i onsh ip has been changed by th e withdrawal of th e

Sovie t Union and th e tu rn ing inward of Russia to so lve its

16



own problems. This withdrawal has left a vacuum in

secur i ty assurances to those n a t i ons t h a t were once covered

by the Sovie t umbrel la and its guaran tee t h a t their

secu r i t y would be guaranteed. That is now gone.

Real iz ing t h a t "na ture abhors a vacuum," NATO heads

o f state and governments dec la red dur ing the Rome

Conference in 1991 t h a t NATO would help provide needed

stability by opening dia logue between NATO and its new

secu r i t y pa r tne r s . 1 4 This indeed happened in th e sp r ing

of 1992 when th e North At lan t i c Cooperat ion Counci l (NACC)

met in Brusse ls . That same Rome Conference t ha t d i rec t ed

th e formation o f th e NACC a l so , as s ta ted by Gerry,

"descr ibed a broad approach" which mandated th e use of

a l t e rna t ive elements o f power, such as economic, soc i a l and

environmental powers, to prov ide t h a t secu r i t y which th e

C&EE nat ions have been seek ing . 1 s On th e sub j ec t of

secu r i t y, Francois Huisbourg also states t h a t th e use of

what could be cal led th e elements of nat iona l power is what

is needed to deal with r i sks and to prevent those r i sks

from becoming th rea t s as descr ibed ea r l iE r.1 6

As a l ready mentioned, th e fu ture r i sks th e All iance

might face a re th e res idua l Russian mi l i t a ry force, loss of

cont ro l of nuc lear weapcris, i n secur i t i e s a t having some

na t i ons accepted into th e All iance while n o t accept ing

o the r s , and, f i n a l l y, th e divergent cu l tu ra l and soc ia l

groups which have been under artificial cont ro l fo r th e

17



pas t for ty years an d have now come to th e sur face . An

example is th e instability in th e former Yugoslavia . 1 7

The r i s k s descr ibed above and th e promise of

stability offered by th e All iance with its Trans-At lan t ic

l ink a re why th e former Pac t look a t NATO fo r help. ' '

To take the po in t f u r t h e r then, how wi l l th e

All iance se t th e minds of th e Z&EE nat ions a t ease? The

fu ture European secu r i t y p i c tu re , al though looking b e t t e r ,

still reflects some concerns. Trea t i e s and th e

ver i f i ca t ion pro tocols t h a t go with those treaties assure

Western planners t h a t th e p o s s i b i l i t y of mil i t a ry a t tack on

NATO territory is small . The possibility o f m i li ta r y

revolu t ion in Russia is not , however, beyond th e realm of

possibility. On this sub jec t , Sergei Rogov, Deputy

Direc tor fo r th e Institute to th e Study fo r th e U.S. and

Canada in Moscow, s t a t ed t h a t th e fu ture of th e CIS lies in

t h r ee pos s ib l e scenar ios . The first is t h a t th e armed

forces of th e CIS wi l l be under cont ro l o f a cent ra l

au tho r i t y. This would be s imi l a r to a s t rong federa l

civilian confedera t ion having overa l l power over a un i f i ed

mil i t a ry s t ruc tu re . This s i tua t ion would be th e most

pre fe r ab l e in terms of cont ro l of th e m i l i t a r y. He gave

this scenar io only a10%

chance of success . The nextscenar io , an d th e second bes t v i s -a -v i s stability, is that

th e mil i t a ry would be under no cen t r a l cont ro l , but Russia ,

as th e number one mil i t a ry power in th e region, would have

18



a l ead ing voice in th e use of mil i t a ry power. He rompares

this s i t u a t i o n with th e r e l a t ionsh ip of th e U.S. and its

NATO allies. He gave this plan a 30% chance of success

The last, and l e a s t des i r ab le s i t u a t i o n , has a 60% chance

of occur r ing . He s ta tes t h a t this s i t u a t i o n would involve

a t o t a l d i s in teg ra t ion o f any cen t r a l au thor i ty anu th e

t o t a l loss o f cont ro l o f th e mil i t a ry. ' 9

As t ime and events have shown, Rogov's pess imis t ic

pred ic t ions t h a t the former Sovie t Union would completely

d i s in teg ra te and its mil i t a ry would be under no control

have not mater ia l ized and are not l ike ly to .

Does th e inability of th e CIS to launch an unwarned

a t t ack on th e West mean t h a t NATO planners should not

worry? The answer is an emphatic no. NATO must still look

eastward with a wary ey e because th e break-up o f th e Soviet

Union has now caused th e con t ro l s it placed on its allies

to disappear. The lack of con t ro l s has sparked th e

fragmentat ion of no t only th e Sovie t Republ ics b u t also

artificially crea ted eas t e rn European na t ions such as

Yugoslavia and Czechos lovak ia . These breakups have caused

regional instability and, as in th e case o f Yugoslavia ,

vio lence and bloodshed. Repercuss ions from t h a t war have

already made themselves felt within th e All iance . These

repercuss ions have included mil i t a ry incurs ion into neut ra l

aoid All iance na t ions and refugee in f lux into much r icher

western na t ions such as Germany and Greece. 2 0

19





o u t t ha t , in addi t ion to dangers of instability, th e

nuc lear weapons which e x i s t in th e Russian and Ukrainian

a r sena l s a re by no means secure . Another r i sk to th e well

being of Europe and th e All iance is nuc lear blackmail made

poss ib le by th e loss o f cont ro l of weapons of mass

des t ruc t ion owned by Russia and th e Ukraine.2"

This por t ion o f th e survey i nd i ca t e s t ha t th e t h r ea t

posed by th e former Sovie t Union has c lea r ly and some say,

forever disappeared . That disappearance has, however,

given r i se to new concerns- - r i sks - -which the All iance must

t ransform itself to meet. These new r i sks inc lude

instability generated by th e lack of cont ro l and guaran tees

once provided by the Sovie t Union to its allies.

The next area worthy o f examinat ion in designing a

new U.S. force s t ruc tu re fo r NATO is examining what NATO

might be cal led on to do in th e fu tu re .

As a l ready examined, th e o ld t h r e a t aga ins t NATO,

t h a t is, a massive land based a t tack which NATO members

built its armed forces to counte r, has gone away. This has

been replaced by ce r t a in r i sks which, if n o t con t ro l l ed ,

could poss ib ly develop into new t h rea t s .

In looking a t fu tu re po ten t i a l r i sks , th e ques t ion

becomes how can NATO bes t handle th e r i sks descr ibed

above? Before this can be answered, it is usefu l to

examine emerging and ex i s t i ng European organiza t ions

i n t e re s t ed in secu r i t y i s sues .

21



The first is, of course, the United Nations. The

fall of th e communist regime in Russia has changed th e role

of th e UN from a l a rge ly i ne ff ec t ive body fo r dia logue to

th e forum fo r mutual secu r i t y it was meant to be. As such,

th e organiza t ion might be in a be t t e r pos i t i on to help

settle'potential secu r i t y problems in Europe. The second

organiza t ion is th e Conference on Secur i ty and Confidence

in Europe (CSCE) and th e ro le it ca n play in so lv ing

reg iona l secu r i t y r i s k s . The t h i rd is the Economic

Community (EC). A ll of these bodies , some lega l ly

cons t i t u t ed and others , l ike th e CSCE, a re bodies s e t up to

discuss secu r i t y i s sues in Europe.

The help these emerging groups could provide has

also been not iced and commented on by former Secre ta ry of

Sta te James Baker when, in November 1991, he in fer red that

only a network of European secu r i t y institutions, of which

NATO was b ut one, would be capable o f suppor t ing a Europe

"whole and f r ee . " The EC and th e CSCE would also have

impor tan t ro les to play in i n t eg ra t ing th e Eas t into th e

community of nat ions . 2 4

This s ta tement c lea r ly ind ica ted t h a t th e U.S. would

look a t o the r organiza t ions to help gain and maintain

stability in Europe. In light of th e above sugges t ions and

t rends , what would be th e bes t use of th e mi l i t a ry power

under NATO's cont ro l?

22



The answer could lie in th ree spec i f i c areas : crisis

management and l i a i son , peacekeeping, and its t r ad i t iona l

miss ion o f deter r ing a t tack on its members.

In h is conf i rmat ion hear ings , Secre ta ry of Defense

Aspin s t a t ed , "Our overa l l s t r a t egy should n o t to be to go

a t it alone bu t to strive to g et new burden shar ing

agreements with our allies." 2 5

This i nd i ca t e s a wi l l i ngnes s on th e p a r t of th e new

adminis t ra t ion to let NATO, under its own author i ty or with

coopera t ion from th e CSCE, if it so chooses , to accomplishthese crisis management miss ions . These are miss ions fo r

which, unl ike the UN, CSCE, and th e EC, th e mil i t a ry i n f r a -

s t ruc tu re needed to accomplish such a task is pre sen t an d

func t ion ing under on e body. Indeed, this example is not

without p receden t in recent h i s to ry. The food airlift to

Russia dur ing the win te r of 1991 was managed by NATO even

though the Al l iance was n ot th e proponent agency. The

a l l i ance provided th e in -count ry expe r t i s e and much of th e

i n f ra s t ruc tu re to suppor t th e opera t ion , but it was not in

charge.

Cr i s i s management is n o t th e only viable mission for

NATO. The t roops assigned to NATO could, with the i r

ind iv idua l n a t i o n ' s suppor t , be involved in peacekeeping,

non-combatant evacua t ion , search and rescue, c iv i l unres t ,

s t r i k e s and ra ids , suppor t o f nat iona l au thor i t i e s who

23







U.S. domest ic political environment and its e ffec t on th e

fu tu re U.S. force s t r u c t u r e as a whole.

Ever s ince Mikhai l Gorbachev began u n i l a t e r a l

withdrawal of Sovie t forces from Eas te rn Europe, political

l eaders and think tank specialists have advocated t h a t th e

All iance in general and th e U.S. in p a r t i c u l a r should show

suppor t o f these initiatives by reducing equal a7_unts of

forces from th e All iance a r sena l s . Given t h e se f ee l ings ,

coupled with new treaties, reduced t en s ions , and a growing

domest ic agenda, we must look forward to reduced spending

on defense .

Since ear ly 1991, th e House and Senate Armed

Serv ices Committees have been looking a t ways to reduce

defense spending in view o f the new pos ture in Europe. In

an opening s ta tement before th e House Budget Committee,

Committee Chairman Leon Penet ta s ta ted t h a t th e spending

plan agreed to by th e Bush Adminis t ra t ion would n o t achieve

th e promised reduc t ion in spending promised by both th e

Execut ive and Leg i s l a t i ve branches dur ing th e Budget

Enforcement Act of 1990. He s t a t ed t ha t , in order to

achieve the goa ls s e t by th e budget agreement, m i li ta r y

spending would have to be cu t by a t o t a l of 40 billion

do l l a r s annua l ly. 3 0 Chairman Penet ta , in t h a t same

hear ing , also se t th e s tage fo r fu r the r defense spending

reduc t ion when he s t a t ed , "We cannot afford to waste our

26



resources on defense spending aga ins t t h rea t s t h a t no

longer ex i s t . " 3 1

In th e October 1992 ed i t i on o f th e Reserve

Associat ion Journa l National Secur i ty Report , Pres iden t

Cl in ton s t a t ed t h a t it was h is goal to reduce th e defense

budget by 60 billion d o l l a r s from th e proposed Bush budget

by 1994.32 He also s t a t ed t h a t in th e fu tu re , th e U.S.

would have to f i g h t as p a r t o f coa l i t i on and to do t ha t "We

must a lso be ab le to f i g h t e ffec t ive ly on our own," thus

neces s i t a t i ng basing a l a rge r pa r t o f our fo r ce s in th e

U.S.3" This b e l i e f was confi rmed when he, on 27 March

1993, in a joint p re s s conference with Chance l lo r Helmut

Kohl, s t a t ed t h a t h is goal was to have a force l eve l of

100,000 t roops in Europe. 3 4 In f a c t - - n o t only wil l the

admin i s t r a t ion ' s policy force a re turn of fo r ce s f rom

Europe, it but may well cause th e f loo r s agreed to by th e

Budget Enforcement Act o f 1990 to become c e i l i n g s . This

would reduce th e defense budget even more.35 This

expected change and th e new admin i s t r a t ion ' s attitude on

basing more forces in th e cont inenta l U.S. wi l l obviously

cause a reduct ion o f force deployment in Europe.

In view o f these i nev i t ab l e reduc t ions beyond those

a l ready in effect--that is reducing th e deployed forcesfrom 350,000 to th e p re se n t number of 150,000, what should

th e s ize o f th e forces overseas be? To do t ha t , we need to

27



examine what JCS Chairman Colin Powell sugges t s th e t o t a l

fu ture force should look l i ke .

The force envisioned by General Powell is cal led th e

"Base Force." This force is to have four major goa ls .

First, it must be able t o de t e r aggress ion mounted both

a g a i n s t U.S. interests and those of our allies with whom we

have t rea ty ob l iga t ions . This study wil l concent ra te on

the de te r rence a ffec t U.S. forces would have fo r our NATO

allies. Second, th e force must be ab le to pro jec t forward

presence. Third, it must be ab le to respond to world-wide

c r i s i s - - a g a i n , fo r this purpose, in Europe. Last ly it must

be a strategic f o r c e - - t h a t is, it must be able to deploy

worldwide. To do these var ious miss ions , the force is to

be div ided into four reg ions of concent ra t ion . They are to

be : At lan t i c forces , which would inc lude Europe; Paci f ic

fo rce s ; Contingency forces , which would be s t a t i oned in th e

United Sta t e s ready fo r world-wide deployment; and finally,

strategic forces , under whose r e s p o n s i b i l i t y would fa l l

maintenance o f th e nuc lear force .

Concent ra t ing spec i f i ca l ly on Europe, what would

those forces , t h a t is, th e At lan t i c fo r ce s , be able to do?

First, according to General Powell, those forces should be

able to de t e r aggress ion in t h a t area and provide initial

combat forces if deter rence fails. He sugges t s tha t

assurance aga ins t t h rea t s in Europe is pre sen t because of

th e mil i t a ry commitment represen ted by th e large force

28



still pre sen t in Europe. 3 6 Ambassador David Abshire

agrees with him. 3 7 The Powell /Abshire so lu t ion to th e

ques t ion o f deter rence in Europe, t h a t is th e placing of

t roops in Europe in l a rge numbers, is n ot agreed to by

everyone. A counte r argument t o Absh i r e ' s t hes i s is that

de te r rence is n o t necessar i ly enforced by a large amount of

s t a t i oned forces bu t by th e idea t ha t th e commitment to

re turn in th e even t o f problems is there and be l ieved .

In h is t e s t imony to Congress, John Ste inbrunner

states t ha t , if th e mission of th e mil ia ry forces is to

w a i t fo r a major invasion mounted by some unforeseen

t h rea t , t ha t force need only be small . 3 8 Others , such as

Stephen Flanagan, former Deputy Direc tor of Foreign Pol icy

Formulat ion a t th e Sta t e Department, insist t h a t th e

so lu t ion to peace in Europe are smal le r, l e s s v i s ib l e

mi l i t a ry forces . 3 ' He emphasizes t h a t l a rge forces are

i den t i f i ed more with th e o ld s t a tus quo than th e ne w

realities. He states t h a t l a rge forces represen t

des tab i l i za t ion because they lead to quick react ion which,

al though good fo r wartime, is dangerous fo r crisis

management s i tua t ions in which "cool heads" and t ime to

defuse th e po ten t i a l ly dangerous s i tua t ion must be th e

primary cons idera t ions . In t h e i r article mentioned

earlier, Pat r ick Garr i ty and Sharon Weiner spec i f i ca l ly

s t a t e t h a t deter rence is no t dependent on th e presence of

l a rge mil i t a ry forces being p re sen t in a par t i cu la r thea ter

29



to be e f f e c t i v e . The t h rea t o r ce r t a in knowledge t h a t th e

force would be used to suppor t a pol icy is just as

e f f e c t i v e as having a force pre sen t in t hea t e r.4 0 A

preceden t fo r such a thought is p re s en t in recent h i s to ry.

The en t i r e theory behind U.S. nuc lear deter rence is based

on the idea t h a t if a h o s t i l e force fires a nuc lear weapon

aga ins t th e U.S. o r its allies, th e U.S. would respond in

kind.

The f a c t t h a t th e U.S. made it pol icy t h a t we would

respond to an at tack in kind is deter rence aga ins t th e use

o f n u c l e a r weapons s ince th e capab i l i t y to use th e force is

there . The same ca n be sa id fo r our own use o f such

weapons aga ins t North Korea in th e Korean War. The thought

t h a t Russ ia would retaliate aga ins t us if we used them

ce r t a in ly played a p a r t in the U.S. dec is ion no t to us e

those weapons dur ing t h a t c o n f l i c t . This , in e ffec t , was

de t e r r ence . Such s ta t ed deter rence has a lso been used to

p r e v e n t th e perce ived t h r e a t o f Chinese i n t e rven t ion into

th e Indo-Chinese t hea t e r in 1954.41 Whether or no t th e

t h r e a t ac tua l ly prevented Chinese i n t e rven t ion ca n only be

surmised. The po in t is t h a t th e t h r e a t o f American

reac t ion was present - -aga in we had th e capab i l i t y to employ

those weapons, something th e Chinese could no t discount .

The same s i tua t ion can be said about Europe o r anywhere

e l se th e U.S. has commitments. As long as we back our

30



promises with th e p o s s i b i l i t y of ac t ion , then we have

deter rence .

The second p o i n t General Powell discusses as a

mission fo r th e forward deployed base force is forward

presence. For the pas t for ty years , we have equated

forward presence with basing a large permanently s t a t i o n e d

overseas force an d th e maintenance o f a l a rge number of war

s tocks (POMCUS) in Europe. Again, Garr i ty and Weidner

disagree with this d e f i n i t i o n o f forward presence. They

state t h a t forward presence ca n be achieved by off se t t ing a

smal le r permanent r ep re sen t a t i on forward with grea te r

temporary p a r t i c i p a t i o n in mil i t a ry exe rc i s e s in which th e

U.S. would prov ide more t roops fo r exe rc i s e s , i nves t in

fore ign mil i t a ry i n f ra s t ruc tu re programs as is done in

NATO, prov ide mil i t a ry as s i s t ance , and par t i c ipa te in

d i s a s t e r relief and o the r forms of humani ta r ian

efforts. 4 2 None o f these are s t range miss ions . The U.S.

has par t i c ipa t ed in al l o f th e above in on e form o r th e

other.

If, indeed, there is no chance o f a massive Russian

at tack o r an y se r ious t h rea t aga ins t U.S. or NATO i n t e r e s t ,

then should th e U.S. main ta in any force in Europe, and if

so what should it be able to do? As a p a r t i a l answer and

sugges t ion , Johann H o l s t sugges ts t h a t th e fu tu re miss ion

of th e U.S. m i l it a ry in Europe should be to p a r t i c i p a t e

31



w i t h i n t h e NATO f ramework to work to do th e f o l l o w i n g

m i s s i o n s :

1. P r o v i d e a c a d r e fo r reconstitution o f a

substantial p r e s e n c e in th e e v e n t o f hostile attack

2. P r o v i d e enough c a p a c i t y for US forces to be

unden iab ly engaged in c o m b a t in th e e v e n t o f attack

3. Protect th e r ema in ing n u c l e a r weapons in Europe

For t h e s e m i s s i o n s , he estimates that a f o r c e of

only 75 to 100 ,0 00 would be ne eded . 4 3

T h i s c h a p t e r has demons t r a t ed that ou r n a t i o n a l

interest vis-a-vis Europe clearly lies in o u r ability to

i n f l u e n c e e v e n t s on th e continent. The c o n t i n u e d

deve lopmen t and emerg ing power o f th e Economic Community

makes it critical that we m a i n t a i n some form o f visible

p r e s e n c e in E u r o p e - - a p r e s e n c e that participation in th e

CSCE o r th e UN c a n n o t p r o v i d e u s.

T h i s c h a p t e r has also showed that th e threat fo r

which we built o u r d e f e n s e structure, that is to c o n t a i n a

no notice attack by S o v i e t Union and S o v i e t s u p p o r t e d

C e n t r a l and Eas te rn European n a t i o n s , is no l o n g e r c r e d i b l e

an d has gone away. T h i s threat has , i n s t e a d , been r e p l a c e d

by'risks. Th e risks i n c l u d e possibilities o f civil war,

e t h n i c unrest an d ultra-nationalism--all p rob l em s that, if

left unchecked, cou ld spillover in to o t h e r w i s e u n a f f e c t e d

a r e a s o f Europe . Such a spillover cou ld t hen Qause th e

dep l oymen t o f NATO forces--forces u n s u i t e d for miss ions

32



which might be r - i r e d - - t h a t is peacekeeping, humani ta r ian

miss ions , and crisis management.

This chapte r also has shown how U.S. in te rna l

politics have mandated th e r e s t ruc tu r ing of forces to be

more in l ine with th e changing economic realities, as well

as how European politics have made it mandatory t ha t th e

U.S. main ta in a presence in Europe, albeit in a presence

changed from its t r a d i t i o n a l ro le as a major supp l i e r of

combat t roops to a presence which is ready to prov ide help

as it is needed to cope with any problems which may occur.

Fina l ly, this chapte r has demonstra ted how th e four

suppor t ing ques t ions should go into making up a new force

s t r u c t u r e fo r th e United Sta t e s fo - p a r t i c i p a t i o n with in

th e NATO a l l i a n c e . The ques t i ons are : what are our

nat iona l secur i ty needs; what is th e changing t h r e a t that

faces NATO; and what are th e poss ib le fu tu re miss ions fo r

the U.S. mi l i t a ry within NATO an d th e domest ic politics

which wi l l prov ide t ha t force?

33



CHAPTER 3

RESEARCG METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapte r is to map ou t th e

methodology of how th e primary and secondary ques t ions will

be answered. The assumptions , d e f i n i t i o n s , l imi t a t ions and

de l imi t a t i ons to be used wi l l be es t ab l i shed . In addi t ion ,

th e criteria fo r se l ec t ing a new fo rce s t ruc tu re wil l be

in t roduced .

This type of study does not lend itself to a

quan t i t a t ive method of research . It does, however, a l low

fo r a qua l i t a t ive model with a subjec t ive ana lys i s of th e

mater ia l included in th e literature and in te rv iews .

Initial research has yie lded th e fo l lowing

assumptions:

(1) The withdrawal of CIS forces from Germany will

n o t be i n t e r rup t ed and wil l be completed as foreseen by

1995.

(2) The p re sen t democra t iza t ion of Eastern and

Cent ra l European coun t r i e s wil l cont inue unabated.

(3) Central and Eastern European nat ions will

cont inue rapprochement with th e West.

34



(4) The present ly es t ab l i shed Unif ied Command Plan

wil l n ot change.

The above mentioned assumptions a re based on fac t

and cu r r en t t rends . Initial research has discovered no

in format ion t h a t con t r ad i c t s those assumptions or ind ica tes

a change in th e near fu tu re .

Research has also provided some usefu l def in i t ions .

They a re as fo l lows: '

(1) Forward Deployed fo r ce s : Forces deployed ou t s ide

their nat iona l boundar ies to par t i c ipa te in peacekeeping,

o r a l l i ance commitments.

(2) Forward Presence : The inf luence one nation ha s

on another and the na t iona l power th e former is wil l ing to

use to maintain t h a t in f luence .

(3) Col lec t ive Defense: The jo in ing by severa l

na t i o n s in a formal o r informal agreement to provide fo r

defense o f both nat ions should those n a t i ons come under

d i r e c t at tack (NATO).

(4) Col lec t ive Secu r i t y : The jo in ing of severa l

na t i o n s in a formal o r informal agreement to prov ide a

forum to d iscuss mutual secu r i t y i s sues and needs. The

forum may or may n ot have an execut ive agen t fo r d i scuss ion

and c o n f l i c t resolu t ion (UN or CSCE).(5) European Pillar: Informal re fe rence made to a

separa te European based m i l i t a r y s t r u c t u r e , which as a

35



body, might provide defense or secur i ty appara tus a

uniquely European mi l i t a ry s t ruc tu re .

(6) Cent ra l and Eas te rn Europearn Nations (C&EE): The

na t i on s include a ll former Warsaw Pac t na t i o ns plus al l

republ ics which made up the former Sovie t Union.

Because this pro jec t dea ls with such a dynamic

sub j ec t , ce r t a in d e l i m i t a t i o n s have been placed on th e

research . Those l imi t a t ions deal with th e t ime frame f rom

which in format ion wi l l be drawn. Because this t hes i s deals

with U.S. involvement with NATO a f t e r th e s ign i f i can t

changes o f la te 1989, research wil l be l imited to

pos t -February 1989. If t he r e are any except ions to th is

l i m i t a t i o n , it wi l l be s t a t ed .

The first por t ion o f this chapter covered th e

d e f i n i t i o n s , de l imi t a t i ons and l imi t a t ions to be used to

define th e scope o f research and wri t ing . The fo l lowing

por t ion wi l l discuss th e methodology to be used to eva lua te

th e recommended force and command s t r u c t u r e which should be

placed in Europe.

Methodology

Whatever th e force and command s t r u c t u r e se lec ted ,

they must be able to meet four criteria. First, th e force

and command s t ruc tu re must suppor t the nat iona l secur i ty

goa ls and nat iona l i n t e r e s t s of this nat ion . Second, th e

force must be t a i l o red to meet th e t h rea t foreseen by both

36



U.S. and a l l i ed planners . Since th e U.S. has articulated

its suppor t fo r a European defense i den t i ty within NATO,

th e U . S . ' s force s t ruc tu re must be ab le to suppor t th e

Al l i ance ' s new ro l e s and miss ions . The U.S. European

deployed force , then, should bo l s t e r NATO's c a p a b i l i t i e s to

opera te independent ly o f major U.S. ground forces . Fourth ,

th e new force and command s t ruc tu re must be capab le of

suppor t ing U.S. un i l a t e ra l mi l i t a ry act ion while still

meeting th e needs fo r reduct ion of th e ove ra l l s ize of th e

U.S. ac t ive duty mil i t a ry s t r eng th .

The proposed solu t ion wi l l be a r r i ved a t by

sub j ec t i ve ana lys i s of th e primary an d secondary source

mater ia l a l ready discussed in Chapter 2 and th e ana lys i s of

t ha t m ate r i a l to be presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 will

descr ibe the th ree opt ions fo r recommended force s t ruc tu re

and th e two recommendations fo r th e command s t r u c t u r e .

Chapter 5 wil l a l so make th e recommendation as to which

force and command s t r u c t u r e would bes t suit th e U.S.

requ i rements fo r th e near fu ture based on th e above

mentioned criteria. In addi t ion , Chapter 5 wi l l a l so

ou t l ine some recommendation for fu ture s tud ie s .

This chapter a lso has discussed how I wil l research

in format ion to answer th e primary and secondary ques t ions .

It has a lso descr ibed the assumptions governing th e

t hes i s . This chapte r has def ined terms ce r t a in terms to be

used th roughout th e chapters . Limi ta t ions and

37





CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Chapter 2 o f this t hes i s concent ra ted on providing a

survey o f th e literature on what has been wri t ten about th e

four ques t ions used to s u p p o r t th e primary ques t ion . This

chapte r wil l analyze th e in format ion provided in terms of

answering th e primary ques t ion , which is : What forces

should th e U.S. con t r i bu t e t o th e fu ture NATO?

Evalua t ion o f th e former and pre sen t admin i s t r a t i on

po l i c i e s and s ta tements on secu r i t y and n a t i o na l interests

makes it c l e a r t h a t both admin i s t r a t i ons agree as to th e

impl ica t ions o f th e change in world secu r i t y environment .

Both admin i s t r a t i ons agree t ha t th e demise o f th e Soviet

Union has changed our secu r i t y interest focus from a s ingle

d i rec t ion based on th e need to conta in Sovie t expans ion ism

to th e need to counte r a number of smal le r problems caused

by reg iona l instabilities.

Where th e s ides disagree is how to handle th e change

and how to focus on t h e i r new secu r i t y s t r a t egy - -

s t rengthening our economy. The Bush adminis t ra t ion was in.

favor of cont inu ing an act ive ro le in European affairs by

maintaining a large presence, t he r e fo re exer t ing a grea te r

39



inf luence in th e way th e Europeans do bus iness . This

approach would help th e U.S. inf luence EC po l i c i e s which

could be det r imenta l to our ability to market our goods in

Western Europe. The Cl in ton adminis t ra t ion seems to favor

par t i a l disengagement to concent ra te on its plan to

revitalize th e economy through in fus ion o f funds on th e

domest ic scene. Such a plan might help a l l e v i a t e some of

th e more press ing domest ic problems bu t it might reduce our

ability to in f luence th e EC.

The poss ib le withdrawal of subs t an t i a l U.S. presence

in Europe begs th e ques t ion 'o f why we saw a need to get

more d i rec t ly involved in European affairs than we a l ready

were immediately after World War II.

The g r e a t e s t concern immediately after t e rmina t ion

o f hostilities was how quickly th e American armed forces

could be demobil ized an d brought home. This lack of

concern fo r th e pos t war events in Europe pushed Bri ta in

and th e USSR toge the r as th e grea t ga tekeepers of European

secu r i t y. As events tu rned out , this s i tua t ion of peaceful

coexis tence d id not last.

Condi t ions in p o s t war Europe were rife with th e

condi t ions fo r c i v i l unre s t . The Sovie t Union took

advantage of these con d i t i on s and s ta r t ed suppor t ing c iv i l

wars in Europe by bo l s t e r ing communist insp i red revolu t ions

wherever it could e x p l o i t c i v i l unre s t . Not even on

rece iv ing George Kennan's "Mr. X te legram," a Sta t e

40





would be cons idered an at tack on al l . This article

guaranteed t h a t th e U.S., with its vas t resources , would be

involved in European affairs, thus forging th e Trans-

Al tan t i c l ink . This t rea ty completed what th e TrumanDoct r ine and th e Marshal l Plan had s t a r t e d - - t h e di rec t

involvement o f the U.S. in European affairs. Thus, th e

American commitment to deter rence and con ta inment has been,

s ince 1949, its one overr id ing defense concern and Europe

its major focus.

Pr io r to th e fall o f the Sovie t Empire, th e U.S.'s

nat iona l secu r i t y interests were d i rec t ly cha l lenged by th e

overwhelming mil i t a ry t h r e a t represen ted by th e Soviet

Union and its allies. Now t h a t th e t h r e a t is gone and th e

U.S. is l i ke ly to t ake a more " la id back" attitude in

European affairs, it must n o t give the impression t h a t th e

government no longer bel ieves our interest lies on th e well

being o f th e con t inen t .3

As mentioned earlier, both th e

Bush an d th e Cl in ton admin i s t r a t i on indica ted t ha t ,

a l though th e U.S. fu l ly rea l ized th e impl ica t ion of a

reduced t h r e a t in Europe and elsewhere, it was still in th e

U . S . ' s interest to s u p p o r t th e development o f new and

emerging democracies in th e C&EE nat ions .

The reasons fo r suppor t of those emerging nat ions in

t h e i r effort to achieve stability are fou r fo ld . Two are

purely political reasons , th e t h i rd is economic and th e

four th is a combination o f th e two.

42



The first reason fo r suppor t of those emerging

na t i ons in their effort to ach ieve i n t eg ra t ion is to

preven t th e r i se of conf l i c t ing economic, defense, and

political a l l i a n c e s which might pit on e group of nat ions

aga ins t another. Such a s i tua t ion could lead to a r e tu rn

o f conf l i c t ing a l l i a n c e s which might, in tu rn , well se rve

as a r epea t o f th e same s i tua t ion which prec ip i t a t ed th e

con t inen t into its First World War. 4

In view of th e above s t a t ed need to i n t eg ra t e a ll of

Surope, why should th e U.S. take th e r e spons ib i l i t y to

ensure that effort to ach ieve stability? The par t i a l

answer is th e second reason why we must remain engaged in

Europe. In our last t h r ee major involvement in European

affairs, we have n o t let ou r se lv e s ge t entangled in

in t ra -European disagreements . In f ac t , we have encouraged

a grea t e r autonomy fo r our Western European pa r tne r s . This

attitude has helped bui ld a ce r t a in amount o f credibility

which gives th e U.S. a neutralist appearance. This neut ra l

s tance has placed us in a posi t ion as th e only honest

broker in Europe. Our only wish is to guaran tee our

secu r i t y and pre-empt the need to re turn to Europe in a

s i tua t ion which would n ot be bene f i c i a l to th e U.S..5

The t h i rd reason why we need to s tay in Europe is

pure ly economic. Nat ions o f Western Europe are , as a group,

our l a rg e s t t rad ing pa r tne r s . If they were s ingle entities

43



then we could deal with them on a bilateral bas is . They

are n o t however. Western Europe has bound itself in a

community o f na t i ons which un i t e s al l of their ind iv idua l

economies in to on e economic power, th e EC. It is an

organiza t ion in which the U.S. has no voice except through

NATO. The po ten t i a l markets o f th e emerging na t i on s a l so

make it imperat ive that we main ta in a s i g n i f i c a n t presence

in Europe.$

The last reason why we need to s tay engaged in

Europe is th e r e su rgen t f ee l ing of m i s t r u s t between the '

European powers. This s i tua t ion is bes t descr ibed in an

anonymous article publ i shed in th e November 1991 National

Review. This article, desc r ibe s how th e Franco-German

Corps may be rev iv ing some age-o ld rivalries between th e

th ree major European powers--Germany, France and Great

Br i t a in . The article sugges ts t h a t Germany's reemergence

as th e leading economic an d mil i t a ry power in Europe will

place it in pos i t i on o f dominance in th e EC. This t ends to

make th e French, Germany's pr inc ipa l r iva l , apprehens ive .

This s i tua t ion could lead to a lack of trust among th e

allies a t worse and dominance o f th e EC by one power at

bes t . This s i tua t ion would probably se rve to make th e EC a

less capable organiza t ion fo r e i the r cont ro l of its markets

o r fo r its capab i l i t y to become th e European pillar of

defense.7

44



If this is permi t ted to cont inue , th e situation

could lead to instability in Western Europe. This would be

disadvan tageous to th e U.S. Although th e EC has been

discounted as a major player in poss ib le European defense

organiza t ion , its po ten t i a l as an economic block is th e

s ing le most impor tan t reason why th e U.S. needs to remain

engaged in European affairs. In th e preceding paragraphs,

na t i on a l interest was equated with th e need to maintain

stability in Europe s ince this stability was needed to

conduct bus iness . Another ingredient needed to conduct

bus iness is access to markets . For this purpose, these

markets are those with our t r a d i t i o n a l t r ad ing pa r tne r s and

those po ten t i a l new markets opening up in th e emerging C&EE

nat ions . For this purpose, al though it is no t - l i ke ly to be

an e ffec t ive defense block, it does n ot remove th e fact

t h a t th e EC ties Western European na t i on s toge ther as a

s ing le market block. This block makes Europe th e s ingle

l a rg e s t economic compet i to r th e U.S. has. It is an

organiza t ion in which th e U.S. has little oppor tun i ty to

in f luence excep t fo r the common par t i c ipa t ion in both NATO

an d th e EC by many EC members. If th e disagreement we

have had with th e EC over t r ades and tariffs'are any

ind ica t ion , we wil l n ot be able to a s s e r t any inf luence in

Europe through th e EC channel.

It is essen t i a l then, t h a t we main ta in a presence in

Europe.$

45



In order to understand why it is importance to

maintain a presence in Europe, it must first be unders tood

t h a t s ince ours is a nation based on a market economy which

depends on free and open markets , we must guaran tee those

markets in o r d e r to surv ive . Surv iva l as a nat ion depends

on a s t a b l e , prosper ing environment in which to conduct

bus iness .

The fu tu re p o t e n t i a l o f markets is n o t th e only

reason why we must main ta in p resence in Europe. If h i s t o r y

is to be be l ieved , it is ev iden t t h a t European instability

can cause reg iona l c o n f l i c t s which, with th e s l i g h t e s t

provoca t ion , can throw th e en t i r e con t inen t into tu rmoi l .

This tu rmoi l could well draw us in to those same cont inenta l

c o n f l i c t . The years between th e First and Second World

Wars se rve to remind us o f what can happen if th e U.S.

removes itself from ac t ive par t i c ipa t ion in European

affairs.$ By main ta in ing a presence in Europe, we then

help to main ta in stability fo r th e emerging na t i ons o f th e

C&EE. An added b e n e f i t wi l l also be our ability to

in f luence p o l i c i e s and events going on in th e EC which even

now is emerging as our g r e a t e s t compet i to r. This presence

and in f luence ca n only be mainta ined ' th rough an ac t ive

suppor t of NATO.

The preceding sec t ions have shown t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n

in NATO is critical to suppor t our na t i o na l i n t e r e s t in

view of th e growing in f luence of th e EC. NATO was,

,46





p r e se n t a problem in terms of stability if they are not

kep t under cont ro l .

There is one remaining r i sk to European secur i ty

which must also be taken into cons ide ra t ion - - the surv iv ing

Russian Army. While t rue t h a t NATO planners d i scount th e

possibility o f aggress ive ac t ion on th e p a r t of Russian

forces , forces still pre sen t a ce r t a in r i sk o f unce r t a in ty,

espec i a l l y if Russia is n ot ab le to so lve its economic

problems. On this sub jec t , Otto von Bismarck ' s admonition,

"Russia is never as s t rong nor ever as weak as it seems,"

means t h a t as long as Russia main ta ins its place in th e

world as a nuclear and convent iona l power, its pos i t i on

should never be d i s c o u n t e d . " ' As such, it is to th e

b e n e f i t o f th e Europeans to keep th e U.S. engaged in

European affairs. This engagement wil l se rve t o o ff s e t

Russian s t r eng th .

The preced ing paragraphs have discussed the fac t

t h a t th e s i t u a t i o n r equ i r i ng NATO's l a rge s tanding m i li t a r y

force , t h a t is, the danger of imminent invas ion from th e

East , has l a rge ly gone. The danger of general convent ional

war has been replaced by dangers brought about by emerging

na t i on s who, fo r th e first t ime in for ty years , ca n vent

f rus t r a t ion a t th e suppress ion of t r a d i t i o n a l problems

which have been con t ro l l ed by artificial means. The danger

is no t t h a t instability from th e emerging na t i ons will

spill to Western Europe b ut t h a t th e spawn of revolu t ion ,

48



t ha t is s t a rva t ion and d i s ea se , could lead to mass and

uncont ro l led migrat ion towards th e west. This could give

r i se to ul t ranat ional i sm in th e West. Ult rana t iona l i sm,

some of which has a l ready occurred in NATO nat ions l i ke

France, Germany, and Belgium, has made it poss ib l e fo r

r i g h t wing f ac t ions to gain popu la r i t y.

Should these r i g h t wing groups be allowed to develop

any type o f power base, t he r e e x i s t s a rea l danger t ha t th e

political an d economic l ibera l i sm which is necessa ry fo r

th e U.S. to opera te , could be replaced by Europeangovernments which could become even more p r o t e c t i o n i s t in

their attitudes towards f ree markets . 12

The preceding por t ion of th e chapter has focused on

th e need o f th e U.S. to sa feguard th e l ibera l i sm which

ex i s t s in Europe. This l ibera l i sm is key fo r a growing

economy which wil l , in tu rn , guaran tee our way of life.

That is why maintaining a c o n f l i c t - f r e e Europe is in th e

na t iona l interest and critical to nat iona l secu r i t y. The

way fo r th e U.S. to guaran tee t h a t sa feguard , then, is

through presence in Europe beyond what can be done by

b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s with th e EC nat ions . We must have a

way to in f luence th e rmajor economic powers in Europe. The

vehic le to do t h a t is NATO.

Because NATO is so impor tan t to our i n t e r e s t , it is

critical t ha t th e U.S. a c t to maintain NATO's viability as

th e a l l i ance of th e fu tu re .

49



When ques t ioned on this sub j ec t by Congress, General

Powell, CJCS, answered t ha t th e Al l i ance ' s new mission was

th e same as its old one - tha t is, to prov ide fo r th e

secu r i t y, stability, and th e defense of a "community of

nat ions" with common va lues and i n t e res t s . 1 3 To be sure ,

this is t r ue , but it is a narrow view which appears no t to

t ake th e new strategic realities of Europe into account .

General Powel l ' s answer assumes t h a t th e s t a tus quo

remains th e same and t h a t th e Al l iance ca n cont inue its old

way of doing bus iness wi thout looking a t th e changes in th e

European secu r i t y needs. Such a l imited view o f th e

Al l i ance ' s fu tu re wi l l probably doom it to obsolescence

s ince domest ic p o l i t i c i a n s , eager to c o l l e c t on th e ever-

e lu s ive peace div idend , wil l n o t allow cont inued spending

fo r a l a rge mi l i t a ry force whose e ff ec t ivenes s agains t the

r i sks descr ibed earlier is suspec t .

The Al l i ance ' s miss ion , simply put , still remains

th e defense o f Western Europe. What must be r ea l i zed ,

however, is th e f a c t t h a t th e Al l i ance ' s way of doing

bus iness must change. Pr io r to th e fall of th e Soviet

Empire, NATO's defended its members by maintaining a l a rge

m i l it a ry force poised a t th e border ready to defend aga ins t

a convent iona l invasion from th e eas t . 1 4

Now, a new way must be found fo r NATO to defend

aga ins t th e r i sks earlier discussed . Key to accomplishing

these miss ions is th e Al l i ance ' s New St ra t eg i c Concept.

50



The concept , adopted in November 1991, is based on th e idea

of changing th e s t r u c t u r e and miss ions of NATO's forces

from a static defense based on th e need to defend aga ins t a

s ing le , thea te r-wide t h rea t to a more f l ex ib le , mobile and

m u l t i - d i r e c t i o n a l response with mul t i -na t i ona l f o r ce s .

This new concep t is designed to be able to respond to th e

r i sk ou t l i ned in th e preceding paragraphs. 1 s

General Powel l ' s assessment is true--NATO's miss ion

is to guaran tee Western Europe ' s freedom through mutual

defense. What is d i f f e r e n t is th e way in which NATO must

guaran tee t h a t freedom.

That guaran tee , some suggest , wil l come from t h r ee

ways. The first wil l be in its t r a d i t i o n a l ro le of

de te r r ing an y remote possibility o f a t t ack . The second

wi l l be by prov id ing fo r. a forum fo r crisis management and

the e s t ab l i shmen t o f c lose r ties between NATO and its

former adve r sa r i e s . The last mission wil l be th e use of

NATO's fo r ce s fo r peacekeeping. '$

First, on th e i s sue o f deter rence , Johann Holst

descr ibed deter rence as a psycholog ica l phenomena which

does n o t remain cons t a n t bu t changes over t ime. 1 7 The

secu r i t y environment in Europe is a good example of change

over t ime. In order to de ter, you must have a t h r e a t . Ithas a l ready been shown t h a t NATO's p lanners no longer

cons ider Russia or Ukraine capable of launching an unwarned

a t tack aga ins t th e west. If t h a t is th e case, then, th e

51



maintenance o f a l a rge s tanding force is a use l e s s drain on

every member's resources .

When the Sovie t Union had a l a rge armed force ready

t o c ro s s the border to at tack th e West, a l a rge s tanding

mil i t a ry force ready to defend aga ins t t h a t force ,

bo l s t e r ed , no doubt , by th e la rge nuc lear umbrella

guaranteed by th e U.S., may have deter red th e po ten t i a l

Sovie t aggress ion . Now that the t h r e a t has been rep laced

by var ied r i s k s , does th e same force provided th e same

amount o f deter rence? The answer fo r NATO is t h a t such a

l a rge force may be more o f a liability than an advantage.

Although t rue that a l a rge force provided deter rence

aga ins t a S o v i e t convent iona l a t t ack , t h a t same force may

actua l ly lead to instability in th e new Europe. This

perception evolves from th e f a c t t h a t NATO's forces

a l though sma l l e r in number, still r ep re sen t s a deep strike

capab i l i t y. This capab i l i t y could lead to th e percept ion

t h a t NATO has no t a d j u s t e l to th e realities o f th e new

s i t u a t i o n . This perception could push former Pac t nat ions

to m i s t r u s t NATO's peaceful i n t en t ions and might push those

former C&EE nat ions in to defense s t r u c t u r e s which could, by

their very exis tence , lead to renewed m i s t r u s t between

Western and Eastern Europe.1 8

There is no quest ion t h a t one of NATO's missions

remains to de ter aggress ion . The ques t ion is how to de te r

in view of th e changing environment. The way to do this is

52



fo r th e Al l i ance ' s mi l i t a ry s t ruc tu re to become less

v i s ib le .

Less visibility can be achieved by th e idea o f th e

Non-Offensive Defense or NOD fo r shor t . This concept ,

initially advocated pr io r to th e demise o f th e Warsaw Pac t ,

sought a way to reduce th e th reshold o f war between th e two

a l l i a n c e s by adopt ing a doc t r i ne which would render nei ther

s ide capab le o f launching a sus t a inab le a t t ack onto th e

others territory. 19

The success o f this concept under th e o ld defense

paradigm was, a t bes t , dubious s ince it would requi re both

s ide s to trust th e o the r to reduce their forward deployed

forces . Since th e s i t u a t i o n has now changed and th e C&EE

nat ions a re looking fo r ways to reduce f e a r of a t t ack , NOD

may be an idea whose t ime has come.

The second mission NATO should be ab le to do in th e

fu ture was sugges t by then Secre ta ry o f Sta t e James Baker

in 1990. Real iz ing t h a t th e s t a tus quo would need to

change, he suggested a new secu r i t y a rch i t ec tu re fo r th e

new e ra upon which Europe was enter ing . He spec i f i ca l ly

ca l l ed fo r giving NATO a s t ruc tu re t h a t would be able to

accomplish two miss ions . One, the Al l iance would have to

be in a posi t ion to help overcome Europe ' s for ty years ofdivis ion by being respons ib le fo r new programs such as arms

cont ro l ver i f i ca t ion and respons ib i l i t y fo r dea l ing with

53



regional confl ic ts . He also proposed that th e CSCE should

increase i ts ac t iv i t i es and responsibi l i t ies . 2 0

Baker's recommendation to expand th e All iance 's role

to include veri f icat ion would not be d i ff i cu l t . Suchoperations would require little addit ional cost since th e

veri f icat ion teams needed to support th i s mission could be

placed in Brussels or SHAPE where th e infras t ructure is

already present .

Along with veri f icat ion, an addit ional role

envisioned fo r NATO's future was ar t icula ted by th e NATO

Heads of State and Ministers in Rome in 1991. At that

meeting, th e heads of s ta te clearly outl ined two paths fo r

a NATO of th e future. The first required the Alliance to

fac i l i ta te th e l iaison relationship between NATO and th e

C&EE nations by invi t ing them to part ic ipate in expanded

meeting of th e North Atlantic Council (NAC). These

meetings, held a t regular intervals invite heads of s t a t e

or the i r representatives to sit in on expanded meetings of

th e NAC. Those meetings, North Atlantic Cooperation

Council (NACC), are designed to provided th e C&EE nations a

forum in which they can voice the i r concerns over issues

which concern a ll of Europe.

If Secretary Baker's veri f icat ions and peacekeeping

respons ib i l i t i e s were accepted by NATO, th e forces required

to do those missions are much different than what is

available to them now. For th e purpose of treaty and

54



disarmament ver i f i ca t ion , th e s t ruc tu re to suppor t th i s

miss ion is n ot a combat force but teams made up of

t e c h n i c a l exper t s with an i n f r a s t r u c t u r e capable of

deploying and suppor t ing them.

Acceptance o f Baker ' s second sugges t ion ,

peacekeeping, is more con t rove r s i a l . If it chooses to so ,

however, how can NATO con t r ibu t e to peacekeeping miss ions?

If requested to do so by bodies respons ib le fo r co l l ec t ive

secu r i t y such as th e UN o r the CSCE, NATO, as an All iance ,

could use its wel l - t r a ined s o l d i e r s and modern equipmentfo r such miss ions .

Although the new admin i s t r a t i on has n o t spec i f i ca l ly

addressed these new NATO ro l e s and miss ions , Pres iden t

C l i n t o n ' s be l i e f , as s t a t ed by both him in var ious speeches

and Secre ta ry of Defense Aspin in h is conf i rmat ion

hear ings , i nd i ca t e s t h a t he would suppor t these new

func t i ons and miss ions if it would requi re more allied

par t i c ipa t ion .

Pr io r to ge t t i ng involved in such a miss ion ,

however, severa l problems must be overcome. The first is

t h a t NATO cannot , on a un i l a t e ra l bas is , deploy to Europe's

t roubled spots . Such a deployment could be perceived as

aggress ive ambit ion on NATO's pa r t on territories of th e

C&EE nat ions . This perception could prov ide C&EE nat ions

who f ea r hegemonic i n t en t ions on th e p a r t o f NATO coun t r i e s

on t h e i r territory an excuse fo r conserva t ive ha rd l ine r s to

55



reestablish themselves in power. It is cr i t ica l then, that

before NATO can get involved in peacekeeping mission in

Europe, it must do so under CSCE or UN auspices.

The second problem that must be overcome is th e

reluctance of some NATO countries to get involved in

mil i tary operations outside of NATO t e r r i t o r i e s . Indeed,

Germany's const i tu t ion forbids such a mili tary operation.

In order fo r th e al l iances out-of-area operations to be

successful, a ll nations must agree to part ic ipate to their

capab i l i t i e s .2 '

As fo r th e peacekeeping force, there are several

advantages to NATO playing a major role in such

ac t iv i t ies . Fi rs t , again, th e log is t i cs infras t ructure

needed to support such an operation is already in place.

Second, th e command and control requirements, l ike th e

infras t ructure , is already in place. Third, the Alliance's

pol i t i ca l decision-making body is, l ike its mili tary

s t ructure , also in place. This would allow fo r fas ter

action should the All iance be requested to part ic ipate in

peacekeeping. The force to be used would be th e Allied

Command Europe's (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).

The second resu l t of th e Rome Summit was th e

ar t iculat ion of th e New Stra tegic Concept and th e creation

of an ACE Rapid Reaction Corps. This multi-national force,

made up of uni ts from various members of the Alliance,

commanded by a Brit ish off icer, is to be NATO's

56



mul t i -na t i ona l force , designed to be f l ex ib le , mobile, and

le tha l .22

The force is made up o f te n d iv i s ions plus other

combat s u p p o r t and CSS un i t s . It is with this fo rce that

NATO initially would defend itself o r, if th e All iance

members wish do so, deploy to out o f area loca t ions . Such

l oca t i ons could include a r ea s where it is in th e Al l iance ' s

interest to conduct peacekeeping opera t ions .

The ARRC came into being in October 1992. It is to

be NATO's force fo r rap id reac t ion an d cont ingency missions

with in ACE area o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y. As such, it is to be

th e land component o f a rap id reac t ion force under cont ro l

o f SACEUR. 2 3

The s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r ence between th e o ld corps

l eve l organiza t ion which exis ted in NATO p r i o r to th e

formula t ion o f th e New St ra t eg ic Concept is t ha t , before,

ind iv idua l members of the Al l iance were respons ib le fo r

providing th e corps s t r u c t u r e s , equipment, C2, and

personnel . Under th e new s t ruc tu re , the na t ion charged

with th e fo rmat ion o f th e new corps, in this case Great

Br i t a in , is respons ib le fo r prov id ing 60 % of th e corps

headquar te rs s t ruc tu re versus 100%. The UK wil l provide

a ll C2 asse t s down to d iv i s ions s l a t ed to make up th e

corps. Member nat ions providing d iv i s ions wi l l provide

their own l o g i s t i c s , C2, organ i za t i ons and equipment below

th e d iv i s ion level . 2 4

57



During non-c r i s i s t imes, the corps organiza t ion will

be made up o f two mul t i -na t i ona l d iv i s ions and two UK

d iv i s ions . The U.S. does n o t prov ide any peacet ime forces

fo r th e two mul t i -na t i ona l d iv i s ions which make up th e

ARRC's peacet ime con f igu ra t i on . It has committed itself,

however, to providing one o f th e s ix d iv i s ions which would

round o u t th e corps ' combat power dur ing t imes of crisis.

Because o f th e rap id deployment nature of th e ARRC, th e

d iv i s ion would presumably come from th e forward deployed V

Corps.

A key a spec t n o t fu l ly discussed fo r th e corps is

the ques t ion of its air suppor t . The air component fo r Lh e

ARRC is a German r e spons ib i l i t y. As o f October 1992,

however, it was running about -s ix months behind in

organizing i t s e l f .23 Even if th e Germans are ab le to

so lve their organ i za t i ona l problems, t he r e is still th e

i ssue o f th e f o r c e ' s capab i l i t y.

The future Rapid React ion Force (AIR) must be able

to perform t h r ee func t ions in s u p p o r t o f th e ARRC. The

first is t h a t it must be able to gain and main ta in air

supe r io r i ty if no t supremacy over th e po ten t i a l deployment

area . The second is t h a t it must be ab le to perform c lose

air s u p p o r t (CAS) and battlefield i n t e rd ic t ion (BI)miss ions (deep s t r i k e ) , and th e t h i rd is t h a t it must be

able to prov ide t h e a t e r lift fo r t roop t r a n s p o r t to th e

deployment area and sus ta inment fo r those forces .

58



However, th e t h r ee air func t ions discussed above

p re se n t some s i g n i f i c a n t problems fo r th e force. The first

problem is th e f o r c e ' s ability to gain and main ta in air

supe r io r i ty. Present ly, the European air forces a re

equipped with t h i rd and four th generat ion air forces be t t e r

su i ted fo r air i n t e rd ic t ion than air supe r io r i ty. The

French do possess a very capab le aircraft in their MIRAGE

2000 C. The problem with th e French aircraft is t h a t it

has, so far, n o t been bought by any o the r NATO nat ions .

Given th e re luc tance o f th e French to entangle itself in

NATO mil i t a ry opera t ions , the availability of t ha t p l a t fo rm

is q u e s t i onab l e . The c l o s e s t a i r f rame ava i l ab l e in terms

'o f air-to-air capab i l i t y ava i l ab l e to all NATO na t i o ns is

th e F-18 f igh te r. Br i t a in has th e capab i l i t y to deploy its

TORNADO F-3 air supe r io r i ty f i g h t e r but , l ike th e F-16, it

is ne i the r th e newest nor th e bes t ava i l ab l e aircraft fo r

air supe r io r i ty miss ions . Germany does n ot present ly have

a modern western designed air defense f i g h t e r capable of

counte r ing poss ib l e adversa ry aircraft such as th e MIG 29,

an a i rp l ane ava i l ab l e to most former Warsaw Pac t nat ions .

Germany's own fleet of MIGs requi re logistic suppor t from a

na t ion which could very well be suppor t ing th e oppos i t i on

in fu tu re milV'ary opera t ions .26

The European answer to its lack of a modern air

supe r io r i ty f igh te r is th e European Fi gh t e r A i r c r a f t (EFA).

The problem with this aircraft is t ha t it has not y e t been

59



flight tes ted and presumably wil l no t be ready fo r field

deployment un t i l well a f t e r the U.S. built F-22 is

ope ra t iona l . 2?

The second mission th e Rapid React ion Force (AIR)

must be able to perform is c lo se air sup po r t and

battlefield i n t e r d i c t i o n . In this area , the European a re

in b e t t e r shape. The UK, Germans and Italians have a very

capable a i r f rame in th e TORNADO strike f i g h t e r. Several

o the r na t ions have F-16s capable o f performing l imi t ed

( d a y l i g h t / c l e a r weather) BI and CA S miss ions . In a d d i t i o nto f ixed wing aircraft, at tack and observa t ion he l i cop te r s

would be used in th e deep strike and CAS miss ions . 2'

Although European air fo rces have at tack h e l i c o p t e r s in

their i nven to r i e s , those are severe ly handicapped by

adverse weather and l imi ted visibility.

The t h i r d func t ion th e NATO air component must be

able to perform is t hea t e r-w ide airlift. Again, a l though

many NATO na t ions have a l imi ted lift capab i l i ty in the i r

C-160 and C-130 fleets, those aircraft are l imi ted in

number and a re incapable o f car ry ing ove r s i ze cargo.

The last problem which th e Europeans have vis-a-vis

airpower is their lack o f stealth and EW capab i l i ty. in

add i t i on , except fo r NATO, French and Br i t i sh AWACS, th e

All iance has very l imi ted a i rborne C3 c a p a b i l i t i e s .

The Al l i ance ' s air component is key to th e ARRC's

ability to f i g h t and sus t a in itself in combat. Yet it has

60



severa l po ten t i a l ly c r ipp l ing shortcomings which must be

solved p - i o r to t h a t force being a capable , sus ta inable

combat force . The answer to NATO's problems lies in two

poss ib l e so lu t ions . The first is t ha t NATO nat ions

belonging to th e ARRC--specif ical ly Bri ta in and Germany

spend a tremendous amount o f resources to bui ld th e

capab i l i t y they need. The second is t h a t NATO must make

every effort to keep th e U.S. engaged in Europe by t ak ing

advantage o f th e air capab i l i t y th e U.S. can offe r to th e

Al l iance .

2 '

The f ina l cons idera t ion to be looked a t in des igning

our con t r ibu t ion to NATO is what wi l l th e remaining U.S.

force s t ruc tu re look l ike? The answer to this ques t ion can

be gleaned by unders tand ing th e Congressional emphasis on

force reduct ion discussed in Chapter 2. Ever s ince Mikhial

Gorbachev initiated S o v i e t u n i l a t e r a l force reduc t ions and

th e demise of th e Warsaw Pac t have made th e t h r e a t aga ins t

th e U.S. l e s s l i ke ly, Congress has wanted to reduce th e

s ize o f th e fo rce - - a force which is seen as use l e s s in view

o f th e lack of a c red ib l e t h rea t due of its

non-deployabi l i ty.

The primary cons idera t ion of th e s ize fo r th e fu tu re

mi l i t a ry force is fo r a smal le r, more read i ly-deployableforce. This is confi rmed by Les Aspin ' s s ta tement to th e

Senate Armed Serv ices Committee when he s t a t ed t h a t th e

m i l it a ry of th e fu tu re should be " f l ex ib le enough to do a

61



large number of s imul taneous smal le r con t ingenc i e s . ' 30

Ear l i e r, while wri t ing in Reserve Off icer

Assoc ia t ion National Secur i ty Report, he s t a t ed t h a t he did

not bel ieve th e American people were wil l ing to spend $250

b i l l ion a year fo r a mil i t a ry which, he did no t bel ieve ,

was incapab le o f opera t ion in "a l l bu t th e most extreme

cont ingenc ies" meaning, genera l ly, a large convent ional

war. 3 1 This s t a t e m e n t i nd i ca t e s an unwi l l ingness to fund

a l a rge force whose primary focus is f i gh t ing a l a rge

convent iona l war--a war which is not l i ke ly to come. His

s ta tement makes it c l ea r t h a t fu ture miss ions wil l depend

more on th e ability o f l i g h t forces which ca n rap id ly

deploy, conduct forced ent ry and rap id ly redeploy. Such

miss ions would depend more on th e Marine Corps' embarked

Marine Amphibious Brigades and th e Army's 101st and 82d

d iv i s ions .

These sugges t ions are a c l ea r ind ica t ion t h a t th e

ac t ive duty heavy forces wi l l be reduced in s t rength and a

grea t e r emphasis wi l l be placed on heavy forces in th e

nat iona l guard and reserve fo r sus ta ined combat

opera t ion . 3 2 The ques t ion is by how much, and what

e f f e c t wil l t h a t have on the forces dedica ted to Europe?

Some exper t s s u g g e s t t h a t th e ac t ive force ca n

safe ly be reduced to ten act ive d iv i s ions - seven of which

would be army un i t s and th ree would be Marine Corps. The

t o t a l A ir Force ac t i ve s t r eng th could be as low as 10

62



f igh te r wing equiva len ts deployed world wide. 33

Using these f i gu re s , as a worse case bas is , it can

only be surmised t h a t th e th ree Marine d iv i s ions , along

with th e Army's 82d Division an d th e 101st Division would

be th e na t ion ' s cont ingency force . These un i t s would be

charged with rapid deployment and forced ent ry miss ions .

These l i gh t , quick ly deployed forces would then be

augmented by the remaining heavy d iv i s ions based in th e

U.S.

The f i na l ques t ion , then, is with smal le r forces

l i ke ly to remain, what should we con t r i bu t e to th e NATO

s t ruc tu re?

To recap then, Chapter 4 demonstra ted t h a t U.S.

v i t a l in t e res t s fo r the fu tu re remains t ied to a s table

Europe. This stability is requ i red fo r th e U.S. to be able

to main ta in its European markets. In tu rn , European

stability depends on main ta in ing an atmosphere in which

f ree and l ibe ra l t rade p r a c t i c e s are encouraged. Although

such prac t i ce s are p re se n t in Europe a t this t ime, events

have demonstra ted t h a t work must be done to preserve that

environment and t ha t preserva t ion of t h a t atmosphere must

be our number one p r i o r i t y. Such must be th e case because

th e EC is our chief r iva l , a r iva l in which its members ca n

form an economic block aga ins t th e U.S. economic block--a

block in which th e U.S. has no way of in f luenc ing s ince we

have no formal representa t ion except fo r th e common

63



membership of many EC nat ions with NATO. Fo r this reason,

th e U.S. must remain a viable and ac t ive member of th e

All iance .

Chapter 4 has a lso demonstra ted t h a t th e primary

purpose fo r NATO, th e t h r e a t of war caused by an

expans ion i s t S o v i e t Union has disappeared . As such, they

a re no longer a t h r e a t aga ins t th e Al l iance . The s ingle

monol i th ic t h r e a t represen ted by the former S o v i e t Union

has been rep laced , however, by a number o f r i sks , which if

no t d e a l t with, could prove as dangerous to th e well being

o f western Europe and, t he re fo re , U.S. intirests.

These new r i s k s include th e dangers o f c i v i l wars in

th e newly emerging n a t i ons caused by e thnic and r e l ig ious

unre s t , t r a d i t i o n a l border d i spu t e s kep t under cont ro l by

communist governments an d wars caused by th e sudden change

of economic systems. These ac t s of vio lence and their root

causes are dangerous in themselves , but they do not have

th e chance of spread ing to th e r i che r more s t ab le western

nat ions . The danger represen ted by these wars is t h a t mass

migrat ion of disp laced popula t ions could immigrate to those

western nat ions . These migra t ions could cause th e

emergence o f r i g h t wing ultranationalist groups in

traditionally l i be ra l Western European nat ions . Thesemovements could prec ip i t a t e a movement away from th e

economic l ibera l i sm which has charac ter ized Europe s ince

th e end of th e Second World War.. Such a move would se rve

64



to i so la t e th e U.S. even f u r t h e r from th e access it needs

to European markets.

Chapter 4 has also demonstra ted t h a t th e remaining

s ize of the Russian and Ukrainian forces , al though

incapab le o f launching a su rp r i s e a t t ack aga ins t th e west

a t this t ime, still r e t a i n s enough convent iona l and nuc lea r

fo r ce s to make them the l a rg e s t European mil i t a ry power.

These f ac t s make it e s s e n t i a l fo r th e U.S. to remain

engaged in European affairs--to a id in working towards an

answer towards stability fo r th e C&EE nat ions . It is a l soadvantageous fo r th e Europeans to keep th e U.S. engaged in

European affairs to help o ff s e t th e Russian and Ukra in ian

fo r ce s .

The t h i rd f a c t o r in de te rmin ing th e ro le and

miss ions o f U.S. forces in th e NATO of th e fu ture wil l be

the Al l iance fu tu re ro les and mission. Again, this chapter

showed t h a t NATO's p a s t ra i son d'etre, t h a t is th e defense

o f Western Europe aga ins t th e massive invasion from th e

East , is gone. With th e disappearance of t h a t danger ha s

come th e ques t ion o f what can th e All iance do in th e

fu tu re . That ques t ion has partially answered by James

Baker who out l ined three main miss ions th e All iance should

be in posi t ion to do are deter rence , t r ea ty verification

and crisis management, and peacekeeping. Obviously, th e

force requ i red to complete those above s ta ted miss ions are

fa r d i f f e r e n t then th e force requ i red to f i g h t a large

65



scale conventional war. The Alliance's refocus from th e

fighting a large war to its new missions is ar t icula ted in

i ts new st ra tegic concept as outl ined in th e Rome Summit of

1991.

Also ident i f ied ear l ie r is th e vehicle th e Alliance

will use to enforce its new concept- - that is, th e ARRC.

One of th e key concept to th e rapid reaction force must be

its capabili ty to rapidly deploy and f igh t once deployed.

Finally, th e l as t factor that was examined in

Chapter 4 which will have an impact on our contribution to

NATO forces must be th e ava i lab i l i ty of U.S. forces.

As discussed ear l ie r in th i s chapter, th e atmosphere

in th e administrat ion is tha t f inancial constra ints

combined with th e lack of a viable th rea t wil l make it

d i ff i cu l t to support a large force permanently stat ioned in

Europe. This bel ief will cause a substantial downsizing of

active duty forces. With the majority of those remaining

forcess ta t ioned in th e U.S. versus forward deployed in

Europe.

Taking th e above questions, concern and facts into

consideration, what should be th e role, size and command

structure to support NATO be?

In conclusion, it is evident that th e national

in te res t of th i s nation l i es in its capabi l i ty to maintain

free and open markets to se l l i ts goods. It is also clear

tha t one of th e larger markets available to us l ies in

66



Europe--a Europe which is t ied to its own economic sys t em

from which we a re excluded. The exis tence of th e EC and

th e new po ten t i a l ly g r e a t markets which e x i s t in th e

emerging democracies of th e Eas t make it essen t i a l t ha t we

insure the maintenance of a s t ab le Europe. This stability

can only be achieved if we s u p p o r t NATO as it evolves into

a s t r u c t u r e designed to de te r aggress ion aga ins t its

members o r its C&EE ne ighbors . The vehic le in which to do

t h a t wil l n o t be th e t r a d i t i o n a l m i l it a ry s t ruc tu re

designed to de fea t th e Warsaw Pac t but a new Mul t i -Nat iona l

Corps guided by th e new St ra t eg i c Concept.

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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose o f this chapter is to s e l e c t a European

deployed U.S. force fo r th e fu tu re . Whatever th e force and

command s t ruc tu re se l ec t ed , t h a t s t r u c t u r e must suppor t th e

four spec i f i c criteria ou t l i ned in Chapter 3. The forces

t ha t wi l l be discussed a re pr imar i ly Army an d A ir forces .

Navy and Marine forces a f l o a t a re excluded from the t o t a l

count because those forces are n o t permanent ly assigned to

U.S. fo r ce s s t a t i oned in Europe.

Those criteria a re : The force must be capable of

safeguard ing U.S. na t i ona l interest and continue to prov ide

fo r the na t iona l secu r i ty ; the force must be a cred ib le

d e t e r r e n t aga ins t an at tack on NATO; it must s u p p o r t th e

t hea t e r CinC 's efforts to main ta in stability in Eas te rn

Europe; and th e force must be able to work with in th e

framework of th e NATO's new St ra t eg i c Concept. At th e same

t ime, it should prov ide th e add i t i ona l asse t s th e new ARRC

wil l requi re to be an e ffec t ive combat force . Fina l ly,

t ha t force must fit with in th e cons t r a in t s es t ab l i shed by

Congress and th e new a d m i n i s t r a t i o n - - t h a t is, it must be

smal le r and t he r e fo re cheaper.

68



The first i s sue to reso lve then is what is th e

sma l l e s t force we ca n deploy in Europe and still be assured

of con t inued sa feguard of our i n t e res t s in Europe? What

should th e minimum capab i l i t y o f t h a t force be ? The answer

is t h a t the force needs to be l a rge enough to allow th e

U.S. to make a con t r ibu t ion which is perce ived as equal to

o r grea t e r then any s ing le o the r o f our allies o r it must

be o f sufficient capab i l i t y to be seen as critical to th e

Europeans ability to main ta in a credib le mil i t a ry s t r u c t u r e

w i t h o u t an y f u r t h e r resources . 1

Since a ll evidence sugges t s t h a t th e m i l it a ry forces

wi l l undergo severe downsizing in th e near fu tu re , th e

obvious so lu t ion to main ta in an e f f e c t i v e voice in NATO

wil l n o t depend on th e deployment o f overwhelming U.S.

forces b ut wi l l depend on th e U.S. ability to provide th e

All iance ce r t a in c a p a b i l i t i e s Which they are no t able to

prov ide themse lves without subs t an t i a l f i nanc i a l cos t s .

These c a p a b i l i t i e s unique to th e U.S. would be used to help

th e European nat ions overcome t h e i r critical shortcomings

and lack o f c a p a b i l i t i e s descr ibed in Chapter 4.

As discussed in Chapter 4, Europeans do not have th e

capab i l i t y to deploy, in th e near term, an a l l -weather

a t tack and observa t ion he l i cop te r capab i l i t y which can be

found in th e U.S. d iv i s iona l and corps l eve l a v i a t i o n

br igades . By deploying a corps l eve l headquar te rs with its

subord ina te a t tack av ia t ion br igade , the U.S. would be able

69





They must be able to take p a r t in th e ARRC as per th e U.S.

commitment to suppor t the Corps with a d iv i s ion . They must

also be ab le to suppor t th e t h e a t e r CinC by prov id ing the

capab i l i t y to conduct combat o pe ra t i o ns independent of

o the r NATO forces , they must be large enough to maintain

c red ib l e forward presence, they must be ab le to pro tec t

U.S. c i t i z e n s , and they must be ab le to take p a r t in th e

mil i t a ry contac ts program as envis ioned by the London

Conference. Fina l ly, they must be ab le to rece ive

re in forcements from th e U.S. in a t ime of crisis if are turn to Europe is ca l l ed for. Again, th e s ize of this

force sugges ts a corps s ize element s in ce such an

organiza t ion has all of th e s t r u c t u r e needed to be able to

f i g h t independent ly, providing it is suppor ted by th e EAC

elements a t some poin ts .

Since th e need o f a t h e a t e r deployed corps has been

i d e n t i f i e d , does this corps need to have its combat

elements a t f u l l s t r eng th? Chapter 4 i den t i f i ed two

reasons why it does not . The first reason why th e corps

does n o t need to be a t f u l l s t r eng th is t h a t th e r isk of

needing a fu l l -up corps is present ly non ex i s t en t s ince

there is n o t a t h rea t of imminent a t t ack aga in s t NATO. The

only reason why th e U.S. needs to main ta in an y decis ive

un i t s in Europe, then, is because of our commitment to

provide a d iv i s ion to th e ARRC. The second reason why we

should reduce th e s t r eng th of th e corps combat un i t s is

71



because of th e be l i e f t h a t such a fu l l -up corps can be

deemed as offens ive in nature by th e C&EE na t ions .

These reasons i nd ica t e t h a t t he re is no requirement

fo r a fu l l -up corps to be permanent ly deployed in Europe.

Because there is not reason fo r a f u l l up corps, th e U.S.

should proceed to reduce t h a t s t ruc tu re .

According to U.S. planners in NATO Headquarters ,

there a re t h r ee poss ib l e ways to reduce th e force . The

first is by deac t iva t ing on e d iv i s ion in th e European based

corps along with th e CS and CSS asse t s which would support

t h a t d iv i s ion . The second is to reduce on e br igade per

d iv i s ion . The t h i rd would be to d i s e s t a b l i s h d i v i s i o n

headquar te rs and leave separa te br igades opera t ing as

sepa ra t e un i t s under a corps headquar te rs . 3

However, none o f t he se so lu t ions offe r a per fec t

answer, and all need to be examined fo r their sepa ra t e

advantages and disadvantages .

The first recommended so lu t ion has four major

advantages.

The first advantage is t h a t th e U.S. mainta ins a

corps headquar te rs in Europe. This would give th e U.S. a

c red ib l e presence in Europe thus assur ing us a "place at

th e t ab le" and th e ability to in f luence events and

dec i s ions both a t NATO and, in an i nd i rec t way, th e EC.4

The second advantage would be to give th e U.S. th e

C3 1 capabi l i ty needed to rap id ly redeploy ground forces in

72







those maneuver br igades might n ot be th e habi tua l

o rgan i za t i ons needed fo r e ffec t ive combat ope ra t i ons . This

would harm th e e ffec t iveness of th e un i t s . Command and

cont ro l would also su ffe r s ince th e span o f cont ro l needed

to command as many as s ix maneuver br igades , th ree av ia t ion

br igades , t h r ee artillery br igades , p lus numerous CSS un i t s

would probably be beyond th e capab i l i t y o f th e s tandard

corps headquar t e r s . The headquar te rs would r equ i r e

augmentat ion. This requ i rement would, o f course , dr ive up

th e numbers of personne l in t hea te r. Since th e primary

ob jec t ive of reduc t ion is to maintain capabi l i ty while

reducing s t r eng th , this so lu t ion would no t be acceptab le .

Regard less o f th e so lu t ion recommended, th e army

s t ruc tu re should then be organized as fo l lows . The ground

component commnander should be dual hat ted as both th e

Thea te r Army and Corps Commander fo r peacet ime and

ope ra t i ons shor t o f war only. Under h is command would be

th e s tandard corps organ i za t i on fo r combat with th e

fol lowing except ions . The first exception would be th e

replacement o f th e armored cava l ry regiment with an air

a s s a u l t br igade . The second change would, of course, be

th e reduc t ion o f d iv i s iona l level combat s t r eng th .

The replacement of th e cava l ry regiment with a

separa te air assau l t br igade with all o f its lift asse t s

would provide th e corps commander with th e ability to

deploy the b r igade separa te ly as a peacekeeping force if

75



t h a t mission were prescr ibed . In addi t ion , t h a t a i r assaul t

br igade could, with minimum support , deploy near ly anywhere

within ACE a t a moment 's no t i ce . An a l t e rna t ive to th is

proposal would be to replace on e of th e d i v i s i o n ' s heavy

br igade with an air a s s a u l t br igade .

The next area to be discussed is the air component

o f U.S. forces deployed to Europe.

The U.S. air component ' s miss ion in Europe would be,

l ike th e ground component, di rec ted towards two

d i rec t ions . It should s u p p o r t th e ARRC's air component

mission, t h a t is, th e force must prov ide fo r air

s u p e r i o r i t y, tactical and strategic lift, and provide EW

and a i rborne C3--a l l miss ions th e ARRC's air component

canno t do fo r itself. The U.S. air a s s e t s deployed

overseas , then, must be ab le to provide all of the above

suppor t plus have th e capab i l i t y to prov ide CA S and BI in

suppor t of th e t h e a t e r CinC.

For tuna te ly, th e r e ce n t reorganiza t ion by th e U.S.

A ir Force into th e composite wing concept is idea l ly su i t ed

fo r th e mission of suppor t ing not only th e ARRC but a l so

th e U.S. corps. The problem is t ha t th e mission

requ i rements fo r these two purposes requi re d i ff e r en t

a i r f rames .

As a l ready d i scussed , th e requirement to suppor t th e

ARRC's miss ion is more fo r air supe r io r i ty and jamming than

fo r th e deep strike miss ions and BI. The composi t ion of

76



th e wing should then be heavi ly or ien ted on air super io r i ty

and EW type aircraft. These would be F-15/EF-111/F-16 type

aircraft. Thei r purpose would be to provide an air umbrella

to th e allied aircraft who would perform th e ac tua l deep

s t r ike miss ion . The wing deployed to suppor t th e U.S.

CinC's mission would have to be more robus t s ince it would

be required to be both a i r - t o -g round and air-to-air

miss ions . Such a wing would be heavi ly dependent on

m ul t i -ro l e capable aircraft such as th e F-15Es an d F-16Cs.

This wing would also have its normal compliment of jammingan d C2 aircraft.

These tw o wings would be the major air force combat

power in Europe. Since wings have between 4,000 to 5,000

personnel in them (depending on th e or i en ta t ion o f th e

wing; i.e., ground at tack vs. air to air) th e es t imate

s t rength o f tactical air forces s t rength in Europe would be

approximately 10,000. Admit tedly, this number of a i rc ra f t

an d personnel seems small . However, it should be

remembered t h a t these forces are forward deployed to deal

with cont ingenc ies . The rapid deploying nature of air

power makes it less essen t i a l t ha t a l a rge number of

aircraft be kept on permanent s t a t ion overseas then army

forces .

The above descr ibed s t r eng ths fo r th e Army and Air

Force are fo r un i t s a t th e t a c t i c a l l eve l and below. Since

there is a demonstra ted p o s s i b i l i t y to reduce th e amount of

77



fo rces in t hea te r, then th e command s t ruc tu re which e x i s t s

in t hea te r could also be changed.

Three poss ib le cons ide ra t ions fo r a command

s t r u c t u r e e x i s t s . The first is th e pre sen t s t ruc tu re .

This s t ruc tu re calls fo r a t hea te r in which the CinC's

th ree components commanders are also four star o ff i c e r s

with th e approp r i a t e l eve l staffs.

The second command s t ructure which could be in place

to support the reorganized forces would be based on th e

Korea model. In this scenario, th e CinC's headquarters

would continue to be in ove ra l l command o f th e t hea te r an d

all ass igned fo r ce s bu t planning responsibilities would be

delega ted to a sub -un i f i ed commander. In th e case of

Europe where th e CINCEUR a l so fills th e ro le o f Major NATO

Commander (MNC), th e r e spons ib i l i t y fo r planning fo r

na t iona l miss ions would come under cont ro l of the DCinC

This is th e s i t u a t i o n which e x i s t s in Europe today. In th e

case o f this model, th e component commanders would be th e

sen io r se rv i ce commanders in t hea t r e . Using th is

desc r ip t ion , th e army/corps commander would become th e

ground component commander. He would also fiHl the ro le of

7th Army commander.

The air component commander would, l i ke h is Army

coun te rpa r t , be th e ove ra l l sen io r air force commander in

t hea te r. Whereas th e pos i t i on is present ly held by an Air

Force 4 star o ff i c e r, this pos i t i on would be reduced to a

78



th ree star off i ce . He would be in command of th e combat

wings descr ibed above.

The navy component commander would be, l ike th e

pre sen t s i tua t ion a four star billet. This is due to th e

pecu l i a r nature of th e European t hea t e r in r e sp ec t to NATO.

Because th e naval component commander is also a Major

Subord ina te Commander (MSC), in this case AFSOUTH, th e

plann ing and command r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s are de lega ted to his

subord ina te , a t h r ee star o f f i c e . This would, in e ffec t ,

make all service•s equal.The th i rd model fo r command s t ruc tu re would be based

on th e SOUTHCOM s t r u c t u r e in a peacetime environment. In

this case, th e CinC would have d i r e c t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for

planning and execut ing all miss ions in s u p p o r t o f nat iona l

and All iance miss ions . He would have cont ro l of a ll Army,

and A ir Force un i t s in t hea t e r. This s t r u c t u r e would only

be appl icable if th e U.S. were to be rep laced in its

pos i t i on o f SACEUR.

Because of th e unique nature o f th e dual command

s t r u c t u r e which ex i s t s in Europe, t h a t is th e NATO planning

and execut ion por t ion under command of th e SACEUR who

doubles as th e CINCEUR, th e bes t command s t ruc tu re fo r th e

s i tua t ion is c l ea r ly th e second choice, t ha t is, a modif ied

Korea Model where nat iona l planning and execut ion is

conducted by someone o the r then th e t hea t e r CinC.

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Using th e reduced tactical and ope ra t i ona l forces

descr ibed in this chapter, the fo r ce s s t a t ioned in Europe

would then look as fo l lows . The army corps would be

between 50 and 55,000 permanent ly assigned personnel . The

air force would have approximately 10,000 permanently

ass igned personnel . The navy would have about 5 ,000

personnel ass igned to suppo r t th e 6 th fleet ope ra t i ons in

th e Mediterranean. The t o t a l s t rength in Europe in terms

o f ope ra t i ona l un i t s and their suppor t ing headquar te rs

would be approximately 70,000 personnel .

In conclus ion , it is c l e a r t h a t in order to meet th e

criteria fo r a viable fo r ce in Europe as descr ibed in th e

methodology sec t ion o f Chapte r 3, th e U.S. should adopt th e

fol lowing Army an d A ir Force s t r u c t u r e in Europe.

The army should reduce th e s i ze of its Corps by one

d iv i s ion . Such a reduc t ion would provide a manpower

sav ings o f approximately 16,000 s o l d i e r s . F ur th e r savings

could be rea l ized if th e s i ze to th e Corps ' s support

command were reduced by th e app rop r i a t e number o f personnel

requi red to suppor t t h a t deac t iva ted d iv i s ion .

In add i t i on , the Corps ' s organic armored cava l ry

regiment should be rep laced by an air a s s a u l t br igade with

a ll o f th e organ ic lift c a p a b i l i t i e s normally asociated

with such a un i t . This exchange would b e t t e r provide th e

corps and thea te r commander the capabi l i ty to quickly react

to any requ i rement fo r Army fo r ce s to handle opera t ions

80



other than war. These l i g h t forces would be par t i cu la r ly

well sui ted fo r peacekeeping type miss ions as evidence by

th e deployment of th e 10th Mountain Divis ion to Somalia.

Corps combat suppor t un i t s should be kep t a t ful l

s t r eng th so as to suppor t th e ARRC miss ions as well as

other deployments requi r ing CS and CSS s u p p o r t versus

combat t roops . Echelons above Corps un i t s should be

maintained a t an appropr ia te l eve l so as to suppor t th e

i n - t h e a t e r forces and be ab le to suppor t th e a r r i v a l of ne w

un i t s if juch a return o f U.S. forces to Europe waswarranted.

The A ir Force should permanent ly s t a t ion two

composi te wings in Europe. One wing should be pr imar i ly

equipped with F15C an d F16C type aircraft dedica ted to air

supe r io r i ty miss ions in suppor t of th e ARRC. This wing

could be removed from t h e a t e r once th e EFA o r a su i t ab l e

rep lacement were deployed.

The second wing would be equipped with F15E type

aircraft. It would be dedica ted to providing the t hea t a r

commander with adequate battlefield i n t e rd i c t ion an d deep

strike c a p a b i l i t i e s while still provide adequate air-to-air

c a p a b i l i t i e s .

Should it be requ i red , these two wings could be

re inforced by Navy strike and air supe r io r i ty a i rc ra f t

opera t ing from c a r r i e r s in suppor t of th e t hea t e r CinC.

81



The command s t ruc tu re in Europe should also be

modif ied as fo l lows . The se rv i ce component commanders

should be reduced from four to three star commanders. This

is ce r t a in ly appropr ia te in view of th e grea t ly reduced

force s t r u c t u r e permanently s t a t i oned overseas .

Reducing th e force s t r u c t u r e as descr ibed above and

modifying th e command s t ruc tu re would fulfill al l of th e

requ i rements fo r a force s t r u c t u r e as descr ibed in Chapter

3. That is, the force would he lp main ta in our in f luence in

European affairs by providing a force capab le of rap id ly

deploying anywhere in Europe. Mainta in ing a Corps

headquar te rs with its robus t combat suppor t element with

two very powerful and capab le air wings assures t ha t th e

U.S. wil l main ta in an i n f luen t i a l voice in All iance

affairs.

This smal le r force , less focused on an imminent

invasion from th e eas t , would a lso alleviate th e f ea r that

NATO fo r ce s are off ens ive in nature . This would help

fos t e r a f ee l ing of trust, and, t he re fo re , maintain

stability in th e C&EE n a t i o ns by r e in fo rc ing th e idea that

NATO has no design on their territory.

The recommended so lu t ion would a lso be idea l to help

NATO in its new ro l e s and miss ions by providing subs t an t i a li n t e l l i gence , C2, CS and air power to th e ARRC. This same

force is still capable of suppor t ing the CinC with any

u n i l a t e r a l U.S. mission he might be assigned to accomplish .

82



Because th e force is still of subs t an t i a l s ize , th e message

tha t th e U.S. is remaining engaged in European affairs is

presen t - - t hus deter rence is achieved.

Fina l ly, th e force is smal le r. This fits into th e

scenar io o f having sm a l l e r ac t ive forces which must still

contend with world wide instabilities which requi re th e

capab i l i t y to deploy world wide.

Recommendations fo r Fur ther S tud ies

Recommendations fo r fu tu re s tud i e s could go in to

th ree d i f f e r e n t d i rec t ions . The first is cos t ana ly s i s .

The second is force s t ruc tu re es t imates fo r a m il it a ry

opera t ion in opera t ions o the r than war. The t h i rd would be

based on a changing s i tua t ion in Europe.

Because this study was based strictly on th e

m i l i t a r y - p o l i t i c a l requ i rements out l ined in th e methodology

sec t ion o f Chapter 3, th e c o s t in terms in money fo r

maintaining a forward deployed force was not taken i n to

cons idera t ion . Fur ther research could center on which

force s t ruc tu re would be bes t using th e addi t iona l

criteria: "How many d o l l a r s would such a force cos t?"

The force s t ruc tu re recommended in th e previous

sec t ion of this chapte r is fo r a force which would

pr imar i ly suppor t the ARRC in conduct ing miss ions such as

peacekeeping or even peacemaking. The recommended force

could be used as a poin t o f depar ture to determine ho•w much

83





ENDNOTES

Chapter 2

1 George Bush, The National Secur i ty St ra tegy ofthe-U.S. , (Washington DC.:Government Pr in t i ng Off ice , 1991)p.1.

2 William J. Cl in ton , "A s t ra tegy fo r ForeignPol icy : Ass i s tance to Russia ," Vi ta l Speeches, 1 May 1992,p. 421.

3 Secre ta ry of Defense Les Aspin, Statement to th eU.S. Senate Secrea t ry of Defense COnfirmation Hearings,(Washington DC: 19 January 1993), p. 13.

4 David Abshire, "S t r a t eg i c Chal lenge,Contingencies , Force S t ruc t u r e and Deterence," TheWashington Quar te r ly, Spring 1992, p. 40.

SFrancois Huisbourg, "The Future of th e Alliance,"

Washigton Quar te r ly, Spring 1992, p. 128.

' Ibid. , pp. 132-133.

7 lbid., p. 135.

'Alexander Gerry, "NATO in Cent ra l and Eas te rnEurope," ROA National Secur i ty Report, November 1992,p. 49.

'Johann Hols t , Explor ing Europe 's Future andTrends an d Prospec t s Re la t ing to Secur i ty,September 1990: Rand Corpora t ion , p. vi.

' 0 Zbignew Brezenski, "Order, Disorder, and U.S.Leadership," Washington Q u a r t e r l y, Spring 1992, p. 9.

"IU.S. , Congress, House, The Committee on th e

Budget, The Long Term Defense Budget, 102st Cong.,2d sess . , 1991, p. 3.

1 2 1bid., p. 5.

1 3I bid . , p. 7.

85



'4Gerry, p. 50.

' I sb id , p. 51.

' 6 ZHuisbourg, pp. 130-131.

17Ibid, p. 134.

"18ZManfred Woerner, "Three Pillars of Order," NewPe r spe c t i ve Quar te r ly, Summer 1992, pp. 25-26.

' 'Sergei Rogov, " In t e rna t iona l Secur i ty and th eCol lapse of the S o v i e t Union," Washington Quar te r ly, Spring1992, p. 5.

2 0 Personna l In t e rv i e r, LTC Dan Skeldon, USA,In t e l l i gence Planner, U.S. Delega t ion to th e NATO MC. 13January 1993, Brusse ls Belgium.

2IU.S. , Congress, House, Committee on th e Budget,The Long Term Defense Budget, Ib id . , p. 24.

22 Interview with LTC Skeldon, Ib id .

2 3 Les Aspin, p. 12.

2 4 james Baker, "U.S. Committment to StrengtheningEuro-At lan t ic Coopera t ion , " U.S. Department o f Sta t eDispa tches , 23 December 1991, p. 15.

2 5 Aspin, p. 7.

2 6General David Maddox, Commanding General, U.S.Army, Europe, Statement to U.S. Army Command and GeneralSta ff Class o f '93, F t. Leavenworth, Ks., March 1993.

2 7 James Goodly, "Peacemaking in th e New Europe,"Washington Quar te r ly, Spring 1992, p. 166.

2 8 Daniel Nelson, " NATO-Means, But no Ends," The

Bul le t in o f th e Atomic S c i e n t i s t , 48:1, January 1992,pp.10-11.

2 9 Goodly, p. 170.

3 0 U.S., Congress. House, The Committee on th eBudget, Defense Policy in th e Post-Cold War Era, 101stCong., 2d sess . , 1991, p. 1.

3 1 Ib id . , p. 2.

86



3 2 "The C a n d i d a t e and N a t i o n a l Security," RO A

N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Repor t , Octobe r 1992, p. 36 .

"3Irbid.

3 4 Remarks by President and German Chance l lo r

H e l m u t Kohl in P r e s s Availability, The White House,Wash ing ton DC, 26 March 1993, p. 2.

3 5 I b i d .

"36U.S., Congres s , House, Commit tee onA p p r o p r i a t i o n s , Depar tmen t of Defense A o o r o p r i a t i o n s fo r1992 - part 8 : The Base Force Concept, 1 0 1 s t Cong. , 2dsess., 1991, p. 32 .

37Absh i r e , p. 36 .

3 9U.S., Congres s , House, The Commit tee on th eBudget , The Long Term Budget , p. 3.

"39Stephen Flanagan , "NATO an d C e n t r a l an d Europe:From L i a i s o n to S e c u r i t y Partnership," Wa sh ing ton Q u a r t e r l ySpr ing 1992, p. 95 .

4 0 Patrick Garrity and Sharon Weidner, "U.S.

Defe nse S t r a t e g y A f t e r t h e Cold War," Wash ing t on Q u a r t e r l y,Spr ing 1992, p. 97.

4 1 Alexande r George an d Richa rd Smoke, D efense inAmerican Fore ign P o l i c y : Practice an d Theory,(New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1974) pp . 250-251.

4 2 Garrity an d Weidner, p. 64 .

4 3 H o s l t , p. 39.

C h a p t e r 3

'These definitions a re th e author's. They a rebased on his u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f th e t e r m s used t h r o u g h o u t hisr e s e a r c h .

C h a p t e r 4

'A lexander George an d Richa rd Smoke, Dete rence inAmer ican Fore ign P o l i c y : Theory an d Practice,(New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1974),pp . 22-23 .

87



2 F r a n c o i s Huisbourg , "The F u t u r e o f th e Atlantic

A l l i a n c e : W ithe r NATO, W h e t h e r NATO?" Was h ing ton Q u a r t e r l y,Spr ing 1992, p. 128.

3 Huisbourg , p. 140.

4Per sonna l In te rv iew wi th COL Jerome Watson, USA,Strategic Forces P l a n n e r, U.S. Delega t ion to NATO MC.

13 Janua ry 1993, B r u s s e l s Belg ium.

'Stephen J. Flanagan , "NATO and C e n t r a l and

E a s t e r n Europe From L i a i s o n to S e c u r i t y Partnership,"Washington Q u a r t e r l y, S p r i n g 1992, p. 143.

@"Espr i t de Kor ps , " N a t i o n a l Review, 43:21 , 18November 1991, pp . 18-20 .

7 James S c h l e s i n g e r , "The Tr a n s - A t l a n t i cPartnership: An Amer ican View," Brook ings Review, Summer1992, p. 19.

& H u i s b o u rg , p. 138.

'Ibid., p. 140.

1 0 "Esprit de Korps , " p. 18.

" Huisbourg , p. 143.

1 2 U.S. , Congres s , House, Commit tee onA p p r o p r i a t i o n s , Depar tmen t o f Defense A p p r o p r i a t i o n s fo r1992 - part 8- The Base Force Co ncep t , 1 0 1 s t Cong. , 2dsess., 1991, p. 8.

1 3 1n te rv iew wi th Col Watson, I b i d .

1 4 I b i d .

15David Absh i r e , "Strategic Cha l l enge :C o n t i n g e n c i e s , For ce Structure an d D e t e r e n c e , " Wash ing to nQ u a r t e r l y, Spr ing 1992, p. 35 .

1 6 Johann H o l s t , E x p l o r i n g E u r o p e ' s F u t u r e Trendsand P r o s p e c t s R e l a t i n g t o S e c u r i t y, (Rand C o r p o r a t i o n ,Sep t embe r 1990), p. 30.

1 7 C o l i n McInnes, Th e C h a n g i n g Strategic Agendas,(London: Unwinn Hymann, 1990), p. 163.

lslbid., p. 165.

88



1 9 Andrew Pierre, "The U.S. and th e New Europe,"Current History, 89:550, p. 354.

2 0"Why NATO?" The Economist, 323:7760, 23 May1992, p. 16.

2 1Micheal Mechams, "Signing NATO's New StrategyMay be th e Easy Part ," Aviation Week and Space Technology,35:20, 4 November 1991, p. 27.

2 2 Rupert Pengelley, "ARRC Arising," InternationalDefense Review, October 1992, p. 981.

23Ibid., p. 981-982.2 4 Ibid. , p. 984.

2 5Hans-Heini Stapfer, MIG 29 in Action, (Carrolton

Tx: Squadron Publishing, 1990), pp. 22-27.2 6 Personnal Interview with John W. Douglass,

BrigGen, USAF (RET), former Deputy United States Mili taryRepresentat ive, NATO MC and presently senior Staff Member,Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 January 1993,Washington DC.

2 TPengelley, p. 193.

28Interview, COL Watson, Ibid.

2 9Les Aspin, Statement to th e Senate Armed

Services Commitee, 19 January 1993, p. 14.30 Les Aspin, "With th e Soviet and th e Cold War

Gone, What Future fo r U.S. Forces," ROA National SecurityReport, November 1992, p. 24.

3 1 John Correll, "The Right Mix Fight Heats Up,"Air Force Magazine, January 1993, p. 68.

3 2 Ibid. p. 69.

Chapter 5

'Personnal Interview with COL Jerome Watson,Stra tegic Forces Planner, U.S. Delegation to NATO MC, 15January 1993, Brussels, Belgium.

2 Rupert Pengelley, "ARRC Arising," InternationalDefense Review, October 1992, p. 63.

89





C2 Commang Struc ture

CinCEUR

DCi nCEUR

JFACC

V Corps 21st Comp Wing Comp WingTAACOM CinCEUR ARRC

* 3 star command. Army component commander ac ts asCommander U.S. Army Forces , Europe. A ir componentcommander ac ts as Commander, U.S. Air Forces in

Europe.

Figure 1

91



Army Forces Structure

5 th Corps

A ir Forces Structure

9 th A ir F o r c e ARRC

Iwing Win Sueirt

win

- -, , - On o r d e r : OPCON

Figure 2

92



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97





INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Combined Arms Res e a rch L i b r a r yU.S. Army Command an d Genera l Staff Col l egeF o r t Leavenwor th , KS 66027-6900

2. Mr. W illiam ConnorDep a r t men t o f Joint an d Combined Opera t ionsUSACGSCF o r t Leavenwor th , KS 66027-6900

3. Defense Techn ica l In fo rma t ion CenterCameron StationAlexandr i a , VA 22314

4. Mr. John W. DouglassRm 228, R u s s e l l Sena te Off ice B u i l d i n gWashington DC, 20510

5. LTC Kenneth OsmondC e n t e r fo r Army Ta c t i c sUSACGSCF o r t Leavenwor th , KS 66027-6900

6. LTC James Swar tz3801 West Temple AvenuePomona, CA 91768-4083

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