Vaccine matching of FMD in the region
• O SEA topotype (Mya-98): O Manisa, O Ind R2/75 and O Taw 98(some isolates from Hong Kong (2011) : not matching O Manisa, O Taw 98)
• ME-SA topotype (PanAsia-2) (2009-2010) : O Manisa, O IND R2/75, O TAW 98 and O BFS.
• FMDV A from Iran (2009-2010) : A TUR 06.
• FMDV A from Afghanistan (2010-2011): A IRAN 05, A TUR 06.
• A from the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Korea: Mya-97.
• Asia 1 from Bahrain, Pakistan and Iran (2010-2011):
not matching with Asia 1 IND 8/79, Asia 1 Shamir, Asia 1 WBN
17
Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus
7 immunologically distinct serotypes
Capsid Non-structural proteins
AAAAAAAAAn
L P1 P2 P35’ UTR 3’ UTRVPg
VP4 VP2 VP3 VP12A 2B 2C 3A 3B 3C 3DPoly C
~8.2 kb
IRES
O, A, C, Asia 1, SAT 1, SAT 2, SAT 3
FMD Differentiation of Infection and Vaccination
FMD VaccineInactivated Vaccine (concentrated purified)Potency:Normal 3PD50
For emergency 6~12PD50
Differentiated Infected VaccinatedAnimal
1)LPB ELISA ○ ○
2)NSP ELISA ○ ×
The conditions for FMD vaccine
•The FMD vaccine must be an inactivated vaccine.
•The vaccine selected should be a good antigenic match for field isolates. It is very important to send samples to FMD Reference Laboratories for virus isolation and sequencing.
•Whenever FMD vaccine is used, in an emergency to control FMD outbreaks or routinely, it is essential to be able to determine whether FMDV antibodies are the result of infection or vaccination.
•The vaccine should be produced in accordance with the OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals.
•Cooperation and research collaboration on FMD diagnosis and vaccine production are important between Member Countries to control FMD in the region.
•In order to be able to differentiate between antibodies by infection and by vaccination, there is an urgent need to continue striving to produce pure vaccines to limit the effect of NSP’s when evaluating surveillance results.
Empty Capsid
Intact FMDV
Empty Capsid of FMDV as vaccine antigen
Virus Genome
One Copy of 3D Protein
No Genome
No NS proteins
Only Outer Shell
Genetic engineering technique
A new generation FMD vaccine
1. Sharing Disease Information in Pool 1 - 3(South East and East, Central and Middle-East Asia)
2. Early notification of the FMD to Members in the region and OIE
3. Strengthen the border control to prevent FMD virus entry 4. Scientific research collaborations of the FMD laboratories
to control the disease among the member countries in the region.
5. Technical supports to the developing countries in the region for diagnosis of FMD
6. Financial and economic supports to provide good matching FMD vaccines to FMD epidemic countries
To reduce FMD outbreaks in the regionProposals
The epidemiological roles of susceptible animals in FMD
Cattle:The most susceptible livestock to FMDV.
(Detector)
Pigs:Pigs excrete very large quantities of the virus (100- to 2000-fold more than cattle and sheep).
(Amplifier)
Sheep:Mild or un-apparent clinical signs, making early detection of FMDV infection difficult.
(Transporter ?)
An example of Detector
• Japan in 2000: PanAsia of O ME-SA topotype• FMD in only cattle
• Miyazaki, Hokkaido killed 740 cattle• Only Japanese black cattle created atypical
clinical signs. No vesicles in mouth or nasal cavity
• Pigs form typical symptom of vesicle in foot by animal experiments
• The source of the virus was considered to be imported hay or straw from the Asia region.
Excretion of virus
Minimal effectiveinfecting dose 101.0 ID50 102.6 ID50
105 ID50 108 ID50
Detector Amplifier
Epidemiology of FMD
Epidemiological role
Examples of Amplifier
• Taiwan 1997, UK 2001, South Korea 2002
• Recently Japan 2010, South Korea 2010-2011
• O type Cathay, ME-SA and SEA topotypes
• Accumulation of FMDV in the environments makes new outbreaks.
• FMD outbreaks in pigs are often on a very large scale.
• The FMD can cause serious economic damage.
Economic Impact in Recent FMD Outbreaks
Year Country No. of Animal Destroy Economic Damage
1997 Taipei China Swine 4 million 3.6 Billion US$ in first year
2000 Japan Bovine 740 72.7 Million US$
2000 S. Korea Bovine 2200 273 Million US$(FMD Vaccine to 850,000 Bovine)
2002 S. Korea Swine 160,000 225 Million US$
2001 UK Susceptible Animals 14.4 Billion US$6 million
2010 Japan Swine & Bovine 290,000 3 Billion US$ for complete recovery
2010- S. Korea Swine & Bovine 3.5 Million 3 Billion US$
Samples of Transporter
• UK in 2001, Cyprus in 2007
• The clinical signs are sometimes mild or unapparent.
• It makes early detection of FMDV infection difficult.
• Possibility of huge FMD outbreaks
• Serological tests are important for the diagnosis of FMD in sheep.
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発生農場数
英国の口蹄疫発生(MAFF UK, 2001~2002)
累積発生数
1日の発生数Numbers of slaughtered animals
2002. 1.14
Cases:2026
slaughtered 4.05 Million
species cattle 0.6 M
sheep 3.3 M
pig 0.14 M
goat 2 Thousand
others 2 T
由来農場Freshwater / Isle of Wight
発見されたと畜場(27頭)Brentwood / Essex
2001.2.21.
由来農場Great Horwood / Buckinghamshire
由来農場Freshwater / Isle of Wight
発生と畜場・農場(4件)Essex州
UK FMD outbreaks in 2001
2001.2.25
e
発生農場(3件)Devon州
発生農場(3件)Northumberland州
移動制限地域Berwick-on-Tweed / Northumberland州
移動制限地域Fyvie / Abardeen州
移動制限地域Woodchester 及びKington
/ Gloucestershire州
発生農場(1件)Hereford州
Epidemiological findings of 2001 UK FMD outbreaks
19 heads of sheep
Livestock markets
Distance between A B 400km
C happened before A and B
A Initial outbreak (Tyne and Wear state)
Pig Farm
Origin of the FMDV
Unknown(Airborn infection)
C Cumbria stateDevon state
Expansion of Nationwide infection
B First find Essex state Slaughter house
(Airborn infection)
Cattle near by the slaughter house
(Epiological Investigation)
To prevent pandemic outbreaks and to inhibit huge economic catastrophes in the region
1. Early Detection
2. Early Extinguishment
3. Early notification
4. Good matching Vaccine
However….
Infected pigs excrete FMD viruses within 2 - 4 days after FMD infection
And it takes about 7 days before the animals can induce protective antibodies by vaccination.
Prompt effective tools are strongly desired