VOLUME 2 2013 - ANU International Relations...

ATLAS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS JOURNAL ANU INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SOCIETY

VOLUME 2 + 2013

ATLAS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS JOURNAL 1

ABOUT THE SOCIETY Founded in 2004, the ANU International Relations Society is one of the ANU's largest student-run organizations, with undergraduate, postgraduate and non-student members. The Society was founded with three aims: § to promote the academic study of international relations and politics in the university

environment; § facilitate the interaction of international relations students with each other in order to

support each other, and enhance their learning experience; and § to give a social setting for those studying international relations to further the enjoyment

of study and allow them to interact with future colleagues and/or employers.

For more information about the Society, events it organizes and opportunities for further involvement, please visit our website at http://irsociety.weblogs.anu.edu.au/ or visit our Facebook page. Atlas International Relations Journal is a publication organised by members of the Australian National University International Relations Society’s Publications and Editorial Subcommittee. Published by Australian National University International Relations Society The Australian National University Acton, ACT, 2601, Australia [email protected] This title is also available online at ANU International Relations Society http://irsociety.anu.edu.au/journal Cover by Daniel McKay. Opinions published in Atlas International Relations Journal do not necessarily represent those of the ANU International Relations Society, its membership, members of the Editorial Subcommittee or the Australian National University. Copyright © 2013 Australian National University International Relations Society. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.


CONTENTS

FROM THE PRESIDENT .................................................................................... 3

FROM THE EDITOR ........................................................................................... 4 AUTHOR PROFILES .......................................................................................... 5

WILLIAM BAULCH THE EASY ANSWER IS NOT ALWAYS THE RIGHT ANSWER: HISTORICAL ANIMOSITY AND THE TRUE CAUSES OF SINO-JAPANESE SECURITY TENSIONS……………………………………………………………………………6 VERONICA FINN PROTECTING REFUGEES: ISSUES WITH THE REFUGEE CONVENTION IN THE 21STCENTURY ................................................................................................. 17 DAVID JOHNSON A CRITICAL ASSESMENT OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND TERRORISM ..... 25 SHERWOOD DU REVIEW ESSAY: MERITS OF PEACE IN THE ASIA PACIFIC ...………………...39 DAVID ROBERTSON

A UNIFIED FUTURE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA ........................................ 43


FROM THE PRES IDENT ADELINE CLARKE It's wonderful to have a second edition of Atlas to reveal the interests and perspectives of International Relations students at our university. The ANU International Relations Society thanks our contributors and the lecturers who recommended them to us. These essays demonstrate the high calibre of work produced by IR students at the ANU. I'd also like to congratulate Daniel McKay and Hayley Wilkinson for putting this edition together and to thank them for their hard work throughout the year. Thank you also to Mark Pennini, last year's editor, for charting a course for the journal; we are looking forward to seeing his vision fulfilled in the future. I look forward to Atlas continuing to establish itself so it becomes a journal in which IR students yearn to be published. Atlas has a great contribution to make.

Adeline Clarke 2013 President ANU International Relations Society


FROM THE ED I TOR DANIEL McKAY Enclosed in this volume are pages and pages of thousands and thousands of words; but what these words represent is greater still, many hundreds of collective hours in careful research, thought, writing, rewriting and editing. As a whole however they represent some of the best writing on international relations by students of the Australian National University. Each contributor has been recognized by their lecturers for the outstanding quality of their work, and for the obvious passion and dedication they have for their subjects. Assembling this work together in the second edition of Atlas, will we hope go some way to expanding the readership of these exemplar student essays. The editing process this year has been met with several challenges, so it is with great pleasure (and relief) that if you are reading these words now, then it has managed to escape the editors desk and begun clanking off the printing press (or at least the PDF machine). It goes without saying however that it would not have been possible without the help of everyone whose labors this publication represents; including the writers and lecturers; but also those who behind the scenes. My especial thanks go out to our Associate Editor - Hayley Wilkinson whose endless patience and eagerness as well as her skill was a constant help. I would also like to express my enourmous gratitude to our President – Adeline Clarke, who has helped drive this project to completion, and whose diligence and leadership was much appreciated. I hope reading this edition of Atlas is enjoyable and stimulating. Happy Reading,

Daniel McKay 2013 Atlas Editor ANU International Relations Society


AUTHOR PROFILES WILLIAM BAULCH William Baulch is a second year undergraduate student at the ANU. He is studying the Bachelor of International Relations, specialising in International Security and minoring in Middle Eastern and Central Asian Studies. William’s essay was one of the highest graded in the course STST2001 International Security Issues in the Asia Pacific. Due to his keen interest in this region, William will be adding the Bachelor of Asia-Pacific Security to his program at the start of 2014. William recently represented the Republic of India at The European International Model United Nations and was recognised for his outstanding contribution. VERONICA FINN Veronica Finn is in her fourth year of a Bachelor of Arts/Laws at the ANU, majoring in International Relations. Veronica has a keen interest in the issues surrounding migration. Last summer, she interned at the Migration Council Australia. Veronica’s academic interests also include Middle Eastern affairs, Australian politics and international human rights law. After university, Veronica hopes to pursue a career in law. DAVID JOHNSON David Johnson is a student of the Master of National Security Policy degree at the National Security College. This essay was originally submitted for the National Security College course; Disease, Security and Biological Weapons. SHERWOOD DU Sherwood Du is a third year Bachelor of Arts (International Relations and Political Science)/Bachelor of Laws student. Sherwood’s review essay was one of the highest graded in the course INTR2010 International Relations in the Asia-Pacific. Sherwood was born in Hong Kong SAR, China and immigrated to Melbourne, Australia at a young age where he completed primary and secondary school at Scotch College before tertiary education at ANU where he is President of the Table Tennis Club – a multicultural testing ground for his political knowledge learnt in class. Sherwood is also fluent in Cantonese and Mandarin and hopes to pursue a career in diplomacy following his studies. DAVID ROBERTSON David Robertson is a third year student at the ANU undertaking a Bachelor of International Relations, specializing in security. David's essay was one of the highest graded in the course STST2001 International Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific. David was born in Sydney and grew up on the east coast, in the United Kingdom and in Canberra. Academically, David is interested in security issues and power politics in North East Asia and the Middle East, and world history. He is intending to study Honours in 2014.


THE EASY ANSWER IS NOT ALWAYS THE RIGHT ANSWER: HISTORICAL ANIMOSITY AND THE TRUE CAUSES OF SINO-JAPANESE SECURITY TENSIONS WILLIAM BAULCH

Sino-Japanese relations can resist referring to the ‘historical animosity’ of the two North Asian states. It has become a mainstay of the discourse, the go-to phrase for academics and media outlets alike. At any sign of strain between the People’s Republic of China and Japan, historical animosity is decried as the primary source of the conflict. In so doing, a grave injustice is committed against those who seek to understand the true causes of Sino-Japanese security tensions. While history undeniably plays an important role in the relationship, to claim that historical animosity is the root of all the troubles in Sino-Japanese relations serves only to mask the true causes of tension. It is the task of this article to pull back that mask. In doing so, it finds that the history of Sino-Japanese relations show no signs of an enduring rivalry. It also unveils several recent developments that have placed undue strain on modern Sino-Japanese relations. These recent developments must be recognised as the true causes of tension before the notion of historical animosity be cast aside. Only then can the PRC and Japan lay the foundations of a stable and peaceful relationship.

The rivalry between East Asia’s two great powers, the People’s Republic of China and Japan, has long been the subject of both academic analysis and public debate. Following the escalation in Sino-Japanese security tensions from September 2012, the volume of academic and media commentary on the topic has proliferated. Many authors choose to preface their work by referring to the ‘enduring rivalry’ between China and Japan. Such an approach perpetuates the myth that Sino-Japanese security tensions principally derive from historical animosity and, in doing so, directs attention away from the true causes of friction. This article will contest the importance of historical animosity and highlight the true causes of tension between China and Japan. In the first section of this article I will argue that the role of historical animosity in the Sino-Japanese relationship has been exaggerated for political purposes. In the second section I will address China’s concerns about the revitalised United States-Japan alliance and Japan’s response to China’s apprehension. In the third section I will analyse the Sino-Japanese struggle for regional leadership and what the potential outcomes of this struggle could mean for regional stability. In the fourth section I will consider the military expansion of each state and how their increasing military capabilities are contributing to a security dilemma. In the fifth section I will discuss the rise of Chinese and Japanese nationalism and its negative impact on bilateral relations. The final section will look at the territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and


demonstrate why recent events, not historical animosity, are responsible for making the islands a flashpoint for conflict between the two great powers. HISTORY REVISED: MANUFACTURING HISTORICAL ANIMOSITY The first record of conflict between China and Japan occurred in AD 663.1 Japanese pirates raided the Chinese coastline from the 13th to the 16th century,2 and at the end of the 16th century, China and Japan fought on the Korean Peninsula for regional hegemony.3 More recently, China and Japan have engaged in a number of conflicts, including the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), the Boxer Rebellion (1900-1901), several ‘incidents’ in the 1930s, and the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45).4 Due to these encounters, each state purportedly maintains deep-seated suspicion and hatred of the other, frequently described as ‘historical animosity’.5 Modern security tensions supposedly derive from this animosity. However, this assumption disregards the extensive periods of peace that have existed in the Sino-Japanese relationship for most of its history. Over the course of fifteen hundred years, the two Asian powers have only fought a handful of times and conflict was concentrated in the age of imperialism. Thus, far from suggesting that China and Japan have been historic rivals, history actually shows that the two states can coexist peacefully. In addition, there is evidence that the concept of historical animosity has been exaggerated in recent decades. From 1945-1971, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) downplayed the recent conflicts between Japan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC/China) and instead emphasised solidarity with its neighbour as a “victim of [American] imperialism”.6 Moreover, from the normalisation of their relationship in 1972 until the end of the 1980s, the CCP “acted to contain anti-Japanese sentiments in the society to avoid damaging bilateral relations”.7 On the Japanese side, a desire to improve bilateral relations resulted in Tokyo directing billions of dollars in Official Development Aid into the developing Chinese economy.8 Until this point, just four decades after the end of their bloodiest conflict in history, China and Japan did not appear remotely perturbed by their alleged historical animosity. It was only at the end of the Cold War that ‘history problems’ entered the relationship. In China, government-sponsored education programs identified Japan as an aggressor and encouraged the growth of anti-Japanese nationalist sentiments. 9 Simultaneously, a generational leadership change in Japan merged with resurgent nationalism to fuel anti-Chinese

1 David Kang, East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 93. 2 James Kraska, Contemporary Maritime Piracy: International Law, Strategy, and Diplomacy at Sea (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2011), 17-19. 3 Kang, East Asia Before the West, 2. 4 Robert Y. Eng, “China”, in Colonialism: An International, Social, Cultural, and Political Encyclopaedia, ed. Melvin E. Page, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2003), 114. 5 Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia”, International Security, 23:4, Spring 1999, 50. 6 Phil Deans, “Diminishing Returns? Prime Minister Koizumi’s Visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in the Context of East Asian Nationalisms”, East Asia, 24:3, September 2007, 285. 7 Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance”, 55. 8 Michael Yahuda, “The limits of economic interdependence: Sino-Japanese relations”, in New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, eds. Alastair Iain Johnston & Robert S. Ross (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 165-6. 9 Ibid. 168.


attitudes.10 Both sides built their nationalist agendas on a flawed belief in their enduring rivalry, giving rise to the pervasive concept of historical animosity.11 This concept served to simplify the varied and complex causes of renewed tension between China and Japan. The remainder of this article will examine why tension has risen since 1989 and prove that the claim of historical animosity as the root of modern Sino-Japanese security tensions is flawed. CONTAINING CHINA OR CONSTRAINING JAPAN? From its 1970s rapprochement with the West until the end of the Cold War, China tolerated the alliance between the United States (US) and Japan, viewing it as a ‘cap in the bottle’ preventing Japanese remilitarisation.12 America’s military protection and its nuclear umbrella dissuaded Japan from revising its ‘no war’ constitution, expanding its military forces, increasing its defence expenditure, or seeking nuclear weapons.13 Tokyo was content to concentrate government spending on developing its economy and Beijing, confident it did not face a security threat from Japan, focused its defensive posture against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR/Soviet Union).14 However, following the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the US-Japan alliance became a source of friction between China and Japan. In 1997, the US and Japan revitalised the alliance and Tokyo, under pressure from Washington to show it was sharing in the burden of its own defence, began to expand its Self-Defense Forces (SDF).15 This included commissioning a new fleet of destroyers,16 coproducing F-15J fighters, and commencing serious negotiations for a theatre missile defence (TMD).17 For China, the revitalisation appears to compromise the alliance’s value as a ‘cap’ on Japanese remilitarisation. Some Chinese analysts, such as Liu Jiangyong, Professor of International Relations at Tsinghua University, claim the notional ‘bottle cap’ has been replaced by an ‘egg shell’, in which the Japanese military is protected by the US until it hatches as a regional power.18 Beijing considers this a direct challenge to its security and territorial integrity, as well as a pillar for American attempts to contain China’s rise.19 Consequently, Beijing has protested against elements of US-Japanese military cooperation, such as the negotiations for a TMD, which threatens China’s minimum nuclear deterrence.20 For Tokyo however, these protests suggest Beijing would prefer

10 Ibid. 168-9. 11 Cheol Hee Park, “A whirlpool of historical controversies in widening waters of cooperation”, in Changing Power Relations in Northeast Asia: Implications for Relations Japan and South Korea, ed. Marie Söderberg (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 40. 12 Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance”, 62. 13 Reinhard Drifte, “China and Japan: between co-operation and competition”, in A Handbook of China’s International Relations, ed. Shaun Breslin (London: Routledge, 2010), 140. 14 Ibid. 15 Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance”, 62-3. 16 Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan's Response to China's Rise: Regional Engagement, Global Containment, Dangers of Collision”, International Affairs, 85:4, July 2009, 845. 17 Patrick M. O'Donogue, Theater Missile Defense in Japan: Implications For the U.S.-China-Japan Strategic Relationship (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, 2000), 17-18. 18 Thomas J. Christensen, Worse than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 236. 19 Yoichiro Sato, “Tango without trust and respect? Japan’s awkward co-prosperity with China”, in The Rise of China and International Security: America and Asia Respond, eds. Kevin Cooney & Yoichiro Sato (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 104. 20 O'Donogue, Theater Missile Defense in Japan, 20.


Japan to be isolated from the US, without which Japan cannot hope to compete with China’s military strength over the long-term.21 This perception has encouraged Tokyo to reaffirm its commitment to the US-Japan alliance through further remilitarisation and the deployment of SDF units to non-combat roles alongside US forces overseas.22 As a consequence of this misunderstanding, the US-Japan alliance is a cause for tension in the Sino-Japanese relationship. TWO CAPTAINS WILL SINK THE SHIP The start of the 21st century has seen a budding leadership rivalry between China and Japan in the Asia-Pacific.23 Generally, China prefers to exert its influence in East Asia, where its economic and military dominance have greatest effect, while Japan favours leading a multilateral community involving North American, South Asian, and South Pacific states.24 The outcome of this contest will have a significant impact on the structural composition of state relations in the region, which will affect the security of both states. To illustrate this point, I will briefly discuss the evolving relationships of China and Japan with the Republic of Korea (ROK/South Korea) and India. Although strained at times by historical and territorial issues, the Japan-ROK relationship is close, with strong economic ties, common political values, and military association through their respective alliances with the US.25 However, China has used its growing economies ties with South Korea to strengthen its bilateral relations with Seoul. Although suffering recent setbacks, Beijing’s persistent use of soft power in the 21st century, such as the offer of a free trade agreement, has encouraged Seoul to promote itself as a “balancer” between China and Japan.26 Moreover, in 2007, China and South Korea agreed to enhance their ‘strategic and cooperative partnership’.27 This is a key concern for Japan, which considers South Korea a potential partner in balancing against the rise of China.28 China’s reluctance to establish a broad Asia-Pacific community has prevented it from reviving its relationship with India, which is strained due to border skirmishes, economic competition, military expansion, and conflicting strategic interests in South Asia and the South China Sea.29 Japan however has managed to improve its already strong bilateral relations with India through multilateral activities, particularly enhancing

21 Mingjiang Li & Dongmin Lee, China and East Asian Strategic Dynamics: The Shaping of a New Regional Order (Lanhan: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2011), 85. 22 Ibid. 23 Watanabe Matsuo, “Issues in regional integration of east Asia: conflicting priorities and perceptions”, Asia-Pacific Review, 11:2, 2004, 1. 24 Quansheng Zhao & Guoli Liu, Managing the China Challenge: Global Perspectives (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 114. 25 Uk Heo, South Korea Since 1980 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 194-5. 26 Seong-Ho Sheen, “Out of America, into the dragon’s arms: South Korea, a Northeast Asian balancer?”, in The Rise of China and International Security: America and Asia Respond, eds. Kevin Cooney & Yoichiro Sato (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 147-9. 27 “Korea, China upgrade relations to strategic cooperative partnership”, Office of the President, Republic of Korea, 27 May 2008, accessed 2 July 2013, <http://english.president.go.kr/pre_activity/summit/diplomacy_view.php?board_no=E05&search_key=&search_value=&search_cate_code=&cur_page_no=&uno=203>. 28 Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989: From balancing to bandwagoning? (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 109-110. 29 Francine R. Frankel, “The Breakout of China-India Strategic Rivalry in Asia and the India Ocean”, Journal of International Affairs, 64:2, Spring 2011, 1-2.


their military cooperation through joint naval exercises that include the US, Australia, and Singapore. 30 Japan has encouraged New Delhi to join multilateral regional institutions, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), where together they are able to dilute Chinese influence.31 Some Chinese analysts are concerned that closer Indo-Japanese relations through multilateral cooperation threaten to create “a string of rapiers”, a concept in which democracies surrounding China collaborate to limit its influence.32 Evidently, Chinese dominance in East Asia or the co-option of India into a Japan-led Asia-Pacific community has serious consequences for the security of each state. Thus, competition for regional leadership is a modern issue causing tension in the Sino-Japanese relationship today. MONEY MEANS GUNS; GUNS MEAN POWER In the mid-1990s, both China and Japan initiated militarisation programs. Beijing began modernising the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) while Tokyo has expanded the military capabilities of the SDF.33 However, each state has misunderstood the goals of the other’s militarisation program, setting them on the path to a security dilemma. Starting in 1996, China’s official military spending increased annually at a double-digit pace to surpass US$100 billion in 2012 and actual spending is estimated to be much higher.34 The primary focus of China’s military expansion is the maintenance of “sovereign, national security and territorial integrity.35 The domestic policing budget has grown faster and larger than even that of military spending,36 while the hardware China has purchased suggests it seeks to deter US intervention in the event that the Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan) secedes from the mainland.37 However, Japanese strategists have underestimated China’s domestic concerns and instead believe China’s growing conventional military and nuclear capabilities make it the greatest long-term threat to Japan’s security.38 Military planners in Tokyo also worry about China’s lack of transparency and its willingness to project military power beyond its borders.39 Consequently, Tokyo views China’s military expansion as a considerable threat to its own security. Similarly, Beijing has failed to understand the driving forces behind Japan’s military expansion. As previously described, Japan has been expanding the SDF since

30 Walter C. Ladwig, “Delhi’s Pacific Ambition: Naval Power, “Look East”, and India’s Emerging Influence in the Asia-Pacific”, Asian Security, 5:2, May 2009, 99-102. 31 Zhao & Liu, Managing the China Challenge, 114. 32 Brahma Chellaney, “Countering China’s ‘String of Pearls’”, The Washington Times, 6 May 2013, accessed 7 May 2013 <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/may/6/countering-chinas-string-of-pearls/>. 33 Hughes, “Japan's Response to China's Rise”, 845. 34 Michael Forsythe & Yidi Zhao, “China Raising 2012 Defense Spending to Cope With Unfriendly ‘Neighbourhood’”, Bloomberg News, 5 March 2012, accessed 27 April 2013 <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-04/china-says-defense-spending-will-increase-11-2-to-106-4-billion-in-2012.html>. 35 Ibid. 36 Yue Xie & Wei Shan, “China Struggles to Maintain Stability: Strengthening its Public Security Apparatus”, in China: Development and Governance, eds. Gungwu Wang & Yongnian Zheng (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co, 2013), 59. 37 John F. Bradford, “The Maritime Strategy of the United States: Implications for Indo-Pacific Sea Lanes”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 33:2, August 2011, 187. 38 Hughes, “Japan's Response to China's Rise”, 841. 39 Ibid.


1997 and debating revisions to its no-war constitution.40 There are several reasons for Japan’s militarisation program. Along with pressure from the US to increase its share of the burden in its own defence, Tokyo wants to deploy combat forces to United Nations (UN) missions, such as in Afghanistan and the Gulf of Aden, to promote itself as a proactive international actor.41 Increasing military spending could also generate growth in Japan’s stagnate economy.42 However, Beijing has failed to appreciate these motives and insists that Japan’s military expansion is part of a containment policy targeting China.43 Thus, the two states have begun to descend into a security dilemma, with each believing their own militarisation to be defensive while perceiving the other’s as offensive. Consequently, the militarisation programs of both China and Japan have generated security tensions. PREACH HATE NOT LOVE In recent decades, both China and Japan have experienced a rise in domestic hostility towards the other nationality. In 2006, the Pew Global Attitudes Project found “seven in-ten Japanese express an unfavourable view of China and an equal number of Chinese dislike Japan”.44 Moreover, those who hold a favourable view of the other nation halved between 2002 and 2006 to just one-in-four.45 The following paragraphs will discuss the reasons for this decline. During the Cold War, the legitimacy of CCP rested upon its communist ideology but this was undermined at the end of the 1980s with the decline of global communism. 46 Public demonstrations demanding reforms, such as in Tiananmen Square in 1989, threatened the survival of the CCP. In response to the challenge, the CCP began propagating itself as the defender of the Chinese people against Japanese aggression with the intention of creating a new source of legitimacy: nationalism.47 Central to this plan was the two-year Patriotic Education Campaign, which “painted the Communist Party as the saviour of the nation in the war against Japan”. 48 Consequently, Japanese atrocities during the Second Sino-Japanese War gained renewed attention, which gave Chinese nationalism a vengeful ‘victim narrative’. 49 Ultimately, the CCP attempts to rally nationalism were successful and the Party gained a new base of legitimacy.50 However, nationalism became a two-edged sword, with its

40 Christopher Hughes, “Why Japan Could Revise Its Constitution and What It Would Mean for Japanese Security Policy”, Orbis, 50:4, Autumn 2006, 726. 41 Ibid. 727. 42 Australian Associated Press, “Japan spends stimulus billions on military”, News Limited, 9 January 2013, accessed 27 April 2013 <http://www.news.com.au/breaking-news/world/japan-spends-stimulus-billions-on-military/story-e6frfkui-1226550423125>. 43 Sato, “Tango without trust and respect?”, 104. 44 Andrew Kohut, Rich Morin & Richard Wike, “Publics of Asian Powers Hold Negative Views of One Another”, Pew Research Center, 21 September 2006, accessed 29 April 2013, 1 <http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2006/09/GAP-Asia-report-final-9-21-06.pdf>. 45 Ibid. 3. 46 Peter Hays Gries, “Narratives to Live By: The Century of Humiliation and Chinese National Identity Today”, in China’s Transformations: The Stories Beyond the Headlines, ed. Lionel M. Jensen & Timothy B. Weston (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 116. 47 Yahuda, “The limits of economic interdependence: Sino-Japanese relations”, 168. 48 Ibid. 49 Gries, “Narratives to Live By”, 116-7. 50 Phil Deans, “Contending Nationalisms and the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Dispute”, Security Dialogue, 31:1, March 2000, 121.


anti-Japanese edge putting pressure on the CCP to stand up for China in the face of perceived insults by Japan.51 Japanese nationalism also revived towards the end of the Cold War. Despite Japan’s military constraints, the “continuing economic boom and smooth social development” during the 1980s gave the Japanese public a sense of equality with the world’s great powers. 52 However, pride gave way to “frustration, confusion, and embarrassment” during the 1991 Gulf War when Japan’s US$13 billion commitment to the mission was derided and the US made “demands for a ‘human contribution’ ”.53 The perceived insult provoked a national debate for constitutional revision and Japanese citizens rallied to the nationalist cry for Japan to become a “normal country” - one with an independent security force.54 The demand that Japan become a ‘normal country’ continued to grow and Tokyo conceded to domestic pressure by revising the terms of deployment of the SDF.55 Beijing is suspicious about Japan’s political motives for the revisions while Tokyo has responded by claiming China wishes to prevent Japan becoming a great power.56 While the narrative of China’s nationalism is based in historical conflict, the roots of the policy are firmly fixed in the legitimacy crisis of the 1990s. Similarly, the rise of Japanese nationalism can be traced back to its humiliation during the Gulf War.57 In both states, nationalists have put pressure on their governments to take a more belligerent stance towards the other. Beijing - unwilling to unleash domestic furore that could threaten the CCP - and the ruling party in Tokyo - seeking to maintain electoral support - have yielded to this pressure.58 The result has been heightened aggression and increased tensions in areas of confrontation, with neither side willing or able to back down.59 The final paragraph will expand upon this concept. TERRITORIAL DISPUTES: SECURITY TENSIONS IN CONTEXT The final analysis will briefly look at the territorial dispute between China and Japan regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The uninhabited islands, known as the Senkaku in Japan and the Diaoyu in China, were annexed by Japan in 1895.60 When the US returned the islands to Japan in 1972, China claimed ownership.61 Both sides have used historical narratives to justify their claims to the islands, underlining the problems

51 Joseph Fewsmith, “The Politics of Economic Liberalization: Are There Limits?”, in China’s Rise and the Balance of Influence in Asia, eds. William W. Keller & Thomas G. Rawski (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2007), 80-1. 52 Jin Linbo, “Japan’s Neo-Nationalism and China’s Response”, in East Asia’s Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism, eds. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa & Kazuhiko Togo (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008), 166. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 166 & 175. 55 Ibid. 166. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Deans, “Contending Nationalisms”, 122 & 125. 59 Ibid. 60 William C. Middlebrooks, Beyond Pacifism: Why Japan Must Become a “Normal” Nation (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008), 77. 61 Seokwoo Lee, “Territorial Disputes among Japan, China and Taiwan Concerning the Senkaku Islands”, Boundary and Territory Briefing, 3:7, 2002, 7-8.


self-interested interpretation of history can cause.62 Complicating the issue is a 1968 UN report claiming that seabeds off the islands may contain large reserves of gas and oil, making them strategically significance for the two energy importers.63 However, the dispute remained strictly legal until the 1990s, at which point many of the elements causing modern security tensions combined to make the islands a flashpoint.64 During recent naval confrontations around the islands, a Chinese frigate locked its radar onto a Japanese destroyer.65 In response, the US reaffirmed its position that the islands are part of Japanese territory and hence under the US security umbrella, a cautious reminder to China of the problematic US-Japan alliance.66 Moreover, nationalists in both states keep the dispute on the public agenda, preventing their governments from seeking a compromise.67 This has been highlighted by Beijing’s recent decision to add the islands to its ‘core interests’, making it harder to reach a negotiated solution.68 Finally, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are a rare point where the modernising Chinese navy and the expanded Japanese fleet meet. With each state feeling more confident in its military capabilities, the chances of miscalculation sparking a conflict are high.69 Thus, the territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is a key source of security tensions, which also highlights nearly all the other causes of modern security tensions between China and Japan. CONCLUSION The constant references of academics and the media to the concept of historical animosity is a dangerous tendency. It spreads the misperception that China and Japan are doomed to an enduring rivalry and lends a sense of futility to any attempt to resolve their bilateral issues. Highlighting historical animosity as a cause of friction obscures the damaging impact more recent events have had on the relationship. It also validates the opinions of nationalists who refuse to consider compromise, let alone partnership, as a future for Sino-Japanese relations. In order to gain a greater understanding of the causes of tension between China and Japan, the myth of historical animosity must be dispelled. The true causes of Sino-Japanese security tensions, such as the US-Japan alliance, the struggle for regional leadership, and the evolving security dilemma, should be given greater prominence in published commentary. While the role of nationalism and its historical bent cannot be ignored, placing nationalism in its modern context may enable debate on the true issues to gain traction. This may lead to greater understanding between China and Japan and a lessening of tensions in areas of conflict. In doing so, China and Japan may finally put aside the notion of historical animosity and lay the foundations of a stable and peaceful relationship.

62 Ibid. 10-12. 63 Middlebrooks, Beyond Pacifism, 77. 64 Lee, “Territorial Disputes among Japan, China and Taiwan”, 6-8. 65 Agence France-Press, “China military officials admit radar lock on Japanese ship, says report”, South China Morning Post, 18 March 2013, accessed 1 May 2013, <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1193600/china-military-officials-admit-radar-lock-japanese-ship?page=all>. 66 Middlebrooks, Beyond Pacifism, 77. 67 Ibid. 68 Harry Kazianis, “Senkaku/Diaoyu Island: A “Core Interest” of China”, The Diplomat, 29 April 2013, accessed 2 May 2013, <http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/04/29/senkakudiaoyu-islands-a-core-interest-of-china/>. 69 Yoshiki Mine, “China's Calculation on the Senkaku Islands as Seen Through the Report of Chinese Media”, The Canon Institute for Global Studies, 8 November 2012, accessed 1 May 2013, <http://www.canon-igs.org/en/column/security/20121108_1648.html>.


BIBLIOGRAPHY Agence France-Press. “China military officials admit radar lock on Japanese ship, says report”. South China Morning Post. 18 March 2013, accessed 1 May 2013. <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1193600/china-military-officials-admit-radar-lock-japanese-ship?page=all>. Australian Associated Press. “Japan spends stimulus billions on military”. News Limited. 9 January 2013, accessed 27 April 2013. <http://www.news.com.au/breaking-news/world/japan-spends-stimulus-billions-on-military/story-e6frfkui-1226550423125>. Bradford, John F. “The Maritime Strategy of the United States: Implications for Indo-Pacific Sea Lanes”. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 33:2, August 2011. 183-208. Chellaney, Brahma. “Countering China’s ‘String of Pearls’”. The Washington Times. 6 May 2013, accessed 7 May 2013. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/may/6/countering-chinas-string-of-pearls/>. Christensen, Thomas J. “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia”. International Security, 23:4, Spring 1999. 49-80. Christensen, Thomas J. Worse than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. Deans, Phil. “Contending Nationalisms and the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Dispute”. Security Dialogue, 31:1, March 2000. 119-131.

Deans, Phil. “Diminishing Returns? Prime Minister Koizumi’s Visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in the Context of East Asian Nationalisms”. East Asia, 24:3, September 2007. 269-294. Drifte, Reinhard. Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989: From balancing to bandwagoning? London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. Drifte, Reinhard. “China and Japan: between co-operation and competition”. In A Handbook of China’s International Relations, edited by Shaun Breslin, 138-146. London: Routledge, 2010. Eng, Robert Y. “China”. In Colonialism: An International, Social, Cultural, and Political Encyclopaedia, edited by Melvin E. Page, 113-114. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2003. Fewsmith, Joseph. “The Politics of Economic Liberalization: Are There Limits?”. In China’s Rise and the Balance of Influence in Asia, edited by William W. Keller & Thomas G. Rawski, 74-94. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2007. Forsythe, Michael & Zhao, Yidi. “China Raising 2012 Defense Spending to Cope With Unfriendly ‘Neighbourhood’”. Bloomberg News. 5 March 2012, accessed 27 April 2013. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-04/china-says-defense-spending-will-increase-11-2-to-106-4-billion-in-2012.html>. Frankel, Francine R. “The Breakout of China-India Strategic Rivalry in Asia and the India Ocean”. Journal of International Affairs, 64:2, Spring 2011. 1-17. Gries, Peter Hays. “Narratives to Live By: The Century of Humiliation and


Chinese National Identity Today”. In China’s Transformations: The Stories Beyond the Headlines, edited by Lionel M. Jensen & Timothy B. Weston, 112-128. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007. Heo, Uk. South Korea Since 1980. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Hughes, Christopher. “Why Japan Could Revise Its Constitution and What It Would Mean for Japanese Security Policy”. Orbis, 50:4, Autumn 2006. 725-744. Hughes, Christopher W. “Japan's Response to China's Rise: Regional Engagement, Global Containment, Dangers of Collision”. International Affairs, 85:4, July 2009. 837-856. Kang, David. East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. Kazianis, Harry. “Senkaku/Diaoyu Island: A “Core Interest” of China”. The Diplomat. 29 April 2013, accessed 2 May 2013. <http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/04/29/senkakudiaoyu-islands-a-core-interest-of-china/>. Kohut, Andrew, Morin, Rich, & Wike, Richard. “Publics of Asian Powers Hold Negative Views of One Another”. Pew Research Center. 21 September 2006, accessed 29 April 2013, 1. <http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2006/09/GAP-Asia-report-final-9-21-06.pdf>. Kraska, James. Contemporary Maritime Piracy: International Law, Strategy, and Diplomacy at Sea. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2011. Ladwig, Walter C. “Delhi’s Pacific Ambition: Naval Power, “Look East”, and India’s Emerging Influence in the

Asia-Pacific”. Asian Security, 5:2, May 2009. 87-113. Lee, Seokwoo. “Territorial Disputes among Japan, China and Taiwan Concerning the Senkaku Islands”. Boundary and Territory Briefing, 3:7, 2002. 1-37. Li, Mingjiang & Lee, Dongmin. China and East Asian Strategic Dynamics: The Shaping of a New Regional Order. Lanhan: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2011. Linbo, Jin. “Japan’s Neo-Nationalism and China’s Response”. In East Asia’s Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism, edited by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa & Kazuhiko Togo, 165-179.Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008. Matsuo, Watanabe. “Issues in regional integration of east Asia: conflicting priorities and perceptions”. Asia-Pacific Review, 11:2, 2004. 1-17. Middlebrooks, William C. Beyond Pacifism: Why Japan Must Become a “Normal” Nation. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008. Mine, Yoshiki. “China's Calculation on the Senkaku Islands as Seen Through the Report of Chinese Media”. Canon Institute for Global Studies. 8 November 2012, accessed 1 May 2013. <http://www.canon-igs.org/en/column/security/20121108_1648.html>. O'Donogue, Patrick M. Theater Missile Defense in Japan: Implications For the U.S.-China-Japan Strategic Relationship. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, 2000. Office of the President, Republic of Korea. “Korea, China upgrade relations to strategic cooperative partnership”.


27 May 2008, accessed 2 July 2013. <http://english.president.go.kr/pre_activity/summit/diplomacy_view.php?board_no=E05&search_key=&search_value=&search_cate_code=&cur_page_no=&uno=203>. Park, Cheol Hee. “A whirlpool of historical controversies in widening waters of cooperation”. In Changing Power Relations in Northeast Asia: Implications for Relations Japan and South Korea, edited by Marie Söderberg, 39-54. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011. Sato, Yoichiro. “Tango without trust and respect? Japan’s awkward co-prosperity with China”. In The Rise of China and International Security: America and Asia Respond, edited by Kevin Cooney & Yoichiro Sato, 94-119. Abingdon: Routledge, 2009. Sheen, Seong-Ho. “Out of America, into the dragon’s arms: South Korea, a

Northeast Asian balancer?”. In The Rise of China and International Security: America and Asia Respond, edited by Kevin Cooney & Yoichiro Sato, 140-158. Abingdon: Routledge, 2009. Xie, Yue & Shan, Wei. “China Struggles to Maintain Stability: Strengthening its Public Security Apparatus”. In China: Development and Governance, edited by Gungwu Wang & Yongnian Zheng, 55-62. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co, 2013. Yahuda, Michael. “The limits of economic interdependence: Sino-Japanese relations”. In New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, edited by Alastair Iain Johnston & Robert S. Ross, 163-185. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006. Zhao, Quansheng & Liu, Guoli. Managing the China Challenge: Global Perspectives. Abingdon: Routledge, 2009.


PROTECTING REFUGEES: ISSUES WITH THE REFUGEE CONVENTION IN THE 21STCENTURY VERONICA FINN

The 1951 Refugee Convention has increasingly come under criticism for being out-dated. There are indeed numerous problems with its application to refugees in the twenty-first century. It is too limited in defining who is a refugee and its Cold War origins have limited its applicability in the post-Cold War era. New waves of refugees from the South have been seen as fundamentally different to Cold War refugees and treated with hostility. Many Western states have increased barriers to prevent refugees reaching their borders, allowing them to avoid their obligations under the Convention and increasing the burden upon developing countries. Despite its numerous problems, the Refugee Convention should not be scrapped – some protection is better than no protection. Any attempts at reform must balance the interests of states with the interests of refugees.

Refugees challenge the international system because states are supposed to protect their citizens.1 In the case of refugees, they have failed to do so. Refugees lack the protection of their state and are thus immensely vulnerable. Recognising this, a global refugee regime has been developed to ensure their protection. Its basis is the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘the Convention’) and its 1967 Protocol. There are 145 parties to this Convention. Although there are regional refugee regimes that also protect refugees, such as the OAU Convention and the Cartagena Declaration, the UN Convention is the “sole legally binding international instrument that provides specific protection to refugees”.2 This and its near universal acceptance make it immensely important for refugees. It defines who qualifies for refugee status and the rights attached to that. The most important right is the right of a refugee not to be returned to territory where their “life or freedom would be threatened” by persecution – non-refoulement.3 This principle is so fundamental that it is binding on all states, not just those party to the Convention. Recognised refugees are also granted rights to property, employment and welfare. Despite the protection it offers refugees, the relevance of the Convention is increasingly coming under challenge for being “anachronistic”4 and out of date. Its definition of a refugee is too limited and is based in its Cold War origins. It has been applied differently to communist refugees and refugees from the South. The Convention also fosters unhelpful distinctions between refugees and economic migrants, helping

1 Emma Haddad, The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 209. 2 Laura Barnett, “Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime”, International Journal of Refugee Law 14 (2002), 246. 3 UN Refugee Convention, Article 33. 4 Adrienne Millbank, “The Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention” (Research Paper No 5, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 2000-01) 7-8.


justify the different treatment accorded to refugees from developing countries. It has also been powerless to prevent the increased barriers to asylum that both North and South have developed. The idea of exile underpins the regime, but this is ill suited to the modern era. Despite these problems, scrapping the regime and the Convention underpinning it is not the solution. Reform may be difficult, but if possible it should be undertaken so that the regime can become more relevant to today’s world. One of the major problems with the refugee regime is its definition of who is a refugee entitled to protection under the Convention. A “well-founded fear of persecution” is required.5 However, this is a problematic requirement, as the majority of the world’s refugees are not fleeing persecution.6 Instead, they flee from situations such as “civil wars, ethnic conflicts and generalised violence”.7 Emma Haddad states that the defining feature of the modern refugee is a “well-founded fear of violence”. 8 Persecution may form part of this, but it is not a necessary requirement.9 Haddad’s broader conception of refugees reflects popular understanding, as anyone fleeing violence “is commonly referred to as a refugee”.10 It is also a logical conception of a refugee as, like those fleeing persecution, those who flee violence do so to save their lives. 11 Regional agreements such as the OAU Convention and the Cartagena Declaration have broader definitions of refugees that encompass this idea.12 In contrast, the UN Convention’s definition remains limited to persecution. Through the UNHCR, it does give assistance to a broader range of people than purely Convention refugees.13 However, they don’t receive the same rights. An expansion of the refugee definition would be an important step in recognising the reality of the modern refugee situation and would treat all refugees equally. It would also be beneficial, as it would apply globally, rather than regionally. Another problem with the Convention is in its application. There has been a stark contrast in the treatment afforded asylum seekers from the Soviet bloc during the Cold War and asylum seekers from developing countries, both during the Cold War and particularly after it. One of the reasons that persecution became central to the definition of a refugee was because the Convention was written during the Cold War.14 The West granted refugee status to Soviet dissidents freely, using it as a political and ideological tool against the Soviet Union.15 Given this, the West rarely examined the claims of those who managed to escape the Soviet Union, as it was assumed that they were fleeing persecution.16 Soviet refugees generally arrived individually or in small numbers,17 and

5 UN Refugee Convention, Art 1A(2). 6 Gil Loescher, Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) 6. 7 Ibid., 6. 8 Haddad, The Refugee in International Society, 32. 9 Ibid., 33. 10 Loescher, Beyond Charity, 6. 11 Haddad, The Refugee in International Society, 151. 12 Barnett, “Global Governance”, 247-8. 13 Loescher and Milner, “UNHCR and the Global Governance of Refugees”, 193. 14 Haddad, The Refugee in International Society, 138. 15 Ibid. 16 Betts, Loescher and Milner, Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection, 34-5 17 Haddad, The Refugee in International Society, 140.


were predominantly white and male.18 They thus presented little threat to Western society. Indeed, they were idealised as “heroic” and “romanticised” individuals, 19 standing up to repressive regimes.20 In contrast to this feting of communist refugees, refugees from developing countries have been demonised and presented as a threat. While refugee situations have existed in the South since the 1960s, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s that they became a widespread issue for Western states. Until then, they lacked the mobility to reach the West.21 As access to means of travel has increased, so have the number of asylum seekers in the West.22 The West’s response has been to construct a “myth of difference”23 around asylum seekers from the South. This is the idea that European refugees and refugees from the South are fundamentally different in nature. The myth was part of the Convention from its formation, when it only applied to European refugees, despite the existence of refugees in the South.24 One aspect of it is that refugees from the South do not fit the traditional refugee model of educated and skilled political exiles fleeing individual persecution.25 As stated above, this model is flawed. It is also questionable how applicable this was even during the Cold War, given that there was rarely an examination of the circumstances of each individuals claim. 26 For example, Hungarian refugees in 1956 were granted “prima facie group eligibility as refugees”. 27 Not all of them would have been granted refugee status if individual determinations had been undertaken.28 This undermines the claims that refugees from the South are fundamentally different in nature and should be accorded different treatment. Central to the “myth of difference” is the perception that the people moving from the South are not genuine refugees – instead they are economic migrants disguised as refugees.29 However, the idea that a person is either an economic migrant or a refugee is disingenuous. Migration is complex and most asylum seekers “come from countries where economic failure and political instability and persecution and poverty are inextricably mixed”.30 Thus a person may flee because of a combination of factors, including poverty. The Convention’s narrow focus on persecution has helped facilitate the distinction between refugees who are “legitimate” and deserve asylum, and economic migrants who are “illegitimate” and do not.31 Again, however, this concern only arose once refugees began to move from the South. Given that many Soviet 18 B. S. Chimni, “The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South”, Journal of Refugee Studies 11:4 (1998) 351. 19 Haddad, The Refugee in International Society, 140. 20 Jerzy Sztucki, “Who is a Refugee? The Convention Definition: Universal or Obsolete?”, in Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving International Concepts and Regimes, eds. Frances Nicholson and Patrick Twomey (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 50. 21 Barnett, “Global Governance”, 249. 22 Betts, Loescher and Milner, Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection, 34-5. 23 Chimni, “The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies”, 355. 24 Ibid. 25 Barnett, “Global Governance”, 254. 26 Betts, Loescher and Milner, Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection, 34-5 27 Haddad, The Refugee in International Society, 141. 28 Chimni, “The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies”, 359-60. 29 Ibid., 356. 30 Millbank, “The Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention”, 15. 31 Ibid.


asylum seekers were granted refugee status without an individual determination, it is possible many had “mixed motives”32 for leaving. Laura Barnett points out that there is an element of racism in the differential treatment of these two groups of refugees.33 States were willing to interpret the Convention in a way that would enable Soviet asylum seekers to be granted refugee status, but have interpreted it differently when faced with refugees from the South. The effect of this is that the global refugee regime is failing to treat refugees equally and, through its inherent biases, actually facilitates this. The construction of the “myth of difference” has meant that the North has treated asylum seekers very differently to how it did in the past. In turn, this has had an effect upon refugee policies in the South. States’ obligations under the Convention only come into force when asylum seekers reach their territory. As such, the North has implemented policies to prevent that happening, aiming to “contain refugees in their region of origin”.34 Its restrictive entry policies include more stringent visa requirements for citizens of certain states, narrow interpretations of the Convention and deterrent policies such as the mandatory detention of asylum seekers.35 These policies have not only undermined the purpose of the Convention,36 but have also led to the relative containment of the refugee problem to the South.37 In 2011, the developing world hosted four-fifths of the world’s refugees.38 This is problematic as many are not party to the Refugee Convention.39 These countries are also significantly less able to deal with refugee flows than the North, yet host the majority of them. 40 Traditionally, they welcomed refugees and gave them assistance.41 However, the increasing numbers of refugees has challenged this.42 Their economies struggle to support their own citizens, making it politically and economically difficult to grant refugees the rights contained in the refugee regime.43 As such, like the North, they have restricted asylum through a variety of measures.44 These include prevention of entry, early or forced repatriation, and “denying [refugees] the social and economic rights contained in the 1951 Convention”.45 Thus, both states in the South and North have implemented highly restrictive policies to discourage people seeking asylum. The global refugee regime is powerless to stop this. The UNHCR, which is the supervisory body responsible for the Convention’s implementation, can only condemn states taking these courses of action.46

32 Chimni, “The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies”, 360. 33 Barnett, “Global Governance”, 254. 34 Loescher and Milner, “UNHCR and the Global Governance of Refugees”, 196. 35 Ibid., 56; Sztucki, “Who is a Refugee?”, 72. 36 Timothy J Hatton, Seeking Asylum: Trends and Policies in the OECD (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2011) 99. 37 Alexander Betts, “Convention Plus as a Norm-Setting Exercise”, Journal of Refugee Studies 20:3 (2007) 517. 38 UNHCR, “UNHCR Global Trends 2011: A Year of Crises”, UNHCR < http://www.unhcr.org/4fd6f87f9.html> 2 accessed 26 September 2012. 39 Millbank, “The Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention”, 19. 40 Davies, “Start Looking South”, 364. 41 Betts, Loescher and Milner, Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection, 37. 42 Ibid., 56. 43 Betts, Loescher and Milner, Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection, 150. 44 Loescher and Milner, “UNHCR and the Global Governance of Refugees”, 197. 45 Ibid. 46 Betts, Loescher and Milner, Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection, 94.


The Convention does not grant a right to asylum. 47 Instead, the principal obligation is that of non-refoulement.48 Practically, the obligation of non-refoulement leads to asylum because states have to assess the claims of those on their territory and anyone found to be a refugee cannot be sent home.49 In this way, the refugee regime enshrines the notion of exile into refugee law. 50 Non-refoulement is an important protection for those refugees who make it to safe countries. However, it is also problematic because states are only under an obligation to protect refugees when they reach their territory.51 There is no “general obligation to refugees”.52 As demonstrated above, states can avoid incurring responsibility by increasing entrance barriers and there is little the UNHCR can do to prevent this. However, the emphasis on exile would be problematic even if states did not seek to minimise their responsibilities. This is because it rewards those who are more mobile while leaving the immobile to languish in refugee camps and their countries of origin.53 This particularly disadvantages women, as it is more difficult for them to move than it is for men.54 These people have fled their homes for the same reasons as refugees, yet are treated differently because of their relative immobility.55 This can mean that the most needy are disadvantaged in their access to asylum in the West.56 The refugee regime is failing to protect them. The emphasis on exile reflects outdated Cold War thinking that some governments are “irredeemably oppressive”.57 To return refugees to such situations would be inhumane. In contrast, today more “durable solutions” are emphasised.58 Voluntary repatriation is the UNHCR’s first preference for a durable solution, as this is what the majority of refugees prefer.59 This recognises that the rights of refugees should be to safety and protection of human rights within their country of origin, rather than exile as the only or preferable solution.60 The UNHCR states that “[o]ver the past five years, some 455,000 refugees were resettled compared to 2.3 million refugees who repatriated”. 61 There is a double standard in the refugee regime. The UNHCR encourages states to accept asylum seekers, whilst emphasising repatriation as the preferable option for refugees in camps.62 This is costly for receiving states as they spend money trying to keep asylum seekers out and then huge amounts of money processing asylum claims when that fails.63 States also incur the costs associated with false asylum claims. In the 1990s, only 10-15 per cent of asylum seekers in Europe 47 Susan Martin, “Forced Migration, the Refugee Regime and the Responsibility to Protect”, Global Responsibility to Protect 2:1 (Feb 2010) 47. 48 Millbank, “The Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention”, 11. 49 Martin, “Forced Migration, the Refugee Regime and the Responsibility to Protect”, 47. 50 Millbank, “The Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention”, 43. 51 Ibid., ii. 52 Ibid., 11. 53 Ibid., 14. 54 Barnett, “Global Governance”, 356. 55 David Lanz, “Subversion or Reinvention? Dilemmas and Debates in the Context of UNHCR’s Increasing Involvement with IDPs”, Journal or Refugee Studies 21:2 (2004) 201. 56 Adrienne Millbank, “The Elephant on the Boat: The Problem that is the Refugee Convention”, People and Place 18:4 (2010) 44. 57 Millbank, “The Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention”, 11. 58 UNHCR, “Global Trends”, 17. 59 Ibid. 60 Millbank, “The Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention”, 11. 61 UNHCR, “Global Trends”, 17. 62 Millbank, “The Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention”, 11. 63 Millbank, “Elephant on the Boat”, 43.


were recognised as refugees.64 States spend more on processing applications than they contribute to the UNHCR budget, which provides assistance to refugees where they are.65 States have to deal with asylum claims first and this limits their ability to assist refugees who remain in the South. Thus the emphasis on resettlement in the Convention is inhibiting the provision of other solutions for refugees who are less mobile. Processing applications is also made more complicated by the fact that, as a result of the increased entry barriers in the North, refugees often enter states illegally. While refugees can’t be penalised for the way they entered a state,66 it does make it difficult to determine if a person is a refugee. Illegal migrants have abused asylum seeker processes,67 while asylum seekers often use the same migration channels and methods as illegal migrants, such as people smugglers and false documents.68 This “asylum-migration nexus” also makes the North more suspicious of refugees and leads to further restrictions.69 Thus, as well as making refugee status determination more difficult for states, the “asylum-migration nexus” is detrimental to refugees who are in genuine need of assistance. The refugee regime inadvertently encourages this situation by focusing on exile. There are many examples of how the refugee regime is not working adequately in the twenty-first century. However, this does not mean the Convention should be scrapped altogether. It remains the only source of universal legal protection for refugees70 and States continue to support it. This was demonstrated when parties to the Convention reaffirmed their commitment to it in a Declaration in 2001.71 The rights contained in it are important to refugees. The problem is its failure to provide protection to more who need it. Thus the Convention should be reformed so that it has a more universal application. However, any reform process would need to recognise two facts. Firstly, the nature of the state system means that refugees will always exist.72 Therefore, there is no such thing as a solution. Instead, a refugee regime should attempt to assist as many refugees as possible. Secondly, states need to accept any reform.73 Thus reform needs to consider the interests of states as well as refugees.74 There are concerns that any attempt at broadening the refugee regime would instead result in states reducing their obligations.75 This is a valid concern given that states already seek to minimise their obligations. However, if reform is possible, it

64 Millbank, “The Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention”, 10. 65 Ibid., ii. 66 UN Refugee Convention, Article 31. 67 Loescher and Milner, “UNHCR and the Global Governance of Refugees”, 197; Khalid Koser, “Refugees, Transnationalism and the State”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33:2 (March 2007) 234 68 Loescher and Milner, “UNHCR and the Global Governance of Refugees”, 197. 69 Koser, “Refugees, Transnationalism and the State”, 243. 70 Barnett, “Global Governance”, 246. 71 “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees”, UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html> 4 accessed 26 September 2012. 72 Betts, Loescher and Milner, Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection, 148. 73 Hatton, Seeking Asylum, 97. 74 Ibid. 75 Haddad, The Refugee in International Society, 25; Millbank, “The Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention”, 3.


should involve an expansion of the definition of a refugee. It should also recognise that refugees may move for a number of reasons. The fact that economic motives form part of this should not undermine their claim to refugee status. Burden sharing would also be fundamental to any reform, recognising that the South bears a disproportionate burden. This could take the form of increased resettlement or more funding to help refugees in the South. Alexander Betts argues that the lack of this makes the Convention “half-complete”.76 The dominant global refugee regime has many problems. Its Cold War origins have made its application to the twenty-first century refugee problem difficult. The definition of a refugee is too limited and fails to take account of the multitude of reasons that force people to flee their countries. The “myth of difference” that has arisen around refugees from the South restricts the universal application of the refugee regime’s protections. It has been used to justify restrictive asylum policies in the North, which in turn has led the South to follow suit. Its emphasis on flight is also restrictive as it rewards those who are mobile to the detriment of those who are not. Despite these problems, the Convention remains important as a source of protection for refugees. To ensure its continuing relevance, it is necessary to reform it so that those protections can reach more of the people who need it.

76 Betts, “Convention Plus”, 510.


BIBLIOGRAPHY Barnett, Laura, “Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime”, International Journal of Refugee Law 14 (2002) 238-262. Betts, Alexander. “Convention Plus as a Norm-Setting Exercise”. Journal of Refugee Studies 20:3 (2007) 509-535. Betts, Alexander, Loescher, Gil and Milner, James. UNHCR: The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection (New York: Routledge, 2012) Chimni, B. S. “The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South”. Journal of Refugee Studies 11:4 (1998) 350-374. “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees”, UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html> accessed 26 September 2012. Davies, Sara E. “Start Looking South: The Refugee Convention Fifty Years On’. International Journal of Human Rights 8:3 (Autumn 2004) 355-366. Haddad, Emma. The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Hatton, Timohy J. Seeking Asylum: Trends and Policies in the OECD (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2011) Koser, Khalid. “Refugees, transnationalism and the State”. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33:2 (March 2007) 233-254. Lanz, David. “Subversion or Reinvention? Dilemmas and Debates in the Context of UNHCR’s Increasing Involvement with IDPs”, Journal of Refugee Studies 21:2 (2004) 192-209. Loescher, Gil. Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the

Global Refugee Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) Loescher, Gil and Milner, James. “UNHCR and the Global Governance of Refugees”. In Global Migration Governance. Ed. Alexander Betts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 189-209. Martin, Susan. “Forced Migration, the Refugee Regime and the Responsibility to Protect”, Global Responsibility to Protect 2:1 (Feb 2010) 38-59. Millbank, Adrienne. “The Elephant on the Boat: The Problem that is the Refugee Convention”. People and Place 18:4 (2010) 41-49. Millbank, Adrienne. “The Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention” (Research Paper No 5, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 2000-01). Sztucki, Jerzy. “Who is a Refugee? The Convention Definition: Universal or Obsolete?”. In Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving International Concepts and Regimes. Eds. Nicholson, Frances and Twomey, Patrick (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 55-80. UNHCR, “UNHCR Global Trends 2011: A Year of Crises”, UNHCR < http://www.unhcr.org/4fd6f87f9.html> accessed 26 September 2012. United Nations, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees”, United Nations Treaty Collection http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?&src=UNTSONLINE&mtdsg_no=V~2&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&lang=en (26 September 2012) accessed 26 September 2012.


A CRITICAL ASSESMENT OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND TERRORISM DAVID JOHNSON

This essay critically assesses the proposition that, when armed with biological weapons, terrorists pose a greater threat than states. It argues that the proposition is flawed for two reasons. First, by presuming an aggressor is already armed with biological weapons it ignores the technical, practical, and organisational challenges inherent in acquiring them. Second, it ignores historical evidence that demonstrates states armed with biological weapons actually pose a greater threat than terrorists. To address both deficiencies in the statement, the essay explores the challenges of biological weapons procurement, concluding that states are typically better-placed than terrorists to successfully acquire and weaponise biological agents. It then discusses historical cases of terrorist and state use of biological weapons, concluding that while neither states nor terrorists have to date posed a particularly serious biological weapons threat, states have used them to demonstrably greater effect than have terrorists. Accordingly, in terms of both capability to acquire, and use of biological weapons, the evidence belies the statement.

It has been said that when armed with biological weapons, terrorists pose a greater threat than states. This position is flawed for two reasons. By starting at the point at which an aggressor is already armed with biological weapons it ignores the technical, practical and organisational challenges involved in acquiring them. By claiming that terrorists pose a greater threat than states it ignores historical evidence to the contrary. This essay will seek to address both deficiencies. It will examine the technical, practical and organisational challenges involved in becoming armed with biological weapons, demonstrating that between them these factors act as a significant brake on procurement efforts. It will then explore the historical development and employment of biological weapons by states and terrorists. This will demonstrate that neither states nor terrorists pose a particularly serious biological weapons threat, but that states have demonstrably greater capability than terrorists to procure biological weapons, and states have used them to substantially greater effect than terrorists. BECOMING ARMED WITH BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS The statement “when armed with biological weapons” inaccurately implies that the process of becoming armed is straightforward. A biological weapon consists of a biological agent (a pathogen or organic toxin) coupled with the means of delivering the agent to a target.1 Obtaining a viable biological weapon is fraught with technical,

1 For specific definitions of biological agents and weapons see: Wendy Barnaby, ‘Biological weapons: An increasing threat’, Medicine, Conflict and Survival, vol. 13, no. 4, 1997, p. 301; Piers Millett, ‘Proliferation of biological weapons: challenges and responses’, Medicine, Conflict and Survival, vol. 20, no. 1, 2004, p. 5; Christian Enemark, ‘Farewell to WMD: The Language and Science of Mass Destruction’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 32, no. 2, 2011, p. 385; Anon., ‘Biological Weapons: The Potential for Terrorist Use’, Strategic Comments, vol. 5, no. 5, 1999, p. 2; and James J. Wirtz, ‘Introduction’, in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (eds.), Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2000, p. 4-5


practical, and organisational challenges. These challenges are more easily overcome by states than by terrorists because states generally have greater access to resources, technical skills, and a secure research and manufacturing environment. Technical challenges An actor seeking to become armed with a biological weapon must either produce the weapon themselves, or acquire an already manufactured weapon. Producing a biological weapon requires the acquisition of a suitable biological agent, processing it into a medium suitable for dissemination, and developing an effective means of delivery (‘weaponisation’).2 Since most agents suitable for weaponisation exist in nature3 they may be collected by those with technical proficiency, although care needs to be taken to isolate a virulent strain.4 Alternatively, an agent could be purchased or stolen from legitimate biological research facilities. A handful of known cases have occurred in Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the US,5 although no evidence exists these agents have subsequently been weaponised. Bio-engineering and gene science also provide the potential to manufacture new agents or greatly enhance existing ones, but require advanced technical skill and equipment and remain at the cutting edge of technology.6 The acquired agent must then be processed into a quantity sufficient for weaponisation; it may simultaneously be enhanced to improve its toxicity, survivability, and ability to be disseminated. The equipment required for processing is readily available and inexpensive.7 However the complexity of processing varies according to the agent. Some agents, such as the toxin ricin, require relatively straightforward processing techniques.8 Others, such as Clostridium botulinum (the causative agent of botulism) are unstable and require great care and skill.9 Despite recent advances in biotechnology the skills required to produce advanced agents remain specialised.10

2 Sammy Salama and Lydia Hansell, ‘Does Intent equal Capability? Al-Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 12, no. 3, 2005, p. 636; Reynolds M. Salerno, Jennifer Gaudioso, Rebecca L. Frerichs and Daniel Estes, ‘A BW risk assessment: Historical and technical perspectives’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 11, no. 3, 2004, p. 40; René Pita and Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Anthrax as a Biological Weapon: From World War I to the Amerithrax Investigation’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, vol. 23, no. 1, 2009, p. 73 3 David P. Fidler and Lawrence O. Gostin, Biosecurity in the Global Age: Biological Weapons, Public Health, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University Press, Stanford CA, 2008, p. 35; Robert H. Kupperman and David M. Smith, ‘Coping with Biological Terrorism’, in Brad Roberts (ed.), Biological Weapons: Weapons of the Future?, The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 1993, p. 39-40 4 Salerno, Gaudioso, Frerichs and Estes, op. cit., p. 41; William Rosenau, ‘Aum Shinrikyo's Biological Weapons Program: Why Did it Fail?’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 24, no. 4, 2001, p. 294 5 Jonathan B. Tucker & Kathleen M. Vogel, ‘Preventing the proliferation of chemical and biological weapon materials and know‐how’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 7, no. 1, 2000, p. 91; W. Seth Carus, ‘R.I.S.E (1972)’, in Jonathan B. Tucker (ed.), Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 2000, p. 55-70 6 Mark Wheelis, ‘Biotechnology and biochemical weapons’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 9, no. 1, 2002, p. 49-51; Edward M. Spiers, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Prospects for Proliferation, Macmillan, London, 2000, p. 66-67; Christopher F. Chyba and Alex L. Greninger, ‘Biotechnology and Bioterrorism: An Unprecedented World,’ Survival, vol. 46, no. 2, 2004, p. 143; Barnaby, op. cit., p. 305-306; James B. Petro, Theodore R. Plasse, and Jack McNulty, ‘Biotechnology: Impact on Biological Warfare and Biodefense’, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, vol. 1, no. 3, 2003, p. 162; Michael J. Ainscough, ‘Next generation bioweapons: genetic engineering and biological warfare’, in Jim A. Davis and Barry R. Schneider (eds.), The Gathering Biological Warfare Storm, Praeger, Westport Connecticut, 2004, p. 177-181 7 Wirtz, op. cit., p. 5; W. Seth Carus, ‘The proliferation of biological weapons’, in Brad Roberts (ed.), Biological Weapons: Weapons of the Future?, The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 1993, p. 22-23 8 Kupperman and Smith, op. cit., p. 40 9 Mark Wheelis and Masaaki Sugishima, ‘Terrorist use of biological weapons’, in Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rozsa and Malcolm Dando (eds.), Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 2006, p. 296; Salama and Hansell, op. cit., p. 619-620; Rosenau, op. cit., p. 294 10 Salerno, Gaudioso, Frerichs and Estes, op. cit., p. 47-48; Chyba and Greninger, op. cit., p. 143


The final stage of biological weapons development is weaponisation. There are three means of agent delivery: aerosolisation leading to inhalation; ingestion into the body; and contact.11 Inhalation attacks are most likely to produce mass-casualty effects but are challenging to conduct. Aerosolisation requires spores of a particular size (1-10 microns, although opinions differ on the best size); the process of aerosolisation damages most agents; and adverse environmental conditions such as wind, sunlight or rain can drastically degrade the effectiveness of the agent.12 Those who claim aerosolisation can be achieved with readily available tools13 and produce casualties on par with nuclear weapons ignore these challenges.14 Ingestion attacks are well-suited to targeted or small-scale attacks, but require access to the victim’s food or drink. 15 Contact attacks involve the agent being absorbed into the skin, or in the case of anti-crop attacks, coating the targeted plant. Most agents are ill-suited to contact attacks.16 PRACTICAL CHALLENGES TO ALTERNATIVE SOURCING METHODS Theft or illicit purchase of an existing biological weapon provides an alternative, but equally challenging, method of procurement. Since the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1972, offensive biological weapons are prohibited under international law. Any state maintaining offensive stocks has a strong incentive to keep them secret and secured. Breaching this security would be difficult: despite recurring concerns over the security of Russian facilities,17 no examples have been identified in open source material of theft of a biological weapon. Conceivably, a state could provide a biological weapon to another state or non-state actor, but there is “no evidence whatsoever” 18 this has ever occurred. Given international abhorrence of biological weapons and the risk of overwhelming retaliation,19 any state considering providing a biological weapon to terrorists would need compelling reasons for doing so. As such, it is considered unlikely that manufactured biological weapons, including from military arsenals, would proliferate deliberately to state or non-state actors. Organisational challenges Actors seeking to acquire biological weapons face additional challenges from their own organisational identities, norms and behaviours. While in theory a ‘rational’ organisation would pursue and utilise biological weapons only where these efforts were directly relevant to their strategic objectives,20 in reality organisations are not purely rational. Instead they are subject to personal preferences, differing risk appetites, prejudices, and internal politics.21 Therefore, their efforts to produce biological weapons

11 Salerno, Gaudioso, Frerichs and Estes, op. cit., p. 43-44 12 Anon., op. cit., p. 2; Rosenau, op. cit., p. 295; Salerno, Gaudioso, Frerichs and Estes, op., cit., p. 43; Enemark, op. cit., p. 385; Jessica Stern, ‘Getting and using the weapons’, in Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (eds.), Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, McGraw Hill/Dushkin, Guildford Connecticut, 2004, p. 185 13 Kupperman and Smith, op. cit., p. 40 14 Enemark, op. cit., p. 387-388 15 Salerno, Gaudioso, Frerichs and Estes, op. cit., p. 43 16 Ibid., p. 44 17 Anthony Rimmington, ‘Fragmentation and Proliferation? The Fate of the Soviet Union's Offensive Biological Weapons Programme’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 20, no. 1, April 1999, p. 99; Tucker and Vogel, op. cit., p. 89 18 Milton Leitenberg, ‘The self-fulfilling prophecy of bioterrorism’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 16, no. 1, 2009, p. 99 19 Enemark, op. cit., p. 390 20 Stephen P. Robbins and Timothy A Judge, Organization Behavior, 12th ed., Pearson Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, 2007, p. 156-158; Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization, Free Press, New York, 1957; Ariel Rubenstein, Modeling Bounded Rationality, MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1997, chapter 3. 21 Jessica Stern, ‘Terrorist motivations and unconventional weapons’, in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (eds.), Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2000, p. 211-222; Lennart Sjoberg, ‘Emotions and Risk Perception’, Risk Management, 9,


become compromises between strategic aims, technical limitations, internal conditions, and resource constraints.22 The practical result is that organisations with the technical capability and strategic interests to produce biological weapons may in fact fail to achieve their goals because of intangible influences that may not be apparent to external observers.23 IMPACT OF TECHNICAL, PRACTICAL AND ORGANISATIONAL CHALLENGES The above challenges impact upon both state and non-state actors, but tend to affect non-state actors more significantly. Most states possess legitimate biological research programs. States can legitimately undertake defensive biological research under the terms of the BWC, so illicit programs can be concealed beneath legitimate programs with little risk of compromise. 24 States may utilise existing industrial and military resources to develop and test biological weapons, and may exploit their territorial security to conduct these activities securely. In contrast, unless they are state-sponsored, terrorists have no natural access to state resources. They must therefore build their own capabilities, infiltrate those of others, or steal what they need. All carry risks of compromise and less effective programs. Only in the area of organisational challenges are states and terrorists on relatively even ground: both can be hamstrung by personal and organisational agendas. In sum, the statement “when armed with biological weapons” fails to appreciate numerous technical, practical, and organisational challenges that complicate the process of becoming armed. By doing so, the statement implies that possession of biological weapons is a simple matter, within the reach of terrorists and states alike. The reality is quite different – the process is difficult at best, and is likely to be more difficult for terrorists than for states. THE THREAT OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS FROM STATES AND TERRORISTS The second part of the statement – “terrorists pose a greater threat than states” – contradicts available evidence. Historically, numerous states have maintained elaborate biological weapons programs and a few have employed their weapons in conflict and for assassinations, resulting in many thousands of deaths. Conversely, while numerous terrorists (defined in this paper as those who seek to use violence to achieve a political or religious outcome)25 have pursued biological weapons, almost all have failed. There is only one confirmed and one possible case of successful terrorist use of biological weapons. Between them they resulted in five deaths, perhaps a thousand brief illnesses, and significant short-term disruption. The evidence clearly shows that states pose by far the greater threat. STATE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMS

2007, p. 232; James G. March, A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen, The Free Press, New York, 1994, p. 35-56 22 Jean Pascal Zanders, ‘Assessing the risk of chemical and biological weapons proliferation to Terrorists’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 6, no. 4, 1999, p. 23-25 23 Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, ‘Barriers to Bioweapons: Intangible Obstacles to Proliferation’, International Security, vol. 36, no. 4, 2012, p. 80 24 Carus, ‘The proliferation of biological weapons’, p. 23; Millett, op. cit., p. 10-11; Avner Cohe, ‘Israel and chemical/biological weapons: History, deterrence, and arms control’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 8, no. 3, 2001, p. 45-46 25 The definition of terrorism is deeply contested. See for example Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter-Measures, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, p. 16; Richard English, Terrorism: How to Respond, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, p. 24; Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, Macmillan, London, 1977, p. 49; Igor Primoratz, ‘What is terrorism?’, in C. Gearty (ed.), Terrorism, Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1996, p. 23; and Jeff Goodwin, ‘A theory of categorical terrorism’, Social Forces, vol. 84, no. 4, June 2006, p. 2028.


States have used biological agents as crude biological weapons for centuries, but organised biological weapons programs began in earnest during the years before World War II. Germany maintained a modest program during World War I;26 Japan invested large resources in research efforts between the wars;27 and all major powers except Germany maintained substantial programs to the end of World War II.28 During the early Cold War a handful of states maintained large biological weapons programs. The Soviet Union’s program was by far the largest, employing 65,000 people to research and successfully weaponise a wide range of lethal and incapacitating agents,29 allegedly including genetically modified agents.30 The program was specifically intended to offset the technical advantage of NATO.31 Western powers, primarily the US, Britain, and France maintained more modest programs.32 These included anti-personnel and anti-crop weapons33 and tests of aerosols to establish the efficacy of delivery systems.34 These programs concluded in the late 1960s; by then biological weapons were being seen as unreliable, inhumane, and unnecessary given the ample deterrent effect of the western nuclear arsenals. 35 Besides the major powers, Israel is alleged to have maintained a program from 1947 until the late 1960s as part of a broad-based deterrent against hostile Arab neighbours.36 Its program ceased when it concluded that biological weapons were of limited military value, morally repugnant, and lacked deterrence value.37 Although the 1972 BWC prohibited offensive biological weapons programs, several signatory states maintained or commenced covert programs after this date. There is strong evidence that the Soviet biological weapons program continued until 1993,38 and may continue in present day Russia.39 Iraq’s program, maintained between 1985 and early 1991, showed that a determined state can relatively quickly manufacture large quantities of biological agents40 and rudimentarily weaponise them on bombs, missiles and aerial aerosol dispersal units.41 The program was intended both to project Saddam Hussein’s influence42 and provide a retaliatory capacity against Israel.43 South Africa’s program, commenced in the early 1970s, was intended to

26 Salerno, Gaudioso, Frerichs and Estes, op. cit., p. 27 27 Daniel Barenblatt, A Plague upon Humanity: the Secret Genocide of Axis Japan's Germ Warfare Operation, New York: Harper Collins, 2004, p. 64-84 28 Salerno, Gaudioso, Frerichs and Estes, op. cit., p. 27-31; Simon M. Whitby, Biological Warfare Against Crops, Palgrave, New York, 2002, p. 118-127 29 Tucker and Vogel, op. cit., p. 88-89; Sergei Popov and Marina Voronova, ‘Russian bioweapons: Still the best‐kept secret?’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 11, no. 3, 2004, p. 189-191; Rimmington, op. cit., p. 88-89 30 Ainscough, op. cit., p. 171 31 Popov and Voronova, op. cit., p. 192-193 32 Brian Balmer, Britain and Biological Warfare: Expert Advice and Science Policy, 1930-65, Palgrave, London, 2002, p. 128-154; John Ellis van Courtland Moon, ‘The US Biological Weapons Program’, in Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rozsa and Malcolm Dando (eds.),Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 2006, p. 10-33; Olivier Lepick, ‘ The French biological weapons program’, in Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rozsa and Malcolm Dando (eds.),Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 2006, p. 108-131 33 Whitby, op. cit., p. 114-116 34 Neil Metcalfe, ‘A short history of biological warfare’, Medicine, Conflict and Survival, vol. 18, no. 3, 2002, p. 276-277 35 Jonathan B. Tucker, ‘A farewell to germs: the US renunciation of biological and toxin warfare, 1969-1970’, International Security, vol. 20, no. 1, Summer 2002, p. 127-128; Pita and Gunaratna, op. cit., p. 69-70 36 Cohe, op. cit., p. 28-29 37 Ibid., p. 42 38 Zanders, op. cit., p. 22; Salerno, Gaudioso, Frerichs and Estes, op. cit., p. 32 39 Rimmington, op. cit., p. 90-91 40 Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, ‘Saddam’s Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars’, in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (eds.), Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2000, p. 52-54; Salerno, Gaudioso, Frerichs and Estes, op. cit., p. 33; Elisa D. Harris, ‘Threat reduction and North Korea's CBW programs’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 11, no. 3, 2004, p. 92; Metcalfe, op. cit., p. 279; Barnaby, op. cit., p. 304 41 McCarthy and Tucker, op. cit., p. 54 42 Ibid., p. 49 43 Cohe, op. cit., p. 44


counter the threat from its Soviet-backed neighbours and due to fears within the apartheid government of a black uprising. 44 The program was initially intended to rival the Soviet program,45 but technical difficulties, fears of massive Soviet retaliation, and corruption within the program resulted in a more modest effort. 46 The program produced offensive military weapons, assassination agents, and possibly an agent designed to degrade the fertility of the black population.47 In the early 2000s it was believed that up to twelve additional states maintained biological weapons programs,48 but more recent evidence suggests this was an overestimation, and that perhaps only five nations including those cited above have contravened the terms of the BWC.49 Few details are known publicly of the programs or their motivations. STATE USE OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS The only confirmed state use of biological weapons in conflict was Japan’s campaign against China and the Soviet Union from the late 1930s through to 1945, killing as many as 580,000 soldiers, villagers and prisoners.50 There are several unconfirmed but likely cases of state use. The 1975 Church Committee revealed repeated failed CIA efforts during the 1960s to employ biological ingestion agents against Fidel Castro, as well an attempt against the Soviet-leaning President of the Congo.51 It is almost certain that the 1978 London death of Bulgarian exile Georgi Markov was caused by a covertly injected Soviet-manufactured ricin pellet. 52 South African Special Forces probably poisoned wells with cholera and spread anthrax in enemy areas during the Rhodesian civil war,53 and Apartheid regime officials admitted that injected biological agents were used to kill hundreds of regime opponents in the 1980s.54 In the 1970s Dhofari insurgency the British are reported to have poisoned wells.55 Finally, in the 1970s and 1980s Iraq made extensive use of chemical, radiological and probably biological agents to assassinate regime opponents, usually through ingestion or injection.56 There are many other unproven allegations of state use of biological weapons, including: German use of glanders against livestock during World War I;57 Japanese use against Soviet troops during World War II;58 Israeli poisoning of Arab wells and villages

44 Helen E. Purkitt and Stephen Burgess, ‘South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme: A Historical and International Perspective’, Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 28, no. 2, 2002, p. 231-232; Chandré Gould and Peter I. Folb, ‘The South African chemical and biological warfare program: An overview’, The Non-proliferation Review, vol. 7, no. 3, 2000, p. 10-23 45 Salerno, Gaudioso, Frerichs and Estes, op. cit., p. 34 46 Purkitt and Burgess, op. cit., p. 231-232, and p. 238 47 Gould and Folb, op. cit., p. 17-18 48 Millett, op. cit., p. 8 49 Leitenberg, ‘The self-fulfilling prophecy of bioterrorism’, p. 98 50 Daniel Barenblatt, A Plague upon Humanity: the Secret Genocide of Axis Japan's Germ Warfare Operation, New York: Harper Collins, 2004, p. 114-175; Peter Williams and David Wallace, Unit 731: The Japanese Army’s Secret of Secrets, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1989, p. 63-80 51 Shlomo Shpiro, ‘Poisoned Chalice: Intelligence Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, vol. 22, no. 1, 2008, p. 11-14 52 Metcalfe, op. cit., p. 278; Zanders, op. cit., p. 19; Shpiro, op. cit., p. 5-6 53 Purkitt and Burgess, op. cit., p. 234; Barbara A. Rasco and Gleyn E. Bledsoe, Bioterrorism and Food Safety, CRC Press, Roca Baton FL, 2005, p. 28 54 Purkitt and Burgess, op. cit., p. 242-244; Gould and Folb, op. cit., p. 18; Zanders, op. cit., p. 19 55 John Newsinger, British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland, Palgrave, Houndsmills, 2002, p. 145 56 Shpiro, op. cit., p. 23-24 57 Zanders, op. cit., p. 19; Salerno, Gaudioso, Frerichs and Estes, op. cit., p. 27; John Pichtel, Terrorism and WMDs: Awareness and Response, CRC Press, Boca Raton FL, 2011, p. 125-126 58 Jeanne Guillemin, ‘Imperial Japan’s germ warfare: the suppression of evidence at the Tokyo war crimes trial, 1946-1948’, in Anne L. Clunan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Susan B. Martin (eds.), Terrorism, War, or Disease?: Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons, Stanford Security Studies, Stanford CA, 2008, p. 165-169; Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Story of Gas and Germ Warfare, Chatto and Windus, London, 1982, p. 75-81; Brian Balmer, ‘Biological warfare: The threat in historical perspective’, Medicine, Conflict and Survival, vol. 18, no. 2, 2002, p. 123


during the 1947-48 war of independence;59 US use of typhus and cholera in the Korean War;60 Brazilian government release of tuberculosis among remote tribes between 1957 and 1963 to resolve a land dispute;61 Soviet use of ‘yellow rain’ in Cambodia and Laos between 1975 and 1981,62 and of glanders against mujahedeen pack animals in Afghanistan in 1979 to 1981;63 and a decades-long US campaign against Cuba.64 These allegations remain unproven for two main reasons: it is extremely difficult to distinguish between natural outbreaks of disease and deliberate release, especially when a disease is endemic to a particular region;65 and many of these allegations lack credibility because they were entangled in Cold War politics, couched in political terms, or apparently used to seek leverage against an adversary.66 Terrorist biological weapons programs and use The first and only confirmed successful terrorist use of biological weapons occurred in Wasco County, Oregon, US, in 1984. The Rajneeshee cult sought to gain political control of the County at local elections, but did not have the numbers. To reduce voter turnout from the general population they manufactured liquid Salmonella enterica (a causative agent of food poisoning) in their own rudimentary laboratory, and used the agent to infect salad bars at ten restaurants. The technically unsophisticated attacks caused 700 people to fall ill.67 The attack was considered a natural disease event until a disgruntled cult member confessed to police.68 It transpired that while the attack appeared to be a rational (if radical) means to a political end, it was in fact orchestrated by a cult member who held an abiding fascination with poisoning people – indicating non-rational influences behind the attack. 69 The Rajneeshee attacks demonstrate that an unsophisticated approach can produce modest effects with limited resources. The second possible case of terrorist use of biological weapons occurred in November/December 2001, when letters laced with Bacillus anthracis were mailed to US politicians and media. The highly virulent strain caused five deaths, numerous illnesses, required tens of thousands of inoculations, closed down some public buildings for extended periods, and caused up to six billion dollars damage.70 Initial suspicion focused on Iraq, more out of post-September 11 fear and hyperbole than due

59 Cohe, op. cit., p. 31-32 60 Milton Leitenberg, ‘False allegations of US biological weapons use during the Korean war’, in Anne L. Clunan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Susan B. Martin (eds.), Terrorism, War, or Disease?: Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons, Stanford Security Studies, Stanford CA, 2008, p. 127-132 61 Wheelis and Sugishima, op. cit., p. 285-286 62 Metcalfe, op. cit., p. 278; Matthew S. Meselson and Julian Perry Robinson, ‘The yellow rain affair: lessons from a discredited allegation’, in Anne L. Clunan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Susan B. Martin (eds.), Terrorism, War, or Disease?: Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons, Stanford Security Studies, Stanford CA, 2008, p. 92 63 Pita and Gunaratna, op. cit., p. 71 64 Raymond A. Zilinskas, ‘Cuban allegations of US biological warfare’, in Anne L. Clunan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Susan B. Martin (eds.), Terrorism, War, or Disease?: Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons, Stanford Security Studies, Stanford CA, 2008, p. 145-151 65 Gregory D. Koblentz and Jonathan B. Tucker, ‘Tracing an attack: the promises and pitfalls of microbial forensics’, Survival, vol. 52, no. 1, 2010, p. 161; Cohe, op. cit., p. 40; Anne L. Clunan, ‘Introduction: Identifying Biological Agents, Characterizing events, and attributing blame’, in Anne L. Clunan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Susan B. Martin (eds.), Terrorism, War, or Disease?: Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons, Stanford Security Studies, Stanford CA, 2008, p. 4-11 66 Martin Furmanski and Mark Wheelis, ‘Allegations of Biological Weapons use’, in Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rozsa and Malcolm Dando (eds.),Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 2006, p. 252-283 67 W. Seth Carus, ‘The Rajneeshees (1984)’, in Jonathan B. Tucker (ed.), Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 2000, p. 122-136; Zanders, op. cit., p. 18; Rasco and Bledsoe, op. cit., p. 27 68 Salerno, Gaudioso, Frerichs and Estes, op. cit., p. 36 69 Carus, ‘The Rajneeshees’, p. 137 70 Koblentz and Tucker, op. cit., p. 159


to any evidence.71 However, painstaking investigation identified the likely perpetrator as a scientist in a US disease laboratory.72 The suspect committed suicide after being publicly named. His motivations remain unclear and it therefore cannot be confirmed whether the perpetrator was seeking a political outcome. Regardless, the case demonstrates that a fortunate terrorist could exploit unique access and technical skills to acquire high quality biological agents, and could employ them in a technically simple manner to produce significant (but by no means mass-casualty) effects. All other known terrorist attempts to acquire and use biological weapons have failed because of the technical, practical or organisational challenges discussed previously.73 The most spectacular failure was by the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which conducted a five year program costing millions of dollars, utilising specialist equipment and moderate technical skills to manufacture two lethal agents (Bacillus anthracis and Botulinum clostridium) intended for aerosol dispersal. They “totally and utterly failed”74 in their efforts because they isolated harmless strains from nature, their aerosol units were poorly made and ill-equipped to disperse the agents,75 and their autocratic organisational structure hampered innovation.76 Their case demonstrates that even with the requisite capabilities and intent, production of sophisticated biological weapons can fail for mundane technical or organisational reasons. Although terrorist success with biological weapons to date has been minimal, a persistent dialogue asserts that it is only a matter of time before Al-Qa’ida or one of its Islamist offshoots utilises a biological weapon indiscriminately. The argument holds that Al-Qa’ida poses a new kind of terrorism unrestrained by the norms that have previously deterred terrorists from using weapons that are abhorrent, that alienate supporters, or that risk massive retaliation.77 Al-Qa’ida has stated publicly that it endorses the use of biological weapons against the US and Israel,78 and provides crude instructions and encouragement to this end in its online publications. 79 However Al-Qa’ida has demonstrated minimal capability to realise these aims. Evidence from Iraq and Afghanistan suggests Al-Qa’ida has managed to operate basic laboratories that have manufactured ricin, but there is no evidence of success with more complex pathogens, and no indications that Al-Qa’ida is close to weaponising agents.80 Since 2003 there has been scant evidence that Al-Qa’ida has progressed its biological weapons program, and “no amount of anti-Western animosity, religious fervour, wishful thinking, enthusiasm, or threatening rhetoric” 81 will provide the capability that Al-Qa’ida lacks.82 Relative threat from states and terrorists. 71 Pita and Gunaratna, op. cit., p. 76 72 Koblentz and Tucker, op. cit., p. 162-165; Pita and Gunaratna, op. cit., p. 82-85 73 Carus, ‘R.I.S.E’, p. 55-70; Jonathan B. Tucker and Jason Pate, ‘The Minnesota Patriots Council (1991)’, in Jonathan B. Tucker (ed.), Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 2000, p. 159-183 74 Milton Leitenberg, ‘Aum Shinrikyo's efforts to produce biological weapons: A case study in the serial propagation of misinformation’, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 11, no. 4, 1999, p. 156 75 Rosenau, op. cit., p. 293; Salerno, Gaudioso, Frerichs and Estes, op. cit. p. 36-37; Salama and Hansell, op. cit., p. 639-640 76 Rosenau, op. cit., p. 296 77 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Orion Publishing, New York, 1998, p. 205; Russell D. Howard, ‘Understanding Al Qaeda’s application of the New Terrorism – the key to victory in the current campaign’, in Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (eds.), Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, McGraw Hill/Duskhin, Guildford Connecticut, 2002, p. 81-82; Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, ‘America and the new terrorism’, Survival, vol. 42, no. 1, Spring 2000, p. 69 78 Pita and Gunaratna, op. cit., p. 77 79 Salama and Hansell, op. cit., p. 633 and p. 638; Anne Stenersen, ‘The Internet: a virtual training camp?’, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 20, no. 2, 2008, p. 227 80 Salama and Hansell, op. cit., p. 622-624 81 Ibid., p. 639 82 Wheelis and Sugishima, op. cit., p. 302


Very few states, and even fewer terrorists, have attempted to acquire biological weapons. Of those who have, most states have been able to produce viable programs but this has required very substantial resources, technical skills, and years of dedicated effort. In contrast, there has been only one confirmed case of a terrorist group producing a viable yet unsophisticated biological weapon, while another more sophisticated effort cannot be confirmed to have terrorist motivations. Several others have committed the resources, time, and skill but failed to produce viable weapons. To date no terrorist group has come close to the sophistication of state biological weapons programs, and the technical, practical and organisational hurdles faced by terrorists will continue to act as a brake on any such developments. Of those states who have acquired biological weapons only one is confirmed to have used them in war, albeit to enormous effect. Others are alleged to have done so although no cases can be verified. States appear to have been more prolific in using biological agents for targeted assassinations and internally-directed political violence. These have tended to be small-scale events but between them have potentially caused hundreds, or perhaps thousands of deaths. On the contrary, terrorists have caused seven hundred cases of food poisoning, potentially killed five people, and created significant disruption. The evidence strongly indicates that although states themselves have posed only a low threat (at least since 1945), the threat from terrorists is substantially lower again. Statements such as “terrorists pose a greater threat than states” are not evidence-based assessments of threat; they are worst-case scenarios based upon an absence of evidence.83 The statement is therefore unsustainable. CONCLUSION The statement in contention in this essay has been demonstrated to be flawed on two counts. First, by starting at the point at which an actor is armed with biological weapons it ignores the technical, practical and organisational challenges involved in the acquisition of biological weapons. These challenges have been shown to generally affect non-state actors (including terrorists) more than states. Second, the assertion that terrorists armed with biological weapons pose a greater threat than similarly armed states has been shown to be false. Neither states nor terrorists have posed a particularly high threat since 1945, but states have demonstrably higher capability to weaponise biological agents, and have used their weapons to cause significant numbers of deaths. In contrast, most terrorist efforts to acquire biological weapons have failed. The one or two successful terrorist attacks using biological weapons have been unsophisticated and have caused at most five deaths and seven hundred brief illnesses. The evidence therefore belies the statement.

83 Zanders, op. cit., p. 21; Wheelis and Sugishima, op. cit., p. 302

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ainscough, Michael J., ‘Next generation bioweapons: genetic engineering and biological warfare’, in Jim A. Davis and Barry R. Schneider (eds.), The Gathering Biological Warfare Storm, Praeger, Westport Connecticut, 2004, p. 165-186 Anon., ‘Biological Weapons: The Potential for Terrorist Use’, Strategic Comments, vol. 5, no. 5, 1999, p. 1-2 Balmer, Brian, Britain and Biological Warfare: Expert Advice and Science Policy, 1930-65, Palgrave, London, 2002 Balmer, Brian, ‘Biological warfare: The threat in historical perspective’, Medicine, Conflict and Survival, vol. 18, no. 2, 2002, p. 120-137 Barenblatt, Daniel, A Plague upon Humanity: the Secret Genocide of Axis Japan's Germ Warfare Operation, New York: Harper Collins, 2004 Barnaby, Wendy, ‘Biological weapons: An increasing threat’, Medicine, Conflict and Survival, vol. 13, no. 4, 1997, p. 301-313 Carus, W. Seth, ‘The proliferation of biological weapons’, in Brad Roberts (ed.), Biological Weapons: Weapons of the Future?, The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 1993, p. 19-27 Carus, W. Seth, ‘R.I.S.E (1972)’, in Jonathan B. Tucker (ed.), Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 2000, p. 55-70 Carus, W. Sethm ‘The Rajneeshees (1984)’, in Jonathan B. Tucker (ed.), Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, MIT

Press, Cambridge MA, 2000, p. 115-138 Chyba, Christopher F. and Alex L. Greninger, ‘Biotechnology and Bioterrorism: An Unprecedented World,’ Survival, vol. 46, no. 2, 2004, p. 143-162 Clunan, Anne L., ‘Introduction: Identifying Biological Agents, Characterizing events, and attributing blame’, in Anne L. Clunan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Susan B. Martin (eds.), Terrorism, War, or Disease?: Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons, Stanford Security Studies, Stanford CA, 2008, p. 1-22 Cohe, Avner, ‘Israel and chemical/biological weapons: History, deterrence, and arms control’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 8, no. 3, 2001, p. 27-53 van Courtland Moon, John Ellis, ‘The US Biological Weapons Program’, in Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rozsa and Malcolm Dando (eds.),Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 2006, p. 9-46 Enemark, Christian, ‘Farewell to WMD: The Language and Science of Mass Destruction’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 32, no. 2, 2011, p. 382-400 English, Richard, Terrorism: How to Respond, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009 Fidler, David P. and Lawrence O. Gostin, Biosecurity in the Global Age: Biological Weapons, Public Health, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University Press, Stanford CA, 2008 Furmanski, Martin and Mark Wheelis, ‘Allegations of Biological Weapons use’, in Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rozsa and


Malcolm Dando (eds.),Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 2006, p. 252-283 Goodwin, Jeff, ‘A theory of categorical terrorism’, Social Forces, vol. 84, no. 4, June 2006, p. 2027-2046. Gould, Chandré and Peter I. Folb, ‘The South African chemical and biological warfare program: An overview’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 7, no. 3, 2000, p. 11 Guillemin, Jeanne, ‘Imperial Japan’s germ warfare: the suppression of evidence at the Tokyo war crimes trial, 1946-1948’, in Anne L. Clunan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Susan B. Martin (eds.), Terrorism, War, or Disease?: Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons, Stanford Security Studies, Stanford CA, 2008, p. 165-185 Harris, Elisa D., ‘Threat reduction and North Korea's CBW programs’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 11, no. 3, 2004, p. 86-109 Harris, Robert and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Story of Gas and Germ Warfare, Chatto and Windus, London, 1982 Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism, Orion Publishing, New York, 1998 Howard, Russell D., ‘Understanding Al Qaeda’s application of the New Terrorism – the key to victory in the current campaign’, in Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (eds.), Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, McGraw Hill/Duskhin, Guildford Connecticut, 2002, p. 75-85 Koblentz, Gregory D. and Jonathan B. Tucker, ‘Tracing an attack: the promises and pitfalls of microbial

forensics’, Survival, vol. 52, no. 1, 2010, p. 159-186 Kupperman, Robert H. and David M. Smith, ‘Coping with Biological Terrorism’, in Brad Roberts (ed.), Biological Weapons: Weapons of the Future?, The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 1993, p. 35-46 Meselson, Matthew S. and Julian Perry Robinson, ‘The yellow rain affair: lessons from a discredited allegation’, in Anne L. Clunan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Susan B. Martin (eds.), Terrorism, War, or Disease?: Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons, Stanford Security Studies, Stanford CA, 2008, p. 72-96 Leitenberg, Milton, ‘Aum Shinrikyo's efforts to produce biological weapons: A case study in the serial propagation of misinformation’, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 11, no. 4, 1999, p. 149-158 Leitenberg, Milton, ‘False allegations of US biological weapons use during the Korean war’, in Anne L. Clunan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Susan B. Martin (eds.), Terrorism, War, or Disease?: Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons, Stanford Security Studies, Stanford CA, 2008, p. 120-143 Leitenberg, Milton, ‘The self-fulfilling prophecy of bioterrorism’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 16, no. 1, 2009, p. 95-109 Lepick, Olivier, ‘ The French biological weapons program’, in Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rozsa and Malcolm Dando (eds.), Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 2006, p. 108-131 March, James G., A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen, The Free Press, New York, 1994


McCarthy, Timothy V. and Jonathan B. Tucker, ‘Saddam’s Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars’, in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (eds.), Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2000, p. 47-78 Metcalfe, Neil, ‘A short history of biological warfare’, Medicine, Conflict and Survival, vol. 18, no. 3, 2002, p. 271-282 Millett, Piers, ‘Proliferation of biological weapons: challenges and responses’, Medicine, Conflict and Survival, vol. 20, no. 1, 2004, p. 4-18 Newsinger, John, British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland, Palgrave, Houndsmills, 2002 Ouagrham-Gormley, Sonia Ben, ‘Barriers to Bioweapons: Intangible Obstacles to Proliferation’, International Security, vol. 36, no. 4, 2012, p. 80-114 Petro, James B., Theodore R. Plasse, and Jack McNulty, ‘Biotechnology: Impact on Biological Warfare and Biodefense’, in Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, vol. 1, no. 3, 2003, p. 161-168 Pichtel, John, Terrorism and WMDs: Awareness and Response, CRC Press, Boca Raton FL, 2011 Pita, René and Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Anthrax as a Biological Weapon: From World War I to the Amerithrax Investigation’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, vol. 23, no. 1, 2009, p. 61-103 Popov, Sergei and Marina Voronova, ‘Russian bioweapons: Still the best‐

kept secret?’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 11, no. 3, 2004, p. 186-200 Primoratz, Igor, ‘What is terrorism?’, in C. Gearty (ed.), Terrorism, Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1996 Purkitt, Helen E. and Stephen Burgess, ‘South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme: A Historical and International Perspective’, Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 28, no. 2, 2002, p. 229-253 Rasco, Barbara A. and Gleyn E. Bledsoe, Bioterrorism and Food Safety, CRC Press, Roca Baton FL, 2005 Rimmington, Anthony, ‘Fragmentation and Proliferation? The Fate of the Soviet Union's Offensive Biological Weapons Programme’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 20, no. 1, April 1999, p. 86-110 Robbins, Stephen P. and Timothy A Judge, Organization Behavior, 12th ed., Pearson Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, 2007 Rosenau, William, ‘Aum Shinrikyo's Biological Weapons Program: Why Did it Fail?’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 24, no. 4, 2001, p. 289-301 Rubenstein, Ariel, Modeling Bounded Rationality, MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1997 Salama, Sammy, and Lydia Hansell, ‘Does Intent equal Capability? Al-Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 12, no. 3, 2005, p. 615-653 Salerno, Reynolds M., Jennifer Gaudioso, Rebecca L. Frerichs and Daniel Estes, ‘A BW risk assessment: Historical and technical perspectives’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 11, no. 3, 2004, p. 25-55


Shpiro, Shlomo, ‘Poisoned Chalice: Intelligence Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, vol. 22, no. 1, 2008, p. 1-30 Simon, Herbert, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization, Free Press, New York, 1957 Simon, Steven and Daniel Benjamin, ‘America and the new terrorism’, Survival, vol. 42, no. 1, Spring 2000, p. 59-75 Sjoberg, Lennart, ‘Emotions and Risk Perception’, Risk Management, 9, 2007, p. 223-237 Spiers, Edward M., Weapons of Mass Destruction: Prospects for Proliferation, Macmillan, London, 2000 Stenersen, Anne, ‘The Internet: a virtual training camp?’, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 20, no. 2, 2008, p. 215-233 Stern, Jessica, ‘Terrorist motivations and unconventional weapons’, in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (eds.), Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2000, p. 202-229 Stern, Jessica, ‘Getting and using the weapons’, in Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (eds.), Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, McGraw Hill/Dushkin, Guildford Connecticut, 2004, p. 182-197 Tucker, Jonathan B., ‘A farewell to germs: the US renunciation of biological and toxin warfare, 1969-1970’,

International Security, vol. 20, no. 1, Summer 2002, p. 107-148 Tucker, Jonathan B. and Jason Pate, ‘The Minnesota Patriots Council (1991)’, in Jonathan B. Tucker (ed.), Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 2000, p. 159-183 Tucker, Jonathan B. and Kathleen M. Vogel, ‘Preventing the proliferation of chemical and biological weapon materials and know‐how’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 7, no. 1, 2000, p. 88-96 Wardlaw, Grant, Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter-Measures, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989 Wheelis, Mark, ‘Biotechnology and biochemical weapons’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 9, no. 1, 2002, p. 48-53 Wheelis, Mark and Masaaki Sugishima, ‘Terrorist use of biological weapons’, in Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rozsa and Malcolm Dando (eds.), Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 2006, p. 284-303 Whitby, Simon M., Biological Warfare Against Crops, Palgrave, New York, 2002 Wilkinson, Paul, Terrorism and the Liberal State, Macmillan, London, 1977 Williams, Peter and David Wallace, Unit 731: The Japanese Army’s Secret of Secrets, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1989 Wirtz, James J., ‘Introduction’, in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (eds.), Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical


Weapons, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2000, p. 1-15 Zanders, Jean Pascal, ‘Assessing the risk of chemical and biological weapons proliferation to Terrorists’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 6, no. 4, 1999, p. 17-34

Zilinskas, Raymond A., ‘Cuban allegations of US biological warfare’, in Anne L. Clunan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Susan B. Martin (eds.), Terrorism, War, or Disease?: Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons, Stanford Security Studies, Stanford CA, 2008, p. 144-164


REVIEW ESSAY: MERITS OF PEACE IN THE ASIA PACIFIC SHERWOOD DU

The three journal articles reviewed, A Changing Asia: Prospects for War, Peace, Cooperation and Order (Muthiah Alagappa), Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia (Aaron Friedberg), and Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks (David Kang), outline contemporary security risks in the Asia-Pacific region. Alagappa contends that an environment of peace optimises a state’s priorities of economic development and state-building objectives. Friedberg deploys realist ideologies to portray the self-interest nature of states as being accentuated by the region’s manifestations of disunity. Kang advocates that unique regional cultural and political realities are key indicators of the long-term sustainability of peace.

The security dilemma is, in essence, an amplifier of anxieties, in which the defensive exertions of the participants stimulate each other and feed back upon themselves. – Aaron L. Friedberg (1993/94, 28).

Historically, power shifts have resulted in war (Friedberg 1993/94, 8). Due to the realist perception of perpetual international anarchy, in the absence of a unifying or deterrent adjudicating force, the scrambling of nations primed towards maximising self-interest security resulted in warfare (Kang 2003, 67). Critically, as Asia undergoes transitions in balances of power, the question is whether the recalibration of regional powers will elude peace as economic prosperity naturally extends to military modernisation and expansion (Alagappa 2011, 165). Firstly, it will be argued that although mainstream scholars draw contrasts between European and Asian institutional mechanisms; to highlight security risks, it is flawed in measuring regional risks with solely Western lenses in absence of appreciating unique regional developments. Secondly, counterbalancing behaviours leading to fruition of conflict forecast by some researchers have not eventuated, and seem unlikely to materialise. However, it is conceded that inherent sensitive issues such as territorial disputes coupled with continuing fears of internal domestic instability may weaken the durability of peace. Nevertheless, rational indicators point towards pragmatism by regional states focusing on uniform state-building attitudes and integration as mutually aligning to sustain long-term peace. POLITICAL INTERDEPENDENCY Neo-realists subscribe to international anarchy contained and regulated within institutions. Since post-WW2, European nations as a collective became interconnected through establishing international institutions and mutually recognised forums for peaceful dispute resolution. As a result of this culture of close collaboration, European states ceded their individual national identities ‘and more disposed to think of


themselves as Europeans than as Germans or Frenchmen’ (Friedberg 1993/94, 13). The cordial effect was that by creating a cultural ground of commonality, the prospect for war was minimised by the collaborative forming of international norms which have instilled a sense of joint responsibility amongst European nations to sustain peace. Comparatively, in the case of the Asia-Pacific, Friedberg (1993/94, 18) contends that there is no such cultural unity where ethnicity in itself gives rise to fervent independent nationalism. This is compounded by the fact that regional states inflate nationalistic leanings by slanting historical events to be sympathetic to their own actions, as well as fostering an adversarial attitude towards other states in constructing national pride. Similarly, as Asia-Pacific states are riddled with unresolved territorial disputes laced with nationalistic connotations, the presence of outstanding disputes means that any fluctuations in a state’s rhetoric or action towards actively attempting to exercise control over contested territory, will not only have the capacity to manifest in transnational violence, but also expand to threaten the stability of the region in acquiescing to the use of the force as an acceptable regional resolution mechanism (Alagappa 2011, 174). To illustrate, the uncertainty over the merit of deterrence by nuclear conflict compounds the security dilemma in a deadlock situation. While deterrence by single states provides limited mutual deterrence, new variables of nuclear alliances complicates risks as states factor in nuclear war breakouts to be absorbed by collective alliances (Friedberg 1993/94, 26). Additionally, as such disputes are charged with nationalistic sentiments, states are reluctant to cede to international adjudication as an adverse outcome would negatively reflect regime legitimacy with violent internal repercussions, and widen the involvement of such issues to an international scale. Also, as regional forums such as ASEAN are non-coercive, it serves as an outlet for states to reinforce divisions, rather than consensus (Friedberg 1993/94, 22). Moreover, in what would be viewed as regime weakness, international pressure to conform to independent adjudication findings also fuel existing domestic security issues pertaining to ethnic minorities to flare from being emboldened by increased international attention (Alagappa 2011, 178). Evidently, it is the absence of regional political uniformity in dispute resolution that threatens the sustainability of peace both internally within a state and in a regional context. Nevertheless, the rationality of states dictates that despite animosity being generated from perceived conflicts, the importance of maintaining internal stability and legitimacy is paramount over all other variables that may lead to external conflict (Alagappa 2011, 170) as the self-interests of states fundamentally lie with state-building capacities. Thus, it is important to evaluate modern perceptions of state power that have shifted from solely military spheres. SELF-RESTRAINT: ECONOMIC COOPERATION While there are regional concerns of under-institutionalisation, as regional economic cooperation is linked to regime survival and internal stability, cultural differences and long-standing territorial disputes are shelved for future discussion (Alagappa 2011, 170) in favour of pragmatic economic development. In consolidating governance legitimacy,


states turn to reinforcing existing domestic sovereignty by ‘fostering national economic well-being’ (Alagappa 2011, 179) in the eyes of their domestic populace. While motivations towards economic interdependence vary from state to state (Friedberg 1993/94, 21), the transitioning of historically weak regional states to middle power nations through economic prosperity has also changed regional security configurations. As China’s economic growth extends to military modernisation in contest with US unipolarity, American efforts to contain China’s growing influence by military alliances with regional states has potential in heightening regional security risks. However, as a result of economic interdependence, regional states are increasingly reluctant to support US containment strategies (Kang 2003, 72). This is because as regional countries become more stable and prosperous, they place more confidence in their own deterrent abilities as well as taking into account lucrative economic relationships with China. In turn, states are not fearful of China as its regime legitimacy is inextricably linked to its reputation of peaceful development, clear signs of regional integration, and maintaining domestic stability by effective governance (Alagappa 2011, 171). CONCLUSION The prominence of regional economic development has provided opportunities to foster trust and minimise the opportunity cost of the use of force. Inherent security issues have the capacity to flare; however, unique circumstances of the region prevent limited conflict from crystallising into full-scale warfare. Indeed, the restyling of state power from predominantly military force, to economic and political understanding has resulted in financially beneficial state-building agreements to cement regime stability, and in turn, regional peace. The cyclical relationship between economic and military power has also translated to a regional level where trust has incorporated collaborative disaster-relief measures and peacekeeping agreements (Alagappa 2011, 184). It has also allowed states to become more independent in security decision making and value collective regional security over external influences. Ultimately, as the regional relationships mature, it is likely that long-term cooperation will cement norm-creating principles that sustain peaceful and mutually benefiting outcomes in the foreseeable future.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alagappa, Muthiah. 2011. “A Changing Asia: Prospects of War, Peace, Cooperation and Order.” Political Science 63 (2): 155-85. Friedberg, Aaron. 1993/94. “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia.” International Security 18 (3): 5-33.

Kang, David. 2003. “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks.” International Security 27 (4): 57-85.


A UNIFIED FUTURE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA DAVID ROBERTSON

The division of the Korean peninsula remains the final frontier of the Cold War. Since the collapse of the communist bloc, North Korea has become increasingly isolated and has consequently become more dangerous as it struggles to survive in the international system. Although largely abated, the provocations by the North, which began with its third nuclear test in February, illustrate that the North remains a powerful threat to regional stability. Despite this, there are numerous trends on the peninsula which suggest that the DPRK is in terminal decline. This is likely to trigger a sudden collapse, where the Kim dynasty's authority is challenged without any internal power to replace it.2 Consequently, this paper will demonstrate that the future security situation on the peninsula will be unification, preceded by the breakdown of the DPRK regime. The initial unification process will cause short-term instability on the peninsula and potentially throughout the region and there will also be significant long-term security and strategic consequences of a united Korea.

The 38th Parallel, the dividing line between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), has been called the final frontier of the Cold War.1 Both have remained technically at war since 1950 and as a result the situation on the peninsula continues to be a primary source for instability in Northeast Asia. After North Korea's third successful nuclear test in February 2013, tensions have escalated to their highest level since the armistice in 1953. Despite this, there are numerous trends on the peninsula which suggest that the DPRK is in terminal decline. This is likely to trigger a sudden collapse, where the Kim dynasty's authority is challenged without any internal power to replace it.2 Consequently, this paper will demonstrate that the future security situation on the peninsula will be unification, preceded by the breakdown of the DPRK regime. The initial unification process will cause short-term instability on the peninsula and potentially throughout the region and there will also be significant long-term security and strategic consequences of a united Korea. To commence, this paper will provide an overview of the debate surrounding the issue of Korean unification, and demonstrate the limitations of three of the four prominent scenarios that have gained academic and policy credibility. Secondly, it will identify changes within the international system that have affected the North's current circumstances. The paper will also reveal economic, political and social trends on the

1 Vimal Anand, 'Prospects of Peace on the Korean Peninsula', in China Report, 39:4 (2003) p. 554. 2 Bruce W. Bennett and Jennifer Lind, 'The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements', in International Security, 36:2 (Fall 2011) p. 88.


peninsula, particularly within North Korea, which suggest that the regime is facing collapse. The final section will discuss the immediate security implications of regime collapse and consider the long-term security situation of a unified Korea. A variety of scenarios have been offered by scholars on the future security situation on the Korean peninsula. Many analysts and regional actors uphold the position that the situation will eventually result in unification and be determined primarily by the ROK.3 There are four broad future scenarios that this essay will analyse. The first scenario is that the North will continue to "muddle through", basically maintaining the necessities for regime survival without any significant attempt to reform, in order to maintain control of the country.4 This has proven viable since the end of the Cold War, when the DPRK's current dilemma began. Unification may eventually occur, but the North has thus far been remarkably successful at survival. The second scenario is that the war is resumed and unification will be completed under the leadership of the victorious state. This was plausible during the first two decades after the ceasefire in 1953. In fact, throughout this early period, South Korean President Syngman Rhee sought to conclude the war by invading the North, but he was restrained by the United States, as it was feared that the resumption of hostilities would have led to retaliation by the Soviet Union and China. Since the 1980s, the prospect of war has become increasingly improbable, due to the disparate economic, political and military capabilities of the Koreas. Despite its bellicose behaviour, North Korea is reluctant to launch an invasion, because of its significant military disadvantage in comparison to the combined capabilities of the ROK and US. The third scenario, which the People's Republic of China (PRC) favours, is that the DPRK will undergo a gradual social and economic transformation, potentially eventuating in unification.5 Consequently, South Korea and its allies should engage with the North, and encourage market-based reform within the country. This approach was implemented by the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations and was collectively known as the Sunshine Policy. After the successful transition of the Chinese and Vietnamese economies, it was predicted that the DPRK would follow their example. Particularly after the accession of Kim Jong-il in 1994, there was optimism that the North would begin its economic transformation. Initially, there were signs that the new leader had reformist tendencies. For example, during his visits to China, he was routinely toured through Chinese factories and other indicators of the PRC's economic success and reportedly expressed interest.6 Another indicator of reform is the North-South joint-operated Kaesong industrial complex, which employs over 50,000 North Korean workers. Despite some limited measures, the DPRK's economic transformation has not materialised. Over twenty years since the collapse of communism, North Korea remains a state-driven collectivised economy that spends approximately a third of its 3 David L. Shambaugh, 'China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term', in The Washington Quarterly, 26:2 (Spring 2003) p. 49. 4 Marcus Noland, 'Why North Korea will Muddle Through', in Foreign Affairs, 76:4 (July/August 1997) p. 106. 5 Shambaugh, op. cit., p. 45-46. 6 Victor D. Cha, 'Next of Kim', in Foreign Affairs <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138554/victor-cha/next-of-kim?page=show> (18 December 2012), accessed: 26/4/2013.


income on military expenditure.7 Moreover, there was initial optimism that Kim Jong-un would be a reform-minded leader, however, he has not been capable or willing to implement major reforms. Pyongyang's closure of the Kaesong industrial complex in May 2013 further dampens prospects of economic reform and recovery. According to Andrei Lankov, the unwillingness to reform is a fundamental component of the regime's survival strategy.8 If this is correct, it is therefore unlikely that the third scenario will materialise whilst the current political elite retain power. Finally, the fourth and most likely scenario is the eventual collapse of the DPRK regime. International, economic, social, and political trends are all reducing the ability of the North Korean regime to function.9 Collapse of the regime will subsequently result in a process of unification led by the government in Seoul. In this author's view, this scenario is the most plausible outcome on the Korean peninsula. Problems such as diplomatic isolation, extensive economic mismanagement, growing internal dissent and a gradual erosion of control have plagued the regime for decades. The government in Pyongyang refuses to address these issues and continues to prioritise regime survival over its economic and social wellbeing.10 As the situation deteriorates, the regime's ability to effectively operate will decline, which may subsequently lead to collapse. Changes in the international system since the collapse of communist regimes have been largely detrimental to North Korea. Its unwillingness to embrace economic liberalisation and its belligerent behaviour have isolated it from the international system, including its closest ally China. Pyongyang is aware that loosening control of society and opening up economically would trigger upheavals within the population and lead to regime collapse, similar to other communist bloc nations.11 Moreover, the South's economic and political transformation in the 1980s has fundamentally altered the balance on the peninsula. The ROK surpassed the DPRK's military capability in the early 2000s, and since the South's liberalisation, the income gap has substantially widened.12 In 1972, the energy consumption of the North was twice that of the South, however, today the ROK consumes approximately six times the energy, with the DPRK's consumption declining by half.13 In addition, North Korea's traditional ally China is increasingly frustrated with the regime due to its belligerent behaviour, refusal to reform and a general lack of appreciation for the PRC's interests.14 This could lead to a significant decline or withdrawal of support. Currently, China will continue to assist the DPRK through aid and trade for geostrategic purposes. However, Beijing is becoming increasingly cooperative with Washington and Seoul. This has been evident by

7 Jeremy Laurence and Danbee Moon, 'North Korea spends about a third of its income on military: group', Reuters <http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCATRE70H1BW20110118?sp=true> (18 January 2011), accessed: 8/7/2013. 8 Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013) p. 212-213. 9 Kongdan Oh and Ralph Hassig, 'North Korea between Collapse and Reform', in Asian Survey, 39:2 (March/April 1999) p. 288. 10 Lankov, op. cit., p. 190. 11 Ibid. p. 111-112. 12 Andrei Lankov, 'Changing North Korea: An Information Campaign Can Beat the Regime', in Foreign Affiars, 88:6 (November/December 2009) p. 98. 13 Victor D. Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future (London: The Bodley Head, 2012) p. 24. 14 Shambaugh, op. cit., p. 44.


President Xi Jinping's visit to the US, and the June ROK-PRC bilateral summit.15 If relations with the ROK continue to improve, China may subsequently realign its interests against the DPRK.16 Consequently, these changes reveal the deteriorating international conditions that the regime must overcome. As a result of its self-imposed isolation and increasing desperation, the DPRK has routinely threatened the ROK and other nations in order to receive concessions such as aid and nuclear technology.17 The 2013 Korean Crisis demonstrates the rising intensity of DPRK rhetoric, with threats of 'simmering nuclear war'.18 The failure of the DPRK's threat to materialise suggests that the regime is increasingly desperate to justify its legitimacy to the populace and possibly the military. Yet, the legitimacy of its rhetoric has suffered since Pyongyang does not follow through with its threats, and is thereby reducing international willingness to concede. For example, President Barack Obama stated in May during ROK President Park Geun-hye's visit that 'the days when North Korea could create a crisis and elicit concessions are over'.19 Therefore, the benefits of this method for the DPRK to sustain itself is declining, and could further undermine the survivability of the regime. Moreover, since tensions on the peninsula early in the year have largely abated, the DPRK has proposed high level talks with the US and ROK governments.20 This could potentially be a sign of a willingness for conciliation and cooperation from the regime. However, Pyongyang has issued a demanding set of pre-conditions (for example, a US military withdrawal from the peninsula) and has already withdrawn from an engagement with Seoul. 21 In addition, these offers for negotiations may have been largely a result of extensive Chinese pressure, rather than genuine attempts at reconciliation. 22 Pyongyang's recent behaviour thereby further undermines the prospects for change in the regime's conduct in international affairs. Economically, during the Cold War, the DPRK received extensive assistance and was capable of trading (or bartering) with its communist allies; as a result, the North became relatively prosperous. However, instead of transforming into a market-based economy, Pyongyang maintained a centralised and planned model. Consequently, North Korea experienced continued economic decline throughout the 1990s, which culminated in the Great Famine in 1994. The economy has since failed to recover, in part due to the state's Juche ideology, which emphasises self-sufficiency and prioritises the military in economic matters. Moreover, in the latter stage of Kim Jong-il's leadership, the DPRK shifted to a fundamentalist interpretation of Juche in an effort to 15 Lee Chi-dong, 'U.S. hails S. Korea-China summit agreement on N. Korea', Yonhap News Agency <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/06/29/13/0301000000AEN20130629000100315F.HTML> (29 June 2013), accessed:8/7/2013. 16 Marcus Noland, 'The (Non-) Impact of UN Sanctions on North Korea', in Asia Policy, 7 (2009) p. 77. 17 Denny Roy, 'Parsing Pyongyang's Strategy', in Survival, 52:1 (2010) p. 122. 18 Scott Neuman, 'North Korea Cuts Hotline, Warns Of "Simmering Nuclear"', NPR <http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/03/27/175453228/north-korea-cuts-hotline-warns-of-simmering-nuclear-war> (27 March 2013), accessed: 1/5/2013. 19 Al Jazeera and Agencies, 'S Korea's Park proposes talks with North', Al Jazeera <http://www.aljazeera.com/video/americas/2013/05/201357155049678486.html> (8 May 2013), accessed: 8/5/2013. 20 Tania Branigan, 'North Korea demands US withdrawal from peninsula before resuming talks', The Guardian <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/18/north-korea-conditions-us-talks> (19 April 2013), accessed: 8/7/2013. 21 Ibid. 22 Zachary Keck, 'US-North Korea to Hold Bilateral Talks', The Diplomat <http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/06/27/us-north-korea-to-hold-bilateral-talks/> (27 June 2013), accessed: 8/7/2013.


maintain domestic legitimacy.23 This has reinforced its extensive cult of personality, its Songun (military first) policy, a preference for economic collectivisation and a rejection of international engagement. As a consequence, this revivalism has prevented economic reform, and may have reversed some progress, as illustrated by the closure of the Kaesong industrial complex. One explanation for this unwillingness to reform is that the regime prioritises political survival over social and economic matters. The political elite of the country would want to maintain the status quo, due to their high living standards and the privileges of their position. 24 Therefore, as long as Pyongyang favours survivability, there is little prospect of comprehensive reform, which may entail further economic collapse. The Korean People's Army (KPA) is a pillar of the regime's authority. There is, however, evidence suggesting that the KPA’s loyalty to the Kim family is possibly deteriorating. This could lead to a coup or a withdrawal of regime support in the event of an uprising, similar to the Egyptian Revolution. Although the KPA has priority in regards to allocation of national resources, this is dwindling as the economy retracts and international sanctions are intensified. The regime has also failed to provide the military with modern equipment and sufficient supplies.25 These factors - coupled with declining standards of living - have led to dissent from within the KPA. For example, defected colonel Chu-hwal Choe has claimed that there have been attempted coups and uprisings throughout the military.26 Although the statements of a defector cannot be entirely relied upon, the fact that there are cases of high ranking defectors suggests at least some discontent within the political elite. Moreover, during the mourning period for Kim Jong-il in early 2012, there was a large purge of military officials with questionable loyalty to the new leadership.27 This demonstrates possible discontent within the ranks of the military. There is also evidence of some reluctance to suppress small scale disobedience, a willingness to accept bribes and to allow market activity, particularly in rural areas.28 As the regime is reliant on the military to maintain control, the leadership must reward the generals' loyalty with goods that are inaccessible to the majority of the population. Continued international sanctions such as the recent UN Security Council Resolution 2094, though primarily affecting the population, have restricted the importation of luxury goods and other rewards for regime support. As a consequence this could hinder the regime's ability to reward loyalty and increase the prospects of political collapse.29 The diminishing ability of the DPRK to provide basic necessities for its population has left the North Korean people to provide for their own sustenance. This,

23 Victor D. Cha, 'The End of History: "Neojuche Revivalism" and Korean Unification', in Orbis, 55:2 (Spring 2011) p. 292. 24 Lankov, The Real North Korea, p. xiii-xiv. 25 Cha, The Impossible State, p. 216. 26 Oh and Hassig, op. cit., p. 301. 27 Donald Kirk, 'Kim Jong-un hid bloody purge of top brass behind North Korea's national grief', The Independent <www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/kim-jongun-hid-bloody-purge-of-top-brass-behind-north-koreas-national-grief-7582488.html> (23 March 2012), accessed: 4/5/2013. 28 Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, 'Pyongyang's Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian in North Korea', in International Security, 35:1 (Summer 2010) p. 69-70. 29 United Nations Security Council, 'Resolution 2094', United Nations Security Council <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2094(2013)> (7 March 2013), accessed: 1/5/2013.


coupled with limited liberalisation reforms in 2002, has facilitated the rise of unofficial markets across the country. According to defectors, the majority of the population primarily relies on these markets for food, clothing and other basic provisions. 30 Consequently, this develops an entrepreneurial attitude in society, which creates an individual mindset within the populace that is incompatible with the government's ideological disposition. 31 Moreover, the population is increasingly exposed to the outside world through access to the internet, television, mobile phones and other communications technology. Despite extensive governmental censorship and a selective process of authorisation for the use of this technology, information is slowly disseminating throughout the population.32 The small yet growing number of people that have internet access may be shaped by the information they receive and could develop reformist tendencies.33 The Pyongyang government is unintentionally stimulating this trend by gradually allowing access to the internet for the public.34 Although there are signs of societal change in the DPRK, while the Kim regime maintains its cult of personality and extensive surveillance and control mechanisms, it is unlikely that it will erupt similarly to the Arab Uprisings in 2010. Because significant reform is unlikely and the above trends will place increasing pressure on the DPRK, this could culminate in sudden regime collapse. One potential trigger would be the death of Kim Jong-un, if he has not appointed a legitimate heir beforehand. Juche holds the state intact and the Kim dynasty is fundamentally connected with the ideology. Without a Kim head of state, it would be difficult for the ruling elite to maintain a cult of personality to ensure their legitimacy. Moreover, there is some evidence of inter-factional rivalry within the DPRK hierarchy, and in the event of Kim's death, this rivalry could cause the regime to implode.35 This would likely lead to South Korean efforts to establish order in the North, thus presenting an opportunity for unification. Sudden collapse will lead to instability on the peninsula and in the region.36 In its current economic situation, collapse would entail a significant financial burden on the ROK (some estimates exceed one trillion US dollars), a task the South Korean population is already reluctant to undertake.37 Another factor of instability will be the massive refugee flows into China and South Korea. In the former's case, North Korean refugees will largely travel to Jilin, which is one of the poorest eastern provinces, and as a result could undermine the internal stability of China. 38 The ROK will need to 30 Cha, op. cit., p. 447. 31 Ibid. 32 Byman and Lind, op. cit., p. 69. 33 Cha, op. cit., p. 449. 34 Kyingmin Ko, Heejin Lee and Seungkwon Jang, 'The Internet Dilemma and Control Policy: Political and Economic Implications of the Internet in North Korea', in The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, 21:3 (September 2009) p. 286. 35 Ken Gause, 'Meet Kim Jong Un's New Team', Foreign Affairs <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136980/ken-gause/meet-kim-jong-uns-new-team?page=show> (21 December 2011), accessed: 30/4/2013. 36 Patrick Cronin, 'The Dangers of Korean Unification', The Diplomat <http://thediplomat.com/2011/02/10/the-dangers-of-korean-unification/?all=true> (10 February 2010), accessed: 1/5/2013. 37 Seung-Hoon Yoo, 'South Koreans' Willingness to Pay for Korean Unification', in Applied Economic Letters 11:1 (2004) p. 15. 38 Drew Thompson and Carla Freeman, 'Flood Across the Border: China's Disaster Relief Operations and Potential Response to a North Korean Refugee Crisis', US-Korea Institute at SAIS <http://uskoreainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/USKI_FAB_040109.pdf> (2009) p. 7, accessed: 2/5/2013.


accommodate approximately 25 million impoverished North Koreans who have been indoctrinated to detest the outside world, particularly the South, and to worship the Kim family.39 A regime collapse will also be a proliferation risk, as internal disruptions may lead to a misplacement of the North's nuclear weapons and technology, and potentially be acquired by state or non-state actors. 40 Dependent on the regional security environment, Seoul may decide to keep the warheads and develop the advances made by Pyongyang, especially if it perceives China or Japan as a threat. This could ignite an arms race, involving China, Japan and potentially Taiwan, consequently destabilising the region. On a global level, as the ROK becomes increasingly crucial economically for the international system, the burden that will be placed on the South would disrupt regional and potentially global markets.41 Overall, it will take decades for Korea to restructure and recover from the DPRK's collapse. In the long term, there will be significant regional implications of a resurgent unified Korea, as it will gain considerable strategic and economic weight in the region. A recent study has suggested that by 2050 a unified Korea could have a larger economy than Japan.42 Without having to concern itself with the DPRK threat, Korea will be capable of redirecting its strategic interests from the peninsula to the East Asia region. If Korea maintains its formidable military capabilities, it will be a major player in the region, if not globally. This could undermine stability in North East Asia, as Japan may perceive Korea's military strength as threatening. This could lead Japan to expand its military, thus creating a security dilemma. Furthermore, the security situation will be largely dependent on Korea's disposition toward China and the United States. Since the ROK's normalisation of relations with China in 1992, the PRC has cultivated strong relations, economically, politically, culturally and increasingly strategically.43 Beijing is aware that unification will be largely determined by Seoul, and therefore by increasing ties, it intends to influence the final outcome on the peninsula. If the PRC is successful, a strong Sino-Korean relationship would provide a significant counterweight to the US-Japan partnership. Another factor for this approach is that China does not want to border a country that maintains a strong alliance with the US and a considerable foreign troop presence. However, after unification the alliance will lose its raison d'être of North Korean deterrence and will need to develop a new purpose for its existence.44 The ROK and US must also justify the continuation of a US military presence on the peninsula to their domestic audiences, which may be difficult considering rising Korean nationalism. A post-unification alliance would also be perceived by Beijing as an effort by the US to contain the PRC, thus broadening the potential instability of a post-unification North

39 Armin Rosen, 'The Long History of (Wrongly) Predicting North Korea's Collapse', The Atlantic <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/08/the-long-history-of-wrongly-predicting-north-koreas-collapse/260769/> (6 August 2012), accessed: 8/7/2013. 40 Lankov, The Real North Korea, p. 180. 41 Werner Pfennig, 'Korea and Beyond: National Reunification Has International Implications', in The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 8:1 (Winter/Spring 2001) p. 125-126. 42 Evan Ramstad, 'Study Sees Gains in Korean Unification', The Wall Street Journal <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125353016156627479.html?opattr=Goldman_Sachs_Has_a_Different_View_of_Korean_Unification> (21 September 2009), accessed 1/5/2013. 43 Shambaugh, op. cit., p. 45. 44 Victor D. Cha, 'Focus on the Future, Not the North', in The Washington Quarterly, 26:1 (Winter 2002-2003) p. 97.


East Asia. Ultimately, the long-term implications will be determined by Korea's ability to recover from unification and the structure of the international system. In sum, trends on the peninsula suggest that the regime will eventually collapse and will likely occur suddenly, because a gradual regime collapse would entail significant economic and social reform by the DPRK. The leadership in Pyongyang is preventing a short term breakdown by reinforcing its Juche ideology, enhancing surveillance, and acting belligerently in order to gain economic concessions. These solutions, however, cannot prevent a mid to long-term collapse, as the trends that are detrimental to the regime will continue to pressure the leadership until it implodes. A collapse will not likely occur whilst the Kim dynasty maintains its legitimacy within the state. The DPRK may continue to "muddle through" for another decade or two, however, this is just prolonging its collapse. As a consequence, policymakers have two options: prolong or hasten regime collapse. China is likely to prolong the North's survival, as long as the South maintains its alliance with the US. Once Beijing is confident that unification will not endanger its interests, it could withdraw its crucial support for Pyongyang. Seoul and Washington can assist in hastening regime collapse through information campaigns and continued economic and political pressure. Furthermore, the short-term implications of a collapse would cause instability on the peninsula and the region and the reconstruction of North Korean society will be an enormous financial burden on the South. In the long term, when the unification process is completed, the regional strategic and security situation will dramatically change. Korea will be a major player in the region and may potentially rival Japan economically and militarily. The security situation on the peninsula, however, will be largely determined by Korea's disposition towards China and the United States. Ultimately, the final outcome of unification will be dependent on the structure of the international system and the process of Korean reconstruction. For relevant states such as the US, China and Japan, it would therefore be beneficial for them to seek strong strategic, political and economic relations with South Korea. To conclude, DPRK regime collapse may occur in a few years or in twenty, nevertheless, if current trends on the peninsula persist, the downfall of the Kim dynasty and Korean unification is a forthcoming reality.


BIBLIOGRAPHY Al Jazeera and Agencies, 'S Korea's Park proposes talks with North', Al Jazeera <http://www.aljazeera.com/video/americas/2013/05/201357155049678486.html> (8 May 2013), accessed: 8/5/2013. Anand, Vimal. 'Prospects of Peace on the Korean Peninsula'. In China Report, 39:4 (2003) p. 553-560. Bennett, Bruce W. and Lind, Jennifer. 'The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements'. In International Security. 36:2 (Fall 2011) p. 84-119. Branigan, Tania. 'North Korea demands US withdrawal from peninsula before resuming talks'. The Guardian <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/18/north-korea-conditions-us-talks> (19 April 2013). Accessed: 8/7/2013. Byman, Daniel and Lind, Jennifer. 'Pyongyang's Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian in North Korea'. In International Security. 35:1 (Summer 2010) p. 44-74. Cha, Victor D. 'Focus on the Future, Not the North'. In The Washington Quarterly. 26:1 (Winter 2002-2003) p. 91-107. Cha, Victor D. 'The End of History: "Neojuche Revivalism" and Korean Unification'. In Orbis. 55:2 (Spring 2011) p. 290-297. Cha, Victor D. The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future. London: The Bodley Head, 2012. Cha, Victor D. 'Next of Kim'. Foreign Affairs <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138554/victor-cha/next-of-kim?page=show> (18 December 2012). Accessed: 26/4/2013.

Cronin, Patrick. 'The Dangers of Korean Unification'. The Diplomat <http://thediplomat.com/2011/02/10/the-dangers-of-korean-unification/?all=true> (10 February 2010). Accessed: 1/5/2013. Gause, Ken. 'Meet Kim Jong Un's New Team'. Foreign Affairs <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136980/ken-gause/meet-kim-jong-uns-new-team?page=show> (21 December 2011). Accessed: 30/4/2013. Keck, Zachary. 'US-North Korea to Hold Bilateral Talks'. The Diplomat <http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/06/27/us-north-korea-to-hold-bilateral-talks/> (27 June 2013). Accessed: 8/7/2013. Kirk, Donald. 'Kim Jong-un hid bloody purge of top brass behind North Korea's national grief', The Independent <www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/kim-jongun-hid-bloody-purge-of-top-brass-behind-north-koreas-national-grief-7582488.html> (23 March 2012). Accessed: 4/5/2013. Ko, Kyingmin, Lee, Heejin and Jang, Seungkwon. 'The Internet Dilemma and Control Policy: Political and Economic Implications of the Internet in North Korea'. In The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis. 21:3 (September 2009) p. 279-295. Lankov, Andrei. 'Changing North Korea: An Information Campaign Can Beat the Regime'. In Foreign Affiars. 88:6 (November/December 2009) p. 95-105. Lankov, Andrei. The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Laurence, Jeremy and Moon, Danbee. 'North Korea spends about a third of its


income on military: group'. Reuters <http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCATRE70H1BW20110118?sp=true> (18 January 2011). Accessed: 8/7/2013. Lee, Chi-dong. 'U.S. hails S. Korea-China summit agreement on N. Korea'. Yonhap News Agency <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/06/29/13/0301000000AEN20130629000100315F.HTML> (29 June 2013). Accessed:8/7/2013. Neuman, Scott. 'North Korea Cuts Hotline, Warns Of "Simmering Nuclear"'. NPR <http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/03/27/175453228/north-korea-cuts-hotline-warns-of-simmering-nuclear-war> (27 March 2013) Accessed: 1/5/2013. Noland, Marcus. 'The (Non-) Impact of UN Sanctions on North Korea'. In Asia Policy. 7 (2009) p. 61-88. Noland, Marcus. 'Why North Korea will Muddle Through'. In Foreign Affairs. 76:4 (July/August 1997) p. 105-118. Oh, Kongdan and Hassig, Ralph. 'North Korea between Collapse and Reform'. In Asian Survey. 39:2 (March/April 1999), p. 287-309. Pfennig, Werner. 'Korea and Beyond: National Reunification Has International Implications'. In The Brown Journal of World Affairs. 8:1 (Winter/Spring 2001). P. 115-127. Ramstad, Evan. 'Study Sees Gains in Korean Unification'. The Wall Street Journal.

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125353016156627479.html?opattr=Goldman_Sachs_Has_a_Different_View_of_Korean_Unification> (21 September 2009). Accessed 1/5/2013. Rosen, Armin. 'The Long History of (Wrongly) Predicting North Korea's Collapse'. The Atlantic <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/08/the-long-history-of-wrongly-predicting-north-koreas-collapse/260769/> (6 August 2012). Accessed: 8/7/2013. Roy, Denny. 'Parsing Pyongyang's Strategy'. In Survival. 52:1 (2010) p. 111-136. Shambaugh, David L. 'China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term'. In The Washington Quarterly. 26:2 (Spring 2003) p. 43-56. Thompson, Drew and Freeman, Carla. 'Flood Across the Border: China's Disaster Relief Operations and Potential Response to a North Korean Refugee Crisis'. US-Korea Institute at SAIS <http://uskoreainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/USKI_FAB_040109.pdf> (2009). Accessed: 2/5/2013. United Nations Security Council. 'Resolution 2094'. United Nations Security Council <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2094(2013)> (7 March 2013). Accessed: 1/5/2013. Yoo, Seung-Hoon. 'South Koreans' Willingness to Pay for Korean Unification'. In Applied Economic Letters. 11:1 (2004) p. 15-19.


Date post:	28-Jul-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	hahanh
View:	223 times
Download:	0 times

VOLUME 2 2013 - ANU International Relations...

Documents