wallerstein despues del desaroolo y la globalizacion que

8/7/2019 wallerstein despues del desaroolo y la globalizacion que

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AfterDevelopmentalism and Globalization,What?*IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, YaleUniversity

In 1900,in preparationfor the Exposition Universellein Paris,the FrenchMinistryof Colonies asked Camille Guy,the head of its geographical service, to produce abook entitled Lescoloniesfranfaises: la mise en valeurde notre domaine coloniale.A literal translation of mise en valeur is "making into value." The dictionary,however,translates "mise en valeur"as"development."At the time, this expressionwas preferred,when talking about economic phenomena in the colonies, to theperfectly acceptable Frenchword, "developpement"If one then goes to Les Usuelsde Robert:Dictionnaire des Expressionset Locutionsfigurees (1979) to learn moreabout the meaning of the expression"mettreen valeur,"one finds the explanationthat it is used as a metaphor meaning "to exploit, draw profit from."

Basically,this was the view of the pan-Europeanworld during the colonial eraconcerning economic development in the rest of the world. Development was aset of concrete actions effectuated by Europeans to exploit and draw profit fromthe resources of the non-Europeanworld. There were a number of assumptions inthis view: Non-Europeans would not be able or perhaps even willing to "develop"their resources without the active intrusion of the pan-Europeanworld. But suchdevelopment representeda material and moral good for the world. Itwas thereforethe moral and political duty of the pan-Europeans to exploit the resources ofthese countries. There was consequently nothing wrong with the fact that, as areward,the pan-Europeans who exploited the resources drew profit from them,since a secondary advantagewould go to the persons whose resources were beingexploited in this way.This rationale of course completely omitted discussion of the cost in life andlimb to the local people of such exploitation. The conventional calculus wasthat these costs were, as we would say in today's euphemisms, the necessary andinevitable "collateraldamage"of Europe's"civilizing mission."The tone of the discussion began to change after 1945, primarily as a resultof the strength of anticolonial sentiments and movements in Asia and Africa,* Keynoteaddressat conference,"DevelopmentChallengesforthe 21stCentury,"CornellUniversity,Oct. 1, 2004.

SocialForces,March2005,83(3):1263-1278O TheUniversityof North CarolinaPress


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1264/ SocialForces83:3,March2005and a new senseof collectiveassertivenessin LatinAmerica.It is at this pointthat "development"came to be used as a code word for the belief that it waspossiblefor the countries of the South to "develop"themselves,as opposedto"beingdeveloped"by the North. The new assumptionwasthat,if the countriesof the South would only adopt the properpolicies,they would one day,sometime in the future,become as technologicallymodern and as wealthyas thecountriesof the North.At some point in the post-1945 period,LatinAmerican authorsbegantocall this new ideology"desarollismo"or "developmentalism."The ideology ofdevelopmentalismtook a numberof differentforms.The Soviet Union calleditinstituting"socialism"whichbecamedefinedasthelaststagebefore"communism."The UnitedStatescalledit"economicdevelopment."Ideologuesin the Southoftenused the two terms interchangeably.Amidst this worldwideconsensus,all thestatesof the North-the UnitedStates,the SovietUnion (andits EastEuropeansatellites),theWestEuropeancolonial(now becomingex-colonial)powers,andthe Nordic countriesplus Canada-began to offer"aid"and adviceconcerningthis developmentthat everyonefavored.The EconomicCommissionfor LatinAmerica(CEPAL)developeda newlanguageof"core-periphery"relations,usedprimarilyto justifya programof "import-substitutionindustrialization."Andmore radical Latin American(and other) intellectualsdevelopeda languageabout"dependency,"which,theysaid,neededto be fought againstandovercomein orderthatdependentcountriesbe in a positionto develop.The terminology may have differed but the one thing that was agreedupon by everyonewas thatdevelopmentwas indeedpossible,if only ... Whenthereforethe United Nationsdeclaredthat the 1970swould be the "decadeofdevelopment,"the term and the objectiveseemedvirtuallya piety.Yet,as weknow,the 1970sturned out to be averybad decadeformost of the countriesofthe South.Itwas thedecadeof the twosuccessiveoil priceincreasesinstitutedbyOPECand of stagflationin theNorth.Theconsequentrisein thecostof importsfor countriesin the Southcombined with a sharpdeclinein the value of theirexportsbecauseof the stagnationin the world-economycreatedacutebalanceof paymentsdifficultiesfor just about everyone of these countries(includingthose in the so-calledsocialistbloc),with the soleexceptionof those which wereoil-exportingstates.The oil-exportingstatesacquiredincrediblylarge surpluses,a large partofwhichtheydepositedin banksin theUnitedStatesandGermany,whothereuponneededto find aremunerativeusefor thisextracapital.Theyfound it in loanstostateswith acutebalanceof paymentsdifficulties.Theseloans,activelypromotedbythebanksthemselves,solvedbothproblems:findingan outlet for the surplusmoney in the accounts of the banks of the North and solving the liquidityproblemsof the virtuallyinsolvent statesof the South.But,alas,the loans ledto cumulativeinterestpaymentswhich,by 1980,had led to evengreaterbalanceof paymentsdifficulties in these states. Loansunfortunatelyare supposedto


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AfterDevelopmentalismandGlobalization,What?/ 1265be repaid.The world thus arrived at the suddenlydiscovered so-called debtcrisis-Poland in 1980,Mexicoin 1982,and then all overthe place.Itwaseasy enoughto findthe villainin the piece.Thefingerwaspointedatdevelopmentalism,so universallypraisedjustadecadebefore.Import-substitutionindustrializationwas nowperceivedascorruptprotectionism.State-buildingwasdeconstructedas feedinga bloatedbureaucracy.Financialaid wasnow analyzedas money poured down a sink, if not a gutter.And parastatalstructures,farfrombeingvirtuous effortsat pullingoneselfup by one'sown bootstraps,wereexposed as deadeningbarriersto fruitfulentrepreneurialachievement.It wasdecidedthatloans to statesin distress,to be beneficial,neededto be hedgedbyrequirementsthatthese statescut wastefulstateexpenditureson suchdeferrableitemsasschools and health.It wasfurtherproclaimedthatstateenterpriseswerealmostby definition inefficientand should be privatizedas rapidlyas possible,since private enterpriseswere again almost by definition responsiveto the"market"and thereforemaximallyefficient.Or at least that was the consensusin Washington.Academicbuzz wordsand fadsarefickleandusuallylastbut a decadeortwo.Developmentwas suddenlyout. Globalizationarrivedin its wake.Universityprofessors,foundationexecutives,bookpublishers,andop-edcolumnistsallsawthelight.Tobe sure,theoptic,orbettersaidtheremedies,hadchanged.Now,thewayto move forwardwasnot to import-substitutebut to export-orientproductiveactivities.Down not onlywith nationalizedindustriesbut with capitaltransfercontrols;up withtransparent,unhinderedflowsof capital.Inplaceof one-partyregimes,let us alltogetherstudygovernance(anewword,splendidlyeruditeandquite inscrutable,if not meaningless).Aboveall, let us face Mecca five times adayand intone AllahuAkhbarTINA-There is No Alternative.The new dogmas took root in the 1980s amidst the decaying rot ofdevelopmentalistdreams.Theyflourishedin the 1990sbathedby the sparkleofthe "neweconomy"in which the United Statesand easternAsiaweresupposedto be leading the world to its economic glory.But alas, the sheen began totarnish.Thecurrencycrisisin Eastand SoutheastAsiain 1997(whichspreadtoRussiaand Brazil),the slide downwardof the WorldTradeOrganizationfromSeattleto Cancun,the fadingof Davos and the spectacularrise of PortoAlegre,al-QaedaandSeptember11,followedby the Bush fiascoin Iraqand the currentaccountscrisisof the UnitedStates-all this and more leads one to suspectthatglobalizationas rhetoricmaybe going quicklythewayof developmentalism.Andhenceour question-After Developmentalismand Globalization,What?Let us not be too acerbicabout fadedtheorizing.Thewholediscussionfrom1945to todayhas indeed been one long effortto takeseriouslythe realitythattheworld-systemis not onlypolarizedbutpolarizing,and that thisrealityisbothmorallyandpoliticallyintolerable.Forthe countriesat thebottom,thereseemednothingmoreurgentthanfiguringout how to improvetheirsituation,and firstof alleconomically.Afterall,all thesepeoplehadto do wassee a movieandthey


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1266/ SocialForces83:3,March2005wouldknow that therewereotherpeopleandplacesin theworldthatwerebetteroff, far betteroff, thantheywere.As for the countriesat the top, they realized,howeverdimly,that the "huddledmassesyearningto breathefree"representeda permanentdangerto worldorderand their own prosperity,and that thereforesomething,somehowhad to be done to dampenthe tinderbox.So,the intellectualanalysesand the derivedpolicyeffortsrepresentedby thediscussionabout developmentand globalizationwere seriousand respectable,if in retrospectquitemisguidedin manyways.The firstquestionwe needto asknow is, is it at all possiblefor every partof the world to attain-one day in aplausiblynot too remote future-the standardof living of sayDenmark(andperhapsalsosimilarpoliticalandculturalinstitutions)?The secondquestionis,if it is not, is it possiblefor the presentlopsidedandhighlyinegalitarianworld-systemto persist,moreor less as such?And the thirdquestionis,if it is not,whatkindsof alternativespresentthemselvesto all of us now?

IIs it at all possiblefor every part of the world to attain-one day in aplausiblynot too remotefuture-the standardof livingof sayDenmark(andperhapsalso similarpoliticaland culturalinstitutions)?

There is no question that Denmark-and most OECD (Organisation forEconomic Co-operation and Development) countries-have a quite decentstandardof livingfor a substantialproportionof theirpopulation.The standardmeasureof internalvariationof income,the Ginicurve,showsquitelow numbersfor most OECDcountries,and by world standardsreasonablygood ones forallof them (e.g.,seeAtkinson,Rainwater,and Smeeding).Tobe sure,there aremanypoor peoplein thesecountries,butcomparedto almostany countryof theSouth,far fewer.So,of course,people in thesepoorercountriesaspireto be asrich as peoplein Denmark.In the lastfewyears,the world economicpresshasbeen full of storiesabout the remarkableratesof growthof China-a countrywhich not too long ago was consideredto be one of the poorest-along withmuchspeculationaboutwhetherornot and to whatdegreethese ratesof growthcan continuein the futureandtherebytransformChinainto a relativelywealthycountryin termsof GDPper capita.Let us leave aside the fact that many,many other countries have shownremarkablegrowthspurtsfor as much as up to 20-30 years,which rates thennonethelesspeteredout. Thereare,for example,the recentcasesof the SovietUnion and Yugoslavia.Let us also leave out of the equation the long list ofcountrieswhose GDPwasbetterin the furtherpastthan in the present.Let usassume for a moment that China'seconomicgrowthcontinuesunhinderedforanothertwenty years,and that China'sGDPper capitaapproaches,let us say,if


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AfterDevelopmentalismandGlobalization,What?/ 1267not thatof Denmarkat least that of Portugalor evenItaly.Let us evenspeculatethat up to 50%of its populationbenefitssignificantlyfromthis growthspurt,which is then reflectedin theirreal income.

Is it credibleto hold everythingelseconstant,and to assumethat,at theveryleast,everyoneelse remainswheretheyaretodayin terms of standardof living?Where is the surplusvalue to come from that would permit 50%of China'spopulationto consume at the level of 50%of Italy'spopulation,while all therest of the world consumes at a level at least as high as at present?Is this allsupposedto come from the so-calledgreaterproductivityof world(or Chinese)production?It is clear that the skilledworkersof Ohio and the Ruhrvalleydonot think so. Theythinktheywouldpayfor it, thattheyarealreadypayingforit,by significantlyreducedstandardsof living.Arethey reallyso wrong?Hasthisnot been happeningin the pastdecade?The firstpieceof evidenceis the entirepast historyof the capitalistworld-economy.In over five hundredyearsof its existence,the gap between the topand the bottom, the core and the periphery,has nevergotten smaller,alwayslarger.What is therein the presentsituationthat should lead us to assumethatthispatternwould not continue?Of course,over thosefive hundredyears,thereis no questionthat some countrieshaveimprovedtheir relativestandingin thedistributionof wealth in the world-system.Thus,it couldbe claimedthatthesecountrieshad"developed"in some sense. But it is alsotrue that othercountriesarelowerin relativewealthrankingsthanearlier,some of themspectacularlyso.And, althoughour statisticaldata is at most of even minimalqualityonly forthe last 75-100 years,suchcomparativestudies as we have do show a constanttrimodaldistributionof wealthin theworld-system,with a fewcountriesmovingfrom one categoryto another.'The secondpiece of evidence is that high levels of profit,and thereforeofthe possibilityof accumulatingsurplusvalue,correlatesdirectlywith the relativedegreeof monopolizationof productiveactivity.2What we have been callingdevelopmentfor the lastfiftyyearsor so isbasicallytheabilityof somecountriesto erectproductiveenterprisesof a type consideredto be highly profitable.Tothe extent that they succeed in doing this, they therebyreduce the degreeofmonopolizationof productionin this particulararena and hence reduce thedegreeof profitabilityof suchproduction.The historicpatternof successiveso-calledleadingindustries-from textilesto steel andautomobilesto electronicstocomputertechnology-is clearevidenceof this.TheU.S.pharmaceuticalindustryis rightnow fightinga rear-guardbattleagainstjust such decline in potentialprofitability.Can BoeingandAirbusmaintaintheirpresentprofitlevels in thefaceof competitionby a putativeChineseaircraftconstructionindustrytwentyor thirty yearsfromnow?So,basically,of two thingsone. Eitherthe rising,so-callednewly-developingcountrieswill be crushedby some highlydestructiveprocess-warfare,plague,or civil war.Andin thiscase,the existingeconomic centersof accumulationwill


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1268/ Social Forces83:3,March2005remainon top,and thepolarizationwill be stillmore acute.Ortherising,newly-developingcountrieswill be able to reproducesome of the major productiveprocessesof the presentcenters.And in this case,eitherthe polarizationwillsimplybe inverted(whichis unlikely)or therewillbe aflatteningof thecurve.Butin this lattercase,the abilityto accumulatesurplusvaluein theworld-economytakenasawholewilldiminishseverely,andthe raisond'etreof a capitalistworld-economywill be undermined.In none of these scenariosdoes every countrybecomea Denmark.If therehascometo be a generalmorosityabouteconomicdevelopmentandthe positivebenefitsof globalization,it is, I wouldargue,becausethe sense thatwe arein a cul-de-sachasbegunto creepin on more and morepeople-scholars,politicians,and aboveallordinaryworkers.Theoptimismof the 1950sand1960s,whichwasmomentarilyrevivedin the 1990s,is no longerwith us.I personallycan see no way in which,within the frameworkof a capitalistworld-economy,we can approacha generalequalizationof the distributionofwealthin the world,and even less an equalizationthat would have everyoneconsume at the level of the modal Danish consumer.I say this, taking intoaccountall possible technologicaladvancesas well as increasesin that elusiveconcept,productivity.

IIIf it is not [possible for all countries to achievea Danish standardoflivingwithin the frameworkof the world-systemin which we live], is itpossiblefor the present lopsidedand highly inegalitarianworld-systemto persist,more or less as such?I doubt it. Butof coursewe must be carefulhere,sincepredictionsof dramaticstructuralchangehavebeen made so frequentlyover the pasttwo centuriesandhave turned out to be inaccurateover a medium term because some crucialelementswere left out of the analyses.The majorexplanationof purported prospectivefundamental structuralchangehas been dissatisfactionof the exploitedand oppressed.As conditionsworsened,thepeopleat thebottom,or someverylargegroup,weredestined-itwasargued-to rebel.Therewouldbe what hasusuallybeencalleda revolution.I shall not resumethe argumentsand counterarguments,which areno doubt

quitefamiliarto almostanyonewho has been seriouslystudyingthe historyofthe modernworld-system.The twentiethcenturywas,amongotherthings,the momentof a long seriesof nationaluprisingsand socialmovementswhichproclaimedtheirrevolutionaryintentsand whichachievedstatepowerin one formoranother.Thehigh pointofthesemovementswas theperiod1945-1970,theperiodpreciselyof theflourishing


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AfterDevelopmentalismandGlobalization,What?/ 1269of developmentalism,which was in some sense the credo of these movements.Butwe alsoknowthat the period1970-2000saw the downfallof most of thesemovementsin power,or at least a drasticrevisionin theirpolicies.Thiswastheperiodof the flourishingof globalization,whoselogic thesemovements-thosestillin poweror thosenow seekingto playa roleof parliamentaryopposition-sullenlyaccepted.So, we have the era of triumphalismfollowedby the era ofdisillusionment.

Some of the cadresof these movementsadjustedto what werethought tobe the new realitiesand othersjumpedship,either into passivewithdrawalorinto joiningactivelythe erstwhileenemy.In the 1980sanduntil the mid-1990s,antisystemicmovementsworldwidewere in a bad way.By 1995, however,themomentarysheen of neoliberalismhad begun to wearoff and there ensuedaworldwide searchfor new antisystemicstrategies.The story from ChiapastoSeattleto PortoAlegrehas been that of the emergenceof a new kind of worldantisystemicmovement,sometimescalledthesedaysaltermondialisme.Mynamefor it is the spirit of PortoAlegreand I think it is going to be an importantelement in theworldpoliticalstrugglesof the next 25-50 years.I shall returntoit in my discussionof realalternativesnow.However,I do not believethata new versionof revolutionarymovementisthe fundamentalfactorin whatI see as the structuralcollapseof the capitalistworld-economy.Systemscollapsenot primarilybecauseof rebellionfrom belowbut becauseof the weaknessesof the dominantclassesand the impossibilityoftheirmaintainingtheir levelof gain and privilege.It is only when the existingsystem is weakenedin terms of its own logic that the push from below canpossiblybe effective.The basicstrengthof capitalismas a systemhas been twofold. On the onehand, it has demonstratedan ability to ensure,againstall odds, the endlessaccumulationof capital.And on the otherhand, it has put into placepoliticalstructuresthathavemadeit possibleto guaranteethis endlessaccumulationofcapitalwithoutbeingdethronedbythe rashanddissatisfied"dangerousclasses."The basic weaknessof capitalismas an historicalsystemtodayis that successisleadingto failure(asSchumpetertaughtus normallyhappens).Asa consequencetoday,both the abilityto guaranteethe endlessaccumulationof capitalandthepoliticalstructuresthat havekept the dangerousclassesin line are collapsingsimultaneously.Thesuccessof capitalismin ensuringthe endlessaccumulationof capitalhasbeenin itsabilityto keepthe threebasiccostsof production-costs of personnel,costs of inputs, and taxation-from escalatingtoo fast.However,it has donethis by mechanismsthat have been exhaustingthemselvesover historicaltime.The systemhas now begunto reacha point where these costs aredramaticallytoo high to makeproductionan adequatesourceof capitalaccumulation.Thecapitaliststratahave turnedto financialspeculationas a substitute.Financialspeculation,however,is intrinsicallyatransitorymechanism,since it is dependent


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1270/ Social Forces83:3,March2005on confidence,and confidencein the mediumrun is underminedby the veryspeculationitself.Allow me to illustrateeach of thesepoints.The costs of personnelare a function of the ongoing, never-endingclassstruggle.Whatthe workershaveon their sideis the concentrationof production(forreasonsof efficiency)andhencetheirabilityovertime to organizethemselvesin both the workplaceandthe politicalarenato put pressureson the employersto increasetheirremuneration.Tobe sure,employersalwaysfightbackbyplayingoneset of workersoffagainstanother.But therearelimitsto doingthis withintheframeworkof a singlecountryorasinglelocalarea,sincetherearepoliticalmeansby whichthe workerscanencrusttheiradvantages(legallyand/orculturally).Wheneverwe are in a KondratieffA-phase,employers,facedwith militantworkerdemands,usuallypreferto allow remunerationto risesomewhat,sinceworkstoppagesdo them moreimmediatedamagethan concessions.Butas soonas we are in a KondratieffB-phase,it becomesimperativefor an employerwhohopesto survivethe badtimesto reducetheremunerationpackage,since thereisacutepricecompetition.It is at thispointthatemployershavehistoricallyresortedto relocation-the "runawayfactory"-transferringtheirproductionto zonesthathave"historically"-lowerratesof remuneration.Butexactlywhathistoryaccountsforthesehistorically-lowerrates?The answeris rathersimple-the existenceof alargepool of rurallabor,forwhomurban,wagedemployment,atwhateverlevelof remuneration,representsa net increasein real income for the household.So,as remunerationgoes up, more or less permanently,in one areaof the world-economy,it is compensatedin termsof the world-economyas a whole by theappearanceof new cohorts of workerswho will acceptlowerremunerationforthe identicalwork,holdingof courseefficiencyconstant.The problemwith this solution to the regularlyrepeatedproblemof theowner/producersis that after 25-50 years the workers in this new zone ofproductionareable to overcometheirinitial urban disorientationandpoliticalignorance and proceed down the same path of class struggle as did otherspreviouslyin other areasof the world.Thezone in questionthereuponceasestobe a zone of historically-lowerremuneration,or at leastnot to the samedegree.Sooneror later,the employersarerequired,in theirself-interest,to flee again,relocatingto yet anotherzone. This constantgeographicalshift of the zones ofproductionhas workedquitewell overthe centuriesbut does havean Achillesheel.Theworldis runningout of new zones intowhichto relocate.This is whatwe meanby the deruralizationof the world,which is going on apace,and at averyacceleratedrate since 1945. The proportionof worldpopulationthat livesin citieswent from 30%to 60% between 1950 and 2000 (see Neubauer).Thecapitalistworld-economyshouldrun out of such zonesentirelywithin25yearsatthe most. Therearealreadytoo few.And withmodernmeansof communication,the time periodfor new zones to learn the lessons of how to organizehasbeendrasticallyreduced.Hence, the abilityof employersto keep remunerationincheck hasbeen drasticallycurtailed.


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AfterDevelopmentalismandGlobalization,What?/ 1271The costsof inputsisdependenton whatpercentageof theinputstheemployeris requiredto pay.Tothe extent that he canget inputsfree,his costsremainlow.The majormechanismby which employershave over the centuriesbeen ableto avoidpaymentfor inputs is by shiftingthe cost to others. This is called theexternalizationof costs.Thethreeprincipalcoststhat havebeenexternalizedaredetoxification,renewalof primaryresources,and infrastructure.Detoxificationiseasyto handleinthebeginning.Onedumpswastesomewherethat is publicor unoccupied.This costs next to nothing.The costs areusuallynot immediate,but delayed.The eventual difficultiesbecome the problemofthe "public"-either as individuals or collectivelyas governments.Clean-up,when it is undertaken,is seldom paid for by the originaluser.In premodern

times,rulersmoved to differentcastlesas theyran out of sewagedumps.In thecapitalistworld-economy,producersdo more or less the same. The problemhere is identicalto the problemof runawayfactoriesand remunerationlevels.We arerunningout of newprospectivedumps.Inaddition,thecollectivecostoftoxificationhascaughtup withus,or at least we aremoreawareof it becauseofscientificadvances.Hence,theworldseeksto detoxifywaste.Thisis calledconcernwith the ecology.And as concernmounts,the questionof who payscomes tothe forefront.Thereis increasingpressureto makethe userof the resourceswholeavestoxic wastepaythe costs of detoxification.Thisis calledinternalizationofcosts.Tothe extent that governmentsimpose such internalizationof costs,theoverallcosts of productionrise,sometimesquitesteeply.The issueof the renewalof primaryresourcesisbasicallyanalogous.If forestsare cut down,theymayrenewthemselvesvianaturalprocesses,but oftenslowly.And the fasterforestsare cut down(becauseof increasedworldproduction),theharderit is for the naturalrenewalprocessto takeplacein meaningfultime. Sohere too, as the ecologicalconcerns havecome to the fore,both governmentsand socialactors haveput pressureon users eitherto restrainuse or to investin renewal.And to the extentthatgovernmentsimposeinternalizationof thesecosts,the costs of productionrise.Finally,the sameis true of infrastructure.Infrastructure,almostbydefinition,is expenditureon costlyactivitiesthat cannotbe attributedto a singleproducer-for example,constructingpublic roadwaysoverwhichtransportationof goodstakesplace.But the fact that these costs cannot be consideredthe costs of asingle producerdoes not mean that they cannot be consideredthe costs of amultitudeof producers.Furthermore,the costof suchinfrastructurehasescalatedgeometrically.Yes,they arepublicgoods,but the publiccan be specifiedup toa point. And once again,to the extent that governmentsimpose even partialinternalizationof suchcosts,the costs of productionrise.The third basiccost of productionis taxation.Anycomparisonof the totallevel of taxationin the world,or in any part of the world,with the world ofa centuryago revealsthat everyoneis paying highertaxestoday,whatevertheoscillationof therates.Whataccountsfor this?Therearethreemajorexpenditures


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1272/ SocialForces83:3,March2005of allgovernments-the costs of collectivesecurity(armies,police,etc.),the costsof allkindsof publicwelfare,and the costs of administration(mostimportantly,the costsof collectingthe taxes).Whyhave thesecosts of governmentrisen sosteeply?The costsof securityhaverisensimplyas a resultof technologicaladvance.Thetoyssecurityforcesuse areeverydayin everywaymoreexpensive.Afterall,securityis agamein whichall sidesalwaystryto havemore than theiropponents.It is likean endlessauctionin whichthe bidsarealwaysbeingraised.Perhapsifwe had a generalizednuclearholocaust,and the survivingworldwent backtobows and arrows,thesecostswouldgo down.But in the wake of anythingless,I see no wayto expectsuch a reduction.

In addition,the costs of welfarehave been goingup steadilyand nothingisslowingthem down,despiteall the hooplaaboutdoingthat.Theyaregoingupforthreereasons.The firstis thatthepoliticsof thecapitalistworld-economyhavepushedthe dominantstratato makeconcessionsto the dangerousclasses,whohave been demandingthreethings-education, healthservices,and guaranteesof lifelongincome.Furthermore,the level of the demandshas been going upsteadilyand becomingmore geographicallyextensive.In addition,people areliving longer(partlythe consequenceof preciselythese welfaremeasures),andhence the collectivecosts have increasedbecauseof the increasein the numberof beneficiaries.The secondreasonis that advancesin technologyin educationand healthhaveincreasedthecosts of providingtheappropriatemachinery(justas in the case of expenditureson security).And finally,the producersin eachof these domains have takenadvantageof this government-subsidizedpublicdemand to takea big cut of the pie.Welfare,as the conservativecomplainthas said,has becomean entitlement.And it is difficultto see how any governmentcould survivea truly significantcutbackin these expenditures.But of course,someonemust pay for this.Andproducersin the end pay,eitherdirectlyor via their employeeswho demandhigherremunerationpreciselyto paythesecosts.We do not havegood data on the steadyincreaseof all thesecosts,but theyare considerable.On the other hand,we cannot have a rise in the salespriceof worldgoods to match the increaseof productioncostspreciselybecauseofthe enormousexpansionof worldproductionwhichhas reducedthe multiplemonopolizationsandincreasedworldcompetition.Sothe bottom line is thatthecostsof productionhaverisen fasterthanthesalespricesof production,andthismeans a profitsqueeze,whichtranslatesinto difficultiesin accumulatingcapitalthroughproduction.Thissqueezehas been evidentoverallfor somethirtyyearsalready,which accountsfor the speculativeragethat has encompassedworldcapitalistssince the 1970s and which shows no signsof lettingup. Butbubblesburst.Balloonscannot be infinitelyexpanded.To be sure, capitalists collectively fight back. This is what neoliberalglobalizationis all about-a massivepoliticalattemptto roll backremuneration


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AfterDevelopmentalismandGlobalization,What?/ 1273costs,to counterdemandsfor internalizationof costs,and of course to reducelevelsof taxation.As has happenedwith every previoussuch counteroffensiveagainstrisingcosts,it has succeededpartially,butonly verypartially.Evenafterallthe cutbacksbythe mostreactionaryregimes,the costs of productionin the firstdecadeof the twenty-firstcenturyaremarkedlyhigherthantheywere in 1945.I think of this as the ratcheteffect-two stepsforwardand one stepbackwardaddup to a secularrisingcurve.As the underlyingeconomic structuresof the capitalist world-economyhave been moving in the directionof reachingan asymptotewhich makesitincreasinglydifficultto accumulatecapital,thepoliticalstructuresthat havebeenholdingthe dangerousclassesin checkhavealso run into trouble.

The period of developmentalism,1945-1970, was also the period of thetriumph of the historic antisystemic movements, which came into powerin one form or another almost everywhere.Theirbiggest promise had beenthe developmentalistdream.When that failed,the supportof their followersdisintegrated.The movements,whetherthey called themselvescommunist orsocial-democrator national liberation movements, fell from power almosteverywhere.The period of globalization,1970-2000, was the period of deepdisillusionmentwith the historicantisystemicmovements.Theyfell fromgraceand areunlikelyto attractthe deeployaltyof the mass of the populationsagain.They maybe supported electorallyas better than the other guys,but they nolongeraredeemedworthyof the faiththey representedfor a goldenfuture.The decline of these movements-the so-called Old Left-is not in fact aplus for the smooth functioningof the capitalistworld-economy.While thesemovements were antisystemicin their goals, they were disciplinedstructureswhich controlled the spontaneous radicalimpulses of their followers.Theymobilizedforspecificactions,buttheyalsodemobilizedfollowers,especiallywhentheywerein government,insistingon thebenefitsin a distantfuture,asopposedto untrammeleddisturbancesin the present.The collapseof thesemovementsrepresentsthe collapseon constraintson the dangerousclasses,who therebybecome dangerousagain.The spreadinganarchyof the twenty-firstcenturyisthe clearreflectionof this shift.Thecapitalistworld-economyis todayaveryunstablestructure.It has neverbeen moreso. It is veryvulnerableto sudden and swift destructivecurrents.

IIIIf it is not, what kinds of alternativespresent themselves to all of usnow?

It is not very comfortingto anyonein countriesof the South to say that thepresentworld-systemis in structuralcrisis and that we are in a transitionfromit to someotherworld-systemoverthe next 25-50 years.Theywillwant to know


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1274/ SocialForces83:3,March2005whathappensin the meantime,and what if anythingtheycan or should do toimprovethe lot of the populationsof thesecountriesrightnow.Peopletend tolive in the present,as indeed they should.On the other hand, it is importantto know what are the constraintsof the presentin order that our actions bemaximallyuseful,in the sense that they furtherthe objectiveswe seekin somemeaningfulway.So let me indicate what I think is the scenarioover the next25-50 years,and what that impliesfor the immediatepresent.The scenario over the next 25-50 yearsis twofold. On the one hand, thecollapseof our existinghistoricalsystemis most likelyfor all the reasonsI laidout just previously.On the other hand,what will replacethe existingsystemis completelyuncertain,inherentlyunpredictable,althoughall of us can haveinputinto that uncertainoutcome. It is inherentlyuncertainbecause,wheneverwe arein a systemicbifurcation,there is no wayof knowingin advancewhichfork in the road we shallcollectivelytake.This is the messageof the sciencesofcomplexity(see Prigogine).On the otherhand,preciselybecausethis is a periodof transitionin whichthe existingsystemis far from equilibrium,with wild and chaotic oscillationsin all domains,the pressuresto returnto equilibriumareextremelyweak.Thismeansthat,in effect,we arein the domainof"freewill"and thereforeouractions,individualandcollective,havea directandlargeimpacton the historicalchoiceswith which the worldis faced.In a sense,to translatethis into our concerns,wemay saythat the objectiveof "development"whichcountriesand scholarshavebeenpursuingfor some fiftyyearsnow are far morerealizablein the next25-50yearsthantheyeverwereup to now. But of coursethereis no guarantee,for theoutcomeis uncertain.In the largergeopoliticalarena,there arepresentlythreeprincipalcleavages.Thereis firstthe triadicstrugglebetweenthe UnitedStates,westernEurope,andJapan/EastAsiato be theprincipallocusof capitalaccumulationin the capitalistworld-economy.There is secondlythe long-standingstrugglebetween Northand Southfor distributionof the worldsurplus.And there is the new strugglethat revolvesaroundthe structuralcrisis of the capitalistworld-economyandcenterson which of the twopossibleforksthe worldwill takein completingthetransitionto a new system.The first two strugglesare traditionalwithin the frameworkof the modernworld-system.The so-calledtriad areroughlyequalcontestantsin the attemptto reorganizethe world-system'sproductionand financialsystems.As with allsuchtriadicstruggles,there is pressureto reducethe triadto a dyad,whichmayoccurin the next decadeor so. I havelong arguedthat the most likely pair isthe United Statesand Japan/EastAsiaagainstwesternEurope/Russia(e.g., seeWallerstein).But I shall not repeatthis argumenthere, since I considerthisstrugglesecondaryto the issue of overcomingthe polarizationof the existingsystem,that is, permittingwhat we have called"development"throughouttheworld-system.


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AfterDevelopmentalismandGlobalization,What?/ 1275The second struggle,that between North and South,has of course been acentralfocus of developmentissues for the last fifty years.Indeed,the greatdifferencebetweenthe era of developmentalismand the era of globalizationhas been the relativestrengthof the two sides. Whilein the firstera,the Southseemed to be improvingits position,if only slightly,the secondperiodhas beenone of atriumphantpushbackbythe North. But thispushbackhas nowcometoa close,with the deadlockin the WorldTradeOrganizationand the splitamongthe spokesmenof the North about the wisdom of the Washingtonconsensus.I think here of the increasinglyopen dissentof such figuresas JosephStiglitz,JeffreySachs,andGeorgeSoros,amongmanyothers,and the remarkablesofteningof the rigiditiesof the InternationalMonetaryFundin the post-2000 period.I

do not expectthatin the comingdecadestherewill be muchpushoff-centerinthis contest.It is the thirdcleavagewhich reflectsthe new situation,that of the structuralcrisiswith its consequentchaos in the world-systemand the bifurcationthat isoccurring.This is the splitbetweenthe spiritof Davos and the spiritof PortoAlegre,which I mentioned previously.I should explainwhat I think are thecentralissueshere. The struggleis not about whetheror not we arein favorofcapitalismas a world-system.Thestruggleis about what shouldreplaceit, giventheimplosionof thepresentworld-system.The tworeplacementpossibilitieshaveno real namesand have no detailedoutlines.What is in questionis essentiallywhether the replacementsystemwill be hierarchicaland polarizing (that is,like the present system,or worse)or will be insteadrelativelydemocraticandegalitarian.Theseare basic moralchoices,and being on one side of the otherdictatesour politics.The contoursof the actualpolitical playersarestill uncertain.The side ofthe spiritof Davos is splitbetweenthose whose vision of the futureinvolvesanunremittingharshnessof strategyandinstitution-buildingandthose who insistthat such a vision would createan untenablesystem,which could not last. Atthe moment,it is a verydividedcamp.The sideof the spiritof PortoAlegrehasotherproblems.Theyconstitutepoliticallymerelya loose allianceof variegatedmovementsall over the worldwhich, todayat least,meet togetherwithin theframeworkof the WorldSocialForum(WSF).Collectively,they have no clearstrategyasyet.Buttheydo havea good deal of grassrootssupport,andtheyareclear aboutwhattheyoppose.The question is what those who would uphold the spirit of PortoAlegreshouldreallydo to advancethis "otherworld"theyassertis possible.And this isa doublequestion.Whatis it thatthosefewgovernmentswho sharetheirvision,at leastup to a point, shoulddo, and what the multiplemovementsshould do.Governmentsdealwiththeshort-runissues.Movementscandealwithbothshort-run and middle-runissues.Both kinds of issuesaffectthe longer-runtransitionprocess.And short-run issuesaffect our dailylives immediately.An intelligentpoliticalstrategymust move on all frontsat once.


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1276/ SocialForces83:3,March2005Thebiggestshort-runissueis thecontinuingdriveof the neoliberalglobalizersto achievea one-sidedexpansionof open borders-open in the South,but not

reallyopen in the North.This is the heartof the persistentdiscussionwithin theframeworkof the WorldTradeOrganization,and of all the bilateraldiscussionsbeing conducted most notably by the United States but also secondarilybythe EuropeanUnion and its members-the creation of multiple "free tradeagreements"likeNAFTA,CAFTA,etc.Basicallywhat the UnitedStatespushesforis guaranteesfor its monopolies(so-calledintellectualproperty)and accessforits financialinstitutionsin returnfor limitedtariff concessionson agriculturaland low-valueindustrialgoodsproducedin countriesof the South.The offensivewithinthe WTOwas stalledatCancunbya coalitionof mediumpowersof theSouth-Brazil, India,SouthAfrica,etc.-who putforwardasimpledemand:free trade that works both ways.If the North wants us to open ourbordersto them,theysaidin effect,it mustopenits bordersto us. But the Northis basicallyunableto acceptthis kindof dealfor two reasons.It would resultinconsiderablyincreasedunemploymentand downsizedincomein countriesof theNorth,whichispoliticallyimpossibleforgovernmentssubjectto electoralconteststo accept.And it is not clearto the triadwhich of themwouldprofitmost,or loseleast,fromsucharrangements,and thereforetheyhesitate.Afterall,the triadisengagedwithtariff/subsidycontroversieswitheachother,andarrangementswiththe Southwouldweakentheirpoliticalpositionsin thiseconomicallyevenmoreimportantconflictfromthe point of view of the countriesof the North.One can drawtwo conclusionsfrom this. This is a politicalquarreldoomedto a standstill.And it is politically very important for the countries of theSouth to maintainthis stance,fromtheir own point of view.This is the singlemost importantaction thesegovernmentscan take to furtherthe possibilityofmaintainingor raisingthe standardof livingin their countries.Tothe sirensofthe neoliberaldogmas,these countries arenow respondingskeptically,"showme,"and this skepticismis justified.Of course,thesegovernmentshaveto remainin power.Andthebiggestthreatto that is externalinterferencein theirpolitics.Whatthe largercountriesof theSouth arenow doing,and will speed up doing in the next decade,is seekingtoenterthe nuclearclub.Whatthis will accomplishis to largelyneutralizeexternalmilitarythreatandtherebyminimizeexternalpoliticalthreat.Andthe thirdthingone candemandof thesegovernmentsis socialwelfaredistributionwithin theircountries,whichof coursecould includelow-leveldevelopmentprojects(suchasdiggingwells,etc.).Whatone cannotexpectof thesecountriesis thatsomepolicyon theirpartis goingto turn them into a.Denmarkin the next 10-20-30 years.It's not going to happenand is basicallya diversionfrom an intelligentpolicy.Theroleof progressivegovernmentsis primarilyto makesurethatconditionsintheircountriesandthe worlddo not get still worsein the decadesto come.It is the movementsthat can do more than the governments,althoughthe


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AfterDevelopmentalismandGlobalization,What?/ 1277movementsneed to keep minimallyprogressivegovernmentsin powerandnotengagein leftistinfantilistcritiquesaboutthe lackof achievementsthat arein factimpossibleto expect.Andherewe mustpoint out an importantelement that isoften lost from observation.The first two geopoliticalcleavagesaregeographic:conflictsamongthe Triadand North-Southconflicts.But the conflict betweenthe spiritof Davos and thespiritof PortoAlegrehas no geography.Itcuts acrossthe entireworld,as do the movements.It is a classstruggle,a moralstruggle,not a geographicstruggle.In the medium run, what the movements can best do is to pushdecommodificationwherevertheycan,and to the extent thattheycan. No onecan be quite sure how this would work.It will take a lot of experimentationto find viable formulas.And such experimentationis going on. It is going on,we must remember,within a basicallyhostileenvironment,in whichthere aresystemicpressuresto undermineanysuchattempts,and which can corrupttheparticipantswith not too muchdifficulty.Butdecommodificationnot onlystemsthe drive for neoliberalextensionsbut buildsthe basis for an alternatepoliticalculture.Of course,the theoristsof capitalismhavelong derideddecommodification,arguingthat it is illusory,that it goes against some presumedinnate socialpsychologyof humankind,that it is inefficient,and that it guaranteeslack ofeconomic growthand thereforeof poverty.All of this is false.We have onlyto look at two major institutions of the modern world-universities andhospitals-to realizethat, at least up to twentyyearsago, no one questionedthattheyshouldbe runasnonprofitinstitutions,withoutshareholdersorprofit-takers.And it would be hard to argue seriouslythat,for that reason,theyhavebeen inefficient,unreceptiveto technologicaladvances,incapableof attractingcompetent personnelto run them, or unableto performthe basicservicesforwhichtheywere created.

We don't know how these principleswould work, if appliedto large-scaleproductionlike steelproductionorsmall-scale,more artisanalproduction.But todismissthis outof handis simplyblind andin anerawhenproductiveenterprisesarebecomingfarlessprofitablethanpreviously,preciselybecauseof theeconomicgrowthwhichthecapitalistworld-economyhasbred,is foolish.Pushingalternateformsof developmentalongtheselines has a potentialfor answeringproblemsnot only of the South but of the decliningindustrialregionsof the North.In anycase,as I haveinsisted,the issue is not what will magicallysolvetheimmediatedilemmasof ourworld-systembut thebasison whichwe shallcreatethe successorworld-system.And to addressthat seriously,we must firstof allcomprehendwithsomeclaritythehistoricaldevelopmentof ourpresentsystem,appreciateitsstructuraldilemmastoday,andopenourmind to radicalalternativesfor the future.And we mustdo all this,not merelyacademicallybut practically,thatis, livingin the presentandconcernedwith the immediateneeds of people


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1278/ SocialForces83:3,March2005as well as longer-run transformations. We must therefore fight both defensivelyand offensively.And if we do it well, we may, but only may, come out ahead inthe lifetimes of some of the younger members of this audience.

Notes1.TheclassicarticleisthatbyGiovanniArrighiandJessicaDrangel(1986).Arrighiiscurrentlyupdatingthisargumentin a forthcomingarticle.2. Althoughthis is primafacie logical, it seldom enters into analysesof mainstreameconomists.

ReferencesArrighi,Giovanni,andJessicaDrangel.1986."TheStratificationof theWorld-Economy:AnExplorationof theSemiperipheralZone."Review10:9-74.Atkinson,AnthonyB.,LeeRainwater,andTimothySmeeding.1993."IncomeDistributionin EuropeanCountries,"Pp. 41-63 in Incomesand the WelfareState:Essayson BritainandEurope,editedbyAnthonyB. Atkinson.CambridgeUniv.Press.Guy,Camille. 1900. Les coloniesfranfaises:la mise en valeur de notredomainecoloniale,Vol.III.Publicationsde laCommissionchargeedepreparerlaparticipationdela MinisteredesColonies,AugustinChallamel.Neubauer,Deane.2004."MixedBlessingsof theMegacities."YaleGlobalOnline,September24.http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4573Prigogine,Ilya,in collaborationwith IsabelleStengers.1997. TheEndof Certainty:Time,Chaos,and the New Lawsof Nature. Free Press.Rey,Alain, and Chantreau,Sophie. 1979. Les Usuelsde Robert:Dictionnaire des expressionset locutionsfigurees.Le Robert.Wallerstein,Immanuel.1991."JapanandtheFutureTrajectoryof theWorld-System:Lessonsfrom History?"Pp. 36-48 in Geopoliticsand Geoculture:Essayson the ChangingWorld-System.CambridgeUniv.Press.

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