Wallerstein, The Ottoman Empire and the Capitalist World-Economy

8/12/2019 Wallerstein, The Ottoman Empire and the Capitalist World-Economy

1/11

Research Foundation of SUNY

The Ottoman Empire and the Capitalist World-Economy: Some Questions for ResearchAuthor(s): Immanuel WallersteinReviewed work(s):Source: Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 2, No. 3 (Winter, 1979), pp. 389-398Published by: Research Foundation of SUNYfor and on behalf of the Fernand Braudel CenterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40240805.

Accessed: 17/04/2012 15:25

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Research Foundation of SUNYand Fernand Braudel Centerare collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve

and extend access toReview (Fernand Braudel Center).

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=rfsunyhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=fbchttp://www.jstor.org/stable/40240805?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/40240805?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=fbchttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=rfsuny


2/11

Review,

I, 3,

Winter

979

,

389-98.

The Ottoman

Empire

and

the

Capitalist

World-Economy:

Some

Questions

for

Research*

Immanuel Wallerstein

My

problem

is

a

simple

one. At

one

point

in

time,

the

Ottoman

Empire

was outside

the

capitalist

world-economy.

t

a later

point

in

time,

the

Ottoman

Empire

was

incorporated

into the

capitalist

world-economy.

ow do

we knowwhatthese

points

n

time

were? And

by

what

process

did the transition

fromTi to

Tn take

place?

I

say immediately

hat

I do not

know

the answers

o

these

questions.

wish

merely

o

suggest

ways

we

might roceed

n order o answer

hem.

All

answers

o

historically-specific

ets

of

questions

presume

a paradigm f social structure nd social change.Allowme to

make

mine

xplicit,

lbeit

very riefly.1

1.

A

world-empire

nd a

world-economy

re two

very

iffer-

ent

kinds

of social

systems

n

terms

of

their

conomics,

heir

Prepared

for First

International

Congress

on the Social

and

Economic

History

of

Turkey

1071-1920),

Ankara,

July

11-14,

1977.

*

I

have elaborated

my

paradigm

t

great

ength

lsewhere.

See The

Modern

World-System

New

York

and London:

Academic

Press,

1974),

and

The

Capitalist

World-EconomyNew York: CambridgeUniversityress,1979).


3/11

390

ImmanuelWallerstein

politics,

and theircultural

xpressions.

A

world-empire

s de-

fined as a

single

social

economy

(division

of

labor)

with

an

overarchingolitical

tructure.

world-economy

s defined

s

a

single

social

economy containing

multiple

state-structures.

These

two

systems

have different

modes

of

production.

A

world-empire

ses

a

redistributive/tributary

ode,

in which

capital

accumulation s

not

maximized,

nd in whichthe basic

redistribution

s

a function

of

political

decisions.

A

world-

economy

uses

a

capitalist

mode,

n which

capital

ccumulation

per

se

is

the

controlling

onsideration

f

social

action,

nd

this

objective s pursued through hemarket,which s however t

most

onlypartially

free from

olitical

nd

social

constraint.

2.

The

dynamics

f

these

wo social

systems

re

quite

differ-

ent. A

world-empire

xpands

to the socio-technical

imits

of

effective

olitical

control f

the

redistributive

rocess,

nd then

either hrinks r

disintegrates.

ts

history

ends

to be one

long

cycle

of

expansion

and contraction.The

capitalist

world-

economy operates

via

repeated cyclical rhythms

f

expansion

and

contraction,

ut

it

also

has secular

inear trends

f de-

velopment .

Crucial

for our

discussion s

one of

these

trends,

that of the

unlimited

geographical xpansion

of the world-

market.The differencesere mentioned

y

no meansexhaust

the

ist.

3.

World-systems

ave an

internal

conomic

nd

political

ife

which

determines

he

largest

part

of

social

reality.

They

also

however

ome

into contactwitheach other

xternally.

World-

empires

meet

each other s

theyexpand

and

usually

et limits

thereby

o

their

mutual

xpansion.

When

world-empire

nd a

world-economy

meet

however,

ne

tends o absorb

he other.

Historically,

t

has

almost

lways

been the

case

that n

expand-

ing

world-empire

as

absorbed

a

surrounding

orld-economy

into its imperium.t is onlywiththe adventof theEuropean

world-economy

n the

sixteenth

entury

hat we

have a clear

case

of

the

opposite:

the

incorporation

f

surrounding

orld-

empires

nto the

ambit f the

capitalist

world-economy.

4. Trade

between

world-systems

s

fundamentally

ifferent

from

rade

within

world-systems:

n

the natureof the

trade;

n

its

mpact

on the

political

tructures;

n

ts

ong-termurability.

Specifically,

rade

between

ystems

ends

to be

trade

n luxur-

ies,

that

is,

non-essentials.n

value

terms,

t tendsto be

equal

trade,

emembering

owever

hat ach

side

tends

o have differ-

ent

cultural

definitions

f

value

(whereas

radewithin

ystems


4/11

Ottoman

mpire

nd

CapitalistWorld-Economy

391

tends o be

unequal

trade).

The tradebetween

ystems

ends o

utilize

ongoing

productive ystems

ather han

to

transform

them.

f

tradebetween

wo

points

eems

o

change

n

character,

this

s both

caused

by

the

consequence

of an

evolving

hift

n

the

systemic

boundaries

themselves,

nd

correlatively

f the

mode of

production.

How does

all

this

apply

to the

Ottoman

Empire

and

the

European

world-economy?

n

my

terms,

he Ottoman

Empire,

at least

at

the

beginning,

as

a

classic ase

of a

world-empire.

t

came into contact with

a

capitalist

world-economy,

hat

of

Europe. There was trade between he twosystems. here was

warfare.

At some

point

n

time,

he

European

world-economy

absorbed

the

Ottoman

Empire

nto its ambit.

At

this

atter

point,

the Ottoman

Empire

was

no

longer

world-empire

ut

simply

one more

state

located

within

the

boundaries

of

the

capitalist

world-economy.

At

this

latter

point

of

time,

the

production

within

he

Ottoman

Empire

was

peripheralized .

That

s,

t

came

to

play

a

particular

ole within

capitalist

mode

of

production,

nd

be

governed

by

the

pressures

or

capital

accumulation

er

se,

as

mediated

by

the

supply

demand

urves

of the world

market,

nd

by

the

capital-labor

elations

hat

were reflected n the

political compromises

f the Ottoman

state. The economic inks

including

he

trade)

between

ocal

regions

of the

Ottoman

Empire

and

various

parts

of

Europe

came

to

be

fundamentally

ifferent

t the ater

point

n time

from

he inks

t the earlier

oint

n time.

I

know

something

f

the

history

f the

European

world-

economy.

know far

ess

about

Ottoman

conomic and

social

history.

can thereforeutline he former

istory

ut

only

raise

questions

bout

the atter.

When he

European

world-economyeveloped

tsboundaries

in the sixteenth entury,ts singlecapitalistdivisionof labor

extended

ver

Europe

east to Poland and

Hungary,

outh o

the

Mediterranean,

nd

westto

IberianAmerica. astern

urope

to

be

precise,

northeastern

urope),

the

Americas,

nd southern

Italy

were

its

primaryperipheral

reas,

specializing

n

low-

labor-cost ulk

essentials

roduced

for

the world

market

nd

utilizing argely

coerced forms of labor. At

this

time,

the

Russian

and

Ottoman

Empires

were

economically

xternal

o

this

system,

s

was

the Indian

Ocean

world-economy

nd the

coastal

zones

of

Africa. These latter

areas were all in

trade

relationswith

the

European world-economy,

ut

it

was es-


5/11

392

ImmanuelWallerstetn

sentially

he so-called rich trades . Each of these atter reas

formed

ts

own

division

of

labor

and had

an

important

nd

complex

conomic

ife

of

ts

own.

The

European

yvorld-economy

ent

through

long

ex-

pansionist

phase

roughly

from 1450

to

1650,

followed

by

a

long

(overlapping)

eriod

of

relative

ontraction

r

stagnation

from

1600-1750.

I

suspect

that the

relationship

f the

Euro-

pean

world-economy

o the

various

ystems

xternal

o

it did

not

change

fundamentally

uring

his

contracting

hase,

al-

though

here

was continuous

volution

of the socio-economic

structuresuring histime.2Beginningbout 1750, theEuro-

pean

world-economygain

expanded

ts

economic

activity

nd

its outer

boundaries.

t

is

clear

to me

that in

the

period

1750-1873,

the

capitalist

world-economy

ncluded

n its

ambit

Russia,

the

Ottoman

Empire,

ndia,

West

Africa,

nd

perhaps

other reas

as

peripheral

ones

(or

a

semiperipheral

one

in the

case of

Russia).

My

own

largest

rea of

uncertainty

n relation o

the

Otto-

man

Empire

s whether

ts

peripheralization

hould

be dated

from he nineteenth

or

late

eighteenth entury)

r

from he

early

seventeenth

entury.

The standard

iterature

ffers

oth

kindsof

periodization.

On the one hand,Halil Inalcik

argues

that

the

1590's

mark the

main

dividing

ine in Ottoman

history. 3

On the

other

hand,

M.

A. Cook

says:

There

was

no

radical

discontinuity

n the

history

f the Ottoman

state

be-

tween

the

early

fifteenth

entury

.

. and the

early

nineteenth

century.

. . 4

I believethat the choice has

to be made

primarily

n terms

f

the real

economics

of the

situation,

nd

only

secondarily

n

terms

of the

continuity

f

political

forms

or of

ideological

belief-systems.

would therefore

ut

forward s

the

questions

for esearchhefollowing:

(1)

If the

Ottoman

Empire

an be

demonstrated

ot to

be a

peripheral

one of the

European

world-economy

n the

six-

^*

There

was

however

expansion

of the

European

world-economy

n

the

1600-1750

period

to

include

North

America

nd

the

Caribbean.

3-

Halil

inalcik,

The

Ottoman

Empire:

The Classical

Age,

1300-1600

(New

York:

Praeger, 973),

4.

4#

M A.

Cook,

Introduction

to

M.

A.

Cook,

d.,

A

Historyof

the Ottoman

Empire o 1730 (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity ress,1976), 9.


6/11

Ottoman

mpire

nd

Capitalist

World-Economy

393

teenth

entury,why

was it not

incorporated

nto the

emerging

division

f

labor from

he

outset,

ike

Poland or

Sicily?

This s

not an

implausible uery, given

the

long previous

conomic

links

f

the Ottoman

mpire

with

Venice

at

least.

(2)

When does the Ottoman

Empire

become

incorporated

into

the

world-economy?

his

question

involves

three

sub-

questions:

(a)

What

were

the

processes,

both

within

the

Ottoman

Empire

nd

within

he

European

world-economy,

hat

ccount

for his ncorporation?

(b)

Is

the

incorporation

single

vent,

r candifferent

regions

f the

Empire

Rumelia,

Anatolia,

yria, gypt,

tc.

-

be

said

to

be

incorporated

t different

oments

n

time?

(c)

What

were

the

political

consequences

of

incorpo-

ration?

(3)

Whenever

he Ottoman

Empire

was thus

incorporated,

why

was

it

not

incorporated

s

a

semiperipheral

egion

ather

than

as

a

peripheral

egion?

Once

again,

this

s

not an

implausi-

ble

query,

as

it

might

e

argued

hat Russia

and

perhaps

lso

Japan),

when

hey

were

ncorporated,

ame

n

as

semiperipheral

regions.

The

way

I

would

go

about

answering

hese

queries,

had

I

sufficient

nowledge,

would

be to look

at actual

production

processes

nd then

t trade

patterns.

In

the

period

up

to

the

end of the sixteenth

entury,

t

seems

clear

that

ong-distance

rade

of the Ottoman

mpire

was trade

in luxuries.

One

description

f

(fifteenth-century)

rade

from

the east

to

Bursa

will

suffice:

The

merchandise

arried n

this

caravan

oute consisted

sually

f

ightweight,

xpensive

oods,

such

as

spices,

dyestuffs,

rugs

nd textiles. 5

Compare

this

withthisdescription

f

intra-systemic

rade

for

the

sixteenth

century):

Egypt

and

Syria

were

vital

to the

economy

of

Istanbul

and

the

empire.

Provisions

or

the

sultan's

Palace,

such

as

rice,

wheat,

barley,

spices

or

sugar,

came

by galleon

from

Egypt,

and in the sixteenth

century

Syria

annually

sent

50,000

kg.

of

soap

to

the

Palace.

Sudanese

gold

came

to

Istanbul

through gypt.

. .

*

inalcik,

op.

cit.,

125.

See

.also

p.

162:

Luxury goods,

such

as

jewels,

expensive extiles, pices,dyesand perfumes,made up most of theoverseas trade.


7/11

394

Immanuel

Wallerstein

Since the Ottomans controlled the Dardanelles theywere easily

able to exclude the

Italians

fromthe

Black

Sea trade

[wheat,

fish,

oil, salt,

ships'

masts]

and

develop

the

region

as an

integral

art

of

the

empire's conomy,

ike

Egypt

or

Syria.

Trade withVenice n the

sixteenth

entury

was

more

mbigu-

ous

in

nature.

To some

extent,

t

seems

to have

been trade n

which

Ottoman

primarygoods

went

outward n returnfor

Venetian manufactures. ut

how did

this trade

compare

in

value

and

importance

o

the trade

deriving

rom

he

role of

Istanbul

as

a

food

importer

rom

he rest

of the

empire

nd

a

manufacturingnd re-export enterof manufactured oods

from

herest

f the

empire?7

urthermore,

s

we

know,

Venice

was

a

decliningpole

of

Europe

as the locus

of

activity

was

shifting

o

the Atlantic.

Why

was

the

Ottoman

mpire

ot

ncorporated

fully)

n

the

sixteenth

entury

nto

the

emerging apitalist

world-economy?

Would

not the

simplest

xplanation

be

the

combination

f

Europe's

needs,

distance,

and Ottoman

resistance?

Could

western

urope

have

absorbed

potential

Ottoman

roduction

f

peripheral

roducts

n addition

o those

of

eastern

Europe

and

theAmericas?WastheOttomanEmpirenotfurtherwayfrom

the

emerging

ndustrialones

of

northwest

urope?

Was

not the

Ottoman tate

strong

nough

o

prevent

process

f

peripheral-

ization?After

ll,

the sixteenth

entury

s

generally

onsidered

6'

Ibid.,

128-29.

'

See

ibid..,

145:

The

need to

provide

food

for

Istanbul

linked

the

empire's

various

areas

of

production

o a

single

entre

nd was a

major

factor

n

creating

n

integrated

economy. The fact that in the mid-seventeenthenturythe city's ovens

consumed

250

tons

of wheat

daily

in

an

indication

of

the

city's

needs.

Bulky

foodstuffs,

uch as

grain,

il,

salt

or

sheep,

could

easily

come

to Istanbul

by

sea,

and

by

the

second

half of

the

seventeenth

entury

the number

of

food-carryinghips

rriving

ach

year

n the docks

of Istanbul

had reachedtwo

thousand.

Wheat,

rice, sugar

nd

spices

from

Egypt;

ivestock,

ereals,

dible

fats,honey,

fish nd

hides

from

Thessaly

and

Macedonia;

and

wine and other

Mediterranean

roducts

from the Morea and

the

Aegean

islands,

ontinually

poured

into

istanbul. Districts lose

to the

capital

were

lso

dependent

n the

Istanbul

market.

From

Tekirdagi

came

the wheat

of

Thrace,

from

Constanta

and

Mangalia

the wheat of

the

Dobrudja.

Timber

was

imported

from

zmit.

The

Dobrudja,

a

no-man's and

in

the Middle

Ages,

became the

granary

f

Istanbul,with the establishment hereof hundredsof villagesand the con-


8/11

Ottoman

mpire

nd

CapitalistWorld-Economy

395

the highpoint of Ottomanpoliticalcohesiveness; he empire

was

certainly

most

xtensive

hen.8

What

then

happened

after he

sixteenth

entury?

or one

thing,

the

expansion

of

the

Ottoman

Empire

was halted.

BernardLewis talks

of the

closing

of

the frontier

nd

its

shattering

mpact. 9

Cyclical

decline had

set

in,

and

as tra-

ditionally

happens:

The

shrinking

conomy

of

the Em-

pire

. .

had to

support

n

increasinglyostly

nd

cumbersome

superstructure. 10

his led to an

acute

increase n the

rate

of

surplus

xtraction

rom he

direct

roducers:

[W]hat

could no

longer

be

picked

up

along

the

frontiers

f

the

empire

could,

in

part

at

least,

be

made

good by

extracting

more

from

subject populations

at home.

Landholders

could and

did

demand

extra

payments

fromthe

peasants

on their

states.

Officials

of

the sultan's

slave

household could

and

did

demand extra

pay-

ments,

itherfor

the

performance

f the

duties of the

office,

r

for

non-performance

f

such

duties, .e.,

for

granting xceptions

to

the

rule. Such

devices allowed the

Turkish

avalrymen

nd the

officials

of the

sultan's slave

family

to live

more

luxuriously

than

their

struction

f state

grain-storehouses

t the

ports.

Rice from he Maritsa

alley

and

western

Thrace

was

an

essential

ommodity

or he Palace

army;

from he

plains

of

Bulgaria,

Macedonia and eastern

Thrace,

dealers

regularly

ent

heep

and cattle

to

the

slaughterhouses

f

Istanbul.

As a

transit nd

re-export entre,

and as

an

exporter

of

manufactured

goods,

Istanbul

provided

an economic link between

regions.

The

export

of

cottons

from

Merzifon,

osya,

Tire,

Bergama,

enizli,

Larende,

Bor

and

Nigde

in

Anatolia,

n return orfoodstuffs

or

stanbul

from

Rumelia and

the

north,

appears

to

have

stimulated

he manufacture

f

cotton

textiles

n

these

places.

At the same

time,

lothing,

woolen

and silk

ndustries

eveloped

in

istanbuL

In the trade

triangle

between

the

northernBlack Sea

region,

stanbul

and

Anatolia,

a

great

deal

of

money

ame into and

again

eft

he

capital.

The

state

spentmuchof its revenueon the Palace and army n Istanbul, largepartof

this

moneygoing

o Anatolia and the

Balkans.

Donald

Edgar

Pitcher's alculations

how

a

high

point

of

area

directly

nder

the

central

government

f

974,500

square

miles in

1595.

In addition

there

were

tributary

tates,

yielding

approximate figures

f

350,000

sq.

miles

in

1566

and

220,000

in

1606. See

An Historical

Geography

of

the Ottoman

Empire

(Leiden:

E.

J.

Brill,

972),

134-35. See

also

Map

XXIV.

Q

*

Bernard

Lewis,

The

Emergence of

Modern

Turkey

London:

Oxford Uni-

versity ress,

nd

d.,

1968),

26.

10-

Ibid., 31.


9/11

396

Immanuel

Wallerstein

predecessors

had done in the

days

of

rapid

territorial

xpansion

and

abundant

booty

income.1

If we look

at what

happened internally

s

a

consequence,

Stanford

Shaw

argues

that the

price

rises

of

Europe

-

he

is

speaking

f

a

period

dated

1566-1683

-

led to

a demandfor

wheat,wool,

copper,

nd

precious

metals uch

that

they

were

sucked

out of the

Ottoman

Empire,

where

the

prices

had

remained

elatively

ow. 12

Eventually

he

consequent

mports

would

destroy

he traditional

ttoman

raft

ndustry 13

ut

Shaw dates this as of the ate eighteenthnd earlynineteenth

centuries.

This

sounds

like

incorporation,

nd

certainly

t has been

interpreted

s such.

Ilkay

Sunar

describes he

seventeenth

nd

eighteenth

enturies hus:

[T]he

Ottoman

economy

underwent

imultaneously ncorporation

into

the world

market

system

and the commercialization

of

its

agriculture.

.

.

Ottoman

trade with the

outside

. .

ceased

to

be

transit

rade and

became

increasingly

ess administered nd increas-

ingly

more an

economic

process

of

exchange

of Ottoman

primary

goods

for

manufactured

uropean products.1'*

Sunar

talks of

the

transition

rom

household

production

o

coerced cash

production,

s

the

estates encroached

upon

the

domestic

economy; 15

he

includes

n

these

arge

estates the

iltizam

(tax-farms),

he malikne

life-

arms),

nd

iftlik,

nd

even the

waqf

lands,

and

argues

that the

organization

f

economic ife became

increasingly

ubject

to the

dynamics

f

the worldmarket. . . 16

Finally,

or

Sunar,

he

11#

William H.

McNeill,

Europe's Steppe

Frontier,

1500-1800

(Chicago:

Uni-

versity fChicagoPress,1964), 60.

12

Stanford

haw, Historyof

the Ottoman

Empire

and

Modern

Turkey,

Cam-

bridge:

Cambridge

University

ress,

1976),

I,

172.

13%

Ibid.,

I,

173.

'

Ilkay Sunar,

The

Political

Rationality

of Ottoman Economics:

Formation

and

Transformation,

n

S.

Mardin and W. I.

Zartman,

eds.,

Polity,Economy

and

Society

in

Ottoman

Turkey

nd

North

Africa

Princeton:

Princeton

University

ress,

forthcoming),

.

14 of

mimeographed

ersion.

15#

Ibid.,

16.

16'

Ibid., 19,


10/11

Ottoman

mpire

nd

Capitalist

World-Economy

397

emerging

networkof market-based

elations,

and the relative au-

tonomy

which

it

engendered

for

the

estate

holders,

. .

cul-

minated ..

in the rise of the

ay

n

in contravention

f

state

power

at the

beginning

f

the 19th

century.

Islamoglu

nd

Keyder

describe

he

process

n a

similar

way:

Commercialization f

production

and,

more

importantly, hange

in

the

status

of

the

peasantry,

both of

which

the

iftlik

ntailed,

are

necessary

omponents

n a

process

of

peripheralization.

Butthey ee the ate sixteenth nd seventeenthenturies as a

transitional

tage

in the

articulation

f the

Ottoman

system

with

the

world-economy. 19

fter

hat,

they

see

a

staggered

integration:

The Balkans

became

integrated

nto

the

European

economy

begin-

ning

in

the

eighteenth

entury.

For

Egypt

and

the

Levant,

the

process

gained

momentum

during

he first

uarter

f

the

nineteenth

century.

n

Anatolia,

the

volume

of

trade

increased

significantly

beginning

n

the

1830's.20

In the

end,

t is

perhaps quantitativeuestion.

How

much

quantitative

hange

n the

production

ystems

f theOttoman

Empire

adds

up

to a

definitive

ualitative

hift?

Need

the

political

and

ideological

transformations,

agging

ehind,

have

occurred

n order for

us to state

that

incorporation

ad oc-

curred?Seen

from he

other side

of the

process,

that of the

existent

European world-economy,

as

there

enough

mpetus

during

his

ongperiod

of relative

tagnation

impetus

n

terms

of what

actually

maximized

capital

accumulation

truly

o

incorporate

an

outlying egion

ike

the

Ottoman

Empire,

before he

expansive

pswing

n the atter alfof the

eighteenth

century?

In

any

case,

there re few

who

disagree

hat n the

nineteenth

century

he

Ottoman

Empire

was

in no

way

a

self-contained

17

Ibid.,

20.

Huri

slamoglu

nd

aglar

Keyder, Agenda

for

Ottoman

History,

Review,

I, 1,

Summer

1977,

53.

19#

Ibid.,

43.

20* Ibid., 53.


11/11

398

ImmanuelWallerstein

social economy. t had clearlybecome a

peripheral

rea.

Why

could it

not howeverhave at

least had

semiperipheral

tatus,

s

did

nineteenth-century

ussia?

The

answer

may

reside

argely

n a

politico-military

ompari-

son

of

the

Russian

nd

Ottoman

mpires

n the

seventeenth

nd

eighteenth

enturies.

Russia

was still

expanding.

ts

army

was

far

tronger

han

that of the

Ottoman

Empire.

ts

own

outlying

areas

were

more difficult or

western

European

capitalists

o

penetratedirectly,

for both

geographical

nd

politico-social

reasons.There

was

no

phenomenon

n

Russia

comparable

o the

janissaries.Thus, the OttomanEmpirewas relegated o the

common

fate of the

politically

weak areas

-

of

China

and of

southeast

Asia,

and

indeed of

Africa.

s thisnot

precisely

what

was

caught p

in

the

epithet:

sick

man of

Europe?

We

have

wide

knowledge oday

of

what it

means to be

a

peripheral

one in

the

capitalist

world-economy.

here

we

are

weak

is in

understanding

he actual

process

f

peripheral/zaft'on,

the

actual

displacement

f a

redistributive-tributary

ode of

production y

absorption

nto

a

capitalist

mode. To

study

his

process,

the

economic

and

social

history

of the

Ottoman

Empire

from

ay

1550-1850

offers

rospects

forconsiderable

progress

n

understanding

hemodalities ftransformation.

Date post:	03-Jun-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	fauzan-rasip
View:	225 times
Download:	0 times

Wallerstein, The Ottoman Empire and the Capitalist World-Economy

Documents