WATER IN FUEL

The record exists! Three Double Engine Failures in Twin-engined Aircraft in the

same passenger flying company between January 1, 1953 and April 11, 1953.

What could have precipitated this little procession of angst? A single cause,

maintenance, neglect, fuel, water in fuel? The fuel company said, “Sabotage.” When the

second event happened police entered the equation, and that was a very fortunate aspect, but

it did not occur for several weeks.

Multiple engine failures have occurred many times in Aviation; however it was this

curious succession of incidents that created difficulty for two pilots of six in the continuum.

The First Double Engine Failure on January 1st, 1953, EI-ACF, Captain Hanley and

First Officer Whyte.

On approach to Elmdon Airport, Birmingham, one engine failed, and the approach

continued in the usual way. Without any indication of it the second engine quit, which

necessitated a landing in terrain – no lives were lost. EI-ACF was necessarily written off in a

ground loop to avoid an obstruction. Fuel systems were damaged on one side. Fuel samples

were not taken by investigators. Cause – mis-selection alleged.

The Second Double Engine Failure on February 2nd, 1953, Captain Quigley, First

Officer Lorrimer immediately before take off at Speke Airport, Liverpool.

Turning on to the runway from the perimeter track one engine ran down and would

not start again, quickly followed by the second engine out. Briefly, when the tanks were

checked, approximately two gallons of water were found in each main tank. Passengers and

crew on this flight were spared a close examination of the river Mersey on take off. The fuel

company Shell told the police that water in their fuel was impossible. Only sabotage could

engender such a circumstance. Cause – Water found.

The Third Double Engine Failure on 11th April 1953, was during approach,

descending at Rush, Co. Dublin, Captain Little and First Officer Young.

Knowing the wrong selector selection accusation leveled at the crew of EI-ACF, both

pilots would have looked at their own selectors, fuel gauge and the rest of their

instrumentation. All Pressures and Temperatures were normal. They were now it seemed

headed for a swim and life fortunately returned to both engines. The pilots landed safely at

Dublin Airport having had a brief demonstration of the last phase of the January 1st incident,

a repetition that had nothing what so ever to do with ‘selectors.’ Cause – None found.

REPORTS ON WATER IN TANKS OF AER LINGUS

AIRCRAFT at LE BOURGET

* * * * * * * * *

Captain Hanley in a written memo stated the following:

Some months ago (1952), Air France took over maintenance of Aer Lingus

aircraft at Le Bourget, from BEA. Air France are reputed to have lost an aeroplane at

Geneva some time ago because of water in the fuel. The Air France engineers were

keen on testing the aircraft tanks for water because of this and also because Shell and

B.P. Headquarters in London has recently issued instructions that all aircraft were to

be examined for water in the fuel.

As a result, the Air France engineers brought to the notice of the Aer Lingus

representative at Le Bourget, that excessive amounts of water were being found in the

tanks of Aer Lingus aircraft on arrival at Le Bourget. On October 21, 1952, the Aer

Lingus representative at Le Bourget sent a letter to the Assistant Chief Engineer, Aer

Lingus, stating that excessive amounts of water were being found in the tanks of Aer

Lingus aircraft. He sent samples of the water found on several occasions, subsequent

to that date. In each Monthly Report since then to the Operations Manager, he has

included a special paragraph on water.

The Assistant Chief Engineer was present at the scene of the accident which

occurred on 1. 1. l953 before the MCA Investigators arrived, and with his know-

ledge of the reports concerning water in fuel since October, it is extraordinary indeed

that he did not bring these reports to the notice of the Ministry of Civil Aviation

Investigators, so that they might have taken samples of fuel from each fuel line - as

recommended in ICAO Manual of Aircraft Accident Investigation, Document 6920 -

An/855.

The Shell and BP Company must have had a very good reason for fresh

instructions regarding the dangers of Water in Fuel and the necessity of vigilance in

this respect. This company has much experience of Water in Fuel in aviation tanks,

and on December 21, 1949 issued the following bulletin:

WATER IN FUEL TANKS - DAKOTA AIRCRAFT.

Issued by SHELL and B. P. SERVICE.

21. 12. 1949.

It has been noted by certain operators of Dakota Aircraft that the amount of

water drained from the fuel Tanks is sometimes much more than could be produced

through condensation. B.E.A. has found that the excess water is obtained in no

aircraft other than the Dakota, and they have checked particularly that no free water

has been supplied with the fuel to account for the trouble. Similar observations have

been made by Malayan Airways and by K.L.M. operating in the Netherlands East

Indies. In Australia, the R.A.A.F. have found that more water is drained from

Dakotas, than from any other types of aircraft and cases have occurred of engines

cutting due to water in the fuel system.

In the course of discussions on the subject, several possible reasons for the

water accumulation have been suggested. In the first place, the fuel tank filler cap is

in a recess in the wing - where rain water can collect, and this can find its way into the

tank if the cap is not seated properly or is removed carelessly. Secondly, the

underside of the wing may be of different lengths - and therefore at different

atmospheric pressures, which may result in a continuous flow of air through the tanks

by way of the interconnected vapour return lines. Increased deposition in the tanks of

water from the atmosphere is therefore possible.

Finally, it has been established through tests carried out by the Shell

Petroleum Company of Singapore in conjunction with Malayan Airways, that it is

extremely difficult to drain all the water from the Dakota tanks - chiefly because some

water can be held back by the tank baffles. The appearance of gasoline at the drain is

thus no guarantee of effective water draining, and the possibility exists of water

collecting over a long period - not withstanding regular Tank draining procedures.

Transfer of this water to the fuel tank sump could explain instances where large

quantities of water are drained.

! * * * * * *

No Captain’s Briefing Notice was issued prior to 10/2/1953.

Statement by Mr. Cannon on accident to EI-ACF, 1/1/1953

To: Chief Engineer, Dublin Airport

From: Acting Station Engineer, Northholt.

Ref: ET/LOV.65

20th January, 1953.

On 2/1/1953, I was present at Spernal Ash where the MCA

Investigating Officers were carrying out their investigation. At their request,

Mr. Brocklebank and myself removed the Port and Starboard carburettor fuel

screens, the fuel selectors, and the booster pumps.

When the Port carb. fuel screen was removed, I observed that there

was the usual amount of fuel there, but on removing the Starboard carb. fuel

screen, there was somewhat less. To remove the fuel selectors and fuel

booster pumps, some of the fuel lines had to be sawn through, and to the best

of my recollection there was fuel in all the lines.

On Thursday, 8/1/1953, I assisted Mr. Lett, MCA Investigating

Officer, to check the carb. system. We blew through the lines from the engine

fuel pump to the booster pump at the connection at the bulk-head and there

was fuel in both Port and Starboard lines. We also blew through the lines

from the engine fuel pump to the carb. and both Port and Starboard lines were

clear.

Witnessed by K.H. Gibney.

District Airport Superintendent

London.

26th January, 1953.

* * * * * * * * * *

Extract from Company Inquiry held prior to the IFALPA 1953 Chicago

Conference.

The Committee reconvened at 09:45

Captain Hanley came before the committee at 10:05, and reviewed with the

committee the previous day's testimony.

CHAIRMAN: That is all you have to say on the corrections.

CAPT. HANLEY: Yes.

CHAIRMAN: Do you want to say anything more to us, Capt. Hanley.

Capt. Scott will be back in a few minutes, Capt. Mc

(illegible) is at a funeral.

CAPT. HANLEY: I wanted some information from Capt. McCormack but

I suppose it can wait. I want to know if he had found

out about the water that came from Paris as samples

from the aircraft tanks. What Storez had to say about it,

how many samples had come, and if there is any

indication of the amount of water found in tanks. On

one occasion I heard that there were 16 lemonade

bottles full taken out of the tanks, and as there were not

any more bottles available, they let the balance of the

water flow on to the ground.

The reason why the Frenchmen are so concerned about

water seems to be that they have lost an aeroplane at

Geneva through water in the fuel, and since then they

have been alert on this water question. They drain the

tanks off as soon as the aeroplane arrives.

CHAIRMAN: Do you mean Air France?

CAPT. HANLEY: Yes. Air France. You might have records somewhere

on British and American accidents where water was the

cause.

The Engineering people may have some records.

CHAIRMAN: Are you suggesting that it might have been water on this

occasion?

CAPT. HANLEY: Well, you do not know.

MR. CUMING: What is the symptom of getting 2 or 3 gulps?

ASSESSOR: It should start cutting, backfiring, missing.

CHAIRMAN: The aircraft in Geneva, was it after the flight or

beginning of the flight it was lost?

CAPT. HANLEY: I do not know.

ASSESSOR: The one at Marianne was water, I think.

CAPT. HANLEY: I do not know. The Liverpool case, the engine just cut

dead.

MR. CUMING: The only reports I was shown on that particular thing

were newspaper reports. I do not know what the

symptoms were.

CAPT. HANLEY: That is an interesting business and it would be well to

read it because it disposes of a lot of theories about

water being immediately discoverable in tanks. First

and foremost there was sufficient water in the fuel

which got to the engines to stop both, and yet when the

bowser was checked for water there was not any sign of

water in it. The Shell people said there would not be

any water found in the bowser that caused this stoppage

of the engines because if water had been in the bowser

it would all have been pumped into the first tank. On

that basis they checked over the bowser and as I

understand it, they went so far as to put water into the

bowser, a certain amount of water, dipping the bowser

and could not find water anywhere in the bowser. Then

they drained off the bowser where the water should

come out, and no water came out; they drove the

bowser around on the instructions of the C.I.D., then

they eventually got 3 pints of water out but they had

originally put in four gallons of water, so the remainder

of the water was still in the bowser.

CHAIRMAN: But there was no trace?

CAPT. HANLEY: No trace. In the case of the Rapide aircraft - in this

case also water was put into each of the tanks from the

bowser.

It did not all go in the first tank because the aircraft got

to almost take off position when one engine cut. The

second engine did not cut and subsequently, I suppose

they stopped it. They found that there was also water in

that tank of the engine that did not cut - but it had not

reached the engine.

So that this throws a new light on how water behaves in

tanks and so forth. It is a complicated business.

ASSESSOR: Is the suggestion that the water would be in suspension

in the petrol.

CAPT. HANLEY: It could be. Some would fall to the bottom, perhaps

move along and stay there, and move at another time. It

may be that they are now messing about with the petrol

and adding stuff to it and so forth; it may have an effect

on the water.

Water may not now as readily get to the bottom and run

to the lowest point as it did formerly. Another point

that arises is as the temperature is lowered the solubility

alters, and water may be separated from the fuel and

form ice, and that of course would block the fuel lines.

There is another aspect that may be worth stating.

Since we started to cruise at 575 H. P., you are flying in

a different position. You are slightly in a nose up

position and the floor of the tank may be slightly tilted

back and allow the water to flow to the rear. Apart

from any water that may be there originally, you now

have a position where the pipes which heat the cabin

run over the tops of the tanks, and you have in the tank

one portion being heated and the other portion of the

tank at perhaps -5oC, so that any time when you have

cold temperatures and heat on in the cabin, and tanks

which would not have a lot of fuel in them, you would

have increased condensation, increased accumulation of

water. You could say that all the water would stay in

the back of the tank and that you get then to a stage

where you start to descend with the water lying at the

back of the tank, then the fuel comes forward and the

water at the back moves out a bit. When it gets out a

little bit from the back, it gets in line with one of the

gaps of the baffle, and then there is a suction along there

on the pump at that part of the tank, and the water can

go right over and get into the pumps depending on the

amount of water there.

We have had two previous cases at least, there may be

more, I do not know where an engine cut momentarily

on descent, after descent started; there must be some

particular reason for this happening.

Why should it not cut on the level?

SABOTAGE - an oblique reference to water in EI-ACF.

On Monday, three days before the forced landing at Spernal, The Taoiseach,

Mr. De Valera had travelled from Utrecht to Dublin in EI-ACF, the St. Kieran. This

fact was recalled by the Secretary to the Taoiseach (Prime Minister De Valera), Miss

Kathleen O'Connell, in conversation with Captain Hanley's wife, Agatha, when they

met at a dinner early in March of 1953, and the question of sabotage was raised by

Miss O'Connell. She explained that several people suggested to her that the failure of

the engines could have been caused by sabotage "to get Dev." In the climate of the

time Water in Fuel and Sabotage had suddenly become synonymous, i.e., the hue

and cry in Liverpool. Mrs. Hanley responded that this was unlikely, indeed that there

had been quite a history of water in fuel in recent times. Miss O'Connell was kind and

advised Mrs. Hanley not to worry that "he would weather the storm" . . . quote from a

letter of Agatha to the Captain in America at that time.

On the 6th of April 1953 Captain Hanley wrote to his wife Agatha, from the

International Pilots Conference in Chicago, USA – an extract:

“The first day of the conference is over. I have the Americans at work looking

things up on DC 3 incidents, fuel, etc. Both from Australia and the

Philippines there have been recent cases of engine failure due to water in the

fuel. The Australian Captain here, had an engine fail on take off. After he

landed they discovered water in the carbs. fuel lines. He had the other tank

examined feeding the good engine. 3½ gallons found in it. The Shell

Refueller was missing for 4 hours. They must be feeling unhappy. Another

accident in which all were killed has been unexplained. Water suspected. A

Philippines DC 6, 3 engines failed at take off but I haven’t the details yet.”

RESOLUTION PASSED AT THE IFALPA CONFERENCE IN MARCH 1953.

ACCREDITED REPRESENTATIVES AT ACCIDENT INQUIRIES.

"WHEREAS the ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices for Aircraft

Accident Inquiry (Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation)

prescribe the procedure to be followed by States in inquiries into aircraft accidents

involving deaths or serious injury; and

"WHEREAS the said Standards and Recommended Practices permit

participation in the inquiry by an accredited representative of the State of Registry of

the aircraft and advisers, the latter not excluding representatives of the operator; and

"WHEREAS pilot participation is regarded as being in the best interests of the

efficient and impartial conduct of an inquiry; and

"WHEREAS at least one State has given permanent authorization to

accredited members of the national pilots' organization to have free access to the

scene of an accident for the purpose of assisting in the examination of the wreckage;

"BE IT RESOLVED THAT member organizations of IFALPA approach their

Governments for authority for accredited members to participate in aircraft accident

inquiries, including the right of access to the scene of the accident for the purpose of

assisting in the examination of the wreckage, with the ultimate object of international

regulation by ICAO of effective pilot participation."

Pilots attending the Chicago conference approached their governments to

allow their request for representation at the scene of any future accidents.

As President of the Irish Airline Pilots' Association, Tommy Hanley and

another colleague, Bill Wallace represented members of IALPA at an International

conference of airline pilots in Chicago. The conference took place after the company

enquiry had concluded. The Irish delegates had reported the EI-ACF experience -

including the absence of pilot representation at the 'on-site' investigation.

Delegates attending the IFALPA Convention (L to R first row) in photograph below:

Mrs. Edna Ward, Secretariat; Mr. D. Fellows, Secretariat; Capt P. Siroux, Belgium;

Capt. B.C. Frost, United Kingdom; C.N. Sayen, U.S.A.; Capt. R.C. Griffin, Rhodesia;

Capt. F. Van Gass, South Africa; Capt. J. Woodman, United Kingdom; Capt A.P.

Ruige, Holland.

Second Row: F. Entwhistle, Observers; Mr. A.G.J. Piccardt, Holland; Capt. C.C.

Harmon, Holland; F. Antonio Gatto, Italy, L.H. Matthey, Switzerland; C.G. Klimcke,

United Kingdom; Capt. N. DeGuia, Philippines; Capt. R.B. Dodson, Philippines;

Capt. C.C. Jackson, Secretariat.

Third Row: Capt. J.P. le Moel, France; Capt. J.E. Wood, U.S.A; Capt. W.A. Wallace,

Ireland; Capt. T.J. Hanley, Ireland; Capt. Wm. R. Masland, U.S.A.; Capt. D.W.G.

Keesing, New Zealand; Capt. Morton, Australia; Capt. E. Ehanti, Finland; W.J. I.

Montgomery, Canada; Mr. A.R. Eddie, Canada.

Capt. T. J. Hanley was one of the founding members of the International Federation ofAir Line Pilots associations in 1948

The founding member associations of IFALPA were:

Australian Air Pilot’s Association (Today Aus-ALPA)Association Belge des Pilots et Navigators (Today Belgian Cockpit Association)Canadian Air Line Pilots Association Intercontinental (Today ALPA-International)Danish Air Line Pilots AssociationIrish Air Line Pilots AssociationSyndicat National des Officers de l’Aviation Marchchande (SONAM France)Verenigung Nederland VerkeersvilgersNew Zealand Air Line Pilots AssociationNorsk Flygerforbund (Today Norway ALPA)Pilots Association of Central AfricaAeropers (Swiss ALPA)British Air Line Pilots Association(USA) Air Line Pilots Association (Today ALPA International)

Extracts from an appraisal requested by the IALPA of the accident to

Aer Lingus Tta Dakota Aircraft, EI-ACF near Studley, Warwickshire

on 1/1/1953, by Eric Brereton. Mr. Eric Brereton, C.ENG., A.M.R.Ae.S.,

L.A.M.E. was an Aeronautical Inspector in the Department of Industry

and Commerce in 1953.

Extract 1.

1. This appraisal is purely factual. It is based on a Sketch of the scene

of the accident made by the Investigator at that time. To introduce

the study a recommended procedure for accident investigation is

given, followed by an analysis of the Sketch, a summary and the

conclusions drawn. The latter section includes theories of the most

likely causations which at this date cannot be proven except by

inference:

conversely, together with the other evidence that was available,

exceedingly grave doubts must be raised as to the validity of the

original findings

Eric Brereton having examined the case for some months declared:

I CONSIDER ONE CAN BE 100% CERTAIN THAT IT WAS

NOT FUEL SYSTEM MISMANAGEMENT.

Note: The complete document will be made available to interested parties.

APPENDIX 2

CERTAIN FLIGHTS RELEVANT TO THE APPRAISAL.

Whilst on a visit to Dublin Airport sometime towards the latter end of 1952, I

chanced on what appeared to be an odd ritual. A Dakota was standing on its own

withdrawn from the general apron 'line up,' attended by a Shell bridger, the refuelling

crew, Aer Lingus Tta., engineers, and the pilot and co-pilot. The tanks were in the

process of being "dipped" for water. I enquired from the Captain (Captain W.

Wallace) what and why? In the course of the conversation, I was told it was on a

'Special Flight,' that it was to see if water accumulated in flight and that it was a

normal scheduled flight to Paris.

The preparations were 'Special.' Whose idea? Some thought that it was the

Dept. of Industry and Commerce, Aviation Section; others that it was the Company.

But it was the 'higher ups' who had asked for it. However, a representative of each of

the groups performed water checks on the bridger and the aircraft. With negative

results.

I suggested to the Captain if he wanted to find water when he arrived at Paris,

he should fly, unless he was on 'Airways,' in coastal regions as much as possible and

where possible near to high ground. I suggested that he called by radio, the Paris

station engineer for the Company prior to his arrival, asking for at least 3 one gallon

clear containers, to be available. The weather was good, sunshine and good visibility,

and was apparently similar for the route. When I sought Captain Wallace out after he

returned, I asked how he fared?

Apparently the Station engineer was not available at the Airport but the

Station Manager (Paris) appeared with a cream jug. This overflowed and Captain

Wallace estimated that nearly a full bottle was lost. "Some empty lemonade" bottles

were then produced and sixteen were filled by the "run off" from the water drains,

probably, including the spillage, about seventeen bottles was the estimate. The size of

the bottle was not known but if they were Vichy water bottles they would be about

2/3rds of a pint or, if the larger bottle 1¼ pints. I would say as it is cheaper to buy 1

quart of Vichy water in the larger bottle (or lemonade) they could be the litre size

bottles.

It has been proven time and time again, that water is ingested into aircraft fuel

systems during flight. The Dakota has been commented upon in many instances and

if my memory serves me the Aviation Manager of Shell, Scotland, (I feel certain it

was Shell) drew attention to this fact in a letter circulated to all Operators in the

Scottish area.

I had second hand information from the Chief Inspector of P. I. A. of seven

gallons (water) being taken from an F. 27. I suggested he take up the matter with the

Folker Company to enquire their thoughts on the positioning of wing vents and

monsoon conditions of flight. I received no further information except that after I left

Rangoon - the particular aircraft had crashed with the total loss of life in heavy rain

conditions.

THE ONLY RADIO MESSAGE "BOTH ENGINES CUTTING."

The flight and crash were relayed to me within 24 hours of the occurrence, but

to my knowledge the facts were not reported in any English National Paper.

A further case concerns a 'jet,' a Comet aircraft. Whilst completing a

familiarisation on Comet aircraft at Hatfield, I was involved with the trials of a Comet

1A aircraft fitted with Avon engines. Trouble with the engines installed was being

experienced in that engines were "cutting" during flight. All the possible standard

causes had been checked and no faults were found. These included lack of air volume

to the engine, but the symptom refused to respond even when maximum guide vane

alteration was made (guide vanes are situated at the forward extremity of the engine

and in the throat of the air intake, consequently stalling of the air supply could

possibly take place.) However, I noticed that after the test flight one day the lower

surface of the wing, beneath the integral tanks, was coated with ice.

After talks with the Chief Designer, a further test flight with unaltered settings

of the guide vanes was scheduled for the following day. One of the tests arranged

was the distribution of any excess fuel from the engines on to the aircraft during the

descent (this test was not a part of the engine stalling test.) It served to have dye put

in the fuel for the descent only, the only tank so accessible was the centre fuselage

tank and served the purpose of running the engines on 'warmer' fuel. After listening

to an exciting cricket Test Match - England v Australia at Old Trafford (Bowler-Laker

taking ten wickets,) and completing the remaining tests, descent was made from

35,000 feet to 2,000 feet without a single engine 'stall' or cut, though the aircraft was

itself stalled all the way down to try and induce the stalling experienced the previous

day.

A rig was made in a hangar with an exact reproduction of the Comet fuel

system supply to one engine. Built into the rig were the temperatures and humidities

obtained from the Rome-London flights, which had been collated. The filter was

sectioned and covered by a piece of thick Perspex. The rig was started and thirty-five

minutes later stopped due to a complete blockage of the filter screen by a coating of

ice - 1 to 1½ inches thick. Glycol was pumped into the filter but proved to be a poor

palliative. I calculated the amount it would be necessary to carry for the longest leg

of the route and it was decided as a very temporary measure to permit a minimum of 5

gallons to be carried.

Heated filters were obviously the correct remedy, and were subsequently fitted

to aircraft. Hence, a piston engined aircraft, a prop jet, and a pure jet can all

experience similar engine cutting. Obviously not the engine, nor engine accessory -

the fuel system is the common factor and the common denominator - WATER.

An Intensive Investigation Into DC 4 Crashes In Australia In Which The

Crew And Passengers Died, Revealed That Water Was The Cause.

The conditions and actions were simulated as far as possible on another DC 4.

It was found that the aircraft had been put into the hangar overnight with partly filled

tanks. Hot day, cold night and condensation played the part of partly filling the tanks

with water. Refuelling in the morning dispersed the water in the fuel, water checks

revealed nothing of import, yet the 4 engines cut after take off. (See Australian

records. Report 252. Appendix 1 of this report.)

During the 1939-45 fracas I was investigating an OXFORD aircraft crash, in

which one engine had stopped in flight. The aircraft lost height and the pilot tried to

land in a small field. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair, the pilot was not. He

told me that the engine just stopped. It was the left engine. The 'take-off' was from

the airfield where I was stationed and I recalled that there had been a heavy downpour

of rain about ten minutes prior to take off, and the aircraft was facing a blustery wind.

On arrival at the accident site I had a general look round then crawled under

the engine which was some two feet clear of the ground and looked at the air intake; it

was undamaged by impact (the intake is below the engine.) I found that there was a

3/32" to 1/8" gap at the joint between the air intake to the carburettor. In the joint, at

the time, an air straightener and ingestion guard was fitted. This was a grill; carefully

removing it I found slight traces of water. The ignition plugs indicated rich mixture.

The pilot had tried all he could to start the engine again, but had to concentrate on

flying on one engine and as he was losing height to put the machine down. If he had

30 ft. more height, he would have missed the tree.

In consultation with Mr. S. Palmer, the Service Manager of Armstrong-

Siddely, who confirmed my theory that ice could form on the guard at the base of the

carburettor blocking the air supply. They had the same experience a month

previously, on the ground, at Austey airfield, and despite having to return to the other

side of the airfield for a camera had photographed the ice. The main difference was

they did not have the gap which produced the freezing temperature at the guard. All

guards were subsequently removed.

Reference to Appendix 1 is advised. The main points of the reference to the

Australian report thereto are very lightly touched upon in the penultimate paragraph

of this appendix. The DC 4 crashes were subsequent to the incident affecting EI-

ACF, and one can but speculate that if the correct solution to EI-ACF had been

discovered in 1953 ____________?

! * * * * * * * * **

APPENDIX 1

WATER AND MICRO-ORGANISM IN AIRCRAFT FUEL SYSTEMS

For some years, laboratories have been researching the presence of water and

micro-organisms in aircraft fuel systems. As a consequence, much has been written,

mainly in laboratory language – to begin this brief exposition, a list of the

terminology used is given:

ABIOGENESIS - The origination of living organisms in lifeless matter.

BIOGENESIS - The origination of living organisms from living

matter.

AEROBIC - Organisms requiring oxygen.

ANAEROBIC - Organisms disliking oxygen.

BIOCIDE - Chemicals which kill micro-organisms.

BIOSTAT - Chemicals which prevent the reproduction of

micro-organisms.

HYDROCARBON - Chemical compound of hydrogen and carbon, e.g.,

paraffin, benzene.

MICRO-ORGANISM- Organisms not visible to the naked eye, e.g., bacteria,

viruses, protozoa, unicellular algae and fungi.

Water in Fuel – we know what water is – something out of a tap or rivers or lakes or

the sea. Do we consider it as part of the atmosphere? Similarly fuel – out of a petrol

pump at a garage or from a fuel bowser, if the latter and it is at an airfield – it is

aviation fuel.

Do we simplify ‘North SEA OIL’ or ‘natural gas’ from the North sea as being

something we have to drain the water from before we use it? What of the other fuels

such as crude oils, tar sands, shales, natural asphalts, coal? These are all fossil fuels

that are in use.

How do they originate? Sedimentary rocks (formed from sedimental deposits) found

in the PRE-CAMBRIAN period of the earth’s history (3 x109 years ago) all contain

evidence of indigeneous life. These are the rock formations which are almost entirely

associated with the major fossil fuel deposits. Careful study has shown that there is

a significant relationship between fossil fuels and living organisms.

Opinions of scientists differ, but a summing up of all the presently available

evidence favours the Biogenic origin, as opposed to the Abiogenic origin, for almost

all of the organic extracts of crude oils and shales. The significance of the structure of

fossil fuel hydrocarbons is in their relation to living organisms.

The presence of water is essential to the growth of micro-organisms. Aviation

fuel suppliers take very stringent precautions to exclude water from bulk storage,

bridgers, hydrant systems, at all stages: to the stage of fuelling an aircraft.

STRINGENT AS THESE PRECAUTIONS ARE – EVIDENCE OF WATER

BEING FOUND IN FUEL SYSTEMS OCCURS. The specification, as it was at

1/1/’53, permitted 0.02% water. This is only one-fiftieth of a gallon per hundred

gallons. But this is worthwhile considering.

The normal practice is to make an analysis at the fuel refinery. From there it

is delivered by bridgers (tankers) to bulk installations at (considering only aviation

fuel) airfields. Bulk installations were normally below ground level (fire and

explosion precautions). Therefore drainage of surplus water is by suction pump.

Cleaning of the bulk tanks is a problem. (This is discussed later). The normal

practice in 1952/’53 was to draw off fuel from the outlet 10 inches above the base of

the tank into bridgers, or by a hydrant system, to fuel the aircraft. It can be seen

therefore that a rise in the accumulated water in the bulk tanks permits water to be

drawn into the fuel.

Added water can be taken in by the tank vents. In the era under consideration,

these were ‘open’ vents. In other words, the space above the fuel in the bulk tank was

open to atmosphere at all times. Humid days, rain, snow, hail, sleet, fog and even low

cloud could be sucked in as condense into the tanks – the ground in which the tank is

sunk is at a fairly constant temperature – consequently there is always the induced

condensate. More modern practice is to fit ‘breather’ vents – those that open only as

fuel is withdrawn.

Assuming then that there is a risk of water contamination, the fuel passes via

pump to a bridger, by another pump to the aircraft. The water is in suspension in the

fuel and until it has had time to settle it is rarely shewn by water finding pastes. The

paste (now superseded by syringe) tests only the fuel from the area that can be

reached in the aircraft tanks. This area is not always the lowest point of the tank,

water has a higher specific gravity than fuel (1: 0.72 average) will displace fuel in the

lowest areas there is no guarantee that they can be drained.

An aircraft tank is the lightest weight structure commensurate with the

Strength required to contain the fuel – therefore they are subject to deformation.

(Integral tanks are also subject to manufacturing tolerances – deformation.) It

must therefore be accepted that water CAN accumulate in aircraft fuel tanks in non-

drainable areas.

Consider two further factors – an aircraft standing in a hangar during an

Extensive inspection and engine change. (EI-ACF ‘off service’ 6/11/’52 to 16/12/’52,

the records say). During this period, the tank vents are open to atmospheric changes

in the hangar.

At the conclusion of the inspection, the aircraft would be washed and cleaned, no

doubt.

As will be seen the water problem (contamination), like the fungus, grows.

The second consideration during flying operations, sufficient atmospheric

water will always condense into the aircraft fuel tanks or water condensate from the

aircraft skin sucked in with the air via the vents as fuel is used – will be sufficient to

sustain micro-biological activity.

Fuel tank water drains are provided in the tanks, but even then irregularities in

fuel tank surfaces, pockets of fuel caused by the structural nature of the tanks and in

parts of the associated fuel system, (certain types of fuel cocks) can retain sufficient

water to sustain growth of micro-organisms. The organisms involved are fed by

acqueous solution hence are identified with the acqueous phase. Acted upon by

turbulence they are transferred to the hydrocarbon phase, then survival and not growth

is the organisms main problem. Bacteria may only survive for a few hours in the

hydrocarbon phase but moulds persist for long periods, for instance, when completing

tests on fuel for living micro-organisms they often only yield moulds, though the fuel

may have been in contact with a pocket of water containing an assortment of living

organisms. Micro-organisms as other living things have a major nutritional

requirement for nitrogen, carbon, sulphur, phosphorous and other elements to a lesser

extent. These they can obtain from the fuel, rubber, paints and other matter. The net

results, the production of more microbes and degradation products many of which are

acidic therefore corrosive. Steep oxygen gradients can be established as also can a

potential gradient amounting to -0.5 volt in a dense flock.

Therefore, in addition to the corrosive factors the indirect effect of

depolarisation, the destruction of sealants and anti-corrosives it will be appreciated

that the imagination does not have to reach vivid proportions to ascertain the cause of

erosion of the materials used in fuel systems. One further aspect of microbial growth

is in itself water, an infection can, therefore, become self-sustaining.

One further aspect is that those micro-organisms in contact with water are, in

general, oxidative. Provided there is continuous operation of the aircraft and therefore

an adequate fuel turnover, oxygen is obtained from that dissolved in the hydrocarbon

phase. WHERE A FUEL SYSTEM REMAINS STAGNANT FOR LONG

PERIODS, the aqueous phase is finally depleted of oxygen by the aerobic organisms

there and growth of anaerobic organisms can occur. These in their turn, can generate

Hydrogen Sulphide which dissolves in the fuel. The fuel, in turn, becomes corrosive

to the fuel system metals. Dead micro-organisms in the fuel are a danger in that they

can lead to blockage of filter gauzes and to fuel gauze malfunction. Micron size water

droplets are attracted to these contaminants, more water adheres, the droplets become

drops and are stopped by the filter gauze, a coating of water adheres to the gauze, a

low ambient temperature of the filter casing or of the fuel and ice forms on the gauze

effectively blocking the fuel supply to the engine.

An experiment was made at, the then, De Havilland factory at Hatfield in 1955

1 ¼ inches of ice formed on the filter gauze after a period of 35 minutes –

running of the rig embodying Rome-London atmospheric conditions and all fuel

flow ceased. Glycol was pumped in to the system, adjacent to the filter, but proved to

be a poor palliative.

Heated filters were introduced.

The factors that are conducive to blockage of fuel systems on the ground, and in

flight, are therefore ‘built in’ by

1. The nature of fuel.

2. Atmospheric conditions.

Obviously high water content of the atmosphere promotes the greater

accumulation of water in fuel systems, when the fuel system is affected by lower

ambient temperatures, which can be caused by loose fitting skin panels or cowlings,

even in hot weather, then it is almost inevitable that trouble with engine running (or

not running) can be the result. These factors not only apply to aircraft but can apply

to motor car engines. Some years ago the writer experienced carburettor icing on a

Ford Anglia. One of the roads to the West from Belfast was noted for the phenomena

- an article appeared in one of the Belfast papers on the subject.

The problem of eradicating water and infection has not yet been solved. The

knowledge gained since 1960 has been high but not fast enough to give complete

protection. There is, however, a necessity to promote immaculate house-keeping in

aircraft fuel and hydraulic systems.

Bulk storage installations, logic suggests the use of water soluble, but not fuel

soluble biocides; confining the action to the water phase by use of a water soluble

pack.

But in aircraft the water may be in places that are difficult to reach. Added to that, a

re-think on venting systems is essential.

A great deal of research has been made into lightning strikes on aircraft wing

tips- the normal place for fuel vents – and evidence was accumulated that in this

respect the wing tips were not the best position for fuel vents. The vents are now

required to be positioned inbound from the tips. Whether this will aid or diminish the

ingestion of atmospheric water remains to be seen, with vapour trails from the wing

tip areas in mind.

Suggested reading:- Fungal Growths in Aviation Fuel Systems, Pts. I & II, Report

252, Defence Standards Lab, Dept. of Supply, Australia, 19061.

Journal of the Inst. of Petroleum No. 53, 1967;

Journal of the Inst. of Petroleum No. 57, 1970;

Le Cheminant, An Accident Report 2492,Civil Aviation Branch,Department of Transport, Ottowa.

This Appendix forms part of the Survey of the sketch of the Accident to EI-ACF, a

Dakota aircraft of Aer Lingus Tta on 1st January, 1953.

Signed: E.F. BRERETONC.ENG., A.M.R.Ae.S., L.A.M.E.

JUNE 1975.

INDICATIONS OF WATER IN FUEL NOTED IN STATEMENTS OF

WITNESSES - “FLAMES AND LOUD BLOWBACKS.”

1. EI-ACF - Sworn Testimony of Sgt. Thomas.

Q. "When did you first observe it flowing?"

A. “When I first arrived on the scene and went underneath the

wing to see the fire."

Q. "Under which wing?"

A. "Under the starboard wing."

Q. "That is the right hand wing?"

A. "That is the one that was damaged."

Q. "Now was it when you went under the wing that you first

observed the petrol flowing?"

A. "Yes there was a strong smell of petrol."

Q. "Did you actually see the petrol?"

A. "I actually saw it, yes."

2. EI-ACL - LIVERPOOL, 2/2/1953.

"In that particular case, the engine cut and on attempted restarting there

was a blow back, backfiring, and long sheets of flame coming out of at

least one engine and that was the point of view from which we have

examined the case."

Appendix V1 (extract) - First Officer Lorrimer - EI-ACL -Liverpool

C.1

"As far as I can remember, the Captain made three attempts to start the

Starboard engine, which would start for a few seconds, then give a

loud backfire, and shoot out a length of flame, and cut out."

Captain EI-ACL to Liverpool C.I.D. Special Branch, Speke, 5th Feb.

1953.

"I next turned my attention to the Starboard engine, and it did start

eventually, for a few seconds only however, and then it cut out. On

my trying again, it started for a few seconds and gave the most

frightening blow backs, so I decided to cease trying to get the engines

going."

3. At the pilots Conference in Chicago, 1953.

Australian Case. Engine failure on take-off. After he landed water

found in carb and fuel lines. Tank feeding good engine had three and a

half gallons found.

4. Rapide GALAT, Cambrian Airways. 6/2/1953

Cambrian Airways Rapide, Liverpool/Cardiff

Having reached the Holding Point. The Starboard engine cut. On

examination a pint of water was found on each side. No water was

found in refuelling vehicle. Examination proceeding to determine

whether the water was introduced at Cardiff or Liverpool. The

aircraft taxied back from the Holding Point to the ramp on the

port engine. Signed: Captain W. J. Heynes.

Statement from Mr. Fred Glover Male, B.E.A. Engineer:

"I re-entered the cockpit and pumped more fuel through to the carb,

and more water came through. I then placed a milk bottle beneath the

drain pipe and pumped about a third of a bottle of pure water through

from the Starboard tank.

I realized this was an excessive amount of water and the cause of the

engine failure. Later the same day, I drained the fuel tanks of both port

and starboard engines, after raising the tail unit to the flying position.

From the starboard tank, we drained about a half pint of water, and

about the same quantity from the port tank. This would indicate that

the starboard fuel system had contained an abnormal amount of water

in view of what had already run off through the supply lines.

Signed: F. G. Male.

Statement taken by Thomas Pennington, Sgt. 4. C.I.D. on 7/2/1953.

5. The Third Aer Lingus Double Engine Failure occurred on April 11,

1953.

EI-AFT. Crew – Capt. Little & First Officer Young - Dublin/Glasgow.

OAT - 3 etc.

"Both engines cut with very loud noise. On putting on Hot Air,

engines recovered power.

On return at Rush, 2,500' in cloud with Hot Air on - on changing to

Cold Air on Starboard engine it cut on four occasions and eventually

landing was made in Hot Air."

6. Randolf Gibbons, EI-ACF witness at Inquiry.

"The noise of an aircraft attracted my attention and I saw a plane

coming over the top of the farm buildings. Its port engine was nearly

still with the starboard engine back firing rapidly. The plane was fifty

feet up and flames were coming from the exhaust of the starboard

engine."

Extracts from Statements made in 1974 by WITNESSES who were

uncalled to the 1953 Inquiry.

7. Mr. Pritchard, Landowner, December 3, 1974.

"As I approached the aeroplane, I could smell petrol quite strongly and

I noticed that what I took to be petrol was running out of what was left

of the starboard wing. I could see too, that petrol had run into the

ditch."

8. Mr. F. H. Weaver, Fireman, December 3, 1974.

"As I approached the aeroplane I detected a strong smell of fuel and

could also hear a persistent and continuous dripping. I noticed that the

starboard wing was broken and that what remained of it was directly

above an open ditch which ran along the line of the hedge dividing two

fields."

9. Mr. H. J. Weaver, Fireman, January 24, 1975.

"There was a strong smell of fuel which could be detected from a

considerable distance and as I approached the wreckage I looked along

the line of the ditch beneath the starboard wing, I saw that the cause of

the splashing was what I took to be fuel falling into the ditch from the

underside of the starboard wing."

___________

The Aeronautical Engineer on the Board of Inquiry in 1975 accepted the

testimony of the above new witnesses, and asserted his belief that their sworn

statements were evidence of a 'weakened mixture.'

Weakened Mixture - Fuel and Air, Fuel and Water.

Colonel Teague specified 'Water in Fuel,' and sent a copy of

‘Air Safety Focus’ which contained an incident where 60 gallons of water was

found on the aircraft.

Commandant Andy Woods delivered the information, plus Colonel Teague’s

copies of the Air Regulations, with his own annotations for our reference.

It is necessary to examine the testimony of the independent witnesses, bearing

in mind the fact that EI-ACF had no Cross Feed Fuel Line.

Port Tank Side- Mr. Pritchard saw fuel on the ground Port side after the

aeroplane was lifted, but only then--days later.

Starboard tank side- Fuel was seen by:

The Captain

Sergeant Thomas

Mr. Pritchard

Mr. H. J. Weaver

Mr. Stephens, and probably several others unknown.

Only one passenger, a Fleet Air Arm individual was questioned! None of the

other 21 passengers gave statements.

During the Court of Inquiry, Counsel for the Company stated “The Captain

was dedicated from the start to a Forced Landing.”

Comments by Mr. Stephens, first witness to reach EI-ACF, who was never

interviewed, nor called to the Inquiry, in a telephone conversation, answers the above

statement as follows:

“He hadn’t got any choice. To my recollection, one engine was

stopped and the other was missing, misfiring very badly”.

“It was misfiring badly”.

“The fuel pipes were fractured--the fuel was flowing directly into the

ditch”.

added remark- “(engines) they were running rough as hell and missing

all the time”.

The conversation with Mr. Stephens shows the importance of calling all witnesses.

* * * * * * * *

13th June, 1975.

Mr. P. Barry, T.D.,

Minister for Transport & Power,

Department of Transport & Power,

Kildare Street,

Dublin 2.

Sir,

The Irish Air Line Pilots Association (IALPA) intend requesting on

behalf of Captain Hanley, that the Enquiry held into the accident to Aer

Lingus DC 3 EI-ACF in January 1953, be re-opened.

This intention is based on:

(a) That important evidence was not produced at the Enquiry (see

S. I. 19. 1957.)

(b) That an important witness was not called to give evidence.

(c) That the Attorney-General should put a question to the Court to

give a Re-commendation or otherwise re endorsing of Captain

Hanley's Licence (S.I. 19. 1957.)

A Public Inquiry held in May 1953 to determine the cause of the accident

concluded that the accident was due to double engine failure, both engines

having been fed from one tank (starboard) until it was empty. Captain Hanley

was adamant that the fuel cocks were not in the wrong positions, and made a

case that the failure could have been due to water in the fuel. He has

maintained this stance down through the years, and the Irish Air Line Pilots

Association, while objecting to the endorsing of Captain Hanley's Licence,

were handicapped in that Statutory Instrument 21, 1928, under which the

Court was convened, made no provision for a re-hearing.

Captain Hanley was forced to emigrate. It is only since he retired and

returned to Ireland and on the instigation of an Irish Times reporter that he has

had time to study and compare case histories of similar occurrences and the

evidence given at all the enquiries into his accident. Because a number of

inconsistencies became manifest and because of evidence which appeared to

have been withheld, an attempt was made to try and re-open the whole affair.

IALPA undertook to examine all the available material. This has now been

completed and in the opinion of the four people charged with the task of this

review, a number of irregularities showed up in the method of investigation

and relevant evidence of other incidents of water in fuel of other aircraft

refuelled in Dublin about that time, was not produced. There is also the fact

that more stringent precautions against contamination were introduced by both

Shell and Aer Lingus after this accident.

In order to carry out a thorough research, efforts were made to obtain

copies of the M.C.A.'s Investigation and the Irish Public Enquiry. The

MC.A.'s report was denied on the grounds that it was private. After

exhaustive enquiries in the Department of Transport & Power, Department of

Justice and the Stationery Office, we were eventually allowed to examine what

is termed to be the only copy available in the Department of Transport &

Power. This copy is held in Room 509 in the Department's offices in Kildare

Street and had to be examined in its location. We had to recourse to the Aer

Lingus Enquiry, and the records of the Irish Times. Also obtained were the

Liverpool Police Enquiry into the "water in fuel" incident to EI-ACL, and Aer

Lingus' Enquiry into the same incident. These documents and statements from

important witnesses who were not called in the Public Enquiry supports the

following criteria.

Firstly, the theory that the accident may have been caused by water in

the fuel should have been explored much further in the Public Enquiry. There

are incidents on record of water having been found in the fuel of aircraft which

must have originated in Dublin Airport. (Appendix 2) (Extracts from

Technical logs, etc.)

The following incidents refute the case made by Shell and A.L.T. that

the precautions to eliminate water in fuel at Dublin Airport at the time of the

accident were adequate. In fact, water in fuel was then a serious hazard.

(a) In November, 1952, just two months prior to the accident in question, a

DC 3 flown from Dublin to Paris was found on arrival to have 16

lemonade bottles of water in the fuel. This water could have got into

the fuel in Dublin. A report by the aircraft's commander, Captain

Wallace is included. This evidence was produced at the Company's

Enquiry, but when asked for at the Public Enquiry, the answer given

was very vague, even though it had occurred just six weeks before.

(See Appendix 2 for this and other incidents.)

(b) On the 2nd February, 1953, one of Aer Lingus' DC 3's, EI-ACL had a

double engine cut in Speke, Liverpool Airport. Liverpool police

suspected sabotage and so carried out an exhaustive investigation and

proved the cause of the failure to be water in the fuel and their report

clearly says it is quite possible that this aircraft was flown from Dublin

with seven pints of water in the tanks. When this report was requested

at the Public Enquiry on 1st June, 1953, the answer was that it was

unavailable, even though when it was subsequently produced it bore

the date 5th March, 1953 and the ALT Enquiry Report into the same

incident was dated 9th February, 1953 and signed by Mr. G. Bourke,

Aer Lingus Development Engineer.

There is no doubt that had either Report been produced then, it would

have enhanced the water in fuel theory. (See Appendix 6.)

Perusal of the Liverpool police report clearly shows that water can be

held in suspension in fuel for a long time and it is quite possible in

very low temperatures that the freezing of such water could block

filters and so cause an engine cut.

In a letter dated 17th November, 1972 to Captain Hanley's daughter, Mr.

Teevan who was Chairman of the Public Enquiry stated that he considered the above

report would be relevant and important and that he asked the assessors resident in

Ireland whether this report would be grounds for the re-opening of the Enquiry. They

said that it would not alter the findings and so there was no point in re-opening it.

This is difficult to understand as IALPA believe that this evidence is definitely

relevant and in view of the fact that it was apparently deliberately withheld, it was

grounds for a re-opening, however, now is the time to rectify this. (Appendix 3.)

Secondly, the findings of the Public Enquiry - that the cause of the accident

was due to both engines being fed from the starboard main tank until it was empty,

merits further examination. The Public Enquiry stated "that petrol was noticed by

witnesses flowing from the left main tank through the open drain cock." Examination

of witnesses’ statements in fact reveals different.

Sergeant Thomas "there was a gush of petrol coming from what appeared to

be a severed pipe immediately behind the cockpit above the

centre of the plane."

Sergeant Greethead "I saw a steady flow of petrol from underneath the

fuselage."

When he looked an hour later it was still flowing.

Mr. Randolph Gibbons "Petrol was pouring from underneath the cockpit."

The M.C.A. Investigators at the scene of the accident concluded that

the port main tank would have contained at impact 120 gallons and starboard main

nil, but these investigators arrived a day after the accident and all the fuel would

have been drained by then. However, Mr. Delaney of Aer Lingus arrived at 3:20 and

said that there was fuel flowing from the port tank and when he left at approximately

4:00 p.m. it was dark and he did not hear petrol dripping when he was going away.

Mr. Pritchard, in whose field the accident occurred, states that he went down to the

aircraft between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. and that there was absolute stillness. This indicates

that the port tank had emptied. Now, using the official rate of flow from the drain

cock as 14.7 gall. per hour and that the tank contained120 galls. it would take 8 hours

and 10 minutes, and the time of the accident to be at 11:04 a.m., then the tank would

have emptied at 7:14 p.m.

Using Captain Hanley's estimate for the amount of fuel in the tank as 62 galls.

and using the same rate of flow (14.7 galls. per hour) then, that tank would have

emptied at 3:17 p.m. This is in line with the witnesses' evidence.

From comparisons between the Company's Enquiry and the Public

Enquiry it appears that the position of the fuel selector valves requires further

investigation. It was proved that due to slackness by pulling the selector cables

the fuel valve could be positioned with moving the selector or vice-versa, also

an impact such as a wheels up landing could very well have moved the selector or

the valve.

There is evidence of fuel being found in both carburettors and in all the

lines to the booster and engine pumps, this in itself could be inconsistent with fuel

starvation. During the course of the Aer Lingus investigation which was parallel

to the M.C.A. and the Irish Department of Industry & Commerce, Captain

Hanley recalls Mr. Delaney saying to him in a hotel in Stratford-on Avon that

ample fuel had been found in the carburettors and fuel lines and so lack of fuel

could not be the cause of the accident. Mr. Delaney subsequently during the

Company's Enquiry said that he could not recall having said it.

Thirdly, the laid down procedures for Accident Investigation as outlined in

I.C.A.O. Annex 13 seems to be ignored by the M.C.A. Investigator, Mr. Newton.

This document calls for a complete examination of all the possibilities

regardless of what might appear to be obvious.

(i) A selection of sparking plugs was only examined; all should have

been.

(ii) A Megger check was not carried out on the Ignition system.

(iii) A fuel sample was not taken for analysis, and Mr. Newton stated that

he tested the fuel for water by "tasting and smelling."

(iv) Mr. Newton did not try to move the port valve and did not know

whether it was capable of movement from the cockpit.

(v) Photographs were not taken of the fuel tanks, which in these circum-

stances would have been very important.

(vi) Component parts should have been bench-tested by an independent

party. Aer Lingus personnel carried out these tests.

(vii) When an accident occurs, it is laid down that the investigation should

begin immediately, but M.C.A. did not commence until the day after.

Time is very important and one of the firemen on the scene has now

made a statement that he "tidied up" the scattered debris. A guard

should have been placed to prevent this.

Fourthly, all of the witnesses were not called to give evidence at the

Public Enquiry. Mr. Pritchard, the owner of the land in which the aircraft

crash landed, has now made a statement which is relevant as to the position of

the star-board wing and why no fuel was found underneath it when it was

moved. This wing was over a ditch six feet deep and he saw the fuel dripping

from it. He arrived at the scene of the crash within 10 minutes and he should

have been called to give evidence.

His statement is sufficient grounds for re-opening the Enquiry, as this

is evidence of fuel in the starboard tank. (See Appendix 1 (Statements.)

Conflicting evidence was given by some witnesses, in particular, Mr.

Delaney. He said that he went into the aircraft, but not into the cockpit, but

yet he saw the de-icer valve selector "On," which is impossible to see without

going into the cockpit, as this is hidden by the radio set above the co-pilot's

seat.

Fifthly, the Irish Times Report of 1st June, 1953 of the evidence given

on the tenth day at the Public Enquiry differs from the verbatim report. This

should be looked into, as Captain Hanley who was not given a copy each day,

subsequently protested to the stenographer about this omission. In fact there

are numerous discrepancies between the Irish Times records and the official

copy which will be listed separately. (See Appendix 4.)

The Irish Shell representative at Dublin Airport said that water had

never been found in their fuel tanks or bowsers - this is incredible.

Finally, as it is the declared intention to seek a re-opening of the

Enquiry, IALPA request that you, Mr. Minister, have the original Court (Mr.

Teevan) and the available Assessors review in Private the new evidence and

for them to rule on it and to confirm that the Court did not think fit to endorse

Captain Hanley's licence. It must be pointed out that S. I. 165 of 1966

empowers the Minister to revoke or suspend a licence on sufficient grounds

after the investigation by him.

The Sworn Enquiry in this case would have to be considered such an

investigation and so the Minister's action in endorsing Captain Hanley's

licence could only be termed an arbitrary act with reference to the regulations

where it states that the Attorney General would have to put that question to the

Court. Furthermore, IALPA, in making the above request, are not seeking to

vilify anyone but to restore Captain Hanley's professional reputation and to

establish appeals machinery to which a member finding himself in similar

circumstances, can have redress.

Signed: ____________________________

P. V. DONOGHUE (CAPTAIN)

PRESIDENT - IALPA.

Signed: ____________________________

T. G. YOUNG (CAPTAIN)

CHAIRMAN - SAFETY & TECHNICAL COMMITTEE

Signed: ____________________________

J. S. O'GRADY (CAPTAIN)

PRESIDENT - INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF

AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION

Signed: ___________________________

T. P. McKEOWN (CAPTAIN)

PAST PRESIDENT - IALPA.

WITNESSES NOT CALLED

In 1974 I sought further information if possible in England. Very kind and willing

individuals were Mr. Pritchard, the landowner, and two firemen who also attended the scene

on January 1st, 1953, Mr. H. S. Weaver and Mr. F. H. Weaver. None of these individuals

were called to the Dublin Inquiry. We have re-typed their statements for clarity. The

facsimiles have been placed with Other Documentation.

I, SAMUEL HERBERT PRITCHARD of Newlands New End Farm,

Great Alne in the County of Warwick do solemnly and sincerely

declare as follows:

1. On the 1st day of January, 1953 I was at the farmhouse

known as Newlands Farm at approximately 11.00 o’clock in the

morning when I heard the sound of an aeroplane which appeared

to be flying very low over the farm. I heard the sound of a

crash and had no doubt that the aeroplane had come down in the

close proximity of my farm house and probably on one of my own

fields.

2. I got into my car and drove along the road towards

Spernall for a distance of about 500 yards and was able to see

that the aeroplane had come to a halt over a ditch separating

two of my fields on the left hand side of the road. It was

approximately 50 yards from the road.

3.. I left my car and went towards the aeroplane. I met a

man whom I subsequently came to know as Captain Hanley to whom

I gave directions to my house so that he could telephone the

Emergency services.

4. I ran along beside the ditch approaching the aeroplane from

the right hand side and slightly to the rear, in fact I would

say that my angle of approach was approximately 45 degrees.

I saw that the starboard wing which was nearest to me had been

broken off near to the engine, and that some part of the

aeroplane was suspended several feet up a tree.

5. As I approached the aeroplane I could smell petrol quite

strongly and I noticed that what I took to be petrol was

running out of what was left of the starboard wing. I could

see too, that petrol had run into the ditch and I assumed that

since the rate of flow was not heavy on my arrival much of it

had already run out before I had arrived. My main purpose

was to see that the passengers were safe and having looked

through the windows of the starboard side I ran round to the

back of the plane and entered to see if anyone inside needed

help. Upon investigation I saw that all the passengers and

crew had alighted.

6. I remained at the scene until everyone had left the ‘plane

and took them to my house to give whatever help I could.

7. I could not see precisely where the flow of petrol was

coming from nor did I inspect that part of the plane again.

In fact I only saw it because it was the nearest part of the

aeroplane to me as I approached. Subsequently I had a

look at the ground beneath the port wing but saw no sign of any

petrol there. I think that I must have reached the scene

within 3 minutes. I returned to the scene some hours

later by which time the flow had ceased.

AND I MAKE this solemn declaration conscientiously believing

the same to be true and by virtues of the provisions of the

Statutory Declarations Act 1835.

DECLARED at Stratford-upon-Avon

In the County of Warwick

This 3rd day of December 1974. Signed: S. H. Pritchard

Before me RWM Notary Public

* * * * * * * *

I, FRANCIS HENRY WEAVER of 19 Mallard Road Studley

in the County of Warwick do solemnly and sincerely declare as follows:

1. I was the Sub-Officer in charge of the Studley

Section of the Warwickshire County Fire Brigade

but have now retired having held such post for approximately ten years.

The Studley Section is a retained station insofar

as all the firemen are retained on a part-time basis

and render assistance when necessary.

2. The central control for emergency calls is at

Leamington Spa and whenever an emergency occurs

the call goes initially to Leamington Spa who then

alert the appropriate section.

3. In 1953 the method of alerting fire officers was to

sound the “all clear” siren which was in use during

the war time.

4. On 1st January 1953 I was a leading fireman in the

Studley section and during the mid-morning I heard

the alarm sounded when I was at my place of work at

Needle Industries Limited, Studley. I immediately

left my post and went by bicycle to the fire

station which then adjoined the Swan Hotel. I

would have reached the station within a couple of

minutes. The procedure has always been to wait for

a reasonable number of firemen to arrive before

departing for the scene of the emergency. The

usual number is six and the average waiting period

is perhaps three to four minutes.

5. The first fireman to arrive at the station would

have taken a telephone call from Leamington Spa to

ascertain the nature of the emergency and its

location. On this occasion we drove along the

A435 towards Alcester and turned left at Spernal Ash

towards Spernal and then right along the road to

Great Alne. The distance from the fire station to

the location of the emergency is approximately three

miles, and the journey would have taken about eight

to ten minutes.

6. The weather on 1st January, 1953 was cold and a

certain amount of sleet was in the air. The roads

were not icy but wet and visibility was fair.

7. As we approached the location I could see that an

aeroplane had landed in a field to our right and

that the hedges on both sides of the road had been

breached. The aeroplane seemed to have struck the

higher ground on the left-hand side of the road

before crossing the road and coming to a halt about

fifty yards beyond it. A certain amount of debris

had been spread about the area and later I

personally cleared some of it away from the road.

8. There were no passengers at the site but I recall

seeing a stewardess in what was left of the galley

part of the aeroplane, presumably collecting medical

supplies.

9. The Alcester Fire Service was already present on

our arrival.

10. The driver stopped our vehicle on the right-hand

side of the road close to the gateway giving access

to the field where the aeroplane had come to rest.

We alighted from our machine and I could see that

there was little to be done. No injured persons

were in sight and the aeroplane was not on fire.

I approached the aeroplane through the hole in the

hedge which it had made in its path and I could

see that the surface of the field had been churned

up. As I approached the aeroplane I detected a

strong smell of fuel and could also clearly hear

a persistent and continuous dripping. I noticed

that the starboard wing was broken and that what

remained of it was directly above an open ditch

which ran along the line of the hedge dividing two

fields. The ditch contained flowing water and I

assumed that petrol was dripping into the ditch.

I did not however carry out a close examination.

11. Present day procedure would require the use of

foam. In 1953 however the technique of dealing

with air accidents was less rigorous and I was

not particularly surprised to discover that no

foam had been used.

12. I walked around the back of the aeroplane to the

port side where I saw the stewardess previously

mentioned and was then directed by the officer in

charge of the Studley Section to deal with traffic

which was accumulating on the road. After the

traffic had been turned back I collected together

some of the debris and placed it near to the

main wreckage. Among the debris I recall seeing

one of the propellers which I assume must have

been the starboard propeller since the other one

appeared to be intact. The propeller was stuck

in the ground in a more or less upright position

some distance from the fuselage.

13. I recall that the remains of the starboard wing

together with the front of the fuselage were

over the ditch but that the port wing was not.

AND I MAKE this solemn declaration conscientiously

Believing the same to be true and by virtues of the

Provisions of the Statutory Declarations Act 1835

DECLARED at Stratford upon Avon

In the County of Warwick, England

This 24th day of January

1975 Signed: F. H. Weaver

Before me RWM

A Notary Public and

A Commissioner for Oaths.

* * * * * * * * *

I, HORACE JAMES WEAVER of 32 The Grove Studley in

The County of Warwick do solemnly and sincerely

Declare as follows:

1. I am now the Sub-Officer in charge of the Studley Section of the

Warwickshire County Fire Brigade at the

Retained station at Studley.

2. On 1st January, 1953 I was at my place of work in the

Carpentry Shop of Needle Industries Limited when I

heard the “all clear” siren which then operated as

an alert for the fire brigade. My place of work

was no more than 150 yards from the fire station in

High Street Studley. I ran to the fire station

And believe that the only member of the service to

reach the station before me was the then sub officer

in charge namely Mr. Horace Ireland. Mr. Ireland

has since died but so far as I recall he had

already taken details of the location of the

emergency.

4. There was a three or four minute wait in the station

for an adequate crew to arrive and the journey to

the site of the accident took about ten minutes.

The Weather was wet and cold.

5. I alighted from the vehicle and approached the

aeroplane on the starboard side at an angle of about

90 degrees. I could see that the starboard wing was

badly damaged and quite a lot of debris including

metal was spread over the field. I had also

noticed that the hedges on both sides of the road

had been broken and I assumed that the aircraft

must have touched down on the left hand side of the

road before crossing and coming to rest close to a

tree on the right-hand side of the road.

6. The aeroplane had come to rest at an angle with the

damaged starboard wing and the front of the fuselage

over an open ditch which ran between two fields.

The ditch contained running water and I could clearly

hear a persistent splashing as liquid fell into the

water in the ditch. There was a strong smell of

fuel which could be detected from a considerable

distance and as I approached the wreckage I looked

along the line of the ditch beneath the starboard

wing. I saw that the cause of the splashing was what

I took to be fuel falling into the ditch from the

underside of the starboard wing. I made no closer

inspection and do not recall the colour of the

liquid.

7. The water in the ditch was flowing down away from

the site of the wreckage.

8. To the best of my recollection the Studley Section

remained on site for about three quarters of an

hour before returning to the station.

AND I MAKE this solemn declaration conscientiously

believing the same to be true and by virtues of the

provisions of the Statutory Declarations Act 1835.

Declared at Stratford upon Avon

In the County of Warwick, England

This 24th day of January 1975 Signed: H. J. Weaver

Before me RWM

A Notary Public, and

A Commissioner for Oaths

* * * * * * * *

DD2002

13. Statement of R. F. Prior, Approach Controller, Elmdon Airport.

Report on Accident to Dakota EI-ACF on 1st January, 1953

I was the duty Approach Controller at Elmdon on the morning of the

1st January, 1953. I received a flight plan on Aer Lingus Dakota EI-ACF

inbound to Elmdon from Dublin via Airways. At approximately 1050 I was

informed by Preston Airways that ECF, ETA Elmdon at 1101, required

clearance. I requested the aircraft at 2500’ on the S.B.A., but was

informed by the Airways Controller that due to conflicting traffic it

could not be cleared below 4500’ until overhead this field.

2. At 1057, ECF CALLED Birmingham Approach on 126.9 kcs reporting by

Lichfield, height 4500’. I instructed the aircraft to maintain 4500’ and

to call overhead this field. I passed him the 1055 Birmingham weather

actual, surface 360o at 14 knots, visibility 3000 yards, cloud 8/8 at 800’,

7/8 at 600’ QFE 989.2 mbs. ECF acknowledged this and a few moments later

requested an emergency descent due to engine trouble affecting both engines.

I cleared him immediately to descend to 2500’, the safety altitude for this

aerodrome, and I informed the A.T.C.C. at Preston of my action. Preston

requested me to check that ECF had passed through 3500’ The aircraft

reported he was at 2000’ with both engines now out.

3. The Aerodrome Fire Service were brought to immediate readiness and

the Homer was taking bearings on all transmissions from the aircraft. ECF

continued to pass his altitude at intervals and at 700’ reported below cloud flying

contact. The aircraft passed further altitudes down to 200’, when at

1104 he stated that he was making an emergency landing. The Homer took a

bearing on this transmission and passed to me a QDM of 0250.

4. Immediate calls were made to Solihull and Warwickshire Police with

the information that an aircraft had crashed on a bearing of 195o from

Birmingham, distance unknown. They were asked to check with all their

local stations. The Aerodrome Fire Service vehicles were held for

immediate readiness on the Coventry Road to proceed to the scene when the

location was known. At 1123 Solihull Police informed me that they had

received an unconfirmed report that an aircraft had crashed at Spernal Ash,

near Studley, approximately 15 miles from Elmdon (N.B. This checks on the

bearing of 195o). The 1123 report was subsequently confirmed and the

Aerodrome Fire Service recalled to Station. During the absence of the

fire vehicles the Centres were informed that we could not accept traffic.

5. At 1203 Centres were informed that we would now accept traffic and

shortly afterwards Alcester Police informed us that ECF had crashed at

Broad Lane, near Spernal Garage, Studley. There were no serious casualties

and the aircraft did not catch fire. During the whole sequence of these

events I issued instructions for aircraft at Castle Bromwich and Honiley to

remain grounded and requested that their crash facilities standby for possible use.

6. Notification action was taken by telephone and teleprinter to

Accident Investigation Branch, London, and South Western Divisional

Headquarters. The Senior Operations Officer of the Aer Lingus Office at

Dublin was informed by telephone.

(Sgd.) R. F. PRIOR

Birmingham Airport, 1ST January, 1953

* * * * * * * *

DD2002

19. Report on Accident to Dakota Aircraft

EI-ACF on 1st January, 1953

I was duty Aerodrome Control Officer on the 1st January, 1953

and approximately 1058, on instructions from the Approach Controller,

I (illegible word) the Aerodrome Fire Section to full readiness. When

ECF reported on the Approach frequency at 700’ and in contact with

Ground, I despatched the Fire Section to the main gate of the

Airport and requested that they maintain radio contact for

Further instructions.

2. I informed the Airport Commandant, Senior Air Traffic Control

Officer, B.E.A.C. and Aer Lingus Operations, Dublin.

3. Whilst awaiting the exact location of the crash I maintained

two way contact with the Senior Air Traffic Control Officer in

the Austin Countryman, who was proceeding to the scene of the

crash with the Aerodrome Commandant. To obviate waste of time,

the vehicle left immediately the aircraft was known to be down

and location details were passed by means of the vehicle’s radio.

I received, on behalf of the Approach Controller, information

from the Alcester Police confirming the location of the accident.

I took notification action to South Western Divisional Headquarters

and A.I.B., London.

Birmingham Airport F. R. Hunt (Signed).

1st January, 1953

* * * * * * * *APPENDIX VI

C.I.D. Special Branch,

Speke Airport,

Thursday, 5th February, 1953.

John Lorimer says:-

I am an Airline Pilot in the employ of Aer Lingus Teoranta, and reside at “Hackett”,

84 Iveragh Road, Whitehall, Dublin.

On Monday, 2nd February, 1953, I was acting as First Officer in aeroplane EI-ACL,

bound from Dublin to Speke, arriving Speke 1705 hours. The trip was completely straight-

forward, and at no time did we fly through cloud. I mention this because at times when

flying through cloud, there is heavy rain, and it might be possible for a drop or two of water

to enter the tanks. The engines behaved perfectly, and did not miss a beat.

On arrival there, I went straight to the front of the aircraft, and supervised the

refueling. I stood between the “bowser” and the aircraft, where I could see the refueller dip

the tanks and go through the motions of refueling. I should have mentioned that at other

airports, refueling is done by means of the men concerned using a portable ladder which is

brought on the “bowser”, and set against the leading edge of the wing near to the refueling

point. On no occasion, however, have I seen such a ladder used at Liverpool Airport, and the

normal procedure there is that one of the refueling crew gives the other one a “leg up” at the

trailing edge of the wing, and this man scrambles up towards the leading edge. The fuel hose

is passed to him by his colleague (who has passed underneath the wing to the bowser) and

fuelling is then commenced. It was this way in which the fuelling was commenced on this

occasion. I saw the refueller mount the port wing, though I did not see him mount the

starboard wing. When he mounted the port wing, although, from where I was standing I

could not see much more of the man who mounted the wings, than his legs whilst he was on

the ground, I knew that when he appeared on top of the wings at the leading edges to receive

the fuel hose, he only had his dip stick in his hand, and whereas he may also have had a

screw-driver he most certainly did not have a large object, such as a can, in his possession.

The refueling was carried out quite normally, and when it was completed, I signed for

the quantity of fuel delivered. As I walked away, the man who had been on the wing was

getting off. I am sure I should have noticed had that man been carrying a can, or other

receptacle, and I am certain that he was not. I then entered the airport building where I did

my normal business in connection with the flight.

At about 1745 hours I was leaving the Terminal Buildings with the hostess, with the

object of returning to the aeroplane, when I saw that the steps with which the passengers

(inward) had disembarked, had been removed. In the circumstances, I returned to the

Customs Hall and remained there for approximately three minutes whilst another aircraft

(belonging to Fred Olsen) departed, when I knew the steps would then be made available to

us.

I returned to the aircraft at about 1748 hours and the steps having been replaced, I

went on board and I carried out the cockpit check. I found everything in order here. The fuel

cocks were turned on by me, and I observed that the gauges were reading the correct

amounts.

I don’t know just at what stage the passengers came on board, but the Captain,

Captain QUIGLEY, joined me after about two or three minutes of my going on board.

I was sitting on the left hand seat, i.e., the Captain’s seat, as I was going to fly the

aircraft back to Dublin. Captain Quigley was in the right hand seat.

Starting procedure was carried out quite normally, and the engines reacted quite

normally. I was facing East on the tarmac, and I turned right through 180 degrees, to taxy to

Runway 04 via the perimeter track. To start the turn, I revved the port engine, and applied

gently the right brake. The machine turned quite normally, and I then taxied towards the

perimeter track along the Apron. Both engines continued to function properly.

After taxying for about 75 to 100 yards, I was instructed by Control to park, and carry

out the pre-take off check of the engines, which consists of opening up each engine in turn,

testing magneto switches etc. I throttled back to about 700 r. p. m., started to apply brakes

gently, and at the same time started to swing the aircraft to the right, so that the tail was away

from any buildings (to avoid disturbing occupants with the slip stream). (At 700 r. p. m. she

would be little more than idling). I then intended to rev up each engine in turn, they would be

revved up to approximately 2,500 r. p. m. As I bent down to apply the parking brake in

preparation for the revving, the port engine faded out completely. The Captain drew my

attention to the revs going off the clock, and he himself advanced the throttle lever, to try and

get the engine to pick up, thinking it was cold, but without success.

The Captain intimated to me that he was of the opinion that I had had insufficient r. p.

m. to maintain idling, due to the engines being cold. I then went through the full starting drill

twice, in an attempt to start the port engine, and in the meantime the starboard engine had

been advanced to 1,200 r. p. m. by the Captain.

The port engine, on both occasions of re-starting, ran for a few seconds before fading

out completely again.

The Captain then decided that the port engine was over primed, and instructed me to

examine, by torchlight, the port engine (and the ground beneath) for signs of petrol flooding

out.

Had the engine been over primed, petrol would have been flooding out of the

overflow vent on to the ground. In fact there appeared to be very little liquid on the ground at

all.

At this stage the Captain decided to have a go at starting the port engine himself, and

towards this end we checked all cockpit controls for correct positioning – just to make sure

we had not left something we should have done.

As the Captain was attempting to start the port engine, I noticed the r. p. m.

decreasing on the starboard engine.

I immediately drew the Captain’s attention to this, and he advanced the starboard

throttle, as he had done with the port engine, but the engine just faded out completely.

Captain Quigley then decided that we should change seats, the reason for changing

being that we normally start the aircraft from that side and handling of the switches comes

more naturally from that side. By now the B.E.A. engineer and fire crew had come up and

were standing by.

Some conversation took place between the Captain and the engineer as to whether the

engines were in fact over primed. The reply from the engineer was in the negative.

The Captain now made several more attempts to start the port engine, with the same

results as I had had.

By this stage we were both convinced that something was wrong, but the Captain

decided to try and start the starboard engine to ensure that by no possible chance we had

made a mistake in starting procedure.

As far as I can remember, the Captain made three attempts to start the starboard

engine, which would start for a few seconds, then give a loud back-fire, and shoot out a

length of flame, and cut out.

By this time the Captain decided to abandon all attempts to start the aircraft, and the

passengers were disembarked..

When we left the aircraft, we found the B.E.A. engineer (Fletcher) examining the

drain cocks to the tanks, and he informed us that he had found water coming through the

carburettor vents. The drain cocks, which are spring loaded, were depressed in turn, one port,

one starboard, and water splashed on to the ground from both cocks. After about a pint had

drained out, and there appeared to be no chance of it stopping, Fletcher decided that it had

better be collected and measured, and he acquired two one pint milk bottles, which were

filled in my presence mainly with water. Fletcher decided that instead of bottles he had better

have a bucket, which was then fetched. He started filling that whilst I was there.

At this stage Captain Quigley went to the Control, with a view to warning the other

two aircraft which had taken off from Speke before us, and as far as we knew had been filled

from the same bowser as we had. I then proceeded towards the Terminal Building and was

intercepted at the door by Mr. Highley, the “Shell” refueller, who had operated the bowser

controls during refueling.

Highley said to me, “Look Sir, I have just tested my bowser for water and there is

definitely none showing. I would like you to come with me to the bowser and witness the

testing of the petrol”. I informed him that I could not do this without the Captain’s consent,

which I then obtained.

I accompanied him to the bowser which was parked at the East end of the Terminal

Building, and in my presence there, he dipped the tank with a rod coated with green water

detecting paste. (This paste changes colour to pink almost immediately on contact with

water.) The result of this test was that at the bottom of the rod about 1/32nd of an inch to

1/14th of an inch showed pink. Mr. Highley informed me that this water was at least one inch

below the minimum level to which they drew.

Highley and I both went to the Captain and informed him of the result of this test.

The next part I took in this case was the following day, Tuesday, 3rd February, 1953,

when at approximately 9.30 a.m., I arrived at the aerodrome with Captain Quigley, and we

both went to the aircraft, where Mr. Bateson, Aer Lingus Inspector, Engineering Department,

informed us that the petrol tanks had been completely drained, and that he intended to have

the aircraft refueled preparatory to flushing the fuel lines and carburettor under pressure. We

left him to carry on. The petrol which had been drained off was in drums by the aircraft.

At about mid-day, on the Captain’s instruction, I returned to the aircraft to see how

the work was progressing, and Mr. Bateson asked me to assist himself and Mr. Fletcher by

operating the fuel bowser pumps and other controls in the cockpit. This I did, and observed

water flowing out of the vent at the bottom of both engines when the booster pumps were

operating. I can tell the difference between water and petrol falling on to the ground, and in

any case whilst I was there, the drain cocks were again opened, and I witnessed more water

coming out mixed with the petrol. It would be about ¼ pint in all, from each tank. This

would not normally be considered excessive.

The amounts coming from the fuel lines when they were being flushed out under

pressure, would be in the nature of about two pints to each engine.

After the lines had been flushed out, I shut off the boosters and left the aircraft.

(Signed) John Lorimer.

To inform the reader of “The Liverpool Police Report”, which was withheld from theCaptain, regardless of his repeated requests before and during the Public Inquiry, wehave compiled the contents as follows:-

CONTENTS

1. Suspicious Circumstances: Water in Aircraft Fuel Tanks, Liverpool Airport, Speke, 2.2.1953. Press Reports suggesting sabotage.

2. Outline of circumstances revealed by initial enquiries.

3. System of dealing with civil aircraft at Speke:(a) Arrival procedure(b) Departure procedure.

4. System of storage, supply and inspection of fuel at Airport:(a) Firms concerned(b) Types of fuel supplied (c) Transportation (d) Storage (e) Refuelling vehicles or ‘bowsers’.

5. Water contamination in storage tanks.

6. Elimination of water in storage tanks.

7. Routine tests for water contamination in Aircraft.

8. Police enquiries:Personnel interviewed and samples taken.

9. Facts from the statements taken re EI-ACL.

10. Possibility of water build-up in EI-ACL.

11. No evidence of attempt to sabotage EI-ACL.

12. Access to aircraft fuel tanks.

13. Access to ‘bowser’.

14. Water in ‘bowsers’ 9822Q. and 9909 Q. :(a) separation and gravitation of water in suspension(b) condensation

(c) the introduction of ‘foreign’ water.

15. Intake of water from bulk storage.

16. Conclusions:Actual amount of water found in EI-ACL.

17. Possibility of water being present in EI-ACL on arrival.

18. Cambrian ‘Rapide’ G-ALAT case:General circumstancesPolice enquiries

Conclusions:Amount of water supplied by ‘bowser’:Port tankStarboard tank.

19. Possible source of water in ‘bowser’ 9909 Q.

20. Corroboration by chemical analysis.

21. Recommendations made:To Airline operatorsTo ‘bowser’ operators.

The actual Report follows:

LIVERPOOL POLICE REPORT

C. I. D.

5th MARCH, 1953.

Suspicious circumstances: Water In Aircraft Fuel Tanks,

Liverpool Airport, Speke, 2.2.1953, and 6.2.1953.

AER LINGUS TEORANTA DOUGLAS ‘DAKOTA’ CASE

Press Reports suggesting sabotage

I (Detective Inspector Censi) beg to report that on Tuesday, 3.2.1953, andWednesday, 4.2.1953, considerable Press publicity was given to a report that at about5.50 p.m., on Monday, 2.2.1953, the engines of an Aer Lingus ‘Dakota’ Aircraft,which had been taxy-ing towards her ‘take-off’ runway at the Liverpool Airport,Speke, en route for Eire, had cut out and that on examination of the Aircraft, twogallons of water had been found in each of the two main fuel tanks.

As by 12 noon on Wednesday, 4.2.1953, we had not received any request toinvestigate the circumstances of this case which, according to published reports, werehighly suspicious and appeared to contain a strong suspicion that a serious attempthad been made to sabotage the Aircraft and so endanger life, on your instructions Iwent to the Aerodrome and commenced enquiries into the case immediately.Sergeant Pennington and Constable Laing also came to the Airport to assist.

Outline of circumstances revealed by initial enquiries

My preliminary enquiries showed that the Irish Aircraft EI-ACL, a Douglas D.C.3‘Dakota’ machine, owned by Aer Lingus Teoranta (Irish Air Lines) had beeninvolved, and that the circumstances of the case were briefly as follows:

At 5.8 p.m., on Monday, 2.2.1953, the aircraft arrived at Liverpool from Dublin,carrying passengers and freight. It was marshalled into the Customs Area on theTarmac and the passengers disembarked. “Between-flight’ inspection was carried outon the Aircraft by one of the British European Airways Engineers, Fletcher, andB.E.A. Aircraft Cleaners, Partington and Boswell, performed the cleaning dutiesinside the passenger cabin. During this period a Shell Aviation Refuelling Vehiclesupplied the Aircraft with fuel, 1st Officer Lorimer, of the Aer Lingus machine, beingpresent while this was done.

At approximately 5.50 p.m., the engines of the Aircraft were started, 1st OfficerLorimer being at the controls and Capt. Quigley of Aer Lingus sitting beside him.The Aeroplane taxied approximately 75 to 100 yards from the position she hadoccupied in the Customs area when the port engine idled and finally stopped. At thisstage the starboard engine continued to run, however. Repeated attempts were madeto restart the port engine, but without success. The starboard engine then ran downand stopped, and attempts to start it resulted in several very violent back-fires in thecarburettor intake. In view of these circumstances, further attempts to start theengines were abandoned and a physical check was made by the Engineer (Fletcher)on the starboard engine, but without any defect becoming apparent to him. On theAircraft’s fuel tank drain-cocks being checked, however, a considerable amount ofwater was found coming from each main tank, though the auxiliary tank was normal.It was then observed that the liquid which had issued from the volute drains of each

engine during starting attempts was water, and not fuel as is usual. It was alleged thatbetween four and five gallons of water were drawn off the tanks of EI-ACL thatevening.

The Shell Mex and B.P. Representative on duty at the Airport had been informed ofwhat had happened in the meantime and he, apparently, carried out a check on theShell Mex and B.P. vehicle concerned and alleged that he had found only a normaltrace of water in it.

At 11.30 p.m., on 2.2.1953, a Mr. Bateson of the Aer Lingus Engineers InspectionDepartment, arrived at Speke from Dublin and made a cursory inspection of themachine, but decided to examine it in detail on the following day.

On the following day, Tuesday, 3.2.1953, a further considerable quantity of water wassaid to have been taken from the pipe lines, filters, carburettors and tanks of the Irishmachine, making an alleged total of almost six gallons. The Aircraft fuel system waseventually cleared of water, and at 2.30 p.m., that day the engines were reported tohave been running satisfactorily.

Representatives of Aer Lingus and B.E.A., apparently then carried out an immediate‘on the spot’ investigation with a view to establishing the origin of the water found inthe ‘Dakota’, and at that stage they appear to have decided among themselves that itwas unlikely that such water had been deliberately placed in the tanks of the Aircraftwhilst she had been standing on the apron at the Liverpool Airport.

I was informed that a conference was subsequently held by Mr. Williams of the AirSafety Committee, Aer Lingus Teoranta; Mr. Bourke, Development EngineersBranch, Aer Lingus Teoranta; Mr. Bousted, Operations Manager, Shell Aviation; Mr.Patton, Liverpool Branch Manager, Shell Aviation, and Mr. Massey, DivisionalAviation Manager, Shell Aviation, with a view to deciding who was responsible forthe presence of the water in the aircraft tanks.

It would appear that at this Conference, the Shell Aviation Representatives insisted tothe Aer Lingus Delegation (quoting their ‘world-wide’ experience with fuel andrefuelling vehicles as their authority) that it was physically impossible for one of theirrefuellers to supply water to an aircraft, with fuel. My information is that suchpowerful arguments were advanced on this occasion by the Shell officials that the AerLingus Authorities were inclined to accept the assertions made by the former. Theidea of ‘sabotage’ seems to have entered into the picture at this juncture.

At no stage, however, was the fact that water had been found in the fuel system of theaircraft, and sabotage suspected, reported to the Police by any of the Authoritiesconcerned. Having had the position outlined to me as set out above, and in order tobe in a position to appreciate, and assess the value of, all information which would beavailable to the Police concerning the suspicious circumstances into which ourenquiries were to be made, I made a close study of the system of dealing with aircraftat the Liverpool Airport, and I also examined the system of the storage, conveyanceand delivery of aviation fuel at the Aerodrome. The facts are as follows:

System of dealing with civil aircraft at Speke:

(a) Arrival procedure

On the arrival of all civil aircraft at Speke, the machines taxy to the Apron, andapproach their selected parking position in accordance with signals given to the Pilotsby airport ground marshallers.

Machines from abroad, (including Eire) are marshaled into what is known as the“Customs Area’, which is a section of the tarmac immediately outside the TerminalBuilding. This area is overlooked by the Customs Office, which is situated in theTerminal Building.

On the arrival of any machine in the fading light or in darkness, a system of brilliantflood-lighting is put into operation and illuminates a large section of the Tarmac,including the whole of the Customs Area. In the parking position in this area, the nearwing tips of the main span of aircraft would be only a few yards from the TerminalBuilding and any strange person in the vicinity of such aircraft would be clearlyvisible from that building and from most parts of the Tarmac.

Arrivals are met by a female receptionist of B.E.A., and other B.E.A., Office Staffwhen necessary, and after the passengers (if any) have been disembarked and escortedinto the Terminal Building for Customs and/or immigration clearance, and the Crewhave left the craft, the freight and passengers’ baggage is unloaded by B.E.A. porters(known as ‘loaders’). Whilst this operation is proceeding, it is customary for the 1st

Officer of the Aeroplane, in company with the crew of the refuelling vehicle (whichby this time has usually been drawn up in front of the machine), to attend to therefuelling of the craft. This Officer supervises the ‘dipping’ of the wing fuel tanks byan employee of the fuel supplying Firm, and decides upon the quantity of fuel to bedelivered to each tank. The fuel vehicle normally remains in a position from whichfuel can be provided through a lengthy hose (fitted with a pistol grip nozzle) to alltanks.

The correct procedure to be adopted by the two men who comprise the staff of therefuelling vehicle (known as a ‘bowser’) is that whilst one remains in attendance bythe vehicle, the other should take a ladder which is carried as part of the equipment ofthe ‘bowser’ and set it against the leading edge of the wing of the Aircraft. (Someseven feet above ground level in the case of a ‘Dakota’). As regards using a ladder,however, this part of the routine has rarely been carried out, the second ‘bowser’attendant usually mounting the trailing edge of the wings (some 4’6” above theground) often with the assistance of his colleague. When the delivery of fuel iscompleted, the 1st Officer signs for the quantity of petrol received and leaves the areafor the Terminal Building. The ‘bowser’ is then driven away.

Normally an Air Ministry Police Officer is present and keeps all the above-describedoperations under observation. His duty is to see that no unauthorized person goes onto the Tarmac.

(b) Departure procedure:

Departure procedure is commenced by loading any outward freight and passengers’baggage, and a few moments from departure time, after the Air Hostess (if one iscarried) has joined the plane to prepare the passenger cabin, the B.E.A. Receptionistconducts the ‘outward’ passengers from the Terminal Building to the Aircraft andthey are allocated their seats. The Captain and 1st Officer usually go on board next,and after the passenger steps have been removed from the side of the fuselage and thedoor closed, the usual ‘cockpit drill’ is carried out by the Pilot. This includeschecking of instruments, etc., etc.

At a given signal from the Ground Engineer the engines are started (a ground batteryhaving been previously connected to the starting motors), and when the engines are‘revving’ satisfactorily, the aeroplane moves off towards the particular Runway to beused.

System of storage, supply and inspection of fuel at Airport:

(a) Firms concerned

The supply of fuel and lubricants to aircraft at Liverpool Airport is undertaken by twoFirms – Shell Mex and B.P., Ltd. And Esso Petroleum Co., Ltd., the principalpurveyor being the former Company. Shell Mex have the contract to supply theMinistry of Civil Aviation, British European Airways, Aer Lingus Teoranta and othersmall concerns, including Cambrian Airways, and are the Company which areimplicated in this enquiry.

(b) Types of fuel supplied

The Shell Mex Company handle and supply two types of fuel at Liverpool Airport,i.e., aviation spirit and aviation turbine fuel (paraffin based).

There are three grades of aviation spirit, viz:-(i) 100 octane, 100% imported.(ii) 100 octane, indigenous.(iii) 73 octane.

As regards these:-(i) is the grade of fuel supplied to foreign aircraft, such as the Aer

Lingus machines, and is, in effect, tax free, H.M. Customsallowing a rebate in respect of the duty paid on supplies of thisfuel which are made to machines going abroad.

(ii) is a fuel which is partly refined in the United Kingdom and istaxed at the rate of 2/6d. per gallon. It is supplied to aircraftengaged on internal United Kingdom flights.

(iii) is the spirit supplied to small aircraft, the engines of which areunsuited to 100 octane spirit.

(c) Transportation

The transportation (known to Shell Mex employees as ‘bridging’) of bulk suppliesfrom main installations to the Airport is carried out in heavy road tankers, in some

instances by Shell Mex vehicles and in others by vehicles owned by tank haulagecontractors. In the case of 100 octane 100 % imported fuel, this is brought fromAvonmouth, and in other cases supplies come from Stanlow, Cheshire.

The road tanks which bring the fuel to the Airport discharge their contents by meansof a gravity feed pipe into the bulk storage tanks.

(d) Storage

The bulk storage tanks used by Shell Mex and B.P. Ltd., at Liverpool Airport are fourin number and are known as S.1, S.2, S.3 and S.4. Two of these (S.1 and S.2) aresituated at a point some 200 yards to the North West of the Terminal Building, nearNo. 1 Hangar; the other two (S.3 and S.4) are some 500 or 600 yards to the West ofthe Terminal Building on the perimeter of the Airfield. Three of these tanks arebelow ground (including S.1 and S.2 with which we have been particularly concernedin this enquiry) and one is partly below ground.

With regard to tanks S.1 and S.2, each has a capacity of 4,000 gallons when full. S.1is used for the storage of 100 octane 100% imported fuel, and S.2 for 73 octane spirit.

These two tanks are, in fact, compartments of a long subterranean cylindrical tank laidhorizontally, and divided equally into three by two metal walls, the third compartmentbeing allocated to Esso Petroleum Co., Ltd.

Both S.1 and S.2 are fitted with perpendicular induction pipes about 4” in diameterinto which fresh supplies of fuel are delivered, and in the case of S.1, there is a secondperpendicular pipe fitted, about 2” in diameter, through which the ‘dip-stick’ isinserted when it is required to establish the quantity of fuel in stock therein. All thesepipes are threaded to receive screw-on caps, but whereas in the case of S.1 caps areused together with a locking device, in the case of S.2 there is no lock fitted.

The induction and dipping pipes mentioned above are contained in two bricked-inpits, one for each tank, to which access is gained by lifting a metal manhole cover.Water from the surrounding area does drain into these pits, but provision is made toallow any of this drainage which accumulates, over a certain amount (the level ofwhich is almost two feet below the apertures at the tops of the induction and dip-stickpipes, thus precluding ingress to the tanks) to flow away.

Fuel from S.1 tank is fed into the appropriate ‘bowser’ by means of an electricallyoperated ‘kerbside’ fuel pump similar to the type found at most commercial garages.This pump extracts fuel at a point some six inches above the base of the tank.

Where supplies from S.2 reservoir are required, a pipe or hose, from the particular‘bowser’ concerned, is inserted in the induction pipe previously mentioned, and fuel iswithdrawn from the stock by means of the pumping mechanism in the vehicle.

(e) Refuelling vehicles or ‘bowsers’:

These vehicles are, in fact, mobile fuel tanks and are driven by internal combustionmotors, and they are fitted with water eliminating sumps and drain cocks, pumping

mechanism, filters, flow-meters and delivery hoses, and are used in the direct supplyof fuel to the fuel tanks of the aircraft.

It is with two of such vehicles that we have been particularly concerned in theseenquiries. The first, which is referred to by the Shell Mex Staff by its number ‘9822Q’, is a vehicle fitted with dual tanks, each of 630 gallons capacity. These tanks areset one behind the other, in line, on the chassis, and are fitted with independent filtersystems, pumping mechanism and supply hoses. The forward tank is used to stockand supply 100 octane indigenous fuel, and the rere tank, 100 octane 100% importedfuel (tax free).

The second ‘bowser’ which is numbered 9909 Q, is a single tank motor-drivenvehicle, operating on the same principle as ‘bowser’ 9822 Q, mentioned above, buthas a capacity of 500 gallons. It is used solely to stock and supply 73 octane spirit.

These ‘bowsers’, when not in use, are parked on the Tarmac either outside the doorsof No. 2 Hangar (known as ‘Jack Olding’s hangar’), some 50 yards or so east of theTerminal Building, or outside the Shell Mex and B. P. Ltd., Offices, which aresituated between the Terminal Building and that as and when it becomes necessary,these vehicles are driven to the bulk storage tanks previously mentioned and filledwith the appropriate fuel, and when aircraft require refuelling, the ‘bowsers’ aredriven to a position in front of them, and the necessary amount of fuel is pumpedthrough the long hoses with which they are fitted, into the aircraft tanks.

Water contamination in storage tanks:

It is a recognized fact that water does collect in fuel storage tanks, whether mobile orstatic.

There are four ways in which such water can become present in appreciablequantities, in storage. These are:-

(a) By separation (and gravitation) of latent water introduced ininvisible suspension in fuel.

(b) By condensation from the atmosphere.(c) By induction of contaminating extraneous water, usually with

fuel on delivery, or, in the case of ‘bowsers’, rain-waterthrough the filling orifices, if the filler-caps are left off in badweather.

(d) Seepage, from surrounding ground, due to faulty tanks, wheresuch tanks are underground.

With regard to (a), I have learned from the Thornton Research Centre of the ShellCompany, that approximately .01% water (which represents approximately 1 pint ofwater in 1,000 gals. of fuel) can be held in latent suspension in the fuel, and can bereleased in certain circumstances of temperature and pressure. If and when released,this water would, of course, gravitate to the bottom of the tank in which it happened tobe, providing there were no obstructions behind which such secretions could becomeimprisoned. In the bulk storage tanks S.1 and S.2, no such obstructions exist.

Regarding (b), a certain amount of water condensation normally takes place in fuelcontainers, but the rate at which the condensate is formed will vary and cannot bepredicted. In the course of time, water accumulating thus at the base of a storage tank(the fuel having a specific gravity less than that of water) is known as a ‘water build-up’.

With regard to (c), Shell Mex and B.P. regulations make it compulsory that on arrivalat the Airport, the road tankers delivering fuel to the bulk storage tanks, shall bedrained of any water content they may have by means of the water drain-cocksspecially fitted to all such vehicles for this purpose. My information is that in spite ofthis, however, chemical tests made by Shell Mex and B.P. Ltd., of samples of watertaken from the base of such bulk storage containers have, in the past, shewn traces ofsalt, a fact which has been taken by Shell Mex and B.P. to indicate that a certainamount of sea water contamination can be, and has in fact been, introduced into thestatic bulk tanks with the deliveries of fuel.

In respect of (d), storage tanks S.1 and S.2 are considered by Shell Mex and B.P. Ltd.,to be in good condition and not to leak. Whilst we have no conclusive proof of this,this surmise would seem to be correct, as no regular increase of water has apparentlyshewn itself over a number of years in either tank.

Elimination of water in storage tanks:

In view of the foregoing, it will be readily understood that those responsible foraviation fuel contained in tanks should keep a careful watch upon the water leveltherein, with the object of taking steps to eliminate any undue or dangerousaccumulations should they occur. Accordingly, a Shell Mex and B.P. order to theirStaff concerned with storage tanks instructs that these shall be tested for water contentonce daily. A water detecting paste is supplied by the Firm to those responsible forstocks of fuel, who are instructed to smear the end of the tank ‘dip-sticks’ with thismaterial and test the tanks regularly in accordance with instructions. With regard to‘bowsers’, Shell Mex and B.P. Ltd., direct that a ‘water-drain’ test shall be carried outon each vehicle every morning, before any supplies of fuel are made to aircraft.Water which may have accumulated in the sump of the ‘bowsers’ should thus bedrawn off.

Instructions have also been given that a ‘drain-off’ test should be made on the vehicle,and water eliminated, fifteen minutes after replenishing any ‘bowser’ from bulkstorage.

Insofar as the bulk storage tanks are concerned, no provision is made for thecollection and ‘drain-off’ of the water which undoubtedly builds-up in them. When itis considered necessary, the Staff have to introduce extractor pumps to draw off anywater build-up in these tanks.

In the case of tanks S.1 and S.2, the Shell Mex and B.P. Ltd., Foreman, Stevenson,asserts that since 1946 when he commenced employment at the Airport, it has notbeen necessary for any surplus water to be extracted from either of these containers.He admits that the water level in both has from time to time risen to about ½” and it

has then shewn a decrease, for which he says he is at a loss to account. He maintainsthat has never risen over ½”.

With regard to the water contamination of fuel, Shell Mex and B.P. Ltd., make aprovision in documentary form, for returns to be made to them by Staff responsiblefor stocks kept at Aerodromes, shewing, in the case of bulk storage tanks, the dailywater level in each, and in the case of the ‘bowsers’, the result of a daily ‘water-dip’.The latter information should be entered on the ‘daily log sheet’ of each vehicle. Weare informed that failure to comply with the water elimination regulations would betreated as a serious neglect of duty by Shell Mex and B.P. Ltd.

Routine tests for water contamination in Aircraft:

Our information from the Assistant Development Engineer of Aer Lingus Teoranta,the owners of the ‘Dakota’ Aircraft with which we have been concerned in this case,is that the Company have a regulation which instructs that aircraft fuel tanks on theirmachines must be drained for water once every 24 hours elapsed time. After this hasbeen done, an appropriate entry should be made on the Aircraft Inspection Sheets ofthe particular Aircraft concerned. The Staff concerned are aware that failure tocomply with this regulation would entail serious disciplinary consequences.

Police enquiries

Personnel interviewed and samples taken.

As indicated earlier in this Report, the Police were not officially informed of thecircumstances surrounding the finding, on 2.2.1953, of water in the tanks of the AerLingus machine. On and after Wednesday, 4.2.1953, however, and after it wasrealized by those concerned that our enquiries had commenced, we were given everyco-operation by them.

On our arrival at the Aerodrome, and after having obtained brief particulars of theoccurrence (as previously outlined), I decided that enquiries should be instituted byhaving all available personnel who had had any dealings whatsoever with the Aircraftinvolved, interviewed and statements taken from them with a view to determiningprecisely who had been near the machine, what each individual had done on thatoccasion, and whom he had seen in the vicinity. This necessitated questioningemployees of the Ministry of Civil Aviation, British European Airways, Aer LingusTeoranta, Shell Mex and B.P. Ltd., and the Air Ministry Police, and this work wascommenced immediately. In addition, steps were promptly taken to obtain samples ofthe water which had been found in the aircraft fuel tanks. Of this, I obtained a bucketcontaining approximately six pints, representing the entire residue then available, ofthe water alleged to have been drawn from the fuel tanks of the Aer Lingus ‘Dakota’EI-ACL.

Other samples which we obtained for examination at the earliest opportunity, were asfollows:-

Tap water – Liverpool Airport.Static water tank – Liverpool Airport.

Tap water – Dublin Airport.Fuel line drainings – Aer Lingus machine EI-ACL.Drainings from Shell Mex ‘bowser’ No. 9822 Q.Fluid from Shell Mex ‘bowser’ No. 9822 Q.Fluid withdrawn from the base of bulk storage tank S.1.Fluid withdrawn from pit under manhole cover of storage tank S.1.

Facts from the statements taken re EI-ACL:

As a result of our enquiries and from the statements which were taken, the facts werefound to be as follows:-

At 5.8 p.m., on Monday, 2.2.1953, the Aer Lingus Aircraft EI-ACL, commanded byCaptain Aidan QUIGLEY, and 1st Officer Lorimer, arrived at Liverpool Airport,Speke, with nine passengers from Dublin. The Aircraft taxied into the flood-litCustoms Area on the Tarmac, immediately in front of the Terminal Building andcame to rest facing East.

According to the Captain (Statement from page 36 to page 39) and 1st Officer Lorimer(Statement Appen.V1, L’pool Rpt.), the engines behaved quite normally during thetrip.

The passengers disembarked and the baggage was unloaded, and a ‘between-flight’inspection was carried out on the Aircraft by Engineer Fletcher (Statement from page40 to page 43). This did not include the testing of the fuel drain-cocks for water, andit should be mentioned here that no person can speak of having performed thisoperation, or having seen it performed, on any Aer Lingus Aircraft at Liverpool priorto the occurrence with which we have been concerned.

The Shell Mex and B.P. Ltd., ‘bowser’ 9822 Q. next drew up in front of the Aircraft,attended by Alfred Highley and Walter Frederick Harris. In the presence of 1st

Officer Lorimer, of Aer Lingus, Harris mounted the starboard wing of the Aircraft bythe trailing edge, and dipped the starboard main fuel tank to ascertain the amount offuel therein (Statements from page 44 to page 45). The fuel hose was then handed upto him by Highley and thirty gallons of fuel were supplied to that tank from the‘bowser’ (Statements from page 44 to page 54).

Harris then came off the starboard wing and mounted the port wing. After he haddipped the port tank he found that it required fifty gallons of petrol and this wassimilarly supplied from the ‘bowser’. The filling operation lasted some fifteenminutes. Lorimer, who was present throughout the refuelling, states that Harris wasnot in possession of a canister or other similar large object from which he could havepoured water into the fuel tanks (Statement Appen. V1, L’pool Report). Harris wasthe only person on the wings during refuelling.

The ‘bowser’ left the Aircraft at about 5.25 p.m., and at that time loaders Hall(Statements from page 55 to page 57); Cottrell (Statement from page 58 to page 59),and McDiarmid (Statement page 60) were engaged unloading freight from the nose ofthe Aircraft. They continued to be so employed until 5.40 p.m., and during that timesaw no person mount the wings of the Aircraft with the exception of Harris, the

‘Bowser’ attendant. Air Ministry Constable 149 Ellis (Statement page 61) states thathe was present on the Tarmac with the Aer Lingus Aircraft in his view, from 5.20p.m., until she taxied away at 5.50 p.m., and during that time he saw no unauthorizedperson approach the Aircraft.

Just before 5.50 p.m., the Crew and eighteen passengers (among whom there were nopersons of political importance) boarded the Aircraft, and Lorimer took the controlswith Capt. Quigley sitting beside him (Statement from page 36 to 39). Startingprocedure was carried out and the engines started up quite normally. After they hadbeen idling for about two minutes, the signal to taxy away …… (illegible) the enginewas revved so that the Aircraft turned through 180 degrees, and then taxied away in awesterly direction towards the appropriate take-off runway. About a minute later, andafter she had taxied a distance of about 70 to 100 yards towards the perimeter track,the port engine ran down and stopped.

Attempts were made to restart the engine, without success. Almost immediately after,the starboard engine also stopped and attempts to restart it resulted in seriousbackfires. Engineer Fletcher, who states he had witnessed the stoppage of the twoengines from near the Terminal Building, went to the Aircraft after sending for aground battery (Statement from page 40 to page 43). Further attempts were made tostart the port engine with the ground battery, without success, and Capt. Quigleydecided to off-load the passengers.

Fletcher sent for a trestle and, when it was brought, made an inspection of thestarboard engine, which revealed no apparent defect. He then decided to test the fueltank drains, and says that from each he filled a one pint milk bottle of water(Statement page 42). A one-and-half gallon white-enamelled bucket (described byFletcher in his statement as a ‘two gallon bucket’) was then obtained and used tocollect what he described as a further gallon of water from each tank. Shortly afterthis the Aircraft was towed to the hangar, where Fletcher says he drained a furthergallon of water mixed with fuel from each tank. He says that pure spirit was by thenflowing from the cocks (Statement page 43).

In the meantime, a check had been made of the water content of ‘bowser’ 9822 Q. byHighley, who used a dip-stick and detector paste, and he says (Statement page 50) thathe found only a slight trace of water. Almost immediately afterwards, he carried out asimilar check in the presence of Lorimer, with the same result.

Possibility of water build-up in EI-ACL.

In seeking for an explanation of the existence of water found in the main fuel tanks ofthis Aeroplane, I had regard to the possibility that there had been a natural waterbuild-up in the Aircraft. As explained above, such a possibility is envisaged by theoperating company when they instruct that the drain-cocks set in the sumps of all fueltanks in their Aircraft should be opened, and any accumulated water drained off onceevery twenty-four hours elapsed time.

I am informed that to find any quantity less than ¼ pint of water issuing from thesecocks daily is not considered abnormal (see Bourke’s Statement Appendix V, L’poolReport, 4th page and Lorimer’s Statement Appendix V1, L’pool Report, 6th page), and

there is reason to think that at times, a larger quantity of water may be found to havebuilt-up in twenty-four hours.

Whilst there is no doubt that all ground-staff charged with the responsibility ofcarrying out a water-drain test on aircraft tanks, will on account of penalties involved,maintain steadfastly that they have carried out their duties as laid down by theCompany, it seems unlikely that on occasions this duty may have been overlooked. Ifsuch be the case, it will be appreciated that in a comparatively short time a few pintsof water will have accumulated in each tank.

Enquiries were, therefore made with a view to obtaining some definite information asto how such water could accumulate in the main fuel tanks of a ‘Dakota’ Aeroplane,without flooding the fuel pipe lines to the carbutettors and engines. As a result, Ilearned from Aer Lingus Teoranta (who provided me with a signed statement fromMr. F.C. Delaney, their Assistant Chief Engineer (Statement page 63) that:-

(i) The engine of one of these machines will not operate either in flightor on the ground, with two gallons of water in each main petrol tank,and

(ii) The residue sump capacity of fluid which cannot be drawn off by thebooster pumps and engine pumps in flight is one quart, while on theground, with the Aircraft in the tail-down position, the residue is half agallon.

As regards (ii) whilst one quart is the amount of fluid which cannot be drawn into thefuel lines in flight (the particular test referred to by Aer Lingus having been carriedout with petrol only in the tanks), were there to have been as much as 3 or 3½ pints ofwater under the petrol in these tanks, I understand that although certain smallquantities of this water would probably have been drawn into the fuel linesintermittently with fuel, there is every reason to believe that the great majority of thefluid intake would have been fuel, and that the engines would have functionedsatisfactorily.

In the above connection, it is interesting to note that Mr. Bourke, of Aer Lingus whenmaking his statement to me (Statement Appendix V, Liverpool Rpt.) before I wasgiven the above-mentioned certificate, said (on the 4th page), that he was informed byhis Company in Dublin, at 11.0 a.m., on 4.2.1953, that the maximum quantity ofwater which could be carried in a ‘Dakota’ tank without entering the engine systemduring taxi-ing or in flight, was in fact ¾ gallon.

“It is quite possible, therefore, that aeroplane EI-ACL was flown from Eire toSpeke with 7 pints of water in the main fuel tanks (3½ pints in each).”

No evidence of attempt to sabotage EI-ACL.

Aircraft under continuous observation at Speke.

As indicated earlier in this Report, particular prominence had been given in the Press(both local and national) to this occurrence and implications had been made that thepresence of water in the aircraft tanks and fuel system had been due to sabotage. Itwas in consequence of the possibility that there might have been some attempt to

sabotage this Aircraft that our enquiries at the Airport were commenced, and specialattention was directed towards establishing when and how such an act could havebeen committed.

It was evident to us at the outset that although a certain amount of water might havebeen brought here in the fuel tanks of the Aircraft, the total amount whichsubsequently caused the flooding of the fuel pipe lines and carburettors, could nothave been carried by the Aeroplane in the tanks, as this would have caused earlierengine failure. I therefore concluded that some water must have been delivered to theAeroplane at Speke.

In an endeavour to discover if any possible ‘saboteur’ had been in the vicinity of theAeroplane during her stay at Liverpool Airport on this occasion, therefore, thestatement of every person whose duty it had been to attend the machine on and afterher arrival at Speke, was closely examined. As a result, it became clear that theAircraft had not been left unattended for any period between her arrival and departuretimes on the evening of 2.2.1953, and that she had in fact been continuously underobservation by one or other of the following people whilst she was on the Tarmac atLiverpool, viz:-

(1) John Lorimer (Statement Appendix V1, Liverpool Report)From arrival time (5.8 p.m.) to end of refuelling operation(5.25 p.m., approximately)

(2) Walter Frederick Harris (Statement page 44 to page 45) and(3) Alfred John Williamson Highley (Statement page 49 to page 51).

From approximately 5.10 p.m., to approximately 5.25 p.m.(4) Constable Edward Allan Ellis (Statement page 61). From 5.20 p.m., to

departure time (5.50 p.m.)(5) Henry Hall (Statement page 55 to page 56) and(6) Edward Cottrill (Statement from page 58 to page 59). From arrival to

departure time.(7) Sergeant Thomas Darcy (Statement page 62). After 5.20 p.m., for two

short periods.(8) Arthur Richard Rose (Statement page 66). From 5.5 p.m., to 5.30

p.m., and from 5.40 p.m., to 5.50 p.m.

From the above it will be seen that (1), (2) and (3) were with the Aircraft until (4)came, and then remained with her for another five minutes. (4) was continuouslypresent near the Aircraft from the time of his arrival until she departed. None of thesepersons saw any unauthorized person near the Aircraft.

In addition (5) and (6) were present with the Aircraft during the whole of the periodscovered by (1), (2), (3) and (4), (i.e. the whole time the Aircraft was stationary on theTarmac) and corroborate their assertion that no unauthorized person went near her.

Further (8), who also saw no unauthorized person near the Aircraft, was presentduring the whole period under review except between 5.30 p.m., and 5.40 p.m., whichperiod is covered by (4), (5) and (6).

These persons state that they saw no unusual occurrence whilst dealing with themachine, and as each is regularly employed in the capacity in which he was workingduring the times shewn above, and as all those listed as well-known to one another,there is little doubt that any unusual act on the part of anyone present, or the presenceof any stranger in the vicinity, would have been noticed immediately by one or moreof them.

Access to aircraft fuel tanks.

As a result of the enquiries made, it was clear that the only person who had access tothe fuel tank filler orifices and caps during the period that the Aircraft was at Spekeon this occasion, was Walter Frederick Harris, the Shell Mex and B.P. Ltd., employee.He was the man who removed the tank caps and actually took part, with Alfred JohnWilliamson Highley, in the carrying out of the refuelling process as described. Harriswas standing on the main wings whilst Highley remained with the ‘bowser’.

During the period that Harris was thus engaged, he was seen by several other peoplewho were working near the Aircraft (particularly Lorimer of Aer Lingus (StatementAppendix V1, L’pool Report) and who have informed the Police that he did not havea container with him during the refuelling operation, and there is no doubt at all thathe is not responsible for inserting water into the fuel tanks intentionally.

The only possible conclusion, therefore, is that some water has been unintentionallysupplied to the Aeroplane with fuel, from the ‘bowser’, and the question of sabotagemust, I suggest, be discounted entirely.

This view is supported by the report of the North Western Forensic ScienceLaboratory (page 94 of this Rpt.) in which it is made clear that the water found in theAircraft differed markedly from the available water at Speke (viz. Speke tap-waterand water from a static tank at the Aerodrome) and from Dublin Airport tap-water.

Access to ‘bowser’.

Our attention was therefore next directed towards learning if and how water couldhave been present in the ‘bowser’ used to refuel the Aircraft (‘bowser’ No. 9822 Q),and in particular, towards examining the possibility of some person or persons havingintroduced water into the vehicle with subversive intent.

We commenced by making enquiries with a view to establishing how the ‘bowser’concerned had been employed during that part of the day prior to the refuelling of theAer Lingus Aircraft. It was learned that the vehicle concerned was used as shown onfollowing pages:-

Time. How used. By whom.

From. To.

After 7.15 a.m. Water drain off test. Harris & Stevenson.

7.40 a.m. 7.55 a.m. Refuel B.E.A. G-AJHY

and G-AGJZ (indigenousfuel). Harris &

Stevenson.7.55 a.m. 10.5 a.m. Parked outside Shell Mex In view of

employees.Office on Tarmac.

10.5 a.m. 10.20 a.m. Refuel ALT. EI-ACL Harris & Stevenson.

(100 % imported fuel)10.20 a.m. 2.0 p.m. Parked outside Shell Mex In view of

employees.Office on Tarmac.

2.0 p.m. 2.15 p.m. approx. Refuel Norwegian LN-IAS Highley & Harris.(100 % imported)

2.15 p.m. 2.50 p.m. Parked outside Shell Mex In view of employees.

approx. Office on Tarmac.2.50 p.m. 3.50 p.m. approx. To S.1 bulk supply tank

where 100 octane 100 %imported fuel tank wasreplenished with 435gallons, bringing total to630 gallons. Highley.

3.50 p.m. 4.10 p.m. Parked outside Shell MexOffice on Tarmac. In view of

employees.4.10 p.m. 4.30 p.m. approx. Refuel B.E.A. G-AMFV Highley & Harris.

(indigenous)4.30 p.m. 4.40 p.m. approx. Unattended on park outside approx. Shell Mex office on Tarmac.

(Harris & Highley havingleft Office for cup of tea inmain building)

4.40 p.m. 5.5 p.m. Refuel ALT. EI-ACL Highley & Harris.(100 imported)30 gallons in starboard tank.50 gallons in port main tank.

From the above, it will be seen that it would have been almost impossible for anyperson to have approached ‘bowser’ 9822 Q, without his movements being seen bythe Shell Mex and B.P. Staff responsible for that vehicle.

The only period during which an individual with subversive or mischievous intentcould have approached this ‘bowser’ is that between 4.30 p.m., and 4.40 p.m., whenthe two men Highley and Harris were in the Terminal Building having a cup of tea.Were such a person intent on inserting a number of gallons of water into the ‘bowser’,however, he would have to climb to the top of the vehicle, by means of an iron ladderwhich is a fixture thereon, whilst carrying a large canister or other receptacle with thewater in it. He would then have to walk along the top of the ‘bowser’ to the rere tankfiller orifice (on this occasion in daylight, and on a perfectly clear day), and

deliberately pour the contents of his receptacle into the tank – an act which would callto itself the immediate attention of any airport employee by reason of its being soextraneous and unusual in normal fuel tank operation. The ‘bowser’ in its parkedposition would all the while be in full view of any person or persons using theTarmac, and any individual on top of it could be clearly seen from the Control Tower.Such a person could never be satisfied that his activities were not being watched.

The likelihood that this water had been deliberately inserted by a ‘saboteur’ istherefore very remote indeed, and, I suggest, can be discounted.

Water in ‘bowsers’ 9822 Q and 9909 Q.

It will be recalled that earlier in this Report (on pages 10 and 11) it was explained thatwater can become present in ‘bowsers’ by (a) separation and gravitation of water insuspension, (b) condensation, (c) the introduction of ‘foreign’ water.

It appeared likely that in certain circumstances, particularly if the water drain-off testswere not carried out regularly a certain ‘water build-up’ resulting from one or more ofthe above causes, could accumulate in fuel supply vehicles, and that some of thisbuild-up water might inadvertently be delivered by the ‘bowser’ concerned, to anaircraft, with fuel.

I considered that ‘bowser’ 9822 Q. might have been responsible for supplying AerLingus machine EI-ACL with some water – thus contributing in some measure, if notentirely, to the flooding of the aircraft fuel lines and carburettors with that fluid, and Isuggested this to certain prominent Officials of Shell Mex and B.P. Ltd., when theyvisited the Airport to make enquiries into this matter on 6.2.1953.

These persons included Mr. Bousted, Operations Manager, Shell AviationDepartment; Mr. Massey, Divisional Aviation Manager, Shell Aviation Department;Mr. Patten, Liverpool Branch Manager; Mr. Lancashire, Chemist and Manager ofDingle Installations; and Mr. Melstrom from Shell Mex House, Strand, London.

These gentlemen were unanimous in their assertion that it was completely impossiblefor water to be delivered with fuel from a ‘bowser’ which had been drained of itswater content.

They also contended and insisted that any water forming or being present in a‘bowser’ would gravitate into the sumps and be drainable through the water draincocks. In view of these claims they dismissed as impossible and fantastic thesuggestion that some quantity of water could have been secreted in the ‘bowser’which supplied the Aer Lingus machine with fuel, and be inadvertently delivered tothe Aeroplane.

At my request, and with their co-operation, certain tests were therefore carried outwith ‘bowsers’ as follows:-

‘Bowser’ 9822 Q had four gallons of water deliberately inserted into it. (Shell

Representatives claimed that the amount of fluid which could not be withdrawn from the base of a tank on this type of ‘bowser’ was in the region of five or six gallons).

Fuel making the quantity of fluid up to a total 630 gallons had been placed in the tank already. “Fuel” was then supplied from this ‘bowser’ to two test Tanks. 30 gallons to one and 50 gallons to the other, under conditions as nearly as possible identical with those existing on 2.2.1953 when EI-ACL was refuelled.

Although it had been predicted by some of Shell Representatives that no watercould be delivered with the fuel, and by others that if some were delivered intothe first tank, none would be delivered to the second tank – examination of thecontents of the tanks afterwards showed:-

In the first tank: 2¼ pints of water with the spiritIn the second tank: ¼ pint of water with the spirit

Withdrawn from water drain cocks of refueller – 3 gallons.Unaccounted for – and secreted in ‘bowser’ 5½ pints.

(We are assured that later the 5½ pints of water were drawn off the vehicle –but they were not forthcoming during the test).

‘Bowser’ 9909 Q. the single tank vehicle described earlier was drained forwater content by Mr. Lancashire – the Shell Mex Chemist – and the sampleobtained when he drew liquid from the drain cocks was of pure spirit.

The vehicle was driven round in a circle of some thirty yards diameter on theTarmac, and Mr. Lancashire was requested to test again for water. Onwithdrawing a further sample from the cock, and greatly to his and all otherRepresentatives surprise, half a pint of water was produced with spirit.

I have therefore concluded that it was not entirely impossible for some waterto have been secreted in ‘bowser’ 9822 Q. when it delivered fuel to the AerLingus machine.

This may have been present due to rain water entering filling orifices of the‘bowser’ if the vehicle had been left in the rain with the tank filler caps off, ordue to natural water build-up in the tank system, and to neglect by the ShellMex and B.P. Staff to carry out water drain tests on their vehicles asinstructed, though they all deny such neglect emphatically

Intake of water from bulk storage.

The possibility of water having been drawn into ‘bowser’ 9822 Q. when Highleyreplenished it at the bulk storage tank S.1 has been considered. As explained earlier,fuel is extracted by means of a fixed pipe, the base of which is only about six inchesfrom the bottom of the tank. As has already been pointed out water does accumulate

at the base of these bulk storage tanks, and although the amount varied, some shewinga ‘dip’ of as much as ½” the fact that it has never risen above that level since 1946(per Stevenson, Statement page 68) and in fact often decreased considerably, wasconsidered to be significant. It seemed most likely that as and when the water levelrises in the base of the tank, some proportion of water would occasionally be drawnup into the extractor pipe with the rush of fuel being withdrawn, thus obviating aconsiderable water build-up which should otherwise have occurred from time to timesince 1946.

In this connection it was of interest that ‘bowser’ 9822 Q. was replenished with 100octane 100 % imported fuel from S.1 tank a short while before refuelling the AerLingus machine (per Highley Statement, page 49) and originally it was thoughtpossible that some extraneous water from the bulk installation was taken in by thevehicle with the fuel, and had lodged itself somewhere therein. In view of the factthat the chemical analysis made by the North Western Forensic Science Laboratory(page 95) of water taken from S.1 tank shows that such water is of high salinity andappears to have no relation to that found in the Aircraft the possibility that water hadbeen taken into the ‘bowser’ from the bulk storage tanks has not been discounted,however.

ConclusionsActual amount of water found in EI-ACL

Enquiries were next directed towards establishing the correct amount of water whichhad been present in the main tanks and fuel system of the Aer Lingus ‘Dakota’airplane.

It was learned that whilst several people were present for short periods and witnessedwater being drained from the main tank drain cocks of the machine, nevertheless onlyone person was present throughout the whole of this operation. That person wasFletcher, the B.E.A. Engineer. In his statement (page 42 – page 43) he speaks of verylarge quantities of water issuing from the tanks, pipelines, filters and carburettors,which in all add up to some 6 gallons.

It seemed likely to me that the amounts of water he had spoken of as having issuedfrom the various component parts of the fuel system were each considerably over-estimated and that the total amount of water alleged to have been found was thereforegrossly exaggerated, and I accordingly interviewed him again.

I pointed out to him that in the darkness and working by hand torch as he had been, hemight have originally thought that there had been more water in the fuel than therereally had been. I also drew his attention to the fact that what he had thought was atwo-gallon bucket – used in collecting the water – was, a one-an-a-half gallon bucket.After I had spoken to him, he thought for a moment and said: “Well, if it wasn’t sixgallons, there was at least three”.

According to my information, Fletcher is a most diligent Aero-engineer, and to such aman the finding of more than a pint or so of water running from an aircraft tank,particularly in the dark, would doubtless give the impression that ‘gallons’ were

running from it, and I am of the opinion that this is what has in fact happened, andthat his estimate, though given in good faith, is quite inaccurate.

In support of this contention is the fact that the Police were handed only six pints ofwater alleged to have been drawn off ‘Dakota’ EI-ACL, and whereas it is known theapproximately 2 pints of the original quantity obtained were taken by Aer Lingus andShell Mex and B.P. Ltd., as samples for chemical analysis, we have no evidence thatany more was disposed of.

It therefore seems almost certain that the approximate quantity of water drained offEI-ACL was a little over 1 gallon and in the region of 9 pints.

Possibility of water being present in EI-ACL on arrival.

As previously indicated, from the results of the tests carried out by Aer Lingus on oneof their ‘Dakota’ Aircraft, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the Aircraft EI-ACLcould have flown from Eire to the United Kingdom with as much as 3 or 3½ pints ofwater in either main fuel tank (6 or 7 pints in all).

Had this been the case (due to neglect by Aer Lingus Staff to drain the fuel tanks ofwater regularly), and had a small additional quantity of water, say between 1 and 1½pints of water been added by some outside agency to each main tank (2 or 3 pints inall) whilst the Aircraft was on the ground at Speke, the engines would have started inthe normal way, and would have continued to run whilst operating on the fuelcontained in the fuel lines and carburettors. They would, however, have cut out assoon as water (the level of which would then be above the apertures of the fuel pipelines in the tanks) had filled the lines and reached the carburettors.

That this is what happened in the case of Aircraft EI-ACL is borne out by thefollowing facts:-

(a) The Aircraft flew here without engine trouble.(b) No unauthorized person approached her on the Tarmac at

Liverpool. The only person who had access to the tankfiller orifices was the refueller – Harris – who suppliedfuel from ‘bowser’ 9822 Q. He did not insert waterintentionally.

(c) The engines started normally and ran for a few minutes.The port engine (which had been revved more that thestarboard engine to turn the Aircraft through 180 degreesin the Customs area) cut out first and was followedshortly afterwards by the starboard engine.

(d) The total amount of water which was found was mostprobably in the region of 9 pints.

(e) The Report from the North Western Forensic ScienceLaboratory (page 95) makes it clear that the water foundin the Aircraft was neither water from an accessiblesource at Speke (i.e. tap water or water from a static tankin the vicinity of the Tarmac) nor Dublin Airport tapwater.

I am, therefore, of the opinion that the ‘critical’ amount of two or three pints of waterhave without doubt been inadvertently inserted with fuel into the aeroplane from‘bowser’ 9822 Q. This has almost certainly been ‘build-up water, secreted in the‘bowser’, which has worked its way through the various filters, etc., in the ‘bowser’system, finally emerging from the supply hose with the fuel being supplied to the AerLingus machine.

It should be mentioned that, although according to the North Western ForensicScience Laboratory the water found in the Aircraft shews approximate agreementwith water from the pit beneath the S.1 tank cover, it would not have been possible forany of the latter water (which is in fact rain-water seepage, (see page 10)) to havebeen taken into the ‘bowser’ during replenishing operations, due to the fact that theautomatic ‘kerbside’ type pump which is used to supply fuel from the S.1 tank,extracts spirit from inside the tank through an extraction-pipe which is a fixturetherein, and there is no possible connection between that pump and the extractor-pipe,and the seepage water mentioned. Certainly none was inserted deliberately into the‘bowser’.

CAMBRIAN ‘RAPIDE’ G-ALAT CASE.

General circumstances

At about 10.5 a.m. on Friday, 6.2.1953, and whilst the previously described enquirieswere being conducted, a Cambrian Air Services Ltd., De Havilland ‘Rapide’ Aircraft,G-ALAT, arrived at the Liverpool Airport, Speke, piloted by Captain WilliamKenneth James HAYNES (Statement page 80 to page 81). The Aeroplane had leftCardiff at 8.40 a.m. the same morning, carrying no passengers, and the Pilot hadexperienced no engine trouble on the journey.

On arrival at the Airport, the Aircraft was parked on the Tarmac in front of theTerminal Building, and was refueled by Highley (Statement page 51) who supplied 6gals. of 73 octane petrol to each of the two fuel tanks from ‘bowser’ No. 9909 Q.

There were four passengers due to travel outward with the Aircraft, and together withthe Pilot they embarked just before 10.30 a.m. that day. The Pilot started bothengines of the machine without difficulty (Statement page 80) and having allowedthem to warm up for about two minutes, taxied the Aircraft away towards the selectedtake-off runway. After the Aircraft had been taxied about 200 yards, the starboardengine failed, though the port engine continued to run normally. Repeated attemptswere made to restart the starboard engine but without success, and the Pilot thenasked Airport Control to send an Engineer to his machine.

Frederick George MALE, a B.E.A. Ground Engineer (Statement page 82 to page 83)went to the Aircraft. He was unable immediately to find the reason for the stoppageof the engine and so the passengers were disembarked and the Aircraft was taken toNo. 1 hangar.

On examination there it was found that engine failure had been caused by water whichhad been drawn into the engine from the fuel tank (Statement page 83).

Police enquiries:

I was informed of the occurrence almost immediately and instructed Constable Scott,of this Department, who was also assisting me, to go to the Aircraft, which was thenstill on the perimeter track. He did so and was present when this Aeroplane was takento the hangar, where a third of a pint of water was pumped from the supply lines andcarburettor of the starboard engine by Male, and when approximately half a pint ofwater was drained from each of the fuel tanks (one and one third pints in all). Thiswater was retained by Constable Scott and was sent later to the North WesternForensic Science Laboratory at Preston for analysis.

From enquiries which were promptly commenced, it was quite definitely establishedthat during the whole of the time that this Aircraft was on the Tarmac at Speke, it wasunder the constant supervision of Constable 375 Quirk of the Ministry of CivilAviation Constabulary (Statement page 84) and Engineer’s Labourer, George Fellows(Statement page 85). The only person who had access to the fuel tanks of the Aircrafton this occasion was the Shell Mex and B.P. Ltd., employee, Highley, and althoughthere is no doubt that he did not intentionally supply water to the Aircraft, there is noquestion at all that he did supply some water with the fuel from ‘bowser’ 9909 Q.

I learned from the Chief Engineer of Cambrian Air Services Ltd., that the maximumamount of water that can be held in one of the tanks of an Aircraft of the typeconcerned in this case, in the position, without some being drawn into the fuel lines, is1/3 pint. It will be seen, therefore, that the Cambrian ‘Rapide’ could not have flownto Speke with more than 1/3 pint of water in each tank.

ConclusionsAmount of water supplied by ‘bowser’.

From Male’s statement (page 82 to page 83) it will be seen that from the port tank ofthe ‘Rapide’ Aircraft he withdrew ½ pint of water which, with the Aircraft in the tail-down position, had not been drawn into the engine. From the starboard tank, hewithdrew a similar amount in addition to the 1/3 pint which he had withdrawn fromthe fuel lines and carburettor of the starboard engine.

It is clear, therefore, that the maximum amount of water which can be carried in thetanks with the Aircraft in the tail-down position, without any being drawn into thefuel lines, is ½ pint.

It must follow that ‘bowser’ 9909 Q. supplied water to the ‘Rapide’ tanks, with thefuel, in the following quantities:-

Port Tank.Not less than 1/6 pint (allowing for a maximum of 1/3 pint of water which could have built-up in the tank) and not more than ½ pint.

Starboard Tank.Not less that ½ pint (allowing for a maximum of 1/3 pint of water which could have built-up in the tank) and not more than 5/6th pint.

It will be recalled that ‘bowser’ 9909 Q. which was used to refuel this Aircraft, wasthe one that ‘produced’ approximately ½ pint of water for Mr. Lancashire of ShellMex and B.P. Ltd., after being pronounced ‘clear’ of water, when the tests were beingdone by Shell Mex and B.P. Ltd., on their ‘bowsers’ at our request. (see page 25).That particular test was in fact carried out almost immediately after this ‘bowser’ hadbeen used to refuel Cambrian Airways ‘Rapide’ G-ALAT, and a sample of the waterwhich was taken from it on that occasion was also forwarded to the North WesternForensic Science Laboratory for analysis.

Possible source of water in ‘bowser’ 9909 Q.

In connection with this ‘bowser’, it is of interest to note that it had not been used forany purpose between the 2.2.1953 and the 6.2.1953, when it was used to refuel the‘Rapide’ in this case. During that period some water will almost certainly have built-up in it. Further, the water elimination routine may not have been carried out on thevehicle as laid down. Water could also have been present in ‘bowser’ 9909 Q. due tohaving been drawn-in from the S.2 bulk supply tank. There is a strong likelihood ofthis happening in the case of tank S.2, as the fuel extractor hose is inserted into thistank on each occasion that a ‘bowser’ has to be replenished from it (see page 9). Thisextractor hose can touch the bottom of the tank where the water, if any, lies . . . . . . . .(illegible word)……..many occasions. We were unable to obtain a sample of waterfrom the base of S.2 however, as there was not sufficient present when we required it.

In conclusion, it can be stated that, as in the case of the Aer Lingus ‘Dakota’, thewater supplied by the ‘bowser’, in this instance to the Cambrian ‘Rapide’, has withoutdoubt been the ‘critical’ amount, and has been the cause of engine stoppage.

Corroboration by chemical analysis.

The above conclusion is supported by the report from the North Western ForensicScience Laboratory (page 95) in which it is asserted that the water from the Aircraftand the water from ‘bowser’ 9909 Q. shewed approximate agreement, while bothdiffered markedly from the tap and static water at Speke Airport, and from DublinAirport tap water.

Recommendation made

To Airline Operators

At the outset, it appeared to me that some system of testing all aircraft fuel tank drain-cocks for water contamination, particularly after refuelling and immediately precedingtake-off of the machines, was not only desirable, but essential in the interest of safety.

I therefore made enquiries with a view to establishing if there were any rules that suchsystematic ‘pre-flight’ drain tests should be made to Aer Lingus or B.E.A machines atSpeke. I learned that there was no such rule.

I pointed out to senior representatives of the organizations with whom I conferredconcerning these cases, that had such a rule been in force and been complied with,Aircraft EI-ACL would never have left the Speke Customs Area, as the water in herfuel tanks would have been discovered before the engines had been started. I alsopointed out that if it were made a standard practice by aircraft operating concerns tohave a ‘pre-flight’ water test done on the fuel tanks of all machines, the possibility ofwater reaching the fuel pipe-lines and carburettors during the actual take-off of theaircraft and the almost certain disastrous results which would ensue, would be avertedentirely.

I therefore suggested to the authorities referred to at end of preceding page thatinstructions should be given without delay and that all aircraft should always besubject to a water drain-off test or, in the case of De Havilland machines, to a waterdip test,(a) after refuelling and (b) immediately prior to flying. The suggestion was agreed toand, I understand, instructions were issued immediately for such water tests to becarried out by the B.E.A. and A.L.T. Engineers on all aircraft under their control orsupervision.

To ‘bowser’ operators.

Insofar as Shell Mex and B.P. Ltd., are concerned, I discovered that no provision hadbeen made for the fuel inlet caps on their ‘bowsers’ at Speke to be locked. I pointedout to the senior Representatives of this Firm, who were present whilst the tests on‘bowsers’ previously referred to were being carried out, the possible dangers ofleaving such vehicles unattended all night, and every night, on the Aerodrome, towhich the public had comparatively easy access, and upon which there was often onlyone Police Officer on night-duty. I explained that it would be a simple matter for anyperson with subversive intent to insert water, or some other substance, into thesevehicles. I then recommended to the authorities concerned that they shouldimmediately take steps to have their ‘bowsers’ secured by the fitting of locks to thecaps mentioned, and having these caps locked at all times other than whenreplenishing the vehicles from bulk storage installations.

The authorities concerned fully appreciated the force of the recommendations I hadmade to them, and stated that arrangements would be made for proper locking devices

to be fitted to their ‘bowsers’ as soon as possible, and to their static tanks in instanceswhere such locks were not already in use. They also gave instructions that in theinterim, all fuel tank caps under their control were to be wired and sealed.

The investigations in this case were made under the direction of Chief SuperintendentBalmer, who, with you, personally examined the various systems of fuel storage, etc.,which are in operation at the Airport and are described in this Report.

I would suggest that copies of this Report, together with copy statements, etc., beforwarded to the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Civil Aviation Constabulary, andto the Director of the North Western Forensic Science Laboratory, Preston.

(Signed) Inspr.(Signed) Ch. Inspr.(Signed) Ch. Supt.

Submtd. to Ch. Supt. C.I.D. 9.3.53Submtd. to C.C., C.I.D. 9.3.53.

NOTES:

(1) At 10 p.m. on the night of 2.2.1953, Captain Quigleytelephoned the Hanley family home from Liverpool to alertCaptain Hanley that he had just experienced a doubleengine failure at the runway prior to take-off.

(2) The Liverpool Police Report was delivered to the Captainby a government messenger on the day of publication of theVerdict in August 1953.

(3)

NORTH-WESTERN FORENSIC SCIENCE LABORATORY. PAGE 95

Water in Aircraft Fuel Tanks, at Speke Aerodrome, February, 1953.PARTS PER MILLION.

Total Suspended Dissolving Volatile Ash Chloride pH Total Perm Temp Mls. Mls. Solids Solids Solids Matter Value hard- hard- hard- Total Total

1. A. Tap Water, Liverpool Airport 72 - 72 36 36 12.1 6.6 12.71 11.12 1.59 450 -2. B. Static Water, L'pool Airport 80 - 80 68 12 11.3 6.8 27.01 22.22 4.79 680 -3. C. Tap Water, Dublin Airport 108 - 108 48 60 9.2 6.8 30.18 23.03 7.15 460 -4. D. Fuel Tanks, EI-ACL 560 28 532 244 288 69.5 7.4 73.87 61.95 11.92 1425 25. E. Flushings of pipe lines, EI-ACL 562 - 552 212 340 77.3 7.4 - - - 92 4156. F. Port & Starboard Main Fuel

tanks, EI-ACL - - - - - - - - - - 9 5607. G. Fluids from Drain off Tap Shell

Mex Bowser 9822Q - - - - - - - - - - 2 3968.H. Fluid from Carburettor

Aircraft, G-ALAT 2008 240 1768 1296 472 108.5 7.4 80.23 75.46 4.77 185 29. I. Fluid Right-Hand Tank,

Aircraft, G-ALAT 1732 132 1600 1112 488 110.6 7.4 96.12 75.86 20.26 515 30. J. Fluid Right-Hand Tank,

Aircraft, G-ALAT 1872 724 1148 636 512 111.3 7.3 111.2 77.05 34.15 266 161. K. Fluid from Shell Mex Bowser 9909 Q. 12.18 P.M. 6.2.53 2244 84 2160 1706 452 86.5 7.1 112.4 69.9 42.5 186 262. L. Fluid from Shell Mex Bowser 9909 Q. 12.18 P.M. 6.2.53 - - - - - 106 - - - - 10 5201. M. Water from S.I. Storage

Tank (red colour) 4160 - 4160 3228 932 1510.6 4.8 254.2 294.2 4.8 267 22. N. Water from pit beneath cover S.I. Tank 874 24 760 432 328 111.98 7.8 75.06 23.03 32.03 312 -

Comments -The water from Aircraft and Bowser differs markedly from the tap and Static Water from Liverpool Airport, and Tap Water from Dublin Airport.The water in the Aircraft shows approximate agreement with water from Bowser (1.K) and water from pit beneath cover S. 1 Tank (2. N.)The water from S. 1 Storage Tank (1. M) is a very hard water and salinity. The total dissolved solids is also exceptionally high.This water appears to bear no relation to water found in Aircraft.

(Signed) J. B. Firth.DIRECTOR: NORTH WESTERN FORENSIC

SCIENCE LABORATORY

Schedule of Witness Statements.

Statement of: Aidan Quigley; pages 36 – 39Captain of Aer Lingus“Dakota’ EI-ACL

“ “ Leslie S. Fletcher; B.E.AEngineer at Speke Airport “ 40 - 43

“ “ Walter F. Harris; AssistantForeman of Shell Mex andB.P. Ltd., at Speke Airport “ 44 - 45

Further Statement of: Walter F. Harris re watercontamination tests. page 46

“ “ Walter F. Harris re movementsof ‘bowser’ 9822 Q. “ 48

Statement of: Alfred J. Williamson HighleyAirfield Operator of Shell Mex& B.P. Ltd., at Speke Airport pages 49 – 51

Further Statement of: Alfred J. W. Highley removements of ‘bowsers’ 9822 Q.9909 Q. “ 52 – 54

Statement of: Henry Hall, Aircraft Loader inEmploy of B.E.A., at SpekeAirport “ 55 – 56

Further Statement of: Henry Hall, re Cambrian AirServices Ltd., ‘Rapide’ G-ALAT page 57

Statement of: Edward Cottrill, Aircraft LoaderIn employ of B.E.A. at SpekeAirport. pages 58 – 59

Statement of: Frank McDiarmid, AircraftLoader in employ of B.E.A.,at Speke Airport page 60

Statement of: Allan Ellis, Constable 149 ofMinistry of Civil AviationConstabulary “ 61

Statement of: Thomas Darcy, Sergeant 110of Ministry of Civil AviationConstabulary “ 62

Statement of: F.C. Delaney, Assistant ChiefEngineer of Aer LingusTeoranta “ 63

Statement of: Peter Stephen Wall, Charge-hand Porter in employ ofMinistry of Civil Aviation pages 64 – 65

Statement of: Arthur R. Rose, Head Loaderin employ of B.E.A. at SpekeAirport page 66

Statement of: Sidney H. Stevenson, Foremanin employ of Shell Mex andB.P. Ltd., at Speke Airport pages 67 – 71

Further Statement of: Sidney H. Stevenson, re watercontamination tests. “ 72 – 76

Statement of: Harold E.T. Smith, Duty Officerat Speke Airport. page 77

Statement of: Cyril F. Warner, Airport-handin employ of Ministry of CivilAviation. “ 78

Statement of: William Kenneth J. Haynes,Captain of Cambrian AirServices Ltd., ‘Rapide’G-ALAT pages 80 – 81

Statement of: Fred Glover Male, StationEngineer, in employ of B.E.A.,at Speke Airport. “ 82 – 83

Statement of: James Quirke, Constable 375of Ministry of Civil AviationConstabulary page 84

Statement of: George Fellowes, EngineersLabourer in employ of B.E.A.,at Speke Airport. “ 85

Statement of: Millicent Curran, Receptionistin employ of B.E.A., atSpeke Airport. “ 86

Statement of: Henry E. Boswell, AircraftCleaner in employ of B.E.A.,at Speke Airport. pages 87 – 88

Statement of: Thomas H. Partington, Air-craft Cleaner in employ ofB.E.A., at Speke Airport. “ 89 – 90

Statement of: William H. Mayher, Porterin employ of B.E.A., atSpeke Airport. page 91

Statement of: George A. Langridge,Aircraft Loader in employof B.E.A., at Speke Airport pages 92 – 93

Statement of: Eric John Davies, TrafficController at Speke Airport page 94

Statement of: Dr. J.B. Firth, Director ofNorth Western ForensicScience Laboratory “ 95

References to Water Contamination and Accident

Investigation in the United Kingdom.

The sabotage hue and cry and change of operating procedures in BEA and Aer Linguswere indicators probably associated also with the world-wide fuel crisis at that time,and the uplifting of fuel from more unusual sources to alleviate the serious shortfall.

I include a brief extract from an address given in 1951 by Air Commodore Vernon-Brown who was Chief Inspector of Accidents. Air Safety was a basic premise of themeeting and he included an incident that drew into his ambit a privately ownedaircraft to emphasize his Air Safety message.

He explained the slides shown at this juncture:

(A) Is the steel pin and(B) parts of the corroded chain(C) sediment.

“And this is what was found in the petrol tank of the same aircraft. The pin and chainhad become detached from the cover and had obviously been for a long time at thebottom of the tank and had become corroded by contact with water from wet petrol.”

Concluding Remarks

“Accident Investigation is a fascinating job but it isn’t an easy one.We do not gaze into a crystal ball nor is there any black magic about it.We work on principles arrived at as a result of some years ofexperience. The evidence must be found, it must be written down andmost carefully studied. What is untenable or irrelevant is discardedand after the elimination of the impossible what remains must be thetruth. There is no easy road to the cause of an air accident and it isvery dangerous to give a quick answer.”

Note: Filter de-icing was soon introduced by the Air Registration Board to obviate the water in fuel hazard.

* * * * * * * * *

Colonel James Teague, a member of the Board of the Public Inquiry contacted me in

1975, on hearing of the new witnesses' evidence (firemen and Mr. Pritchard's sworn

testimony.) He sent me a case of 'Water in Fuel,' extracted from an Air Safety

Bulletin (restricted at the time) and he also included copies of his own air regulations

with his own annotations. He did this to reassure me of his belief that EI-ACF was a

case of 'Water in Fuel.' These were brought to me by Commandant Andy Woods.

Details of the origin and destination of the flight were omitted from the Bulletin.

“Prior to departure of a DC 10, engines 3, 1 and 2 were started. At no time

were there any abnormal indications on any instruments. As the aircraft taxied out for

take-off, No. 2 engine ran down, N1, N2 and fuel flow being zero EGT approximately

450oC. All fuel panel switches were checked as being correctly set. The shut down

drill for No. 2 engine was carried out and the aircraft returned to the ramp. Before

parking an unsuccessful attempt was made to start the APU.

Having obtained ground power and ground facilities, the remaining engines

were shut down. A further unsuccessful attempt was made to start the APU. No. 2

engine was then restarted. The start up was normal and the engine was run at idle

thrust for approximately 12 minutes after initially opening up to 40% NI for about 4

seconds. With the ground electrics and air still connected, No. 1 and 3 engines were

started. Both starts were perfectly normal, although it was noticed that No. 1 engine

fuel flow fluctuated twice before settling down to normal indication. Approximately

30 seconds after the last (No. 1 engine) had been started, No. 3 engine ran down to

zero. All engines were shut down.

Subsequent investigation showed that the fuel in the aircraft tanks was badly

contaminated with water, and a total of approximately 60 gallons of water was

drained from the system.

The tanks were completely drained and fuel filters replaced. 300 kgs. of fuel

was loaded into each tank and then this was drained. Subsequently 1500 kgs. of fuel

loaded into each tank and engines were run for approximately 20 minutes. After

further checks, the aircraft was refuelled for the return flight. On this flight all

indications were normal. An initial investigation of the refuelling bowser prior to the

first attempted departure indicated that the fuel in the trailer section of one bowser

was contaminated with water. It is reported that the ground engineer responsible for

the fuelling had checked samples taken from the 'bowsers' prior to the refuelling;

these were normal. It appears possible that these samples were taken from the tankers

but that no test of the fuel in the tanker's trailer was made.

An intensive investigation has been carried out and the necessary actions to

prevent a recurrence are being taken. The investigation has, however, highlighted the

following points in relation to aircraft refuelling procedures:-

1. The need to ensure that the sampling of fuel supplies at the time of

the aircraft refuelling are carried out in accordance with laid down

procedures. When a visual check of a sample results in any doubt,

one of the chemical water tests should be called for. Such samples

should always be obtained from the filter/separator sump of the

tanker or hydrant facility being used.

2. When an aircraft is being, or is likely to be, refuelled from more

than one vehicle or source, to ensure that the sampling procedures

adequately cover all the sources.

3. The need to ensure that aircraft fuel system water drain check

4. requirements are carried out in accordance with the laid down

procedures.”

**********

I did not meet Colonel Teague until after the death of Judge Teevan. He had

sent me several messages of encouragement and I felt that he perhaps might consider

helping further with the case. His first words after an amiable greeting, "It wasn’t the

first wrong verdict in the History of Aviation." My response - "I realised that very

well, however, alas, this was the case I was dealing with." Persuading him to help

was my main objective, after the courageous intervention by Judge Teevan. He

explained the reason the Board of Inquiry made no Licence recommendation, the

Minister could not act without it, that was their reading of Regulations. I pursued the

case with him, new witnesses, etc. He was exceedingly gracious and hospitable, so

also his wife and family.

Later in conversation at Colonel Teague's home outside Dublin, he explained to me

that the testimony of new witnesses was consistent with a 'weakened mixture,' i.e.,

water in fuel, in my father's forced landing.

* * * * * * * * *

Mr. Ron Gibbons was a witness of the Forced Landing, and was called to

give evidence at the Public Inquiry in 1953.

Here We Indicate How inadvertently STARBOARD Became PORT

And PORT Became STARBOARD

The Captain phoned me at my home in Dublin. At that time he was retired from

Honolulu and living in Easkey, Co. Sligo.

Subject Matter – The True Testimony of Ron Gibbons.

“Water flowing Left to Right,” Mr. Gibbons said, also

“Could see no petrol on Right Side.”

These two statements show the witness was standing facing the cockpit in the second

field.

Consequently when he said in the High Court, “No petrol on Right Side,” everyone

would presume right side = Right side of the aeroplane = Starboard.

It was his Right side, and True, but it was in fact Left or Port of the Aeroplane, as it

lay before Mr. Gibbons.

The Sketch of the Scene had a wrong Water Flow indicated, which didn’t help the

Court and they did not attend the scene.

I visited Spernal and watched the flow of water away from the road which indicated

where Mr. Gibbons was standing.

Left to Right and, of course, that telephone call. A few words only sorted it all out.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

In recent decades it became necessary to prove no Crossfeed or Wobble Pump on EI-

ACF

Discussion during Company Inquiry regarding effect of crash damage.

Extract Company Inquiry – page 18.

Chairman: Have you anything else to say now?

Capt. Hanley: I wanted to talk about some of Mr. Delaney’s evidence. Para 138,

page 23

“Valve on the right hand side was to the right main if it was slightly off

the clicked position.”

If it was out of the clicked position it would draw some fuel from the

port side?

Mr. Cuming: We had evidence on that, though it was not in the clicked position.

Chairman: We have a photograph of the particular valve involved.

Mr. Giltrap: Mr. Delaney did say that the position was such that it could only have

drawn off the right.

Chairman: It was an even further exactness on his part. He did not make it, could

not have drained fuel from any other tank except the one it was

selected to.

Captain Hanley: How many degrees above did he say you could get fuel from?

Chairman: He did not say. When you see the photo, it could not in that position

draw fuel from the main.

(Mr. Giltrap brought in the valve and photo).

Captain Hanley: That explains that to me!

Para. 294. Page 50 (6th day).

This is Captain Hanley’s response to the fuel consumption raised by the Court:

Over a period of many months and 15,000 hours flying - the

Company found that the chock to chock petrol consumption was

70.30 gallons per hour at 575 horsepower per engine. They

published these figures in their Monthly Technical Reports. This

was the horsepower in use on EI-ACF. It taxied out at 09:30 not

09:28 as stated. (The latter figure was shown to avoid a delayed

departure and consequent trouble for the Traffic Department.)

The engine cut at 11:01. That is one hour and 31 minutes later. At

70.30 gallons per hour, this means that 106½ gallons were used.

This amount would not empty either Main Tank. As each engine

operated from its appropriate tank, at 11:01, there were 66½

gallons in the Port Main and 61¾ gallons in the Starboard Main.

Assuming Delaney's rate of flow - 14.7 gallons per hour from the

drain cock (there are different types of drain cocks) it would take

4 hours and 33 minutes to empty the undamaged Port Tank.

4 hours 33 minutes add to 11:01

equals 15 hours 34 minutes or 3:34 p.m.

Delaney arrived at 3:20 approximately. He said "petrol could be

heard dropping into the ditch. The noise was coming from the

port side, but it need not necessarily have been petrol from the

port side." It then fell dark and the party visited the farmer's

house. In cross-examination, he said he did not hear the petrol

when he was going away. With a slower rate of flow for the last

20 gallons, the time of flow would have gone on until 3:52 or 3:55

p.m. or so, and would then have stopped.

Delaney did not hear it when he was going away, and he would

have noticed it undoubtedly if still flowing. It was dark at 4:00 or

4:05 p.m., and then he left - this confirms that the Port Tank was

empty before 4:00 p.m. or 4:05 p.m.

(Court's Verdict - UNUSED FROM DUBLIN !!! 120 GALLONS IN

PORT TANK.)

If 120 gallons had been in the tank, it would take 8 hours 10

minutes to empty, and 15 or 20 minutes extra for the last 20

gallons equals 8½ hours.

11:01 plus 8 hours 10 minutes = 19 hours 11 minutes = 7:11 p.m.

plus 20 minutes = 7:31 p.m.

Therefore the fuel would have still been flowing when F. Delaney

was leaving the field, as strongly as when he came and he couldn't

have failed to notice it. He did not notice it - so the flow had

stopped, which shows that 120 gallons could not have been in the

tank as the Court alleged.

Delaney's evidence on this matter clearly proves that only the

lesser amount of 66½ gallons could have been in the tank and that

it could only have emptied between 3:34 p.m. and 4:00 p.m., which

is correct for the amount; the approximate rate of flow and some

slowing down due to obstruction in the drain cock and lessening of

the head of fuel.

That is apart from my evidence which was given many times -

Pilot's evidence, re selection.

* * * * * * * * * *

Tommy and Agatha Hanley in Hawaii, March 1962

NO RECOMMENDATIONS WERE MADE BY THE BOARD OF

INQUIRY IN THIS CASE.

THE HANLEY FAMILY AWAIT

QUASHING OF THE ORIGINAL VERDICT.

“TRUTH DEFIES TIME.”

LET RIGHT BE DONE.

The Hanley family wishes to extend gratitude to Mr. Teevan, S.C.,

Chairman of the Board of Inquiry, Colonel Teague, B.E., D.I.C., A.F.R., Ae S, and

other Board members, also to the witnesses in the ‘70’s in England who made sworn

statements and so graciously assisted with photographs, the loan of photographs. We

wish to thank Mrs. Pritchard and the Danks family for the loan of photographs and a

considerable volume of Press Reports. For the 2002 Inquiry we wish to acknowledge

the efforts over decades of the members of the IALPA committee. We are thankful

for the presence of First Officer Whyte and all the pilots and friends who attended; the

legal advice by Michael Farrell, Michael Hanahoe, Solicitors; Michael Forde S. C and

Jane O’Neill B.L. We express gratitude to Mr. Arthur Watson Fearn, LLB, who

gathered with admirable dedication the testimony of new witnesses in the ‘70s.

(Click on individual photos to see larger version)

Cruciform Flight over shipbringing the Papal Legate to

Ireland, 1932.

“C” Flight Aerobatic TeamBack Row: Lt. T.J. Hanley; Lt.

J.F. Moynihan; Lt. A.G.Russell; and Lt. F.O.Cathain.

Front Row: Lt. W.J. Keane;Capt. O.A. Heron; and Lt. J.Twohig.

Walking with Peig.

Pupil and Instructor Capt.Oscar Heron.

A member of the IrishEquestrian Team patiently

waits while this Bristol Fighterhops the jump (Irish Times).

“Tied-together” aerobatic teamCapts. W.J. Keane, F.O.Cathain, and T.J. Hanley

Aerobatics instruction in aBristol Fighter, Andy Woods is

the pupil this time.

Publicity photo for ArmyRecruitment, 1939

Publicity photo for ArmyRecruitment, 1939.

(Click on individual photos to see larger version)

Publicity photo for ArmyRecruitment, 1939.

Publicity photo for ArmyRecruitment, 1939.

A Lysander. Very closeattention to Shell refueling.

Note: Spats off.

(Click on individual photos to see larger version)

Record of Army Service.

Group heading forConstellation training in the

United States, 1947.

Training in the States.

Radio Training.

St. Brendan and crew. In the cockpit, awaiting takeoff.

EI-ACS also takes off.Publicity photo for Aer Linte.

EI-ACS flown by Capt. S.Williamson, as photographedfrom EI-ACR flown by Capt.

T.J. Hanley.

The St. Brendan crewwelcomed at Shannon Airport.

(Click on individual photos to see larger version)

Delivery flights completed.

Press report.

Captain S. Williamson arrivesin Dublin.

A proving flight departs fromthe States with Capt. B. Martin

in the right seat.The return to Ireland of

President and Mrs.Sean T. O’Kelly

Cumberbatch Trophy Awardsreception with Jeremiah

Dempsey.

IFALPA Conferencein Amsterdam

(Click on individual photos to see larger version)

Captain Tommy McKeown. Captain Paddy Donoghue. Captain James O’Grady.

Captain Brendan Flanagan.IALPA dinner. Deputy MayorMaurice Dockrell; Col. O.W.

Lundy, American Air Attache;and Captain T.J. Hanley,

President of the Irish Air LinePilots Association

Tommy & Agatha in Hawaii

The following section contains other relevant documents, facsimiles of statements

which have been retyped for ease of reading, Press Reports, a telephone conversation

40 years after the event with the first witness to reach the aircraft, a 14 year old

teenager John Stevens, who had not been asked for a statement. Included also are

fascimiles of the introductory pages of the 1953 and 2002 Inquiries, and the original

sample pages with notations as presented to the AAIU.

! * * * * * * * * *

A recorded telephone conversation was made with Mr. John Stevens in December1993. A complete audio tape and an edited typed version was presented to the Courtfor the Non-Statutory Inquiry. We have re-inserted the edited words in parenthesis.John Stevens was a 14 year old teenager in 1953.

JS 0878, Hello Miss Hanley.

MPH Hello, (hello Mr. Stevens.)

JS Good Evening.

MPH (Hello, I’m late, Mr. Stevens. I’m so sorry.)

JS (Hang on just a minute –pause. Now .. . )

MPH (All right)

JS (Right)

MPH (Hi, I think with all the storms or gremlins on the line I couldn’t

get on for a while.)

JS (Ah, Huh.)

MPH (All right.)

JS (OK.)

MPH (Are you all organized there, are you comfortable?)

JS (Yes.)

MPH (Jolly good,) now, I'll start by asking you a few questions.

That's probably the easiest way.

JS Mm, Mm.

MPH (So,) the first one is, what alerted you to the emergency in the

first place?

JS The sound of the plane coming over very low, (em) and

misfiring.

MPH (Misfiring.)

JS (Yes.)

MPH (Jolly good,) were you out, out of doors playing with pets or

toys, or whatever?

JS No, no, no, I was working, (I was) in the cowshed with one of

our staff.

MPH With Ron Gibbons?

JS Yes, that's right, washing the cowshed down.

MPH Yes.

JS After the morning milking.

MPH Jolly good, (em now) when you saw it going overhead, what

did you notice?

JS (Now), hang on, . . . we couldn't see it because the cloud was

very low.

MPH You couldn't see it?

JS (Nah,) it was sort of, (it wasn’t) misty. It was very low cloud.

MPH There was, yes.

JS And although we could hear the aircraft circling, we couldn't

see it. It was in the background, at first.

MPH (Yes.)

JS So it, (so it) was audible not visible.

MPH Audible, not visible. And then what happened? (next)

JS It suddenly got a lot louder.

MPH (Yes.)

JS And I ran out of the shed.

MPH (Yes.)

JS And that's when I first saw it, as he, (it) was actually going in to

try and land.

MPH (Yes.)

JS And at that stage in the proceedings, we had two large elm trees

at the bottom of our garden, and he actually lifted the wing to

miss those.

MPH Oh, My God, are you serious?

JS Ah, yes (yes). He was very close to us.

MPH (Now listen,) I've been there and you know when you go out

from your house straight across into the cornfield. And there's

a funny kind of a humped hill.

JS (Ugh, huh,)

MPH (Yeah.) There was a funny kind of a hump, was he going over

that?

JS No. He went straight. He was, (he was,) he was actually trying

to put it down, I think for certain, by then . . (he was)

MPH At that stage?

JS (Yeah, I think) he hadn't got any choice. (I mean he was, the,

the,) to my recollection, (the) one engine was stopped and the

other was missing (very badly).

MPH That's right, because I spoke to you before and you described

that perfectly to me - the port engine, (ugh, ugh,) you saw the

blades were barely turning, and that the starboard was going . . .

loud noise, and - smoke and flames, (rather.)

JS It was misfiring badly - yes.

MPH (Yes and eh) and there were flames, you saw flames shooting

back?

JS The (the) exhaust was flaming - yes.

MPH Jolly good. Now (em so) you ran after it then?

JS Yes, (‘cos) well.

MPH Sorry, I'll go back to that. There were two elm trees?

JS (Eh, eh, the the,) there was well, one big elm tree at the bottom

of my garden.

MPH Yes.

JS Front garden.

MPH And he had to miss that?

JS Yes. He lifted, (he lifted) . . . he sort of angled the plane

slightly to miss that tree.

MPH (Yeah.)

JS So he was only about 50 feet from the floor at that stage in

the proceedings.

MPH My God!! (Were you, were you) was your heart stopping?

JS Well yeah, but it all happened very quickly, remember.

MPH Oh yes, seconds.

JS In the mist and . . .

MPH (Oh) Yeah, in seconds apparently.

JS (Oh, yes indeed.)

MPH (Yeah, now eh, so you chased then after - yourself and Ron

Gibbons ran down after it presumably.)

JS (Well, we, we went and I mean we) neither of us (sort of) could

believe what we were seeing, (and) we couldn't (really) see

terribly well (cos) it was a very misty morning.

MPH Yes, (it was.)

JS (Then,) of course, we heard it crash.

MPH (Yes.)

JS And realised what (had) happened and then set off running

after it.

MPH (Yes.)

JS Thinking it had crashed, which it did, (in fact) on my land.

MPH (Yes.)

JS (But) then (it) went across the road (em) on to the neighbouring

farm.

MPH Yes, yes, you ran along . . . you presumably went after . . . the

way it went . . . down through the field.

JS Mm, Mm.

MPH (And now)when you were running along, em did you see any

bits of aeroplane on the ground?

JS (In?)

MPH In the first field?

JS In the first field – no (‘cos he he he kept it, he he, I mean, he,

he,)

MPH (You didn’t notice anything at that time.)

JS (There was nothing there, because I mean he made a very fair

attempt at landing it, he was, he was a bit unlucky.)

MPH Apparently he lost, (he lost) a propeller in the first field.

JS Yes, he did.

MPH Which was standing upright?

JS That was in the second field. There was one field between the

house and where he (actually) touched down first.

MPH I see.

JS And it was in the second field that he lost the propeller, I can't

remember which engine.

MPH (Yes.)

JS And he also lost the tip of one wing there.

MPH That's right - Oh, my God . . . and did you see the wing on the

ground beside the propeller?

JS I saw, (though) I can't recollect its exact position.

MPH But that's where it was (when you)?

JS Definitely in our field, yes.

MPH Yes, great. (Oh) well, you're absolutely fantastic . . your

recollection is (superb,) absolutely wonderful. Now, you ran

along then towards the road?

JS I ran into the second field, past the, (where he, he, I mean) if he

got it down a bit sooner , he (he) would (he would) probably

have managed to land it in one piece.

MPH Well, I'll tell you a bit of a story at this point. What happened

him was, (he,) he had to land, and he didn't land at his chosen

landing place (which is) where you thought he'd have landed.

JS (Ugh, huh.)

MPH Because he was lifted by the port engine coming back on.

JS Aaah!!

MPH The port engine came back and lifted him whoosh up – (so that

he went and in fact) that brought him much further into the

field.

JS Yes, he didn't touch down until he was three quarters way

across (the field.)

MPH (Yeah, and that’s why but that the port engine, if the damned

thing had kept going he’d have been away again,) but it cut, (it

cut) again. So then he said, for a millionth of a second he

contemplated a ground loop in the first field. (Huh) My God, .

. . because the road was across his path - the road . .

JS At that time he was committed - he had no choice.

MPH (Yes, road and two hedges,) so, when you came to the road, and

you got across there, and you crossed (across) the road, with

yourself and Ron Gibbons . . . and then what did you see?

JS At that stage I had outdistanced the other fellow, of course.

MPH (Yes)

JS I was fourteen years old, and fit. (laughter.)

MPH You were running like hell?

JS Yes.

MPH (Great. So then what did you see?)

JS (Yes) I was very frightened.

MPH (Was he?)

JS (Well I was.)

MPH (Were you?)

JS I was terrified.

MPH (Yeah.)

JS I didn't know what I was going to find.

MPH Oh, mm.

JS Yes, I knew I had to go and I was expecting to find bits of

bodies everywhere.

MPH Oh, my God!!

JS (Well, I mean) he went in with a fair old thump. You never

heard a noise like it.

MPH (Yeah,) well now, that thump that you heard must have been - I

tell you what he did, (he had to go up over the road,) he got up

over the road, and he came down on the second hedge, on the

second hedge on the other side of the road, in other words (off

the road.)

JS Well, he blasted through the first hedge.

MPH Well, (that’s well) apparently he got it up over the road,

(because there was.)

JS He (‘d, he’d, he’d lost, he’d,) he'd cut two great grooves in the

field where he touched down first.

MPH (Yes.)

JS That's where the propeller was.

MPH Yes, well he touched with the tail wheel first. First, there was

the tail wheel, then there was one main wheel and then another

main wheel - three marks.

JS (Well, he got it,) he got across the road - he was - then he was

slewing sideways by then.

MPH (Well now,) when he got (it) across the road, he said to me that

she bounced in the air – (when she) after she hit the first ditch,

(the ditch,) the second ditch.

JS (Well, the, the, the, the,) there's a slight drop into the lane - so

he would have done.

MPH Yes. She went up into the air and went on into the field. Now,

when he went into the field he said there was a drag on the right

hand side, and he couldn't steer her into the open field, she

wouldn't go - she was going straight for the oak tree or

whatever tree that was.

JS Yes, there was an oak tree, she he (he) actually went into the

corner of.

MPH (Yes.)

JS The field . .

MPH (Yes.)

JS Across – (there em,) there was a junction of fields on the

other side of the road.

MPH That's right. Well, (there was uh,) that field - he was heading

straight for that tree and (if,) he had to avoid that. (So what he

did was,) he did a ground loop, now did you see any of that?

He swung up in the air and the tail went up in the air.

JS The tail went into - finished up in the tree.

MPH Yes, but it had departed when his trajectory changed away from

the tree, the tail went on towards the tree.

JS (Well) with great respect to your father.

MPH (Yeah).

JS I think by that stage in the proceedings he wasn't in charge,

MPH (Yeh)

JS It happened so fast.

MPH (Yeah.)

JS I mean, (uh,) I think he was extremely unlucky not to have got

it down in one piece.

MPH Yeah, well he actually did the ground loop deliberately - he had

to do the ground loop.

JS Well, (all I can, you know,) I can't comment on it.

MPH (Yeah.)

JS All I can say is how I found the plane.

MPH (Yeah.)

JS Which is.

MPH Of course.

JS With its back broken across the ditch.

MPH Yes. (Of course,) it was facing you, it was facing you in other

words when you came along.

JS (Yes it was,) yes it was, well, at an angle.

MPH Yes, yes.

JS (He turned turned through from his original flight path - he'd

come back through 90o. Yes.)

MPH (Yes, yes.)

JS And the tail plane.

MPH It was up in the tree.

JS (The tailplane was in the tree,) and the fuselage was across the

ditch - with the cockpit broken off.

MPH Broken off into the field towards you.

JS (Into the field,) but it wasn't completely attached to the plane.

MPH No, no. Well, now what did you see then at that stage, when

you got there?

JS When I got there, they were all still sat in the plane.

MPH (Go way!)

JS (Em) and we got 'em out - a bit quick.

MPH (Yes.)

JS We just - they were very shocked, of course.

MPH (Eh) Did you go around (to the,) to the passengers first?

JS Yes, I went into the plane.

MPH (Yes.)

JS (And we.)

MPH How did you go across the ditch - did you go across the wing?

JS (I) can't remember. I mean you do - you do superhuman things

in those circumstances.

MPH Yes, of course. So you got in and began helping everyone out?

JS We, we got in and started getting them out.

MPH Great.JS By which time, Ron was with me and we just and we were on -

just the two of us there.

MPH (Yes.)

JS (Eh) And the police and fire people arrived – sort of five or ten

minutes later, but by the time they got there, we'd got them all

off.

MPH Everyone out. (Well was it,) did you notice a ss-smell of petrol

at any stage?

JS The petrol was running out of the engines into the ditch.

MPH (Yes.)

JS They were very lucky in that respect - because it was - the fuel

pipes were fractured, - certainly.

MPH On the starboard side?

JS Yeah, and the, the (em, the) fuel was flowing directly into the

ditch - in a way - because we'd had a lot of rain,

MPH (Yes.)

JS And the ditch was in flood.

MPH Yes. Mr. Pritchard said the same, (that) he saw the petrol, you

know, lying on the top of the water flowing away, that his ditch

was already damaged when he arrived. So that's the tank that

was supposed to be dry, (dry) at 5,500 feet - you understand!

JS Mm, em.

MPH (So) "They" were wrong about that! So, (em,) then there's

another thing about that – (eh,) the port tank went on draining

all day (eh,) and (eh) it would have stopped - nobody would

have heard very much sound from that but it would have

stopped around four in the evening - around that time?

JS Of course, by that time we'd done all the work! by the time the

police arrived – (and of course) they got properly officious and

made us, (made us) . . .

MPH And you all had to go?

JS Yes, we, we, (we) were getting luggage off by then. I mean we

got . . .

MPH Yes, did you help my father to take the luggage out. He took

some luggage he said out of the forward hold (through the.)

JS He probably did. I can't recollect that, we were then, by then

concerned with getting the co-pilot (who was.)

MPH (Yes he was ta- that’s right.)

JS He was not in very good shape.

MPH No - he was in pain.

JS (Eh,) we got him off and tried to get him off up the road and

your father of course, had a very nasty cut on his head, to my

recollection.

MPH And on his hand.

JS And (em) he was, (he was) semi, semi, he wasn't semi-

conscious, but he was very dazed. Obviously he'd taken a hell

of a clout on the head.

MPH (Yes.)

JS Quite apart from the fact that he just crashed a plane - well, he

had to crash land a plane.

MPH (Yes.)

JS I'll rephrase that.

MPH (Yes, yeah.)

JS (Cos I’m on your side I don’t think . . .)

MPH (Oh sure I know ah hah. Actually) he did very well to get her

down on instruments out of cloud, (you know) because he was

on an instrument approach.

JS (Well,) he certainly couldn't have seen the floor.

MPH (Oh,) no he didn’t.

JS Till he was, I would have thought – (within) 150 feet.

MPH No, he didn't. (No.) You were perfectly right, there. (He

didn’t.) It was an absolute miracle, (and actually the

navigators in England, fair dues to them, they made him an

honorary member in 1954 of their Guild.)

JS (No) I, I think he did a good job, (and)he was damned unlucky.

MPH Yes, he was, yes.

JS I do think it was water in petrol. I have had time to think about

it since I got your letter.

MPH (Yeah.)

JS And the full inquiry which I'd never read before.

MPH (Yes.)

JS And the way the engines were running before I could see the

plane.

MPH Yes, loud backfiring.

JS Well, (it was,) they were (they were) just running rough as hell,

and missing all the time.

MPH Yes, and that's water in fuel.

JS (Well, that’s what,) it makes sense.

MPH (Yes,Yeah,Yeah.)

JS Let's put it that way.

MPH Yeah, yeah. Well, there's no doubt it, there was a history of

water in fuel. (But they covered it up and I suppose you can

see Big Business when they can get one guy to take the blame,

they’ll get him to take the blame, you know.)

JS (Inaudible word yes.)

MPH (But it is not fair, so anyway the thing about this, we were

doing nothing about this and he had his licence restored and

then the Aeronautical Engineer that was involved in all this –

(edited word) - wrote a book about aviation in general, and he

wrote about this and he blamed my father again even though he

had been cleared, you know.)

JS (Inaudible)

MPH (So that’s why I had to do the book.)

JS (Yes indeed.)

MPH (I think that’s justified.)

JS (Yes indeed.)

MPH. (Yeah.) So now, (when) you were looking at the petrol

pouring out of the starboard wing down into the ditch?

JS Yup.

MPH Making a noise?

JS Well, it was visible, it was clearly visible.

MPH (Was it coming from under the tank?)

JS It was clearly visible. It was coming from a fractured pipe.

MPH From a fractured pipe. That's what the evidence is. Mr.

Pritchard saw the same and the firemen.

JS Mm, Mm.

MPH Now, eh (the tree) the tail was in the tree and there was a dog

crate - with a dog in it?

JS I can't remember that.

MPH That's all right. (Ah, ah,) there will be some things you won't

remember and that I know and - you've been very good

so far it's tremendous. Did you chat to anyone when you,

(when you) reached them or were they too shocked to respond

to you?

JS I, yes, I chatted to all of them. I mean, we, we, we (just talked

away.)

MPH (Just talked away.)

JS (Yes, I mean we were as nervous as hell too).

MPH (Yeah.)

JS (I mean) I was still shaking like a leaf, I can remember now.

MPH Yes, (you say that.)

JS Bear in mind, I was only fourteen.

MPH Yes. I have (I have) a picture of you in my mind (as a boy

because there was a photograph of you I think that one of the

pressmen took without a coat and I think. . . )

JS (We just, well, I mean I mean when you’re scrubbing a shed

down, it’s hard work and we’d stripped off to do that.)

MPH (Yeah.)

JS (We just left as we were.)

MPH (Yes, you were in a jumper and em shorts and eh, pull-up

socks, I think.)

JS (Probably. I don’t remember.)

MPH (That sort of gear. You looked grand – a lovely lad. (laughter)

Now, so you saw and you heard the fuel flowing and there it

was under the starboard wing . Now there was a gate, did you

see a gate?) I saw a gate in a photograph under the starboard

wing as well, a gate like a farm gate?

JS He probably collected that on the way in.

MPH That's what I think – (from,) either from Mr. Pritchard's field or

your field.

JS Mr. Pritchard's field, there was no gate in my field at that point.

MPH (So there was a gate?)

JS (It lifted the gate into the, the . . .)

MPH So there was a gate at Mr. Pritchard's field?

JS Yes.

MPH Well then that must be it - and that must have been what was

stopping him moving her to the right out of the field, (you

know,) into the open space, (and) he couldn't steer her into the

open space - and so (he)-.then the firemen told me that they,

they pulled it out from he ditch from underneath the wing and

they tried to get it to go across the ditch for them to walk on it,

but they said it was too broken up.

JS Right.

MPH Did you notice the ground in that field "churned up," (em,) I

think (that) the gate when he did the ground loop churned up

the ground first on the right hand side, and then on the left hand

side of the "trail"?

JS I can't remember that.

MPH You can't remember that - oh, that's all right. You saw the fire

tenders, (the) firemen and all they did?

JS By the time we got them off.

MPH (Yeah.)

JS (We) The police and firemen arrived and we were shooed

away.

MPH So you didn't (really) see much more then from that point?

JS No, (eh,) because (you know) - they kicked us all out.

MPH (Yes.)

JS And I remember being very cross because we'd done all the

work and . . .

MPH I should think so.

JS (And, and really) the dangerous bit was really over.

MPH Of course, of course and it was very dangerous. Did you notice

my father, he said (that) he pushed the starboard wing, moved it

a little, before he went away to Pritchard's to make (the)phone

calls, to try and direct the petrol (directly) into the water, (it

was) rather than against the ditch. It was splashing, he said, it

was very dangerous.

JS (Em,) it certainly was pouring all over the place. I can't

recollect him moving it, but of course, then we probably were

still getting the passengers off.

MPH Yes, so he moved it.

JS If you recollect, the fuselage was broken up badly.

MPH Oh, I saw it (yes) from the photographs.

JS And, and we got them out to my recollection through the front.

MPH (Yes.)

JS But it, it was fairly tricky (actually) getting off the plane - and

one or two(of them) were fairly elderly and of course, they

were all very, very shaken.

MPH One was the Queen Mother's Lady-in-Waiting, (you know)

JS I didn't know that.

MPH She was Lady Bowes-Lyon. (Yes and) she did everything (in

the kitchen) for Mrs. Pritchard, while Mrs. Pritchard met all the

passengers (and everything.) Did any of the passengers go

back to your house or did they all go to Pritchards?

JS They all went to Pritchards - it was much nearer.

MPH I see. (em,) now did you talk to the Captain at all, did he talk to

you?

JS I certainly had a conversation with your father. What was said

I cannot recollect. He was very, very shaken, (he was) white as

a sheet.

MPH I'm sure.

JS I, (I) was very concerned that he was going to pass out.

MPH (I.)

JS Because he'd taken a hell of a clout.

MPH I'm not surprised, I'd say the shock was what he had (had) to do

for them to survive.

JS Oh, (I mean,) indeed, (he, you know,) they were very, very,

very lucky.

MPH (Yeah.)

JS In the circumstances.

MPH Oh, yeah – (now, Brrrrrrrrrrrr, wait til I see, (inaudible)

he went across the third field to)… I know that when the First

Officer was taken away he ran across the third field, the

ploughed field to try and cut them off to get the name of the

place, (because) he didn’t know where they were taking him.

He tried and (eh,) have you any idea (about) the height of the

oak tree?

JS It would be about 35 feet.

MPH At that time.

JS (Yes.)

MPH Would it?

JS Yes, it's not much changed. It's still there.

MPH Yes, (it is still there,) I saw it in 1970 something.

JS (It was,) it's a fairly mature oak. They don't grow much, of

course, when they are mature, (not) in terms of height.

MPH Yes, yes. (Eh,) the tail was stuck in it quite, (quite em, you

know) it was quite well held in the tree.

JS Oh yes, it was.

MPH Considering the tail would have been going at a hell of a speed,

it didn't go past the tree.

JS No.

MPH It must have been a very strong tree.

JS Yes, well it went into the (into the) sort of fork of the tree

where the branches.

MPH (Yeah.)

JS Branch out.

MPH (Yes.)

JS It was the strongest point.

MPH Yes, I wonder . . .

JS It went into it sideways, I think.

MPH Yes, I saw that from the photographs and from going seeing the

damage in winter that it had done, it still shows where it went

in . . .

JS (Yes.)

MPH At the side there, and you think it's only 35 feet high, is that all

it is?

JS It's not very big.

MPH (Yeah.)

JS (It might eh) It could be, (you know,) it could be, without going

and having a look at it.

MPH (Yeah.)

JS But it's not that tall.

MPH Yes, I know. Now, wait till I see is there anything else? The

gate, (anyway,) they couldn't do anything with the gate. (Em,

were your) were your shoes damaged by fuel at all?

JS I'd got Wellingtons on.

MPH (You’d got Wellingtons on so it wouldn’t show.) Were any

people crying or joking, no?

JS (Well,) no, they were, we - quite honestly all I was concerned

(about) at that stage.

MPH (Yeah, getting them out.)

JS Was getting them out, because (there was,) petrol was flowing

and you could smell it.

MPH (Yeah.)

JS And it was (very) obviously – (THE) THE ENGINES OF

COURSE WERE STILL HOT.

MPH (Yeah, and) it could go up at any moment?

JS Precisely.

MPH (Yeah, yeah,) it was a terrible business. So then you went

(really) back I suppose it was about lunch time when you left

really and went back to the house probably?

JS (No, long before then., because)

MPH (Yeah.)

JS What time was the crash (about?)

MPH 11:04.

JS (11:04.)

MPH Touched down. He was on the ground at 11:04.

JS (Yeah, well) I would say I was back in the house by just after

midday, (because) I mean, it all happened (pretty) quickly.

MPH (Yes.)

JS There weren't (that) many on it, (were there twenty or so?)

MPH (Twenty-two about or something, yeah.)

JS So once we got them moving, it didn't take long to get them

out and then, (of course then) as I said, the Fire Engine arrived

and we were all shooed out into the road away from it.

MPH (Yeah,) which was unfair.

JS Well, it makes sense, I suppose.

MPH (Yeah.)

JS But I was, I remember being distinctly p.....'d off at the time,

because I felt (that eh, you know) it was my crash, (I saw.)

MPH I should think so. (I should think it really was. It really was, it

was, was fantastic.) Now, you have, (you have) done very

well. You've answered really all my questions. The propeller

upright was very important, that you saw the propeller

standing.

JS Oh, it was upright all right, yes.

MPH And the (and the) bit of wing nearby.

JS Yep.

MPH (Now,) the interesting thing I'll tell you about that (is,) the

investigators drew the wing in where the firemen had brought it

and left it at the tree, they left the wing, carried it into that field

near that oak tree and they put it for easy, (being easily)

collection, and they piled it high with wreckage. I don't know

if you (ever) went back again, and they piled the wing (there on

the ground) with all the bits of wire, (and all) the bits of piping

they found all on top of that wing. (And now) the investigators

came and they decided (that) that’s where the wing came off!!!

JS No - the wing was in my field.

MPH (Yeah.)

JS Definitely.

MPH Yes. And (eh then) they said the aircraft went on the road side

of the tree, into that other (ploughed) field and back out again -

and that's what they said. They said that in a book! (two

voices indecipherable to us)

JS (I mean) he went across the road into the corner.

MPH Yeah, (to the right of that oak tree.)

JS To the right of that oak tree.

MPH (Yes.)

JS (He,) he then only had about thirty yards (to run) to hit the tree.

MPH (Yes.)

JS (Em, if that,) from where he went across . . .

MPH (Yes)

JS And I mean the speed he was travelling at – obviously, (I mean

okay) he was beginning to slow down by then . . .

MPH Yes, well the ground loop was what (really,) what slowed him

down (actually, was not the ground loop, what slowed him

down) was that ditch, when the undercarriage went down into

the ditch - that held him.

JS Yes.

MPH He said that.

JS He went, he went into that ditch sideways.

MPH Yes, he said that the deceleration on the ditch was colossal -

was how he described it.

JS Well it must have been because (I mean) he ended up with the

back broken across the ditch.

MPH Yes, and then he said after (that, after) the deceleration the tree

was hit by the tail, that was the next thing, a tremendous

whoosh into the tree, (into the tree of the tail) – in fact the tail

arrived last, in other words.

JS Yeah, well that makes sense, (He was beginning, he was

beginning to go sideways by the time he crossed the road.)

MPH (Yeah.)

JS (I mean, I couldn’t see this, although we actually saw it hit the

floor.)

MPH (Yeah.)

JS The visibility was so bad.

MPH (Yes.)

JS (Em, that) it was sort of my recollection is that of noise rather

than the sight.

MPH (Yes.)

JS (Cos he was almost invisible.)

MPH (Yes, yes, of course because) actually the photographs taken an

hour later, I mean you can see the, (the) edges of the cloud

hanging down, (the) visibility was desperately bad.

JS A very bad day.

MPH (Very bad. So that) he was very lucky to, (to be able to)

remember that place, and to go back there, to turn back. He

turned back, completely back on his track.

JS He was circling (the area) for some time.

MPH Yes, you’d heard that he was.

JS Oh yes, (he was over,) he was in the area.

MPH (Yeah.)

JS Eh, he was over, he was in the area.

MPH (Yeah.)

JS (Eh,) for two or three minutes before . . .

MPH Yes that's right, he was, (he was coming down. He was coming

down for two minutes. From the engines cut it was two

minutes to touch down.)

JS He circled the area several times.

MPH (Yes)

JS To my recollection, but of course, then . . .

MPH You couldn't know exactly.

JS No.

MPH (Yeah.)

JS But we could hear the noise (I mean.)

MPH Yes, (that’s right) the backfiring.

JS I mean, I was, as a young man, very interested in aircraft.

MPH I know that from talking to you before, but that you had an

exact description of the port engine (propellers going round –

and in fact, you said to me you at the time,) you thought it was

going so slowly it was 'feathered' but in fact, it wasn't and then

it came on when he turned to the right, it came on (again) and

(eh) unfortunately it cut (back,) cutout there, it didn't keep

going, you know.

JS Ugh, huh.

MPH (But eh,) the thing about (eh about) that was, (that) your

description was so accurate, and the interesting thing is that the

propeller marks on the ground were equidistant, (cough-

Pardon me,) both port and starboard propellers made the same

distance of cuts - in other words, (they were) operating under

the same degree of power at the actual moment he touched

down.,(you know.) Isn't that extraordinary?

JS (So that proves that) they came back on again.

MPH They came back on again, and that, (that) couldn't happen

unless there was fuel. Well now, I think you have given me

tremendous help and I will write a chapter about this and I will

. . . I had tried to do it my-self on what I'd spoken to you about

before but it didn't have enough in it and I didn't know that you

had actually spoken to my father or I didn't know those things

you told me now. So that will make it more people friendly,

shall we say, (you know, the fact that I have all those details

and eh, it’s been a very great help to me.) You know, you

should have been called to give evidence.

JS Yes I should (because I.)

MPH (Because under ICAO regulations there’s provision for

interviewing a child and you should have been.)

JS (I wasn’t a child really.)

MPH (Well, I mean you were a young, you were a youth, you were a

teenager.)

JS (Yes, and I would and I, I think I, would have given them a

more accurate description of it perhaps than Ron Gibbons did

because eh.)

MPH (Well, he, he wasn’t really, he didn’t really understand, I don’t

think. He found it difficult, God love him. And) you should

have been called. (But anyway now) that's history anyway.

(Anyway) I hope we'll be able to put it straight anyway, on the

record.

JS Right oh, Ma'am.

MPH Okay.

JS Okay.

MPH I'm very, very grateful to you. I may ring you up to check one

or two points in the future before I get this done.

JS Okay.

MPH Is that all right?

JS Okay, no problem.

MPH I'm very, very grateful to you.

JS Okie doke.

MPH God Bless, thanks a million.

JS Right.

MPH Bye, bye now, thanks.

! * * * * * *

We extend our deepest gratitude to the witnesses who

came forward. Each and every one was valiant.

DD2002

WeatherForecast1/1/1953

DD2002

D DD2002

DD2002

DD2002

DD2002

EXTRACT FROM THE IRISH INDEPENDENT, FRIDAY, JANUARY 2, 1953:

“Forced down when his engines failed, Captain T. J. Hanley crash-landed his

Aer Lingus Dakota, St. Kieran, in a ploughed field, 14 miles south-west of

Birmingham, yesterday morning, saving all the occupants. Only the second

pilot, First Officer P. White (30), a native of Miltown Malbay, Clare, received

slight injuries.

The aircraft landed at about 11 a.m., an hour and a half after leaving Dublin

Airport. On board, as well as the two officers were 22 passengers and Miss

Sarah McCloskey, the hostess.

The plane was flying at about 7,000 feet when the first engine cut. Captain

Hanley dived to 4,000 feet and then the second engine began to falter. Captain

Hanley then announced he would have to make a crash landing.

One of the passengers, Mr. W. Manifold, of Coventry, told reporters: “The next

thing we knew was there were a few bumps and the plane seemed to crumple

around us.”

Mr. Manifold and other passengers told after their escape how the 23-year-old

hostess, Miss Sarah P. McCloskey, of Munreary House, Claudy, Co. Derry, who

was formerly a nurse in Jervis Street Hospital, Dublin, walked calmly from seat

to seat before the landing. “She was marvelous,” said Mr. Manifold. “When the

engines began to sputter, she told us to pray and then kept us calm.””

* * * * * * * *

EXTRACT FROM THE DAILY MAIL, FRIDAY, JANUARY 2, 1953:

“The Dakota - the St. Kieran – was due at Birmingham at 11.15 a.m. Five

minutes before that the pilot, Captain T. J. Hanley, of Knockhill, near Ballina,

County Mayo, radioed the airport that an engine had cut out.

The plane was flying at 7,000 feet in icy conditions. It began losing height, and at

4,000 feet the pilot decided to try and land.”

EXTRACT FROM THE DAILY TELEGRAPH AMD MORNING POST, FRIDAY,

JANUARY 2, 1953:

“WING AND TAIL PLANE RIPPED OFF”

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT BIRMINGHAM THURSDAY:

“Twenty-two passengers including two children and a 6 month old baby escaped

unhurt when a Dakota airliner on the Dublin-Birmingham service of Aer Lingus

made a Forced landing in a field near Great Alne, Warwickshire, today.

The pilot, Captain T. Hanley of Rathfarnham, Dublin, and the navigator, Mr. P.

Whyte of Roebuck Park, Dundrum suffered cuts and shock. They were treated

at Stratford-on-Avon hospital. The air hostess of the plane, Miss Phil

McCloskey of Rathmines was unhurt. She reassured the passengers as the plane

crash-landed and asked them to pray.

The aircraft bearing the name St. Kieran was an extra plane on the regular

morning service from Dublin to Birmingham. It was carrying extra passengers

who had spent the Christmas holiday in Ireland.

Weather conditions deteriorated as the plane approached Elmdon. 14 miles

south south west of Birmingham the aircraft developed technical trouble and the

pilot came out of cloud to make a forced landing.”

WING TORN OFF

“The Dakota first bounced in one field, jumped across a lane and came to rest

across a ditch. The tail plane was flung into an old oak tree and the starboard

wing torn off. Although the plane was badly damaged and petrol escaped there

was no fire. Wreckage was scattered for more than 100 yards around the

aircraft.

A bus was sent from Birmingham to convey the passengers to their destination

and a relief plane was sent from Dublin to take passengers booked for the New

Year Day journey to Ireland.

Captain Hanley, who was slighted injured, scrambled from the plane

immediately it crash landed and ran to a telephone at a farm to get aid. Field

workers helped passengers to the ground. They were provided with hot tea in a

farmhouse until the bus arrived to take them to Birmingham.

“D0G MISSING”

“Missing from the plane is a thoroughbred Australian terrier. The box in which

it was traveling was found broken open after the crash. Eyewitnesses state that a

dog ran away from the plane after the landing.

Mr. W. Manifold, of Coventry, said later today: “The air hostess was

marvelous.” Mr. Manifold, who had been to Ireland to see his sick mother, said,

“The engines seemed to cut out, there was a bump or two and then the crash.

But she calmed everybody. She told us all to pray.”

Miss McCloskey, who is 24, said “There was no panic. Everyone was calm.

After we came down everyone clambered out of the wreckage into the muddy

field.

Among the passengers was the Hon. Mrs. G. Bowlby. She was a Lady-in-

Waiting to Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother when she was Duchess of York in

1932 and Woman of the Bedchamber to the Queen Mother from 1937 to 1945.

The St. Kieran on Tuesday carried Mr. De Valera home from Utrecht, Holland.

* * * * * * * *

EXTRACT FROM THE IRISH PRESS, SATURDAY, JANUARY 3, 1953:

“Police had overnight guarded the wreckage against possible interference by

sightseers whose souvenir hunting might make it difficult to establish when the

plane was flying at 7,000 feet, one engine had cut out, and the other began to

sputter and finally stopped at 4,000 feet.”

* * * * * * *

TIMES PICTORIAL WEEK ENDING JANUARY 10, 1953

PLANE’S PASSENGERS SAVED

AIRCRASH

A few minutes before 11:00 a.m. on Thursday, January, Birmingham

airport control heard a voice come over the air –“7,000 one engine cut.” There

was silence for a few seconds then the voice came in again: “4,000 second engine

cut….600….” It was the voice of First Officer Paddy Whyte of the Aer Lingus

Dakota, St. Kieran, on flight from Dublin to Birmingham with a passenger load

of 22 and a crew of three.

While airport control waited Captain T. J. Hanley, the pilot, viewed the

onrushing telephone wires through the cabin window as he made for a “belly-

landing” in what he later described to his wife as a “pathetic little field.”

Back in the passenger section, hostess “Phil” McCloskey, the twenty-three year-

old Claudy (Derry) girl, moved from seat to seat calming travellers. In gentle

tones, as the ground came nearer, she asked them to pray.

As the near hedge came under the wings of the St. Kieran the plane lost

airspeed. It grounded, cut a path through the “pathetic little field,” made its

own gateway through the hedge sloshed across a roadway and, tearing a gap

through another hedge, swung round in a ploughed field to come to a stop beside

a tall tree. The ground trip had cost it two wings, engines and its tail section.

Up in the cabin Captain Hanley brushed blood away from his face. First

Officer Whyte felt himself for breakages. The two officers looked to their

passengers.

“All aboard safe and sound,” reported hostess McCloskey as travelers

reached to undo their safety-belts and step out of the plane in the ploughed field

at Spernall Ash, some 14 mils South-West of Birmingham.

“This would have to happen on the first day of the year. But thank God

everyone is safe” said Captain Hanley.

The services of the doctors, nurses, and firemen who made their mercy-

dash across the frozen roads to the crash-scene were not needed. In a nearby

farmhouse passengers and crew clustered around an open fire as a busy English

housewife made steaming cups of tea for her unexpected visitors.

”Captain Hanley displayed superb airmanship. I can only describe the escape of

the passengers as ‘a miracle,’” stated an expert of the British Ministry of Civil

Aviation who, with Aer Lingus officials, arrived on the scene shortly afterwards

to conduct research into the cause of the crash.

Only one person, First Officer Whyte, sustained injuries sufficient to

warrant a trip to hospital, but he was discharged the following day. Apart from

Captain Hanley’s scratches, no one else was even bruised.

Investigations are now taking place to find the cause of the crash.

The St. Kieran was the plane which took the Taoiseach back from

Amsterdam the previous Monday.