West Peninsular Title Co... - Crimes of Def. John E. Steele, Ft. Myers, FL

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41 F.3d 1490

WEST PENINSULAR TITLE CO., Absolute, Inc., Marion H.Cooper,

for Estate of Alfred R. Cooper, Plaintiffs-Appellees,v.

PALM BEACH COUNTY, Carol A. Roberts, Chair of Board ofCounty Commissioners of Palm Beach County,

Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 93-4104, 93-4449.

United States Court of Appeals,Eleventh Circuit.

Jan. 10, 1995.

Patti A. Velasquez, Asst. County Atty., West Palm Beach, FL, Robert S. Hackleman, Ft.

Lauderdale, FL, for appellants in No. 93-4104.

Sharon M. Pitts, Patti A. Velasquez, Asst. County Atty., West Palm Beach, FL, Robert S.

Hackleman, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for appellants in No. 93-4449.

Jeffrey A. Aman, Smith, Williams & Bowles, P.A., Tampa, FL, Joan E. O'Dell, Gregory L.

Williams, Smith, Williams & Bowles, P.A., Washington, DC, for appellees in both cases.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before HATCHETT and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, MELTON* , Senior District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for plaintiffs. Defendantsraise several arguments, hoping mainly to void concessions made in district court inthe joint pretrial stipulation. The district court is affirmed.

1

The controversy concerns the ownership of strip parcels (roads and ditches)offered by Palm Beach Farms for dedication to Palm Beach County in 1912. A 1976instrument entitled "Notice of Withdrawal of Platted Roads, Streets, and OtherUnexercised Rights" revoked the offer of dedication. In 1986, pursuant to localOrdinance No. 86-18 (the "Ordinance"), defendant Palm Beach County (the

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"County"), began a practice of selling easement and right of way interests inproperty originally acquired through dedication. In return for a "privilege fee," theCounty issued an abandonment resolution, which, when recorded, transferredownership of the parcel to the payor of the fee. This dispute began when the Countyattempted to collect fees in exchange for abandonment resolutions for parcels that,according to plaintiffs, had never been accepted by the County.

Plaintiffs, claiming that they were successors in interest to Palm Beach Farms(and thus owners of the strip parcels), challenged the County's practice as anunconstitutional taking--under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments--of theirproperty.1 The County conceded that it never expressly accepted the dedication;but, at trial, the County attempted to show that it had impliedly accepted thededication by using the strip parcels. The jury found for plaintiffs, deciding that theCounty had not accepted the 1912 offer of dedication within a reasonable time. Thedistrict court entered judgment for plaintiffs: plaintiffs were judged the fee simpleowners of the pertinent strip parcels; defendants were enjoined from applying theOrdinance to plaintiffs' property; and plaintiffs were awarded attorney's fees.Defendants appeal.

3

The County now contests plaintiffs' standing, arguing that plaintiffs could notpossibly own the strip parcels (and thus have no interest at stake). But givenplaintiffs' allegations and the County's stipulations in the district court, the recordsupports both standing and jurisdiction. A "case or controversy" exists in this casebecause the parties genuinely disputed ownership of the strip parcels in the districtcourt. The County stipulated to plaintiffs' chain of title, agreeing that plaintiffs weresuccessors in interest to Palm Beach Farms. The controversy was thus limited to adecision about whether the offer of dedication was accepted.2 Plaintiffs have

standing to challenge the application of the Ordinance to what they assert is theirproperty.

4

But the County insists that adjoining landowners own the strip parcels, citingMurrell v. United States, 269 F.2d 458 (5th Cir.1959), as an alternative to 16.33

Acres. This decision is not about standing: what the County is really arguing is thatplaintiffs failed to join indispensable parties. Amicus Boywic Farms agrees, arguingthat it was harmed by the entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Because thedistrict court could only determine who, as between plaintiffs and the County, hadthe better claim to the strip parcels, amicus is not bound by the district court'sorder. It was no abuse of discretion for the district court to refuse to dismiss thiscase for failure to join indispensable parties. The County, as movant, had theburden "to show the nature of the unprotected interests of the absent parties," 5AWright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 1359; yet, the County'scitation to the record reveals only that it established the existence of adjoininglandowners (not the nature of allegedly unprotected interests).

5

And, plaintiffs' "arbitrary and capricious" due process claim is ripe.3 Plaintiffs

accused the County of applying an arbitrary and capricious action (assertingownership to the strip parcels and recording abandonment resolutions whichtransferred title) to their property. Plaintiffs' claim was ripe as soon as the Countyapplied the ordinance and the petition process (including a $400 nonrefundableapplication fee) to the undedicated strip parcels. See Eide v. Sarasota County, 908F.2d 716, 724 n. 13 (11th Cir.1990).

6

The County argues that no subject matter jurisdiction exists because plaintiffs'claims are so frivolous. But the course of litigation and stance of the County in

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district court undercuts its claim of frivolousness. We also note that the pretrialstipulation plainly reads that "[n]either party contests subject matter ...jurisdiction."4 If the County actually thought plaintiffs' claims were frivolous, itshould not have so willingly conceded facts giving rise to jurisdiction in thestipulation. Because the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs'federal claims, the court did not err by including plaintiffs' state claims fordeclaratory relief--pendent jurisdiction was proper.

The County also argues that the district court erred by interpreting the stipulationas a "winner-take-all" proposition. That is, the County says it reserved a right tomake several arguments, after the jury's fact finding, by referring to "undisposed ofmotions" in the stipulation. We disagree. The parties agreed that the jury'sconclusion would "be outcome determinative of all of the federal and state claims."The County does not argue that it was unfairly duped into signing the stipulation.And, we owe great deference to the trial judge's interpretation and enforcement ofpretrial stipulations. See Morrison v. Genuine Parts Co., 828 F.2d 708 (11thCir.1987); Hill v. Nelson, 676 F.2d 1371, 1373 n. 8 (11th Cir.1982). In the light of thestipulations, the district court did not err when it refused to entertain the County'spost-verdict motions.

8

Defendants raise other arguments, none of which present grounds for reversal.The district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.

9

Honorable Howell W. Melton, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Middle District ofFlorida, sitting by designation

*

Application of the Ordinance, according to plaintiffs, put a "cloud" on plaintiffs' titlebecause title to the strip parcels was transferred to the payor of the privilege fee.Plaintiffs' property was, in other words, not transferable so long as the County continued

to demand fees for the "abandonment" of property it never owned

1

"[S]tanding cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation." Harris v.Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n. 4 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc). We disagree with the County'sargument that plaintiffs' ownership claim is so obviously frivolous that standing couldnot possibly exist, regardless of stipulated facts pointing to standing. In support of thisclaim, the County cites the allegedly "remarkably similar" case ofUnited States v.16.33 Acres of Land, 342 So.2d 476 (Fla.1977), as binding precedent denying plaintiffs'ownership claim. But 16.33 Acres is distinguishable because in that case the governmentexpressly accepted the offer of dedication. Id. at 479

2

Because we conclude that plaintiffs' arbitrary and capricious due process claim was ripe,we say nothing about whether plaintiffs' additional constitutional claims were ripe. Wedo note, however, that plaintiffs were not granted relief pursuant to a specific claim.Instead, the County stipulated that plaintiffs would be entitled to the remedies requestedif plaintiffs prevailed on any of the disputed fact issues

3

Parties may not stipulate jurisdiction. Bush v. United States, 703 F.2d 491, 494 (11thCir.1983). And we do not say that jurisdiction was proper because jurisdiction wasstipulated. Instead, we look to the record; we affirm the district court's conclusion that

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the stipulated facts give rise to jurisdiction. For example, the County arguesfrivolousness by pointing to purported transfers--by plaintiffs' predecessors in interest--that the County says are null and void. But the County stipulated to plaintiffs' chain oftitle; and, the County agreed that it was undisputed that "plaintiffs are the successors ininterest to the Palm Beach Farms Company." The record was set in district court

CC | TRANSFORMED BY PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTMIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

JORG BUSSE

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No. 2:07-cv-228-FtM-29SPC

LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA; BOARD OF LEECOUNTY COMMISSIONERS; KENNETH M.WILKINSON; LEE COUNTY PROPERTYAPPRAISERS OFFICE; STATE OF

FLORIDA, BOARD OF [PAST & PRESENT]TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTTRUST FUND, STATE OF FLORIDADEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTALPROTECTION, AND DIVISION OFRECREATION AND PARKS; LEE COUNTYATTORNEY; JACK N. PETERSON,

Defendants.___________________________________

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the following motions:

(1) defendant Property Appraisers Motion to Dismiss and Close File

(Doc. #285), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. #302); (2)

defendants State of Florida Board of Trustees of the Internal

Improvement Trust Fund (Trustees) and Florida Department of

Environmental Protections (DEP) Joint Motion to Dismiss for Lack

of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Cause of Action (Doc.

#291), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. #316); (3)

defendant The Lee County Appraisers Motion to Dismiss for Lack of


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Jurisdiction (Doc. #303), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc.

#317); and (4) defendant Board of Lee County Commissioners Motion

to Dismiss (Doc. #304), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc.

#318). Because Plaintiff is proceedingpro se, his pleadings are

held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by an

attorney and will be liberally construed. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d

1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003).

I.

On December 10, 1969, the Board of County Commissioners of Lee

County, Florida adopted the Resolution Pertaining to Public Lands

in Cayo Costa Subdivision, Book 569, page 875 (the Resolution).

The Resolution stated that the Second Revised Plat of the Cayo

Costa Subdivision contained certain designated lot and block areas

and other undesignated areas. The Resolution further noted that

the plat contained certain un-numbered and unlettered areas lying

East of the Easterly tier of blocks in the subdivision and lying

West of the Westerly tier of blocks in the subdivision. The

Resolution stated that Lee County claimed the lands to the east and

west of the tier of blocks as public lands together with all

accretions thereto and does by this Resolution claim all of said

lands and accretions thereto for the use and benefit of the public

for public purposes. (Doc. #288, p. 9.)

Plaintiff Jorg Busse (plaintiff or Dr. Busse) asserts he is

the current owner of Lot 15A of the Cayo Costa Subdivision and


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Count 2 alleges an unconstitutional temporary taking under

color of the Resolution. Plaintiff asserts that the Resolution was

never signed, executed or acknowledged and did not meet resolution

and recording requirements, and was therefore not entitled to be

recorded and must be stricken from the public record. (Id. at

17.) Plaintiff further alleges that the Cayo Costa Subdivision

was outside of Lee Countys home rule powers, and therefore the

State and County had no powers to adopt resolutions or ordinances,

and therefore the Resolution is unenforceable and ineffectual and

the County capriciously grabbed private accreted land and

easements. (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff asserts that defendants took

his accretions onto the riparian gulf front Lot 15A without

authority, justification, due process of law, public notice,

hearing, vote count, or compensation, and that this unauthorized

unconstitutional taking injured plaintiff and destroyed his

property value. (Id. at 19.)

Count 3 sets forth a state law claim for trespass. Plaintiff

alleges that since the 1969 Resolution the defendants have asserted

that Lee County is the owner of the Cayo Costa accretions and have

induced and caused the public to intrude onto the private beaches

and other areas on Cayo Costa, injuring plaintiffs property. (Id.

at 20-21.) Plaintiff asserts that the State cannot exercise

power within the Subdivision east of the mean high water mark of

the Gulf of Mexico and west of the mean high water mark of

Charlotte Harbor. (Id. at 22.)


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Count 4 alleges a conspiracy to fabricate, fraud and

malfeasance. Plaintiff asserts that the Lee County Property

Appraiser claimed that the Resolution entitled Lee County to

ownership of the accreted property, but the County Appraiser has

admitted that Lee County was not empowered to adopt the Resolution.

(Id. at 23.) Plaintiff asserts that the Resolution on its face

did not meet recording or resolution requirements, and that the

County Appraiser had a professional duty to verify the validity of

the sham Resolution under the Uniform Standards of Professional

Appraisal Practice. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that without evidence

of title, defendants conspired to concoct an un-plated lot, block

and park for the benefit of the State and County. (Id. at 24.)

Plaintiff also asserts that defendant denied agricultural

classification to his accreted lot. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that

defendants destroyed most of his property value, deprived him of

private easements without compensation, and denied equal protection

in a land grab scheme. (Id.) Plaintiff describes the agreement as

being to assist the unconstitutional confiscation of the

accretions. (Id. at 25.) Plaintiff also asserts that the County

Appraiser made incompetent valuation reports which were

controverted by other comparable sales data and done in violation

of Federal Appraisal Standards, but defendant continued to slander

plaintiffs perfect title. (Id. at 26.) As a result, plaintiff

received purchase offers far below market value and the County

Appraiser has committed malfeasance and abuse of position. (Id.)


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Count 5 alleges a conspiracy to materially misrepresent and

defraud. Plaintiff asserts that Lee County does not hold title to

the accreted property pursuant to the Resolution, and there has

been no proceedings such as eminent domain or adverse possession.

(Id. at 29.) Plaintiff asserts that Lee Countys claims of

ownership of the accretions therefore violated the Fifth Amendment

Takings Clause, and therefore defendants deprived the public of tax

revenues which could have been received from the private accretions

and easements. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that defendants conspired

to misrepresent the extent of the Army Corps of Engineers

authority over his lagoon. (Id. at 32.)

Count 6 alleges oppression and slander of title by defendant

Peterson for failing to challenge the invalidity of the Resolution

despite his questions about its validity. (Id. at 33-35.)

The Third Amended Complaint asserts the Court has jurisdiction

based on the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 1983), 28 U.S.C. 1343,

Articles 3 and 4 of the United States Constitution, and Amendments

4 and 5 of the United States Constitution (Doc. #288, 7), the 1899

Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act (33 U.S.C. 403)(id. at 8),

the 1862 Homestead Act (id. at 9), the federal common law Doctrine

of Accretion and Erosion (id. at 10), the Federal Appraisal

Standards, Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (12

U.S.C. 3331-3351), and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act (28

U.S.C. 2201)(id. at 12).


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See Lee County v. Morales, 557 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)1

for a description of Cayo Costa island and the Lee County zoninghistory of the island since 1978.

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III.

The Court will first address the federal claims, since these

claims are necessary to provide subject matter jurisdiction. Given

plaintiffs pro se status, the Court reviews the Third Amended

Complaint liberally.

A. Takings Clause Claims:

A consistent theme which runs through several of plaintiffs

counts is that the Resolution constitutes an unconstitutional

taking of his property rights in his subdivision Lot 15A on Cayo

Costa island. The legal principles are well-settled, and preclude1

plaintiffs takings claim.

Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Takings Clause of the

Fifth Amendment, which states in pertinent part nor shall private

property be taken for public use, without just compensation. U.S.

CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is applied to the States

through the Fourteenth Amendment. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New

York City, 438 U.S. 104, 121-23 (1978). The Third Amended

Complaint may also be read to allege a conspiracy to violate the

Takings Clause.

State law defines the parameters of a plaintiffs property

interest, and whether state law has created a property interest is

a legal question for the court to decide. Morleys Auto Body, Inc.


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v. Hunter, 70 F.3d 1209, 1212 (11th Cir. 1996). Under Florida law

a riparian or littoral owner owns to the line of the ordinary high

water mark on navigable waters, and the riparian or littoral

property rights include the vested right to receive accretions to

the property. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust

Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934, 936-37 (Fla. 1987);

Brannon v. Boldt, 958 So. 2d 367, 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). These

rights constitute property, and cannot be taken or destroyed by the

government without just compensation to the owners. Sand Key

Assoc., 512 So. 2d at 936; Lee County v. Kiesel, 705 So. 2d 1013,

1015 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). By now it is beyond question that a

permanent physical occupation of private property by the state

constitutes a taking for which a landowner must be compensated.

New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County, 95 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th

Cir. 1996)(citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.

1003, 1015 (1992) and Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,

458 U.S. 419, 434 (1982)).

Thus while plaintiff has adequately alleged a taking of his

property, a property owner has not suffered a violation of the

Just Compensation Clause until the owner has unsuccessfully

attempted to obtain just compensation through the procedures

provided by the State for obtaining such compensation . . .

Williamson County Regional Planning Commn v. Hamilton Bank, 473

U.S. 172, 195 (1972). Williamson County boils down to the rule

that state courts always have a first shot at adjudicating a


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takings dispute because a federal constitutional claim is not ripe

until the state has denied the would-be plaintiffs compensation

for a putative taking, including by unfavorable judgment in a state

court proceeding. Agripost, LLC v. Miami-Dade County, Fla.,

F.3d , 2008 WL 1790434 (11th Cir. 2008). Without having

pursued such available state court remedies, a plaintiffs Takings

Clause claim is not ripe and therefore a federal district court

lacks jurisdiction to consider it. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at

195; Watson Constr. Co. v. City of Gainsville, 244 Fed. Appx. 274,

277 (11th Cir. 2007); Garbo, Inc. v. City of Key West, Fla., 162

Fed. Appx. 905 (11th Cir. 2006). It has been clear since at least

1990 that Florida law provides a remedy of an inverse or reverse

condemnation suit. Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transp.,

563 So. 2d 622, 624 (Fla. 1990); Tari v. Collier County, 56 F.3d

1533, 1537 n.12 (11th Cir. 1995); Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d

1412, 1417 (11th Cir. 1994). Additionally, plaintiff could have

pursued an state action for declaratory judgment under FLA. STAT.

86.011, a suit to quiet title, Trustees of Internal Imp. Fund of

State of Florida v. Toffel, 145 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962), or

a suit in ejectment if the matter is viewed as a boundary dispute.

Petryni v. Denton, 807 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

The Third Amended Complaint does not allege that plaintiff

pursued any state relief. Indeed, plaintiff has never suggested

that he has taken any action in state court to quiet title or

receive damages under an inverse or reverse condemnation claim.


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Since there is no showing of federal jurisdiction as to the Takings

Clause claim, the Taking Clause claims and any conspiracy to

violate the Takings Clause in any count will be dismissed without

prejudice.

B. Substantive Due Process Claim:

A liberal reading of the Third Amended Complaint might suggest

that plaintiff also frames the alleged taking of his property

rights as a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth

Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit has held, however, that there is

no independent substantive due process taking cause of action.

Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 121 F.3d 610, 612-14

(11th Cir. 1997). Additionally, substantive due process protects

only fundamental rights, that is, those rights which are implicit

in the concept of ordered liberty. Such rights are created by the

Constitution, and do not include property rights. Greenbriar

Village, LLC v. Mountain Brook City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir.

2003). Merely asserting that the governments actions were

arbitrary and irrational does not bring the matter within the

protection of the substantive due process provision. Greenbriar

Village, 345 F.3d at 1263-64. Therefore, those portions of counts

in the Third Amended Complaint which attempt to assert a

substantive due process takings claim or conspiracy will be

dismissed.


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C. Procedural Due Process Claim:

Plaintiffs counts may also attempt to state a procedural due

process claim. For example, plaintiff asserts that Lee County had

no home rule powers or jurisdiction over the undedicated Cayo Costa

subdivision (Doc. #288, 13, 18, 23), that the Resolution was

never signed, executed or acknowledged and did not meet resolution

and recording requirements (id. at 17, 23), and that the taking

was without authority, justification, due process, public notice,

hearing, vote count, or compensation (id. at 19).

Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to

be heard before any government deprivation of a property interest.

Zipperer v. City of Fort Myers, 41 F.3d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1995).

Not all government actions, however, are subject to a procedural

due process claim. The Countys action in passing the Resolution

constituted a legislative act, and therefore plaintiff cannot state

a procedural due process claim. 75 Acres, LLC v. Miami-Dade

County, Fla., 338 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff

asserted that the Resolution effecting the taking of more than 200

acres other than his 2.5 acres. This is sufficient to constitute

a legislative act. See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of

Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915)(noting that it is

impractical to give every one a voice when a legislative act

applies to more than a few people). Additionally, even if not a

legislative act, a procedural due process claims does not exist


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merely because state mandated procedures were not followed. First

Assembly of God of Naples, Florida, Inc. v. Collier County, Fla.,

20 F.3d 419, 422 (11th Cir. 1994). In this regard, some of the

allegations in the Third Amended Complaint are contradicted by the

Resolution which is attached to it. The copy of the Resolution

attached to the Third Amended Complaint establishes that it was

signed, executed, and duly recorded in the public records, and

plaintiff will not be allowed to assert otherwise. The remaining

claimed defects are arguments concerning state law which do not

arise to a constitutional level. Finally, plaintiff fails to state

a procedural due process claim because he has failed to allege that

Florida law provided him with an inadequate post-deprivation

remedy, Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 382 (11th Cir. 1996), and as

discussed above it is clear that Florida does provide adequate

post-deprivation remedies. Therefore, any claim founded on

procedural due process will be dismissed.

D. Equal Protection Claim:

Plaintiff also alleges that the Resolution violated his equal

protection rights. To properly plead an equal protection claim,

a plaintiff need only allege that through state action, similarly

situated persons have been treated disparately. Boyd v. Peet, 249

Fed. Appx. 155, 158 (11th Cir. 2007)(citation omitted). See also

Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1552 (11th

Cir. 1991). The Third Amended Complaint does not identify any

similarly situated person with whom plaintiff can be compared. The


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Third Amended Complaint states that defendants have taken over 200

acres pursuant to the Resolution, far in excess of his 2.5 acres.

The only assertion of disparate treatment is for those lots owned

by government, which plaintiff alleges did not have their rights

taken. However, a private owner such as plaintiff can not be

compared to a public owner such as a government unit. Therefore,

no equal protection claim is stated, and such claims will be

dismissed without prejudice.

E. Other Bases of Federal Jurisdiction:

Having found no federal claim set forth in the Third Amended

Complaint, the Court now examines the other purported bases of

federal jurisdiction.

Article III of the Constitution sets the outer boundaries of

the federal court jurisdiction, but vests Congress with the

discretion to determine whether and to what extent that power may

be exercised by lower federal courts. Therefore, lower federal

courts are empowered to hear only cases for which there has been a

congressional grant of jurisdiction. Morrison v. Allstate

Indemnity Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2000). Therefore

Article III does not provide any additional basis of federal

jurisdiction. Additionally, plaintiffs reliance on Article IV of

the Constitution is misplaced because Article IV does not address

the jurisdiction of a federal court.

Plaintiff cites 28 U.S.C. 1343 as a basis for federal

jurisdiction. Section 1343 sets forth the jurisdiction of district


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courts for certain civil rights actions, but does not itself create

a private right of action. Albra v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 232

Fed. Appx. 885, 892 (11th Cir. 2007). Since none of plaintiffs

federal civil rights claims are properly before the court, 1343

is not a basis for jurisdiction over the remaining state law

claims.

Plaintiffs reliance on the 1899 Rivers and Harbors

Appropriation Act, 33 U.S.C. 403 is misplaced. Section 403

relates to the creation of an obstruction not authorized by

Congress, and simply not relevant to any of the claims in this

case. The 1862 Homestead Act, 43 U.S.C. 161-64, cannot form

basis for jurisdiction because it was repealed in 1976. Assuming

there is a federal common law Doctrine of Accretion and Erosion, it

cannot provide a jurisdictional basis in federal court. The

Federal Appraisal Standards, Uniform Standards of Professional

Appraisal Practice, 12 U.S.C. 3331-3351, also do not create

federal jurisdiction. These standards relate to real estate

appraisals utilized in connection with federally related

transactions, 12 U.S.C. 1331, and no such transaction was

involved in this case. Additionally, in Florida the county

property appraiser is a constitutionally created office whose

appraisals are carried out pursuant to state statute, FLA. STAT.

193.011 as well as professional appraisal standards established by

the International Association of Assessing Officers and the


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Appraisal Institute. Parrish v. Nikolits, 86 F.3d 1088, 1091 n.2

(11th Cir. 1996).

Therefore, the Court finds no other basis of federal

jurisdiction has been plead in the Third Amended Complaint.

F. Remaining State Law Claims:

The remaining possible claims in the Third Amended Complaint

are all state law claims. Read liberally, the Third Amended

Complaint may be read to allege a claim to invalidate the

Resolution for alleged state-law procedural defects, a state law

claim of trespass, a state law claim of conspiracy to misrepresent,

a state law claim of fraud, state law claims of malfeasance, a

state law claim of oppression, and a state law claim of slander of

title. Even assuming these are properly pled, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. 1367(c)(3) the Court would exercise its discretion and

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state

claims. Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (11th

Cir. 2004)(encouraging district courts to dismiss state claims

where all claims which provided original jurisdiction have been

dismissed.) The dismissal of the state claims will be without

prejudice. Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999).

Having found that this Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction, and will not retain supplemental jurisdiction, the

Court need not address the issues raised in the remaining

defendants motions to dismiss.

Accordingly, it is now


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ORDERED:

1. Defendant Property Appraisers Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint (Doc. #303) is GRANTED to the

extent set forth in paragraph 5 below.

2. Defendant Property Appraisers Motion to Dismiss and

Close File (Doc. #285) is DENIED as moot.

3. State of Florida Department of Environmental Protection

and Division of Recreation and Parks, State of Florida, and Board

of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Funds Joint Motion

to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a

Cause of Action (Doc. #291) is GRANTED to the extent set forth in

paragraph 5 below.

4. Defendants Lee County, Florida, Board of Lee County

Commissioners, Lee County Attorney, Jack N. Petersons Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. #304) is GRANTED to the extent set forth in paragraph

5 below.

5. The Third Amended Complaint is dismissed without

prejudice as to all defendants and all claims. The Clerk shall

enter judgment accordingly, terminate all pending motions as moot,

and close the case.

DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 5th day of

May, 2008.

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