Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour

39:20021–8308

© 2009 The Authors

Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009. Published by Blackwell

Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

Blackwell Publishing LtdOxford, UKJTSBJournal for the Theory of Social Behaviour0021-83081468-5914© 2009 The Author Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009XXXOriginal Article

PosthumanismSamuel Wilson and Nick Haslam

Is the Future more or less Human? Differing

Views of Humanness in the Posthumanism Debate

SAMUEL WILSON AND NICK HASLAM

As Sandel (2007) recently observed, advances in the biosciences move faster than

our conceptual and moral understanding of their consequences. These advances

may ultimately change human nature and our understanding of what it means to

be human (Fernández-Armesto, 2004; Robert & Baylis, 2003). This is strikingly

reflected in the debate in the bioethics literature between advocates and opponents

of the non-therapeutic modification or enhancement of human nature. Issues in

this debate include how we should think about human nature and human identity,

whether we should attempt to use technology to make ourselves “more than

human,” and whether this attempt carries a threat of dehumanization.

Whereas advocates posit that biotechnological enhancement will not degrade the

humanity of altered beings and may even make them

more

than human, opponents

argue that it will degrade their humanity and make them

less

than human

(Arnhart, 2003). Whether they envisage a superhumanized or dehumanized

future, advocates and opponents generally agree that the application of modifica-

tion technologies to humans will change human nature and that modified human

beings may be more appropriately classified as “post-human” (Bostrom, 2005;

Fukuyama, 2002).

The debate about human nature modification and posthumanism is a complex

and evolving one whose threads are coloured by secular and religious moral and

political philosophy, developments in science and technology, and folk psychology.

Although this has produced a rich tapestry of ideas and arguments, there is

disagreement about the meaning of some fundamental concepts; among the

most basic being the ways in which the concepts of humanness and humankind

are understood. The precise meaning of humanness advanced by advocates and

opponents of modification is rarely or vaguely articulated and the relationship

between humanness beliefs and the ascription of human, posthuman, superhuman

or dehumanized status is often unclear.

In this essay, we consider neither the concept of humankind nor the challenge

posed to it by developments in primatology, paleoanthropology, biology, the animal

rights movement and artificial intelligence research (see Fernández-Armesto, 2004,

248

Samuel Wilson and Nick Haslam

© 2009 The Authors

Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009

for a review), but rather upon what folk psychology suggests about the meaning

of humanness and its attribution or denial. Unlike conceptions of humanness and

the human-nonhuman boundary in the sciences, which change in response to

changes in scientific understanding, folk psychological beliefs about humanness,

buttressed and stabilised by the culture in which they are embedded, change more

slowly and may offer a coherent conceptual framework within which to organise

thinking about humanness and the humanizing or dehumanizing potential of

modification technologies. Consider, for example, references in this debate to the

“human essence” (Fukuyama, 2002) or an “essential human nature” (Somerville,

2006). Whereas the age-old philosophical idea that species are natural kinds, with

essential, universal traits has generally lost currency in scientific understandings

of human and nonhuman animals, considerable evidence attests to the perseverance

of essentialist thinking in folk psychology (Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian,

2005; Haslam, Bastian, & Bissett, 2004). The use of such terminology in this

debate suggests that folk psychological beliefs are being recruited in the service of

advocates’ and opponents’ arguments, attesting to the utility of a folk psychological

approach to the enhancement debate.

Folk psychology refers to a system of shared meaning that organises laypeople’s

understanding of, experience in, and transactions with the social world. All

cultures, as argued by Bruner (1990), possess a folk psychology, which describes

the elements of our own and others’ minds—beliefs, desires and intentions—as

well as providing a set of more or less normative descriptions about what makes

people “tick.” As the enhancement debate begins to move out of academe and

into the public domain, folk psychological beliefs about humanness will almost

certainly inform laypeople’s understanding of the meaning and consequences of

modification and whether human status is properly ascribed to, or withheld from,

the modified. Thus, in addition to offering a framework to analyse the arguments

of advocates and opponents, a folk psychological approach also provides a possible

foretaste of laypeople’s thinking about the conceptual and ethical consequences

of human nature modification.

In this paper, we draw on recent social psychological research into folk con-

ceptions of humanness and dehumanization (Haslam et al., 2005; Leyens et al.,

2000, 2001) to propose two basic ways in which humanness is understood. We

begin with a brief overview of the posthumanism debate. Next, we survey the

views of prominent advocates and opponents about the meaning of humanness

and the consequences of its modification. Following this, we outline two empirically-

grounded folk psychological senses of humanness and the consequences of

ascribing or denying these two senses to persons. We then demonstrate how

advocates and opponents of modification recruit the different senses of

humanness, and how this may, in part, underlie their disagreements about

whether modification will be dehumanizing. Although our description of the

arguments offered by advocates and opponents simplifies and skirts the nuances

of the arguments within and between the two camps, we hope that our sketch

Posthumanism

249

© 2009 The Authors

Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009

of the broad knowledge structures recruited by each camp demonstrates the

value of such a simplifying approach.

The range of perspectives relevant to an analysis of the meaning and consequences

of humanness modification is vast. The main objective of this essay is to reanalyse

aspects of the bioethics debate in folk psychological terms and demonstrate

how the use of different folk concepts of humanness predicts whether humanness

modification will be judged as dehumanizing or superhumanizing. As such, we

necessarily screen off a number of important issues. First, we restrict our analysis

to arguments for and against non-therapeutic modifications of human nature

that seek to

enhance

rather than

repair

it. Second, we do not consider the distinction

between temporary and permanent enhancements (e.g., the use of Ritalin by

individuals without ADHD to temporarily improve concentration versus the

use of biotechnology to permanently achieve the same end). Third, we do not

consider the distinction between modifying extant humans and the unborn, or the

distinction between modifications that are and are not heritable. Fourth, we do

not examine the power of different modification technologies to change human

nature or the assumptions that advocates and opponents make about its power to

do so (cf. Arnhart, 2003). Finally, because we aim to clarify the views of humanness

that are implicit in the various arguments offered, we do not critique the arguments,

but present a framework that renders those views explicit. The absence of critique

does not imply uncritical endorsement of claims, but a deliberate neutrality.

HUMANS AND POSTHUMANS

Advances in the biosciences promise or threaten humankind with a posthuman

future (Bostrom, 2005; Fernández-Armesto, 2004; Fukuyama, 2002; Seiler,

2007). The relevant technologies are many and summarised by two acronyms:

NBIC (nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive

science) and GRAIN (genetic manipulation, robotics, artificial intelligence, and

nanotechnology) (e.g., Hughes, 2004). In addition to the convergence of NBIC/

GRAIN technologies, Hughes (2004) has argued that there may also be a

convergence of at least seven biotechnologies this century (Hughes, 2004). Taken

together, these biotechnologies may precipitate the creation of post-humans

whose capacities so radically exceed those of present-day humans as to be no

longer unambiguously human (Bostrom, 2003; Hughes, 2004). In addition to the

post-humans that NBIC/GRAIN may yield, such technologies may also lead to

the creation of new living organisms, machines with human or superhuman

intelligence, and humans with machine parts and genetically enhanced bodies

(Kurzweil, 1999; Seiler, 2007).

There is profound disagreement between advocates and opponents as to whether

the application of such technologies to humankind will be humanizing, super-

humanizing, or dehumanizing. Prominent advocates of enhancement include Nick

250

Samuel Wilson and Nick Haslam

© 2009 The Authors

Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009

Bostrom (2003, 2005, 2008), Julian Savulescu (2003, 2005), James Hughes (2004),

Gregory Stock (2002), Nick Agar (2004), Rodney Brooks (2002), Hans Moravec

(2000), Ray Kurzweil (1999) and Lee Silver (1998). Prominent opponents of

enhancement include Leon Kass (2002, 2003), Francis Fukuyama (2002), Jeremy

Rifkin (1984), Bill McKibben (2003), Jürgen Habermas (2003), Michael Sandel

(2007), and Margaret Somerville (2006).

Although the issues with which pro- and anti-enhancement writers are

concerned are vast, human dignity, the “mastery” of our nature and the proper

use of reason are especially prominent. Although various established (e.g., humanism)

and emerging (e.g., posthumanism; see Murphy, 1997) moral and political philo-

sophical ideas inform, and constrain, arguments for and against enhancement,

the debate is marred by imprecise, excessively narrow and vague definitions of

humanness and human nature. Moreover, the relationship between humanness

and the ascription of human, superhuman or dehumanized status is often unclear.

Finally, in addition to such conceptual imprecision and ambiguous relationships

between humanness and human, superhuman, and dehumanized status, the

question of how much modification of humanness has to occur for human status

to be ascribed or withheld is almost entirely unexamined. Indeed, as argued by

Fernández-Armesto (2004) the question of how much of our nature has to change

before our descendants cease to be human is one we are not ready to answer.

Despite these many issues, the writings of advocates and opponents have proliferated,

in turn illuminating and confusing our conceptual and moral understanding of

human nature and the consequences of its modification.

ADVOCATES OF MODIFICATION

Views of Human Nature

Advocates of modification emphasise the malleability of human nature and the

influence that the social and technological context exerts upon its expression.

This idea is especially apparent in the writings of those who refer to themselves as

transhumanists, extropians or singularitarians (see, e.g., Bostrom, 2003; Hughes,

2004). The writings of transhumanists such as Bostrom (2003, 2005, 2008) are

especially salient in this debate and figure prominently in this review. Advocates

of modification argue that human nature is dynamic, partially man-made

(Bostrom, 2005), and potentially subject to conscious or rational evolution

(Savulescu, 2005).

Explicit characterisations of humanness by advocates of modification are rare,

but the bioethicist Julian Savulescu (2003, 2005) has nominated rationality, the

capacity to make normative judgements, and the capacity to act on the basis of

reasons as defining human qualities. This view is consistent with the long-standing

emphasis of Western philosophers upon human distinctiveness (Midgley, 1979/

Posthumanism

251

© 2009 The Authors

Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009

2002). Similarly, Brooks (2002) argues that syntax and technology separate people

from animals; in effect, reason and its application.

Despite the dearth of explicit characterizations of humanness, the attributes

nominated for enhancement provide a good source of evidence from which

advocates’ conception of humanness may be inferred. Specifically, to the extent that

the attributes nominated for enhancement improve what is fundamentally human

(see, e.g., Savulescu, 2005), such attributes may be held to figure prominently in

advocates’ conception of humanness. Such enhancements include the extension of

intellectual capabilities, such as improved memory, and psychological capabilities,

particularly those involving increased control over mental states, moods, emotions

and impulses (Bostrom, 2003, 2005; Hughes, 2004; Savulescu, 2005). Arguments

regarding the dignity of posthumans in the bioethics literature also provide evidence

for advocates’ conceptions of humanness. Advocates argue that posthumans will

possess as much, if not more, dignity—defined as a kind of excellence, including

moral excellence, worth or honour—as unmodified humans (Bostrom, 2005, 2008).

As suggested above, self-control features prominently in advocates’ arguments.

For example, Bostrom (2008) nominates enhanced executive function, self-control

and self-regulation as desirable qualities of the post-human, which serve also to

enhance the moral worth of the enhanced. In sum, the types of qualities that

epitomise humanness for advocates include intelligence, rationality, self-control

and moral excellence. Typically, however, enhanced intelligence appears at the top

of most advocates’ lists of improvements to human nature (Agar, 2004), pointing

to a focus on the qualities that make human beings psychologically unique and

distinct from other species.

Consequences of Human Nature Modification for Advocates

Advocates of modification argue that the biotechnological modification of human

nature represents, if anything, an enhancement of our fundamental humanness

and offer two closely related arguments in support of this proposition; first, that

enhancement will improve our humanity, and second, that enhancement will not

degrade our humanity.

According to the first argument, if the enhancement of human nature leads to

the creation of beings that are not unambiguously human by current standards,

then these beings are likely to represent an improvement on present humans and

may even be “more than human” as indexed by their superior capabilities, such

as the uniquely human capacity for rational judgement and decision making

(Savulescu, 2005). Moreover, advocates argue that the use of reason in the very

act of

deciding

to enhance specific human attributes increases an enhanced being’s

endowment of fundamental humanness—a quantitative change—as well as

increasing the depth of the endowment—a qualitative change. To clarify, Bostrom

(2008), for example, has asserted that

252

Samuel Wilson and Nick Haslam

© 2009 The Authors

Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009

a capacity or an attribute that has become ours because of our own choice, our own thinking,

and our own experiences, is in some sense more authentically ours than a capacity or attribute

given to us prenatally (p. 182).

In making this argument, Bostrom (2008) echoes long-standing humanist

arguments that humans exhibit their authentic humanity upon emancipation

from nature, particularly animal nature (see, e.g., Murphy, 1997, for an incisive

analysis of the humanism-posthumanism relationship). Enjoining the claims

that humanness is partially man-made (Bostrom, 2005); that enhancement

increases our endowment of fundamental human qualities (Bostrom, 2003,

2005, 2008; Savulescu, 2003, 2005); and that our humanness is epitomised

by our intelligence, rationality, and self-control, produces an argument for a

superhuman future.

The second argument in favour of enhancement is that it will not dehumanize

the enhanced. One strand of this argument rests on the assumption that that most

people who choose modification are unlikely to choose degradation over enhance-

ment (Bostrom, 2005). A second strand concerns the improbability that attempts

at modification will fail to produce enhancement. To illustrate, Savulescu

(2003)—with specific reference to human-animal transgenesis—has asserted that

whereas in some cases the creation of transgenic human beings will reduce the

“essential features of humanity,” our humanity will be promoted in most cases. A

third strand draws on the proposition that human nature is partially man-made,

such that its expression is partly contingent on the social and technological

context. In particular, advocates argue that despite the “extended phenotypes” of

present-day humans being radically different from those of our ancient forebears,

this distance from our original state has not divested contemporary humans of

human identity (Agar, 2004) or dehumanized us in the sense of making us

generally unworthy or base (Bostrom, 2005).

OPPONENTS OF MODIFICATION

Views of Human Nature

Among opponents, there is greater variation in beliefs about the “nature” of

human nature, and fewer attempts at explicitly characterizing what is fundamen-

tally important about human nature. Further, as noted by Bostrom (2005),

whereas opposition seems to variously derive from religious or crypto-religious

sentiments for some opponents (e.g., Kass), for others it stems from secular

grounds (e.g., Fukuyama, Habermas, Somerville).

To begin with the “nature” of human nature, Fukuyama (2002) has taken a strong

nature (vs. nurture) view and defined human nature as “the sum of the behaviour

and characteristics that are typical of the human species, arising from genetic

Posthumanism

253

© 2009 The Authors

Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009

rather than environmental factors” (p. 130). On the other hand, Somerville (2006)

has taken a more measured view and characterised human nature as partly

stemming from our biology and partly involving a combination of biology and

culture. Whereas the position advocated by Fukuyama (2002) suggests that human

nature is largely immutable, Somerville’s (2006) position suggests that human

nature is malleable, but not infinitely so.

Despite this conceptual variation, there is greater agreement among opponents

of modification that humans are imbued with a “given” or “sacred” essence or

soul—understood in either a religious or secular sense (Fukuyama, 2002;

Kass, 2002; Sandel, 2007; Somerville, 2006). This view represents a sharp

rejection of the advocates’ view that human nature is dynamic, improvable and

in large measure an artefact of societal and technological context. Moreover,

there is a repudiation of advocates’ endorsement of non-spiritual, reductive and

technologizing conceptions of nature and human nature. Sounding a strong

note of caution about taking a reductive approach to understanding humanness

and humankind, Kass (1984), a conservative philosopher whose arguments tend

to be informed by a religious perspective on what it means to be human, has

asserted that

We are witnessing the erosion, perhaps the final erosion, of the idea of man as something

splendid or divine, and a replacement with a view that sees man, no less than nature, simply as

raw material for manipulation and homogenization (p. 37).

With respect to the constitution of human nature, opponents argue that although

human nature may be linked to a number of species-typical attributes, it is reduc-

ible to none of them. Somerville (2006), for example, has written:

it is [the]

totality

[of the biological and cultural factors] that makes up the natural in human

nature (p. 99, emphasis added).

Similarly, but expressing an explicitly essentialist perspective upon attributes

regarded as both general within and unique to humans, Fukuyama (2002) has

asserted that the human essence:

cannot be reduced to the possession of moral choice, or reason, or language, or sentience, or

emotions, or consciousness or any other quality that has been put forward . . .

It is all these factors

coming together in a human whole that make up [the human essence]

(p. 171, emphasis added).

Although some of these qualities resemble those nominated by advocates as

reflecting human nature, it is the holistic, indivisible, and irreducible treatment

of these qualities that distinguishes the opponent’s conception of humanness

from the advocates’.

Kass (2002) also avoids explicitly defining the constitution of human nature.

However, his description of the consequences of modification upon the nature of

254

Samuel Wilson and Nick Haslam

© 2009 The Authors

Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009

altered beings arguably permits the inference of what he regards as fundamentally

human qualities:

Homogenization, mediocrity, pacification, drug-induced contentment, debasement of taste, souls without loves and

longings

—these are the inevitable results of making the essence of human nature the last project

of technical mastery (p. 48, emphasis added).

Such a characterisation is also echoed by the President’s Council on Bioethics

(2003), which Kass was appointed to in 2001, who report that

[a post-human future] could rather resemble the humanly diminished world portrayed in

Aldous Huxley’s novel

Brave New World

, whose technologically enhanced inhabitants live

cheerfully, without disappointment or regret, “enjoying” flat, empty lives devoid of love and

longing, filled with only trivial pursuits and shallow attachments (p. 7).

Elsewhere, and with respect to the use of gratification technologies by these

“creatures of human shape but stunted humanity” (Kass, 1985, p. 34), Kass (1985)

envisages the demise of thought and art, the need for deep personal relationships

and public spiritedness—the capacity to imagine the other.

From these characterizations, which describe the void in our humanness when

specific human qualities are absent or negated, we might infer that such qualities

as individuality (vs. homogeneity), agentic striving (vs. passivity), emotional

responsiveness (vs. drug-induced contentment), strong relational bonds (vs.

shallow attachments), deep and rounded experience (vs. superficial, flat experience),

thought, art and creativity (vs. unimaginativeness) and passion and desire (vs. souls

without loves and longings) are critical elements of Kass’ conception of humanness,

in particular, and perhaps of opponents more generally.

A final way in which the opponent’s conception of humanness is distinguished

concerns those “human ways of knowing” regarded as fundamentally human. In

contrast to the emphasis placed by advocates upon rationality, Somerville (2006)

rejects the idea “that the ability to reason comprises the totality of human intelligence”

(p. 169). Non-rational, experiential ways of knowing (e.g., imagination, intuition)

are equally, if not more, important, viz: “our primary decision-making mechanism

is often a ‘gut reaction,’ not based on reason, but . . . [where] . . . reason is an

essential secondary verification mechanism” (Somerville, 2006, p. 31).

Such sensory—or experientially—contingent ways of knowing are subsumed

more generally by the concept of embodiment. Drawing on the writings of the

theologian William May, Somerville (2006) suggests that embodiment is reflected

in three things our body does for us; “it presents the world to us; it acts as our

presence to the entire universe—in that if our body breaks, our personhood is

threatened or disintegrates; and it is what relates to others” (p. 158). Embodiment

is therefore of central importance, in marked contrast to the advocates’ proposition

that “[it] is not our human shape or the details of our current biology that define

what is valuable about us” (Bostrom, 2003, p. 4).

Posthumanism

255

© 2009 The Authors

Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009

Consequences of Human Nature Modification for Opponents

Opponents of modification argue that biotechnological modification will degrade

or invalidate the humanity—the essence—of altered beings and diminish humankind’s

intrinsic worth and dignity. The proposition that the modification of human

nature will be intrinsically dehumanizing stems, at least in part, from the view that

human nature is either “given” (Kass, 2003), or “gifted” and “sacred” (Somerville,

2006). To illustrate, Kass (2003) has asserted that because humans possess a given,

species-specific nature, which is different in kind to the natures of other species, then

any attempt “to turn man into more than a man” (p. 20) would be intrinsically

dehumanizing.

Related to the proposition that humans are imbued with an indivisible essence

that undergirds identity and dignity is the notion that it is improper to act upon this

essence even if we could, an idea that is rendered particularly clear by Somerville

(2006):

The dangers of rejecting a concept of the natural—for example, of human nature—include this:

if there is no essential human nature, then no technologizing of that nature is dehumanizing

(p. 97).

Opponents’ arguments against modification, therefore, rest upon the proposition

that the technological mastery of human nature is dehumanizing. This idea also

finds expression in Kass’ (1985) arguments about use of biotechnology to produce

“optimum” babies:

the price to be paid for the optimum baby is the transfer of procreation from the home to the

laboratory and its coincident transformation into manufacture . . . The complete depersonalization

of procreation . . . shall itself be dehumanizing (p. 33).

Similarly, Habermas (2003) has characterised the biotechnological modification

of human nature as “obliterating the boundary between persons and things”

(p. 13).

Another reason why opponents argue that modification will be dehumanizing

is related to their concern about its consequences for modified humans’ capacity

for autonomous action. This concern is especially apparent in the writings of

Habermas (2003), Kass (2003) and the President’s Council on Bioethics (2003).

On this view, modification will degrade altered beings’ innate autonomy and

agency, such that the causes of their behaviour will be properly understood in

purely mechanical terms without recourse to such intentional mental states as

beliefs and desires that pervade our folk psychology.

Let us summarise the differing conceptions of humanness and the con-

sequences of its modification held by advocates and opponents (see Table 1). First,

whereas advocates regard human nature as dynamic, improvable, and contingent,

256

Samuel Wilson and Nick Haslam

© 2009 The Authors

Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009

opponents regard it as “given” and argue that there is an immutable “human

essence.” Second, whereas advocates take a generally reductive view of human

nature as specific capabilities, opponents take a more “holistic” perspective and

regard human nature as indivisible. Third, whereas advocates tend to focus on

the centrality of rationality, self-control, and the capacity for moral excellence,

opponents tend to focus on individuality, agency, and emotionality. Fourth,

whereas advocates argue that the modification of their nominated aspects

of humanness will not denude the human identity of enhanced beings,

opponents argue that modification will divest them of their humanness.

Finally, whereas advocates argue that, if anything, modified beings will be more

than human, opponents argue that such beings will be dehumanized. The

rival positions therefore appear to work with highly distinct conceptions of

humanness.

A NEW MODEL OF HUMANNESS AND DEHUMANIZATION

In this section we draw upon a recent line of social psychological research into

conceptions of humanness and dehumanization (Haslam, 2006; Haslam et al.,

2005; Loughnan & Haslam, 2007) to set out the ways in which humanness is

Table 1. A summary of the assumptions of the advocates and opponents of modification

Advocates of modification Opponents of modification

There is no human essence (human nature is dynamic, still evolving)

There is a human essence (human nature is given, fixed)

A focus on non-essentialised qualities (e.g., intelligence, self-control)

A focus on essentialised qualities (e.g., emotion, warmth, agency)

An emphasis on the “beyond nature” parts of ourselves: Human Uniqueness

An emphasis on the “in nature” parts of ourselves: Human Nature

The qualities of human nature as modular parts that can be separably maximised

A focus on indivisibility and preserving the “wholeness” of human nature

Repudiation of the “natural” as a guide to what is normatively good or right

Protection of the “natural” as a guide to what is normatively good or right

Privileging rational ways of knowing (intelligence, thought: “agentic” mind)

Privileging nonrational ways of knowing (emotions, desires: “experience” mind )

Enhancement does not affect qualities fundamental to self-identity

Enhancement does affect qualities fundamental to self-identity

Modification represents a gain of humanness (HU)

Modification represents a loss of humanness (HN)

Modification will produce superhumanised beings

Modification will produce dehumanized beings

Posthumanism

257

© 2009 The Authors

Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009

understood in folk psychology and the consequences of denying it to people. In

so doing, we argue for an empirically-based strategy for defining and using such

concepts as human nature and dehumanization. Specifically, we argue that

people conceptualise humanness in two distinct ways: as an essentialised, species-

typical

human nature

and as a non-essentialised

human uniqueness

that distinguishes

humans from other species. We argue that the attribution or denial of these

conceptually and empirically distinct senses of humanness has markedly different

implications for person perception. We do not claim that this distinction exhausts

all important conceptions of humanness in folk psychology or, of course, in the

history of ideas. For instance, Bakhtin’s (1993) analysis of carnival and the

grotesque reveals a historically enduring view of humanness that emphasizes its

carnal, instinctual and animalistic aspects, and does not align closely with our

two senses.

Human Nature (HN) is a species-typical sense of humanness, involving the

fundamental attributes that all humans share. Some of these attributes may be

shared with other animals, grounded, for example, in our common mammalian

evolution. In folk psychology, people understand this sense of humanness to

involve emotionality, warmth, cognitive openness (e.g., imaginativeness), and

agency. HN traits tend to be regarded as biologically-based, unchanging,

deep-seated (Haslam et al., 2004), universal across cultures, and innate rather

than acquired through experience (Haslam et al., 2005). Haslam et al. (2005)

argue that laypeople regard this sense of humanness as the human essence:

defining, fixed, inhering and natural.

In contrast with HN, Human Uniqueness (HU) is a comparative sense of

humanness involving those qualities that distinguish humans from nonhuman

animals (Haslam, 2006). According to folk psychology, HU involves refinement,

civility, morality, higher cognition, maturity and self-control (Haslam, 2006;

Haslam et al., 2005). HU traits are regarded as socially learned, late to develop,

culturally-specific, and unrelated to emotionality (Haslam et al., 2005). These

conceptual judgements parallel those found in research on the perceived attributes

of emotions (Demoulin et al., 2004), which showed that people discriminate between

“uniquely human” and “non-uniquely human” emotions and see the former as

cognitively complex and internally-caused rather than responsive to the environment.

HU attributes tend not to be essentialised (Haslam et al., 2005), as they are

viewed as acquired, enculturated and malleable rather than innate, natural and

fixed. In sum, HN and HU are senses of humanness that are conceptually distinct,

empirically unrelated, and that roughly correspond to Romantic and Enlightenment

views of humanness, respectively (Kashima & Foddy, 2002). The former emphasizes

our continuity with nature, revealed by emotion and desire, as is well captured

by a quote from Carlyle: “Heart! Warmth! Blood! Humanity! Life!” (Berlin, 1991).

The latter foregrounds reason, civility, and the transcendence of nature.

Haslam (2006) incorporated HN and HU into a new model of dehumanization,

in which the denial of the each sense yields distinct forms of dehumanization.

258

Samuel Wilson and Nick Haslam

© 2009 The Authors

Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009

When HN is denied, people are implicitly viewed as automata, machines or

inanimate objects, and when HU is denied they are likened to animals. A growing

body of research supports the psychological reality of these two human/nonhuman

contrasts, and the mechanistic and animalistic forms of dehumanization that they

imply (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007).

Animalistic dehumanization involves the denial of HU qualities (see Figure 1).

When people are dehumanized in this way, they are characterised as bestial:

amoral, uncultured, instinctive, and lacking reason and the capacity for self-

control. Mechanistic dehumanization, in contrast, involves the denial of HN

attributes. Dehumanized in this way, people are therefore seen as passive, inert,

cold, and cognitively and behaviourally rigid; attributes more characteristic of

robots than persons (Haslam, 2006).

Figure 1. Proposed links between conceptions of humanness and corresponding forms ofdehumanization.

Posthumanism

259

© 2009 The Authors

Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009

Evidence for this pair of linked oppositions comes from a recent study (Haslam

et al., 2008) in which Australian, Chinese and Italian participants rated humans

in comparison with animals and robots on a variety of mental states. As expected,

humans were distinguished from animals on the basis of higher cognition and

refined emotions, consistent with the themes defining HU, and they were

distinguished from robots primarily on the basis of emotionality and desire, core

components of HN. Similar findings have been obtained by Gray, Gray and

Wegner (2007), who found that humans were perceived to differ from robots and

animals on two distinct dimensions, the former reflecting self-control, morality,

and cognition (HU), and the latter reflecting desire, emotion, individuality, and

sentience (HN).

RE-EXPRESSING THE DEBATE IN FOLK PSYCHOLOGICAL TERMS

Advocates: Modifying Human Uniqueness

The centrality of rationality and self-control, and, to a lesser extent, moral excellence

to the advocates’ conception of humanness, in conjunction with their rejection

of an essentialist view of humanness, strongly suggests that they understand

humanness primarily as

human uniqueness

. As outlined earlier, HU involves such

qualities as higher cognition, self-control, and civility (Haslam, 2006), qualities

that closely parallel those nominated by advocates in their characterisation of

humanness. In essence, advocates of modification see it as an enhancement of HU

qualities that moves humans away from their animality.

The idea that advocates focus on the HU sense of humanness receives additional

backing from psychological research into the relationship between the humanness

of traits and their centrality to identity. Unlike HN traits, which laypeople regard

as fundamental to personal identity (Haslam et al., 2004), HU traits are judged

as largely peripheral to identity. Support for the relatively marginal role played by

uniquely human traits in self-identity is also provided by a recent study by Riis,

Simmons and Goodwin (2008), which demonstrated that participants were least

reluctant to endorse imagined enhancement of intelligence-related traits—such as

rote learning ability, episodic memory, and concentration—because such traits were

regarded as largely peripheral to self-identity. Such findings are broadly consistent

with the arguments of advocates that the enhancement of intelligence-related traits

will not divest altered beings of self and human identity, adding indirect support to

the proposition that advocates of modification privilege the HU sense of humanness.

Our claim that HU is the default sense of humanness for advocates of modifica-

tion may also be derived from their characterization of enhanced posthumans.

Consider, for example, Bostrom’s (2005) argument that enhanced humans may

demonstrate higher degrees of moral and intellectual excellence than unaltered humans.

These qualities arguably follow quite straightforwardly from the enhancement of

260

Samuel Wilson and Nick Haslam

© 2009 The Authors

Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009

the qualities of moral sensibility and rationality that are grouped together in the HU

conception of humanness. Moreover, such desiderata as increased control over

mental states, moods, desires, and emotions (Bostrom, 2005) are central to HU.

Opponents: Modifying Human Nature

The centrality to the opponents’ conception of humanness of such qualities

as individuality, agency, and emotionality, in conjunction with the endorsement

of the idea of an immutable human essence, points to a focus upon the sense of

humanness that we have described as

human nature

. HN involves qualities like

emotional responsiveness, warmth, individuality and agency (Haslam, 2006),

which are essentialised (Haslam et al., 2004), regarded as fundamental to personal

identity (Riis et al., 2008) and therefore protected. In their study of beliefs

about the enhancement of traits, Riis et al. (2008) found that the traits that people

were most resistant to modifying included kindness, empathy, self-confidence

and mood; qualities consistent with the HN facets of emotionality, warmth, and

agency. Riis et al. (2008) explained these results with the argument that such traits

were judged by participants as fundamental to their identity. The notion that HN

traits are regarded as sacrosanct and central elements of identity is consistent with

arguments of the opponents that the modification of human nature will divest

altered beings of self and human identity.

Our claim that opponents view humanness as HN receives further support

in the characterisation of dehumanization offered by Kass (2002), who sees it as

involving homogenisation, mediocrity, passivity, and the absence of emotions,

passions and desires. These elements correspond closely to the features of mech-

anistic dehumanization presented in Figure 1, implying that HN is the operating

conception of humanness in Kass’ work. Homogeneity and passivity accord with

the denial of individuality and agency, and impoverished emotions and desires

accord with the denial of emotionality and warmth. Similarly, as noted earlier,

Habermas (2003) has argued that the modification of human nature obliterates

“the boundary between persons and things” (p. 13), implying the objectification,

inanimacy and inertness that is associated with that form of dehumanization.

Thus, where advocates of modification see a gain in humanness (HU) in which

posthumans transcend human animality, opponents see a loss of the human

essence (HN) that reduces posthumans to automata.

PROSPECTS FOR DEHUMANIZED POSTHUMAN FUTURES

The burgeoning debate in the bioethics literature about the consequences and

ethics of the modification of humanness has illuminated the ethical and conceptual

challenges posed by actual and prospective developments in the biosciences.

Posthumanism

261

© 2009 The Authors

Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009

Moreover, the debate has drawn attention to a temporal aspect of dehumaniza-

tion that has received comparatively little attention in the psychological literature;

namely, the humanness of

future

human beings (but see Haslam & Bain, 2007 on

people’s attribution of lesser humanness to future selves). Unlike individuals and

groups that have been most saliently dehumanized in the mid (e.g., Jews during

World War II) and late twentieth century (e.g., Tutsis in Rwanda), laypeople

typically do not have a referent for thinking about dehumanized future beings.

One of the significant, if somewhat incidental, contributions of this debate,

therefore, has been to begin to address this gap in our conceptualisation of the

scope of dehumanization.

Although the debate has generated a voluminous literature in a short period of

time, interpretations of the basic concepts involved have also proliferated. This

conceptual variability partially obscures the nature and scope of the disagreement

between the opposing parties, the capacity of the debate to clarify the challenges

and opportunities raised by advances in biotechnology and, possibly, the discovery

of potential areas of agreement. What, then, can we say about whether modified

humans—posthumans—will be regarded as more human or less human than

regnant humans? As suggested throughout this essay, the answer depends, in part,

on the sense of humanness that is focused upon.

To begin with

human uniqueness

—an Enlightenment view of humanness as

rationality, intellect, and self-control—this sense implies that humanness is socially

learned, dynamic and improvable. If

human uniqueness

is the operative sense of

humanness, as it appears to be for advocates of modification, then it becomes

clearer why they implicitly see humanness as dynamic, partially constructed

rather than given, and as an ensemble of malleable capacities rather than an

indivisible whole. This also sheds light on why advocates do not see dehumanization

as a risk following the modification of specific qualities. Rather than a wholesale

loss of humanness, there will be a piece-wise gain in it.

Turning next to

human nature

—a more Romantic view of humanness emphasising

emotionality, warmth, and agency—this sense implies that humanness is biologically-

based, inherent, and immutable; a human essence. If

human nature

is the operative

sense of humanness, as it appears to be for opponents of modification, it is clear

why humanness is conceptualised holistically and why modification is seen as

threatening dehumanization. If the essence is modified, then the category that it

undergirds (humankind) will be radically altered.

Re-expressing the positions of advocates and opponents in terms of

human nature

and

human uniqueness

highlights the utility of an empirical approach to concep-

tions of humanness and its modification. First, it demonstrates how privileging

qualitatively different senses of humanness can yield conceptual confusion and a

tendency to speak past, rather than to, one another. The parallels between the

folk psychological model of humanness and the conceptions of humanness that

suffuse the writings of advocates and opponents strongly suggests that they recruit

disparate folk concepts of humanness, notwithstanding the different religious, ethical

262

Samuel Wilson and Nick Haslam

© 2009 The Authors

Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009

and philosophical bases of their arguments. Second, re-expressing the positions in

folk psychological terms suggests that the different senses of humanness recruited

by advocates and opponents are necessary but not sufficient for an analysis of the

consequences of enhancement for human nature and human identity. These

senses of humanness—in folk psychology—are complementary and jointly con-

stitutive of personhood (e.g., Gray et al., 2007). Focusing exclusively on one or the

other leads to markedly different evaluations of modification—optimism about an

uncomplicated gain in humanness or pessimism about a fundamental loss of it.

The lack of explicit characterizations of humanness in terms of specific

attributes or traits in favour of more general speculations about the “nature” of

human nature is particularly problematic. In a sense, this is understandable

because, as observed by Fernández-Armesto (2004):

There is still no agreement about what “human nature” is . . . Human nature, if it is

proper to speak of such a thing, is not fixed: it has changed in the past and could change

again. Its continuity with the natures of other animals is part of its fluidity (p. 169).

Despite the lack of non-trivial agreement about the meaning of human nature,

some conception of humanness is of central importance, however problematic or

impoverished it is. The application of an empirically-grounded folk psychological

model of humanness to the enhancement debate suggests that employing abstract

and ill-defined concepts of human nature produces conceptual confusion. In

lieu of an analysis of modification that employs more elaborate, scientifically-

grounded understandings of humanness, an analysis that uses specific and multiple

folk psychological conceptions of humanness may provide a more nuanced basis

from which arguments about modification can proceed.

The consequences of modification, within this framework, need not involve a

mutually exclusive choice between a quantitative gain in humanness or a funda-

mental, qualitative loss of it. To illustrate, the modification of intelligence-related

capabilities like rote learning ability or concentration may quite reasonably

engender little ethical concern because such capabilities are regarded in folk

psychology as malleable, learned and incidental to self-identity. Quantitative

enhancement of such capabilities is unlikely to endanger our fundamental sense

of what it is to be human. On the other hand, the modification of species-typical,

emotion-related traits like kindness and empathy may reasonably engender

considerable ethical concern because such traits are regarded as inborn,

immutable and fundamental to self-identity. The interaction between these

senses of humanness would, however, also need to be considered. Specifically,

modifying particular capacities or traits may have adverse implications for other

capacities or traits, as gains in one dimension of humanness may be accompanied

by losses in another.

The proposition that advocates and opponents attach different meanings to the

terms “humanness” and “human nature” should not be taken to imply, however,

Posthumanism

263

© 2009 The Authors

Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009

that the difference between advocates and opponents is merely semantic, such

that disagreement would be diffused if only the meaning of terms was consensual.

Clearly, the debate turns on more than definitions of humanness. Rather, re-

expressing the arguments of advocates and opponents in folk psychological terms

illuminates their markedly different presuppositions about humanness. The

analysis set out in this paper indicates how divergent basic assumptions about

humanness inform how theorists think about its modification. Indeed, an important

contribution that this folk model of humanness and dehumanization makes to

bioethical analyses of modification is its conceptual precision.

If the implicit structure of the two camps’ views of humanness that we propose

is sound, it would be interesting to learn how the arguments of advocates and

opponents would change if they were to consider the sense of humanness that

they normally neglect. For example, would the optimistic views of advocates

about modification and their confidence in its ethicality be affected if they were

to consider the possibility that humanness is holistic rather than modular and

that emotion is central to it alongside abstract cognition? Similarly, would the

pessimistic views of opponents be tempered if they were to consider the possibility

that humanness is in some respects malleable and modular, and that cognitive

enhancement might not fatally endanger other fundamentally human attributes?

It was noted earlier that as the enhancement debate begins to move out of

academe and into the public domain, folk psychological beliefs about humanness

will inform laypeople’s understanding of the meaning and consequences of

modification. A final contribution of this analysis, therefore, is what it suggests

about how laypeople will make sense of these issues. One possible application of

this framework might be the creation of a folk psychology-grounded taxonomy of

humanness and humanness modification. Such a taxonomy could delineate the

constitution and correlates of the two senses of humanness and set out the effects

of attributing or withholding HN and HU upon an individual’s humanness or

personhood. In so doing, such a taxonomy would provide a valuable base upon

which to understand and predict lay thinking about enhancement.

Finally, despite the utility of applying a folk psychological framework to the

enhancement debate, we caution against any confusion of folk psychological

conceptions of humanness with scientific conceptions. In an analogue of the

naturalistic fallacy, what

is

, folk psychologically, should in no sense be regarded an

endorsement of what

ought

to be. Finally, despite the stabilisation and reinforcement

of folk psychology by the social, political and economic forces of the culture in

which it exists, there is nothing immutable about folk psychology in general, or of

conceptions of humanness and dehumanization in particular. As Bruner (1990)

noted, folk psychology is often indistinguishable from cultural history, which

implies that the folk psychological model sketched in this paper may not be

germane to all cultures, but rather specific to Western ones. This implies that the

two folk concepts of humanness proposed in this paper may be subject to change

as cultural ideas about what it means to be human themselves change.

264

Samuel Wilson and Nick Haslam

© 2009 The Authors

Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

In this paper, we have argued for the utility of taking an empirically-based strategy

to understand the divergent conceptions of humanness and dehumanization of

advocates and opponents of modification. Doing so helps us to clarify why these

parties have reached such discrepant conclusions about the consequences of

modification in the possible post-human future. Not only do their distinct concep-

tions of humanness lead to very different conclusions about whether or not

modification will dehumanize post-humans, but they are also associated with

distinct interpretations of dehumanization itself. The systematic study of folk

psychological concepts offers a useful method to clarify the conceptual and ethical

challenges posed by advances in the biosciences to our understanding of what it

means to be human.

Samuel Wilson

Nick Haslam

Department of Psychology

University of Melbourne

Parkville VIC 3010

Australia.

wilssg@unimelb.edu.au

nhaslam@unimelb.edu.au

REFERENCES

A

gar

, N. 2004.

Liberal Eugenics: In Defense of Genetic Enhancement

. Oxford, UK: BlackwellPublishing.

A

rnhart

, L. 2003. Human Nature is Here to Stay.

The New Atlantis

, 2, 65–78.B

akhtin

, M. 1993.

Rabelais and His World

. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.B

erlin

, I. 1991.

The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas

. New York:Alfred A. Knopf.

B

ostrom

, N. 2003.

The Transhumanist FAQ (Version 2.1)

. Available http://www.transhumanism.org/resources/FAQv21.pdf

B

ostrom

, N. 2005. In Defense of Posthuman Dignity.

Bioethics

, 19(3), 202–214.B

ostrom

, N. 2008. Dignity and Enhancement. In

Human Dignity and Bioethics: EssaysCommissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics (pp. 173–207). Washington, D.C.: ThePresident’s Council on Bioethics.

Brooks, R. 2002. Flesh and Machines: How Robots Will Change Us. New York: Pantheon.Bruner, J. 1990. Acts of Meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Demoulin, S., Leyens, J.Ph., Paladino, M.P., Rodriguez, R.T., Rodriguez, A.P., &

Dovidio, J.F. 2004. Dimensions of “Uniquely” and “Non-Uniquely” Human Emotions.Cognition and Emotion, 18(1), 71–96.

Fernandez-Armesto, F. 2004. Humankind: A Brief History. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Fukuyama, F. 2002. Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. New

York, NY: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux.

Posthumanism 265

© 2009 The Authors

Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009

Gray, H.M., Gray, K., & Wegner, D.M. 2007. Dimensions of Mind Perception. Science,315, 619.

Habermas, J. 2003. The Future of Human Nature. Cambridge, UK: Polity.Haslam, N. 2006. Dehumanization: An Integrative Review. Personality and Social Psychology

Review, 10(3), 252–264.Haslam, N., & Bain, P. 2007. Humanizing the Self: Moderators of the Attribution of

Lesser Humanness to Others. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33(1), 57–68.Haslam, N., Bain, P., Douge, L., Lee, M., & Bastian, B. 2005. More Human Than You:

Attributing Humanness to Self and Others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,89(6), 937–950.

Haslam, N., Bastian, B., & Bissett, M. 2004. Essentialist Beliefs About Personality andTheir Implications. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(12), 1661–1673.

Haslam, N., Kashima, Y., Loughnan, S., Shi, J., & Suitner, C. 2008. Subhuman, Inhuman,and Superhuman: Contrasting Humans with Nonhumans in Three Cultures. SocialCognition, 26, 248–258.

Hughes, J. 2004. Citizen Cyborg: Why Democratic Societies Must Respond to the Redesigned Humanof the Future. Cambridge, MA: Westview Press.

Kashima, Y., & Foddy, M. 2002. Time and Self: The Historical Construction of the Self.In Y. Kashima, M. Foddy & M. Platow (Eds.), Self and Identity: Personal, Social, and Symbolic(pp. 181–206). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Kass, L.R. 1984. Towards a More Natural Science: Biology and Human Affairs. New York:The Free Press.

Kass, L.R. 2002. Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics. SanFrancisco, CA: Encounter Books.

Kass, L.R. 2003. Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Perfection.The New Atlantis, 1, 9–28.

Kurzweil, R. 1999. The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence.London: Pheonix.

Leyens, J.P., Rodriguez, A.P., Rodriguez, R.T., Gaunt, R., Paladino, M.P., Vaes, J.& Demoulin, S. 2001. Psychological Essentialism and the Differential Attribution ofUniquely Human Emotions to Ingroups and Outgroups. European Journal of SocialPsychology, 31, 395–411.

Leyens, J.P., Paladino, M.P., Rodriguez, R.T., Vaes, J., Rodriguez, A.P., & Gaunt, R.2000. The Emotional Side of Prejudice: The Attribution of Secondary Emotions toIngroups and Outgroups. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4, 186–197.

Loughnan, S., & Haslam, N. 2007. Animals and Androids: Implicit Associations BetweenSocial Categories and Nonhumans. Psychological Science, 18(2), 116–121.

McKibben, B. 2003. Enough: Staying Human in an Engineered Age. New York: Times Books.Midgley, M. 1979/2002. Beast and Man. London: Routledge.Moravec, H. 2000. Robot: Mere Machine to Transcendent Mind. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.Murphy, R. 1997. Sociology and Nature. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.President’s Council on Bioethics. 2003. Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of

Happiness. Available at http://bioethics.gov/reports/beyondtherapy/beyond_therapy_final_webcorrected.pdf

Rifkin, K. 1984. Algeny: A New Word—A New World. New York: Penguin Books.Riis, J., Simmons, J.P., & Goodwin, G.P. 2008. Preferences for Enhancement Pharmaceuticals:

The Reluctance to Enhance Fundamental Traits. Journal of Consumer Research, 35, 495–508.

Robert, J.S., & Baylis, F. 2003. Crossing Species Boundaries. The American Journal ofBioethics, 3(3), 1–13.

266 Samuel Wilson and Nick Haslam

© 2009 The Authors

Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009

Sandel, M.J. 2007. The Case Against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering.Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Savulescu, J. 2003. Human-Animal Transgenesis and Chimeras Might be an Expressionof Our Humanity. The American Journal of Bioethics, 3(3), 22–25.

Savulescu, J. 2005. New Breeds of Humans: The Moral Obligation to Enhance. Ethics,Law and Moral Philosophy of Reproductive Medicine, 1(1), 36–39.

Seiler, L.H. 2007. What Are We? The Social Construction of the Human Biological Self.Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 37(3), 243–277.

Silver, L. 1998. Remaking Eden. New York: Avon.Somerville, M. 2006. The Ethical Imagination: Journeys of the Human Spirit. Melbourne:

Melbourne University Press.Stock, G. 2002. Redesigning Humans: Choosing Our Genes, Changing Our Future. New York:

Mariner Books.