Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 16693 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT RWANDA AGRICULTURAL SERVICES PROJECT (Credit 2026-RW) June 6, 1997 Agriculture Group 2 Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
Transcript
Document ofThe World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No. 16693
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
RWANDA
AGRICULTURAL SERVICES PROJECT(Credit 2026-RW)
June 6, 1997
Agriculture Group 2Africa Region
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in theperformance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed withoutWorld Bank authorization.
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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTSUS$ 1.00 equivalent in Rwanda Franc (RF)
Vice-President C. MadavoCountry Director N.O. TcheyanTechnical Manager J. Baah-DwomohTask Team Leader M. Muhtar
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ASP Agricultural Services Project
BEA Basic Extension Agent
BNR Banque Nationale du Rwanda
BP Banque Populaire (also UPB Union des Banques Populaires or
Cooperative Savings Bank)CFRC-IWACU Centre de Formation et de Recherche en Cooperatives
(Cooperative Research and Training Center and NGO)
DCE Direction de Contr6le et Evaluation (Directorate for Control and
Evaluation in the Ministry of Agriculture)
FAO/CP Food and Agriculture Organization/Cooperative Program with the
World Bank, RomeGOR Government of RwandaIBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA International Development Association
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development (Rome)
IRD Integrated Rural Development
ISAR Institut des Sciences Agronomiques du Rwanda (Agricultural
Research Institute of Rwanda
KORA An NGO whose name means "Work"
MINAGRI Ministere de l'Agriculture. de l'Elevage et des Forets (Ministry of
Agriculture, Livestock and Forests)
MINFIN Ministere des Finances (Ministry of Finance)
NGC National Coordination Committee
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NSC National Seed CommitteeOCIR-Caf6 Office des Cultures Industrielles du Rwanda Cafe
(Office for Industrial Crops Rwanda - Coffee)
OCIR The Office for Industrial Crops-Tea
PCCV Projet Cafe et Cultures Vivrieres(Lake Kivu Coffee and Foodcrop Project)
SMS Subject Matter Specialist
SSS Service des Semences Selectionnees (Selected Seed Service)
T&V Training and Visit Method of Extension
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UO Unite Operationnelle (Operational Unit)
USAID United States Agency for International Development
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the
performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without
World Bank authorization.
RWANDA
AGRICULTURAL SERVICES PROJECT(Cr. 2026 RW)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. PREFACE
2. EVALUATION SUMMARY
A. INTRODUCTION ........................................................... I
B. PROJECT OBJECTIVES ..........................................................C. IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE AND RESULTS ........................................................... 11
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, FUTURE OPERATIONS AND KEY LESSONS LEARNED .......................... 1.................... 1ii
3. PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT
A. STATEMENT AND EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES .......................................................... 1IIntroduction ......................................................... IProject Objectives, Components, Covenants, Costs and Financing ......................................................... 1
B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES ........................................................... 2C. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT .......................................................... 4D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY ........................................................... 6E. BANK PERFORMANCE ........................................................... 6F. BORROWER ........................................................... 7G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME ........................................................... 7H. FUTURE OPERATIONS .......................................................... 71. LESSONS LEARNED ........................................................... 8
4. PART II: STATISTICAL ANNEXES
TABLE 1: Summary of Assessments .9TABLE 2: RELATED BANK CREDITS .11TABLE 3: PROJECT TIMETABLE .IITABLE 4: CREDIT DISBURSEMENTS: CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL .12TABLE 5: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION .13TABLE 6: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT OPERATION .14TABLE 7: STUDIES INCLUDED IN PROJECT .14TABLE 8A: PROJECT COSTS .14TABLE 8B: PROJECT FINANCING. 1 5TABLE 9: ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS .15TABLE 10: STATUS OF LEGAL COVENANTS .16TABLE I 1: COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATIONAL MANUAL STATEMENTS .17TABLE 12: BANK RESOURCES: STAFF INPUTS .17TABLE 13: BANK RESOURCES -- MISSIONS .18
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
RWANDA
AGRICULTURAL SERVICES PROJECT(Cr. 2026 RW)
1. PREFACE
1.1 This is the Implementation Completion Report for the Agricultural Services Project inRwanda for which Credit 2026 RW in the amount of SDR 15.5 million (US$19.9 million equivalent)was approved on May 30, 1989 and made effective on June 15, 1990.
1.2 The credit was closed on December 31, 1996 which represented an extension from theoriginal closing date of June 30, 1995. Final disbursement took place on 23/5/97, at which time, thecumulative balance of SDR 379 (US$527 equivalent), representing the undisbursed amount, wascanceled.
1.3 A draft ICR was prepared by a FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program (FAO/CP) mission'which visited the country in August 1996. This draft was substantially revised and updated byMansur Muhtar with support from Bhagwanti Khushalani and Isabelle Razafimanalina, based onadditional information in project files as well as Country Team input. The borrower contributed tothe preparation of the ICR by arranging field visits and meetings, providing data and information aswell as comments on the mission's aide-memoire, The borrower also provided comments on theICR which have been incorporated in the text.
1.4 The preparation of the ICR has suffered from insufficient availability of physical, economicand financial data as well as other information related to project performance, which was destroyedduring the serious civil disturbances of 1994.
Mr. F. Yriarte (Mission Leader) and Mr. H. Trupke (Marketing Economist).
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
RWANDA
AGRICULTURAL SERVICES PROJECT(Cr. 2026 RW)
2. EVALUATION SUMMARY
A. INTRODUCTION
2.1 The Agricultural Services Project (PSA) was formulated to help raise Rwanda's agriculturalproductivity and boost farm output. It was designed to consolidate, streamline and refocus effortstowards providing improved, cost-effective agricultural services for the country by replicating, on abroader geographic scale, the pilot experience under the IDA-financed Gitarama AgriculturalProduction project (PAG). Since 1973, the Bank has had a substantial involvement in the sector byproviding support for multi-component area development projects. Due to the poor implementationexperience with these types of projects, and the desire to institutionalize more coordinatedapproaches, the Bank's assistance strategy was being reoriented, by the late 1980s, towardssupporting more focused stand-alone projects that would provide a common framework for donorassistance. The PSA belongs to this later generation.
B. PROJECT OBJECTIVES
2.2 Project Objectives and Components. The main objectives of the project were to: (a) improvethe delivery of extension services to farmers; (b) strengthen adaptive and on-farm research;(c) strengthen the production and distribution of selected seeds; and (d) promote greater privatesector participation in the marketing of agricultural inputs and produce. The project replicated, on abroader geographic scale, the pilot experience under the IDA-financed Gitarama AgriculturalProduction project (PAG). To achieve its objectives, it was expected to finance, over a five-yearperiod, the following components: (i) reorganization and streamlining of the extension services,including the implementation of a new structure based on the T&V extension principle;(ii) strengthening of adaptive and on-farm research; (iii) support for monitoring and evaluation;(iv) strengthening of seed production and distribution; and (v) promotion of private sector participationin input supply and marketing. Following the first supervision mission in 1991, the project'sgeographic scope was expanded to cover eight prefectures instead of the five originally planned. Theproposed support for seed production and distribution was also reoriented away from direct publicsector involvement to support for private participation, in line with the evolving role of Governmentwithin the context of a structural adjustment program supported by the Bank.
2.3 Evaluation of Project Objectives. Project objectives were broadly consistent with sectoralconstraints/needs, and reflected the Government's stated agricultural development priorities. Theywere however too broad and ambitious to be undertaken within the framework of a single
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intervention, given the country's weak absorptive and implementation capacity. Furthermore, whilethere was support for the project objectives from key political actors at the time, the voices of dissentwere also significant, requiring more efforts in consensus building. The Gitarama pilot project uponwhich project design was based, was already exhibiting implementation and performance problemsat a mid-term evaluation, which was conducted prior to the appraisal of the PSA project. Thejudgment was that these "teething" problems could be surmounted. In retrospect, the findings shouldhave elicited a higher degree of caution in the design, scope and timing of the operation. In addition,the subsequent decision to expand the geographic coverage of the project, following a governmentrequest, was also inopportune. As originally agreed during project negotiations, this should havebeen preceded by a thorough evaluation at mid-term review.
C. IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE AND RESULTS
2.4 Achievement of Project Objectives and Sustainabilitx The overarching goal of improvingagricultural productivity and boosting food supply was not achieved by the project. The Project-specific objective relating to improving institutional arrangements for agricultural services was onlypartially achieved. Progress made in strengthening seed production and promoting private sectorparticipation in input and output marketing was either marginal or non-existent. At mid-term review,measures were identified for refocusing and redynamizing the project to achieve greater impact.These were however thwarted by the war of April 1994 and the subsequent which had tragicconsequences on institutions, infrastructure, logistical and human capacity, as well as on socialstructures and relationships. Disbursements were resumed after the war, and project's closing dateextended, to support sector rehabilitation and permit rebuilding of institutions. This decision wasinformed by the desire to provide rapid support to post-conflict reconstruction through existingvehicles, without the associated delay of preparing a new operation. As it turned out, the Bankunderestimated the degree of effort required for jump-starting activities in the prevailingcircumstances. Project activities are not sustainable in the present context, especially given thelimited achievements recorded prior to the war-related dislocations.
2.5 Project Costs and Financing. At appraisal, total project costs were estimated at US$30.1million, with a foreign exchange component of about 37 percent. The project was to be financed byan IDA credit of US$19.9 million, with expected domestic contribution amounting to US$10.2million. As a result of implementation delays and war-related disruptions, as well as the substantialdownscaling of infrastructure and private sector support programs, project-related expendituresamounted to only US$13 million, with an IDA financing of US$11.4 million.
2.6 Major Factors in Achievement of Objectives. The tragic events witnessed by Rwanda since1990 have had the most profound impact on project implementation and limited the attainment ofproject objectives. A civil war broke out in October 1990, three months after credit effectiveness,which created an exceptionally difficult operating environment for the project and climaxed in thegenocide of April 1994. The war and subsequent genocide of April 1994, together with ensuingevents, resulted in massive human losses and associated social dislocations, decimation ofinstitutional capacity, and destruction of physical investments, bringing project implementation to acomplete halt. Attempts to restart project activities after the war proved futile, given the severelylimited institutional capacity, fragile political balances and social dislocations.
2.7 The performance of the Government and the implementation agency also had a bearing onthe achievement of project objectives. Problems encountered included: (i) delays and inadequaciesin the provision of counterpart funds; (ii) wavering commitment on the part of the borrower;
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(iii) interference of political factors in filling vacant key positions and associated conflictualrelationships between political leadership and the technocrats: (iv) inability to make progress inliberalizing input supply and veterinary services, which hindereci the emergence of a competitive andservice-oriented private sector; (v) administrative difficulties associated with insufficientunderstanding of roles and responsibilities; (vi) financial management improprieties; (vii) delays insubmission of training and work plans; and (viii) insufficient attention to the systematic participationof the farmers.
2.8 Performance of the Bank and the Borzower. The PSA project was designed to replicate, on abroader scale, the pilot experience under the Gitarama Agricultural Services project, whose positivefeature included the involvement of beneficiaries in project design and implementation. However,the Gitarama project suffered from poor institutional organization and bad management and its weakperformance should have elicited a greater degree of caution in the timing of PSA preparation andappraisal, to allow for acquiring more experience. Instead, the Bank made the judgment to proceedwith preparation on the optimistic assumption that the difficulties could be overcome in the follow-up project. Once it was decided to proceed, the preparation process was led by the borrower, basedon extensive beneficiary consultation, which was innovative in the context.
2.9 Project implementation was constrained by weak borrower performance and inadequatecovenant compliance. There were perpetual delays and shortfalls in providing counterpart funds, andGovernment commitment to the project appeared to be wavering at times. In addition, there was thepersistence of an authoritarian culture, accompanied by weak beneficiary participation and areluctance to support private sector development. There were also performance problems related tothe selection and deployment of project staff, which was sometimes excessively influenced bypolitical considerations. Amidst these constraints, the Bank made efforts to provide closeimplementation support from the field and was beginning to make some progress in introducing astructured, more disciplined approach to extension service delivery. The withdrawal of this supportby the Bank, as well as the deteriorating security conditions, stymied these efforts. Mid-term reviewrecommendations for addressing the performance problems could not be implemented. Followingthe war, the Bank and the Borrower restarted the project in a restructured form. However, theyoverestimated the capacity to move forward in rehabilitation institutions and eventually moved toclose down the project.
2.10 Project Outcome. The project's outcome is rated as highly unsatisfactorv. Implementationwas perpetually constrained by poor borrower performance, exacerbated by the difficult socio-political conditions prevailing in Rwanda. Only limited results were achieved by the mid-termreview in 1993. Following the crisis of April 1994, the prospects for achieving project objectivesand realizing development outcomes were jeopardized further. Even the modest institutionaldevelopment gains realized under the project have been eroded.
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, FUTURE OPERATIONS AND KEY LESSONS LEARNED
2.11 Project Implementation Experience and Sustainability. Implementation continued to behampered by fiscal, institutional and human resource constraints, exacerbated by wavering borrowercommitment, persistence of an authoritarian culture, as well as administrative and political problems.The most significant factor shaping project implementation, however, was the endemic conflict thatengulfed Rwanda since October 1990, and which culminated in the genocide of April 1994. In thiscontext, it was impossible to continue with project implementation, which had, in any case, never
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been easy under the protracted conflict conditions. Project sustainability, which was alreadyquestionable due to limited implementation progress realized, was jeopardized by these events.
2.12 Lessons for Future Projects. Any subsequent operation will have to take into account thechanged parameters, while adequately incorporating lessons from the past. Some of the key lessonsfrom this operation include:
(a) project design should be kept simple, and tailored to the borrower's absorptive andimplementation capacity;
(b) borrower ownership and commitment is essential and should be continuouslynurtured;
(c) participation and empowerment of key stakeholders should be secured at variousstages in the project cycle;
(d) pilot operations, with clear benchmarks and indicators, should be used for improvingknowledge about the operating environment and finding solutions to implementationproblems, as well as for building stakeholder ownership, before mainstreamingbased on sound professional judgment; and
(e) the Bank should continuously assess operating risks and take appropriate action tohedge these in country situations characterized by adverse political and securityconditions.
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
RWANDA
AGRICULTURAL SERVICES PROJECT(Cr. 2026 RW)
3. PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT
A. STATEMENT AND EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES
Introduction
3.1 The Agricultural Services Project (PSA) was formulated to help raise Rwanda's agriculturalproductivity and boost farm output. It was designed to consolidate, streamline and refocus effortstowards providing improved, cost-effective agricultural services, as a means of addressing thegrowing challenge posed by the country's excessive population pressure over limited arable land.With a population density of 400 per km2 of arable land (the highest in continental Africa), croppingpractices, which centered around area expansion and increased cropping intensity, could no longersupport sustainable agricultural growth. Annual agricultural output growth rate, which averaged 5.8percent between 1974-80, had declined to 2 percent by the second half of the 1980s, against apopulation growth rate of 3.7 percent. Concomitantly, per capita daily kilo calories produced by theRwanda farmers declined steadily from an already low level of 2,055 per person, reaching 1,509 perperson by 1991. Against this background, it was considered necessary to boost productivity throughthe development and dissemination of relevant technology, complemented with other measures toimprove inputs supply and marketing as well as expand credit access. The primary vehicle forachieving this goal was the PSA, which was appraised in 1988, building on IDA experience fromprevious and on-going operations in this sector.
Project Objectives, Components, Covenants, Costs and Financing
3.2 j iect Objectives. Within the overall goal of government's strategy to increase productivityand output of the agricultural sector, the main objectives of the project were: (i) to improve thedelivery of extension services to farmers with a particular emphasis on reaching women; (ii) tostrengthen adaptive and on-farm research; (iii) to strengthen the production and distribution ofselected seeds; and (iv) to promote greater private sector participation in the marketing ofagricultural inputs and produce. The project was designed to replicate, on a broader geographicscale, the pilot experience under the IDA-financed Gitarama Agricultural Production project (PAG),whose objective was primarily to introduce an organizing framework for extension and adaptiveresearch based on the Training and Visit extension principle. It was to be implemented over a five-year period (June 1990 to June 1995), with field-based activities covering selected sub-prefectures ofKigali, Kibuye, Kibungo, Gisenyi and Cyangugu. In 1991, following the first supervision mission, the
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project's geographic scope was expanded to cover an additional three prefectures, leaving only twooutside the project zone. Also, the planned support for public sector participation in input productionand marketing was abandoned in favor of the private sector, largely as a result of the changes in theperception of Government's role ushered in by the structural adjustment process, and the subsequentprogress in preparation of a proposed Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit (AGSAC).
3.3 Project Components. To achieve its objectives, the project was expected to finance thefollowing components: (i) reorganization and streamlining of the extension services, including theimplementation of a new structure based on the T&V extension principles; (ii) strengthening ofadaptive and on-farm research through better diagnosis of problems at the farm level and aparticipatory approach in problem identification and resolution; (iii) support for monitoring andevaluation through the implementation of a decentralized management system; (iv) strengthening ofseed production and distribution; and (v) promotion of private sector participation in input supplyand marketing through assistance to cooperatives and private enterprises.
3.4 Evaluation of Project Objectives. The objectives supported by the project appear broadlyconsistent with sectoral constraints/needs, and they reflect the Government's stated agriculturaldevelopment priorities. There are a few shortcomings, however. First, these objectives may beconsidered too broad and ambitious to be undertaken within the framework of a single projectintervention, given the country's weak absorptive and implementation capacity. Secondly, althoughproject objectives and preparation process had the support of the political leadership at the time andinvolved extensive beneficiary participation, consensus within the Ministry of Agriculture wasfragile. Thirdly, poor implementation results from the mid-term evaluation of the Gitarama pilotproject, which was to provide the basis for the project design, should have elicited caution on thetiming of project preparation. The prevailing judgment however was that these "teething" problemscould be overcome through appropriate project design and intensive supervision efforts. Fourthly,the expansion of the geographic scope of the project further at an early stage during projectimplementation to support the establishment of a national extension system was premature. Asoriginally agreed during project negotiations, this should have been preceded by a thoroughevaluation at mid-term.
3.5 Project Costs and Financing. At appraisal, total project costs were estimated at US$30.1million, with a foreign exchange component of about 37 percent. The project was to be financed byan IDA credit of US$19.9 million, with expected domestic contribution amounting to US$10.2million. By March 1994, only US$8.5 million was disbursed against an original cumulative estimateof US$14.3 million. This disbursement lag was largely as a result of implementation delays andcounterpart funding inadequacies, as well as the substantial downscaling of infrastructure and privatesector support programs which were undertaken at the beginning of project implementation. Thedisruption of activities associated with the civil war and the tragic events of April 1994 alsoconstituted a major explanatory factor. At the time of the closing of the credit account, US$11.4million had been disbursed from the IDA Credit representing 52 percent of the SAR target. An amountof US$10.2 million was canceled, and the Government's total contribution amounted to about US$1.6million, resulting in the re-estimated total project costs of US$13 million.
B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES
3.6 The overarching goal of improving agricultural productivity and boosting food supply wasnot achieved by the project. Likewise, the 15 percent Economic Rate of Return estimated atappraisal is unlikely to be realized. As regards the specific objectives of the project, only partial
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progress was made in improving the institutional arrangements for agricultural services delivery,while the strengthening of seed supply and distribution systems, as well as promoting private sectordevelopment were not achieved. In the absence of concrete data, it is difficult to quantify the extentof deviation from the stipulated objectives. But the following assessment of the implementation ofvarious project activities supportive of the objectives illustrates the divergence between projectobjectives and outcome.
3.7 Reorganization and Streamlining of Extension Services. A major objective of the projectwas to help boost agricultural productivity through improved extension services. The focus was onthe establishment of a nation-wide extension structure, based on the T&V principle, designed tostreamline and harmonize public services in agriculture. There were initial start-up delays andproblems associated with administrative and staffing difficulties, weak borrower commitment andmisunderstanding of roles and relationships. With the resolution of these issues, intensifiedimplementation support was provided by the Bank from an extension specialist located in the field.This began to have an impact in introducing a structured and disciplined approach to extensionservice delivery, especially at the provincial level, as well as nurturing ownership and fosteringdonor coordination. Some progress was also made in introducing the T&V principle on the ground.By early 1994, an estimated 20,000 demonstration plots had been established through about 6,000farmers' contact groups, thus demonstrating the potential outreach of the system.
3.8 There were however continuing difficulties arising from the weak technology generationprocess and poor research linkages, which eventually resulted in rehashing of old techniques.Furthermore, diagnostic surveys with farmers planned to be carried out jointly with research, werenot implemented, thus resulting in a disconnect between technical messages diffused by theextension agents and the concerns/interests of the farmers. There were also problems associated withshortages of qualified extension staff, low staff motivation and incessant counterpart fundingproblems. Other problems of systemic and policy nature included the persistence of a top-down,bureaucratic culture and weak community empowerment, and a lack of understanding andcommitment to the system among some technical staff. The departure from the field of theimplementation specialist and the deteriorating security situation further compounded the situation.The mid-term review, conducted in December 1993, proposed measures to address some of theseproblems, including: (i) the implementation of a staff training program; (ii) mainstreaming ofparticipation. Its recommendations could not be implemented however, due to the turn of events inApril 1994. The genocide and ensuing events further reduced the already insufficient number ofextension staff available to 30 percent of the pre-war level, with many either killed or having fled thecountry.
3.9 Strengthening of Adaptive and On-farm Research. The Agricultural Research Institute ofRwanda (ISAR), in collaboration with the extension services, was to play an important role indiagnosing problems at farn level, implementing on-farm and multi-locational trials addressingfarmers' priority problems, as well as conducting adaptive research. Improvements in the research-extension linkages were initially slow, as ISAR was involved in a reorganization process followingthe appraisal of the Second Agricultural Research Project. There were also delays in setting upRegional research centers, associated with the shortage of funds. Gradually, however, as theseproblems were overcome, more frequent meetings were beginning to result in useful collaboration,including the implementation of numerous scheduled on-farm trials. Unfortunately, time was tooshort for these results to concretize before the explosive events of 1994, which had devastatingconsequences on ISAR. Nearly all the researchers and technicians were killed, while the remainingfled the country, with only two presently remaining out of about sixty reconstituted staff after the
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war. Moreover, stations were pillaged, buildings, vehicles and equipment were destroyed, and nearlyall the germ plasma and scientific experiments lost.
3.10 Support for Monitoring and Evaluation. There were no plans for the creation of a separatemonitoring and evaluation unit, although technical assistance from the UNDP was envisaged tostrengthen the M&E function. The Monitoring and Evaluation system was ineffective, largelybecause the central management team, regional directorates, as well as operational units weresubjected to frequent dismantling or reshuffling. There was also a lack of support by staff at alllevels, who still continued to perceive the system as a means of policing and control. In thesecircumstances, the UNDP was unable to follow up on its initial action plan to strengthen the M&Eservices within the Ministry of Agriculture. Moreover, in the absence of pre-project studies toestablish a base line of the main indicators for monitoring the project, it would have been difficult tomonitor project outcome and impact. To address the deficiency above, a decision was taken in late1993 to adapt the M&E system from an on-going UNDP/FAO project to PSA requirements, whichwould lead to the creation of a Monitoring and Evaluation Unit at the central level and in the regionaloffices. The design process for this proposal was however interrupted by the 1994 events.
3.11 Strengthening of Seed Production and Distribution. The availability of good quality seedswas seen as a key factor to improving agricultural productivity. Hence, the project sought tostrengthen seed production and distribution as well as assist the implementation of a national seedspolicy. Specifically, it sought to: (a) enhance the capacity of the Selected Seed Services (SSS) ofMiNAGRI for improved seed quality control, certification and supervision; (b) facilitate the gradualrationalization of seed production through improved management of seed farms and the developmentof a multi-purpose farm that would serve as a focal point for small farmer contract outgrowerschemes; and (c) provide support for reactivation of the National Seed Committee as a regulatoryagency. At the first revision of the project (July 1991), it was agreed to phase out support for seedproduction by SSS and reorient actions towards facilitating the private sector, in accordance with theevolving perspective of the role of the state within the context of a structural adjustment programsupported by the Bank. Accordingly, initiatives were taken in all Prefectures to form farmer groupsand support their activities. Legal enactment of seed certification, however, was not carried out andinput production continued to be heavily subsidized.
3.12 Promotion of Private Sector Participation in Input Supply and Marketing. The projectaimed at strengthening the private sector provision of agricultural inputs as well as processing,storage and marketing of agricultural products. For that purpose, it was planned to: (i) create 5agricultural promotion offices (BPA) initially acting as wholesalers; (ii) provide a guarantee fund tothe "Banques Populaires" (BP) to facilitate the financing of the above mentioned activities, and(iii) train cooperatives and artisans. The BPAs were not created at the beginning and were abolishedat the first revision. The credit operation with the BP never got started because of its lack of interestin financing agriculture. Training of cooperative managers and accountants as well as artisansbegan late (1992-93) and was reportedly registering successes, although no detailed information isavailable. This was however aborted with the war and subsequent departure of the TechnicalAssistance following the April 1994 events.
C. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT
3.13 Factors Not Generally Subject to Government Control. The tragic events witnessed byRwanda in the last few years have had the most profound impact on project implementation andconstitute a major contributory factor for non-attainment of objectives. A civil war broke out in
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October 1990, three months after credit effectiveness, and the country was plunged into a spiralingcycle of violence and instability, which created an exceptionally difficult operating environment forthe project. As schisms deepened further, the cycle of conflict and violence degenerated into full-scale genocide, which, together with ensuing events, resulted in massive human losses and associateddecimation of public sector institutional/technical support capacity. Project implementation wasbrought to a complete halt and the basis for realizing its stipulated development objectives furthereroded.
3.14 Following the war, the project closing date was extended to December 31, 1996 to helprestore basic institutional capacity, rebuild infrastructure, as well as reconstitute logistical supportneeded for providing skeletal agricultural services. Slow progress was made however, given thechanged parameters and the difficult country conditions. Specific challenges encountered include:(i) persistent counterpart funding shortages due to the erosion of the fiscal base; (ii) destruction ofproject investments; (iii) loss of vehicles, equipment and other logistical support; (iv) loss oftechnical and managerial staff, and associated loss of institutional memory; and (v) erosion of trustbetween farmers and technical staff. With the benefit of hindsight, the Bank, in its desire to respondto an emergency situation and provide quick support using existing vehicles, misjudged thecomplexity of the situation.
3.15 Factors Generally Subject to Government Control. The provision of adequate counterpartfunds had been slow and erratic from the beginning of the project, resulting in delayed start-up. Theproblem was exacerbated by the outbreak of the war, with funding levels falling nominally asGovernment adjusted its budget to military requirements. The amendment of the Credit Agreementto increase the level of IDA financing did not overcome the problem, and project implementationcontinued to suffer delays. Government commitment to the project appeared to be wavering at thestart, especially as the Gitarama project did not appear to be yielding the desired results. Because ofthis, there was an initial lack of interest in making available the required counterpart funds to makethe project effective. The counterpart funding problem persisted through the project implementationperiod. The GOR was also slow in filling vacant key positions during various phases of the project,such as the position of the Director of Extension during the initial stages. In general, political factorsushered in by multi-partyism interfered in the selection and deployment of key technical staff, resultingin high staff mobility and creating discordant relationships. In the period following the genocide,protracted delays were experienced in filling the newly created position of project coordinator.Finally, the government failed to actively pursue its liberalization policy for input supply andveterinary services, which hindered the emergence of a competitive and service-oriented privatesector.
3.16 Factors Generally Subject to Implementing Agency Control. During the initial stages,project implementation suffered from administrative difficulties associated with insufficientunderstanding of roles and responsibilities. In particular, the implementation of the extensionservices component was hampered by a lack of understanding on the part of the executing agency asto the philosophy and rules governing the T&V system, as well as a neglect of key organization andmanagement features. The project manager suffered from work overload arising from his dualfunctions, and was often unable to secure the support of other directors at both regional andheadquarters level. Financial management also suffered from improprieties on the part of the TAfinance manager, who was subsequently dismissed. The M1NAGRI was slow in filling vacancies atheadquarters, initiated staff training programs with substantial delays and was late in the submissionof the project related work plan. Furthermore, the ministry paid little attention to the creation of anadequate M&E system, which could have facilitated timely identification of problems and
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appropriate adjustments to project operation. Finally, community empowerment and farnerparticipation were weak. Mid-term review recommendations aimed at correcting these deficienciescould not be implemented.
D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY
3.17 Project sustainability is unlikely because of the limited progress made in implementingproposed project activities. As indicated earlier, only partial progress was made in institutionbuilding with regard to the introduction of a structured, disciplined extension system that wasbeginning to gain the support of other donors. Even in the limited areas where progress has beenrealized, future sustainability has been undermined by the deleterious consequences of the war oninstitutions, infrastructure, logistical and human capacity, social structures and relationships.Although attempts have been made to rehabilitate basic infrastructure and reconstitute the logisticalbase, this is by no means sufficient. Poor implementation progress of the other project componentsat the time of project closing, and the overall operating context associated with the impact of theconflict, render them unlikely to be sustainable.
E. BANK PERFORMANCE
3.18 The PSA project was designed to replicate on a broader scale, the Gitarama AgriculturalServices project (Cr. 1669 RW) which was prepared as a vehicle to test a new approach to theprovision of agricultural services involving extensive beneficiary participation. The mid-termevaluation of the Gitarama project, which had just been completed at the time of PSA preparation,revealed implementation difficulties and problems. Nonetheless, the Bank proceeded with PSAproject preparation and appraisal, on the assumption that the these problems could be surmountablewith proper project design and intensive supervision effort. Accordingly, project preparation wasdone in a participatory manner. Implementation however proved difficult and was continuouslyhampered by similar problems identified in the implementation of the Gitarama project (as well asthe previous projects), including scarcity of technical messages; weak extension-research linkages;insufficient beneficiary participation; project complexity; inadequate monitoring system. With thebenefit of hindsight, it would have been better to delay PSA appraisal (or, at least, to limit the scopeof the project) until there was a better understanding of why the Gitarama project was experiencingproblems.
3.19 During the project's first supervision mission, amidst various implementation problems, theBank acceded to the borrower's request to extend the geographic scope of the project to providesupport for implementation of a national extension policy. Given implementation problems, thedecision to extend the geographic scope also should have been delayed until a mid-term evaluationwas carried out, as agreed during project negotiations. To assist the borrower in improvingimplementation performance, an extension specialist had been posted to the field by the Bank, andwith time, noticeable results were being registered (i.e. demonstration plots and farmer contactgroups). However, the withdrawal of this support and the deteriorating security conditions stymiedthese efforts. The Bank's supervision efforts with respect to Monitoring and Evaluation weredeficient. Following the war, the Bank misjudged the capacity of the borrower to resume projectimplementation and hence did not adequately consider the option of closing the project. In its effortto provide immediate assistance to resumption of agricultural activity, the Bank agreed with theBorrower on a new action plan for restarting the project after the war. However, capacity had been
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weakened to such an extent that this action plan could not be implemented. The Bank moved toclose the project when it became obvious that results could not be achieved in this context.
F. BORROWER
3.20 The Borrower's performance during project implementation was generally weak andcovenant compliance inadequate. Project start-up was delayed because of the failure of Governmentto meet counterpart funding requirements (a major credit covenant), which remained a perennialproblem throughout the implementation period. Government commitment to the project alsoappeared to be wavering at times, which exacerbated the problem. In addition, there wereperformance problems related to the selection and deployment of project staff, which weresometimes overly influenced by political considerations. Project management problems resulted inthree qualified and/or unsatisfactory audits while the non-establishment of a proper M&E systemdeprived management of an effective tool for monitoring performance and adjusting projectoperations. The achievement of results on the ground was undermined by the persistence of anauthoritarian culture, accompanied by weak beneficiary participation and reinforced by an occasionalaversion to private sector involvement. The legal and regulatory reforms and enabling measuresneeded to promote privatization of veterinary services and input supply were not sufficientlyaddressed. The weak performance of the Borrower, however, has to be set against the background ofthe prevailing socio-political environment which made project implementation increasingly difficultfrom 1990 onwards.
G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME
3.21 The project suffered from slow start-up associated with major implementation problems.With intensified supervision efforts, some progress was being made in the reorganization of theextension service, although there were continuing difficulties with regard to weak extension-researchlinkages, insufficient beneficiary participation, staff shortages and recurrent funding problems. Thedeparture of the extension specialist and the deteriorating security conditions in early 1993 erodedthe gains that were being recorded. Little progress was made in strengthening seed production andpromoting private sector participation in input and output marketing, while cost-recovery andsubsidy reduction efforts were only half-heartedly supported. With the crisis of April 1994 and itsaftermath, the prospects for achieving project objectives and realizing development outcomes werejeopardized further. As a result, anticipated project benefits including institutional development,increased productivity and output, financial gains, improved nutrition and poverty alleviation werenot realized. There is considerable uncertainty over the sustainability of even the modest gainsrealized under the project. For these reasons, therefore, the project's outcome is rated as highlyunsatisfactory.
H. FUTURE OPERATIONS
3.22 There is a strong commitment by the GOR to provide continuing support to the agriculturalsector. Discussions have been initiated with the Bank to support a follow-up operation. Given thecomplex, high risk operating environment and limited implementation capacity, a modulatedapproach, combining a blend of instruments, is being considered. One possibility is to initiate a pilotoperation focusing on selected strategic areas such as agricultural services and community-basedrural investments. The operation will be complemented by ESW and grant-funded capacity-consensus building activities to clarify and improve the framework for intervention in the sector.
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Based on knowledge and experience acquired, a replication of efforts may be envisaged on a phased,calibrated manner, using repeater loans, or scaling up to major investments depending on the triggersto be built into the proposed project on policy making and capacity rebuilding.
I. LESSONS LEARNED
3.23 Some of the key lessons from this operation include:
(a) Project design should be kept simple, and tailored to the borrower's absorptive andimplementation capacity. In this regard, preparation should be accompanied byintensive assessment of the fiscal and institutional context.
(b) Borrower ownership and commitment is essential and should be continuouslynurtured.
(c) Participation and empowerment of key stakeholders should be secured at variousstages in the project cycle - design, preparation, implementation and evaluation.
(d) Pilot operations provide a potentially fruitful avenue for improving knowledge aboutthe operating environment and finding solutions to implementation problems, as wellas building ownership, commitment and familiarity with project concept among thestakeholders. Sufficient time should however be allowed to elapse for lessons andexperiences to crystallize and for learning and internalization to take place. Clearbenchmarks and indicators should guide the transition from pilots to full-scaleoperations, which underscore the importance of establishing functioning monitoringand evaluation systems.
(e) Social conflict, adverse political and security conditions, have an overriding impacton project outcomes. While it is difficult to foresee these, Bank should adequatelyassess operating risks and take appropriate action to hedge against these.
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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
RWANDA
AGRICULTURAL SERVICES PROJECT(Cr. 2026 RW)
4. PART II: STATISTICAL ANNEXES
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENTS
A. Achievement of Objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Notapplicable
ighly E. Assessment of Outcome satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory unsatisfactory
(V) (1) (1) (V)
0 El 0 0
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TABLE 2: RELATED BANK CREDITS
Loan/Credit Title Purpose Year of StatusApproval
Preceding Operations _ _ _ _ _
1. Rural Development I, Area Development 1979 Completed 1986(Cr.937 RW)
2. Integrated Forestry Project (Cr. Forestry 1980 Completed 19871039) Development3. Lake Kivu Coffee and Foodcrops Support to Coffee, 1981 Completed 1988
Production Project (Cr. 1126 RW) and Food CropsSector
4. Bugesera-Gisaka-Migango (BGM Area Development 1982 Completed 199111)
(Cr. 1283 RW)5. Agricultural Research Project I Support to 1985 Completed 1991
(Cr. 1546 RW) Agricultural Research6. Gitarama Agricultural Services Support to 1986 Completed 1991
(Cr. 1669 RW) Agricultural ServicesDevelopment
7. Forestry II (Cr. 1811 RW) Forestry 1987 Completed 1994Development
8. Agricultural Research II Support to National 1993 Canceled 1994(Cr. 2547 RW) Agricultural Research __ _
TABLE 3: PROJECT TIMETABLE
Steps in Project Cycle Date Planned Date Actual/Latest Estimate
Identification (Executive Project Summary) March 30, 1988Preparation/Pre-appraisal July 1988Appraisal September 1988 October 1988Negotiations April 1989 April21, 1989Board presentation May 1989 May30, 1989Signing September 13, 1989Effectiveness December 1989 June 15, 1990Midterm review (if applicable) December 1993 December 10, 1993Project completion December 31, 1994 Not completedLoan closing June 30, 1995 December 31, 1996
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TABLE 4: CREDIT DISBURSEMENTS: CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL(US$ thousands)
___________._______________ FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97'Appraisal estimated 0.4 2.3 6.2 11.0 15.3 19.1 19.9 19.9Actual 0 2.2 2.8 6.2 8.5 8.5 9.8 11.4Actual as percent of 0 96 45 56 56 45 49 52estimated I I I _ __
Date of final May 23, 1997disbursement
2 According to SAR no disbursements were foreseen in FY 1997. As a result of extension of the credit closing date andBank's approval of selected expenditure beyond the revised date additional claims amounting to about US$ 1.3 millionare expected to be submitted.
3 Includes US$ 1.0 million opening fund, actual cumulative disbursements up to end of FY 91 amounted to only US$ 1.2million equivalent to 52 percent of target.
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TABLE 5: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
Indicators Unit Estimated ActualI. Key Implementation indicators inSAR/President's Report1. Prefectures to be covered 5 82. Extension staff
5. Forest sector nurseries 239 n.a6. TA + consultants
a) R/D 8 m/m 0b) M/E 9 m/m I m/mc) training 13 rn/m 13 m/md) finance 36 rn/m 36 m/me) seed multiplication 5 9 m/m 9 m/m
I. Modified Indicators _
1. Prefecture to be covered 9 82. Extension staff
a) high level 259 302b) lower level 937 678
3. Extension staff training Allocation increasedwithout specification ofrn/days n.a
All other quantifiable actions pertaining to community support, adaptive research, M&E, seedproduction, promotion of private initiative, women support program and animal productions werenot only marginally tackled by the project and are therefore not listed here. The only notableexception was the training of artisans by an NGO under the private sector support initiative.
After extension of geographical coverage.
5 Funded by CIDA.
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TABLE 6: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT OPERATION
Not applicable
TABLE 7: STUDIES INCLUDED IN PROJECT
PIrpose J Status j Impact
Marketing of Improvement of marketing Completed No impact as study was completedAgricultural system only after the events of April 1994Products
Processing of To identify scope for rural NotAgricultural agroprocessing ImplementedProducts
Introduction of fruit To diversity agricultural ISAR6
and vegetables production base
TABLE 8A: PROJECT COSTS
(in US$ million)
Appraisal estimate Actial estimateItem Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
On assumption that annually 4 percent of families would adopt improved farming practices, itwas estimated at appraisal that the project would achieve an ERR of 15 percent. Due to theinterruption caused by the war and the subsequent near collapse of the extension system noattempt has been made to re-estimate the ERR, especially since no agricultural statisticscovering the project period were available.
Includes US$ 1.3 million in Taxes.
8 Includes US$ 70,000 in taxes (mission estimate)
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TABLE 10: STATUS OF LEGAL COVENANTS
Agreement Section Covenant Present Original fulfilment date Revised fulfilment date Description of Commentstype status covenant
DCA 2.02 b) I C Special Account
3.02 b) 9 CD Nov. 30 annually Annual Work Plan Repeatedly late
3.02 c) 9 C Nov. 30 1992 Nov. 30, 1993 Mid-tern Review Postponed by one year
3.02 d) 9 C July 31, annually Reporting
3.03 a) 4 CP January 1, annually Governunent funding Late and insufficient
3.03 b) (i) 4 C January 1, annually Project account
3.03 b) (i), (ii) 4 CD January 1, annually . Fund availability Repeatedly late
3.03 c) 3 CD January 1, annually Funding of local subaccounts Repeatedly late
3.04 10 C June 30, 1990 Extension, contracting to local communes l
3.06 a) and b) 2 NC Rental of housing to staff Staff resistance
3.06 c) and d) 2 C Leasing equipment to staff
3.06 e) 10 C Dec. 15, 1990 Gishwati Centre, privatisation proposals
3.07 10 CP Dec. 31, 1992 Seeds production, cost recovery, seed certification Process was under review prior to April1994
3.08 (i) 10 CP March 31, 1990 Contracting credit to Banques Populaires and co- Limited loans extended but no recordsoperative available
3.08 (ii) 10 CP March 31, 1990 Support activities to IWACU Limited training given
3.09 9 NC Dec. 31,1991 Monitoring and evaluation Late attempts to establish a system wereswatted by the events of 1994
4.01 a) I CP Annually Maintain records and accounts Disrupted by events of April 1994
4.01 b) I CP June 30, annually Audit accounts, including Special Account, no later Disrupted by events of April 1994than six months after end of fiscal year
4.01 c) I CP Annually Maintain and audit records of statements of expenditure Disrupted by events of April 1994for which withdrawals have been made from the Credit
Covenant types: I = Accounts/audits; 2 Financial performance/revenue generation from beneficiaries; 3 Flow and utilisation of project funds; 4 = Counterpart funding; 5 = Management aspects of the project orexecuting agency; 6 = Environmental covenants; 7 = Involuntary resettlement; 8 = Indigenous people; 9 = Monitoring, review, and reporting; 10 = Project implementation not covered by categories 1-9
Present status: C = covenant complied with; CD =complied with after delay; CP = complied with partially; NC =not complied with
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TABLE 11: COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATIONAL MANUAL STATEMENTS
No significant lack of compliance with applicable Bank Operational Manual Statements could be observed.
TABLE 12: BANK RESOURCES: STAFF INPUTS
Stage ofroject Cycle ACTUAL......._________, _.. __. W eeks US$('000}
Preparation to appraisal 61.7 122.6Appraisal 32.1 82.2Negotiations through Board-Effectiveness 10.6 27.3Supervision 137.2 400.9Completion 14.8 56.2TOTAL 256.5 689.2
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TABLE 13: BANK RESOURCES - MISSIONS
Performance Rating
Number Specialized Implementation Development
Stage of Month/ of Days in Staff Skills Status Objectives Types ofProject Cycle Year Persons Field Represented Problems
