World Outlook Spring 2013

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“Today we use the term ‘the world’ with what amounts to brashfamiliarity. Too often in speaking of such things as the world food problem, the world health problem, world trade, world peace, and world government, we disregard the fact that ‘the world’ is a totality which in the domain of human problems constitutes the ultimate in degree ofmagnitude and degree of complexity. That is a fact, yes; but another fact is that almost every large problem today is, in truth, a world problem. Those two facts taken together provide thoughtful men with what might realistically be entitled ‘an introduction to humility’ in curing the world’s ills.”

— President Emeritus John Sloan Dickey, 1947 Convocation Address

WORLD OUTLOOK

Editors-in-Chief

Executive Editors

Ryan Smith ’14

Senior Editor

Liz Lin ’16

Staff Editors

Katie Hake ’16Axel Hufford ’16

Sarah Koulogeorge ’16

Catherine Ledna ’15Justin Maffett ’16Tausif Noor ’14

The Editors of World Outlook would like to express our special thanks to the John Sloan Dickey Center for its encouragement and assistance.

Maria Fernandez ’14Saara-Anne Azizi ’14

AN UNDERGRADUATE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Angela Jin ’15Angad Kapur ’16

Andrew Kenealy ’15Ramtin Rahmani ’16Justin Roshak ’15Jiyoung Sohn ’14

Kristy Choi ’14

Web & Social Media Editors

Feyaad Allie ’16Blaine Johnson ’13

About the Journal:

World Outlook is a student-run journal of international affairs that publishes papers writ-ten by undergraduate students. Its name and missions are motivated by the words of late Dartmouth President John Sloan Dickey.

Subscription Information: World Outlook (ISSN 0895-7452) is published bi-annually. Subscription requests should be directed to [email protected]. World Outlook is free on demand for all current and former Dartmouth students, faculty, and alumni. All contributions are tax-deductible.

Submissions:

World Outlook welcomes all current and former undergraduate students to submit papers relating to any aspect of international affairs. Papers to be considered for publication must be available in digital format. Papers should include references and bibliography consistent with the Chicago Manual of Style guidelines, though they need not be at the time of submission. Length should be under 7000 words, although outstanding works of greater length will be considered. Submissions must be original works with accurate citations. Submit your work for review to [email protected], and include your name, school, and class year. All submissions become property of World Outlook.

Contact:

World Outlook welcomes comments, criticism and corrections. Letters to the editor and cor-rections should be addressed to: World Outlook, Dickey Center, 6048 Haldeman, Dart-mouth College, Hanover, NH 03755 or via email to [email protected] visit our website at www.dartmouth.edu/~worldoutlook

Alumni Advisory Board

Amb. Robert L. Barry ’56 Peter M. Lehmann ’85

Richard L. Duncan ’57Dennis C. Goodman ’60Richard C. Halloran ’51

Mark C. Henrie ’87

Edward C. Luck ’70Peter B. Martin ’51Amb. Jonathan Moore ’54

Christopher Wren ’57

Faculty Advisory Board

Stephen G. Brooks Michael MastandunoDouglas E. Haynes Edward Miller

Diederik J. VandewalleMartin Dimitrov

Founders

Timothy E. Bixby ’87 Peter M. Lehmann ’85Anne E. Eldridge ’87 Mark C. Henrie ’87

Peter D. Murane ’87

Grace Afsari-Mamagani ’13

John Biberman ’13

Marina Villaneuve ’13

CONTENTS

Editor’s Note...................................................................................................................6

Essays

Limits of International Commitments: The International Criminal Court & Arrest Warrant for Omar al-Bashir Jeongu Gim.........................................................................................................7

Global Food Crisis & The Rural Poor Daniel Bornstein...............................................................................................18

Democratic Stability & Political Development in Costa Rica: A Structural Approach Richard Medina.................................................................................................34

on Tibetan Nationalism Aamir Hussain...................................................................................................55

Interviews

Smart Power in United States Diplomacy: An Interview with Maria Otero, former Under Secretary of State forCivilian Security, Democracy & Human Rights .................................................75

Journalism & the War in Afghanistan: An Interview with Jake Tapper, Chief Washington Correspondent for CNN......................................................80

Editorials

The Case for Security Council Reform Chris Looney.....................................................................................................87

The Southern Wave Drifts North as Northern Beauties Migrate South:

Kyooeun Jang....................................................................................................92

On the North Korean Threat Jiyoung Sohn.....................................................................................................96

Spring 2013, Issue 43

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Editors’ Note Over the last year, the international stage has been dominated by states struggling to

of Bashar al-Assad; in Iran and North Korea, authoritarian regimes develop nuclear programs;

the Arab Spring. Yet the international community still hesitates in its role in these internal con-

continued nuclear activity in Iran. Meanwhile, South Korea and the United States are unsure whether to respond to North Korean provocations with concessions or with demonstrations of strength. In keeping with the spirit of these events, this issue of World Outlook focuses on internal struggles over national identity and the intersection of international institutions and national interests. We begin with a paper by Jeongu Gim that explores the relative strength of norms within international institutions when opposed by the self-interests of member states. Using the response of Chad and Kenya to the arrest warrant for Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir as a case study, Gim argues state interests ultimately prevail over international norms when states have to choose between compliance and self-interest. Our next paper continues to explore the role of the international community in fac-ing global problems – Daniel Bornstein examines the failure of the international community to solve the global food crisis by analyzing differential access to agricultural resources and state alliances with global agribusiness. Our focus then shifts to internal struggles over national identity. In our third paper, Richard Medina analyzes the history of democracy in Costa Rica. His conclusion – that Costa Rica’s democratic success story is based on geographical and cultural factors – has implications for the infant democracies of North Africa.

-sain. Hussain discusses the role of religion, medicine, and politics in creating a “cultural na-tionalism” in Tibet, challenging traditional paradigms of national identity. Also in this issue, World Outlook is pleased to include two interviews with leaders

Maria Otero lays out her vision for the future of American foreign relations and security. We also sat down the host of CNN’s The Lead, Jake Tapper, to discuss the evolution of U.S. counter-insurgency strategy, the implications of drone warfare, and the role of journalism in international affairs. We conclude this issue with a series of three op-eds. Chris Looney argues for reform of the U.N. Security Council, while Kyooeun Jang emphasizes the power of cultural exchange

-tor Jiyoung Sohn examines recent North Korean belligerence and argues for continuing the hardline response of the United States, South Korea, and the international community.

Thanks for reading,The Editors

7

INTRODUCTION: THE ICC AND THE QUESTION OF COMMITMENT

How strong are normative commitments to international institutions in the

July 2002, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been heralded as a beacon of

Rome Statute, subjecting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court. Many scholars

commitment to human rights and justice. The court has brought charges against 28 individuals in 15 cases,1 and member states seem to have cooperated well in arresting the indicted and transporting them to Hague for trials. Despite the hopeful signs, however, challenges to commitment still remain. The state members of the ICC often face a dilemma of commitment: should they help the ICC capture and try the indicted, even when doing so brings them into

political scientist at Duke Univeristy, cites a study on the U.S. goal to sign bilateral non-surrender agreements with all countries in the world in an attempt to give U.S. citizens immunity from potential ICC indictments. Kelley argues that even though many states did sign the agreement under the U.S. threat of loss of military aid, those who refused to sign emphasized commitment to the ICC and the normative impor-tance of the court. This, according to Kelley, demonstrates that states can prioritize

LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND ARREST WARRANT FOR

OMAR AL-BASHIR

Jeongu Gim

Since its inception in July 2002, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has stood as a symbol of hope in international criminal justice and as a sign of a normative commit-tment to human rights and justice. Instead of relying on calculations of national inter-est, its member states accept the court as a legitimate international institution. Political scientist Judith Kelley has studied the U.S. efforts to bypass the ICC jurisdiction and concluded that states prioritize normative goals and the rule of law, not only national in-terests. In this paper, I question Kelley’s premise that not signing bilateral non-surrender

-gue that the true test of commitment comes when member states have to make a tangible trade-off between complying with the ICC and protecting national interests. To illustrate my arguments, I examine the response of Chad and Kenya to the arrest warrant for Su-danese president, Omar al-Bashir. I conclude that although the ICC does carry normative

a choice between compliance and self-interest.

Jeongu Gim is a Government major from Gwangju, South Korea, and graduated from Dartmouth in -

tions. He plans to attend law school and pursue a career in international relations.

8

normative goals and the rule of law, not only national interests. In this paper, I argue that the commitment of member states to the ICC is

signatories of bilateral non-surrender agreements with the U.S. I argue that the true test of member states’ commitment comes when there is a trade-off between com-plying with the ICC and protecting national interests. To advance my arguments, I

-tional obligations. I then examine the response of two ICC member states, Chad and Kenya, to arrest warrant for the Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir when national

criticisms of my arguments. Finally, I examine case studies of past compliance that did not involve major national interests and conclude that compliance with the ICC

DIFFERENT LOGICS OF COMPLIANCE AND THE ICCScholars of international relations have proposed two diverging theories as

to why individual states would subject themselves to the obligations of international law and institutions: the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences. The logic of appropriateness emphasizes the role of norms and suggests that states subscribe to international law and institutions because it is the right thing to do. The

individual states and suggests that states care about the outcomes of behaviors rather than the underlying reasons. I argue that because the ICC does not have any coercive mechanism to draw compliance from member states, the logic of appropriateness is

obligations and serving its own national interests, they are more inclined to pick the latter.

The Logic of AppropriatenessAs previously stated, the logic of appropriateness holds that states agree to

be bound by international institutions because it is the right thing to do. Finnemore

understandings about what is good and appropriate” and that states constantly rede--

national system is both constitutive and generative of state behavior, not a simple epi-phenomenon, as the logic of consequence posits.2 Tannenwald, for example, argues for the existence of a “nuclear taboo” that has prevented the U.S. leaders from using

interests, which in turn prevented the use of nuclear weapons even when doing so would have served strategic interests.3

Moreover, when states join international institutions, they do so with the intention of complying. Chayes and Chayes suggest that noncompliance is a deviant

LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMITTMENTS

9

behavior in international agreements that needs to be managed rather than punished.4 Normative obligation plays an important role in international relations, and even in the absence of centrally imposed rules, states are generally inclined to comply with international obligations.5 A treaty will not unravel until a critical mass of defections is reached,6 and “managing” deviations is a better strategy than coercive sanctions or harsh punishments. From this point of view, states ratify and comply with the Rome Statute of the ICC because they accept the normative principles of the institution as legitimate. Even in the anarchic international system, member states have a shared notion of human rights and justice that is deemed important to promote through an institu-tion, regardless of national interests. Given strong normative commitments, states will

The Logic of ConsequencesThe logic of consequences holds that self-interest and coercion drive state

individual state interests, and they matter to states only when they serve states’ interest in international cooperation.7 Because the international system is an anarchy that lacks both a central governing power and strong enforcement mechanisms, international institutions cannot force states to deviate much from this pattern of behavior.8 Insti-tutions are not a government –states must voluntarily obey the rules for institutions to function.9 As a result, international institutions cannot compel states to comply unless there are motivations of self-interest. Cooperation can take place even among rational and egoist states, but only when there is a conjunction of interests.10 Even under a cooperative scheme, unless the consequences of cheating are greater than the ben-

commitments whenever it is advantageous.11

self-interests.12 From this perspective, member states’ compliance with the ICC is fragile at

-13 or for other self-

interest motivations. Its true level of commitment depends on national interest calcu-

with the ICC obligations, they are likely to violate their obligations rather than incur the costs of compliance.

Measuring ICC State Parties’ Levels of Commitment

The two logics of compliance present very different motivations for states to -

ally exclusive; it is possible for a state to ratify the ICC because it values human rights

membership. In fact, most cases of compliance with international institutions seem to

JEONGU GIM

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involve both the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences.14

The real question, then, is which logic of compliance determines the be-

interests. If the logic of appropriateness were dominant, we should expect future compliance with the ICC. The current state parties would remain committed to the court as long as supporting its principles outweighed short-term self-interest calcu-lations. New states would join if they internalized the norms of human rights and international justice. If, on the other hand, the logic of consequences is dominant, the ICC is unlikely to expand much beyond its current role. Unless all involved par-ties are in agreement, even indicting a perpetrator for crimes against humanity could

membership and jurisdiction would haunt the court, which could not expect strong normative commitments from both state parties and non-signatories. Thus, compara-tive evaluation of the two logics of compliance is crucial, as different policy implica-tions will follow depending on which logic dominates.

In the following sections, I discuss how to measure the level of commit-ment and determine which logic of compliance better explains state behavior with regards to the ICC. In particular, I focus on Judith Kelley’s arguments for the logic of appropriateness. I question Kelley’s premise that not signing a bilateral non-surrender agreement with the U.S. is by itself a strong indicator of normative commitment to the ICC. I argue that in order to measure the level of commitment, it is necessary to look at situations in which states have had to balance trade-offs between serving national interests and complying with the ICC.

Measuring Commitment How do we determine which logic of compliance determines ICC member

commitment to the Rome Statute is challenged and it must decide between complying with the ICC and serving its own self-interests. If states remain committed to the ICC obligations even when doing so could harm national interests, the logic of appropri-ateness is the main driver of state behavior and the level of normative commitment is high. If, on the other hand, states violate prior commitment in order to protect their self-interests, the logic of consequences dominates and norms do not constrain state behavior as much. In order to answer this question, Judith Kelley examines U.S. efforts to by-pass the ICC constraints by pressuring other nations to sign bilateral non-surrender agreements. These agreements exempt all U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the ICC, even when ICC obligations would exist. Kelley argues that this challenged the normative commitment to the ICC since the U.S. threatened to withdraw military aid from those who did not sign the agreement – an issue of national interest.

Many states did sign such agreements, including 43 out of 100 ICC state parties at the time of Kelley’s study.15 A large number of ICC state parties, however, many of which are strong U.S. allies, refused to sign bilateral agreements on norma-


11

tive grounds. Kelley argues that these states remained committed to the ICC for two reasons. First, they prioritized human rights and justice rather than immediate mate-rial interests. Second, these states valued compliance with the ICC for its own sake. Most states with a high rule of law refused to sign the non-surrender agreement be-cause doing so would violate the key terms of the Rome Statute and therefore previ-ous commitments to the treaty.16 For states that refused to sign the agreement for the reasons explained here, normative commitments to the ICC remained strong despite the potential harm to the state parties’ national interests. In short, this suggests that the logic of appropriateness dominated for more than half of the ICC state parties, demonstrating a high level of normative commitment as a result. Kelley’s study, however, only explains part of the picture, falling short of testing full commitment. First, as Kelley acknowledges, most ICC state parties that did not sign the bilateral non-surrender agreement already had strong ties with the U.S., rendering the threat of withdrawing military aid toothless.17 The lack of a cred-

ICC without harming national interests. More importantly, it is not certain that state parities lacking bilateral non-sur-

render agreements would in fact arrest U.S. citizens in accordance with ICC statutes. Although the act of signing and ratifying a treaty itself incurs certain costs – confor-

18 –

by other interests. For state parties to the ICC in particular, joining the institution by itself does not involve much cost. Unless a state is obliged to arrest one of its own citizens or an indicted foreign national in its territory, its commitment to the court does not entail many practical costs. Absent material challenges to member states’

-ness determines state behavior.

Three Scenarios of Commitment In order to test member states’ normative commitments, it is necessary to examine situations in which states face a trade-off between protecting national in-terests and complying with the ICC obligations. I argue that the clearest indication of commitment from member states is whether they help the ICC arrest and try the indicted persons. This test is especially illuminating if immediate security or material interests are at stake for the state in question. For example, if a high-ranking member of the U.S. military were indicted by the ICC for war crimes in Iraq and traveled to Germany, an ICC state party that has not signed the non-surrender agreement with

level of commitment to the ICC through its action (arrest him) or inaction (do noth-ing). In general, I can imagine three possible state responses to such a challenge to commitment to the ICC:

(1)When the indicted is in its territory, a member state arrests and turns in that person to the ICC.

JEONGU GIM

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(2) It does nothing, even if it has a chance to arrest the person.(3) It actively prevents the arrest or has already subverted its obligations to the ICC (such as by signing a bilateral non-surrender agreement).

Scenario 1 represents the strongest case of normative commitment and the logic of appropriateness; Scenario 2 represents a mixed effect of the two logics but favors the pursuit of national interest; and Scenario 3 represents weak commitment and the logic of consequences. It is possible that Scenario 1 best serves national self-interest, but I assume that states generally value good relations with neighbors and that the arrest of a foreign national on behalf of the ICC would damage relations. Under this assumption, states face a trade-off between sustained commitments to the ICC and material or security gains from violating the ICC obligations. A strong case can be made against Kelley’s argument if a state party to the ICC that has not signed non-surrender agreement with the U.S. nonetheless chooses to follow Scenario 2 or 3. It may have seemed committed to the ICC under the parameters of Kelley’s study, but when its commitment is challenged by competing national interests, it would renege

CASE STUDY: ARREST WARRANT FOR OMAR AL-BASHIR

Omar al-Bashir, the current President of Sudan, was indicted by the ICC on July 14, 2008. The charges included crimes against humanity, war crimes and geno-cide, all of which were allegedly committed in Darfur since 2003; a formal arrest warrant for al-Bashir was issued on March 4, 2009.19 Since the issue of arrest warrant,

three state parties to the ICC – Chad, Kenya and Djibouti.20 During each of his visits, host countries welcomed al-Bashir as a guest of honor rather than as an indicted sus-pect; none of them arrested the Sudanese president despite mounting criticisms from the ICC and NGOs. In the following section, I focus on Chad and Kenya, two ICC state parties that allowed al-Bashir’s visit without arresting him. I examine how each

maintaining good relations with Sudan.

The Response in Chad Chad almost exclusively followed the logic of consequences, with low initial commitment to the ICC and national self-interest at stake. Omar al-Bashir visited Chad on July 21, 2010, to attend a meeting of leaders of the Community of Sahel-

commitment to the ICC when it signed bilateral non-surrender agreement with the U.S. in 2003, long before it joined the ICC.21 Moreover, Chad and Sudan had only recently agreed to stop supporting proxy militias to destabilize each other, and Chad clearly did not want to harm thawing relations with its neighbor by arresting its visit-ing president.22

-


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ICC, Chad was obligated to arrest the Sudanese president upon his entry into its territory, but no Chadian authority ever even considered this action. In fact, Ahmat Mahamat Bachir, Chad’s interior and security minister, was reported to have said that Chad was not obliged to arrest al-Bashir because “Bashir is a sitting president,” and a sitting president had never been arrested on his travels by the host country.23

rule of law tend to be less committed to the ICC24; according to one study published in 2011, Chad was ranked 52nd in overall governance out of 53 African countries and 37th in the rule of law index alone.25 Perhaps as a natural consequence of the imme-diate security gains and the dismal performance of domestic rule of law, normative constraints of the ICC were virtually nonexistent in Chad. The logic of consequences dominated Chad’s behavior.

The Response in Kenya Omar al-Bashir visited Kenya on August 26, 2010, to attend a ceremony in

ICC treaty in March 2005 but had refused to sign a bilateral non-surrender agreement with the U.S.26

Bashir’s visit, and the invitation to a constitutional ceremony is an indication of rather close relations between the two countries. Despite its previous display of commitment to the ICC when it refused to sign a non-surrender agreement with the U.S., Kenya did not arrest al-Bashir. Regard-ing al-Bashir’s visit and Kenya’s failure to arrest him, foreign minister Moses Wetan-gula remarked that Kenya had “no apologies to make about anybody we invited to this function,” because al-Bashir was invited as a neighbor.27 Kenya could expect no immediate or long-term gains from arresting al-Bashir and had much to lose in terms of regional security and trade ties with Sudan if it did arrest the Sudanese president. Although the ICC obligations and normative commitments suggested that it would pursue a different path, the Kenyan government chose to protect its national interests by letting al-Bashir return home a free man. In November of the following year, however, Justice Ombija, a High Court judge in Kenya, ordered the government to arrest al-Bashir should he visit Kenya again. Immediately after the court order was issued, Sudan threatened to expel the Kenyan ambassador and recall its own ambassador from Nairobi, again challenging the Kenyan government to choose between upholding its international commitment and maintaining good relations with its neighbor. Kenya once again valued its national interest more than its normative commitment, sending foreign minister Wetangula to Sudan to ease the tension and immediately appealing the High Court judge’s order.28

-ings that low rule of law states are less likely to be committed to the ICC. Kenya did in fact rank, on average, 32nd out of 35 countries assessed for rule of law in 2010.29

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However, Kenya did not sign a non-surrender agreement with the U.S., even though 30

Since Kenya is an important regional ally in terms of counter-terrorism, a U.S. threat to cut off aid could not have been credible, Yet Kenya’s refusal to sign the agreement

-cant cost of compliance – was important. The court order to arrest al-Bashir is also noteworthy because it indicates an independent judiciary, an important component of rule of law. But these nominal signs of commitment do not mean that Kenya acted on the logic of appropriateness; when faced with a trade-off, Kenya chose to protect its own interests rather than honor the ICC obligations.

LIMITS OF TESTING NORMATIVE COMMITMENT?-

quences determines state behavior is that the court has so far brought up cases only in Africa. Indicted African leaders rarely travel to countries that would potentially arrest them. This excludes a majority of the ICC state parties as potential travel destinations, especially those with high rule of law, and potentially biases any study of the host country’s response to a visit of indicted persons. Even with the caveat that ICC cases and travel destinations of the indicted have been limited to a few African countries, it is still possible to draw meaningful observations from how those states have responded to their ICC obligations. The fact that two ICC member states, Chad and Kenya, did not arrest a person sought by the court, revealed the limits of their normative commitment. Chad showed a consis-

Chad easily neglected its commitment whenever convenient. Kenya initially showed its commitment to the ICC by refusing to sign a non-surrender agreement with the U.S., but its ensuing actions shattered any illusion that it was acting on purely norma-tive grounds. One could also object that the bar was set too high, given that the ICC has no enforcement mechanism and relies on voluntary support from its member states. It could be almost tautological to argue that states will prioritize their national interests over normative commitments when keeping the latter entails immediate political, eco-nomic, or security costs. On this point, Chayes and Chayes suggest that “an accept-able level of compliance” shifts according to “the type of treaty, the context, the exact behavior involved, and over time.” In fact, the problem does not lie with controlling all instances of deviation but with containing deviance within acceptable levels.31

My concern is that simply admitting “an acceptable level of deviance” from the ICC obligations might end up limiting the role of the institution. To begin with, it is not clear if an acceptable level of deviance could exist without jeopardizing the court’s legitimacy and effectiveness. If the ICC only prosecutes leaders from weak states that cannot resist external pressure and other non-compliance cases are dis-missed as acceptable deviations, I doubt that the court can maintain its image of impartiality and legitimacy. Allowing for even a small number of deviations from the


15

ICC obligations would be tantamount to selective justice – an important concern that has already been raised by the African Union.

CONCLUSION

state interests ultimately prevail when states face a trade-off between compliance and self-interest. The ICC, even with its limited membership and jurisdiction, symbolizes an incredible improvement in international criminal justice, but this does not warrant optimism about its future. Kelley concluded that some states with high rule of law might appear to value normative commitments more than their short-term national interests, but it is too early to tell. There has yet to be a case in which those states actu-ally face a material trade-off between complying with ICC obligations and protecting national interests. In a few cases in which ICC state parties found their commitments challenged by competing state interests, all states chose to renege on their institutional obligations, as demonstrated by the previous cases. Chad has consistently chosen to promote its national interests rather than uphold its commitment to the ICC. Kenya, which initially seemed committed, failed to uphold its ICC obligations in the face of

In addition, relying too much on the optimistic assessment of states’ nor-mative commitments might hamper potential improvement of the ICC. I do not re-ject the logic of appropriateness completely, but we cannot base future predictions of

If the ICC expands its jurisdiction and plays a more important role in international criminal justice, the question of commitment from member states will only become more salient. As Downs, Rocke and Barsoom argue, continued progress of the ICC is likely to depend on how to make defection a less attractive option – but this requires a better enforcement mechanism that would be hard to achieve given objections to the court from the major powers of the world today.32 If creating enforcement mecha-nisms for the court is not possible, we should at least make a realistic assessment of how strongly state parties are committed to the ICC and its principles. Only then can we devise effective ways of improving the court and promoting international criminal justice.

NOTES

1. The ICC website, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/ (accessed June 1, 2012)

2. Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp.2-6.

3. Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use,” International Organization, Vol.53, No.3 (Summer, 1999), p.463.

4. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, “On Compliance,” International Organization, Vol.47, No.2 (Spring, 1993), pp.204-205.

5. Chayes and Chayes, pp.185-186.6. Chayes and Chayes, p.201.7. Eric Posner, The Perils of Global Legalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), p.xv.

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8. Posner, p.31.9. John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol.19,

No.3 (Winter, 1994-1995), p.9.10. Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1984), p.107.11. George Downs, David Rocke and Peter Barsoom, “Is the Good News about Compliance Good

International Organization, Vol.50, No.3 (Summer, 1996), p.384.12. Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, p.386.13. Andrew Moravcsik, “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar

Europe,” International Organization, Vol. 54, No.2 (Spring, 2000), p.228.14. Jay Goodliffe and Darren Hawkins, “Explaining Commitment: States and the Convention against

Torture,” The Journal of Politics, Vol.68, No.2 (May, 2006), p.369.15. Kelley, p.574.16. Ibid., 586.17. Ibid, 580.18. Goodliffe and Hawkins, pp.363-364.19. ICC situations and cases in Sudan, http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20

2012).20. For details on Chad visit, see The Guardian, July 22, 2010, “Chad refuses to arrest Omar al-Bashir

on genocide charges” http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/22/chad-refuses-arrest-omar- al-bashir (accessed June 1, 2012). For Kenya, see Grassroots.net, “Kenya, Sudan Resume Ties After Bashir Court Ruling” http://www.grassroots.co.ke/latest/kenya-sudan-resume-ties-after-bashir-court-ruling.html (accessed June 1, 2012). For Djibouti, see http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/related%20cases/

21. 21. Georgetown Law Library, International Criminal Court - Article 98 Agreements Research Guide http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/guides/article_98.cfm (accessed June 1, 2012).

22. The Guardian, July 22, 2010, “Chad refuses to arrest Omar al-Bashir on genocide charges” http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/22/chad-refuses-arrest-omar-al-bashir (accessed June 1, 2012).

23.

24. Kelley, p.587.25. Mo Ibrahim Foundation, “Chad ranks 52nd out of 53 countries in latest assessment of African

Governance” http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/media/get/20111005_Chad.pdf ac-cessed (June 3, 2012).

26. Georgetown Law Library.27. The Guardian, August 27, 2010, “Omar al-Bashir tarnishes Kenya’s landmark day” http://www.

guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/27/omar-al-bashir-war-crimes-kenya (accessed June 3, 2012).28. CNN U.S., November 30, 2011, “Kenya to challenge high court judge’s arrest warrant for Suda-

nese resident” http://articles.cnn.com/2011-11-30/africa/world_africa_kenya-sudan-spat_1_

June 4, 2012).29. 29. World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2010, http://www.worldjusticeproject.org/sites/

p.119.30. USAID Kenya Fact Sheet, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/countries/ke-

nya/ kenya_fs.pdf (accessed June 4, 2012).31. Chayes and Chayes, pp.197-198.32. Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, p.397.


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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chayes, Abram and Chayes, Antonia Handler. “On Compliance,” International Organization, Vol.47, No.2 (Spring, 1993): 175-205.

Downs, George, Rocke, David and Barsoom, Peter. “Is the Good News about Compliance

1996): 379-406.

Finnemore, Martha. National Interests in International Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.

Goodliffe, Jay and Hawkins, Darren. “Explaining Commitment: States and the Convention against Torture,” The Journal of Politics, Vol.68, No.2 (May, 2006): 358-371.

-nal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 101, No. 3 (August 2007): 573-589.

Keohane, Robert. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Econo-my. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Mearsheimer, John. “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol.19, No.3 (Winter, 1994-1995): 5-49.

Moravcsik, Andrew. “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe,” International Organization, Vol.54, No.2 (Spring, 2000): 217-252.

Posner, Eric. The Perils of Global Legalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.

Tannenwald, Nina. “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use,” International Organization, Vol.53, No.3 (Summer, 1999): 433-468.

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INTRODUCTION It is a generally accepted notion that the current global food crisis could be alleviated by boosting agricultural productivity. While advocates of this approach acknowledge the potential negative consequences for some populations, they assume that any detrimental impact could be negated by the increased availability of food. However, in this paper, I argue that vastly unequal access to agricultural resources is not merely a negative effect of, but actually a necessary condition for the functioning of the current export-driven global agriculture system, which is rooted in increased productivity. I focus on three interlocking components of export agriculture: exports of industrial crops and luxury commodities from the global south to the north; in-tegration of developing world agriculture into agribusiness supply chains; and the Green Revolution’s emphasis on national production of a single commodity crop. To advance my argument, I connect international trade in food and food products, the rural inequality underlying export production, the Green Revolution model, and transnational agribusiness investment. In each of these sections, I critique the role of the state in reinforcing the gains of large-scale agriculture at the expense of the

rural poor and point out how the 2008 food crisis has exposed the weaknesses of the export agriculture paradigm. I also highlight how rural social movements need to confront particular aspects of the current global agriculture paradigm. I then argue that the increase in international investments in response to the 2008 crisis fails to confront the inequality in access to agricultural resources that is at the heart of global

Daniel Bornstein

THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS AND THE RURAL POOR

Despite vast increases in crop productivity in the 20th century, hunger and rural pover-ty have only been exacerbated. I argue that differential access to agricultural resources provides the foundation of a world food system predicated on comparative advantage.

developing world peasant farmers, with the neoliberal paradigm regarding this out-come as a negative “externality” to be offset. Yet such dispossession is a fundamental basis of today’s systemic food crisis, suggesting that this crisis remains very much sa-lient even during periods when large-scale export-based production has proven capa-ble of providing cheap food. The state’s function has not merely been diminished, but re-oriented to respond to the demands of global capital, creating an alliance between the state and global agribusiness. Though the 2008 food crisis offered a repudiation of comparative advantage, the international community’s response has only replicated this model and therefore threatens to reproduce the crisis of displacement. In particu-lar, large-scale land acquisitions and the integration of developing world farmers into global agribusiness supply.

Daniel Bornstein ’14 is a Geography major interested in the globalization of food and agriculture. He has written Op-Eds for the Christian Science Monitor, the Worldwatch Institute, and PolicyMic.com. He spent the fall term in The Gambia conducting research on the social relations underlying farmer-led seed systems. This paper was written for an independent study in Summer 2012, advised by Professor Chris Sneddon.

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food insecurity; it may even widen the gap between wealthy and poor farmers. The

directly confront the political-economic structures upon which global agriculture has long rested.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE

The post World War II political-economic structures undergirding the inter-national food trade rendered the rural poor ever more vulnerable. Although policies varied across the decades, all were export-based and all exacerbated rural inequality and poor countries’ dependence on global food markets. This suggests that any gov-ernance structure predicated on export agriculture may be inherently incompatible with the needs of the world’s poorest farmers. From 1945 to 1970, supply management, as modeled by US policy, was the global norm at both international and domestic levels. Price supports and produc-tion controls, such as limits on the amount of land devoted to a commodity, helped stabilize food prices1. Governments offered price supports to farmers and bought surpluses in order to prevent market gluts, releasing them during times of high prices. Agreements at the international level established prices and production targets. Al-though this model safeguarded against market collapse, it propped up an inequitable political-economic structure that overwhelmingly favored the large-scale farmers who

farmers to capture the state’s resources – in the form of irrigation, research, ex-tension, and lower taxes – at the expense of rural farmers2. Yet this inequality was masked by low international food prices, which served to avert a visible food crisis; this suggests that cheap food helps keep the dominant social order intact. The 1970s marked the dawn of the liberalization of the global agriculture system. While agriculture was still export-oriented, the global food system’s vulner-abilities and inequalities were no longer concealed by the regulations of the previous

the global economy, which expands their market and leads to the disregard of lo-cal markets3. As demonstrated by the case of Mexico, large-scale farmers began to produce industrial inputs and luxury commodities rather than maize, the main staple crop.4 These farmers specialized in crops that were competitive on global markets, a system made possible by free trade. The World Bank, in Principles for Responsible Agricul-tural Investment (2010), suggests that any local farmers who are displaced in the process of economic globalization will be able to gain employment and purchase food from the market. The prevalence of export production is driven by two political demands. First, integration into global markets, a core tenet of the market-led development pathway, enables a country to gain legitimacy in the international political arena. In the eyes of international institutions and development agencies, this is a criterion for

institutions to pay off external debt exceeds the pressure to feed the people. Failing -

DANIEL BORNSTEIN

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cline in domestic food production is less economically painful and could be mitigated by global markets5. The structural adjustment programs (SAPs) were perhaps the starkest display of the ideology underlying this period. In response to the debt crisis, international

eliminate price supports for farmers and orient agriculture toward exports, with the assumption that the capital generated would enable people to buy food on global markets. However, the 2008 food crisis was a stark repudiation of this model. High fuel and energy prices, combined with the diversion of cropland to biofuels and live-stock feed, drove up food prices around the world and pushed millions more into the ranks of the hungry. This revealed a global food system highly vulnerable to price shocks due to a dependence on inputs. Though this vulnerability existed in the years of regulation prior to the 1970s, it was masked – and therefore not addressed – by

price spike underlined one of the most catastrophic political outcomes of the SAPs: though the food crisis was a result of IFI policies, the state was burdened with the re-sulting social unrest6. Thus, the IFIs are able to evade accountability for the outcomes of policy prescriptions. Despite the structural differences between the years of regulation and the following period of deregulation, the state remained a crucial player throughout. The state’s role in regulation is more obvious: price supports for farmers, import restric-

neoliberalism is dependent on the ability of the state to establish and control property rights7. Export agriculture in the neoliberal era requires implementation of inequi-table property rights by the state as well as the state’s refusal to undertake progressive land redistribution. The former has come about in part through the World Bank.

8. Yet most small-scale farmers who are outcompeted on this market end up as wage laborers on rural plan-tations or in the urban industrial sector. Vietnam’s liberalization land reform polices in the 1980s and its ensuing emergence in the late 1980s the world’s number-two rice exporter illustrate this point. Since demand for land comes from those most ca-pable of investing in productivity, proponents of liberalized land markets argue that it boosts overall agricultural production9. Yet this process of establishing inequitable property rights transfers land away from those with little capacity to invest in produc-tivity enhancements and towards those best positioned to pursue capital-intensive ag-riculture10

structure underlying agriculture, marked by the emergence of large-landowning farm-ers, a class of small-scale peasants, and landless laborers. Thus, the surge in Vietnam’s rice exports required the dispossession of farmers from their land. In terms of the failure to undertake land redistribution, India’s “Green Revolution” offers a valuable example. When food shortages threatened to plague India in the 1960s, it was as-sumed that there was no more land available for cultivation, but in fact farmland was


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instead being used for cotton exports. From this, it can be deduced that maintaining the sanctity of private property and preventing land distribution was more important than ensuring the livelihood of peasants. For the above reasons, the liberalization of agriculture must be seen not merely as a minimization of the state’s role but as a re-direction of its interests to-wards the accumulation of capital – at the expense of local people’s well-being. The

-tion of the state11. Thus, as African political leaders are co-opted as mere technocrats into the neoliberal order, they come to see export production as more effective than small-scale food production 12. Therefore, one cannot classify export agriculture in

vision – but instead must determine whether the state is oriented toward supporting global market linkages or local food production. In the neoliberal order, the state is incorporated into the market domain and becomes concerned with private capital and not local people’s rights. As a result, the state de-legitimizes forms of agriculture that are not amenable to capital investment. The situation of the most vulnerable farmers is exacerbated, then, not only because of encroachment by large-scale producers but by the undemocratic nature of the state’s focus on private capital. Thus, in order to create a “right to food” the challenge is to divorce the state from the market domain.

TRANSNATIONAL AGRIBUSINESS INVESTMENT

Transnational agribusiness investment has become the dominant force shap-ing production, consumption, and trade in world agriculture, undermining the ability of the state to respond to human needs13. As previously discussed, the state has not so much been eliminated as re-oriented in favor of the interests of international capital. Viewed in this context, international agricultural trade is not a “natural” manifesta-

determined to be optimal for accumulation. This is the nature of the current “agro-industrial” complex, whereby many commodities are not end products but instead become integrated into industrial products and manufactured foods14. This diversion of land from local food production by agribusiness investments has increased the vulnerability of the world’s poor, both by denying small farmers access to land and by driving up food prices. Corn and soybean production is particularly pertinent to the interests of transnational capital, since each crop’s association with large-scale production and multiple uses has opened avenues for the West to both pursue relentless growth and avert the usual crises such relentless growth precipitates. The value of corn in this regard can be seen in the context of post-World War II U.S. agriculture. In the 1950s, while cotton and wheat farmers were suffering from overproduction, corn growers were spared because they could use corn for livestock feed and high fructose corn syrup to avoid large surpluses15. The growth of the U.S. production of high fructose corn syrup allowed the nation to effectively replace sugar imports from European colonies.16

DANIEL BORNSTEIN

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for capital accumulation by avoiding corn surpluses. The diversion of corn consump-tion to secondary products contributes to high global food prices. In addition, corn exports have the effect of marginalizing developing world agriculture because they undermine local growers – but it also leaves American farmers themselves vulner-able. In the 1970s, when grain prices were high, banks extended credit to American farmers to increase investments and expand acreage. But when other countries began capitalizing on the high prices and exporting to the developing world, prices dropped and a debt crisis ensued among American farmers. Overall, agribusiness control over monocrop agriculture – as seen in its multiplicity of purpose and exportability – is in-herently incompatible with the livelihood and food security of the rural poor. Efforts to avert a capitalist crisis ended up facilitating a social crisis felt by the world’s poorest populations. The most prominent example of soybean’s diversion from local markets is the crop’s integration into the global livestock sector. Brazil has converted some of its most productive farmland into export-based soybean plantations to provide livestock feed in response to China’s rising demand for meat. This has negatively impacted Brazil’s most vulnerable populations, since food prices rise and small farmers are denied access to land for local food production. These soybean growers, along with corn growers, provide key ingredients to livestock feed manufacturers, and all three parties are linked to corporate agro-processors and distributors. Such is the tendency for agribusiness control to “recombine” seemingly separate elements of the agro-industrial complex17. Corporate control over the global livestock trade illuminates the weakened capacity of state regulations in the governance of trade relations, as invest-ments within the agriculture sector itself are increasingly traversing national boundar-ies18. This explains the ease with which international agribusiness is able to externalize the environmental and land-use impacts of soybean production for livestock feed, a critical factor in lowering the price of meat19. Transnational agribusiness would op-pose any of the regulations on prices and production that characterized the period from 1945 to 1970, since such rules would hamper its ability to dictate global trade and production and to squeeze farmers with low prices. The liberalization period, then, was characterized not only by a rollback of direct state regulations, but also by a replacement of the state by corporations in determining the path of international

power dynamics—demonstrating how TNCs have co-opted states to advance their own agenda. Transnational agribusiness control partly explains the paradoxical nature of today’s global malnutrition crisis, which is intimately linked with international trade in food. As agribusiness becomes the main supplier of cheap food produced by mono-crop agriculture, developing countries are beginning to experience diseases long con-

and hungry. In Mexico, for example, the North American Free Trade Agreement has


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displaced Mexico’s corn farmers, leaving them impoverished and food insecure. Yet a -

tors has led to the increased incidence of health problems typically produced by an unhealthy processed food diets. This highlights how NAFTA has resulted in the ex-port of “U.S. obesity” to Mexico20. Yet just as developing countries can, in a sense, import malnutrition, so too can they export nutrition. Such countries rely on globally produced cheap grains and export high-value fruits and vegetables under the premise that such crops will generate revenues from wealthy countries’ consumers - but the local people have no access to these nutritious foods produced on their lands. In a parallel example, in response to the hamburger boom in the U.S., Latin American countries dramatically increased beef exports, depriving local people of the protein needed for well-rounded diets21. Thus, the overconsumption of a nutrient in the rich world resulted in the under-consumption of that nutrient in the very region that pro-vided it. The global malnutrition problem, then, is partly a function of agribusiness’ neglect of local, diverse agriculture systems. The inequitable land access associated with transnational agribusiness con-

exports. During times of low global prices, there is little choice but to ramp up pro-duction, which often involves further encroachment onto smallholders’ lands. While

such a strategy does nothing to address the dominance of exports over local produc-tion. Hence, once again, exporting countries must avert a capitalist crisis in a way that inevitably accelerates a social crisis – this time one of peasant displacement. Hardly is there a better example of the subordination of local people’s rights to the demands of capital accumulation. Once developing countries enter global supply chains, they are locked into supporting the policies that divert both land and public resources from local food production. As De Schutter (2011) writes in an article, “These coun-tries are caught in a vicious cycle. The more they are told to rely on trade, the less they invest in domestic agriculture. And the less they support their own farmers, the more they have to rely on trade. In the current climate, this means relying on imports of grain at historically volatile prices.”22 This trap is rooted in the tendency for interna-tional commodity chains to forge alliances between the industrial sector of the global north and the agriculture sector of the global south23. Those advocating on behalf of developing world farmers have often made the argument that global injustice in trade relations would be resolved if Western nations would eliminate the subsidies that give them an unfair advantage in global markets. However, this step would do little to improve food security because it fails to address three things: export farmers would still be at the mercy of transnational agribusiness buyers; exports reduce the amount

global markets, but instead to wrest developing countries from the political-economic dictates of the global North.

DANIEL BORNSTEIN

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CRITIQUE OF EXPORT-BASED AGRICULTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON LAND ACCESS

Food shortages are fundamentally an outcome of a deliberate strategy to promote export agriculture which requires social inequality. Export agriculture’s de-

-crue equitably throughout the population. The ability of large-scale agriculture to dominate the most productive farmland involves the displacement of peasants onto marginal soils, a process which is seen in Britain’s Enclosure movement and is oc-curring all over the developing world24. Since peasants’ inferior landholdings cannot guarantee subsistence, they are forced to rely on wage labor offered by export planta-tions, working below the cost of subsistence. The provision of cheap food is essential for the creation of this labor force and the maintenance of the low labor costs25. In-deed, export agriculture not only enables capital accumulation for large-scale farmers, but also generates the foreign exchange needed for the purchase of cheap food on global markets as well; thus, it is self-sustaining. Cheap food can have the expedient effect of clearing the countryside to provide avenues for capital accumulation, in that cheap food 1) undermines small farmers, establishing the reserve of cheap labor; 2) enables, as a result of peasant displacement, large-scale agriculture to predominate in the developing world; and 3) provides the cheap food necessary for a labor force in the shift to industrialization26. Cheap food, then, becomes the basis for “moderniza-

-tion of the prevailing inequitable social order in the countryside. However, no matter whether food prices are high or low, the rural poor remain vulnerable due to the prevailing political economy of food production. High food prices, of course, are a more obvious manifestation of their plight. However, low food prices can likewise be associated with social inequality. Export agriculture, which displaces peasants, is sustained by the low food prices that enable displaced people to purchase food on global markets. Therefore, mere access to food is an

food crisis is a systemic condition, embedded in structural inequalities that are only exposed by famine or riots. As previously established, such structural inequalities are based on public and private support for export agriculture at the expense of local production; diversion of cropland to uses other than food; and the disposses-sion of small farmers. Following from this, it is necessary to challenge the neoliberal logic that casts peasant displacement as simply a “negative externality”27. The World Bank argues that the negative social impacts of small-scale farmers’ displacement can be mitigated through employment of local people, which is meant to provide them with the means to purchase food on a market. As the Bank’s Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment state (2010): “Whenever there are potential adverse effects on any of aspect of food security (availability, access, utilization or stability), policy-makers should make provisions for the local or directly affected populations certain such that: (i) equivalent access to food is assured; (ii) opportunities for outgrower involvement and off-farm employment are expanded to protect livelihoods and raise incomes.” But the emphasis on mitigation is an excuse to keep intact a paradigm that


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-balization is legitimized by the notion that the most vulnerable populations would be cushioned against any negative outcomes of economic growth. But this assumption conveniently neglects that small-scale farmers’ control of food production is in fact the best way to promote stable livelihoods and food security. The challenge for rural

-tions for small farmers the core, rather than as a negative externality. The 2008 food crisis, which exposed the fallacious logic of a social protection policy based on cheap outside food markets, has offered an opportunity to re-open this debate.

GREEN REVOLUTION-STYLE AGRICULTURE

The Green Revolution (GR) model, based on the deployment of high-yield-ing varieties and chemical inputs, has ideological hegemony in the agricultural de-

all over the world and the associated de-legitimization of small-scale farming. Even though the model was applied with the intent to increase food output in response to imminent domestic food shortages in Asia and Latin America, it has resulted in export-based agriculture. India and Vietnam, for example, have emerged as major exporters of rice and wheat, respectively, even as hunger persists among their ru-ral poor. And the GR targeted major globally-traded commodity crops, not the di-versity of crops necessary for nutrition. These outcomes serve to question whether the Green Revolution was ever meant to address food insecurity. In fact, it seems that the GR was a convenient way to avoid the land redistribution that would have transformed export-oriented agriculture systems into localized ones. The notion that higher yields were the only path to averting famine rested on the belief that no more land was available for cultivation – but this was not the case28. Ironically, not only had the prevailing export-based system driven the threat of famine, it had actually laid the foundation for further export production via new technologies.

Technological dissemination was based on vast inequalities, a fact which il-luminates how removed the GR was from feeding people. High-yielding varieties (HYVs) required irrigation and chemical fertilizers. Since state investments in irriga-tion were biased in favor of certain regions29 and fertilizers were unaffordable for most small-scale farmers, only wealthier farmers were able to capitalize on HYVs Re-gional disparities were also at the root of this model: the GR focused on boosting the productivity of high-potential areas, with the assumption that small farmers in mar-

not only the deployment of technologies beyond the reach of smallholders, but also the exclusion of peasant agriculture from the modern commercial economy30. There-fore, rural social disparities are not simply a negative outcome of export agriculture; they are a necessary condition for its realization. Moreover, the Green Revolution set in motion an international research sys-tem aimed at creating a global reach. As a result, crop breeding is largely geared toward generating widely adaptable homogenous varieties (i.e. diffusion of innova-

DANIEL BORNSTEIN

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tion), neglecting the particular characteristics of marginal areas31. (Though recent ef-forts focus more on marginal areas, these are worrisome as well, as will be discussed in the next section). Since the international research establishment – embodied by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR – focuses

large-scale producers are bound to outcompete smallholders32. Here the “agricultural treadmill” is at play: those farmers – wealthy, large-scale ones – who can seize on new innovations will capture the market, while those who are unable to do so will be left behind (IAASTD). Just as the proponents of the GR sought to discredit peasant agriculture, today there also exists a campaign to eradicate the small farmer. Rural social movements are a threat to the capital accumulation of Western agribusiness33; the more land controlled by small farmers practicing low-input agriculture (especially under communal ownership), the fewer avenues for transnational investment. The standardization of intellectual property rights infringes upon farmers’ ability to har-vest and re-plant local seed varieties (IAASTD), providing agribusiness with a socially

RESPONSES TO THE 2008 FOOD CRISIS

The 2008 food crisis marked a fundamental repudiation of an international food system based on export specialization and dependence on global markets. The riots in over three dozen countries were a reminder to governments of the politi-cal consequences of policies centered on inequitable access to agricultural resources.

ideology, it was ultimately governments themselves that had to deal with the burden of social unrest, not the IFIs. The immediate causes of the crisis were commodity speculation, irregular weather in major grain-exporting countries, high-energy prices, and the diversion of cropland to biofuel production and livestock feed. All these fac-tors were a product of a longer-term political-economic structure favoring large-scale farmers at the expense of smaller, poorer farmers. This critical perspective must guide assessment of the investments in agricultural development that have been marshaled in response to the 2008 food crisis. Throughout this paper, it has been argued that vast disparities in access to agricultural resources have undergirded the integration of developing world farmers into global markets. A key question is as follows: why have the tremendous produc-

It is because the global food system is tailored toward export production and the exigencies of transnational agribusiness. This is the problem with the reductionist view that higher yields are the answer to ending hunger. Focusing on yields alone fails to understand the political-economic context in which production is occurring. A key argument of this paper is that boosting agricultural productivity has not only over-

in the marginalization of small farmers in those same countries. While many have recognized the importance of emphasizing domestic pro-


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duction in light of the recent crisis, most new initiatives largely occur within the prevailing framework of the Green Revolution development paradigm. They also assume that increased funding is the sole path to confronting food insecurity, with no regard for the power imbalances pervading the global food system. Look no further than the great fanfare that greeted the World Bank’s 2008 World Development Report on agriculture (focused on the productivist model) compared with the near silence that accompanied the release of the IAASTD (which called for a fundamental transi-tion)34. Though the 2008 food crisis lead to the growing realization of the danger of the neoliberal model and reliance on outside food markets, there seems to be an emergence of a localized form of neoliberalism that brands itself as compatible with

is oriented toward enhancing “enabling conditions” for future capital accumulation – the very function of the state envisioned by proponents of export production. “En-abling conditions” has become a buzzword in agricultural development discourse; it requires states to seek to open opportunities for the private sector. It suggests that the state’s role in development is a short-term exercise and that the private sector will

indicate the government’s effectiveness in establishing the enabling conditions; there

As seen in the examples below, this emphasis on enabling conditions may signal the emergence of a more localized form of neoliberalism: the targeting of smallholder farmers and the growth of public-private partnerships.

Smallholder farmers Development programs, such as USAID’s Feed the Future initiative and the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, attempt to place an explicit emphasis on small-holder farmers through the dissemination of crop technologies. But there are several problems with this approach. First, many of these technologies are unaffordable for the poorest farmers, as evidenced by the uneven outcome of the Green Revolution. In addition, farmers could become more vulnerable despite higher yields if they are forced into debt by the purchase of expensive technologies. Second, the targeting of small farmers fails to take into account the wider economic context35. Given that the diffusion of innovation model favors large-scale farmers, these farmers are likely to outcompete the poorest farmers on markets, even when poorer farmers have crop technologies. Development programs that fail to confront the social structure under-lying agriculture – and that continue to be guided by technology transfer – will only widen the disparities that have driven food crisis. In response to the malnutrition crisis, the Gates Foundation and AGRA are breeding “orphan” crops, crops that have long been neglected. In the process, however, they are trampling upon farmers’ rights. Multinational seed companies control orphan crops, but the seeds contain traits found in locally-adapted, traditional crop varieties. Agribusiness takes copies of farmers’ local seed varieties, add new genetic traits, and then sell the seeds back to

DANIEL BORNSTEIN

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those same farmers. Farmers now have to purchase the genetic resources that they

The Malawi government’s provision of a subsidy for chemical fertilizers tar-geting smallholders has emerged as one of the most contentious agricultural devel-opment policies. The IFIs, in accordance with their liberalization and privatization agenda, have condemned the government. This subsidy is condemnable, but not be-cause it opposes the IFIs’ agenda. By providing its farmers with the means to pur-chase fertilizer, Malawi legitimizes private sector agro-chemical companies. In other words, Malawi is creating the enabling conditions for the long-term involvement of these companies in the agriculture sector. There are two main problems with this situation.

eventually, the country’s farmers will be at the mercy of the private sector. At this

afford the fertilizer. In addition, given the inextricable linkages between agro-chem-

seed varieties beyond the reach of small farmers. A key question is: will substantial private agribusiness investment emerge on the marketing side to capitalize on farm-

farmers, increasing inequality between large-scale and small-scale farmers. However, despite this inequitable outcome, the government would likely be applauded for hav-ing successfully produced the enabling conditions for fertilizer companies. Second, public funding for fertilizer distracts attention from the agriculture approaches that may be more effective for farmers’ livelihoods. Such alternative approaches are not amenable to private investment, for there is no input that can be sold to farmers. Therefore, the fertilizer subsidy is once again an attempt to make government policy compatible with private sector interests. This again raises the question of whether public and private investment are distinguishable.

Public-private partnerships The emphasis on public-private partnerships for agricultural development, particularly by USAID administrator Rajiv Shah, is allowing transnational agribusi-ness investment to increasingly become legitimized under the banner of “develop-ment.” This is problematic because it renders the integration of developing world agriculture into global markets – which has long been predicated on politically and economically unequal relationships – compatible with humanitarian objectives. It also ignores the reality that African countries’ dependence on global food markets is pre-cisely why the continent was susceptible to the 2008 food crisis. In this context, then, development becomes a propagator of the transnational capitalist forces currently

by Pepsi Co., which, through a public-private partnership, is investing in export-based chickpea production for its supply chain36. The ultimate danger is that as development grants credibility to such invest-ments, the fact that such investments have historically come at the expense of food


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security will be forgotten. Examination of poor countries’ global market linkages in a historical perspective supports this point in three ways. First, African nations’ global agricultural trade occurred in the context of political subordination at the hands of European colonial powers, and thus was far from a natural or even autonomous phe-nomenon 37. The political relations of the colonial era were antithetical to the democ-

the SAPs oriented African agricultural economies toward export, Western agribusi--

tries’ vulnerability should give pause to any development models that wish to replicate the type of foreign investment that proceeded in the wake of the SAPs. Third, and most recently, developing world agriculture has increasingly served as a source of inputs for manufactured foods controlled by agribusiness38. These three historical ex-amples are linked by the diversion of cropland from local food production, as well as an association with Western political and economic dominance. It is troubling, then, that development institutions continue to embrace this model of export production that has driven today’s food crisis.

Land grabs The third troubling trend since 2008 is the escalation of large-scale land ac-quisitions, or “land grabs.” Asian and Middle Eastern countries are buying up large tracts of African farmland to secure food supplies for their own populations, while Western countries are doing so mainly for biofuel production. Land grabs are evi-dence that integration of African agricultural land into the global economy is still a dominant paradigm, even though many agricultural development programs are em-

the assumption that the injection of capital into the land will automatically generate food security and employment for local people. But these land grabs can only be see as a positive development if the displacement of local people is viewed as a “negative externality” mitigated through employment of local people39. Besides the fact that mitigation distracts attention from more equitable land access structures, it is also

High global food prices are rendering it impossible to guarantee that displaced people will even be able to afford food from outside markets. In fact, the acceleration of land grabs portends a fate eerily similar to that which befell Africa in the wake of the SAPs. Once countries oriented agriculture toward export, they became susceptible to price volatility in global markets. The 2008 food crisis repudiated the shift to export pro-duction. It seems, then, that by pushing for the liberalization of African land markets and therefore enables land grabs, the IFIs are setting up African countries for another blow as devastating as the one in 2008. As Shepard Daniel writes, “The [Interna-tional Finance Corporation and Foreign Investment Advisory Service] prioritize the improvement of investment climates and promote business-enabling environments and, in doing so, it appears they overlook the more urgent problems of hunger and poverty that persist in their client countries, losing sight of their principle mission: to

DANIEL BORNSTEIN

30alleviate poverty.”40 -rutilized – the very same narrative that drove European colonial expansion41. If land grabs go unchallenged, these land acquisitions might become accepted as Africa’s “natural” comparative advantage, just as with colonial-era exports.

CONCLUSION Overall, I have argued that the globalization of food and agriculture has manifested itself in the stark inequalities not only between the global north and south but also within developing countries themselves. The food crisis is a product of the social class disparity that characterizes developing world agriculture, which renders it a near-permanent condition. In particular, export production has been sustained by the allocation of land and resources toward large-scale producers at the expense of small-scale producers. At times, the acceleration of export agriculture has involved the displacement of peasants and the generation of a landless class. Any analysis of

agricultural resources. The task ahead for rural social movements is to upend this prevailing order. There exists a great divide among global left-leaning social movements and citizens’ groups. Some argue that the global south should strive to even the playing

that the solution is to overhaul the fundamentals of the prevailing political-economic structure42. The former camp fails to realize that the current framework based on capital accumulation is the root of today’s food crisis and cannot be embraced as a pathway to reducing inequality. Instead, what is needed is the promotion of the

food systems. A core tenet of food sovereignty is the assertion of local people’s con-trol over the production, consumption, and distribution of food. The drastic change that is needed will come not from USAID or the World Bank but from these rural social movements. Throughout this paper, I have referenced the state’s complicity in

crucial within the food sovereignty model. Neoliberalism places the state under the domain of the market, so the detachment of the state from that domain may address the current food crisis. First, state investment in those farmers who lie outside the

key is that these investments do not merely set the stage for private sector activity, but instead are tailored to these farmers’ interests. One example is support for participa-tory plant breeding, in which researchers collaborate with farmers to select the most appropriate varieties (IAASTD). Second, state investment in agro-ecological systems grants credibility to alternative forms of innovation – a much-needed departure from the current notion that technological improvements are the most legitimate pathway (i.e. transfer of technology). The crop diversity associated with agro-ecology could help address the malnutrition crisis caused in part by the dominance of a select major commodity crops on large-scale farms, while farmers’ local knowledge can help to


31

ensure resilience in the face of shocks. Third, and most dauntingly, macroeconomic indicators must not take precedence over people’s livelihoods. The Right to Food framework may be particularly relevant in this area.

The 2008 food crisis has energized a critical mass of people and organiza-tions working toward a fundamentally new model for agriculture, a movement which has enabled a re-opening of the debate on the issues discussed in this paper that have long been “off the table” in development discourse.

NOTES

1. Bill Winders. “The Vanishing Free Market: The Formation and Spread of the British and US Food Regimes.” Journal of Agrarian Change. Vol. 9, Issue 3 (July 2009): 315-344

2. Alain deJanvry. The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

3. Akram-Lodhi, A. Haroon. “Land, Markets, and Neoliberal Enclosure: an agrarian political economy perspective.” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 8 (2007): 1437-1456.

de Janvry, The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America4. Ibid.5. Ibid.6. James Ferguson. Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order. (Durham: Duke University

Press, 2006).7. Harrison, Graham. “Economic Faith, Social Project and a Misreading of African Society: The

Travails of Neoliberalism in Africa.” Third World Quarterly. (2007).8. Olivier De Schutter. “How not to think of land grabbing: three critiques of large-scale invest-

ments in farmland.” Journal of Peasant Studies. (2011).9. World Bank. Land Sales and Rental Markets in Transition: Evidence from Rural Vietnam. K. Deininger

and S. Jin, Policy Research Working Paper. No. 3013. 2003.10. Martin Ravallion and Dominique Van de Walle, “Breaking Up the Collective Farm: Welfare Out-

comes of Vietnam’s Massive Land Privatization.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 2710 (2001).

11. De Schutter, “How not to think of land grabbing: three critiques of large-scale investments in farmland.”

12. Ferguson. Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order13. Harriet Friedmann, and Phil McMichael. “Agriculture and the State System: the Rise and Decline

of National Agricultures, 1870 to the Present.” Sociologia Ruralis, Vol. 29 issue 2 (August 1989): 93-117.

14. Ibid.15. Bill Winders. “The Vanishing Free Market”16. Friedmann and McMichael. “Agriculture and the State System: the rise and decline of national

agricultures, 1870 to the present.” 17. Ibid. 18. David Goodman and Richard B. Howarth. “International trade and sustainable development.” In

Flashpoint in Environmental Policymaking: Controversies in Achieving Sustainability. Sheldon Kamieniecki, ed. George A. Gonzalez, and Robert O. Vos, (New York: State University of New York, 1997).

19. Galloway et al. “International trade in meat: the tip of the pork chop.” Ambio, 36 no. 8 (Dec 2007): 622-629.

20. Walter Walinga et al. Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy. “Exporting Obesity: How U.S. farm and trade policy is transforming the Mexican food environment.” 2012.

21. Eric Ross. The Malthus factor: population, poverty, and politics in capitalist development. (London: Zed Books, 1998).

22. Olivier De Schutter,. “WTO Defending an Outdated Vision of Food Security.” 2011.

DANIEL BORNSTEIN

32

www.srfoods.org23. Winders, Bill. “The Vanishing Free Market”24. Ross, Eric. The Malthus Factor25. de Janvry, The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America26. Ross, Eric. The Malthus Factor27. Akram-Lodhi, A. Haroon. “Land, Markets, and Neoliberal Enclosure”28. Ross, Eric. The Malthus Factor29. de Janvry, The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America30. Ross, Eric. The Malthus Factor31. Division of Early Warning and Assessment, United Nations Environment Program, “Interna-

tional Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development,” 2012. www.agassessment.org

32. de Janvry, The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America

33. Akram-Lodhi, A. Haroon. “Land, Markets, and Neoliberal Enclosure”34. McMichael, Phil. “A food regime analysis of the world food crisis.” Agriculture and Human Values.

(31 July 2009).35. De Schutter. “How not to think of land grabbing: three critiques of large-scale investments in

farmland.”36. Stephanie Strom. “PepsiCo to Foster Chickpeas in Ethiopia.” New York Times (Sept 20, 2011).37. Friedman and McMichael. “Agriculture and the State System” 38. Ibid.39. Akram-Lodhi, A. Haroon. “Land, Markets, and Neoliberal Enclosure”40. Daniel, Shepard. “The Role of the International Finance Corporation in Promoting Agricultural

Investment and Large-scale Land Acquisitions.” Paper presented at International Conference on Land Grabbing. Brighton UK, (2011).

41. Lands.” Journal of World-Systems Research. (2012).

42. Immanuel Wallerstein. “Land, Space, and People: Constraints of the Capitalist World-Economy.” Journal of World-Systems Research, 18 no. 1 (2012): 6-14

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Akram-Lodhi, A. Haroon. “Land, Markets, and Neoliberal Enclosure: an agrarian political economy perspective.” Third World Quarterly, 28 no. 8 (2007): 1437-1456.

Deininger, K. and S. Jin. “Land Sales and Rental Markets in Transition: Evidence from Rural Vietnam.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 3013, April 2003.

deJanvry, Alain. The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.

De Schutter, Olivier. “How not to think of land grabbing: three critiques of large-scale invest-ments in farmland.” Journal of Peasant Studies, 38, no. 2 (March 2011): 249-279.

“WTO Defending an Outdated Vision of Food Security.” 2011. www.srfoods.org

Division of Early Warning and Assessment, United Nations Environment Program, “Interna-tional Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Develop-ment,” 2012. www.agassessment.org


33

Ferguson, James. Global shadows: Africa in the neoliberal world order. Durham, N.C.: Duke Univer-sity Press, 2006.

Friedmann, Harriet and McMichael, Phil. “Agriculture and the State System: the Rise and De-cline of National Agricultures, 1870 to the Present.” Sociologia Ruralis, vol. 29 issue 2 (August 1989): 93-117.

Galloway et al. “International trade in meat: the tip of the pork chop.” Ambio, vol. 36 no. 8 (Dec 2007): 622-629.

Lands.” Journal of World-Systems Research, vol. 18 issue 1 (2012): 15.

Goodman, David, and Richard B. Howarth. “International trade and sustainable develop-ment.” In Flashpoint in Environmental Policymaking: Controversies in Achieving Sustainability. Sheldon Kamieniecki, edited by George A. Gonzalez, and Robert O. Vos, New York: State University of New York, 1997.

Harrison, Graham. “Economic Faith, Social Project and a Misreading of African Society: The Travails of Neoliberalism in Africa.” Third World Quarterly, 2007.

McMichael, Phil. “A food regime analysis of the world food crisis.” Agriculture and Human Values, 31 July 2009.

Ravallion, Martin and Dominique Van de Walle, “Breaking Up the Collective Farm: Welfare Outcomes of Vietnam’s Massive Land Privatization.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 2710 (2001).

Ross, Eric B. The Malthus factor: population, poverty, and politics in capitalist development. London: Zed Books, 1998.

Shepard, Daniel. “The Role of the International Finance Corporation in Promoting Agricul-tural Investment and Large-scale Land Acquisitions.” Paper presented at Interna-tional Conference on Land Grabbing. Brighton, UK (2011).

Strom, Stephanie. “PepsiCo to Foster Chickpeas in Ethiopia.” New York Times, Sept 20, 2011.

Walinga, Walter et al. Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy. “Exporting Obesity: How U.S. farm and trade policy is transforming the Mexican food environment.” 2012.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. “Land, Space, and People: Constraints of the Capitalist World-Econ-omy.” Journal of World-Systems Research, vol. 18 no. 1 (2012): 6-14

Winders, Bill. “The Food Crisis and the Deregulation of Agriculture.” Brown Journal of World Affairs, 2011.

“The Vanishing Free Market: The Formation and Spread of the British and US Food Regimes.” Journal of Agrarian Change, vol. 9, issue 3 (July 2009): 315-344

World Bank. “Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Liveli-hoods, and Resources.” 2010.

DANIEL BORNSTEIN

34

INTRODUCTION

In 2011, Costa Rica ranked twentieth on the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index, the highest of any Latin American country with the exception of Uruguay, and just one slot below the United States.1 Since its formal indepen-

most countries in Latin America. For many years, mechanisms of liberal or republi-can democracy have functioned in a relatively stable and institutionalized manner in Costa Rica, especially when compared to the political mechanisms of its neighboring countries in Central America and in the Latin American region as a whole. With the exception of two disturbances—the brief dictatorship of General Federico Tinoco Granados from 1917-19 and the forty-four day civil war in 1948, which ended in the permanent dissolution of the Costa Rican military—Costa Rica has had a tradition of peaceful transitions of power. This political history has coincided with extraordinary economic success, making Costa Rica a success story in Latin America.

-racy since the expansion of suffrage and the beginning of mass political participation

democracy over this period has the potential to serve as an instructive example for the rest of Latin America.

In spite of the revolutions, military dictatorships, political upheaval, and geo-political meddling that plagued Central America throughout the twentieth century, Costa Rican democracy managed, for the most part, to survive during these politically turbulent times. It is important to note that the institutions of Costa Rican democracy

Richard Medina

DEMOCRATIC STABILITY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN COSTA RICA:A STRUCTURAL APPROACH

By most measures, Costa Rica has consistently been among the most “democratic” nations in Latin America. With the exception of two brief disturbances, the country has been characterized by economic success and peaceful transition of power. In this paper, I seek to explain this phenomenon through a primarily structural approach. I challenge the culturalist theories of authors such as Consuelo Cruz, which contend that Costa Rica is so “democratic” because it has a uniquely democratic culture. I instead argue that the same structural elements of Costa Rica’s unique history that facilitated its democratic de-velopment also explain what appears to be a cultural proclivity toward a more democratic outlook. Among these factors are the limited political role of the military, the country’s historic isolation from the rest of Latin America, especially during the colonial years, a

-cious metal deposits or other natural resources.

Rich Medina is a Senior at Columbia University majoring in Economics and Political Science and con-centrating in Hispanic Studies. He is interested in Latin American economic and political development as well as U.S. foreign policy and security studies. He recently completed his senior thesis in political science on the United States’ practice of withholding diplomatic recognition from communist regimes. He is an executive board member of the Columbia International Relations Council and Association and a Senior Editor of the Columbia Journal of Politics and Society.

35

remained intact despite varying levels of unrest and opposition, with the exception of the two discontinuities to be discussed within this paper. While there were certainly

democracy over time, there were only two instances in which the country’s governing democratic institutions were actively—and violently—overthrown.

The history of Costa Rican democracy is one of punctuated equilibrium rather than long-term stability. The two “democratic disturbances” discussed in this paper are best thought of as equilibrating shocks to the political system in response to democratizing pressures. What is unique about the Costa Rican political system is that it was able to absorb these shocks and adjust very quickly, each time creating the conditions for a stronger and more democratic government. The question at hand is

-tor that has allowed Costa Rica to adapt and adjust—though not always smoothly—to

1948 civil war represent adjustments of the state’s democratic institutions to accom-modate new forms of political participation.

This paper will focus primarily on the process through which Costa Rica democratized in order to gain insight into the unique factors that have allowed for its relative institutional stability. The ultimate question is whether the Costa Rican case can provide some insight into a path forward for less democratically stable countries throughout the rest of Latin America. What, then, can Costa Rica reveal about com-

that Costa Rica is unique when compared to the rest of Latin America in a number

replicate its path to democratization in other countries within the region. In many re-spects, the factors that allowed Costa Rica to develop the way it did reach back to the

into democratization as a general phenomenon and the circumstances under which it is most likely to occur.

There are two complementary theories of democratization that are best sup-ported by Costa Rica’s democratic foundation—the structuralist and elite settlement models. The structuralist model contends that “elites relinquish exclusive ruling pow-er and democracies develop only when forced to do so by the growth in the power and resources of competing non-elites.”2 This model applies most accurately to the period leading up to the 1948 civil war, as this paper will seek to demonstrate. The second model, the elite settlement theory, “contends that elites forge democracies through agreements, whether explicit or tacit, to play by democratic rules and toler-ate mass participation.”3 As we shall see, elites in Costa Rica not only tolerated mass participation; they actively encouraged it in the lead-up to the 1914 election and the subsequent 1917 military coup. Culturalist theories, which suggest that Costa Rica was able to democratize so successfully primarily because of its uniquely democratic cul-ture, appear less persuasive. While culture may be a part of the story, it certainly is not adequate to explain the full process of Costa Rican democratization. I contend that

RICHARD MEDINA

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such theories suffer from a sort of omitted variable bias. There appears to be little or no causal link between Costa Rica’s uniquely “democratic” culture and its path of democratization. Rather, I argue that the same structural variables in the Costa Rican political-economic system that allowed for successful democratization also account for its “democratic” culture. Furthermore, the extent to which Costa Rica was charac-terized by an egalitarian and democratic society is often exaggerated.

In her article in World Politics, “Identity and Persuasion: How Nations Re-member Their Pasts and Make Their Futures,” and in her subsequently published book, Political Culture and Institutional Development in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, politi-cal scientist Consuelo Cruz takes a primarily culturalist approach by attributing the tradition of democracy to the rhetorical framing of national identity and collective

Costa Rica which attributes the nation’s political development primarily to unique aspects of its cultural history that have in turn affected the population’s general at-titude toward democracy. A broader analysis, however, suggests that this “Costa Rican exceptionalism,” while perhaps a contributing factor to Costa Rica’s uniquely resilient democracy, does not adequately explain the full complexity of the phenomenon. In order to understand the full picture of Costa Rican democracy, one must consider Costa Rica’s unique socioeconomic structure, its political-military structure, and its electoral landscape.

THE CULTURALIST APPROACH

Rather than referring to themselves as costarricenses, Costa Rican natives use the colloquial term “ticos.” This self-referential term is often used as both adjective and noun by Costa Ricans to describe their unique national outlook and attitude. Ticos “do not like unpleasantness and shun extremes and fanaticism.”4 They prefer to resolve disputes a la tica, the tico way, “with civility and without rancor.” 5 La tica has become a source of immense national pride for Costa Ricans, and many ascribe Costa Rica’s exceptional democratic development to this unique cultural outlook. This has led to the promulgation of Costa Rica’s great national myth: “that democracy grew upon the colonial foundation of a uniquely racially homogeneous, egalitarian, rural protodemocracy.”6

Cruz argues that, as early as the colonial period, Costa Rica began to “forge a national identity that declared such virtues as civility and peacefulness to be consti-tutive of their ‘character’.”7 Cruz essentially takes what political scientist John Booth would call a culturalist approach to Costa Rican democratization, arguing that “de-mocracy arises from a process of cultural change that leads to widely shared demo-cratic norms.”8 This approach implies that democracy was a sort of cultural norm in

la tica.Cruz puts a unique spin on the culturalist approach by arguing that the idea

of Costa Rican exceptionalism, incorporating all of the attributes associated with la ticarhetoric. In her formulation, “we cannot grasp the nature and dynamics of political

COSTA RICA: A STRUCTURAL APPROACH

37

identity—and collective identity more broadly—unless we understand the rhetorical frames that emerge as dominant at critical junctures in the history of a group or na-tion.”9 Costa Rica’s democratic character is thus best explained, according to Cruz, by the employment of Costa Rican exceptionalism as the primary rhetorical strategy of elites. Because political actors situated their struggles “within a dominant rhetorical frame, political contests between them engender a -tiescan or cannot be changed and how the future ought to look.”10

Costa Rica was moderated by a rhetorical framework that made illiberal or non-dem-ocratic forms of government unimaginable. Such aberrations were simply not “the tico way.” The Costa Rican rhetorical frame “upheld as truth the claim that they were, both by reputation and in fact, an inherently peaceable and diligent people.”11 The employment of this rhetorical frame allowed elites to collaborate and build consensus on developmental policies and ultimately create a politically stable environment for their interests.12

It is clear that Costa Rica had, and continues to have, a very unique cultural proclivity toward moderation, peace, cooperation, and democracy. However, it is not clear that this cultural tendency, or the efforts of political elites to promote this ten-

It is possible that this cultural idiosyncrasy might be a result of Costa Rica’s history of democratic continuity and stability, rather than the other way around. Alternatively, and perhaps more likely, there might be an omitted variable or a series of omitted variables that correlate with both democratization and cultural attitudes toward de-mocracy, causing us to overestimate the explanatory power of cultural attitudes. In or-der to gain a greater understanding of the scope of Costa Rican political development and democracy, we must consider a number of structural, political, and socioeco-nomic aspects that make the country unique, in addition to its cultural peculiarities.

POLITICAL-MILITARY STRUCTURE

Foremost among the foundations of Costa Rica’s democratic stability is the historical relationship that the country has had with its military. Costa Ricans have a history of distrusting militarism, and the military has never played a very substantial role in Costa Rican politics.13 The two major exceptions to this rule in the twenti-eth century are the 1917 military coup and the 1948 civil war. Here I follow Cruz’s example in reaching back to Costa Rica’s colonial history and the early years of its independence. Charles Ameringer notes that “with neither an external threat nor an indigenous population to subjugate, warfare and arms were not part of the colonial experience.”14 Costa Rica’s distinctly nonviolent colonial history did more than just frame the rhetoric of its elites, as Cruz would argue. Although this lack of violence and militarism had a distinct dispositional effect on Costa Rican culture, it also meant that, unlike in the rest of Latin America, there was no impetus for the development of a politically powerful military apparatus.

Ironically, Costa Rica’s apparent relative lack of wealth might have had a sig-

RICHARD MEDINA

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colonists, and the indigenous population was too small to provide enough labor to permit the establishment of large agricultural estates. The settlers were mostly small farmers who worked the land themselves. For this reason, the Spanish Crown took

-veloped. These factors, combined with its relative geographic isolation created condi-tions within Costa Rica that permitted a sort of socioeconomic development unlike

15

As important as Costa Rica’s colonial history, or perhaps even more so, is the manner in which it achieved independence. Unlike most of Latin America, Costa Rica never fought a violent revolution against a colonial power. In the wake of the Mexican Revolution, in which it did not take part, Costa Rica was simply granted independence with the rest of Central America. There was never any reason for the

-bilities. As a result, “civilian authorities, not caudillos (military chieftains), formed the

16In many Latin American countries including Chile, Argentina, Co-lombia, and Peru, the years following independence were marked by a series of armed struggles between military leaders, creole elites, and rural peasants, all of whom had played a role in the wars of independence and demanded a role in the governance of the newly independent nations.17 Not only did Costa Rica escape the frequent regime

-ity or political-military structure that arose in much of the rest of Latin America.

This unique civil-military balance was disrupted a few times over the course

century, is out of the scope of this analysis, but it is worth noting for the historical background it provides. In keeping with the theme of isolation and fear of external

in 1855, when the Nicaraguan Democrats sought to break a stalemate in the Nicara-guan Civil War by bringing in the American William Walker and his band of mercenar-ies. 18Walker took over Nicaragua in a matter of months, and many within Costa Rica feared that he would move south. Costa Rica’s “civil character” and “inferior military capabilities” meant that up to this point it had been in the interest of Costa Rican governments to “keep at arm’s length from the rest of the region.”19With Walker as a looming threat, however, elites were divided as to the wisdom of interfering in Nica-

war on Walker and personally led his troops into Nicaragua. While the President was away from the capital, the opposition attempted a failed coup. Mora Porras hastened home to reassert political control, and was forced to appoint a military successor on

20 Walker surrendered in May of 1857, which gave President Mora Porras a brief surge in popularity. But the president, having broken tradition by becoming


39

and the coffee economy.”21 By 1859, that balancing was “less than perfect” and the president was removed and executed.22

Here we see a momentary disruption in two stabilizing factors: geopolitical isolation and military activity. Not only did Mora Porras put Costa Rica into an inter-

themselves in battle.”23 Although we will see later that true democratization did not come to Costa Rica until the twentieth century, up until this point the oligarchy of coffee elites that ruled the country had been constrained by “the substantive logic of rule legitimation” and by “the process of transacción, or bargaining.”24 Now, however, elites could “turn to the military to impose or depose presidents from this or that notable family.”25

The new political role of the military proved unsustainable and did not last. Power shifted among elite families depending on which family was able to most suc-cessfully bid for the military’s support. Under the postcolonial system of “exception-alist normative scheming,” those who were perceived by the elite as the most effective leaders were able to retain political power, while those who were deemed less effec-tive were excluded.26 This meritocratic system, in which governmental legitimacy was based primarily on perceived effectiveness and the ability to fairly negotiate the in-terests of all of the members of the ruling oligarchy, was directly undermined by the military’s role. When Tomás Guardia came to power in 1870, he immediately “severed

of the nation’s sovereignty.”27

SOCIOECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND MASS ELECTORAL POLITICS

It is tempting to think of Costa Rica as an inherently exceptional nation with a long history of inclusive democracy and an egalitarian society, punctuated only by the two brief disturbances in 1917 and 1948. This historical interpretation, how-

within Costa Rica itself, “the traditional history of a classless society of subsistence farmers living in a rural democracy has been shown to be little more than a myth.”28 In reality, Costa Rica was ruled by an oligarchy of cafetaleros, or coffee-grower elites, for most of its history.29 While the country does have a history of progressive economic reforms, until the middle of the twentieth century these reforms were largely carried out by a group of “enlightened elites” and were not formulated in response to popu-lar agitation—a system that eventually proved to be unsustainable.

It should be noted that the “elites” I refer to in this paper are primarily eco-nomic rather than social elites. As in the United States, class in Costa Rica was primarily based on economic rather than social status. While there was certainly no across-the-board equality, there was a certain level of equality among economic elites, which was instrumental in developing the system of transacción, or bargaining between elite families for political power. This bargaining system, along with the lack of social

RICHARD MEDINA

40

of mass electoral politics and the expansion of political participation. The unique Costa Rican socioeconomic structure, in other words, allowed for the alignment of economic and political interests between elites and the “popular classes.” In this way, democratization in Costa Rica started out as a top-down, as opposed to a bottom-up, process. The socioeconomic class structure and the history of political development in Costa Rica were such that both elites and the working class were invested in a model of mass electoral politics.

This alignment of interests was one of the most important driving forces behind the expansion of political participation that occurred around the turn of the century. Even into the twentieth century, as John Peeler has shown, Costa Rican re-gimes

“employed variants of the indirect election: presidents (and some-times deputies) were elected by electoral colleges, which were in turn popularly elected. The right to vote was normally restricted by lit-

was restricted by higher property requirements . . . [L]iteracy require-ments alone would have excluded 90 percent of the population in the mid-nineteenth century.”30

Throughout the Liberal Republic era, which lasted roughly from 1882 to 1948 in Costa Rica, the educated elites “‘competed and cooperated in the control of political

developmental tendencies.”31 As pressures for increased political participation began to emerge, these elites actually supported these pressures, primarily through efforts at educational reform.

settlement” model. Proponents of this model contend that “the small minority of -

tization.”32 Thus, in order for democratization to occur, “powerful minorities must limit their own behavior and accept citizen involvement.”33 Using the elite settlement model to analyze Costa Rican democratization raises the question of identifying the motivation the existing elites had to pursue mass electoral politics. What incentive was there for elites to “accommodate each other in politics, tolerate some citizen in-

34 In fact, the transacción system had already established such a precedent for competing elites. Adding the new variable of “some citizen involvement” to the equation would mark the beginning of

Leaders and members of the ruling socioeconomic class championed educa-tional reform because “by creating a broader base of literate citizens, they hoped to produce mass electoral victories for themselves.”35 By the late 1880s, political elites were building “political-electoral machines designed to reach into the grassroots of the polity.”36 This elite pursuit of mass electoral politics was made feasible by the con-


41

the economic and political interests of workers and economic elites, and the relative weakness and limited political role of the military.

In order to fully understand Costa Rica’s unique socioeconomic structure, we must refer back to the colonial period once again. I have argued thus far that Costa Rica has never been characterized by an exceptional level of equality. I stand by this

was ruled by an oligarchy of coffee-grower elites, it never developed the intense social

This was primarily a result of the colony’s small indigenous population and lack of mineral wealth. Costa Rica did not attract members of the Spanish aristocracy or elite classes who could gain material wealth by exploiting the colony’s natural resources or enslaving its native population in large encomiendas, or land-labor systems. Thus, Costa Rica was unique in that “as early as the seventeenth century there was a notable ‘ab-sence of aristocracy and of a class that enjoyed prestige and privilege because of its status.’”37 Early on, Costa Rica was a colony of small-scale subsistence farmers who practiced “a form of agrarian democracy.”38

There is a racial element to the Costa Rican socioeconomic structure as well.

races created a distinct racial hierarchy the origins of which trace back to the sixteenth century. At the top of the ladder were criollos, or individuals of pure European descent living within the colonies. Below them were varying degrees of mestizo or “mixed” individuals, followed by the indígenas, the indigenous population, which was mostly enslaved39. Costa Rica’s relatively small indigenous population largely prohibited the development of this racial class structure. To this day, “compared to much of Latin America, Costa Rica is relatively racially and culturally homogeneous.”40 What small minorities did exist, including the original indigenous and even smaller black popula-tions, “were largely assimilated into the predominantly mestizo, culturally Hispanic population.”41

Eventually, of course, an upper class did form, “with the advent of coffee production on a large scale, roughly in the period from 1830 to 1890.”42 This coffee-producing elite, however, was less an aristocracy and more “a working class whose initiative, drive and understanding of the mechanisms of capitalism, especially as ap-plied to commercial farming, brought to Costa Rica the largest measure of prosperity that she had known.”43 The economic role of the cafetaleros, or coffee growers, was such that the prosperity they brought to the country tied their economic interests inextricably to the economic interests of the working class, as well as those of smaller coffee producers and farmers. The nation of small farmers was replaced by a nation of “large capitalistic farmers, who employed many farm laborers.”44 A symbiosis de-veloped between farm laborers, who relied on the market for coffee exports and on employment on large-scale farms, and coffee elites who, in the absence of a margin-alized social or racial lower class, relied on criollo farm workers and sometimes small farmers for labor. Even smaller coffee producers became “dependent on the large

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42

producers who controlled the , where the beans were prepared for market.”45 This symbiosis generated an alignment of economic and political interests that made it easy for “enlightened elites” to enact progressive economic and social reforms on behalf of the larger population. This eventually helped incentivize elites to push for educational development and the expansion of mass electoral politics. Furthermore,

-ing political participation.

The limited political role and enforcement capabilities of the military also come into play here. Without “the success of presidents between 1906 and 1913 in curtailing the use of military personnel to intimidate electors,” it is not clear that elites would have pursued mass electoral politics with as much zeal as they did.46 This is true for two reasons. First, elites could not see the military as a viable source of political legitimacy. Second, not only were political elites restricted from turning to the military as a source of political legitimacy, but the military’s limited role meant that elites felt

In the aftermath of President Mora Porras’ execution, elites had competed

power. This directly undermined the performance-based approach to political legiti-macy and the system of bargaining between competing elite families that had main-

-

that the military would no longer be a viable political force.When political elites were restricted from turning to the military as a source

politics as a winning strategy. In other words, the military lacked the political resourc-

sought the allegiance of the “popular classes” could do so without fearing that the military would thwart their efforts. The relative political weakness of the military thus greatly increased the potential political power of the “popular classes,” which made them attractive to elites as a source of political power and legitimacy.

FIRST DISRUPTION: THE 1917 COUP

The political alliance between elites and the “popular classes,” as well as the developing norm of mass political participation, played an instrumental role in the

of the problem was the rapid transition to a more transparent and participatory form of mass democracy. Political leaders continued to “view developmental success as the primary source of political legitimacy,” and failed to fully recognize the vote as the new and powerful source of political legitimacy that it had become.47 The presidential

resulted in the choice of a minority president and a compromise candidate.48 When none of the three major candidates received a majority, the outgoing president, Ri-


43

cardo Jiménez, placed Congressman Alfredo González Flores, who had not been on the original ballot for the presidency, as his successor.

Jiménez, accustomed to the traditional Costa Rican political system, severely misjudged the way in which this imposition would be received. The succession of González Flores particularly outraged organized workers, who were becoming in-

Costa Rican political system, such electoral politics were “neither a novelty nor a fundamental concern.”49 The number of actors in the domestic political system, how-ever, had changed dramatically with increased literacy rates, the expansion of suffrage, and a huge boom in the Costa Rican population. González Flores was easily able to uphold the more traditional tenets of Costa Rican exceptionalism by implementing the sort of developmental programs that had become popular over the years in areas such as education, but “now the exceptional core of the Republic called for electoral legitimation as well.”50

González Flores was confronted by the need to enact progressive socioeco-nomic policies in response to the economic crisis brought about by the onset of World War I. However, he lacked the electoral legitimation that had now become expected. By the start of World War I, the Costa Rican economy had adopted “monoculture production, an import-export model of economic growth, and . . . [had] integrat[ed] into the international market.”51 While the war’s effect on export levels was somewhat delayed, there was an immediate negative effect on imports. Since “the government’s principle source of revenue had been taxation of imports, the war resulted in a pre-cipitous decline in government revenues.”52 President González Flores responded to these economic pressures through increased state intervention in the economy and a

and secure base’ and to address the economic injustices of the current tax system by introducing a progressive tax system that challenged the oligarchy’s economic hege-mony.”53

While González Flores’ economic reforms clearly favored the working, “popular classes” over economic elites, they failed to win him the support of work-ers and labor organizations. This lack of support is a further manifestation of the changing norm of electoral legitimation. Because of the manner in which González Flores became president, he “had no popular mandate or support base within the Congress.”54 This represented “an affront to procedurally based normative standards” in the eyes of organized workers.55 González Flores’ presidency was thus doomed from the very beginning. His governance depended completely on the support of the “enlightened elites” that had always implemented economic reforms on behalf of, but not in response to, the popular sectors of society demanding for reform. González Flores also lacked the electoral legitimacy that the new model of mass political par-ticipation required.56 While the economic reforms he implemented favored popular classes over the elites, he could not turn to organized workers or any other vehicle of the new model of popular political participation because the circumstances of his rise to the presidency had alienated these groups.

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The 1917 military coup led by General Federico Tinoco was thus supported by an unlikely coalition of economic elites and organized workers. The former were responding directly to unfavorable economic policies, while the latter sought simply

-ic elites saw the coup as reestablishing “the proper boundaries between the develop-mental state and the economy,” while laborers saw it as “a well-deserved punishment for transgressions against the electoral principal.”57

It is tempting to ascribe the breakdown in democracy between 1917 and 1919 to the underlying economic pressures brought about by World War I, but the economic dimension is only a part of the story. The real question at hand is why

Economic pressures alone did not cause the system to breakdown, but rather the failure of political elites to adjust the governance model to new trends in Costa Rican political participation. Presidents Jiménez, González Flores, and their administrations failed to fully grasp the implications of mass political participation and reacted poorly to these changes, thus providing the unique circumstances under which economic elites and organized workers found it in their mutual interests to support the over-throw of González Flores’ administration.

The 1917 military coup heralded two developments in the structure of Costa Rican democracy. First, it showed that both the old model that emphasized develop-mental success as a source of political legitimacy and the system of transacción were still relevant to economic elites and to the traditional Republican leadership. González Flores’ “tendency to craft policy without securing the party’s internal consensus” of-

the tradition of transacción.”58 Second, the coup showed that competitive electoral pro-cesses and legitimation by popular vote had become fully incorporated into the Costa

new model of mass political participation promulgated by the elites, but did not fully appreciate the importance of the political process itself.

González Flores’ overthrow was a direct consequence of this failure. He recognized his own lack of electoral legitimation and the need to respond to the economic crisis in a way that would maintain the “substantive legitimation” that had been the basis of power of all the elite-supported administrations that had come be-fore him. In an effort to reconcile these competing models of legitimation, González

working class over economic elites. In doing so, he alienated both the economic elites who sought substantive legitimacy and the organized workers who sought procedural legitimacy. In the lead-up to the coup, the political balance between the elites and the “popular classes” had shifted in such a way that allowed González Flores to anger both socioeconomic groups at the same time, therefore aligning their interests in sup-port of the only viable political alternative.

This momentary disruption in democratic governance may be thought of as the pains of adjusting to the new political reality of mass electoral participation, which


45

itself came about as a result of elite investment in the electoral process. González Flores’ lack of procedural legitimacy also concerned rival political elites because it “signaled the irrelevance of the electoral competitive process in which they were in-creasingly invested.”59 Elites and organized workers had a shared commitment to the principle of electoral legitimation. The real breakdown in democracy was not so much the military dictatorship as the “selection” of González Flores—who wasn’t even on the original ballot—by his predecessor.

It seems counterintuitive that military dictatorship was chosen as the form of government to replace the González Flores administration. It is unclear whether the economic elites or organized labor, both of which supported the coup, saw mili-tary dictatorship as a long-term solution or a means of transition. As Cruz notes, “approval of the coup … did not translate into support of the dictatorship.”60 After

-signing and leaving the country in August 1919 after a mass demonstration in May by schoolteachers and students ended in clashes with police and the army, further discrediting the regime.61

The U.S. role in bringing down Tinoco’s government should not be under-estimated. President Woodrow Wilson’s refusal to recognize the Tinoco government “effectively prevented Costa Rica from accessing much-needed foreign capital from U.S. markets.”62 Tinoco’s failure to alleviate the country’s economic problems, which was partially a result of Wilson’s refusal to recognize his government, alienated both the coffee and import-merchant elites. Once again, the political interests of workers and elites were aligned and the dictatorship was swiftly brought to an end. The 1917-1919 period may thus be thought of as a sort of two-step transition to a new form of mass electoral politics: from González Flores to Tinoco, and then from Tinoco back to functional democracy.

THE INTERWAR YEARS: CLASS STRUGGLE AND DIVISION IN THE 20S AND 30S

The interwar years in Costa Rica, though democratically stable from an in-stitutional perspective, were rather turbulent and were characterized by two political

of the political alliance between elites and organized workers. This alignment of in-terests, as mentioned above, led to the promulgation of mass electoral politics, a coup against President González Flores based on a lack of electoral legitimacy, and the subsequent removal of the military dictator Federico Tinoco. It would seem that this unlikely coalition was well on its way toward establishing a stable democratic regime in Costa Rica. Democracy was restored after the ousting of Tinoco and lasted until the 1948 civil war, but the competing logics of substantive and electoral legitimation

accommodation and principled reform” throughout this period.63

Cafetalero elites had initially pushed for the expansion of political participation

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elites were “plainly caught between the urgent need to respond to popular griev-ances and the equally pressing need to contend effectively with rivals on the electoral plane.”64 During the interwar years, “repeated electoral fraud and several opposition rebellions” underscored public discontent.65 Those labor organizations that survived, such as the Confederación General de Trabajadores (CGT), became increasingly frustrated

to radical measures. 66 The response to this growing societal dissatisfaction was the second major

change to the democratic system: the appearance of true political parties. Technically speaking, political parties had been around since the 1889 election, but these parties were “personalistic electoral machines, working to elect contending leaders from the coffee elite as president rather than ideologically based party organizations.”67 These new political parties were organized along “popular” lines, and were largely an at-tempt to reconcile the electoral and substantive models of legitimacy.68 As we will see, however, the political system proved largely incapable of handling this new form of political participation, which contributed in large part to the second major disruption in Costa Rica’s democratic continuity: the 1948 civil war. The civil war, like the Tinoco

structure of the political system.How can we explain the breakdown of the alignment of interests between

atrophied in contrast with their progenitors in that they no longer cooperated for the common welfare.”69 As the cooperative alliance across socioeconomic classes broke down, the elite class “attempted to maintain its position without relinquishing tradi-tions of education and democracy, which by their very nature threatened the status quo.”70 Whereas in the past the governing elite had taken on responsibility for social and economic development policies, it now appeared that the cafetaleros had lost inter-est in seeking out new frontiers for economic development.

Up until the interwar years, the Costa Rican working class had very little in-centive to challenge elites as the ruling oligarchy upheld the democratic system and encouraged people to vote and participate in the process of national decision mak-ing.71 This worked in the oligarchy’s favor as long as its economic and political inter-ests were closely tied to those of the working class. As the economic and social gap between the oligarchy and the middle and lower classes widened, though, the highly democratic model that had been promulgated by elites actually started to work against them.

Partido Re-formista) founded in 1921 by General Jorge Volio Jiménez, a European-educated priest and a former soldier that had fought against Walker in Nicaragua. Volio “deplored the lack of ideological content in Costa Rican politics and criticized the oligarchy,

people.’”72 The Reformist Party constituted a direct challenge to the rule of the liberal patriarchs and cafetaleros, but the challenge came from within the elite class itself. Vo-


47

lio, though a reformist, was still a member of the political elite. The Reform Party was “above all interested in the solution of the social problems which beset the nation” rather than in changing or reforming the political system.73

Volio was the Reformist Party’s candidate in the 1924 election, and when none of the three candidates in the race received a majority and the election was left in the hands of the Congress, he gave his support to the candidacy of former president Ricardo Jiménez of the National Republican Party. In return for his support, Volio was granted the Vice Presidency. This marked the demise of the Reformist Party and the return of the old liberal patriarchy to power. Remember that it was Jiménez who appointed González Flores to the presidency in 1914, which eventually sparked the 1917 military coup. Jiménez and the liberal elites managed to maintain the political status quo for some time despite increasing economic and social injustices, but the days of the liberal patriarchy were numbered. The rise of strong ideologically-based

The pro-labor sectors of society, which included unionists, Marxists, social-

years. The Reformist Party of the 1920s was replaced by the Communist Bloque de Obreros y Campesinos (Peasants and Workers Bloc), established in 1930 by Manuel Mora Valverde.74 If the elite had felt threatened by the Reformist party and by the ear-lier reforms of President González Flores, “it was horrorstruck by the possibility that

Rica.”75 This fear was exacerbated by the “alliance between reformist Catholic clergy 76 Once again, a coalition

was starting to build between two sectors of society.

THE CALDERÓN PRESIDENCY: NEW COALITIONS, DIVIDED ELITES, AND THE 1948 CIVIL WAR

When the Great Depression hit in 1929 and banana and coffee prices col-lapsed, the layoffs of thousands of workers gave further impetus to the labor move-ment. A series of successful strikes spread unionization and “the misery affecting Costa Rica’s lower classes during the depression eventually reunited social Christians and labor,” leading to the election of the Republican Party coffee aristocrat Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia.77 -tion that included the Church, the Communist Party, and unions, and pushed a social security program through Congress.78 In response, many of Calderón’s cafetalero al-lies turned against him, effectively splintering the economic and political elite, which

should have marked a “continuation of the oligarchic politics that had characterized 70 years of Liberal rule.”79 Outgoing president León Cortés Castro had in fact chosen Calderón to run on the National Republican Party’s ticket for the 1940 presidential election.”80 Calderón’s presidency, as well as the coalition of labor and church leaders, brought about “the demise of the oligarchy’s largely uncontested control over state resources and policies.”81

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-gates on all of the political pressures that had been building up over the past two

the interwar years even in the face of increased labor struggle, “the elite divided as -

rón’s presidency.82 In many ways, Calderón’s reforms merely served as the catalyst for political change. The alignment of interests between elites and the working class upon which Costa Rican democratic stability had been based throughout the Liberal Regime had shattered during the twenties and thirties. With Calderón’s reforms, this

to the 1948 civil war.The Calderón era was marked not only by a division between elites and the

working class, but also by a series of disagreements within the oligarchy itself. This “precipitated a scramble for political allies that ultimately pitted areform movement spearheaded by President Calderón, the communists, and the archbishop of San José against an opposition alliance composed of the conservative faction of the oligar-chy and middle- and upper-middle-class members of the Social Democratic Party.”83 There are a number of parallels between the Calderón era and the 1917 military coup, not the least of which is “the striking multiclass coalitions that … formed on the

economic objectives,” which allowed them to “temporarily overlook their internal 84

Consuelo Cruz points out that this period was characterized by a competition among competing factions to frame their ideologies within the political rhetoric of la tica. Republican standard bearer Ricardo Jiménez wrote in 1945: “Our people instinc-tively repudiate [the communists’] violent lexicon. In other environments this [lexi-con] might be appropriate, but [in Costa Rica] it merely inspires fear and caution.”85

that the Communist Party needed to pursue its goals “realistically, taking into account the level of education of our masses, their political and philosophical traditions. This is what it means to do revolution in Costa Rica. All the rest is low-grade utopianism. . . . Costa Ricans need a Costa Rican brand of communism.”86 Both groups attempted to frame themselves as inherently democratic, keeping in line with the unique tica brand of democracy and civility while simultaneously attempting to cast the other group as anathema to the tica way. According to Cruz’s theory, however, this rhetorical

the country to avoid civil war and maintain democratic stability. Revolution, as even Mora would admit, is not the tica way. There is certainly some legitimacy to Cruz’s argument. The debate was framed in a way that emphasized the civility and democratic character of the Costa Rican people, but in order to understand why that civility and democratic character broke down, we must look beyond cultural attitudes toward the structural changes in the Costa Rican political economy.

The years leading up to the 1948 civil war were characterized by a number


49

of discontinuities and changes in the Costa Rican political system. Foremost among these was the development of a class-based division between elites and workers. Much of Costa Rican history up until this point had been characterized by a spirit of symbiosis and alignment of interests between these two socioeconomic groups. Early on, the Costa Rican “Liberal Regime” enacted economic, social, and political reforms on behalf of the working class. Later, these same elites actively pushed for the expansion of literacy programs and the promulgation of mass electoral politics and increased political participation. This eventually led to the 1917 military coup and the subsequent 1919 ousting of General Tinoco, two events which were supported by both workers and elites, though for different reasons. Throughout the interwar years, however, this coalition broke down and a class-based political struggle began to form.

The second major development in the lead-up to the civil war was the prom-ulgation of ideologically-based political parties. In many ways, these political parties contributed to the aforementioned class divide. Political parties that were based on ideology, rather than personalistic parties formed around individuals, were an im-portant facilitator for the political mobilization of the popular classes. While these

-sisted of the reforms of the Calderón presidency, which splintered the elite and led to the formation of new political coalitions. The division of elites and the increasing rate of popular organization “led factions of the elite to court multiclass alliances [in order] to bolster their respective strength in the political arena.”87 The division within the oligarchy “created the political opportunity and political imperative for the differ-ent factions of the oligarchy to make alliance with the popular sectors.”88 These new coalitions were different, however, in that they pitted elite factions against each other, each vying for electoral support from different sectors of the population.

While Calderón and his supporters sought an alliance with the Catholic Church and the communists, other elites joined with the country’s middle class, many

economic corruption.”89 The middle class in Costa Rica differed from that in other Central American countries in the way in which it began to emerge “simultaneously with the formation of an elite.”90 It was mainly restricted to urban areas, and consisted

workers, and small businessmen, but it also included farmers who owned middle-sized holdings or who produced crops largely for domestic consumption.”91 While the middle class retained an identity distinct from the oligarchy, Costa Rica’s monoculture export-based economy restricted the economic growth of this class and denied it an effective voice in national politics, making it largely irrelevant. Twentieth century urbanization, however, provided the conditions that allowed the middle class to grow

-olic coalition.

In 1948, this opposition coalition selected Otilio Ulate Blanco as its presi-

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dential candidate. Ulate Blanco had been a member of the oligarchy’s National Union Party and was “a newspaper publisher who longed for the good old days of the liberal patriarchy.”92 Ulate Blanco won by about 10,000 votes, but the election was plagued by violence and rampant electoral fraud, and the congress, controlled by the National Republican Party, voted to annul Ulate’s victory. Government troops then moved against the National Union Party and arrested Ulate Blanco.93

The civil war was led by José Figueres Ferrer, “a farmer and businessman who had been catapulted onto the national political stage when he was exiled from Costa Rica for vociferously attacking the Calderón government on national radio in 1942.”94 While “a number of political actors were willing to compromise with the incumbent regime … Figueres was unwilling to do so and was committed to remov-ing the old regime by force.”95 The country’s weak military, even with the support of the Communist Party’s militia, was no match for Figueres’ National Liberation army. Figueres was also supported by foreign mercenaries from the Caribbean Legion, a group of exiles from other Central American and Caribbean countries with whom Figueres had begun making plans during his exile from Costa Rica.96 The war was brought to an end after six weeks by the signing of the Mexican Embassy Pact, under which Figueres would temporarily rule as a de facto military dictator until a new con-stitution had been written and Ulate Blanco could take over as president.97

The constitution of 1949 permanently abolished the standing army and set up a series of democratic institutions to form a “Second Republic” that has lasted to this day. Since the creation of the Second Republic, Costa Rica has been one of the most consistently democratic countries in Latin America. This brings us back to the original question regarding the “equilibrating factor” that has stabilized Costa Rican democracy. Why did Costa Rica’s civil war—a clear disruption of democratic stability

-mala, for example, which founded authoritarian rule after undergoing a coup in 1954

Again, though it is tempting to write off the founding of a new democratic regime to some unique aspect of Costa Rican culture, we must refer back to the social, economic, and political dynamics of the long-term process of democratization. As in 1917 and 1919, the opposition was made up of a multiclass coalition. The key differ-ence here is that the opposition in 1917 and 1919 enjoyed virtually unanimous sup-port among both workers and elites. In the run-up to the 1948 civil war, this alliance fractured, eventually leading to the creation of new multiclass coalitions that divided the elites among them, thus severely weakening the oligarchy. This helps to explain why the existing liberal regime was replaced by a more robustly democratic system in the 1949 constitution. Furthermore, the fact that the regime-founding coalition consisted of a cross-section of different socioeconomic classes helped to guarantee a democratic outcome. The coalition “resolved competition among all these groups in a democratic compromise between the middle class and the elite political parties.”98


51

CONCLUSIONS-

as the processes of political development that surrounded them, can provide some useful insight into the circumstances under which democratization is most likely to be successful.

as a time of democratic continuity, but as a period of inconsistent democratic devel-opment. As we have seen, Costa Rica did not enter the twentieth century as a fully

-gree of economic inequality. The country did, however, have the liberal democratic institutions necessary to accommodate changes to its political system. The limited political role of the military, as well as a unique socioeconomic structure, allowed for the alignment of interests between workers and elites early on that led to the eventual expansion of mass electoral politics and political participation. This provides support for the elite settlement model of democratization, in which democratization is willingly brought about by a small group of elites. The existing po-litical structure proved unable to handle this new level of political participation, and this instability created the necessary conditions for a coalition of elites and organized workers to unite in order to overthrow the existing government and the military dicta-tor that subsequently took over. Once democracy was restored and this alliance broke down, Costa Rica experienced a period of intense political turmoil, but its democratic

-tional structure was brought down when the elite divided, political parties further mo-bilized the popular classes, and new multiclass coalitions formed. Once again, the ef-fect of this democratic disruption was moderated by the existence of these multiclass coalitions. In the case of both of the democratic disruptions discussed in this paper, the equilibrating factor that allowed for a return to a higher level of stable democracy was the ability to create multiclass coalitions that consisted of a broad cross-section of Costa Rican society. While tico culture certainly has a unique proclivity for moderation, civility, and democracy, its principles alone cannot entirely explain Costa Rican democratic stabil-ity; nor can the rhetorical framing used by competing elites explain this stability. As we have seen, for much of the twentieth century, Costa Rican democratic stability was

and acted in cooperation with the popular classes. This stability, however, is some-thing of a separate phenomenon from the process of Costa Rican democratization. Each of the two disturbances in institutional stability were a reaction to democratizing shocks to the political system, and after each of these shocks the system was balanced

not impossible, to replicate these unique structural factors elsewhere in Latin America or any other region, these conclusions regarding political-military structure and the value of multiclass coalitions could provide some insight into the outlook for future

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processes of democratization.

NOTES

1. Economist Intelligence Unit. Democracy Index 2011: Democracy Under Stress. 2011.2. John A. Booth, Costa Rica: Quest for Democracy (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998), 197.3. Ibid.4. Charles D. Ameringer, Democracy in Costa Rica (New York: Praeger, 1982), 1. 5. Ibid.6. Booth, Costa Rica, 196.7. Consuelo Cruz, Political Culture and Institutional Development in Costa Rica and Nicaragua: World-making

in the Tropics (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005), 90.8. Booth, Costa Rica, 7.9. Consuelo Cruz, “Identity and Persuasion: How Nations Remember Their Pasts and Make Their

Futures,” World Politics 52.3 (2000): 276.10. Ibid., 277. 11. Ibid., 278.12. Ibid.13. John Booth. “Costa Rican Democracy,” World Affairs, Vol. 150, No. 1 (Summer 1987), 50.14. Ameringer, Democracy in Costa Rica, 2.15. Ibid., 10.16. Ibid., 2.17. David Bushnell and Neill Macaulay. The Emergence of Latin America in the Nineteenth Century. (New

York: Oxford University Press, 1988)18. Cruz, Political Culture and Institutional Development, 113.19. Ibid, 113-114.20. Ibid, 11421. Ibid. 22. Ibid.23. Ibid.24. Ibid.25. Ibid.26. Ibid., 115.27. Cruz, Political Culture and Institutional Development, 115.28. Bruce M. Wilson, Costa Rica: Politics, Economics, and Democracy, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 35.29. Booth, Costa Rica, 36.30. Cruz, Political Culture and Institutional Development, 116.31. Ibid, 117.32. Booth, Costa Rica, 8.33. Ibid.34. Ibid.35. Cruz, Political Culture and Institutional Development, 118.36. 36. Ibid.37. John P. Bell, Crisis in Costa Rica: The 1948 Revolution (Austin: Published for the Institute of Latin

American Studies by the University of Texas, 1971), 5.38. Ibid.39. Marisol de la Cadena, Formaciones de indianidad: articulaciones raciales, mestizaje y nación en América

Latina. (1. ed. Colombia: Envión, 2007)40. Booth, Costa Rica, 86.41. Ibid.42. Bell, Crisis in Costa Rica, 5.


5343. Ibid, 5-6.44. Ibid, 6.45. Ibid.46. Cruz, Political Culture and Institutional Development,118.47. Cruz, Political Culture and Institutional Development, 121.48. Ameringer, Democracy in Costa Rica, 21.49. Cruz, Political Culture and Institutional Development, 121.50. Ibid, 122.51. Wilson, Costa Rica, 28.52. Ibid.53. Ibid.54. Ibid, 29.55. Cruz, Political Culture and Institutional Development, 123.56. Wilson, Costa Rica, 29.57. Cruz, Political Culture and Institutional Development, 123.58. Ibid. 59. Ibid.60. Ibid. 61. Ameringer, Democracy in Costa Rica, 23.62. Wilson, Costa Rica, 29.63. Cruz, Political Culture and Institutional Development, 124.64. Ibid.65. Booth, Costa Rica, 46.66. Cruz, Political Culture and Institutional Development, 124.67. Wilson, Costa Rica, 30.68. Cruz, Political Culture and Institutional Development, 124.69. Bell, Crisis in Costa Rica, 7.70. Ibid., 7-8.71. Ibid., 10.72. Ameringer, Democracy in Costa Rica, 24. 73. Bell, Crisis in Costa Rica, 11.74. Ibid.75. Ibid.76. Booth, Costa Rica, 43. 77. Ibid.78. Ibid.79. Deborah J. Yashar, Demanding Democracy: Reform and Reaction in Costa Rica and Guatemala, 1870s-

1950s, (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1997), 72.80. Wilson, Costa Rica, 31.81. Yashar, Demanding Democracy, 73.82. Ibid.83. Ibid.84. Ibid.85. Cruz, Political Culture and Institutional Development,,128.86. Ibid., 129.87. Yashar, Demanding Democracy, 81.88. Ibid., 83.89. Wilson, Costa Rica, 33.90. Bell, Crisis in Costa Rica, 9.91. Ibid.92. Wilson, Costa Rica, 34.93. Ibid.94. Ibid., 33-34.

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95. Ibid., 34.96. Ibid.97. Ibid., 35.98. Yashar, Demanding Democracy, 211.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ameringer, Charles D. Democracy in Costa Rica. New York: Praeger, 1982.

Bell, John P. Crisis in Costa Rica: The 1948 Revolution. Austin: Published for the Institute of Latin American Studies by the University of Texas, 1971.

Booth, John A. Costa Rica: Quest for Democracy. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998.

Bushnell, David and Neill Macaulay. The Emergence of Latin America in the Nineteenth Century. (New York: Oxford University Press). 1988.

Cadena, Marisol de la. Formaciones de indianidad: articulaciones raciales, mestizaje y nación en América Latina. 1. ed. Colombia: Envión, 2007.

Cruz, Consuelo. “Identity and Persuasion: How Nations Remember Their Pasts and Make Their Futures.” World Politics 52.3 (2000): 275-312.

Cruz, Consuelo. Political Culture and Institutional Development in Costa Rica and Nicaragua: World-making in the Tropics. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005.

Lara, Silvia, Tom Barry, and Peter Simonson. Inside Costa Rica. Albuquerque, NM: Resource Center, 1995.

Wilson, Bruce M. Costa Rica: Politics, Economics, and Democracy. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998.

Yashar, Deborah J. Demanding Democracy: Reform and Reaction in Costa Rica and Guatemala, 1870s-1950s. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1997.


55

Medicine, religion, and politics are often viewed as disparate disciplines with dissimilar pur-

harnessing the intersections of medicine, religion, and politics to forge a common identi-ty. I argue that Tibet’s unique form of cultural nationalism, integrating Tibetan medicine, Buddhist religious ethics, and the Dalai Lama’s leadership, has developed over the course of many centuries to make the Tibetan people particularly resilient to attacks on their identity. Since the Chinese invasion of 1950, this nationalism has been especially impor-tant in resisting the Chinese government’s attempted suppression of Tibetan culture. This paper will describe the growth of Tibetan nationalism by analyzing the interplay of Bud-

era ranges from the 5th century BCE to the 13th century CE, beginning with the found-ing of Buddhism and ending with the establishment of the position of Dalai Lama. The second historical era ranges from the 14th century CE to 1949 CE, beginning with the re-gimes of various Dalai Lamas and ending with the collapse of British imperialism. In the

His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama, and his charismatic leadership’s centrality to the con-temporary unity between medicine, Buddhism, and political culture. This paper will also analyze the possible implications of the Dalai Lama’s retirement as of March 2011 on both Tibetan cultural nationalism and the contemporary Tibetan resistance movement.

Aamir Hussain

THE INFLUENCE OF MEDICINE, BUDDHISM, & POLITICAL CULTURAL ON TIBETAN NATIONALISM

Aamir Hussain is a junior at Georgetown University majoring in Government, minoring in Theology, and pursuing a pre-medical concentration. He is the co-president of Georgetown University’s Interfaith Student Council and a nationally-registered emergency medical technician. Aamir hopes to attend medi-cal school after graduation, and is especially interested in studying the intersections between interfaith cooperation and public health policy. This paper was originally written for an interdisciplinary seminar taught by Thomas Banchoff, Director of the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University.

INTRODUCTION

-cess which involves knowledge of human physiology, methodical hypothesis testing, and treatment of illness with chemical compounds. However, medicine never exists in isolation; contemporary clashes over medical issues such as contraception, abor-

between science, religious ethics, and public policy.1 These tensions raise a central

The case of Tibet demonstrates that such a harmony can be achieved. Since the Chinese People’s Liberation Army invasion of 1950, the Tibetan people have struggled to maintain their historical and cultural identity in the absence of their own sovereign state. I argue that the unique Tibetan multi-disciplinary philosophy towards medicine known as sowa rigpa, or “the science of healing,” combined with the Dalai Lama’s charismatic leadership have created a unique Tibetan cultural identity

56 TIBETAN NATIONALISM

This identity originated alongside the earliest developments in Tibetan medicine and Tibetan Buddhism, and developed over the course of many centuries to make the Tibetan people especially resilient to attacks on their identity. In the modern era, this cultural identity has essentially transformed into a Tibetan nationalism, which enables the Tibetan people to resist the Chinese government’s cultural imperialism. Indeed, through sowa rigpa and the Dalai Lama, this cultural nationalism lies at the intersec-tion of Tibetan medicinal practice, Buddhist religious ethics, and political leadership.

Tibetan nationalism even transcends the traditional borders of Tibet. Fol-lowing the invasion of the Tibetan region by China in 1950, the territory has be-come known as the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), a province within the People’s Republic of China.2

including His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama, currently live in the Himachal Pradesh state of India. 3,4 Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, Tibet pre-1950 refers to

-ern China including TAR, Qinghai, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Gansu, as well as parts of present-day India, Nepal, and Bhutan. Tibet post-1950 largely refers to regions with

However, since the 14th Dalai Lama announced his retirement in March 2011 from political leadership, Tibetan society has faced an unprecedented threat. While Tibetan cultural identity remains strong due to the aforementioned intersections of medicine, religion, and politics, it remains to be seen whether the Dalai Lama’s charis-matic leadership was solely responsible for reinforcing these connections.

This paper will describe the growth of Tibetan nationalism by analyzing the interplay of Buddhism, medicine, and politics during three different eras of Tibetan history. In addition, I will analyze the implications of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama’s retirement on Tibetan cultural identity and the contemporary Tibetan resis-tance movement.

PART I: BUDDHISM, MEDICINE, AND POLITICS IN CLASSICAL AND MEDIEVAL TIBET (CIRCA 600 BCE TO CIRCA 1300 CE)

Origins of Buddhism and Its Relation to Tibetan MedicineMuch of Tibet’s cultural identity is rooted in the tradition of Buddhism. Bud-

Gautama, later known as the Buddha (“Enlightened One”).5 The Buddha taught that attachment and desire cause suffering, and nirvana—escape from the earthly cycle of life, death, and reincarnation—can be achieved by eliminating desire and behaving in accordance with the Noble Eightfold Path. The Eightfold Path consists of correct view, intention, speech, livelihood, effort, mindfulness, concentration, and action.6 Missionaries gradually spread Buddhism throughout East and Southeast Asia after the Buddha’s death, and the religion entered Tibet in approximately the third century BCE.7

57AAMIR HUSSAIN

The principle of correct action as part of Buddhist theology is especially relevant to the origin of Tibetan medicine due to the belief in karma. This doctrine holds that individuals will be rewarded for good actions and punished for immoral ones. Tibetan Buddhism emerged as a distinct tradition as Tibetan scholars gradu-ally agreed on the principle that one’s physical health could be a direct manifestation of one’s karma: diseases and physical ailments were often considered punishments for people’s immoral actions in their current incarnations.8 This belief was based on the Tibetan Canon, a unique series of sacred texts that originated in Tibet at an unknown date, but were continuously compiled beginning in the 8th century CE and

th century CE.9 One central component of the Tibetan Canon is The Four Tantras, a detailed medical text which is believed to have been dictated by one of the Buddha’s human incarnations (described in Part II of this paper) to one of his students during a sermon.10 The philosophy of this individual, known as the Medicine Buddha, is called sowa rigpa, or “the science of healing”. This term refers

foundation for Tibetan medicine.11 One essential concept articulated in sowa rigpa is that the individual is viewed

each living being contains a mixture of them. In addition, each human body contains

humors are governed by a wide variety of physical and metaphysical forces, including the alignment of stars and planets, seasonal patterns on earth, and human actions. In Tibetan medicine, the three basic humors of wind, bile, and phlegm correspond to the three moral “poisons” of Buddhism - ignorance, anger, and desire, respectively.12 One’s health is inextricably linked to the morality of one’s actions; one could be di-

humoral balance.13 For this reason, sowa rigpa emphasizes caring for an individual’s bodily and moral needs simultaneously in order to preserve the balance between body and soul. Bodily treatments often involve the prescription of diets based on analyses

-tion, and repeating certain Buddhist chants.14

In addition, sowa rigpa expands on the aforementioned relationship between karma and health to include good actions; according to The Four Tantras, the Buddha teaches that providing medical care for the sick is a form of positive karma for the caretaker. Furthermore, monks and nuns are instructed not only to establish sanghas, monastic communities that establish regular prayer and meditation, but also provide medical treatment for the ill. These two doctrines provided clear moral incentives for devout Tibetan Buddhists to actively care for the sick. Therefore, the multi-disci-plinary approach to medicine in sowa rigpa philosophy served to bridge theological

Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetan medicine as unique spheres of knowledge.

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Early Interactions between Politics, Religion, and Medicine

not gain popularity until between the seventh and eighth centuries CE, when several kings began to actively promote the religion.15 This central role of state leaders in

-ing and compilation of the sacred texts composing the Tibetan Canon starting in the eighth century CE, creating a scholarly tradition that would help Tibet develop its unique identity.16

In addition, many rulers in the seventh and eighth centuries actively pro-moted Tibetan medicine as a way to further their support of Buddhism. For example, during this period, one state-employed physician in the court of King Trisong Det-

medical knowledge throughout the region.17 Many of the kings during this period also promoted knowledge exchanges with other major civilizations such as India, Greece, and China, as translators and scholars from around the world were invited to study theology, medicine, and other disciplines at the Tibetan court. Many histo-

18 For example, some scholars suggest that the Tibetan concept of “humors” came from

19 However, rather than adopting foreign understandings of medicine in their entirety,

thought. Therefore, the emphasis on Buddhist ethics as fundamental for bodily and spiritual harmony distinguished Tibetan medicine from these foreign traditions. Med-

even more permanent than that of Buddhism. After Detsen’s death, his successor Lang Darma (d. 847 CE) persecuted Buddhism throughout the kingdom, murdering religious leaders and destroying houses of worship. However, although Lang Darma and other kings throughout the 9th and 10th centuries opposed Buddhism, they were tolerant of the Tibetan medical tradition. Indeed, many provinces continued to estab-lish their own medical communities. Scholars are unsure as to why medical advance-ments seemed to continue without interruption during the persecution of Buddhism, but one hypothesis is that Tibetan medicine had “come to be a collaboration between international and indigenous traditions” that could be applied outside of the context of Buddhism.20 Buddhism was later restored as the dominant religion of Tibet in the 10th century CE when Lang Darma’s dynasty was replaced by another group of rulers favorable to the religion.21

By establishing its importance despite major political and religious upheav-als, Tibetan medicine acquired a character of permanence and ubiquity in Tibetan culture. Interestingly, this situation would reoccur during the Chinese invasion almost 1,000 years after the rule of Lang Darma. Indeed, Tibetan medicine acted as a pow-erful identity marker and unifying tradition for Tibetans during a period of political

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turmoil. By establishing itself as a constant in the absence of organized Buddhism or stable political rule, Tibetan medicine laid the foundations for a lasting Tibetan cultural identity that would eventually develop into nationalism. Medicine and the Structure of Tibetan Society

One area of advancement throughout the development of Tibetan medicine was embryology. Interestingly, the study of politics advanced alongside embryology because Tibetan scholars began to examine the concepts of personhood and human identity. Their interest in these areas originated with a desire to understand the devel-

does not believe in creation by divine providence, the overarching paradigm for cre-ation, called the Doctrine of Dependent Organization, states that every event occurs as the result of another event..22 As a result, any person’s actions or alterations of the universal order will impact the lives of others. The example of the fetus illustrates this idea, since it is impossible for a single person in isolation to create life; rather, the relationship between a male and female is required in order for conception to occur. The Doctrine of Dependent Organization creates a group identity within Buddhist (and Tibetan) society, and reinforces the doctrine of karma discussed earlier. Indeed, it is necessary for people to act virtuous within a society, since the consequences of their actions may be felt by everyone in their community.23

Sanghas were designed to provide the religious and medical leadership that would cultivate this virtuous behavior among the general public. Most societies were part of the larger feudal system that had existed for centuries before Buddhism en-tered Tibet. The majority of people were peasants who would cultivate livestock or crops for the aristocracy in exchange for protection. However, the establishment of sanghas as described above ensured that Tibetan medicine was a part of everyday life.24 The existence of indigenous beliefs alongside the rapidly developing Tibetan medical tradition also gave rise to various “classes” of healers, such as diviners and oracles (specializing in ritual healing), Tantric practitioners (specializing in exorcisms), and amchi (doctors trained in monastic schools). Despite the presence of “alterna-tive” forms of healing, amchi were accorded the highest prestige among societal heal-ers because they represented the legitimacy of the unique Tibetan medical tradition.25

As Buddhism spread throughout Tibet, monastic communities became in-creasingly common. In each region, sanghas gradually developed their own hierarchi-cal systems for monks and nuns which operated independently of the feudal system. The leaders of these monastic systems came to be known as lamas. 26,27 The religious and feudal systems became more closely intertwined when Tibet was threatened by

patronage over monasteries: the lama would serve a lay patron’s spiritual needs in exchange for a guarantee of military protection and societal status from the patron.28

authority. However, by the 14th century, Tibetans came to believe that the reincarna-tion of the Buddha existed in human form, and that this person—the Dalai Lama—was a leader destined to head both religious and political affairs.29,30 As such, the Dalai

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of social organization, Buddhism, and political leadership.

PART II: BUDDHISM, MEDICINE, AND POLITICS IN TIBET FROM CIRCA 1300 CE TO 1949 CE

Dalai Lamas as Religious and Political LeadersThe belief in the Dalai Lama is unique to Tibetan Buddhism, but has its

origins in the concept of bodhisattvas, which is present in all forms of Buddhism. Bodhisattvas are roughly equivalent to “saints” in the Christian tradition, and repre-

-sion. 31 Bodhisattvas are often individuals who are no longer living, but attained such moral perfection on Earth that others claim they reached nirvana after death. Many Buddhists believe that nonliving bodhisattvas can assist and inspire those on earth who invoke them through chants and practice moral virtues. In Tibetan medicine, the legendary founder of sowa rigpa was a bodhisattva known as the Medicine Buddha or Bhaisajyaguru. The Medicine Buddha’s goal was to care for the lay public by under-

32

The various sects of Buddhism diverge on the question of the bodhisattva’s identity. In Theravada Buddhism, the oldest tradition and dominant form in modern Southeast Asia, the original Buddha chose to leave nirvana and return to Earth in various human incarnations (i.e. bodhisattvas) in order to model particular virtues and lead his followers by example. In Mahayana Buddhism (the form which encompasses Tibetan Buddhism and other traditions in East Asia including Japanese Zen Bud-dhism) a bodhisattva can be any individual who has made a commitment to not only achieving nirvana but also aiding others in reaching this goal.33,34,35

Beginning in the late 14th century CE, Tibetan Buddhism developed the con-cept of the Dalai Lama that integrates views of the bodhisattva from both Theravada and other Mahayana theologies. In Tibetan Buddhism, the Dalai Lama is considered to be a living reincarnation of the Buddha known as the Chenrezi (or Avalokitesh-

36 The Dalai Lama’s role on Earth is to act as both a political and religious leader; in practical terms, the Dalai Lama bridges the gap between the secular feudal aristocracy and the religious sanghas by being at the top of both hierarchies.37

(1543-1588 CE), the third abbot of Drepung Monastery near Lhasa, the largest city in Tibet. Drepung Monastery was part of the Gelukpa sect of Tibetan Buddhism, known for its strict enforcement of discipline and adherence to traditional forms of

Lama after visiting the court of Khoshut Mongol chief Altan Khan in 1578 and con-vincing the Khoshut Mongols to adopt Buddhism. After several decades of war and conquest, the Mongols longed for a stable system of government, and Altan Khan had a great regard for the disciplined tradition of the Gelukpa sect. Interestingly, So-

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nam Gyatso was considered the Third Dalai Lama, and the Dalai Lama title was con-ferred posthumously on two of his predecessors. The Dalai Lama is believed to exist on Earth perpetually, so every time one Dalai Lama passes away, monks begin a quest

years, and involves the examination of numerous individuals who must exhibit very

for the previous Dalai Lama’s personal items.38 The years immediately following any Dalai Lama’s death were often turbulent and resulted in instability from the lack of a

Tibetan Identity under the Great Fifth Dalai Lama Despite the supposed spiritual and political authority of the Dalai Lama, the

-gion. Tibet remained divided into two other major monastic sects, the Kagyupa and Nyigmapa, which corresponded to other geographic regions.39,40

The Fifth Dalai Lama Lozang Gyatso (1617-1682 CE) presided over another period characterized by many intersections between Buddhism, politics, and Tibetan

leader to rule over the entire Tibetan region. He was able to accomplish this feat through a military alliance with the Khoshut Mongols under the leadership of Gushri Khan. This marked a change from the tacit subservience of Tibetans to Mongol authority in previous centuries. Instead, Lozang Gyatso used the common ground of Buddhism to forge a partnership between Tibetans with the seemingly alien Mon-gols. This consolidation of Dalai Lama authority over all of Tibet fostered the sense

Gyatso sought to enshrine this newfound authority by ordering the construction of

Lhasa.41 Throughout his reign, Potala served as a reminder that Tibet was no longer a disjointed collection of feudal states.

Lozang Gyatso also realized that his authority would allow for a greater con-solidation of Tibetan medical identity. Lozang Gyatso’s minister, Desi Sangye Gyat-so reconciled the major divisions between the Tibetan medical traditions based on geographic regions and monastic sects that had existed for many centuries. Lozang Gyatso also sought to improve Tibetan medical knowledge by learning from outside sources; to this end, he revived the tradition of knowledge exchanges begun in the early period of Tibetan medicine by inviting medical experts from neighboring India and China to study in Tibet. In one instance, Indian scholars discussed their own Hindu ayurvedic texts, Chinese physicians taught eye surgery, while Tibetan scholars showcased many herbs and remedies native to the Tibetan medical tradition.42

These knowledge exchanges also helped foster the idea of Tibetan cultural nationalism because they were more than just conferences between scholars of India and Tibet; rather, both regions had powerful empires at this time, and these exchanges were now viewed as a form of goodwill between two strong regimes. As in the case of

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the earlier interaction between Tibet and the Khoshut Mongols, the reputable intel-lectual tradition of Tibetan Buddhism and medicine was the foundation for Tibet’s greater prestige among other cultures.43

Desi Sangye also established many state-sponsored medical schools in the

Mountain) Medical College, founded in 1696 after the death of Lozang Gyatso. Desi Sangye actually ruled as regent from the death of Lozang Gyatso until 1702 CE, in order to prevent the power vacuum that may have resulted from the lack of a Da-lai Lama. Desi Sangye required Chagpori doctors to train new physicians in major provincial monasteries, and establish a series of new medical colleges throughout Tibet following the philosophy of sowa rigpa.44 Many aspects of the medical college structure became standardized, including medical curricula, granting of degrees, and student enrollment procedures.45 During this period, many physicians became part of the civil service, becoming employed by provincial and federal governments; the doc-tors trained at Chagpori were the most respected, and frequently served as personal physicians to provincial rulers.46 By bridging the religious and political spheres of Tibetan society, Lozang Gyatso and Desi Sangye were able to greatly advance medical education and research by combining the rich traditions of monastic medical knowl-edge with institutional support.

In contrast to the strong federal government system described above, inef-

Dalai Lamas throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although Tibet was periodically ruled by other empires including the Qing (Manchu) Dynasty of China, the overall structure of Tibetan medicine was left undisturbed since it was again so deeply ingrained in society. The lack of a consistent Dalai Lama (many of them died young, and Tibet was nominally governed by regents) may have hurt the ideal of a coherent Tibetan identity throughout these centuries, but Tibet’s geographic isolation due to the Himalayas allowed the Tibetan people to retain their lifestyle.47

The British Colonial PeriodBeginning in 1903, Tibet was forced to interact with foreigners as the British

sought to increase their empire in South and East Asia. Under the command of Lord Younghusband, British armed forces fought their way from Northern India to Lhasa, and demanded that Tibet enter into diplomatic relations with British India. The Brit-ish also established a permanent presence in Tibet and built Western-style hospitals to dispense European medicine.48

This episode was extremely troubling for Tibetans because it appeared that their entire identity was under attack. No longer could they pay nominal submission to the Manchu and maintain their traditional lifestyle within their Himalayan sanctu-ary; the British were constantly attempting to gain control over Indian trade routes and to make matters worse, the establishment of Western medicine threatened to delegitimize the centuries-old Tibetan medical tradition.49 Tibet would need to adapt

Britain.

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Tibet was thrown a lifeline when the Chinese Revolution deposed the Man-chus in 1912. The resulting chaos allowed Tibetans to expel the Chinese troops, and the newly-formed Chinese government allowed Tibet to exist as an independent state under the rule of the 13th Dalai Lama, Thubten Gyatso (1876-1933 CE).50 Thubten Gyatso knew that Tibetan cultural identity through Tibetan medicine needed to be

the Men-Tsee-Khang (MTK) in 1916, a medical hospital that integrated traditional Ti-betan medicine with Western biomedical practices. In doing so, he laid the foundation

51 The Tibetan population was extremely supportive of this idea because the

MTK provided greater healthcare accessibility, and was in accordance with the Dalai Lama’s moral-spiritual duties as a bodhisattva of love and compassion to provide for the well-being of his people.52 Through the MTK, the Tibetan government was particularly successful in providing for pregnant women, new mothers, and infants, as well as needy communities throughout the country.53 Even established elites and re-ligious conservatives largely supported the MTK, because it did not supplant pre-ex-isting training centers like village monasteries and the Chagpori; instead, the Tibetan government required monasteries to send small quotas of students to the MTK where equal numbers of students would study either Western biomedicine or Tibetan astrol-ogy.54 To many Tibetans, this multi-disciplinary study of religion was nothing new; in fact, it was a modern re-interpretation of the sowa rigpa. This approach maintained an optimal balance of modernization and tradition that maintained the Tibetan people’s pride in their cultural identity and legacy.

The success of the MTK caused many Tibetans to grow disillusioned with British hospitals. After all, since the MTK treated patients with both Western medi-cine and traditional Tibetan practices, what was the use of British hospitals that could

as condescending and elitist because British physicians made no attempts to become

accounts because although some of the British may have had missionary spirit to alle-

were only concerned about the lack of Tibetan interest in Western medicine because

Western biomedical tradition.55

Although the 13th Dalai Lama accomplished his goal of combating British

to ensure Tibet’s security. His attempts to modernize the Tibetan military were con-tinually blocked by religious and secular elites within Tibet. In 1930, a border dispute with the Republic of China erupted into the Sino-Tibetan War, which proved devas-tating to Tibet. The Tibetan Army was roundly defeated, and the 13th Dalai Lama was required to concede various provinces to China. This defeat greatly weakened Tibet, and set the stage for the infamous Chinese invasion of 1950.56,57

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Despite these setbacks, the Tibetan medical tradition endured, and again served as a powerful marker of identity for the Tibetan people. The MTK was a sym-

capacity to adapt and assimilate foreign forms of knowledge into their own cultural tradition. In many ways, the attempted British colonization of Tibet was a precursor for the later Chinese invasion. In both cases, Tibet was treated as an inferior territory;

a result, the Tibetan people derived their national identity both from the Buddhist

between the religious and political realms.

PART III: Challenges Facing Tibet Post-1950

The Chinese Invasion of 1950

After the victory of the Chinese Communist Party against the forces of Chi-

The agreement between Tibet and the Republic of China that established Tibet as an independent state was viewed as void, and in 1950, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army invaded Tibet. There was some violence and destruction of cultural buildings, but like most invaders of Tibet throughout the centuries, the Chinese also tolerated Tibetan culture to some degree. Traditional religious practices were allowed, and ex-isting medical colleges like the MTK and Chagpori were allowed to function as long as they emphasized Western biomedicine instead of sowa rigpa. Scholars suggest that the Chinese pursued this tolerant policy in order to gain loyalty from the Tibetan people.58,59,60

In addition, the 14th Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso (b. 1935 CE) had been rec-ognized in 1937, and was accorded full privileges as head of state in 1950 during the Chinese invasion. As the political and religious leader of Tibet, Tenzin Gyatso trav-elled to China throughout the 1950s in order to negotiate (albeit unsuccessfully) with the Communist Party.61

However, despite attempts by the Chinese to gain Tibetan loyalty, the Tibetan people became increasingly disillusioned with the Chinese occupation. Again, medi-cine, politics, and religion crystallized into a greater sense of Tibetan cultural identity. In general, Tibetans disliked the general Chinese attitude that Tibetan culture was in-ferior and should be gradually “phased out.” As mentioned above, the MTK and Cha-gpori colleges were required to focus on Western medicine, and the Chinese forcibly established Western-style hospitals to compete with Tibetan medical schools. Monk-physicians were often forbidden to practice, and their philosophy of sowa rigpa could

Central Tibet attempted to uproot traditional Tibetan societal structure and institute land reforms, much to the chagrin of the landed aristocrats. Finally, many of the Dalai Lama’s supporters vocally expressed frustration that the Dalai Lama was not treated with the respect usually accorded a head of state, and that the Communist Party did not take Tibetan negotiation attempts seriously.62

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All of these factors contributed to the rise of Tibetan nationalism, and a growing feeling of resentment among the Tibetan people. This discontent with Chi-

and these sporadic attacks spiraled into a full-scale rebellion in Lhasa in 1959 known as the Lhasa Uprising. The Chinese army was called once again to suppress the revolt, and this time, the Chinese were not at all tolerant of Tibetan practices. The Chinese government destroyed the Chagpori medical college and gradually curtailed funding to the MTK, decreasing the number, quality, and accessibility of doctors in Tibet.63 Furthermore, Chinese forces razed monasteries, plundered temples, and murdered religious leaders. An estimated 1.2 million Tibetans lost their lives, and those who professed loyalty to the Dalai Lama were tortured or jailed. China attempted to eradi-cate all notions of Tibetan history and culture in order to forcibly assimilate Tibetans into the new Communist Chinese identity. The systematic Chinese extermination of monks, nuns, and spiritual teachers even led some to question the survival of Tibetan Buddhism. While the Dalai Lama had been allowed to remain in Tibet after the initial invasion of 1950, the extremely brutal Chinese suppression of the Lhasa Uprising

64 Following this crackdown, -

betan Autonomous Region (TAR), a province of China itself, while other regions of

as Sichuan, Yunnan, and Qinghai.

Tibetans in China outside of the TARSince 1959, Tibetans living in these other provinces have faced systematic

cultural imperialism by China. For example, the Chinese government, employing its strict control of public education, has portrayed Tibetan culture in a negative light, prevented the teaching of Buddhism, and discouraged Tibetan children from learning their native language.65 However, certain applications of their cultural identity have allowed Tibetans to resist these efforts. One interesting case study involves Diqing, a prefecture in Yunnan Province with a large number of Tibetans. Facing serious economic hardship, Tibetan political and religious leaders decided to heavily invest in tourism focusing on the large number of traditional monasteries in the region.66 Clearly, this was politically problematic, but the Chinese government allowed a mod-est amount of investment to occur in the hopes of promoting economic growth. When the results were far better than expected, the Chinese government further re-laxed restrictions and allowed greater autonomy for Tibetan leaders, therefore en-abling Diqing to generate an even larger amount of revenue from tourism. 67

Diqing’s economic success was based largely around its leaders’ efforts to promote an accurate view of Tibetan culture, history, and literature without interfer-ence from the Chinese government.68 This was very unique within China, as even the TAR faces a large degree of censorship with regards to its portrayal of Tibetan history to tourists. The case of Diqing suggests that the Chinese government is of-ten more interested in economic success than cultural imperialism. Although Tibetan

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medicine was not explicitly a part of this effort, the case of Diqing demonstrates that promoting the unique religious and historical aspects of Tibetan culture still allows Tibetans living under Chinese rule to resist suppression of their identity in the present day. Unfortunately, Diqing is the exception rather than the norm among regions with large numbers of Tibetans within China, and it remains to be seen whether these oth-er areas will follow Diqing’s model for economic growth based on cultural identity.69

However, the massive exodus of Tibetan refugees to India has marked a new

Tibet under the Fifth Dalai Lama, Tibetans had always been able to base their iden-

sanghas and feudalism. Both of these ideas could no longer be taken for granted, as Tibetans were now a refugee population who would need to re-establish their entire culture in a foreign land. However, the familiar triad of Tibetan medicine, Buddhism, and the leadership of the Dalai Lama would continue to serve as constants which

The Dalai Lama’s leadership post-1950Outside of China, the 14th Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso has made an incred-

ible commitment towards preserving Tibetan culture in the face of adversity. Ten-zin Gyatso and over 80,000 Tibetans established a Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamsala, Himachal Pradesh (India) following the 1959 crackdown. Since its founding, the Tibetan government-in-exile has expanded drastically, and includes a wide variety of divisions, including a Department of Public Health. Although the Tibetan government is technically a theocracy with the Dalai Lama as head of state, Tenzin Gyatso has constantly promoted freedom of expression, human rights, and even democratic governance. The Tibetans in exile even say, “Our democracy is a gift from the Dalai Lama.”70

By advocating for these democratic norms, the Dalai Lama has been able to draw a clear contrast with authoritarian China, and gain immense international sympathy for Tibet among democratic nations. Dharamsala is also the base for Ti-betan international relations, and in accordance with Tibetan tradition, Tenzin Gyatso

71 Indeed, Tenzin Gyatso has frequently attempted negotiations with the Chinese government by laying out a Five Point Peace Plan, and has given numerous speeches on the topic of Tibetan autonomy to the United States government.72 In these speeches, the 14th Dalai Lama constantly references the Tibetan commitment to peace, and he attempts to draw cultural connections with the Chinese (through their common Buddhist history) as a foundation for honest dialogue. Interestingly, the Chinese government has often tried to delegitimize the Dalai Lama by casting the negotiations as an attempt by His Holi-ness to gain more personal power. The 14th Dalai Lama states that he is personally

and foremost to promote the well-being of his people. 73 By representing Tibet on the world stage and gaining legitimacy for the Tibetan cause through advocacy for non-

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violence, Tenzin Gyatso remains the embodiment of Tibetan culture. For this reason, his charismatic leadership has been central to the preservation of Tibetan national identity in the post-1950 period.

The 14th Dalai Lama has also focused on maintaining Tibetan culture. Af-ter the crackdown of 1959, re-establishing Tibetan medicine was a major priority; in 1961, a “new” Men-Tsee-Khang (which will be hereon referred to by its other name, The Tibetan Medical and Astrological Institute, or TMA, to avoid confusion with the “old” MTK) was founded in Dharamsala, Himachal Pradesh.74 Both the “old” medi-cal school in the Tibet Autonomous Region (now part of China) and the TMA remain in existence today. Interestingly, the “old” MTK is currently able to maintain its Ti-betan medicine traditions, following a gradual liberalization of Chinese policy towards Tibet beginning in the 1980’s.75 The TMA in India primarily serves Tibetan refugees in various parts of the Tibetans’ adopted country. It has worked to emphasize many aspects of pre-1950 Tibetan medicine, including the synthesis of Tibetan spiritu-ality and modern biomedicine. However, the TMA has made a particular commit-ment to Western biomedical research, and has also gained increasing legitimacy from other hospitals due to its research divisions in cancer, diabetes, and hypertension.76 This medical success has prompted the creation of TMA branch clinics in 14 other provinces of India, encouraging the widespread application of Tibetan medicine to non-Tibetan and even non-Buddhist patients.77 This phenomenon demonstrates that Tibetan medicine is not only a strong identity marker for Tibetans, but a successful medical tradition in its own right which is still useful in the modern era. For Tibetans, the success of the TMA and its branches are a clear reminder of their own rich cul-tural history, and the importance of maintaining their cultural identity in the face of Chinese occupation of their homeland.

The 14th Dalai Lama also references the historic legacy of sowa rigpa by discussing the interplay between religion, science, ethics, and world affairs. In one of his speeches on the role of science in the modern era, he suggests that a holistic un-derstanding of medicine and caring for others can infuse much-needed values into the rapid advance of technology. Tenzin Gyatso observes that modern technology seems to be “value-neutral,” and that science is not an end in and of itself. Instead, he argues that science is only good insofar as it helps, rather than harms the human condition.

-search before pursuing it. Also, it is necessary for physicians to emphasize connecting with patients on a personal level while treating them. In this context, the Buddhist Eightfold Path is especially important to ensure proper medical ethics.78,79 Through this application of sowa rigpa and Buddhist values to modern society, the Dalai Lama is able to promote the richness and contemporary relevance of Tibetan culture.

The Greatest Modern Challenge: The Dalai Lama’s Retirement On March 19, 2011, the 14th Dalai Lama stated that he would retire from the political realm, and focus on the spiritual development of the Buddhist community. Since 2001, Tenzin Gyatso has sponsored democratic governance and the establish-

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ment of a political system that involves direct participation from the people. In his speech “Remarks on Retirement,” he says that the Tibetan theocratic system of gov-ernment is outdated, and that Tibetans should follow the Western model of electing their own leaders. A successful election would show the world that Tibet is capable of governing itself and further undermine the Chinese government’s portrayal of the Dalai Lama as power-hungry.80

policy on Tibet which merits further discussion, but is outside the scope of this pa-per.) The Dalai Lama’s retirement poses clear problems for the continuation of Tibetan national identity. It is important to note that the 14th Dalai Lama says that the position of Dalai Lamas as both spiritual and political authorities can no longer exist, and that all of his successors will need to remain only in the religious sphere. Although the spheres of modern sowa rigpa and the application of Buddhist ethics to modern society will likely continue to exist, it is also probable that they will no longer be explicitly linked to the Tibetan cause through a Dalai Lama’s leadership. Moreover, the 14th -betan leader would lack the recognition and legitimacy to continue in the Dalai Lama’s footsteps. It is also possible that any additional sympathy (and additional discrediting of China) that Tibet would gain from democratic elections would be counterweighed by the lack of legitimacy that the Dalai Lama’s political successor would have. However, there are also potential positive outcomes to the retirement deci-sion. The 14th Dalai Lama’s retreat from the political sphere while he is still living al-lows for a more stable transition of power to the succeeding regime. He can continue to serve in an advisory role, and ensure that Tibetan Buddhism and sowa rigpa remain central aspects of Tibetan identity. Tenzin Gyatso also acknowledges that he is getting older, and that provisions will need to be made for religious leadership after his death; by retiring early, he can also advise these conversations and ensure that the succeeding Dalai Lama will have the necessary guidance.

CONCLUSIONSince the adoption of Buddhism in Tibet as the dominant religion beginning

in the eighth century CE, religion, politics, and medicine have remained closely in-tertwined. For example, The Four Tantras, a holy text believed to have been revealed by the Buddha himself, advocates sowa rigpa, the “science of healing”: caring for an individual’s physical, spiritual, and moral needs simultaneously. Furthermore, many Tibetan political leaders demonstrated their support for Buddhism through state-sponsored medical practice and education. Tibetan medicine also provided a platform for the integration of seemingly disparate spheres of knowledge which helped form the basis for human identity, societal structure (in the form of sanghas), and the moral imperative for religious leaders to pursue medical and religious learning from all perspectives.

Throughout the succeeding centuries, Tibetan medicine and its natural inte-gration with Tibetan Buddhism served as a powerful marker of Tibetan cultural iden-

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tity, and fostered a political culture that was conducive to Tibetan nationalism. In the 14th

secular divide in Tibetan society and acted as bodhisattvas. The combined political and religious leadership of the Dalai Lamas further cemented this Tibetan cultural nationalism, allowing Tibetans to maintain their identity in the wake of foreign invad-ers such as the Mongols, the British, and the Chinese.

Since the invasion of Tibet by the Chinese army in 1950, Tibetans have faced the challenge of maintaining their culture in the absence of their own state. In the modern era, His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama has successfully advocated for Tibetan culture through his support for the intersections of Tibetan medicine, Buddhism, and modern international relations. The best example of modern Tibetan medicine is the TMA, and its adaptation of sowa rigpa philosophy to suit the modern context

research. In terms of the modern status of Tibet, the Chinese government has shown

some leniency towards Tibetan medicine by allowing the old MTK in Lhasa to oper-

by portraying his negotiation attempts as ploys for personal power. In order to gain additional international sympathy for Tibet, discredit China, and motivate Tibet to move towards a democratic form of government, the 14th Dalai Lama has chosen to retire from the political sphere and end the combined political and religious authority of succeeding Dalai Lamas. Therefore, the most pressing question facing the Tibetan identity is whether the Tibetan people can maintain the traditional intersections be-tween medicine, politics, and religion in the absence of a singular charismatic leader.

Perhaps the transition towards democratic governance will revitalize the Ti-betan people to take an active role in reclaiming their homeland. It remains to be seen whether another leader could inspire the same near-universal goodwill that the 14th Dalai Lama has achieved over the past several decades. However, examples such as the TMA and the maintenance of traditional Tibetan Buddhist practices provide evi-dence that Tibetan identity remains strong, and that the Tibetan people can continue to resist Chinese cultural imperialism by holding on to their historical and cultural legacies.

Tibet will remain an important region for study in the near future, owing particularly to its tumultuous relationship with China. As China’s economic growth slows and its policies become more liberal, perhaps the Chinese Communist Party will re-evaluate its stance on Tibet. China may wait for the 14th Dalai Lama to pass away, and take advantage of the possible power vacuum. On the other hand, fearing a threat to its reputation, China may make minor concessions to Tibet in order to gain international goodwill. Future studies may want to evaluate the current Tibetan model of government, and analyze whether it could function effectively without the Dalai Lama as its head of state. It may also be interesting to research whether the intersections of medicine, politics, and religion and cultural nationalism are as salient to members of the Tibetan diaspora in Europe and North America as they are in

AAMIR HUSSAIN

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Dharamsala.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS:Amchi: A loanword from Mongolian, literally meaning “doctor.” An amchi was some-one who had studied medicine in the traditional monastic schools or sanghas.

Bodhisattva: A Buddhist “saint,” an individual who represents Buddhist virtues. They are usually nonliving, except in the case of Tibetan Buddhism, where the Dalai Lama is considered to be a living bodhisattva. Buddhists often direct prayers to these indi-viduals for guidance and wisdom.

Dharamsala: A city in the northeastern Indian province of Himachal Pradesh. It serves as the headquarters for the Tibetan government-in-exile after the Lhasa Upris-ing of 1959.

Lama: The religious leader of a Tibetan Buddhist monastery around the 11th to 14th century CE. This position would eventually evolve into the Dalai Lama, believed to be the reincarnation of the Buddha and both a political and religious leader.

Lhasa: The capital and largest city of historic Tibet, and the present-day capital of the Tibetan Autonomous Region in China.

Karma: Philosophical doctrine in many Eastern religions which holds that positive outcomes result from an individual’s good actions, and that negative consequences are a result of evil or immoral actions.

Men-Tsee-Khang (MTK): A medical institute established by the 13th Dalai Lama in 1916 in Lhasa, Tibet that integrated Western biomedicine with traditional Tibetan practices. It still exists today in the Tibet Autonomous Region under Chinese control.

Sangha: Literally “community.” A social living community of ordained Buddhist monks and nuns usually established for religious and medical services in a society.

Sowa rigpa: Literally “the science of healing.” Tibetan Buddhism’s multi-disciplinary philosophy of medicine that integrates theology, cosmology, ethics, science, and vari-ous other disciplines.

Tiprovince of the People’s Republic of China. This geographic region which borders modern-day India and Nepal is roughly equivalent to historical Tibet.

Tibetan Medical and Astrological Institute (TMA): The “new” Men-Tsee-Khang es-tablished by the 14th Dalai Lama in Dharamsala, Himachal Pradesh (India) after the exodus of Tibetan refugees from China in 1959. It still operates today, and has branch

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clinics throughout other states in India.

Tibetan Canon: A series of scriptures unique to the Tibetan branch of Buddhism. It contains The Four Tantras and other works critical to Tibetan Buddhist theology.

NOTES

1. Thomas Banchoff, Embryo Politics: Ethics and Policy in Atlantic Democracies, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011). 3-5.

2. Ashild Kolas, “Tibetan Nationalism: The Politics of Religion,” Journal of Peace Research, 33, no. 1 (1996): 52.

3. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. “Tibet,” accessed March 15, 2012, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/594898/Tibet.

4. Kolas, “Tibetan Nationalism: The Politics of Religion,” 57.5. Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs, “Buddhism.” Accessed March 17, 2012. 6. Ibid.7. Igor Pietkiewicz, Culture, Religion, and Ethnomedicine: The Tibetan Diaspora in India (Lanham,

Maryland: University Press of America, 2008). 119-120.8. Kenneth Zysk, Ascetisim and Healing in Ancient India: Medicine in the Buddhist Monastery,

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 30-31.9. Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs, “Tibetan Canon.” Accessed March 17, 201210. Audrey Prost, Precious Pills: Medicine and Social Change among Tibetan Refugees in India,

Epistemologies of Healing, edited by David Parkin and Elizabeth Hsu, vol. 2 (Oxford: Bergahn Books, 2008). 80.

11. Adams, Vicanne, Mona Schrempf, and Sienna R. Craig, eds., Medicine Between Science and Reli-gion: Explorations on Tibetan Grounds. Epistemologies of Healing, edited by David Parkin and Elizabeth Hsu, vol. 10 (Oxford: Bergahn Books, 2011), 9.

12. Adams et al., Medicine Between Science and Religion: Explorations on Tibetan Grounds, 5-9.13. Craig R. Janes, “The Transformations of Tibetan Medicine,” Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 9,

no. 1 (1995): 10.14. Adams et al., Medicine Between Science and Religion: Explorations on Tibetan Grounds, 5-10. 15. Igor Pietkiewicz, Culture, Religion, and Ethnomedicine: The Tibetan Diaspora in India (Lanham,

Maryland: University Press of America, 2008). 119-120. 16. Pietkiewicz, Culture, Religion, and Ethnomedicine: The Tibetan Diaspora in India, 119. 17. Prost, Precious Pills: Medicine and Social Change among Tibetan Refugees in India, 80-82.18. Ibid., 82.19. Ibid.20. Frances Garnett, “Routledge Critical Studies in Buddhism,” Religion, Medicine, and the Human

Embryo in Tibet, (London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2008). 41.21. Pietkiewicz, Culture, Religion, and Ethnomedicine: The Tibetan Diaspora in India, 120.22. Sulak Sivaraksa,Cromwell Crawford, Venerable Mettanando Bhikku, Roongraung Boonyoros, and

John H. Crook, “The Present: Current Issues,” chap. 12,15-18 in Buddhist Ethics and Modern Society: An International Symposium, ed. Charles Wei-hsun Fu and Sandra A. Wawrytko (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991).

23. Garnett, Religion, Medicine, and the Human Embryo in Tibet, 130-135.24. Janes, “The Transformations of Tibetan Medicine,” 11. 25. Ibid. 26. Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs, “Tibetan Canon.” Accessed March 17, 2012.

http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/tibetan-canon 27. Pietkiewicz, Culture, Religion, and Ethnomedicine: The Tibetan Diaspora in India, 119-120.28. Ibid., 120.

AAMIR HUSSAIN

7229. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. “Dalai Lama,” accessed March 17, 2012, http://www.britan-

nica.com/EBchecked/topic/150076/Dalai-Lama30. Kolas, “Tibetan Nationalism: The Politics of Religion,” 54.31. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. “Bodhisattva,” accessed May 10, 2012. http://www.britan-

nica.com/EBchecked/topic/70982/bodhisattva32. Prost, Precious Pills: Medicine and Social Change among Tibetan Refugees in India, 103.33. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. “Bodhisattva,” accessed May 10, 2012.34. Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs, “Theravada.” Accessed May 10, 2012. 35. Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs, “Mahayana.” Accessed May 10, 2012.36. Pietkiewicz, Culture, Religion, and Ethnomedicine: The Tibetan Diaspora in India, 120.37. Kolas, “Tibetan Nationalism: The Politics of Religion,” 53. 38. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. “Dalai Lama,” accessed May 10, 2012.39. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. “Dalai Lama,” accessed May 10, 2012.40. Pietkiewicz, Culture, Religion, and Ethnomedicine: The Tibetan Diaspora in India, 120.41. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. “Dalai Lama,” accessed May 10, 2012.42. Kurtis R. Schaeffer, Janet Gyatso, and Matthew T. Kapstein, “Early Modernities of Tibetan

Knowledge,” chap. 11-13 in Forms of Knowledge in Early Modern Asia, ed. Stephen Pollock (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011). 324.

43. Schaeffer, Forms of Knowledge in Early Modern Asia, 290-296.44. Prost, Precious Pills: Medicine and Social Change among Tibetan Refugees in India, 82.45. Gyatso, Forms of Knowledge in Early Modern Asia, 324.46. Janes, “The Transformations of Tibetan Medicine,” 13.47. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. “Tibet,” accessed May 7, 2012.48. Adams et al., Medicine Between Science and Religion: Explorations on Tibetan Grounds, 34-36.49. Ibid. 50. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. “Dalai Lama,” accessed May 10, 2012.51. Men-Tsee-Khang, “Tibetan Medical & Astrological Institute.” Accessed March 17, 2012. http://

www.men-tsee-khang.org/tibmed/med-treatise.htm.52. Janes, “The Transformations of Tibetan Medicine,” 14.53. Ibid., 15.54. Ibid. 55. Adams et al., Medicine Between Science and Religion: Explorations on Tibetan Grounds, 34-36.56. Kolas, “Tibetan Nationalism: The Politics of Religion,” 52-55.57. Adams et al., Medicine Between Science and Religion: Explorations on Tibetan Grounds, 34-36.58. Janes, “The Transformations of Tibetan Medicine,” 18-20.59. Pietkiewicz, Culture, Religion, and Ethnomedicine: The Tibetan Diaspora in India, 121-122.60. Kolas, “Tibetan Nationalism: The Politics of Religion,” 52-55.61. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. “Dalai Lama XIV,” accessed May 10, 2012. http://www.

britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/736395/Dalai-Lama-XIV62. Kolas, “Tibetan Nationalism: The Politics of Religion,” 52-56.63. Janes, “The Transformations of Tibetan Medicine,”18-20.64. Pietkiewicz, Culture, Religion, and Ethnomedicine: The Tibetan Diaspora in India, 122.65. Adrian Zenz, “Beyond Assimiliation: The Tibetanisation of Tibetan Education in Qinghai,” Inner

Asia, 12, no. 2 (2010): 293-315,66. Hillman, Ben. “China’s many Tibets: Diqing as a model for “development with Tibetan character-

67. Ibid.68. Ibid.69. Ibid.70. Gyatso, Tenzin. “Remarks on Retirement.” Speech given at Tsulagkhang, main temple of

Dharamsala, March 19, 2011.71. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. “Dalai Lama XIV,” accessed May 10, 2012.

TIBETAN NATIONALISM

7372. Gyatso, Tenzin. “ Five Point Peace Plan.” Speech given at U.S. Congressional Human Rights Cau-

cus, Washington, DC, September 21, 1987.73. Gyatso, Tenzin. “An Appeal to all Chinese Brothers and Sisters.” Speech given in Hamilton, NY,

April 2008.74. Prost, Precious Pills: Medicine and Social Change among Tibetan Refugees in India, 83.75. Janes, “The Transformations of Tibetan Medicine,” 17.76. Men-Tsee Khang Branches, “Tibetan Medical & Astrological Institute.” Accessed March 17, 2012.

http://www.men-tsee-khang.org/tibmed/med-treatise.htm.77. Ibid.78. Gyatso, Tenzin. “Science at a Crossroads.” Speech given at annual meeting for the Society of Neu-

roscience, Washington, DC, November 12, 2005.79. Sulak Sivaraksa,Cromwell Crawford, Venerable Mettanando Bhikku, Roongraung Boonyoros, and

John H. Crook, “The Present: Current Issues,” chap. 12,15-18 in Buddhist Ethics and Modern Society: An International Symposium, ed. Charles Wei-hsun Fu and Sandra A. Wawrytko (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991).

80. Gyatso, Tenzin. “Remarks on Retirement.” Speech given at Tsulagkhang, main temple of Dharamsala, March 19, 2011.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Medicine.” Cultural Anthropology 16, no. 4 (2001): 542-575.

Adams, Vicanne, Mona Schrempf, and Sienna R. Craig. Epistemologies of Healing. Medicine Between Science and Religion: Explorations on Tibetan Grounds. Vol. 10. Edited by David Parkin and Elizabeth Hsu. Oxford: Bergahn Books, 2011.

Banchoff, Thomas. Embryo Politics: Ethics and Policy in Atlantic Democracies. Ithaca, NY:

Cornell University Press, 2011

Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs, “Buddhism.” Accessed March 17, 2012. http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/resources/traditions/buddhism.

Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. “Bodhisattva,” accessed May 10, 2012. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/70982/bodhisattva

“Dalai Lama XIV,” accessed May 10, 2012. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/736395/Dalai-Lama-XIV

“Tibet,” accessed March 15, 2012, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/594898/Tibet.

Garnett, Frances. Routledge Critical Studies in Buddhism. Religion, Medicine, and the Human Embryo in Tibet. London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2008.

Gyatso, Tenzin. “An Appeal to all Chinese Brothers and Sisters.” Speech given in Hamilton, NY, April 2008.

“Five Point Peace Plan.” Speech given at U.S. Congressional Human Rights

AAMIR HUSSAIN

74 Caucus, Washington, DC, September 21, 1987.

“Remarks on Retirement.” Speech given at Tsulagkhang, main temple of Dharamsala, March 19, 2011.

“Science at a Crossroads.” Speech given at annual meeting for the Society of Neuroscience, Washington, DC, November 12, 2005.

Hillman, Ben. “China’s many Tibets: Diqing as a model for “development with Tibetan

Janes, Craig R. “The Transformations of Tibetan Medicine.” Medical Anthropology Quarterly. 9. no. 1 (1995): 6-39.

Kolas, Ashild. “Tibetan Nationalism: The Politics of Religion,” Journal of Peace Research, 33, no. 1 (1996): 51-66.

Men-Tsee Khang Branches, “Tibetan Medical & Astrological Institute.” Accessed March 17, 2012. http://www.men-tsee-khang.org/tibmed/med-treatise.htm.

Pietkiewicz, Igor. Culture, Religion, and Ethnomedicine: The Tibetan Diaspora in India. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2008.

Prost, Audrey. Epistemologies of Healing. Precious Pills: Medicine and Social Change Among Tibetan Refugees in India. Vol. 2. Edited by David Parkin and Elizabeth Hsu. Oxford: Ber-gahn Books, 2008.

Schaeffer, Kurtis R., Janet Gyatso, and Matthew T. Kapstein. Early Modernities of Tibetan Knowledge. Forms of Knowledge in Early Modern Asia. Edited by Stephen Pollock. Dur-ham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011.

Sivaraksa, Sulak, Cromwell Crawford, Venerable Mettanando Bhikku, Roongraung Boony-oros, and John H. Crook. The Present: Current Issues. Buddhist Ethics and Modern Society: An International Symposium. Edited by Charles Wei-hsun Fu and Sandra A. Wawrytko. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991.

Zenz, Adrian. “Beyond Assimiliation: The Tibetanisation of Tibetan Education in Qinghai.” Inner Asia. 12. no. 2 (2010): 293-315.

Zysk, Kenneth. Ascetisim and Healing in Ancient India: Medicine in the Buddhist Monastery. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

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You’ve traveled to 53 countries in your time as Under Secretary and have expressed that American leadership is respected and required. Based on this, why do you believe some of these countries are not supportive of US actions?

There is no question that there are some countries that don’t agree with some of our policies or decisions. In fact, especially if you go to some of the coun-

-sponse to the US would be relatively low. For example, the Benghazi attack in which our ambassador and three other Americans were killed was an expression of protest and dislike for the United States. However, at the same time we are also sitting with the government of Libya and we are working with them on a variety of issues that are important to them as they are building up their own new democratic institutions and structures and establishing the rule of law. They are asking us to help them as they carry out elections, as they try to integrate militias into the national army. So even

States you see this general sense that the United States has a lot to give and can be of enormous help as countries put forth their own priorities, especially when these are countries transitioning to democracy.

You’re a supporter of Smart Power in US diplomacy, which supports alliances and institutions -

ative and cost effective methods due to the lack of resources to handle security issues. What are some examples of these methods that can be used? We are operating in a world of scarce resources and certainly in the United States that’s very clear to all of us. One way of playing out Smart Power is to bring other players to the table in a broad range of actions that further our policies. For example, we can engage the private sector and have them be partners with us in initia-

SMART POWER IN US DIPLOMACY

Maria Otero is the former Under Secretary of Civilian Security, Democracy, and Hu-man Rights at the United States Department of State. During her tenure she served as

Secretary in United States history. She grew up in Bolivia and moved to the United States at the age of 12. She holds an M.A. in Literature from the University of Mary-land, and M.A. in International Relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University (SAIS), and an honorary Doctorate of Humane Letters from Dartmouth College. She was formerly the Economist for

at the Centre for Development and Population Activities (CEDPA). After, she served as adjunct professor at SAIS. She was formerly the CEO and President of ACCION

World Outlook sat down with Maria Otero to discuss her tenure as Under Secretary.

SMART POWER IN UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY: AN INTERVIEW WITH MARIA OTERO

Conducted by Feyaad Allie & Sarah Koulogeorge, World Outlook Staff

76

tives we are undertaking to pursue a given issue or area of work. The private sector

want to be engaged in a variety of different topics whether it’s improving the lives of women through education, addressing issues related to water, or collaborating in

-tilateral organizations such as the World Bank. A third way we found to do this work has been to create funds which make grants to NGOs – for example, in the area of human rights – through the Department of State. We can ask other countries to par-ticipate in these funds so we can increase the resources available for grants. These are some both creative and partnership-driven ways to expand the resources available.

How can other countries develop the capacity to handle terrorism in their backyards? How has the US played a role in supporting the development of these capacities in other countries and how do you think we should improve upon our efforts? Terrorism is a big concern. Various factors feed its growth and it is expand-ing to a growing number of fragile or weak countries where extreme forces can play a more active role and create greater instability. Some terrorist groups cross national borders and expand into other regions, but some are indigenous to particular coun-tries. Nigeria, for example, has a terrorist group called the Boko Haram, which is really of Nigerian origin, but the threat it poses both in and outside the country is of growing concern. Also, the linkage terrorists make with drug cartels and criminal organizations is yet another source of concern and way in which they can strengthen their force. So overall, these non-state actors are requiring a response that can’t be carried out by only one country, and it certainly shouldn’t sit on the shoulders of the United States alone. Terrorism is of enormous concern throughout the world. There are a couple of things that we can do. One, we need to bring countries around the

violent extremism, and address the needs of their victims. One of the things that for-mer U.S. Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism Daniel Benja-min launched was the Global Counter Terrorism Forum, or CGTF, which brought

which countries could increase their own knowledge and capacity to counter terror-ism. All these countries have different perceptions and views of the issue and have experienced it differently, but they all share a deep concern. Building capacity is very important across the board; some countries in particular need to train their police and their armies. For this reason, a second thing we have done has been to create an institution that will provide training to countries that confront terrorism or want to improve their ability to prevent it. This institution is based in Tunisia, it is just start-ing its work, and it is funded by additional countries, not just the United States. The institute will have its own staff, curriculum, and trainers. These are two initiatives in place, but I do believe we are not dedicating the resources that we should be to this issue.

INTERVIEW WITH MARIA OTERO

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Is it possible for a country to respect human rights without US efforts to promote democracy in that region? A system of government based on democratic principles brings with it the fundamental belief of individual rights and freedoms of every person. However, not all nations that hold elections and call themselves ‘democracies’ guarantee rule of law or other freedoms. An important question is what really constitutes a democracy. In countries that are working very hard to make sure human rights are respected and car-ried out, the role the US plays there isn’t nearly as important as the role the countries play themselves. Our role is to focus on countries where democracy and democratic principles are threatened, and play an active role in trying to support respect for hu-man rights.

How are religions and cultures respected through Smart Power diplomacy? What extra precautions must be taken to prevent infringement on others’ religions and cultures? I would say that perhaps even more important in this area is how can we ensure, in the work we’re doing, that we help protect and enhance the freedoms of religious minorities. In countries where the majority of the people are of a particular religion, the precautions that the US needs to take are not the issue. Religious minori-ties are the ones that really require a lot of input from the US because they are the ones that otherwise can suffer enormously. I have met with groups, with one group in particular, whose temple had been ransacked, and well over a dozen people killed during a raid by members of the dominant religion. In Pakistan, a very courageous man, Minister Bhatti, who was a Christian, and who defended religious minorities in that Muslim country, was named Minister of Minorities, which is a huge undertaking. He was just the right person for the job, and he was outspoken and represented the minorities in a very public way. He was not minister for long because he was brutally assassinated. There was no tolerance in Pakistan for issues of religious minorities to be addressed at that level. And so the degree of violence takes place as you try to protect the religious rights of everyone. This is very serious, especially in Muslim countries. So this is the work that is most important for us.

How has your position as the Special Coordinator of Tibetan Issues had an impact on the dialogue between Tibet and the Chinese government? I came in as Under Secretary in 2009 and the very last dialogue took place between the Tibetans and China in January 2010. After that, during my tenure it was nearly impossible to get the Chinese to express interest and to respond to the over-tures on the part of the Tibetans to enter into a dialogue. So I don’t think that I was all that successful or that the US was successful and it is not really our role to make that happen. But it is our role to encourage both players to engage in dialogue to solve issues that have led to repression, violence, and militarization by encouraging and demanding the respect of Tibetan human rights. So even though dialogues have not resumed, there were a lot of other things that we worked on in order to support that effort to bring the Chinese to address the Tibetan issue. Part of my role was to bring up that issue and to continue letting the Chinese know that for us this is an important


78

human rights issue and it’s not something that we will either keep under the table or that we would ignore as we are having discussions with them.

In your term as Under Secretary, you have done work with human rights, in particular supporting and pushing various women’s rights agendas. What are some of your most memorable experiences working with women on these issues? I’ve been doing this for thirty years so the most memorable experiences are hard to highlight because there have been so many. But what is most inspirational is that many of the women I have met are working in situations that are adverse, where the degree of repression is high and women are unable to have access to the full set

engage, and to have a vision of improving the situation of women in their own coun-tries. I have always been amazed at the degree of commitment women have to these issues. That in and of itself is always memorable and really quite inspiring. There have been opportunities while I was at the Department of State where women were

Courage Awards. Listening to their stories really impacted me and demonstrated that around the world the leadership is coming from women who themselves are taking on this task and that it isn’t the United States that is coming in and doing it. Our role is to support them, to elevate them, to recognize them, to raise funds to make their work more available, and to partner with them in order to be able to extend the work that they are doing. When Secretary Clinton traveled she met not only with the heads of states but also with some of these representatives from civil society who are agents of change. Many of these were valiant, engaged women. Being able to participate in supporting their efforts was just a real privilege. Overall, it was a personal high honor of a lifetime to be in these situations.

How is the US’s ability to lead efforts to promote gender equality abroad affected by the fact that women make up less than 20% of the 535 seats in Congress? In many ways when you’re addressing an issue like women’s rights you can begin by saying that we have a long way to go in our own country. There are interna-tional conventions that we have not signed. It is clear that the percentage of women among our elected representatives is lower than what we would wish. You don’t dis-card that, you say this is the work we need to do in our country; however, it’s the work that we share among all of us. In our own country we are still undertaking the process of moving in the right direction. This acknowledgment creates more credibility and more of a sense of solidarity among countries. We also know that some countries ad-dress women’s participation differently than we do. For example, in some countries if you put together a board of directors for a private company, NGO, or other organiza-tion, the law calls for you to have at least 40% of these board members be women. We would never do that in the United States, it just falls outside of the framework that we use. In other countries there can be more of a state-driven direction for equality through quotas for congressional bodies or parliament, which must have a certain

INTERVIEW WITH MARIA OTERO

79

percentage of women. Our role in expanding women’s leadership role worldwide is

policies but also create programs to educate, train, and empower women.

Based on your tenure at ACCION International prior to working for the Department of State, abroad?

I spoor people with loans, it also gives them a place to save, even if they have only 25 dollars. The banks that ACCION helped create offer savings deposits, and they have also developed other ways in which their clients can protect themselves. For example, some banks partner with insurance companies and offer health insurance

-mation technology and the potential of mobile banking can be used for low-income

themselves out of poverty and to build their own wealth. It has been so wonderful and gratifying to participate in something that’s actually worked and is making a dif-

started, and it will likely have an impact in additional important ways.

What are the prospects for the future of international relations with new Secretary of State John Kerry? Secretary Kerry comes to this position with lots of experience in interna-tional issues and is thus very well prepared. He will continue to carry out the thrust of the objectives the Obama administration put forth in the beginning. Much of what Secretary Clinton started, he will continue. He will certainly continue to incorporate promoting democracy and respecting human rights as a part of our foreign policy. The US will retain its position of global leadership using Smart Power as a means to be able to do it.


80

What was your goal in writing about Combat Outpost Keating in your book? The goal was, from the very beginning, a personal one: to learn about the meaning of counterinsurgency beyond an intellectual and academic perspective. I didn’t really know who these men and women were, what motivated them, why they were in the army, why they had been sent to different parts of the country, and I said: I’ll go out to get this story. I’ve been covering the war on Afghanistan but it wasn’t until my son was born that the desire to really understand on a much more compre-hensive basis took hold of me. My son was born on October 2nd, 2009 and on Octo-ber 3rd, Combat Outpost Keating was attacked and overrun by the Taliban. I was in the hospital, holding my son, listening to this broadcast about just over 50 U.S. troops facing up to 400 Taliban. The enemy all had the upper ground because Combat Out-post Keating had been built in a valley, at the bottom of three steep mountains. There was just something poignant about the moment where I was holding my son, my newborn baby boy, and hearing about eight other sons taken from this earth and I needed to know more. I needed to know more about who these men were, and what it was like for the troops there to face such overwhelming odds and such an incredible attack, and also there was the lingering mystery of why anyone would put an outpost

to those questions. And it later became a desire to understand the war in greater and larger terms: in terms of what our troops are doing, who they are. Ultimately, when the book came out, it was the desire to share the stories and make sure that other Americans understood this war on a more personal level – because I had been so disconnected with it, I suspected a lot of other Americans had been as well.

Was there anything you learned as you were writing your book that you wish you could have included but you weren’t able to? You know, it’s a tough question because the book is already fairly long, so it’s tough to argue that it should be longer. But there were stories that I had to cut for space reasons that made me sad for the individuals or the soldiers or the families; they were not going to be mentioned although their stories were just as important. It

JOURNALISM & THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: AN INTERVIEW WITH JAKE TAPPER

Jake Tapper ’91 is a journalist, anchoring The Lead with Jake Tapper and serving as Chief Washington Correspondent for CNN. Since graduating from Dartmouth with a His-

President Obama, among others. He is a three-time recipient of the Merriman Smith Memorial Award for broadcast journalism. He has published books on the 2000 presi-dential election and Jesse Ventura. His most recent work considers the war in Afghani-stan. World Outlook sat down with Jake Tapper to discuss his recent work, The Outpost: An Untold Story of American Valor (published November 2012), implications of drone warfare, and the spirit of journalism.

Conducted by Marina Villeneuve, World Outlook Staff

81

was just that in the construct of the narrative of the book, they slowed things down or were repetitive. There was a great Special Forces soldier whom I interviewed, who had a really interesting story about going to a village and trying to bond with the vil-

of the book. It wasn’t one of the villages we were focused on, it wasn’t a character, or a Special Forces team that was part of the larger story, that was why it got cut. That’s the nature of editing. It can be painful. Another example is the section in the book where I talk about an eleven-year-old Afghan boy who was killed, who was collateral damage. And I have much more in there, two or three examples of collateral damage, of innocent Afghans killed. But I ultimately decided that that one story would repre-

to do.

President Obama has announced a shift in composition of personnel in Afghanistan from combat gether?

Different roles altogether. I wouldn’t say counterinsurgency was over, but it’s not the prevalent strategy in Afghanistan right now. Counterinsurgency, you know, if you divide the war into thirds: enter Afghanistan, go after the Taliban, go after Al Qaida, and then stand their guard. That’s one. Two starts in 2006 and it’s counterin-surgency, the attempt to win over villagers and locals. And three is what we’re in now, which is training Afghans to get out. Counterterrorism forces, government specialist forces, that’s been a constant throughout, but it’s separate and apart from the larger strategy for combat troops.

To what extent do you think that the book can illuminate the greater discussion about the wars in Afghanistan? Well, the book can certainly be read as a metaphor for Afghanistan and the whole war. I don’t know that that’s entirely fair since I don’t think that the end of the war in Afghanistan - or the end of US combat involvement in the war in Afghanistan - is necessarily similar to the end of Combat Outpost Keating. But, it can be seen as

is. And as a metaphor for those who want to critique the military strategy, how US troops are set up to fail if they are not given everything they need to accomplish the mission. It’s also a case study of a counterinsurgency. What you have here is a coun-terinsurgency in Nuristan, Kamdesh: how did it work, what worked, what didn’t work, and I think that one of the things that becomes very clear is that there isn’t enough continuity between deployments and, you know, that has an effect on the effective-ness of counterinsurgency. Not just that there’s a new team coming in every year,

Americans when there’s a constantly shifting rotation, a constantly shifting cast.

Many cover the politics of war from Washington. Do you think the fact that reporters often do not

coverage?

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It has to do with how White House reporters are with the President at the White House and Pentagon reporters are with the Secretary of Defense at the Penta-gon; combat reporters are all separate and distinct. I will say that my personal experi-ence, having been to Iraq, having been to Afghanistan, brought me a much deeper

know, in a perfect world, it would be great if everybody who covers the politics of the war were able to see the actual war of the war. But, you know

What comments do you have on the state of foreign coverage, and do we need more expansive cover-age? Accordingly, would a more enlightened American public have an impact on foreign policy? Well, it’s a complicated question because there is a lot of great foreign cov-erage. Look at the Washington Journal today: front page of the fold, “Government Missile Lays Waste to a Syrian Rebel Enclave.” There’s a story from Russells. I mean, there is a lot of foreign coverage. There’s a lot of great foreign coverage. The prob-lem, I think, is more when it comes to broadcast television, not journalism in general. And there are a lot of great broadcast journalists who are providing foreign cover-

American people being more enlightened, the American people are living their jobs, living their day-to-day lives. They’re worried about domestic concerns because they’re worried about jobs and they’re worried about the protection of their families and the safety of their families. What I think is incumbent among us in the media to do is to explain why Syria matters to them. Why Iran matters to them. Or Congo matters to them. I think we in the media have to explain that, to connect the dots, to make them

o their lives.

Speaking of broadcast television, what are your goals for your show on CNN and its programming? The broad goal is a great front page of a newspaper. When you pick up a newspaper, whether it’s the Times, the Journal, the Valley News, whatever, and you see six stories, business, health, international, politics, sports, culture, and you want to read all six. And those six are the lead stories for those subjects. And they’re smart and they’re interesting, and you learn something and they’re important. And that’s the goal for this show, to have the show be like that great front page where there’s a bunch of topics and interesting stories for each topic. And hopefully international topics will be a consistent part of that.

The War and Peace Fellows at Dartmouth had circulated a video where you asked Press Secretary Jay Carney about President Obama and the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki and his son. Anonymous posted that video. Oh, what an honor. Maybe they won’t hack me for a year. (laughter)

What role does the White House Press Room play in U.S. politics now, given that in the you usually can’t get too much

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–news actually.

be armed with some news, some tidbits, of the week, you know, or the schedule of the next week. But generally speaking, he comes armed with talking points, ones that even a cursory viewer of American politics is already well versed in: balanced

value for news creation. Ultimately, I started to see them as an opportunity to ask not just challenging questions to the administration but challenging questions that maybe nobody had been asking in a public way. I think I asked about drones in February or March of 2009. I had heard a story on NPR about how the Obama administration was increasing the use of drones, and I just found it really interesting. I hadn’t heard anything about this. So I mean, it became a way to hold the administration’s feet by

an opportunity for the question to bring an issue to light that had maybe not gotten enough attention. Whether it was al-Awlaki or drones or Benghazi, it didn’t matter if the issue was generating heat on the left or on the right. It’s one of the only opportu-

White House, to consistently hold the executive branch’s feet by t

Increasingly, military operations are conducted at a distance. Do you think drone warfare and its implications will pose challenges to war coverage? I think that on one level, drone warfare allows the military to not have future Combat Outpost Keatings. We don’t have to send hundreds of men and women to

the President asserts when he sends his planes in – especially when he sends them

killing enemies in other countries. But also, I think there is fear because it is less of a risk to the Americans. All you really risk is losing a drone or having a legal battle with some country, because it’s simple, you have a guy with a joystick in New Mexico – not

skin in the game and going there and risking your life. The question is, does that make

be discussing as a country, the issues that should be debated.

Aren’t they already being debated? we’ve had discussion of how maybe there should be oversight by a judge. But for the most part, you know, this program is operated in the dark, and the debate has been re-ally quiet. Also, the Pentagon has a drone program and the CIA has a drone program. There are different drone programs and they operate under different rules. I just think that in an open and free society there should be as much discussion as possible


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because we’re talking about killing people, and sometimes not bad guys. Sometimes there are innocent guys, and sometimes, [there are] American citizens who might be

means exactly what I say it means” kind of way, and this approach is really troubling.

In the past, you’ve discussed the disparity between the War in Afghanistan and the War in Iraq. Could you expand on that idea? There was a time during the existence of Combat Outpost Keating when there were literally twenty times more troops in Afghanistan. Twenty times. I’m not going to take a position on the War in Iraq, but I can’t comprehend why anybody would think the War in Iraq was twenty times more important than the War in Af-ghanistan. Those decisions to underman and under-asset the mission of Afghanistan costs America a lot. One of the things that the book hopefully achieves is it directly links the decisions made by Washington and across the river at the Pentagon to activi-ties on the ground in Afghanistan. If you don’t have enough helicopters in Afghani-stan then you have to set up a camp and be on the road so you could be resupplied. Well, in that part of Afghanistan, if you are on the road then you’d be at the bottom of a mountain or two. Likewise, one of the reasons General [Stanley] McChrystal, not the only one, but one of the reasons General McChrystal delayed the closure of Combat Outpost Keating was because he still did not have enough helicopters by 2009 to do what he wanted to do. There was a military operation north of Combat Outpost Keating, in a town called Barg-e-Matal, and also there was a missing in action soldier Bowe Berghdahl who’s still in Taliban custody. So because his aircrafts were tied up with those two things he couldn’t close the camp. He wasn’t exactly chomping at the bit because he couldn’t be there for a number of reasons. The point is under both presi-dents, President Bush and President Obama, there were not enough assets in Afghan-istan soon enough to save the eight guys who died. And that’s a direct relationship between decisions made in Washington about how we man or asset a war, and U.S. troops being killed. It also came to play in other ways. The troops that had served in Iraq, when they got to Afghanistan, they couldn’t believe how horrible the conditions were. Considering that the US has been in Afghanistan longer, and that it was the war against al-Qaeda. They couldn’t believe how horrible the conditions were. But beyond that were life and death decisions.

Lastly, would you have any advice for young people who are looking to be journalists and want to provide better coverage of US foreign policy decisions, in general? Tell the stories that people aren’t telling. That’s what motivated me to write

they didn’t. So if somebody had written a magazine article or a substantial newspaper story, I would have read it, and maybe that would have been the end of it. But what motivated me to write the book was curiosity about this camp and the desire for in-formation that no one else was providing. So what I would suggest is that an effective

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way to carve out a niche in journalism, especially when it comes to foreign affairs, is -

swered, and go answer them. Don’t wait for somebody else to do it, go do it, whether that’s in person, on the ground, abroad, or through Skype or phone calls. You can do a lot these days electronically. Tell those stories and the stories are what propel your career. As you know, everybody has opinions, and if you are a brilliant op-ed writer then that will come to fore but I suspect that most people are not. I’m not. What

they cannot tell them, and keeping my opinions out of it but including the context that I see. Now, I think if you work hard and seek the information that others are not providing, you will succeed.


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Speaking to the United Nations General Assembly in September of 2007, German Chancellor Angela Merkel criticized what she saw as the inadequacies of the contemporary Security Council. Citing continued failures with climate change initia-tives and an inability to “come up quickly with universally binding proposals” in crisis situations, Merkel traced this incompetency back to a singular source – the crumbling universal legitimacy associated with the organization.1 In order to be effective, the Security Council “must have international legitimacy. However, (its) present composi-

2

While there is a disconnect between Merkel’s argument and her narrow so-lution – permanent German membership on the council – her causal logic for ex-plaining the increasingly deadlocked and impotent institution has been echoed by numerous other UN member states that feel disenfranchised by the structure of the system.3 “Virtually everyone agrees that more states should be added to the Security Council,” say Karns and Mingst.4 Former Nigerian President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua denounced “the situation whereby Africa is itself totally excluded from … permanent membership (as) unfair” and in need of repair.5 Put together, these arguments for

the will of the international community” and the Council is no longer representative 6

The heavy reliance on legitimacy issues as a rationale for expansion is prob-lematic in that these arguments are derived in part from egalitarian concerns. While these ideals are certainly desirable in international institutions, they do not necessarily translate to effectiveness. For Weiss, these “argument(s) for expansion (are) linked to equity, not to practical impact.”7 In other words, while increasing the number of per-manent members would further the democratic nature of the Council, it would not

While Weiss correctly points out the imperfect correlation between demo-cratic institutions and effectiveness, he goes too far by discounting legitimacy as an important variable.8 Legitimacy in some sense stems from a level of equal participa-

have within the system. It also facilitates accountability and persuasion – if members deem the institution to be legitimate, they are more likely to voluntarily adhere to its

– participation, accountability, and persuasion – to be the “procedural criteria for an acceptable global governance system.”9 Because they can all be traced back to legiti-macy, it follows that these concerns are not simply idealistic and spuriously related to

THE CASE FOR SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

Chris Looney

Chris Looney is a Senior at Colgate University, double majoring in International Relations and History. He was nominated this past year by Colgate for the Rhodes Scholarship and his work has also appeared in The Yale Politic. This paper was written for Professor Ed Fogarty’s International Institutions class.

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effectiveness, but are an integral part of successful institutions. An examination of past Security Council actions provides ample evidence to support this link between legitimacy and effectiveness. Despite former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton calling Israeli settlements in the West Bank “illegitimate,” the US vetoed a resolution that would have made them illegal, even though the resolu-tion was co-sponsored by almost 2/3 of the General Assembly and supported by the entirety of the remaining Security Council members.10 While this could be hastily ex-plained away as a result of power politics, and thus something Security Council reform could not change, the reality is much more nuanced. Barnett and Finnemore show how institutions “articulate and diffuse new norms, principles, and actors around the globe.”11 The effective marginalization of Middle Eastern states from the Security Council has hindered these norms from developing, creating a tension over issues dealing with Palestine. As a result, these states dispute the authority of the Council instead of working through the General Assembly to achieve their objectives. This has inhibited the effectiveness of the Security Council because the disproportionate power dynamics institutionalized in 1945 have estranged the region and effectively removed it from the decision making process. Consequently, resolutions that do pass are not always viewed as legitimate by these members, which in turn minimizes their effect and undermines their implementation.12

The variables that Keohane, Barnett, and Finnemore associate with effective collective action elevate the importance of legitimacy and endorse Security Council

current system is decidedly asymmetrical, its bias does allow for a relative consensus surrounding certain issues. Though this comes at the price of universal legitimacy,

opinions, interests, and concerns of entire blocks of states. In this sense, legitimacy through expansion can be said to have an inverse relationship with group coherence. Since each actor brings to the table a distinct set of goals that are often at odds with one another, agreement can only happen at a “bottom-line” of policy objectives that all states can agree upon. As more states are brought into the group, actors have to ac-

further away from each individual state’s desires. This harms effectiveness because it creates deadlock among the group, and any decisions madetend to be vague in nature to avoid impeding upon state interests.13

acute as membership grows. Because the Security Council can be said to provide pub-

their individual contribution. As the amount of participants increases, the role of any single state relative to the entire body is reduced. Recognizing this, and knowing that

to “free-ride” on the efforts of other states. As each member gravitates towards free-

less effective.14 Thus, bottom-line and free-riding concerns link effectiveness to group

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size, and can be seen as arguments against Security Council expansion.15

Now that both the advantages and drawbacks of expansion are understood, an informed discussion regarding the merits of different proposals for enlargement can be had. Karns and Mingst outline these plans, which all involve geographical con-siderations and are predominantly hinged upon the veto question.16

the veto would be completely eliminated, setting all permanent and temporary mem-bers on equal footing. While this will elevate weaker, regional players such as Nigeria and Turkey to equal footing with the US and China, creating a paragon of legitimacy on the council, it would maximize the consequences of the collective action problems listed above as well.17 In essence, assuming that these new representatives pursue de-signs similar to others in their region, cosmopolitan interests must be discussed, ne-gotiated, and agreed upon, lowering the bottom-line and stagnating Security Council action. A second proposal, which would extend the veto power to any additional members while retaining this right for the current P5, would not only encounter com-

make new and status quo members fully equal, and can be said to equally possess the positive effects of added legitimacy. However, the incorporation of veto power into the equation creates a situation where each individual state has the ability to block ac-

would mandate unanimity on all decisions, further obstructing the council’s ability to govern effectively.

two, adds permanent members to the council but does not grant them veto power. This serves to balance the positive and negative effects connected with expansion, maximizing the gains associated with legitimacy but avoiding the full costs of collec-

members will enhance dialogue and facilitate the creation of norms more global in nature. While equality will not be fully achieved, legitimacy, and therefore acceptance and compliance, will still be strengthened by a system that absorbs all interests into its decision making process. Collective action problems are also negated to some degree by pursuing this strategy. The reason states want to be included as permanent members on the council is because they view the public good that is currently being provided to the interna-

will have even greater incentive to take an active role on the council, regardless of the capacity that they are promoted in. Rather than free-ride, they will aggressively pursue their objectives, seeking to rectify previous marginalization.18 Bottom-line concerns are also reduced by this proposal. While the addition of new, variant voices will lower this line, the preservation of the veto power for the P5 allows them to circumnavi-gate these opinions if necessary in order to make concrete decisions. In practice, the voting process on resolutions will be very similar to the current procedure with the

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process. The call for Security Council reform has been largely due to concerns about equality, and derived from this, legitimacy. While there is an idealistic component to these demands, the Council’s lack of universal legitimacy also undermines effec-tiveness. However, expansion raises a set of collective action problems, primarily “bottom-line” and “free-riding” issues, which serve to balance the positive effects of increased legitimacy. While proposals that seek to add new members and push for complete equality among the reformed council allow collective action concerns to overpower the gains made by increasing legitimacy, plans to add permanent members without granting them veto power serve to both increase legitimacy while minimizing

Council effectiveness in a way that both the status quo and other suggestions do not. This expansion should take into account economic and geographical factors when choosing new members, and the current distributive selection of ten nonpermanent

interest and seeks only to improve effectiveness, enhancing the value of the public

NOTES

1. Angela Merkel, “Speech by Dr. Angela Merkel, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, at the United Nations General Assembly” (Speech in New York, New York, September 25, 2007), http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/62/2007/pdfs/germany-eng.pdf, accessed March 1, 2013, 5.

2. Ibid.3. This disconnect arises from the fact that the current members of the P5 are not geographically

diverse, and therefore regions such as Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East are underrepre-sented.

4. Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2010), 133.

5. Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, qtd. in “Nigeria to Press for Reform of Security Council, Its Presi-dent Says”, UN News Centre, September 26, 2007, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.

6. Michael J. Glennon, “Why the Security Council Failed,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 3 (May-June 2003), 21.

7. Thomas G. Weiss, “The Illusion of Security Council Reform,” The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 4 (Autumn 2003), 149.

8. This is in part because he is evaluating the chances for Security Council reform rather than the effec-tiveness of these potential changes. Accordingly, he sees US power as his most important variable, saying that reform has “repeatedly proved implausible; today, uncontested US power makes such efforts largely irrelevant. Weiss, “The Illusion,” 147.

9. Robert Keohane, “Governance in a Partially Globalized World: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 2000,” American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (March 2001), 3.

10. Hillary Clinton, qtd. in “Hillary Clinton: Israeli Settlements ‘Illegitimate’,” ABC News, Febru-ary 18, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/hillary-clinton-israeli-settlements-illegitimate/

on Israeli Settlements”, UN News Centre, February 18, 2011, http://www.un.org/apps/news/

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11. Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations,” International Organization 53, no. 4 (Autumn 1999), 710.

12. Examples of this include the Arab League’s collective rejection of Resolution 1397 calling for a two state solution, its hesitation to endorse sanctions against Iran, and the fact that in 2010 the votes of Arab states in the UN aligned with the US only 31.5% of the time.

United Nations Security Council, “UN Resolution 1397 (2002),” Security Council Demands Immedi ,

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sc7326.doc.htm, accessed March 4, 2013; United Nations Security Council, “UN Resolution 1929 (2010),” http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary. org/jsource/UN/UNSC1929.pdf, accessed March 4, 2013 United States Department of State, “Voting Practices in the United Nations: 2010,” http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/162416.pdf, accessed April 6, 2013. 13. -

cially in regards to Syria. See: United Nations Security Council, “UN Resolution 2042 (2012),” Se-curity Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2042 (2012) Authorizing Advance Team to Monitor Cease Fire in Syria, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10609.doc.htm, accessed March 5, 2013.

14. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (New York: Shocken, 1965), 53-65.15. The primary practical impediment to expansion here, as outlined by Weiss, is that the P5 currently

and relative power concerns, this has so far been impossible Weiss, “The Illusion,” 147-161. 16. Karns and Mingst, International Organizations, 134. 17. Nigeria and Turkey are two states that have pushed for reform and have been mentioned as pos-

sible regional representatives. See: Jo Adetunji, “Turkey Calls for UN Security Council Reform Over Failure to Pressure Syria,” The Guardian, October 13, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/13/turkey-un-security-council-reform-syria, accessed March 5, 2013

Yar’Adua, “Nigeria to Press for Reform.”18. This argument can also be made for the previous two plans. However, the ensuing bottom-line

discussion is unique to this third proposal.

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I think now, almost all citizens listen or watch. You can tell when you talk to them…they will use [South] Korean words. In North Korea there is no such phrase as “no doubt” ( . When they use a word like that, you think, "that person watches too." 45, Female, Hamkyongnamdo, Left NK May 2010

The Director of the 109 Grouppa [an illegal video censorship team comprised of party state security,

South Korean dramas with a Director of the Escort Bureau [Ministry of Public Security] and a high-level member of the State Security Agency.55, Male, Pyongyang, Hamgyeongnamdo, Left NK May 2010

For many years, scholars have sought answers to the question of Korean

German model of absorption, while others have applied American federalism and the European Union’s neo-functionalist approach. Much of the existing literature on Ko-

1 that 2

However, socio-cultural interaction on a “people-to-people” level remains important, for it fosters mutual trust, the foundation for successful integration.3 While the July

-ments’ mutual interest in expanding “religious, cultural, and academic exchange,”4

political contexts. Recently, though, the bottom-up “people-to-people” approach has gained momentum within the peninsula, carrying the potential of further develop-ment in inter-Korean relations; the indirect interaction facilitated by exchange of

Korean contemporary culture, currently taking East Asia and Southeast Asia by storm, has risen as South Korea’s newest “soft power tool.”5 The “Korean Wave,” or “Hallyu,” a term used to describe South Korean pop culture’s spread through Asia, Europe, and America, is now making its way up to the North. North Koreans access

The Southern Wave Drifts North as

Northern Beauties Migrate South:

Kyooeun Jang

Kyooeun Jang is a Junior at Yonsei University’s Underwood International College, pursuing a double major in Comparative Literature and Culture, and Political Science and International Relations. She is currently an exchange student at Dartmouth College. This paper was written for Professor David Rez-vani’s Politics of Asia class.

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indicates a much broader base of accessibility: social classes from every region, from Pyeongyang in the south to Shinuiju near the border, have access.6 -sic, and dramas are often smuggled from the North Korean-China border across the Yallu River, and smugglers can reportedly bribe North Korean border guards at a rate

during the holidays,7 to the effect of “breaking the state’s top-down monopoly on the supply of info and ideas.”8

-tural diplomacy, shaking also the foundation of the North Korean regime: its planned economy. Research suggests that increased communication via media exchange has created demand not only for media content itself, but also for material goods associ-ated with a capitalistic lifestyle. The black market — the only way to purchase Korean

-ing South Korean kitchen appliances, snacks, and even “skinny jeans” (frequently

trade contributes to the sophistication of the underground capitalist system, giving

second-hand video trading system. Consequently, the demand of the dollar used in these markets has also skyrocketed between 2002 and 2009.9 Over 20,000 defectors living in South Korea “facilitate this illegal trade by pouring in foreign currency to

-logical forms increasingly catalyze direct communication. While cassettes and video-

consumers to share media content.10 Illegal Chinese phones have begun to circulate as an alternative to North Korean cell phones, which operate on a network that blocks international calls and Internet connections; equipped with the physical technology, North and South Koreans exchange information, including negotiations for defection plans. Shifts in markets for goods and ideas have been accompanied by changes to propaganda tactics and government stances. In North Korean media, South Koreans were portrayed as poor until the 2000s, and have since been described as a “soulless society mined in environmental pollution, crime, and inequality.”11 The North Korean government has sought to promote cultural ties with China and Russia to counter

operas.12 In the online arena, the government established a server in Pyongyang and -

trations of foreign ideas, news, and culture.”13 After the Korean War, South Korean media outlets were under government supervision and media portrayals of North Korea focused on the North’s human rights violations, poverty, and political ideol-ogy. With the establishment of a civilian government in the 1990s and the rise of the 386 generation (Koreans born in the 1960s and politically active in the democracy

Shiri and Joint Security Unit

KYOOEUN JANG

93

began to paint North Koreans in a “more humane manner” through the zenith of the Sunshine Policy.14

indeed, entertainment has largely abdicated the theme of tragic division in favor of active engagement and visions of a reunited peninsula. Unlike past dramas seeking

-stitutional monarchy; in the course of its plot, the crown prince of South Korea falls in love with a northern female drill instructor, eventually resulting in marriage. As a result of the show’s popularity, South Korean viewers have begun to download North Korean folk songs embedded in the drama, an act that would previously have been branded as “treason.”15 As One (2012) recreates the 1991 World Table Tennis Championships, in which the North and South competed as one team to prevent the Chinese team from claiming their “ninth consecutive title.” Though the players express hostility at the movie’s outset, they soon realize that their unity “means more to them than [divisive] politics.”16 Given its release just prior to the 2012

17

Perhaps the most shocking improvement in Korean media’s treatment of de-fectors comes in the form of “Now on My Way to Meet You.” The talk show features thirteen female North Korean defectors, styled in the latest East Asian fashion and physically indistinguishable from women walking the streets of Seoul, actively defying previous images of gaunt and malnourished North Korean defectors. The show was unprecedented insofar as the defectors reveal themselves on South Korean television and publicly discuss their pasts, including the guilt associated with leaving family in the North. The show soon developed a following among Koreans and gained the attention of American and Japanese media; since the show’s launch, fan clubs have appeared for some of the women and defectors are “waiting in line” to appear on the show.18

There is no doubt that both Koreas will have to address other concerns in

emerged arena in which low-level, informal interactions can occur without (or in evasion of) direct government involvement. As informal contact among citizens in-creases, their respective governments will be more likely to collaborate19; if contacts are “expanded and regularized” through “active socio-cultural” exchange, peace can ensue.20 And, although bottom-up pressure of citizens on the North Korean regime

made possible by media exchange offers North Koreans a critical lens. Understanding these changes can help South Korea and other countries “implement effective North Korea policies” in the future.21 Willingness among North Koreans to engage the “Ko-

KOREAN REUNIFICATION

94

rean Wave” demonstrates the possibility of further interaction and, ultimately, the spread of media should be employed as a tool to enhance the socio-cultural interac-

NOTES

1. Imho Bae, “People-to-people dialogue between North and South Korea: looking ahead,” Negotia-tion Journal, 27.1 (2011), 42.

2. Journal of Peace Research. 21.1 (1984), 55.

3. Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (Houndmills/Basingstoke: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000), 44

4. Gabriel Jonsson. Towards Korean Reconciliation: Socio-cultural Exchanges and Cooperation (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 98.

5. Dana, “Hallyu Hits Pyongyang,” Seoulbeats (March 14, 2012). http://seoulbeats.com/2012/03/hallyu-hits-pyongyang/

6. Jung Park, 8.7. Jung Park, 7.8. “A Quiet Opening in North Korea,” InterMedia. http://www.audiencescapes.org/research/north-

korea-quiet-opening/quiet-opening-north-korea-8049. Gene Choi, “North Korea Hallyu Capitalism,” Peterson Institute for International Economics (May 12,

2010). http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/05/12/the-cheonan-sinking-and-kim-jong-ils-china-visit-now-what/

10. Nat Kretchun and Jane Kim, “A Quiet Opening: North Koreans in a Changing Media Environ-ment,” InterMedia (2012), 3.

11. Andreas Lorenz, “Kim Jong Un Sends Cautious Signals of Reform,” Spiegel (July 12, 2012). http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/kim-jong-un-sends-cautious-signs-of-reform-in-north-korea-a-844061.html

12. Young Sun Jeon, “Diagnosis and Assessment of North Korea’s Sociocultural Sector in 2012,” 20.2 (2011), 113.

13. Kretchun and Kim, 74.-Sonia Ryang, “North Koreans in South Korea: In Search of Their Human-ity,” http://www.japanfocus.org/-Sonia-Ryang/3771

14. Seungbin Yi, “ , …

Voice of the People. http://www.vop.co.kr/A00000486323.html.

15. Mark Olsen, “Review: United in sports in ‘As One’.” The Los Angeles Times (June 8, 2012). http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/08/entertainment/la-et-as-one-capsule-20120608

16. Wall Street Journal Asia (March 30, 2012). http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2012/03/30/korean-

17. Hyun Nam Gung, “A Different Type of Chatter from 13 Beauties,” KangwonIlbo (July 13, 2012).

18. Haas, 55. 19. Jonsson, 230.20. Kretchun and Kim, 59.

Prerequisites,” Korea Observer 29.3 (2008). Young Jung Park, “ '

Wave Blowing in North Korea] Jeju Peace Institute 2011-30 (2011).

KYOOEUN JANG

94 95

rean Wave” demonstrates the possibility of further interaction and, ultimately, the spread of media should be employed as a tool to enhance the socio-cultural interac-tion on which the success of Korean reunification may depend.

Notes

1. Imho Bae, “People-to-people dialogue between North and South Korea: looking ahead,” Negotia-tion Journal, 27.1 (2011), 42.

2. Michael Haas, “Paradigms of Political Integration and Unification: Applications to Korea.” Journal of Peace Research. 21.1 (1984), 55.

3. Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (Houndmills/Basingstoke: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000), 44

4. Gabriel Jonsson. Towards Korean Reconciliation: Socio-cultural Exchanges and Cooperation (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 98.

5. Dana, “Hallyu Hits Pyongyang,” Seoulbeats (March 14, 2012). http://seoulbeats.com/2012/03/hallyu-hits-pyongyang/

6. Jung Park, 8.7. Jung Park, 7.8. “A Quiet Opening in North Korea,” InterMedia. http://www.audiencescapes.org/research/north-

korea-quiet-opening/quiet-opening-north-korea-8049. Gene Choi, “North Korea Hallyu Capitalism,” Peterson Institute for International Economics (May 12,

2010). http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/05/12/the-cheonan-sinking-and-kim-jong-ils-china-visit-now-what/

10. Nat Kretchun and Jane Kim, “A Quiet Opening: North Koreans in a Changing Media Environ-ment,” InterMedia (2012), 3.

11. Andreas Lorenz, “Kim Jong Un Sends Cautious Signals of Reform,” Spiegel (July 12, 2012). http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/kim-jong-un-sends-cautious-signs-of-reform-in-north-korea-a-844061.html

12. Young Sun Jeon, “Diagnosis and Assessment of North Korea’s Sociocultural Sector in 2012,” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 20.2 (2011), 113.

13. Kretchun and Kim, 74.-Sonia Ryang, “North Koreans in South Korea: In Search of Their Human-ity,” The Asia-Pacific Journal. http://www.japanfocus.org/-Sonia-Ryang/3771

14. Seungbin Yi, “하지원 항아송, 음원 갖고 싶네…국가보안법 위반일까?" [“Downloading Hangah's Songs: Violation of the National Security Act?”] Voice of the People. http://www.vop.co.kr/A00000486323.html.

15. Mark Olsen, “Review: United in sports in ‘As One’.” The Los Angeles Times (June 8, 2012). http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/08/entertainment/la-et-as-one-capsule-20120608

16. Min-Jeong Lee, “Korea Fantasy: ‘King’ Has Royalty, Unification And, As Always, Love.” Wall Street Journal Asia (March 30, 2012). http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2012/03/30/korean-king-drama-mixes-romance-unification/

17. Hyun Nam Gung, “A Different Type of Chatter from 13 Beauties,” KangwonIlbo (July 13, 2012). http://www.kwnews.co.kr/nview.asp?s=801&aid=212071200007

18. Haas, 55. 19. Jonsson, 230.20. Kretchun and Kim, 59. Eung-Kyuk Park and Bernard Rowan, “Federalist Path to Korean Unification: Global and Local Prerequisites,” Korea Observer 29.3 (2008). Young Jung Park, “북한에 부는 '한류 열풍이 진단과 전망'” [A diagnosis and prospects of the Hallyu Wave Blowing in North Korea] Jeju Peace Institute 2011-30 (2011).

Kyooeun Jang

On the North Korean Threat

Jiyoung Sohn ’14 is a Political Science and Comparative Literature major at Underwood International College in Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea. She is studying at Dartmouth College for a year as an exchange student. She has spent a significant amount of time in both US and South Korea, and is inter-ested in East Asian international affairs. She wrote this piece as a response to the recent set of North Korean provocations.

Jiyoung Sohn

For a tiny, isolated country with a crippled economy, North Korea has an impressive record in riling up the global community over the past few decades. In recent weeks, North Korea has again launched a set of destabilizing provocations: Kim Jong-Un has declared an end to the 1953 armistice and a return to a “state of war.” As North Korea prepares for another nuclear test, the atmosphere has become incredibly tense. Projections that North Korea will launch an attack against the US have increased, along with fears of an irrational North Korea on the brink of nuclear detonation. Undoubtedly, there are legitimate reasons for watching North Korea with caution and alarm, but it must be acknowledged that the recent “crisis” unraveling in the Korean peninsula is not a novel predicament. It is an all-too-familiar strategy fabricated by North Korea to bolster the regime’s legitimacy and garner international attention in order to support a crippled regime unable to survive without external aid and resources. However, the difference today is that North Korea’s bargaining strat-egy of coercive brinkmanship, which has yielded concessions from the international community in the past, is no longer generating similar responses from critical actors. The time is ripe for North Korea to realize that its traditional tactic of self-inflicted security crises will no longer be tolerated.

The cycle of North Korea’s military provocations, international sanctions, and threatening rhetoric from Pyongyang has become a fixed pattern in North Ko-rean international relations. In the past, the US and South Korea have managed to ease tensions with the North by offering concessions in exchange for the North’s promise to halt nuclear weapons development. However, the North soon reneges on this promise, leading to more sanctions, and thus the cycle continues. Kim Jong-Un, as he seeks to bolster his regime, is following a trajectory similar to his father, but for the first time this strategy has not reaped optimal outcomes for the regime.

The international community at large is certainly irked, but rightfully un-alarmed by North Korea’s threats of war and hostilities. The North recently warned foreign embassies to pull out of Pyongyang and South Korea. Britain dismissed this as merely “rhetoric”1 and Russia, China, and Brazil all believe that pulling out is un-necessary. North Korea has failed to instill the fear that it hoped for among the inter-national community. Foreign investors are not fleeing South Korea en masse and no foreign embassies have pulled out of the Korean peninsula.

South Korea’s calm in the face of the North’s threats demonstrates a fun-

96 97Jiyoung Sohn north Korean threat

damental change in its perception of the threat posed by the North, as well as the strength of the deterrence structure arrayed against it. Ironically, those furthest away from the Korean peninsula are the most anxious. South Korea, whose existence is “threatened” the most by North Korea, has remained the most stable throughout the North’s incessant provocations over the years and continues to retain such an attitude—for good reason. It is difficult to find any South Koreans who are panic-stricken in Seoul. Although some are appalled that South Korea may have developed a troubled sense of “security insensitivity,” we must understand that it is a legitimate and prudent response. South Korea understands that a military attack by North Ko-rea is highly unlikely because such a trajectory would equate to suicide for the Kim regime. Secure in this knowledge, the South has avoided falling into the “war hysteria” that the North has been trying to impose.

Thus, with credible deterrence and a generally resilient international com-munity firmly established, the only “crisis” that again plagues the Korean peninsula is a risky, but predominantly political game of rhetoric played by North Korea to boost the legitimacy of the new regime and test the limits of how far the US and South Korean leadership will go until they negotiate with the North. Only this time, Kim Jong-Un may have pushed his game a bit too far.

In response to North Korea’s vitriolic provocations, the US and South Ko-rea have jointly taken on an unusually tough display of deterrence. In order to send a clear warning to North Korea, the US has greatly increased its military presence around the Korean peninsula. It has deployed B-52 and B-2 bomber planes, the state-of-the art F-22 Raptor, and the sea-based X-band Radar, capable of discerning a mov-ing baseball located as far as 4800km away, around the Korean peninsula.2 Massive military drills with Asian allies have begun. The new South Korean leadership under Park Geun-Hye has taken a firm stance on the issue of North Korea, announcing that “unlike previous regimes, it will no longer tolerate the continuation of North Korea’s brinkmanship diplomacy and adhere to its demands, even if it means possibly risking total war with North Korea.”3

As the US and South Korea project their military might, China, North Ko-rea’s critical and only ally, is moving towards a tipping point where the penalties of supporting North Korea may outweigh the benefits of preserving it. China has his-torically been reluctant to crack down on North Korea, fearing that the collapse of North Korea would lead to the elimination of the buffer zone between itself and US-backed South Korea. However, North Korea is now becoming more of a liabil-ity than an asset to China. To China’s frustration, Pyongyang has been continuously defying Beijing’s orders. China was strongly opposed to the long-range missile launch in December of 2012 and the nuclear test held in February 2013. As North Korea continues down its path of aggression, the Korean peninsula now faces a greater US military presence than during the decades following the Korean War.

Essentially, Beijing must decide between proactively pressuring the North to reverse its aggressive course of action or face an increasing US military presence on

the Korean peninsula. Given its recent behavior, China seems geared towards the first option. China understands that it can no longer continue to provide unconditional support of the Kim regime. In fact, breaking from its role of “watering down the degree of punishment imposed against Pyongyang [by the UN]”, China now backs “biting sanctions” against North Korea following its February 2013 nuclear test.4 China and the US have formally recognized a joint interest in “ridding the peninsula of nuclear weapons… [and] calling on North Korea to refrain from provocations and abide by international obligations”.5 Although it remains to be seen how far China is willing to go in actively containing North Korea, it is clear that China is no longer an unconditional patron to the North.

In conclusion, the odds are increasingly stacked against North Korea. Key actors are moving towards a common conclusion that North Korea’s aggressive nuclear trajectory cannot continue. Totalitarian, cruel, and extreme as it may seem, North Korea is far from suicidal. Indeed, “dictators do not survive without sophisti-cated political skills”6 and Kim Jong-Un is no exception. As it finds itself increasingly isolated in the world, North Korea should rationally begin to question how far it can go until it conducts one provocation too many.

Given recent trends, North Korea will soon be forced to abandon its ag-gressive rhetoric and halt its nuclear program at which point the US and other allies should be prepared to reward those acts with substantial assistance and dialogue. Until then, the key parties must be clear that North Korea’s desire to simultaneously continue its nuclear program and request foreign economic aid is not a viable option in the future.

Despite heightened tensions, I believe that the recent crisis can act as win-dow of opportunity for leaving North Korea with one option: peace, once and for all.

Notes

1. Malcolm Moore. “North Korea: We can’t keep you safe, Pyongyang tells foreign embassies.” The Telegraph, 05 April 2013.<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/north-korea/9975148/North-Korea-we-cant-keep-you-safe-Pyongyang-tells-foreign-embassies.html>

2. Compiled Report. “What Does North Korea Hope to Gain From 2-track Strategy” Chosun Ilbo. 02 April 2013. <http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/04/02/2013040200895.html>

3. Sang-Gu Kang. “North Korea’s Kim Jong-Un has misunderstood President Park Geun-Hye” Chosun Ilbo. 07 April 2013 <http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/04/07/2013040701389.html?brief_news01>

4. Jennifer Lind. “Will China Finally ‘Bite’ North Korea?” CNN. 14 Mar 2013. <http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/11/opinion/lind-north-korea>

5. Michael R. Gordon. “Kerry in China to Seek Help in Korea Crisis” The New York Times. 13 Apr 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/world/asia/kerry-in-china-seeking-help-on-north-korea.html?pagewanted=all>

6. Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang. Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 21.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/9975148/North-Korea-we-cant-keep-you-safe-Pyongyang-tells-foreign-embassies.html


http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/04/02/2013040200895.html

http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/04/07/2013040701389.html?brief_news01


http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/11/opinion/lind-north-korea


http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/world/asia/kerry-in-china-seeking-help-on-north-korea.html?pagewanted=all


96 97Jiyoung Sohn north Korean threat

damental change in its perception of the threat posed by the North, as well as the strength of the deterrence structure arrayed against it. Ironically, those furthest away from the Korean peninsula are the most anxious. South Korea, whose existence is “threatened” the most by North Korea, has remained the most stable throughout the North’s incessant provocations over the years and continues to retain such an attitude—for good reason. It is difficult to find any South Koreans who are panic-stricken in Seoul. Although some are appalled that South Korea may have developed a troubled sense of “security insensitivity,” we must understand that it is a legitimate and prudent response. South Korea understands that a military attack by North Ko-rea is highly unlikely because such a trajectory would equate to suicide for the Kim regime. Secure in this knowledge, the South has avoided falling into the “war hysteria” that the North has been trying to impose.

Thus, with credible deterrence and a generally resilient international com-munity firmly established, the only “crisis” that again plagues the Korean peninsula is a risky, but predominantly political game of rhetoric played by North Korea to boost the legitimacy of the new regime and test the limits of how far the US and South Korean leadership will go until they negotiate with the North. Only this time, Kim Jong-Un may have pushed his game a bit too far.

In response to North Korea’s vitriolic provocations, the US and South Ko-rea have jointly taken on an unusually tough display of deterrence. In order to send a clear warning to North Korea, the US has greatly increased its military presence around the Korean peninsula. It has deployed B-52 and B-2 bomber planes, the state-of-the art F-22 Raptor, and the sea-based X-band Radar, capable of discerning a mov-ing baseball located as far as 4800km away, around the Korean peninsula.2 Massive military drills with Asian allies have begun. The new South Korean leadership under Park Geun-Hye has taken a firm stance on the issue of North Korea, announcing that “unlike previous regimes, it will no longer tolerate the continuation of North Korea’s brinkmanship diplomacy and adhere to its demands, even if it means possibly risking total war with North Korea.”3

As the US and South Korea project their military might, China, North Ko-rea’s critical and only ally, is moving towards a tipping point where the penalties of supporting North Korea may outweigh the benefits of preserving it. China has his-torically been reluctant to crack down on North Korea, fearing that the collapse of North Korea would lead to the elimination of the buffer zone between itself and US-backed South Korea. However, North Korea is now becoming more of a liabil-ity than an asset to China. To China’s frustration, Pyongyang has been continuously defying Beijing’s orders. China was strongly opposed to the long-range missile launch in December of 2012 and the nuclear test held in February 2013. As North Korea continues down its path of aggression, the Korean peninsula now faces a greater US military presence than during the decades following the Korean War.

Essentially, Beijing must decide between proactively pressuring the North to reverse its aggressive course of action or face an increasing US military presence on

the Korean peninsula. Given its recent behavior, China seems geared towards the first option. China understands that it can no longer continue to provide unconditional support of the Kim regime. In fact, breaking from its role of “watering down the degree of punishment imposed against Pyongyang [by the UN]”, China now backs “biting sanctions” against North Korea following its February 2013 nuclear test.4 China and the US have formally recognized a joint interest in “ridding the peninsula of nuclear weapons… [and] calling on North Korea to refrain from provocations and abide by international obligations”.5 Although it remains to be seen how far China is willing to go in actively containing North Korea, it is clear that China is no longer an unconditional patron to the North.

In conclusion, the odds are increasingly stacked against North Korea. Key actors are moving towards a common conclusion that North Korea’s aggressive nuclear trajectory cannot continue. Totalitarian, cruel, and extreme as it may seem, North Korea is far from suicidal. Indeed, “dictators do not survive without sophisti-cated political skills”6 and Kim Jong-Un is no exception. As it finds itself increasingly isolated in the world, North Korea should rationally begin to question how far it can go until it conducts one provocation too many.

Given recent trends, North Korea will soon be forced to abandon its ag-gressive rhetoric and halt its nuclear program at which point the US and other allies should be prepared to reward those acts with substantial assistance and dialogue. Until then, the key parties must be clear that North Korea’s desire to simultaneously continue its nuclear program and request foreign economic aid is not a viable option in the future.

Despite heightened tensions, I believe that the recent crisis can act as win-dow of opportunity for leaving North Korea with one option: peace, once and for all.

Notes

1. Malcolm Moore. “North Korea: We can’t keep you safe, Pyongyang tells foreign embassies.” The Telegraph, 05 April 2013.<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/north-korea/9975148/North-Korea-we-cant-keep-you-safe-Pyongyang-tells-foreign-embassies.html>

2. Compiled Report. “What Does North Korea Hope to Gain From 2-track Strategy” Chosun Ilbo. 02 April 2013. <http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/04/02/2013040200895.html>

3. Sang-Gu Kang. “North Korea’s Kim Jong-Un has misunderstood President Park Geun-Hye” Chosun Ilbo. 07 April 2013 <http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/04/07/2013040701389.html?brief_news01>

4. Jennifer Lind. “Will China Finally ‘Bite’ North Korea?” CNN. 14 Mar 2013. <http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/11/opinion/lind-north-korea>

5. Michael R. Gordon. “Kerry in China to Seek Help in Korea Crisis” The New York Times. 13 Apr 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/world/asia/kerry-in-china-seeking-help-on-north-korea.html?pagewanted=all>

6. Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang. Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 21.



http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/04/02/2013040200895.html







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