WWII 19th Tactical Air Command

8/9/2019 WWII 19th Tactical Air Command

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XIX Tactical Air CommandThe flak section at XIX TAG commenced

operations in March 1944, when one officer and oneenlisted man undertook the staggering job of reconstructing the flak picture in Belgium, Hollandand N orthe rn Fran ce by poring over results ofall photo interpretationmade during the pasttwo years. The information was furnished bv theBritish War Office in theform of pinpoint locations which were plotted on the standard1150,000 scale overlaidmaps. With the acquisition of a flak officer ateach Wing in April 1944the TAC flak picturetook on a more balancedaspect, since crews couldthen be lectured andGroups more properlybriefed on flak and flakanalysis.

Toward the middleof May, just as most ofthe problems seemed re-

The Command flak section compiled a cardfile indexed to correspon d to the ma p sheets of the1:50,000 and 1:100,000 maps of Europe. Photointerpretation reports were extracted and filed toprovide reference from the card system as to photo

and sortie number, dateof photos, etc. Groundsource information andpilot experience were alsoentered on the cards,which then became a flakhistory for each ma p shee t.Data Transmission

Highlights to emphasize the contributionsof XIX TAC to flakduring its organizationcan perhaps best be described by listing someof the methods used todisseminate flak intelligence in coping withthe flak menace.

(a) Crew Rep orts ofFlak Reaction (teletype)- This message was dispatched each morning toolved, long range fight- Major General Otto P. Weylanders providing escort for

heavy bombers deep inside Germany started toattack German airfields while enroute home fromthese escort missions. This necessitated consolidation and distribution of flak positions covering thedefenses of ab out 100 Ge rm an airfields.

Air Force and units ofthe Command. It contained flak experience of theGroups for the preceding day, indicating new andold defenses, flak trends, balloon defenses, flak traps,etc.

(b) Daily Briefing Information Bulletin This

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Capt. W. C. CharltonCapt. Thomas B. KellySgt. C. L. Shotwell


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bulletin prepared at Command for the briefineof pilots on the missions of the following day contained a flak briefing paragraph written by theCommand flak officer and was sent to Wings andGroups each evening. The strength of each defenseand locations of guns were included, headings intoand out of the target areas were recommended, andother danger areas in the vicinity noted. When lastminute selection of targets became necessary, information normally sent in this paragraph was telephoned directly to the Groups and when aircraftwere airborne enroute to targets, this informationwas transmitted to pilots over the radio telephone.This briefing paragraph superseded the earl ier"Flak Over Target" message sent down from Wingson targets to be attacked. This latter teletype messagecontained pertinent information on targets and wasused during the hectic invasion period.

An example of this message follows, the successive numbers constituting the circumferentialvalues of the "I N " and " O U T " flak clocks:

FLA K T AR GE T WM 8932, 4 heavy 15light. In Ht 13000 Begin 360. 3.1, 3.0, 2.7, 1.5, 1.3,1.1, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 2.8, 3.2. Out Ht 3000 Begin 360.1 .7 , 1 . 5 , 1 . 1 , 1 . 0 , 1 . 2 , 1 . 7 , 2 . 0 , 2 . 3 , 2 . 7 , 3 . 0 , 2 . 5 , 2 . 0Best out between 60-120. Past target 3 miles thenclimb to minim um 6000 during next 7 miles. Keepout of SW sector.

(c) Daily Intell igence Summary A paragraph was included in the published DIS whichgave information on flak trends in dispositions andtactics of interest to other air or ground units withwhich the Command cooperated.

(d) Loss and Dam age Analysis Rep ortsThese statist ical reports prepared bi-monthly wereinstrumental in presenting in a factual manner theprogress being made against the ever present flakthreat .

Target SelectionTh e flak officer at Com man d was always present

with advice and intelligence at the targe t conferences.His daily indications of the appearance of new flakconcentrations often resulted in re-examination ofcover and discovery of new targets. Many timesthe selection of targets depended on the flak officer'sdecision as to feasibility of attack from the flakstandpoint.

Flak officers of this Command also contributedgreatly to the development of probability curves forlow level flak analysis. Here too counter-batteryflak fire was developed and employed through theCommand flak section, as was the case throughoutthe Air Force.

With war's end so ended the flak section atthe XIX Tactical Air Command, but not withoutrealization that it had played a vital part in theprovision of intelligence which had unquestionablysaved lives and may well have enhanced the successes of many missions.

Flakked up!

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XXIX Tactical Air CommandIn September 1944 the 84th and 303rd Fighter

Wings formed the X X I X TAG , and the two flaksections joined in gathering and organizing themany overlaid maps, teletypes and SOP's necessaryfor a command flak section in the new area of operations.

In maintaining i tsflak intelligence theXXIX TAG sect ion depended mainly on NinthAir Force flak bulletins,but also made use of original photo interpretat ion reports of Ninth Army, Second British Army,and a detac hm ent of 20thPhoto Interpretat ion Detachment which was assigned to the TA G. Pho topinpoints were compiledon the standa rd 1:100,000scale overlaid maps usedthroughout the Air Force,while the 11500,000 and11250,000 flak maps wereused for general planning. At Groups the same

made available at Group level via the Commanddaily flak teletype. As close cooperation betweentargets and flak was a necessity, these two sectionswere always situated in the same room. A flakofficer attended the "Combined Target Committee"

meeting each eveningwhere ma teria l for the following day's progra m wasinstigated. A flak officeralso spoke at the moreformal briefing for theCommanding General ,relating strength of defenses, trends in flak deployment, new technicaldata, and plane loss anddamage to flak. Flakmaps were always keptup - to - date in the com batoperations section in11500,000 and largerscales for reference atany time of day or night.Controllers

Flak informationwas available in anotherBrigadier General Richard E. Nugentprocedure was followed, form for fighter control-the Group S-2 servicingthe Squadrons by transmitt ing for use at squadronbriefings pin-pointed flak positions around theimmediate target area assigned for that mission.Recent crew reports from neighboring fighter groupsand units of other Tactical Air Commands were

lers. Range circles weredraw n around heavy gun defended areas on the1:500,000 scale vectoring boa rd. Since the boa rddisplayed only a grid and not ground features ornames of towns, the flak circle clearly showed saferoutes of approach and withdrawal from defended

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areas for use by the vecto ring officers. T o aid in theprocessing of information speedily to group level, aspecial paragraph was reserved for flak in the dailyX X IX TAG A-2 periodic report. Contents of publications whose distribution stopped at commandlevel were repro duc ed and disseminated tolower units. The flak officers made repeated visitsto squadrons where they carried on discussions ofthe capabilities of flak and the guard against it.Considerable interest was manifested at these conferences, as X X I X T AC 's operationa l area includedthe Cologne plain and the "Happy Valley" of theRuhr the hottest piece of sky in the world.Flak Considered

Except in the Ruhr valley and in the center ofthe larger industrial cities of the Rhine, a target wasnot turned down on account of flak alone. Certainareas in the Ruhr were recognized beforehand asprohibitive to wise operation, and targets therewere not presented for consideration. When thebattlefield was to be isolated, the interdiction ofcommunications systems was accomplished at themost advantageous places flak being one of theinfluencing factors in the selection of points ofattack.

After the b reak thro ugh in Decem ber, an especially close wa tch was kept on mov emen ts of flak inall areas, since changes in flak dispositions wereindicative of enemy movements and preparationsfor attack. A special chart was prepared with theentire Western front divided into Luftgau subsections and German army zones. The relativestrength of zones was determined bi-weekly and theresults pooled with other information to give anall-round intelligence picture.By the Spring of 1945, many new agencieswere becoming interested in flak intelligence, as

flak guns were being used more and more in a groundrole. The X X IX TAC daily flak bulletin then included on its distribu tion all Corps and A rmy artillerysections as well as the pertinent air units.Counter-Battery

Anti-flak fire was also coordinated with the9th Arm y artillery, and becam e SOP on closesupp ort o peration s. It met with considerable success, much to the delight of our fighter-bomberpilots.During the last months of the war, the X X IXTAC section was pressed to keep up with rapidlyadvancing Allied Armies, and the end of hostilitieswas received with both relief and satisfaction relief to know that the threat of German flak wasover and satisfaction with the realiza tion th at theX X I X TA C flak section had played a very potentpart in disallowing this flak threat from ever developing into a menace to the fighter-bomber airmenand aircraft they served.


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Development of mathematical solutions to theflak problems of a tactical air force was the continualand ingenuity-testing goal of flak analysis officersin this theater. "Approved solutions" were produce d, but as the camp aigns rolled on it be cam emore evident that the best flak analyses in therapidly shifting tactical areas were very seldom themathematical solutions.

The eternal question in the tactical operational area was, "'Where are those German flakpositions?", and because flak analysis is foundedon an exact knowledge of the weapon locations andcharacteristics, the problem became extremely nebulous. Th ere always appe ared to be more unkn ownsthan equations. In addition, in a tactical air unit

targets were selected and attacked with such dispatch that formal analysis systems, especially withfighter-bomber organizations, were applied onlywhen time allowed. It was with these limitation sthat flak personnel approached the subject andevolved the procedures briefly described in thefollowing paragraphs.Medium Bombardment

Essentially the analysis method in use throughout the Bomber Command was that system originally devised for the strategic high level bombers inthis theater, slightly revised to accomodate thelower bom bing altitu des (10,000 to 14,000 feet)employed on the B-26, A-20, and A-26 missions in

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"Sir, the flak was light, bu tthe tactical area. Oftentimes because of the typicalunbalanced defenses of the tactical area it was possible to choose the proper bombing axis and routewith out reso rting to the flak clock. Howev er, if anydoubt existed, due to gun density, wind, possibilityof shifts in the mobile defenses, etc., the flak defenseswere thoroughly analyzed in conjunction with otheroperational factors of sun, drift, etc.

In order to better evaluate and record flakexperience for future use, overlays (see insert) ofeach mission route with flak experience as to location, intensity, planes damaged, quality and typeof fire, etc. were composed at group level and forwarded to Command for analysis. This method ofpresenting flak fire experiences proved very suc

accurate over Malmedy"cessful in providing intelligence of enemy dispositions in areas for which there was no photographiccover.Fighler-bombers

With due regard to the enormity of the vagaries,the possible errors, the unknown quantities, theflexible conditions, etc. which haunt the fighterflak problem, efforts were made to produce a workable "gadget" that would indicate best routes intoand out of light flak areas for the particular benefitof fighter-bombe r aircraft. In M ay, 1944, flakanalysis officers of the IX and XIX Tactical AirCommands produced the first dive-bombing andlow level bombing flak computers for light flakanalysis.

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Ninthfighter-bombersscore on anenemy ammocolumn

(See fig. i, Pg. 27) This simple expedient forcomputation of gun effectiveness factors was basedon the probability of hitting at midpoint slant rangesfor light flak weapons. The effectiveness numberswere placed on the computer between the slantrange limits (2,500 yards considered maximum effective range of light flak), and the altitude s of bombrelease and scale of the map determined the sizeof the computer. Values for each of the guns in adefense were computed at various headings, thesmallest effectiveness number determining the bestaxis of approach.

(See fig. 2, Pg. 27) This second computer wasbased on the assumption that the effectiveness oflight antiaircraft artillery at various ranges is inversely proportional to the square of the slant range.The curves shown were constructed for typicaldive-bombing methods in use at the time; i. e..seventy degree dive, release of bombs at 4,000 feet

and pullout at 1,500 feet, with full recovery 2,500yards beyond the aiming point. Again, in order todetermine axis of attack, data derived from readingvalues of gun positions at thirty degree intervals ofthe compass was compiled and the best headingreadily chosen.

Although these systems were merely basic anddid not consider the fact that the aspect of a movingplane constantly changes, thus presenting varyingsize targets to the ground gunner, this factor is inall probability eliminated since aiming errors increase with deflection, which itself is greatest whenthe aspect of the target makes it appear largest.

From these beginnings mathematical analysisof light flak has progressed, but it can still be saidthat flak analysis in a fluid battle situation is essentially one based on intelligence of the enemy's flakdispositions, capabilities and tactics.


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All crews reported Meg ger Inaccurate HFFin areaof HULMEN in and out,and at COESFELD on theroute out. Meager inaccurate LFF was observed bysome crews of the ALTENBEKEN mission at thetarget,on the strafing runwhich was made at 3,500ft. and an airspeed of approximately 2 9 0 miles anhour indica ted. No HFF orLFF was reported at thefive primaries when thea/c were at bombing alt i tude.Visibility was I % milesup sun, 6 miles down sun.No clouds.

ONE FLIGHT DROPPED HERE. *HAMMDORSTEN

SOEST

323 BOMBGP(M)AAF22 FEBRUARY 1945TARGETS 8 KEY

I N E U B E C K U M 3 Runs-10 A/C.LEAD # 2 a # 6 Cat. A3TS.W. of NEUBECKUM3 Runs-I I A/C.IEAHLEN 3 Runs-12 A/C.LEAD #1 Cat. A

1 2 L A G E 1 Run-6 A/C.LEAD # 4 Cat. AISZALTENBEKEN2 Runs-I I A/CMEAG. INACC.MEAG. 1NACC LIGHT.BRIEFED ROUTE

No Flak in target areasexcept for meag. inacc.LFF on strafing run.TIME 1419 to 1430

HEIGHT 8,000 ' to 12 ,000 'NO CLOUDS VIS. ifeMI. UP SUNWEATHER 6 Ml. DOWN SUNHAZE.

FO. 424REPRODUCED BY Co B, 942ND ENGR AVN TOPO BN


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Early in 1944 flak replaced enemy aircraft as the principle cause of loss and damage to Allied aircraft. Flak production moved into high gear and the Hun built uppowerful defenses throughout the Reich for the protection of his cities, industries,and military installations.

During the hey-day of the German Air Forceflak was considered a minor and annoying evil, likea mosquito that buzzed around and sometimes bit.The greatest proportion of loss and damage toAllied aircraft during this early period was causedby enemy fighter planes. Formations, tactics, andother defensive measures aimed at reducing thedestructive power of enemy aircraft and flakwas hardly considered worthy of special treatment.

That was before the back of the GAF wasfinally broken in the early months of 1944, forcingthe Hun to rely almost completely on his flak defenses for protection against the air supremacy enjoyedby the Allies.

Production of flak equipment, which had thesame priority as did production of aircraft, increased in tempo, and by the end of 1944 the alreadyformidable defenses had increased to 16,000 heavyguns, 50,000 light guns, 7,500 searchlights, and1,500 balloons, manned by a total of more than1,000,000 personnel. Moreover in December 1944production of flak equipment was given higherpriority than all aircraft except jet propelled planes.Around his most important industries theH un amassed the greatest con centration of flakguns the world has ever known. The Ruhr defenses,greatest of the great, were capable of hurling 200tons of metal and explosive into the air every minute;the Cologne defenses, 80 tons; the Berlin defenses,70 tons.

The total defenses of Germany, firing for one

minute, could have put 5,000 tons of shells int o the sky.Defense of the Reich, as well as of GAF installa

tions, was mostly the responsibility of the GermanAir Force, which controlled approximately 80%of all flak defenses. The Army and SS units controlled 15%, and the Navy, 5%. Everywhere, oneverything, flak guns were found: on the ground,on buildings, towers, trucks, tanks, submarines,barges, small boats, warships, and railway cars.

Fire control equipment, both optical and radio,directed accurate fire to heights seven miles abovethe earth's surface.

These, plus deceptive tactics, tricks, and trapsengendered of Germ an ingenuity, all joined indesperate battle against the crushing blows of thebomb ers and the deadly sting of the fighter-bombers.This was the enemy against which flak sectionswere established. This was the enemy that was, afterthe demise of the GAF, the primary cause of lossand damage to our aircraft. This was the enemywhich is described pictorially in the following pages.

Port engine smoking from flakhit, B-26 streaks for home


17/19

Cap able of shooting 20 rounds per minute ,this gun made up 80% of Germany's heavyflak defenses, protecting all important industries,communication centers, supply points, bridges,etc. More tha n 1000 heavy flak guns were usedin the defense of the R uh r. Not visible in thepicture are two sets of bogies which are themobile mounting.

"Bogie" of airmen and tankers alike, this dual purpose gunwas the mainstay of Germany'sheavy flak defenses, capable offiring effectively to a height of35,000 feet or of piercing fiveinches of armor at 2,000 yards.Note foliage camouflage on barrel.The gun was fired electrically.


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In traveling position thisgun weighed 12 tons, and itwas generally towed by a12-ton half-tracked vehicle.In an emergency it could befired from the wheels. At0" elevation the barrel recoiledfour feet. This picture, takenin Africa, shows the gunnerswaiting in foxholes till timeto move out to new locations.The gun was loaded manually.

Considerable use wasmade by the enemy ofsuch railway mountedheavy flak as shown herefor rapid reinforcement ofthreatened areas a mobilestrategic reserve. Generallythere were four heavy gunsper battery, complete withdirector (Kommandogerat40) and radar equipment.The guns could not be firedon the move.

msmmmm


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128mmA bigger gun patterned after

the 105mm, this wea pon strengthened already large defenses ofimportant targets. Intended forstatic op eration , there was also amobile model which weighed morethan 26 tons. *

In addition to the static mounting shown here, there was also a mobileversion of the 105mm flak gun. In rangeand rat e of fire it was inferior to the" 8 8 " (41 mod el), though its projectileweighed 65% more. Since the 88mmwas a better all-round weapo n, production priorities favored the 88mm asthe stan dar d heavy flak gun and the128mm in the heavier class. Both the 105mm and 128mm had automatic loaders.

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WWII 19th Tactical Air Command

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