拉丁美洲經貿季刊 - 商貿外語學院

發行人 Publisher : 致理科技大學校長尚世昌博士

編輯委員會 Editorial Board :

總編輯 Editor in Chief : 向駿 (拉丁美洲經貿研究中心主任)

副總編輯 Deputy Editors in Chief :

楊建平(Antonio Yang)

馮慕文(Fabricio Antonio Fonseca)

向洵(Jerome Hsiang)

本期主編 Editor : 馮慕文(Fabricio Antonio Fonseca)

執行編輯 Managing Editor : 龔建華 (研究員)

特約編輯委員 Contributing editors :

編輯委員 Editorial Board:

陳敬忠致理科技大學副教授

柯玉枝政治大學國際關係研究中心副主任

蘇彥斌政治大學政治系助理教授

黃富娟淡江大學美洲研究所助理教授

吳穎錫實踐大學國際企業英語學位學程助理教授

莫伊賽斯(Moises Lopes de Souza，南海智庫副主任)

馮慕文(Fabricio Antonio Fonseca，政治大學亞太研究博士候選人)

贊助單位: 漢儒、華儒文教基金會

創刊於 2010 年 6月 1日，每年區分春(3月 1日)、夏(6 月 1 日)、秋(9 月 1 日)、冬(12月 1 日)四季

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平台之 HyRead 台灣全文資料庫(www.hyread.com.tw )、華藝線上圖書館(http://www.airitilibrary.com)期

刊資料庫。

林國榮 (致理科技大學商貿外語學院院長)

歐鴻鍊 (中華民國外交部前部長、社團法人對外關係協會會長)

鄧中堅 (國立政治大學外交系教授)

蘇振興 (中國社會科學院學部委員、研究員)

韓琦(南開大學拉丁美洲研究中心教授/中國拉丁美洲學會副會長)

李和 (美國 Merrimack College 教授)

曾福生 (麥可福國際公司執行董事 )

孫正大(中南美經貿聯誼會創會理事長)

向洵 Jerome Hsiang (美國 Fairfield Consulting Group 副總裁)

平臨泰 Jorge Pinto (墨西哥外交部前次長，古今東西文化公司共同創辦人)

吳華安 Juan Uriburu (阿根廷財政部法律暨行政秘書局國際法律事務處長)

歐威信 Wilson de Jesus Beserra de Almeida(巴西 Catholic University 教授)

Aldo Flores -Quiroga (墨西哥能源部次長、國際能源論壇 IEF 前秘書長)

Áriel Alvarez Rubio (智利國家政治暨戰略研究院教授)

Carlos Saravia Frias (阿根廷 Austral 大學教授)

Edgar Ricardo Bustamante Figueroa (瓜地馬拉 Universidad Galileo 教授)

Herber Oswaldo Vides Lucha (薩爾瓦多國家最高研究院顧問)

Roberto Zayas 所羅文化公司負責人

拉丁美洲經貿季刊

目錄

ISSN 2305-8927

拉丁美洲經貿季刊第三十一期二○一七年十二月一日 The Quarterly of Latin American Economy and Trade

Revista Trimestral de Estudios Economía Latinoamericanos N° 31 2017/12/01

主編的話:

From the Editor:…….. ………………………………………….…......……1

拉美專題:

Xavier Demian Soto Zuppa, Nationalism in Mexico and North East Asia....5

Manuel Villegas Mendoza, Elementos explicativos de continuidad y transición en la política exterior de China hacia América Latina. ….……..41

Gabriel Ramírez, Labor Markets in Mexico: concepts and methodologies..73

拉美新聞分析:

向駿，NAFTA 重新談判何去何從………………………….………….89

拉美史話:

陳敬忠，我在薩爾瓦多軍校的一些回憶（一）……….…….…….……92

拉美經貿書評或重要文獻介紹: …………………..…..…..….….108

拉丁美洲經貿研究中心新聞剪影.…….……………......................111

投稿須知及體例: ………………………………...…..……..….……115

致理科技大學商貿外語學院拉丁美洲經貿研究中心新北市板橋區文化路一段 313 號電話： 886-02-2257-6167# 4202 網址: http://portal.chihlee.edu.tw 電子郵件： [email protected] 著作財產權人：拉丁美洲經貿研究中心

本著作保留所有權利，欲利用本著作全部或部分內容者，須徵求著作財產權人同意或書面授權。本刊文章僅代表作者之意見;不代表本刊立場。

The opinions expressed in this journal's articles are the author's own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Quarterly of Latin American Economy and Trade.

El contenido de los artículos de esta revista refleja las ideas propias del autor, y no representa necesariamente la opinión de la evista Trimestral de Estudios Economía Latinoamericanos

CONTENTS

拉丁美洲經貿季刊第 31 期 (2017 年 12 月)

The Quarterly of Latin American Economy and Trade N°31

Revista Trimestral de Estudios Economía Latinoamericanos N°31 頁 1

主編的話

From the Editor of this Issue

It is with great pleasure that we present the last issue of the Quarterly of Latin

American Economy and Trade of 2017, a year filled with many challenges for the

region, derived from the arrival of Donald Trump to the White House and his “America

First” agenda, as well as from other domestic issues, particularly in South America,

related to a changing political landscape. For Mexico, the second largest economy in

Latin America, 2017 will be remembered, among many things, as the year of the

renegotiation, or probably the beginning of the end, of NAFTA. A trade agreement that

changed the face of the country for more than two decades, NAFTA’s negotiation

process has advanced at a slow pace, and after five rounds of talks, there are still few

signs of improvement. American officials representing the Trump Administration have

made proposals deemed unacceptable for their Canadian and Mexican counterparts, as

well as for important sectors in the US economy, aiming to demonstrate their

commitment with the electoral base that brought back the Republican Party, and

particularly Team Trump, to the presidency. The difficulties arisen from the negotiation

process have also affected the Mexican peso, after a period of recovery from the volatile

months during the US presidential election, noting the uncertain scenario in the minds

of foreign investors and local producers.

Meanwhile, Mexican officials have responded with warnings of a potentially

decreasing cooperation in bilateral security affairs, in case of a US withdrawal from the

treaty, to show the extent of interdependence and the complexities and intertwining of

bilateral socioeconomic topics. The constant calls made by Trump to build a wall along

the US border with Mexico, and to make the latter pay for it, even when destined to

domestic audiences in the United States, have been perceived as a deep offense by the

Mexican people, and with the coming presidential elections in June 2018, it is likely

that NAFTA will become a decisive issue in the Mexican electoral process. At the same

time, the Mexican government has started to take steps to diversify the country’s

foreign trade, to overcome its extremely high and unhealthy dependence on the US

market. A natural option are the countries in the Asia-Pacific region, considering their

increasing presence and weight in international economic affairs, combined with their

need for natural resources and places with relatively cheap and semi-skilled labor to

invest. The rise of China is coincidental with this process, hence making it an attractive

partner for the Latin American emerging economies, including Mexico.

For those reasons, this issue of our Quarterly introduces papers written by young

Mexican scholars, which reflect important considerations related to the current situation

of the country and/or the region. Aware of Mexico’s need to strengthen its economic

ties with the countries across the Pacific Ocean, Xavier Demian Soto Zuppa, from

Fudan University, elaborates a comparative study between the types of nationalism

adopted in Mexico and in some East Asian states. Once considered as one of the most

nationalistic countries in Latin America, Mexico shares some features with other

nations in Northeast Asia, which due to deep-rooted nationalistic considerations have

also failed to advance on a comprehensive regional integration agenda. According to

Soto Zuppa, an analysis between the different paths followed by each of those countries

can be useful for the Mexican authorities in their efforts to get closer to Asia, therefore




improving the country’s bilateral trade with those economies and decreasing its heavy

dependence on the United States.

The uncertainty provoked by an unnecessarily difficult and slow renegotiation

process of NAFTA, and the need to diversify its international trade have led Mexico to

look for reliable partners in Asia, and the Chinese government, immersed in its own

process of economic development and internationalization, has been seen as a potential

target. The example of South America, and particularly Brazil during the first decade

of this century, is appealing for some economic sectors in Mexico. The high economic

growth rates observed in different countries in the region between 2003-2013 could not

be explained without considering the direct and indirect role played by China, through

its demand on commodities but also through its important investments and credits,

especially in countries like Brazil, Peru, Argentina, Venezuela and Ecuador. It was also

during those years that the Chinese government began to elaborate a more

comprehensive policy towards the region, although still framed in a modest

consideration of its own place in the world, in tune with the “pacific development” ideal

carried by Hu Jintao. However, the new emphasis put in the Chinese Belt and Road

Initiative, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, places the relationship between the

People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Latin America under a new and wider path,

giving China a more important position in the foreign policymaking process of all the

countries in the region. In this regard, Manuel Villegas Mendoza, from Universidad de

Colima and Universidad del Valle de México, made an analysis comparing the changes

and continuities between the foreign policies followed by Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping,

during their years as Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),

highlighting the potential contradictions of keeping both the ideas of “peaceful

development” and “Chinese dream” as part of the governing concepts in the

implementation of those policies, and presenting some of their implications for Latin

America.

Another important element in the renegotiation of NAFTA has been the insistence

of the US and Canada officials on raising the wages in Mexico. Their complaints relate

to the fact that minimum wages and their purchasing power in Mexico have remained

practically stagnant since the 1980s, with the country trying to attract foreign direct

investment offering low cost labor as one of its main competitive assets. Compared to

salaries in its northern neighbors, wages in Mexico are still a fraction of the OECD

average, getting closer to Chinese levels; and the prevalence of neoliberal ideas among

the ruling elites for the past three decades have made it impossible to increase the

minimum wages at a higher speed, based on the assumption that raises should be made

according to increases in productivity growth, as a way to avoid unnecessary inflation.

A vicious cycle has been created as a result, with more Mexicans unwilling to obtain a

job with a minimum wage, hence opting to be part of the informal sector, which also

makes it harder to increase overall productivity levels. Part of this problem is presented

in the paper written by Gabriel Ramírez, from El Colegio de México, who analyzes the

structure of labor markets in Mexico and notes how despite having one of the lowest

unemployment rates in Latin America, and also among the members of the OECD, the

country has many of its population working in the informal sector of the economy. The

situation becomes even more challenging when considering other important factors

affecting the quality of jobs created in Mexico, as well as the living standards of an

important part of the population, that of workers, mainly women, who are also engaged

in domestic and caregiving duties.




Finally, we hope that the papers and other information contained in this issue of

our Quarterly be of interest and utility for our readers, and contribute to improve our

common understanding of the current situation in the region. And on behalf of the

Editorial Board of the Quarterly of Latin American Economy and Trade, and the Center

for Latin American Economy and Trade Studies at Chihlee University of Technology,

we wish you Happy Holidays and a Prosperous Year 2018.

Fabricio A. Fonseca Fernández

Associate Researcher, Center for Latin American Economy and Trade Studies

Chihlee University of Techonology




拉美專題

Nationalism in Mexico and North East Asia

Xavier Demian Soto Zuppa

Abstract:

The present paper dicusses the main features of nationalism in Mexico and North East

Asia. Nation and nationalism are concepts that change in terms of the specific

historical context of the community that produces them. Mexico is currently

undergoing a crisis of national identity, whereas nationalism seems to be the dominant

political ideology in North East Asia (with a partial exception of Japan).

Keywords:

Nation, nationalism, Chinese nationalism, Japanese nationalism, Korean

nationalism, Mexican nationalism.

The author is coursing the PhD program in International Politics at the School of International Relations

and Public Administration (SIRPA), Fudan University, Shanghai; holds a Master degree in China Studies

from the Center for Asia and African Studies (CEAA), El Colegio de México (COLMEX), and a Master

degree in Chinese-English Translation and Interpreting, Beijing Language and Culture University

(BLCU).




A nation is broadly defined as a social group integrated by one or many ethnicities having

a dominant culture, and endowed with civic ties established after the community’s struggle for

political autonomy. Accordingly, nationalism is understood as an ideological construct aimed

at legitimizing the nation’s sovereignty. Although nationalism acquired a negative connotation

after the excesses committed in its name all around the world during the first half of the

twentieth century, it remains a compelling form of ideology nurturing collective identities and

working as a source of legitimation for the nation state. In the following pages we will discuss

the transformation of national identities in Mexico and North East Asia, with the intention of

contributing to the mutual understanding between the relevant countries.

North East Asian countries are important for Mexico as sources of foreign direct

investment (FDI), export markets for its natural resources and agricultural products, as well as

diplomatic partners in international institutions. China, Japan and South Korea are the second,

third and fourth imports partners for the Mexican economy, respectively. (León-Manríquez and

Cardenas, 2017: 26) Mexico’s current administration is very interested on reinforcing economic

ties with the region, as it faces an unfavorable environment for trade negotiations with

Washington. President Enrique Peña Nieto has attached special importance to rebuild Mexico’s

bilateral relationship with China, severely damaged during the previous two governments under

the National Action Party (PAN), particularly during President Calderon’s tenure (2006-2012).

Some steps have been taken in order to institutionalize the relationship, such as the creation of

three new working groups for economic affairs and the agreement to increase oil sales to China,

after President Xi Jinping’s visit to Mexico in 2013. The bilateral relationship was stepped up

to a comprehensive strategic relationship, after President Peña Nieto’s visit to China in 2014.

(Haro Navejas and Mendoza, 2016: 409-411, 441).

Mexico has signed seventeen bilateral agreements in diverse fields with South Korea,

and started negotiations for a free trade agreement between the two countries in 2012. President

Park’s visit to Mexico in 2016 had the main objective of resuming these negotiations, but the

effort was unsuccessful due to protectionist pressures on the Mexican government from the

steel and automotive sectors. (León-Manríquez and Cardenas, 2017: 26) However, Mexico and

South Korea collaborate at the ministerial level within the framework of the MIKTA, to

promote mutual understanding and communication and to “play a constructive role in the

international agenda and exert greater influence” on it (MIKTA, 2017). Mexico expelled North

Korea’s diplomatic representative in September 2017, in protest of Pyongyang’s nuclear tests

(The Korean Herald, 2017). This decision can be certainly understood as a way of showing

support to the U.S.’ demands for more U.N. sanctions on Pyongyang, at a moment of delicate

trade and immigration policies negotiations with Washington. However, this decision also




cements the relationship with South Korea and is in line with Mexico’s traditional stance on

nonproliferation.

Mexico’s was the first country to sign a treaty on the basis of equality with Japan in 1888

(Tanaka, 2011: 212), which established a precedent of cordiality for the diplomatic relations

between the two countries. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi facilitated the establishment of

an exceptional Economic Partnership Agreement with Mexico in 2006, which allowed Mexican

agricultural products to enter the Japanese market (Tanaka, 2011: 212). The agreement was

amended and complemented with other protocols and diplomatic notes in 2007, 2011 and 2012

(MOFA, 2012). China, Japan and South Korea consider Latin America and the Caribbean

region (LAC) as an attractive market for their goods, a profitable destiny for investment and a

source of raw materials, energy resources and agricultural products, notably after the region’s

recovery from the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. In the last decade, China became the

region’s second trading partner and its third source of FDI, whilst the LAC region became

China’s seventh trading partner. Bilateral trade between China and the region rose from USD

12.6 billion in 2000, to USD 254 billion in 2014. Chinese FDI flow to the region totaled USD

10.7 billion in 2013, focusing in commodities, raw materials, energy resources, agriculture and

infrastructural projects. Japanese and South Korean trade to the region reached USD 64 billion

and USD 54 billion, respectively (Myers and Kuwayama, 2016: 4). 80% of the Republic of

Korea’s FDI flow to LAC (USD 27 billion in 2012, concentrating in Mexico and Brazil) goes

to manufacturing (ECLAC, 2015: 73, 75), while Japanese FDI (USD 6.9 billion in 2013) is

evenly distributed among manufacturing, services and primary sectors (Myers and Kuwayama,

2016: 7). Mexico has a special appeal for these countries for its geographic proximity with the

U.S. market.

The study of the history of these countries’ national identities will help them to identify

shared values and cultural similarities on which to build consensus to advance their common

interests in international forums. I will organize my exposition as follows: The first section of

the paper discusses the concepts and definitions of nation and nationalism from the perspective

of Anthropology, International Relations, Philosophy, and Social Psychology. The second

section explores the causes of the crisis of Mexico’s post-revolutionary nationalism, which

might be found in the profound transformation of the political culture that have dislocated the

traditional ways in which the citizenry was linked to the power structure. The third section

presents the case of Japanese nationalism. It will be seen that Japanese ruling elites have failed

to produce a master narrative in which the main groups of society find themselves represented.

Nationalism intensifies in Japan when external pressures force the state to modify the policy of

defense. Chinese nationalism is discussed in the fourth section. I will argue that state

nationalism has presented two main interpretations in China, one nativist during Mao’s era, and




the other pragmatist, during the period of reform and opening. During Mao’s China, nationalism

intensified as an important element of the Chairman’s continuous revolution strategy to deal

with domestic and foreign threats to the CCP’s rule. The era of reforms has been characterized

by a soberer official nationalist discourse, competing at times with alternative popular

narratives. The fifth section discusses nationalism in the Korean peninsula. Korean nationalism

was created during the colonial period as a form of resistance against Japanese attempts to

impose their culture over the Korean people. Korean nationalism was established on ideas of

ethnic homogeneity and blood ties, however, a new concept of nationalism might be emerging

among the younger generations in the South, more exposed to modernization and globalization.

North Korean nationalism rests on the synthesis of Neo-Confucian philosophy and Korean

cultural traditions with modern forms of political structures (i.e., corporatism), into what

appears to be a powerful and stable instrument for the regime’s legitimation. Concluding

remarks are presented in the last section.

Nation and nationalism

Let us start our discussion about nationalism in Mexico and North East Asia by specifying the

different meanings that have been attached to the concept, and commenting on the main features

of the most influential approaches, typologies and ideas related to the concept of nationalism.

Philosophers consider that the term nationalism generally expresses two meanings, i.e., the

attitude of the members of a nation towards their national identity; and the nation’s struggle to

achieve or maintain self-determination. Starting with the first meaning, a nation “is often

defined in terms of common origin, ethnicity, or cultural ties” (SEP, 2010), being the

membership in a nation usually involuntary. Regarding the second meaning, nationalism as a

struggle for self-determination, includes the issue of the nation’s need of a full or partial

sovereign statehood or any other form of political autonomy. Here, sovereignty is understood

as the complete authority over the polity’s domestic and international affairs. Thus, it’s

necessary to distinguish between a nation (that is, an ethnic and/or cultural community) and a

state (a sovereign political institution). The ethical debate about nationalism stems from the

moral tension between the need for solidarity with oppressed national groups and the rejection

of crimes perpetrated in the name of nationalism. It is a crucial debate for nationalist ideologies,

including the issue of how to resolve ethnic and cultural differences within and between

political entities, such as, territorial and migration issues (resource rights, boundaries,

citizenship), ecological matters and others.

Historically, the most typical form of nationalism (ethno-cultural nationalism) considers

full territorial sovereignty as an essential objective of its political program due to the




possibilities of internal control and external exclusion that it creates, for instance, territorial

claims could be justified by referring to “the attachment that members of a nation have to its

territory” (Ibid). Territorial sovereignty involves such issues as the resources rights implied in

the movement of money and people (i.e. the access to national healthcare and other welfare

services for immigrant population). Classical nationalism was the dominant ideology in Latin

America and Europe during the nineteenth century. This interpretation of nationalism

globalized later and still characterizes contemporary nationalisms, as we will see in detail when

discussing Anderson’s, Itzigsohn’s and Vom Hau’s notions of nationalism applied to the case

of Mexico.

Nationalism is a historical phenomenon that appears in different fashions under different

historical conditions (Bartra, 1989: 216). Following Renan, Alan Knight argues that

nationalism stems from a shared collective experience, which includes both dimensions of

space and territory. Geographic and historical processes shape in different ways the national

identity. The effects of geographic processes on nationalism are very difficult to notice, whereas

historical processes remain in the collective memory through historical narratives and education,

thus they are more conscious and subject to ideological debates (Knight, 2010). Therefore,

history explains why different countries produce different types of nationalism, according to a

number of social, economic, cultural and political variables. For instance, the cohesion and the

ability of the ruling class to portray its nationalistic discourse as representative of the interests

of the majority vis à vis the intensity of a social movement, will determine if the official

nationalistic narrative becomes hegemonic or not. Ethnic cleavages and class struggles

determine how inclusive the nationalistic discourse results, which in turn will have a strong

influence on the community’s perception of other societies. Social and political struggle might

create critical junctures involving a reconfiguration or substitution of the political elite as well

as its cohesiveness, deciding the partial or complete transformation of the national master

narrative. This will also affect how nationalism would be combined with other political

ideologies, such as, anti-capitalism for Mexican post-revolutionary nationalism or liberalism

for Mexican technocratic nationalism.

Nationalism can be summoned to legitimate specific economic policies as well, for

instance, economic nationalism (protectionism, mercantilism and imports substitution) was the

economic policy of post-revolutionary Mexico; a self-reliance system was justified in

nationalistic terms in North Korea; on the other extreme, the economic reform in China was

presented by a nationalist discourse detached from previous Communist ideological lines.

Different cultural backgrounds would also determine the diversity of resources available for the

creation of a national narrative, as well as the sensitivity of the community towards the

influence of other cultures. In the four cases we will discuss here, a strong state controlled by a




unified political elite successfully created a hegemonic nationalist discourse at different

historical periods. As we will see, this political and discursive dominance has survived in the

cases of China and the Koreas, but not in the case of contemporary Mexico and Japan. Thus

nationalism might not be always monopolized by the state, like in Argentina and Peru; or it

might not even be created in its totality within the cultural framework of the relevant community,

as it happens with the new South Korean nationalism emerging among the younger generations,

or with the romantic national images produced in Europe about some Arabian countries, but

adopted by the latter as their own.

Two different notions of the concept of nation depend on whether the inclusion of the

members into the community is seen as voluntary or involuntary. Civic nationalism is based on

the idea that the members are able to choose to be part of the community. As David Brown puts

it, “The term ‘civic nationalism’ refers ... to a sense of community which is focused on the

belief that residence in a common territorial homeland, and commitment to its state and civil

society institutions, generate a distinctive national character and civic culture, such that all

citizens, irrespective of their diverse ancestry, comprise a community in progress, with a

common destiny. This commitment to a common destiny, tied into the idea of common loyalty

to the territory and its institutions, means that civic nationalism implies the acquisition of ethical

obligations, and should not be regarded simply as a voluntary association lacking emotive

power.” (Brown, 2000: 51) Some authors refer to civic nationalism with the term patriotism.

However, ethno-cultural nationalism (also known as, classical nationalism), compares the

membership into a community with other involuntarily acquired cultural features, such as one’s

mother tongue. Exceptions as voluntary changes of nationality are acknowledged. Brown

defines ethno-cultural nationalism as “a sense of community which focuses on belief in myths

of common ancestry; and on the perception that these myths are validated by contemporary

similarities of ... physiognomy, language or religion.” (Ibid, 50) The concept of ethno-cultural

nationalism is very useful to study the case of Korean nationalism. However, in China and Latin

America there are several examples where the community aspiring to nationhood is composed

by several ethnicities of particular cultural features, which either complement or challenge the

master narrative of mythical origin. These ethnicities’ struggle for membership into the

community can only be understood as an effort to achieve civic objectives (i.e., political rights).

In this sense, Michel Seymour attenuate the ethnic component in his definition of nation, to

highlight its political and cultural dimensions: “A nation is a cultural group, possibly but not

necessarily united by a common descent, endowed with civic ties.” (SEP, 2010) This definition

has received a widespread acceptance among philosophers.

Nationalism is currently described through the metaphor of national identity, or the

conviction of belonging to a cultural group. “It is centered upon cultural membership, and used




both for the identity of a group and the socially based identity of its members” (Ibid). According

to Benedict Anderson and Roger Bartra, nationalism is the social component of the personal

identity of each member of the community. Thus, they believe that the membership into the

community is essentially determined by birth and becomes more conscious and complete by

the individual’s endorsement of it. The identity issue relates with the questions of the origin

and authenticity of the ethno-cultural nation. The main realist approaches to this issue are

primordialism and constructivism. Primordialist authors suggest that the ethno-cultural nation

began with the very emergence of human societies. However, the constructivist (also modernist)

perspective claims that nations are a type of social organization among others. Anti-realist

approaches argue that although nations are in fact imaginary communities, they are however

powerful constructs dominating the believers. According to Benedict Anderson’s very

influential definition, nationalism is a cultural artifact that creates a collective identity in ways

similar to religion and kinship. The nation is an imagined political community which is

inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because although the members of a nation will

never meet or even hear about most of their fellow-members, yet “in the minds of each lives

the images of their communion” (Anderson, 1986: 49). It is imagined limited because it has

boundaries beyond which other nations exist. It is imagined sovereign, because its concept was

born during the European Enlightenment, which destroyed the worldview of a “divinely

ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm.” Finally, the nation is imagined as a community,

“because regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation

is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (Ibid). On its most basic level,

nationalism is “a political doctrine that argues that the cultural unit (the nation) should be

coterminous with the political unit (the state).” Or as Stephen Walt puts it from the perspective

of International Relations, “in the competitive world of international politics nations have

incentives to obtain their own state and states have incentives to foster a common national

identity in their populations” (Walt, 2011). Sometimes, the best ways for national groups is to

have their own state in order to become less vulnerable to conquest, absorption or assimilation.

As for modern states, they also have strong incentives to promote a common national identity,

that is, to “foster nationalism - because having a loyal and united population that is willing to

sacrifice (and in extreme cases, to fight and die) for the state increases its power and thus its

ability to deal with external threats” (Ibid).

About the rationality of nationalism, some authors regard it as rational, emphasizing its

instrumental dimension, and other as irrational. Among the arguments in the last position, we

have those who consider it as a false consciousness, resulting from the manipulation of the

masses by the elites. Marxists believe that nationalism is the ideological result of mechanisms

that have more to do with impersonal and structural social factors than with the spontaneous

credulity of individuals. Authors who think of nationalism as a rational attitude describe its




positive and negative effects. Among the positive ones are the greater identification, cohesion

and cooperation among the members of the ethno-cultural nation. As for the negative effects,

nationalism may stimulate conflict among ethno-cultural nations and impede cooperation with

outsiders. Social psychology has shown that some kind of rationality may underlie individual’s

involuntary tendency towards identification with a randomly selected group, “individuals who

develop a sentiment of identification and a sense of belonging end up better off in the

evolutionary race” (Ibid).

Taxonomies of nationalism depend on the way in which the members of a nation attain

and keep political sovereignty over a territory. The more general taxonomy starts with ethno-

cultural nationalism:

1) Ethno-cultural nationalism is a political program which claims that the creation, maintenance

and strengthening of a fully owned state is a fundamental duty of every member of a given

ethno-cultural nation. It might justify expansionist policies arguing, for instance, the need of

bringing all the members of the nation under the state, or the need of gaining more territory and

resources. Depending on the political context, it may advocate isolationist policies. Classical

nationalism often justifies the use of force as a means to achieve national objectives, however,

it can also resort to peaceful and merely ideological means for the maintenance of sovereignty,

through the preservation and transmission of a given culture. Classical nationalists believe that

the national interest precedes group or personal interests and even individual rights. Classical

nationalism comes both in universalizing and particularistic fashions. (SEP, 2010)

2) Universalizing nationalism is a political program claiming that all ethno-cultural nations

should have a rightfully owned state whose interests they should promote, whereas,

3) Particularistic nationalism is the political program that claims that only some ethno nations

should have their state.

Thus, there are three normative dimensions at the core of the nationalist program, namely,

1) internal strength (moral and legal obligation to create and maintain the state); 2) comparative

strength (precedence of the national claims over any other internal or external claims); and 3)

scope (universalizing or particularistic fashion). Radical approaches to one of these dimensions

usually extends to the other two for the sake of coherence. Hybrids of extreme attitudes on one

dimension but not on the others tend to be both psychologically and socially unstable. These

normative claims fit well with the realist approach to international relations, where morality

would end at the state boundaries; beyond these boundaries there is only anarchy. So the nation-

state competes with other actors in the international arena on behalf of its constitutive people.

Once it is established that “the political form of a nation-state has some value as such,

that a national community has a particular, or even central, moral and political value, and that




claims in its favor have normative validity” (Ibid), the debate opens between classic and liberal

views about what specifically would be the main values of the community. Some of the duties

classical nationalism set towards one’s ethno-cultural nation interfere with essential values of

liberal democratic societies, such as individual autonomy, impartiality towards members of

culturally different groups, and values that are important for the development of culture and

creativity. Despite the fact that modern states are integrated by a great diversity of ethnic groups,

nationalism does not seem to foster multiculturalism and pluralism, neither in theory nor in

practice. Nationalism appears more commonly in its particular fashion, probably because of the

nation-state’s competition for scarce resources. This situation can lead to the excesses that

nationalism has produced in history, thus nationalist thinkers have tried hard to separate the

idea of nationality from those evils.

Nationalism in Mexico

Itzigsohn and Vom Hau follow Anderson’s definition of nation as an imagined political

community that is sovereign, equal and inherently limited. The membership to the community

is signaled by specific “emotionally charged norms and values, cognitive orientations and

symbols”, which are historical constructions, but “experienced as primordial elements of

collective life” (Itzigsohn & Vom Hau, 2006: 196). National internal and external boundaries

change over time and thus depend upon a constant tension between inclusion and exclusion.

“Nations are crossed by internal cleavages that determine degrees of belonging and exclusion

of different groups”; excluded groups (minorities, immigrants, etc.) might propose alternative

ideas of the nation with the objective of reshaping established national imagineries and

expanding its internal boundaries. Thus, “Nations are ... intrinsically unstable political and

cultural constructs subject to renegotiation and change” (Ibid: 196). Nationalism, is regarded

as “a consciously articulated ideology put forward by the state or by social movements in order

to legitimate authority, mobilize political support, and achieve social control”, but it is as well

“a cultural script with almost self-evident plausibility that provides a lens through which

common people frame their social relations and construct solidaity in their daily habits and

routines” (Ibid: 196).

State nationalism changes due to political and social conflict. In order to get political

legitimacy, the state strives to make its national ideology (including notions of national identity

and a specific interpretation of history) accepted as a hegemonic cultural script. It does thus

through public education, mass media, public rituals and coopted intellectuals. However,

cultural narratives are relatively autonomous and very resistant to conscious indoctrination;

they constitute the substrate from which excluded minorities and social movements take the




elements of their alternative national naratives. These alternative discourses exist sincronically

to the official discourse, and find their way to reform or substitute the state ideology when

historical junctures alter significantly the balance of power between states and societal forces.

With regime change “the formation of new social and political groupings, the

reorganization of ethnic groups and class relations, and the ascendance of new state elites set

the stage for the challenge of established ideas about national identity, and enhance pressures

on states to expand their boundaries of national inclusion” (Ibid: 197). The specific features

that nationalism may acquire depend on the countrty’s socioeconomic, political and

demographic circumstances. More specifically, the extent and type of social mobilization, that

is, the “organizational strength and coalition patterns of major and political social movements”

(Ibid: 199); the extent and form of political control excersized by state elites, involving their

cohesiveness and ability to induce social groups to embrace state ideology; the ability of the

state to difuse its ideology, including mass socializing institutions (i.e., military, social welfare

programs); and the community’s type and history of ethnoracial clevage and conflict. All these

elements determine the political opportunity and cultural resources available for the

construction of both state and alternative nationalist narratives, as well as the depth and extent

of their transformation.

Popular nationalism became the prefered ideological tool in Latin America during the

early twentieth century. Nationalist discourses inscribed the nation into an ethnocultural

narrative, in contrast to what happened during the ninetheenth century, when liberal national

ideologies “imagined the nation as grounded in a political community and shared institutions”

(Ibid: 200). These narratives acknowleged the diverse ethnical origin of the nation, but

attempted to achieve ethnical homogeneity. Mass-based political movements institutionalized

in political parties, and their charismatic leaders, were presented as the embodiment of the

national community. Mass mobilization was achieved through a corportatist structure

subordinated to the party or movement, “rather than in terms of equal individual citizenship”

(Ibid: 200).

In Mexico, after the armed phase of the 1910 Revolution, the reconstitution of the state

and the political incorporation of subordinates sectors, conditions were set for the establishment

of a popular nationalism based on the idea of racial and cultural fusion. Despite the ethnic

diversity of the Mexican population, racial polarization was never an issue, thus, subaltern

social groups’ mobilization was based on class or region, rather than on ethnic identity. During

the previous period of Porfirio Díaz dictatorship, a floursishing agricultural export sector and

the creation of new industries created the basis for a sustained economic expansion. Díaz

political power rested on an alliance with an elite of big landowners and wealthy industrialists.




National ideology during this period overlaped positivists ideas of order and progress, backed

up by modern political institutions and economic development. The Indian community

(regarded as ethnic minorities) was imagined as an element of backwardness and an obstacle to

social cohesion. However, although the revolutionary struggle between rival social and regional

factions caused the collapse of the state and a dramatic economic decline, it left a highly

mobilized peasantry and working class. The new leadership created a coalition with organized

labor and peasantry movements during the 1920s. This alliance rested on paternalistic ties

between President Calles (1924-1928) and subordinate leaders. It was until Lazaro Cardenas’

presidency (1934-1940) when the coalition was institutionalized, the state was systematically

strengthened and moderate segments of labour and peasantry were organized. Cardenas’ pro-

labor and land reform policies were not thoroughly implemented due to the opposition of the

Catolic Church, foreign capital and other dominant economic sectors. The corporatist

organization of the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) was the mechanism to strike a balace

between the interests of these social groups. Stability between political factions was achieved

after the oil reform of 1938.

At this point, popular nationalism gained traction as a state-sponsored national ideology.

The official interpretation of national history presented the Mexican nation as the result of the

process of conquest, where Spanish and Prehispanic societies became racially and culturally

fused. The indigenous civilizations were revered and set as distictive marker of the Mexican

people. The 1910 Revolution was transformed into a myth, and some of the revolutionary

leaders were worshipped as heroes, becoming symbols of the new identity. National identity

acquired a class (if not anti-capitalist) component emphasizing the importance of the working

masses. According to Roger Bartra, Mexican revolutionary nationalism can be minimally

defined by four characteristics, namely, 1) mistrust towards the great powers, especially the

U.S., accompanied by xenophobia and anti-imperialism; 2) nationalization as a way to limit

land property (ejido system and land reform), the control of natural resources (especially over

the oil) and the concentration of capital (legal limitations on foreign investments; 3) a strong

interventionist state leigitimized on its revolutionary origin and its ample mass base; and, 4) an

over-valuation of Mexican identity as a source of political trust (Bartra, 1989: 199).

The ideological capabilities of the state organizations and the active support of rural

teachers facilitated the translation of state national narratives into cultural narratives. The

conversion of the new state ideology was facilitated by the government’s efforts in the spheres

of culture and education. The National Museum of Anthropology and the National Institute of

Anthropology and History were established to preserve and spread national culture. Different

regional traditions were depicted as national symbols in textbooks, radio broadcasts, and so on.

“The PRI portrayed itself as the institutional embodiment of the nation and mobilized popular




sectors for national rituals, such as the Independence Day” (Itzigsohn & Vom Hau, 2006: 202).

Indian ethnic minorities continued to be perceived as a threat to national unity, and

assimilationist cultural policies were implemented through the Instituto National Indigenista,

to integrate excluded minorities into the homogeneous culturally and racially mixed population.

During the 1940s and the 1950s the economic model focused on the internal market,

protectionism, and industrialization targeting only domestic consumption. A new ruling group

consolidated during Miguel Aleman’s presidency (1946-1952). This new elite was integrated

by the technocrats, who represented other groups of the bureaucracy (unions, agrarian sector,

employees); the new nationalist businessmen (the burgeoisie created by protectionism in the

central region of Mexico, partially opposed to the businessmen from the North) that represented

the economic interests of the domestic industrial and trade sector; and the bankers, mediating

between the interests of the northern businessmen (grupo Monterrey) and the political

bureaucracy. The state had to deal with the interests of the Catholic Church, the industrialists

and the large landowners, as well as with the protests of organized labour and peasantry. These

elements pushed the new political elite towards the right, who intensified its authoritarianism

toward subordinate sectors. Nevertheless, these social conflicts did not affect the official project

of a mestizo national identity.

Mexico was forced by external forces to change its economic model at the begining of

the 1990s, after forty years of systematic growth. The political tensions created by the economic

crisis of 1982, made evident that the power structure had lagged behind the democratization of

the civic culture, shared by increasingly expanding sectors of the society, as well as by all the

levels of the political class. Democratic aspirations created fractures even within the PRI, who

suffered the escicion of its democratic current in 1988. The political crisis of the late 1980s and

early 1990s had two main causes, namely, the political elite’s increasing difficulty to maintain

cohesion within the governmental structure, and the terrible inefficiency to manage the

economic crises. For instance, President Jose Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) nationalized the

banking system using extremely authoritarian means. This implied the elimination of the

bankers as a group within the political elite and made manifest both, the lack of cohesion of the

governing group, and the failure of authoritarianism to reproduce and legitimize the functions

of the state.

The 1982 crisis produced a number of important factors that politically strengthened the

group of the technocrats, i.e., the deepening of the division between the technocrats and the rest

of the political bureaucracy (due to the bad administration of increasing oil revenues and the

bad management of economic crisis); the disappearance of political differences between the

protectionist and liberal businessmen factions (since the first abandoned populist positions);




private bankers were eliminated as a group in 1982, which created a generalized distrust among

the businessmen towards the political bureaucracy; the erosion of caciquism in the agrarian

sector of the party, together with the strengthening of the regional burgeoisie and middle classes;

and a relative strengthening of the corrupt union bureaucracy, accompained by an increasing

number of divisions between groups and currents struggling for power (Ibid: 97).

The group of neoliberal technocrats argued that if the PRI’s traditional ways were not

efficient anymore, it would be necessary to find a new governance technique to unlock the

processes of control. This new technique emphasized efficient administrative and economic

measures, rather than the establishment of political pacts, the manipulation of the leaders and

the distribution of spheres of influence. A new pact should be reached with the businessmen

who now distrusted the political class after the elimination of the bankers as a political group;

with the new rural burgeoisie, increasingly uncomfortable with the state’s centralism; a union

bureaucracy suspicious of any democratizing change; and with foreign investors vying for the

opening of the market and the extractive industry, as well as for the liberalization of the

financial system.

Thus, the technocrats proceeded to remove traditional politics from agriculture, oil

exploitation and foreign investment, dismantling the three pillars of revolutionary nationalism

(agrarianism, union populism and protectionism), in order to impose a “modern” perspective

on economic policy (Ibid: 194). The problem was that the new policy destroyed the clientelistic

system that in the past gave the state the capability of managing contradictions by allocating

resources among the different groups of interest according to their loyalty. From this time on,

the market would allocate resources according to a criterion of productivity (Meyer, 1999: 604).

Consequently, the effectiveness of authoritarianism and political stability decreased even more,

which was evident in 1994 with the assassination of the presidential candidate of the state party

and the eruption of the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas (Meyer, 1989: 603). The new policy has

not helped Mexico to recover from the crises, but it eroded the popular bases of the PRI,

strengthened political right trends and was unable to eliminate poverty, illiteracy,

authoritarianism and corruption (Bartra, 1989: 194). The postrevolutionary elite, having linked

Mexican national identity with the government created a source of political dispersion and

social confusion in times of crisis. Revolutionary nationalism became associated with

corruption and authoritarianism, and it lost its capability to legitimize the regime and to

culturally link a very diverse society with the political structure.

As for the relation with the United States, the technocrats not only do not distrust the

U.S., but also became collaborators of its economic policy, based on the Chicago school’s

economic theories; and promoters of the transnational mass culture (mainly created in the U.S.)




that reproduces the values of political and economic liberalism. New generations of Mexican

politicians reject anti-imperialist attitudes. Periodic contradictions between Mexico and the U.S.

are managed in terms of the interests that revolve around the U.S. economy and a pragmatic

approach towards the North American market with Asian branches (Ibid: 201). The U.S. had

become one of the bases of the Mexican authoritarian regime by the end of the 1920s, when

President Plutarco Elias Calles and President Calvin Coolidge reached an agreement by which

the new Mexican government committed to keep the Mexican society under control, while the

U.S. pledged to provide support to the new regime, despite its undemocratic nature, and grant

it “certain amount of freedom and relative independence (Meyer, 1999: 607). When President

George Bush accepted Mexico as an economic parter under the NAFTA, the message was not

to change politically if the complexities of democracy implied instability, which would create

unsolvable troubles for the U.S. Accordingly, after the period of sociopolitical instability

brought about by the 1982 crisis, the U.S. was ready to tolerate some political change in Mexico,

as happened during the 2000 presidential elections.

The PRI lost the Congress majority in the legislative elections of 1997 for the first time

in its history, initiating a series of events that resulted in the regime change with the National

Action Party (PAN) in the 2000 presidential elections. It looked as if Mexico was about to

finally overcome the period of athoritarianism, arriving to democracy through an authentic

electoral process. However, the PAN's performance did not represented a substantial political

change, and the leftist Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) got corrupted very fast, making

apparent it's lack of ideological cohesion and its unique objective of capturing resources and

privileges by colonizing some governmental offices, especially in Mexico City (Meyer, 2017).

Currently, Mexico is immersed in a partitocracy of a new oligarchy based not on a rural large

state, since the agricultural sector is in decay, but on the concentration of wealth in the more

dynamic sectors of the economy (i.e., telecommunications). This partitocracy clearly represents

the vested interests of the groups and individuals within their institutions, linking the political

class with the market economy by means of influence peddling. The outcomes of the rather

expensive electoral process in Mexico are predetermined by factual powers and the rest is

nothing but a democratic fiction. All these elements have deepended the crisis not only of

Mexican nationalism but also of the political culture, that is, the “deep cultural roots where

myths, legends, traditions, images and symbols are interwoven in a relatively independent way

from social and political struggles” (Bartra, 1989: 193) that frame the narratives through wich

the people links to the political structure.




Japanese Nationalism

Japanese society is undergoing a process of redefinition of the state and the national

identity that began in the post-war years. The most coherent proposals of a new idea of the

nation come from the sphere of politics. The political left argues that the military during

Imperial Japan brought the sufferings of war to the civilian population, and sets itself in

opposition to the government, which remains under the control of the same conservative

political faction that was influential during the Imperial era. Accordingly, the leftist idea of the

nation rests on the defense of the Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution, by which Japan renounces

to its sovereign right to wage war. At the other pole of the political spectrum, right wing

politicians pretend to create a level of cohesion between the people and the government similar

to the one achieved during the imperial period, thus, they suggest to create the national narrative

of a strong country that stresses Japan’s historical achievements, instead of focusing on the

harms inflicted upon other countries during the Colonial and the Second World War periods.

Consequently, the political right bids for strengthening military capabilities bypassing Article

9, nuancing in the history books the atrocities commited by the imperial army in South East

Asia, abandoning the policies of apologizing for past mistakes and fostering nationalism

through symbolic gestures, such as the Prime Ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.

Nevertheless, most of the people is indifferent to these political projects of national identity and

focus instead on the performance of the economy as well as on rising the living standard. The

average Japanese citizen is skeptical of the leftist propositions of radically reducing defense

expenditures, and about the rightist ideological obstinacy. According to surveys conducted in

2002, when Japanese citizens were asked about how would they prefer to contribute to their

society, the majority chose social solidarity over defense; only 3.7% of the respondents between

20 to 29 years old chose to fight aggressors in the hypothetical case of an invasion (Berger,

2014: 3-4).

Some analysts wonder if times of intense nationalistic mobilization in Japan might come

as a consequence of a poor performance of the economy, but it does not seem to be the case.

Economic modernization was set as a national priority from the outset of the Meiji Reform

(1868), however, the new contours of a modern Japanese economy were already visible around

1855. From this year to 1930, the average economic growth stood around 2.8% annually. Real

GNP doubled over this period, reaching an anual rate of 1.6%. Economic fluctuations before

1940 were determined to a certain extent by events in the global economy. For instance, GDP

doubled to a 4% anual rate between 1915 and 1920, due in part to the rise in the European

demand which came an effect of World War I. The Great Depresion determined a declining of

the Japanese economy between 1920 and 1930, but a dramatic recovery came afterwards with

the preparations for World War II (Alexander, 2000: 5). Wartime destruction pushed the




economy back to the levels of 1939, and it did not recover until 1955. However, GDP reached

double-digit rates from 1956 to 1970. Economic growth began to slow to an anual rate of 4%

during the late 1960s, and remained thus until 1989, when the government decided to pop the

financial bubble. Since then, Japanese economic growth has maintained a long term average

anual growth rate of roughly 2%. In terms of personal welfare, Real GNP per capita closely

approached the levels of the U.S. in 1992, when its economy was only 24% bigger than the

Japanese economy in per capita terms, however, after the Lost Decade of the 1990s, “America

turned out some 40 percent more than Japan” (Ibid: 7). The seize of Japanese economy in

current USD amounted to $6.203 trillion in 2012, but it fell again to $4.83 trillion in 2015

(levels similar to 1998) (World Bank, 2017).

Moments of intense nationalistic proselitism have been reflected by the right wing’s

attempts to minimize the aggressions committed by Imperial Japan against its neighbors, and

by the different Prime Ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Rightist nationalism kept a very

low profile between 1946 and 1970, since the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

limited the spread of militaristic and nationalistic views on Japanese history, geography and

ethics in the education sector at the end of 1945. (Yoshida, 2000: 73) However, Yamamoto

Shichihei and Suzuki Akira published in 1972 two different books denying the occurrence of

the Nanjing Massacre, provoking an ardent opposition from progressive intellectuals, such as

Hora Tomio, from 1972 to 1975 (Ibid: 81-83). Tomio refuted Yamamoto’s and Suzuki’s

arguments providing uncontroversial historical data that seemed to put an end to the academic

debate. Nonetheless, Tanaka Masaaki published another history book depicting the Nanjing

Massacre as a fabrication in 1984, and two years later, some politicians from the Liberal

Democratic Party (LDP), such as Fujio Masayuki and Okuno Seisuke, defended the revisionist

cause, sparking protests not only from the progressives at home, but also by the governments

of China and South Korea. Although, rightist revisionists won some concessions from the

Ministry of Education and their views prevail among the leaders of the LDP, they were

successfully contained by civil society organizations and progressive intellectuals, including

Kasahara Tokushi, Okono Kenji, Fujiwara Akira and Honda Katsuichi (Ibid: 101-105). As in

the case of the publication of revisionist history books, Prime Minister visits to the Yasukuni

Shrine did not occur only at times of economic stagnation (Figure 1). Nationalism in its

militaristic fashion was intense in Japan, especially during the 1930s, whilst economy was

recovering from the adverse effects of the Great Depression and Japan was preparing for war.

From the late-1950s to the 1970s, Japanese economy grew at a very good pace after the debacle

of the post-war, yet there were some nationalistic bursts during the mid-1960s. Although

economic growth started decelerating from the late-1960s on, Real GNP per capita increased

narrowing the gap with the U.S. in 1992. Therefore, it seems safe to assert that economic

performance is not correlated with the periods of nationalistic proselitism in Japan.




Figure 1. Periods of relatively poor performance of the Japanese post-war economy and PMs’ visits

to the Yasukuni Shrine1

Periods of Relative

Economic Decline (GDP)

PMs’ Visits to the Yasukuni

Shrine

Issuing of Revisionist

Nationalistic History Books

Mid 1960s Anti-Communist

policies

1972 Yamamoto’s Shichihei and

Suzuki Akira’s works

1975 Miki Takeo

1978-1980 1980 Zenko Suzuki

1982-1984 1982 Zenko Suzuki

1983 Nakasone Yasuhiro

1982 Ministry of Education

dispositions on textbook

language

1984 Tanaka Masaaki’s works

1985 Nakasone Yasuhiro

1986 LDP politician’s

statements of support to

revisionist authors

1988-1990

1992 Kiichi Miyazawa

1994 Fujioka Nobukatsu’s

works

1995-1998 1995, 1996 Hashimoto Ryutaro 1995 Fujioka Nobukatsu’s

works

2000-2002 2001-2002 Junichiro Koizumi

2003 Junichiro Koizumi

2004-2007 2004-2006 Junichiro Koizumi

2012-2015 2013 Shinzo Abe

Thomas Berger suggests instead that every time a shift in the international environment

exerts pressure on Japan to modify its national defense policy, the right wing has pushed to

strengthen nationalism, striking coalitions with moderate sectors who tolerate the revisionist

discourse in order to get the changes in defense policy that they consider necessary. However,

when conservatives go too far in promoting nationalism, moderates retire them their support,

1 Elaborated with data presented in DAIKI, Shibuichi. (2005). “The Yasukuni Shrine Dispute and the Politics of

Identity in Japan”. Asian Survey. Vol. 45, n.2; YOSHIDA, Takashi. “A Battle over History: The Nanjing Massacre

in Japan”, in FOGEL, Joshua A. (2000). The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography. Berkeley, University

of California Press; and The World Bank. (2017). “Data on Japan”.




leaving them no choice but to content themselves with relatively marginal modifications to the

national discourse and the defense policy. Historical evidence seems to confirm that this cyclic

pattern occurs with a frequency of five to ten years (Berger, 2014: 1). This was the case when

the U.S. Occupation ended in 1952 and the Mutual Security Treaty was enforced, allowing the

country to reappear on the international stage as an independent actor in the context of the Cold

War. Japan didn’t signed a peace treaty with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) nor with

the USSR during the post-war. The 1955 political system led by Yoshida Shigeru focused on

economy, relying on the U.S. for security and aligning with it politically (Huges, 2009: 839).

Later, the process of revision and ratification of the Mutual Security Treaty produced again an

upsurge of nationalism in Japan. The modifications consisted on allowing U.S. ships carrying

nuclear weapons, calling on Japanese ports and transiting Japanese waters. There also was a

“secret agreement allowing U.S. to bring nuclear weapons into its bases in Okinawa in a crisis;

nuclear weapons were actually stored in Okinawa prior to the reversion in 1972” (Kingston,

2013: 118). The Sino-U.S. rapprochement of the early 1970s exacerbated Japanese concerns

about Washington’s commitment, in the context of the Vietnam War and the domestic political

disorder in the U.S. Japanese political leaders wondered if they should continue relying on the

U.S. for security. These processes coincided with Yamamoto Shichihei’s and Suzuki Akira’s

revisionist history books publications in 1972, as well as with Prime Minister Miki Takeo’s

visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 1975. The Soviet buildup in East Asia seemed to pose a threat to

Japan at the end of the 1970s, prompting Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone to expand the

defense budget and to visit the Yasukuni Shrine in 1985. (Berger, 2014: 6)

At the end of the Cold War, the rise of an increassingly assertive China and the

continuation of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs made the Japanese government to

rethink its alliance with the U.S. against a backdrop of fears of entanglement in U.S. wars, or

abandonment in case Washington decided to switch its alliances in North East Asia. The alliance

strengthened with the expansion of the bilateral security relationship, from the mere defense of

Japan to a coordinated response to regional contigencies, including North Korea’s nuclear

threats (1994-5) and the support to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Straits issue (1995-6)

(Huges, 2009: 844). On its side, the U.S. has been urging Japan to expand its participation in

the security alliance, as suggested by the East Asia Strategic Report (the “Nye Report”) in 1995,

and later with the revision of the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation (1996-1997),

by which Japan agreed on providing rear area logistical support for U.S. regional power

projection operations and to back the U.S. up in a Taiwan contingency. Refferences to the

Taiwan issue raised China’s concerns about Japan’s military involvement on a Taiwan Strait

confrontation. As expected, Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro visited the Yasukuni Shrine in

1995 and 1996, whilst the security debate was most intense. Similarly, Fujioka Nobukatsu was

very active promoting his revisionist interpretation of history between 1994 and 1995.




LDP’s right wing conservatives came back to power with Prime Minister Junichiro

Koizumi in 2001. Koizumi’s agenda consisted on implementing neoliberalist policies, not

submitting on historical issues, supporting Taiwanese democracy and expanding the military

budget, both independently and in terms of the security alliance with the U.S. The Bush

administration’s plan for upgrading the alliance was expressed in the “Armitage Report” (2001),

which suggested expanding the Japanese role in the transpacific alliance, as well as “revising

the Japanese constitution and legitimizing the right of collective defense” (Wu, 2006: 121).

Consequently, Koizumi raised the defense budget to US$ 41 billion and the Self Defense Force

(SDF) joined the United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) in Cambodia, Mozambique

and the Golan Heights. Japan joined the “Coalition of the Willing” in September 2001, and

deployed its forces in Iraq in 2004 (Samuels, 2006: 113-114). “This deployment was extremely

unpopular with the Japanese public, but was regarded as an unavoidable quid pro quo for US

protection from North Korea in the context of its repeated missile tests and nuclear weapons

development program.” (Kingston, 2013: 121) The Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI,

2004-2005), restated and expanded Tokyo’s commitments with the U.S., including the support

of a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue, cooperation in the achievement of global strategic

objectives, strengthening U.S.’ regional and global power projection from its bases in Japan,

and fostering the U.S. military and the JSDF operational integration with the joint development

of an anti-missile system. Prime Minister Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine every year

during his term in office.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe attempted to rebuild the political relationship with China,

visiting Beijing in 2006 and receiving Premier Wen Jiabao in 2007. Nevertheless, he promoted

at the same time the implementation of revisionist policies, such as the restablishment of a

patriotic education and the abolishment of Article 9. The public’s reaction to Abe’s nationalistic

proselitism was so strong that it caused the LDP to lose its majority in the Upper House in 2007,

and forced Abe to resign as Prime Minster (Ibid: 122-123). However, the confrontation with

China over the Diaoyu-Senkaku Islands in 2010, and the intensification of the territorial

disputes in 2012 gave Abe another try as Prime Minister in 2013. This time, Abe’s agenda

focused on economy, which not impeded his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 2013. Japanese

defense budget was around USD 50 billion (1% of its GDP) in 2015, (one of the seven largest

military budgets worldwide), and spends around USD 2 billion a year on financing the U.S.

military bases in its territory.

As any other nation state, Japan defines its interest, at least in part, according to the core

features of its national identity. If Japan defines itself as a global power, it will continue trying

to contain Beijing regionally, to cooperate with it bilaterally, and to compete with it in other




latitudes (i.e., Africa) to get its own model of development accepted. If Japan defines itself as

a regional power which can share the political leadership with other powers, it might find a way

to live in harmony with its neighbors if they behave in the same way (Liu, 2012: 28-29).

Nationalism in China

The concept of nationalism as “the political notion of territorial self-determination, the cultural

notion of national identity, and the moral notion of national self-defense in an anarchical world”

(Zhao, 2000: 3) was not known in China until the early years of the twentieth century. Chinese

cultural and political identity rested on the concept of culturalism before this time. Culturalism

is broadly defined as “a common historical heritage and acceptance of shared beliefs”

(Townsend, 1992: 97-98). The concept presents two main components, 1) the belief that China

was the only civilization whose cultural attainments (most notably, its written/printed language,

technology, philosophies, arts and traditions) could not be rivaled by any other ethnic groups;

and, 2) the political prescription that leaders must be educated and rule according to Confucian

principles and values (which were considered as universal). Thus, as a political identity,

culturalism was incompatible with the European set of beliefs that “nations should be states,

holding formally equal status in a world order properly composed of such states, whose

members are citizens with equal rights and obligations” (Ibid: 105). In China, however, the

loyalty of the people was to the culture, not to the state. Thus, to be a part of the Chinese

community one needed to share its principles and values, not its ethnic features. Consequently,

it was possible for non-ethnic Chinese to be recognized as political leaders if they accepted the

premises of the Confucian order, and ethnic Chinese individuals could lose their political power

if they failed to abide by that order (Ibid: 98-99).

Culturalism helped to cement the power deriving from the material bases of the empire,

ensuring its dominion for more than 2000 years, until European imperialism, promoting its own

cultural superiority and basing its claims on an overwhelming military power, imposed itself

over the local political identity. It must be stressed, however, that the crisis of political authority

that the introduction of nationalism brought about was not a crisis of cultural identity. In this

sense, Townsend points out that the more the Chinese “have been exposed to the outside world

the more self-consciously Chinese they have become.” The primary problem at the turn of the

century (1900s) was the erosion of the authorities’ political legitimacy, and the search for new

forms of authority which could satisfy the “need to reassert a historic self-confidence and also

provide the basis for reordering their society in modern times.” (Ibid: 115)

The transition from culturalism to nationalism occurred between 1860 and 1919. In 1895,




the defeat by Japan gave intellectuals like Liang Qichao (1873-1929) more incentives to search

for alternatives to prevent the thorough disintegration of Chinese culture; nationalism took its

final form during the May Fourth Movement (1919), and it would be the most powerful system

of political values since then. The PRC was established in 1949 by a political movement with

strong nationalist credentials. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) restored national unity and

central power implementing a corporatist institutional framework that reached the grassroot

levels of society (Ibid: 115-116). The establishment of a new Chinese nation-state and its

position in the international system satisfied some of the nationalist aspirations and generated

expectations for an expansion of the national interest among observers both at home and abroad.

It is important to mention that although the new project of nation-state includes all the 55 ethnic

minorities present in Chinese territory, state nationalism is strongly identified with the Han

ethnicity, comprising approximately 93% of the population. During this historical process,

those ethnic minorities also acquired national self-consciousness, which in some cases nurtured

in separatist movements (i.e., Tibet and Xinjiang). Chinese leadership promoted nationalism to

enhance social cohesion after 1949, setting as its historical mission transforming “China into a

powerful and modernized state as well as a new national community integrating all of the state’s

territory and peoples” (Ibid:119). From the 1950s to the late 1970s, the state’s nationalistic

discourse presented a nativist-confrontational style, characterized by a xenophobia directed

specially against the West, anti-imperialism and a high sensitivity against perceived insults from

foreigners, which easily evolved into ultranationalism (Zhao, 2000: 32). Nationalist sentiment

was promoted with a narrative focused on national greatness and the CCP’s glorious victories,

and national awareness was facilitated by the development of communication technologies

(film industries, radio, television, etc.), the expansion of literacy and education, the

establishment of an official common tongue and propaganda emphasizing national unity and

goals (Townsend, 1992: 119).

However, with the policy of reform and opening up adopted in 1978, Communist

ideology became less influential, and pragmatic nationalism was adopted as the dominant

perspective of the political elite. Suishen Zhao describes pragmatic nationalism as assertive in

its international orientation, and powerful when the national interest is endangered, however,

rather than offensive it is “assertive in form, but reactive in essence” (Zhao, 2000: 29).

Fundamented on the concpet of sovereignty, the core objectives of this kind of defensive

nationalism are: 1) to ensure national security, in terms of social stability and territorial integrity,

and, 2) to protect the country’s international image and prestige. Official discourse reflects the

leadership’s hypersensitivity against real or perceived threats to the national territorial integrity

and international image, i.e., “Chinese leaders have repeatedly claimed that they would rather

lose thousands of troops than give up one inch of their land” (Ibid: 30). They have also produced

a historical narrative of victimization. Peter Gries claims that Chinese histories of the “Century




of Humiliation” have shaped Chinese national identities in the present and affect perceptions

of mutual threat between the PRC, Japan and Korea (Gries, 2011: 16). Therefore, the CCP’s

legitimacy since the period of reforms not only rests on maintaining the good performance of

the economy, but also on its ability to use nationalism to present itself as the guarantor of

national integrity and prestige.

Nationalism in China is not limited to the official narrative, but it has adopted popular

versions whose radicalism has limited at times the political elite’s margin of action in

international affairs. “Not only do popular nationalists support and challenge the state’s claims

of legitimacy, but they also issue their own rival nationalist claims. The party suppresses and

responds to such challenges to its nationalist credentials” (Gries, 2005: 110). Censorship and

repression of rightful nationalist claims erode the party’s legitimacy and authority, so the

prefered method to deal with these problems is cooptation. However, this strategy limits the

number of foreign policy options, since leaders have to give some answer to popular demands.

Chinese popular nationalism is usually nativist and confrontational. An illustrative example of

this phenomenon would be the anti-Japanese demonstration trip to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands

that some netizens organized in June 2003, “13 members of the Action Committee for

Defending the Diaoyu Islands … set off from a port in Zhejiang province to China’s east and

arrived at the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands the next day. […] They […] burned a Japanese

flag before leaving. Both Beijing and Tokyo were forced to take tough stands” (Hughes, 2009:

844). Another example came during the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, when Beijing had to reject a

Japanese offering of humanitarian aid to appease the nationalistic netizens (Ibid).

Although the performance of the national economy cannot explain the periods of

intensification of Chinese nationalism, periods of good economic performance correlate with

periods of relatively moderate levels of nationalism. There is no reliable data for China’s

economic growth during the 1950s, but it is safe to say that economy had an initial recovery

when the pacification of the country was achieved. Chen Yun kept inflation under control (from

more than 80% in 1949 to 3% in 1951) (Botton, 2002: 302); and the First Five Year Plan (1953-

1957) was successfully completed. However, the implementation of radical economic policies

in 1958 (Great Leap Forward), combined with the worst droughts and floods of the century

(1959-1961) resulted in a terrible famine which claimed around 30 million human lives (Ibid:

302). Thanks to Bo Yipo’s economic policies, implemented during Liu Shaoqi’s presidency

(1959-1966), the economy grew from current USD 59.716 billion to USD 92.603 billion in

1970, and to USD 149.541 billion in 1978, at the outset of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms.

After Jiang Zemin’s financial reforms in 1995, the economy reached the value of USD 734.548

billion; from this point to 2003, the GDP grew to USD 1.66 trillion. China displaced Japan as

the world’s second largest economy in relative terms in 2010, hitting the mark of USD 6.101




trillion. GDP kept increasing at very fast rates until reaching USD 11.065 trillion in 2015 (World

Bank, 2017). “Average annual per capita income soared from 528 yuan at the start of the

economic-reform process in the early 1980s to 19,100 in urban areas and 5,900 in the

countryside at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century. The aim is to double that

between 2012 and 2020” (Fenby, 2012: 3).

The periods of most intense nationalist mobilization in China occurred in Mao’s era

(1949-1976), soaring at times of political conflict, such as the Korean War (1950-1953), the

First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954-1955), the Great Leap Forward, the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis

(1958), the Vietnam War (1964-1969), the Cultural Revolution (1966), the border clashes with

the USSR at Zhenbao Island and Xinjiang and the seizure of the Xisha Islands (the Paracels,

1974). As the international environment became less threatening during the era of reform and

opening up, the leadership focused on national modernization and economic development,

sharply reducing state sponsored nationalist proselitism. Nevertheless, pragmatic leaders

encouraged nationalist upsurges during the invasion of Vietnam (1979), the Third Taiwan Strait

Crisis (1995-1996), the bombing of the Belgrade Embassy, the 2001 plane collision incident,

and every time a Japanese Prime Minister has visited the Yasukuni Shrine, or the

Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands controversy goes out of control (most recently in 2012).

Thus, although periods of intense nationalist mobilization correlate with periods of poor

economic performance, and periods of accelerated growth correlate with lower levels of

nationalism, the actual reason for change in nationalism intensity comes from the realm of

politics. Under Mao’s rule, the state prioritized political and ideological goals over economic

development, whereas the objective of the 1978 reforms was precisely the modernization of the

economy. Chen Jian explains nationalism upsurges during Mao’s years as resulting from the

Chairman’s continuous revolution, a two-level game strategy “aimed at transforming China’s

state, population, and society, and simultaneously reasserting China’s central position in the

world. The domestic and international goals of the revolution were deeply connected. … it

was … by virtue of the revolution’s domestic mission that the revolution’s international aim

became justified; … [in turn,] the international aspect of the revolution served as a constant

source of domestic mobilization, helping to legitimate the revolution at home and to maintain

its momentum” (Chen Jian, 2001: 7). Thus, every time Mao intended to implement a radical

domestic policy or to achieve certain foreign policy goal, he purposely fostered nationalism, as

a means of obtaining the public’s support for his cause. However, after 1978, Chinese leaders

have only fostered nationalism as a reaction to real or perceived foreign threats. Spontaneous

bursts of radical popular nationalism could probably be understood as one of the long term

cultural consequences of the mass politics implemented by the CCP leadership during the first

decades of the PRC as an independent nation state.




Nationalism in South Korea

Shin Gi-wook’s Ethnic Nationalism in Korea (2006) is the most recent and comprehensive

review of Korean nationalism. It describes a nationalist discourse in terms of ethnicity and

blood ties, “race, ethnicity and nation come to be conflated in Korea to produce a strong sense

of oneness based on shared bloodline and ancestry” (Campbell, 2016: 18). According to Shin,

the cultural and social disruption in South Korea caused by modernization and gobalization has

resulted in the intensification of ethnic nationalism. For instance, ethnic nationalism dominated

the student movement’s definitions of the Korean nation after the Korean War (1950-1953),

which included the territory and the people of the North, regardless of the division of the country.

This type of nationalism also influenced the ideology of the opposition during the authoritarian

period (1948-1987), and was expressed through the demands for democracy and reunification,

and with the rejection of opposed neocolonialist relationships with Japan and the U.S.

A New Way of Reading History, Shin Chaeho’s nintheenth centrury history of the Korean

nation, is the first Korean work on ethnic history. Shin proposed a primordialist explanation of

the origin of the Korean nation, fundamentally based on the idea of ethnic homogeneity, as the

pillar of his argumentation againts Japanese colonial attempts to present Koreans as a part of a

greater Japanese race. Shin’s history greately influenced Korean ethnic nationalism in later

historical periods and its primordialist outlook remain central in contemporary Korean academy.

Bruce Cumings argues that the Korean nation was created in modern times, during the last

decades of the Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910). Back then Korea was an agrarian society with a

weak central government whose only objectives were the maintainance of peace and extracting

taxes from subjects living introspective lives and worried only about averting famine. Japanese

intervention brought about the creation of modern Korea, as a result of the 1894 Kabo Reforms,

which basically restructured the social, economic and administrative structure of Korea (Ibid,

14). In the political sphere, the reforms removed the government’s absolute authority over the

population, separated judicial and the executive powers and rationalized fiscal administration

and taxation. Social reforms included the abolition of slavery, prohibition of child marriages,

class distinction and the establishment of primary school systems, among others. Henry Em

also believes that it was during the colonial period when Koreans imagined for the first time

their own nation, as a reaction to Japanese efforts “to erradicate the Korean identity by closing

Korean schools and forbidding the use of the Korean language”. (Ibid: 15) The forced

dislocation of the Korean population by the Japanese to use the labor force in Northeast China

or in Japan prompted Korean people’s national self-awareness process. “Indeed, Kim Ku, the

renowned nationalist and President of Korea under the Provisional Government of the Republic

of Korea following the liberation in 1945, said that ‘until 1910, most adults did not even know




what a nation was’” (Wells, 1990: 83).

There were created, however, different types of nationalism, most interestingly a

Protestant-inspired type, during the pre-colonial and colonial periods. This type of nationalism

did not denied the nation-state ideal, but highlighted the ideal of self-improvement (i.e., through

work and education) as the pillar of the new nation. During the 1920s, another type of

nationalism advocated a program of economic and educational reform to establish an

independent nation without confronting the Japanese. However, these competing nationalisms

were superseded by the more “radical nationalist and socialist movements of the time.” After

the division of Korea into two different political entities, ethnic nationalism was the prevalent

type of nationalism in South Korea. Rhee Syngman used ethnic nationalism to legitimize his

regime (1948-1960), to win autonomy from the U.S. occupying forces and to justify his

objectives. He based the official discourse on anti-Japanse and pro-independence ideas (Ibid:

16).

Park Chun Hee, who had served in the Japanese Imperial Army and needed the U.S.

support for his government de-emphasized the explicit ethnic component of the nationalist

discourse of his regime (1961-1979), yet he relied on the promotion of cultural traditions and

the implementation of a self-strengthening policy to justify the imposition of the highly

repressive Yusin constitution; to mobilize the population towards the achievement of economic

development objectives; and to win a greater military autonomy from the U.S. Park presented

national security and development as the pillars of the nation’s unity and modernization. Chun

Doo Hwan rised to power after a military coup at a time when the Korean public had a strong

expectation of democracy. Chun secured his regime (1980-1988) by supressing opposition

movements violently (i.e., Gwangju massacre), managing economy effectively and using a

nationalist discourse that exploited the fears of a North Korean invasion, ideological opposition

to commmunism, a populist sentiment in favor of unification, the combat against governmental

corruption and the promise of a brilliant economic future.

Opposition to Park’s and Chun’s regimes also relied upon ethnic nationalism and the

popular wish for unification for motivation and justification, acquiring tones of anti-

Americanism and anti-imperialism (Ibid: 17). Ethnic nationalism remained influential when

democratization arrived in 1987, manifesting on the popular support for the 1998 Seoul

Olympic games, and in Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam policies of rapproachemnet to the

North. Campbell claims that the rejection to opennig the domestic market to foreign

competition during the 1990s were due in part to appease nationalist sentiments, and not to

expose the chaebol to unwanted competition (Ibid: 18).

However, as nations change, so do types of nationalism inside a nation. “Brubaker (1998,




p. 298) writes that ethnic and national groups should not be assumed to be “sharply bounded,

internally homogeneous ‘groups’.” Instead, “groupness” and “boundedness” must be taken “as

variable, as emergent properties of particular structural or conjunctural settings.” Thus, nations

are being continually reshaped by the shared historical experiences of their peoples and elites,

“Postmodern networks and ties such as those based upon gender, globalization and universal

human rights have further affected the evolution of nations as units of association” (Ibid: 7). In

this sense, Emma Campbell claims that a new type of nationalism opposed to traditional ethnic

nationalism might be emerging among South Korean youth. At he begining of the 1990s, people

around their twenties changed their attitude towards the issue of reunification and even started

to oppose it arguing that the economic and social changes that the process of unification would

entail would be enormous. Highly educated in a prosperous, technollogically advanced,

democratic and cosmopolitan Republic of South Korea (ROK), this is the first generation

defining itself as South Koreans, imagining their nation as more ethnically diversified and

limited to the ROK territorial boundaries. This new globalized cultural nationalism is based on

the shared cultural values of modernity, cosmopolitanism and status, deriving in part from

globalization and neo-liberal values.

Lee Myung Bak’s (2008-2013) and Park Geun-Hye’s (2013-2017) administrations

turned back towards conservatism, changing Kim Dae Jung’s (1998-2003) and Roh Moo-

hyun’s (2003-2008) policies of dialogue and cooperation with North Korea (León-Manríquez

and Cárdenas, 2016: 3). President Park’s agenda prioritized economic revitalization and

national security (Ibid: 5). During the 2016 National Assembly renewal, the conservative party

Saenuri lost simple majority, due to corruption scandals related to Park’s government (Ibid: 8).

However, this facts do not imply a radical turn towards the left. Security has lost its importance

in the political agenda, whilst the most popular topics relate to the economy, such as the creation

of new and better jobs, a higher minimum wage, lower real state prices, and the sort (Ibid: 9).

The ROK’s economy began to recover from the 2008 global financial crisis in 2009, when

restarted growing at a 0.2% rate, to finally recover by 2010. Currently, the ROK is the fourth

economy of Asia, the sixth global exporter and the eleventh economy in the world, with an

estimated GDP of current USD 1.4 billion, and a GDP per capita around USD 30,000 a year.

After 2013, inflation rates have been lower than 2%, and unemployment rates not higher than

3.7% since 2012 (lower than the OECD average) (Ibid: 10-11). The IMF estimates the economy

will grow at a 3-4% for the period 2014-2024. In 2016, the country grew at 2.8% due to a

reduction in the demand from China and the U.S. (South Korean economy is 60% dependent

on exports). It has an annual trade surplus of almost USD 100 million (equivalent to 7% of the

GDP), which has enabled the implementation of fiscal estimulus strategies, such as those

included in the economic re-activation plan of USD 19 billion implemented in 2017. In the last

25 years, per capita income increased from 39% of the OECD average in 1991 to 75% in 2014




(Ibid: 12).

Nationalism in North Korea

The people of North Korea imagine their nation as based upon a mass society, rather than upon

a class-based or class-divided society. They have “adapted typical postcolonial Third World

policies to their indigenous political culture and to Soviet-style socialism: an economic program

of rapid industrialization and philosophy of subjecting nature to human will” (Cumings, 2005:

452). Marxism-Leninism could not transform the roots of the Korean culture because of the

natural resistance to change of the Korean long-standing general practices; and because North

Korea had a very incipient proletariat at the time of its foundation. Thus, North Koreans took

from Marxism-Leninism the few elements they considered useful and discarded the rest.

The political system has been organized into an authoritarian socialist corporatism,

whose actual degree of supression of political dissidence is still matter of discussion due to the

scarcity of reliable data. Corporatism connects society with the political structure, contrary to

liberalism which separates politics from other realms of human activity. The main components

of traditional corporatism are hierachy, organic connection and family. These elements are

represented by the images of fatherhood, body politic and the great chain, respectively. “For

traditionalists ... the body politic was a living organism, literally corporeal. All members of the

body politic were interconnected and functional to the whole. The head (or king) was the father

of the people, ruler and ruled were joined by “perfect love,” and the paternal wisdom and

benevolence of the leader “was to be relied upon and never doubted” (Ibid: 455). The corporate

unit is the family.

Corporatism was the political way in the European medieval society of states, and it

reappeared in a totalitarian and aggresive militaristic fashion in Italy and Gemany during the

1930s. However, Mihail Manoilescu leftist corporatism is more pertinent for the study of the

North Korean state. Manoilescu proposed a kind of neo-socialist corporatism that departs from

Marxism on substituting nation for class and an idea of a world system of advantaged

(bourgeois) and disadvantaged (proletariat), similar to the contemporary notion of center and

periphery. The international division of labor distributed rich and poor nations around the world;

proletarian nations “should structure themselves vertically at home, to accumulate power, and

horizontally abroad to redress their positions in the world economy” (Ibid: 456). Other neo-

socialist thinkers considered that the concept of nation would be of fundamental importance for

class analysis in the twentieth century, and advocated protectionism and auto-centered

development. They opposed liberalism and individualism with the idea of organic groups,

which in turn led them to take the family as a model for politics as well.




Kim Il Sung’s ideolody also considered the nation “as the “unit” of historical conflict,

and added that former colonies, dependencies, and peripherial socialist nations should unite

horizontally in common cause” (Ibid: 457). These propositions were in tune with Neo-

Confucian notions of the human body as an organism consituting a unitary world which

required harmony to work properly. The Juche philosophy incorporates organic propositions in

its political thought. “It means self-reliance and independence in politics, economics, defense

and ideology” (Ibid: 458). It emerged in 1955 but consolidated during the 1960s, when Kim

sought to follow a political path independent from the USSR and the PRC. Juche is used in

North Korea to create a political perspective similar to that of China’s late ninetheenth century

Self-Strengthening Movement or 1930s Japanese kokutai movement, that is, a way to

modernize the country without losing national identity. However, in North Korea this outlook

took a more self-centered fashion, presenting the country as the center of the (Third) world, in

a very similar way as did Sinocentrism (Ibid: 458-459). In Neo-Confucianism, rationality and

morality are organically integrated. This synthesis of mind and virtue is what separates humans

from animals, and is what guides human activity. Individuals are not thought as rational actors,

but as subjective creatures that construct their own realities. A virtuous mind guides the body.

When these principles are extrapolated to the political realm, the wise and virtuous leader is

regarded as the master of the body polity. Hence, the centrality of the figure of the leader for

North Korean corporatism (Ibid: 461-462).

Kim Il Sung became the top leader of the North Korean Interim People’s Committee in

February 1946. His biography resembles a hagiography, presenting him as the embodiment of

several Confucian virtues. North Koreans seem to assume that the leader is naturally wise and

that they should internalize his teachings through diligent study. The hierarchical political

system follows a Ungerian model of concentric circles having the leader at its centre, his family

in the next level, then the guerrilla comrades who fought with him, then the party elite, and it

continues widening until encompassing the bureaucracy, the military and the rest of the society.

It is also imagined that foreigners are included into model. Following Evely McCune, Cumings

asserts that the guerrilla principle to organize the party and the masses might explain what looks

as an absence of conflict between political factions based on weaker clientelistic relations and

the easiness to dominate rival groups (Ibid: 466). There are however authors like B.R. Meyers,

who believe that the Juche ideology was never an actual guide for the North Korean leadership,

but that was directed to the outside world and produced for the domestic masses cosumption,

“by promoting what appeared to be a homegrown ideology, the DPRK sought legitimacy both

in the West and in South Korea. Meanwhile, Kim Il Sung’s personality cult benefited from

claims that the leader had crafted his own ruling philosophy ... the regime never intended Juche

to guide its own decision-making” (Silberstein: 2016).




Kim Jong Il was officially appointed as his father successor in 1980; his rise to power

had been visibly coordinated with the party throughout 1970. Kim Il Sung died in July 8, 1994

of a heart attack. After waiting the traditional mourning period of three years “for the first son

of the king to assume power, he became the maximum leader (but not President of the DPRK,

because this position is reserved for posterity for Kim Il Sung) in September 1998. The official

discourse claimed that the revolution started by the father should be carried on generation after

generation. Official propaganda started using the concept of chajusong, meaning independence

and autonomy for both political and economic programs (Cumings, 2005: 475).

North Korea “is the most autarkic industrial economy in the world” (Ibid: 476), as a result

of a serious effort to create an independent and self-contained economy. It is a socialist

command economy with seven to ten years plans that favor the heavy industrial sector and

assigns market allocation a limited role in the rural sector, were peasants sell the products of

their small private plots. From 1940 to the mid-1960s (exception made of the period of war and

recovery, 1950-1956), North Korea grew faster than the South, but this upward trend stopped

when the USSR stopped its unprecedented economic assistance to North Korea, after the

country leaned towards China during the Sino-Soviet dispute. Curiosly enough, and contrary to

what happen in South Korea after the war, North Korea used skilled Japanese technicians as

well as Korean colaborationists from the colonial period to push foward the economic effort.

Average annual growth rates estimates for the industrial sector corresponding to the three year

plan 1953-56 are at 41.7%, and 36.6% for the subsequent plan. Around the early 1970s, the

development of both new and prewar Soviet technologies was exhausted and North Koreans

started to buy Japanese and French factories to produce items ranging from cement and

petrochemical goods, to a pantyhose factory (suggesting more attention to consumer goods),

which increased the external debt to estimates ranging from USD 2 billion to USD 3 billion.

By 1978, North Korea’s GNP per capita was estimated by the CIA as equal to that of the ROK

in 1976, but other studies suggest that per capita rates were more or less the same until 1986.

(Ibid: 480)

The South’s economy surpassed the economy of the North during the 1990s, reorienting

its industrial structure and institutional framework towards tecnologically intensive industries.

(Lopez Aymes: 2009, 181) This gap of development between cannot be explained, however,

only by the differences of the economic models. The greater liberalization and opening to the

international market of the ROK dring the 1980s meant a more permisible governmental

attitude towards the industrial conglomerates (chaebol), who acquired new technologies,

greater economic power and capabilities of collective organization. These elements increased

the conglomerates’ capabilities to resist governmental attempts to fragment them in order to

increase their productivity. (Ibid: 215-216) During Lee Myung-bak’s administration, only 10




of the most powerful chaebols concentrated 60% of the total revenue of the country. (León-

Manríquez and Cardenas Barajas, 2016: 15) Thus, although the South has been catching up

technologically in the last decade, due to its higher education levels (more than 80% of the

population has tertiary education, favoring maths and hard sciences) and R&D investment (4%

of the GDP) (Ibid: 13; 15), it could have done better without the negative influence of the

chaebol on economic policy. As for the DPRK, although it is true that sacrifying economies of

scale in an interdependent world of market economy, in order to achieve a relative autarky has

impeded its development, we have to consider as well the devastating effects of the U.S.

blockade and economic sanctions on the economy from 1950 to 2000.

The collapse of the socialist block also deprived North Korea of its major markets,

resulting on the shrinking of the GNP during the early 1990s. Oil imports also declined in this

decade, hurting the chemical industry that provided fertilizer to farms. A series of droughts

(1997) and floods (1995, 1996) as well as “grain hoarding and sales in the international market

to earn foreign exchange” (Cumings, 2005: 487; 489-490), reduced the capability of the regime

to feed its population, thus it had to rely on China, South Korea, the U.S. and Japanese food aid

to reduce starvation, starting from the second half of the 1990s decade, when 5 to 10 % (more

than half a million) of the population died of starvation. However, excepting from China,

donations from all these countries were reduced to the minimum level from 2009 to the present.

In 2013, improved harvests aliviated the food shortages problem (Manyin and Nikitin: 2014,

2). The US alone provided around USD $600 million in energy assistance to the DPRK from

1995-2009. All these elements forced Pyongang to carry out a legal reform around 1995, in

order to attract foreign investment; it also embraced some capitalist practices and established

new trade zones (like the one in Kaesong, funded by South Korean firms). East Asian

development experiences (i.e., China and Singapore) have demonstrated that a strong central

state can be compatible with accelerated capitalist growth (Ibid: 482-483; 491). It is noteworthy

that despite the humanitarian disasters that the North has experienced, there is “little evidence

of a collapse of state power, except for breakdowns at the local level” (Ibid: 492).

Kim Jong Un stated at a meeting with officials of the Central Committee of the Workers’

Party of Korea (WPK) in April 2012, that he intends to “‘uphold the party’s ideology and

leadership with faith and conscience’ and ‘rally firm around the central committee of the party’”

(China Daily: 2012). Ritual nationalistic practices have been given continuity as well; the same

year, Kim Jong Il was endorsed as “the party’s eternal general secretary” and “Kim Jong-un as

its first secretary, a position set up for the first time for WPK’s supreme leader” (Ibid). It seems

that Kim Jong Un has completed his transition without serious opposition, and that he continues

to pursue the objectives of preserving the regime’s legitmacy, building a strong nuclear

deterrent and improving the national economy (McKinney: 2016). Cumings believes that the




strength and stability of the regime stems from a succesful sythesis of traditional forms of

legitimacy (Neo-Confucianism and anticolonial nationalism) and modern bureaucratic

structures (Cumings, 2005: 494).

Concluding remarks

A nation is a cultural or multicultural group integrated by one or many ethnicities, which creates

a collective identity by means of a master narrative about the fraternity bonds of its members,

as well as the boundaries and political sovereignty of the community. The nation strives to

achieve sovereignty by organizing into some form of political autonomy, commonly a territorial

state. The nation state demands from its members to comply with a set of rules and norms that

create ethical values, which in turn produce sentiments and emotions that combine with those

aroused by the master narrative of the community. Nationalism is a political doctrine intended

to legitimize the nation’s (territorial) sovereignty. As the nation changes over time thus does

nationalism, acquiring its specific characteristics according to the sociopolitical, economic and

cultural circumstances of the community that produce it.

Mexican official nationalism was redefined after the 1910 revolution by a new elite of

revolutionary leaders that had to reformulate the structure, objectives and alliances of the state.

This post-revolutionary Mexican nationalism was characterized by a distrust of the great

powers (especially of the U.S.); the use of nationalizations as a means to control land property,

resources exploitation and capital accumulation; a strong interventionist state based on an

ample mass base; and the overvaluation of Mexican identity as a tool for legitimacy. This type

of nationalism pretended to legitimize a strong centralist state dominated by only one highly

authoritarian and inward looking political party, who managed contradictions among different

groups of interest by distributing resources among them according to their loyalty, through a

corrupt clientelistic system. Post-revolutionary nationalism was strongly associated with the

government and it worked as a source of legitimacy for four decades. However, the 1982

economic crisis set in motion a series of changes that resulted on a political crisis that a

technocratic group within the political class tried to resolve by implementing a new policy of

liberalization of the economy. This policy established the market as the preferred means for

resources allocation, which undermined the political system of alliances and consensus on

which the state was supported. With the economic and political crises, authoritarianism and

corruption intensified, provoking in turn the unrest of a citizenry who had liberalized during

the previous decades of economic flourishing and whose demands for democracy were stronger.

Since nationalism and its symbols had been associated with a corrupt government, the

ideological fabric that connected the people with the state structure began to unweave. National




myths and symbols promoted by the state lost their meanings and became targets of popular

mockery. Thus, post-revolutionary nationalism has been peeled off from the political-cultural

framework that sustained it, bringing about a crisis of national identity.

Japanese society is still under the process of creating a new identity for its nation-state.

The best articulated proposals of a new identity come from a polarized political class, whilst

the public remains indifferent to this problematic and prefers to focus on improving the

economy. Nationalism rises in Japan whenever an external threat presses the government to

perform changes on the defense policy. Since the political left is pacifist, it is the right wing

who gets empowered when changes in security affairs are needed. This situation starts a cycle

where rightist politicians, push a radical conservative agenda until it goes too far and loses the

support of the moderates, achieving only relatively modest changes in defense policy and the

official discourse. Japanese national interest is defined according to the features of the national

identity to a certain extent. The creation of a national identity representative of every sector of

the Japanese society and conducive to the establishment of harmonious relations with other

countries cannot be achieved by promoting differences at home and abroad.

The concept of nationalism was introduced in China during the early 1900s, and it found

a clear expression during the May Fourth Movement (1919). Nationalism in China has been the

leadership’s preferred tool for mass mobilization. State nationalism took a nativist and

aggressive orientation during Mao’s era, peaking every time the Chairman needed the public’s

support for his domestic and foreign policies objectives. The PRC’s grand strategy focus moved

from political goals to economic development and modernization after 1978. The intensity of

nationalism has decreased since then, yet it remains high as compared to other countries.

Pragmatic leaders do not hesitate on promoting nationalist upsurges when political cohesion is

needed. As the public became more critical with the achievements in education and the

modernization of communication technologies, popular nationalism strengthened, influencing

foreign policy objectives. Due to its radicalism, popular nationalism can turn into a disturbing

force in the relations of China with other countries, especially with Japan. Non-Han ethnic

minorities in China have also developed their own national narratives. These alternative

narratives are used in some cases (Tibetan and Uighur minorities) as sources of legitimacy for

movements pushing for greater autonomy or even independence.

Koreans created their national identity during the period of Japanese colonial rule over

the Peninsula at the end of the nineteenth century. Japanese attempts of imposing their own

culture over everything identified as Korean (i.e., language, practices and traditions) helped

Koreans to identify the cultural and ethnic elements that distinguished them from other societies,

and to create the idea of a community based on blood ties. Korean ethnic nationalism competed




with other types of nationalism (protestant, non-confrontational) during the first decades of the

twentieth century, but it achieved hegemony and has been the dominant form of nationalism in

the peninsula until now, even after the split of the country into two different political entities.

In South Korea, ethnic nationalism served to legitimize the economic and political goals of the

dictatorships of Rhee Syngman, Park Chun Hee and Chun Doo Hwan. After the

democratization period it also served to promote some attempts of reconciliation with the North

through the idea of ethnic homogeneity, political independence from the great powers and the

desirability of political reunification. However, with the generational change, globalization and

modernization processes, a new form of nationalism is emerging among the South Korean

youth. This new nationalism manifests in the feeling of pride of national economic

achievements, modernity and cosmopolitanism, but it has lost reunification as one of its core

elements. The requirement of ethnic homogeneity for belonging to the community has also cede

some terrain to global transnational values. Regarding North Korean nationalism, political

leadership has been successful on translating the Western underpinnings of a modern

corporatist state structure into a traditional Korean interpretation of Neo-Confucianism. This

synthesis took the form of a philosophy in the Juche idea, which calls for a self-reliant way to

modernize the nation without losing what is authentically Korean. The strength and stability of

the regime, evident in the lack of a serious political resistance as well as on smooth power

transitions, seems to validate the effectiveness of the Juche philosophy as a tool for legitimacy.

A nationalist narrative achieves a hegemonic status only when it successfully represents

the values and identity features of all the members of the community. Nationalistic uprisings

do not seem to correlate with economic performance in any of the cases we have studied, but

with times of political instability caused either by domestic factors, or foreign pressures.

Nationalism can take a constructive form if it channels social forces towards the achievement

of rightful political or economic objectives; but it can also take a destructive fashion when

political elites pursue egoistic objectives (i.e., ethnic homogenization), or when subordinate

groups decide to punish their leaders in times of social unrest. Thus, the study of nationalism

should focus not only on the narratives created by the ruling class, but also pay attention to the

competing popular narratives which constrain the margin of action of the political elites.

In the four cases discussed here, the ruling elites, emerging from a political struggle

involving the aggression of foreign powers, were very successful on channeling the social

forces towards the foundation of independent nation-states. Their respective national projects

were cemented by a nationalist discourse, which represented the most important sectors of their

communities, combining with different types of political ideology. Diverse socioeconomic,

political and cultural environments produced different transformations in the composition and

strength of these countries’ social movements, their dominant classes and their political




ideologies. However, the practice of propping up any political project upon a particular form

of nationalism has remained as a constant. Even in contemporary Mexico and Japan, where the

political leaderships have failed to construct a new hegemonic national identity, the citizenry

goes on manifesting a malleable form of collective identity in nationalistic terms, for instance,

identifying symbols of national pride in the cultural or economic achievements of their societies.

The study of these processes and awareness of the similarities and differences of the history of

nationalism in Mexico and North East Asia will contribute to the mutual understanding of these

countries and provide some clues about how to improve cooperation between them.




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拉美專題

Elementos explicativos de continuidad y transición en la política

exterior de China hacia América Latina.

Manuel Villegas Mendoza

Resumen:

El objetivo del artículo es realizar una primera aproximación al análisis

comparado diacrónico de las políticas exteriores de los presidentes chinos Hu Jintao y

Xi Jinping en la región latinoamericana de 2010 a 2016. Para ello, se identifican sus

principales similitudes, peculiaridades y diferencias, a partir de tres indicadores clave:

principios ordenadores, pautas identitarias y estrategias de inserción internacional.

El trabajo sostiene que, con la llegada de Xi Jinping a la presidencia, se ha puesto de

manifiesto un distanciamiento de la estrategia de política exterior de bajo perfil

establecida previamente, dando paso a una presencia china más proactiva en el mundo.

Si bien existen semejanzas en cuanto a la asimilación del pragmatismo como un

principio ordenador central de la política exterior de China en los dos mandatos, hay

también contrastes: mientras Hu tiene como sustento de su política exterior “el mundo

armonioso”, Xi tiene en el “sueño chino” su principal derrotero. Cada presidente, por

tanto, otorga una interpretación diferente a la priorización del desarrollo económico y

al nacionalismo como pautas identitarias de sus políticas exteriores; lo cual incide, a

su vez, en las diferentes estrategias de inserción de la política exterior de China puestas

en marcha en la región latinoamericana.

Palabras clave:

política exterior de China, América Latina, “mundo armonioso”, “sueño chino”.

Doctorante en Relaciones Transpacíficas, Facultad de Economía de la Universidad de Colima. Maestro

en Estudios en Relaciones Internacionales, Unidad de Posgrado de la Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y

Sociales de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Coordinador y profesor de las licenciaturas

en Relaciones Internacionales, Comercio Internacional y Administración de Negocios Internacionales de

la Universidad del Valle de México campus San Rafael, Ciudad de México.




1. Introducción.

El presente artículo se refiere a la política exterior de China en Latinoamérica (esta

expresión o la de América Latina incluye a la subregión del Caribe) en el periodo de

2010 a 2016, que comprende de manera parcial las administraciones de Hu Jintao y Xi

Jinping.

Una característica fundamental de las relaciones internacionales de China con la

región de referencia es su alto grado de concentración en la agenda de comercio y de

cooperación, lo cual refleja el proceso de apertura por el que ha transitado Beijing desde

1978, para lograr una de sus mayores aspiraciones nacionales: la consolidación su

desarrollo económico interno. La economía china ha experimentado un rápido y

sostenido crecimiento en los últimos años, debido a su carácter industrial y al enorme

peso que en ella tienen sus exportaciones. De ahí que América Latina sea un lugar

estratégico tanto para la obtención de materias primas y alimentos, como para la

exportación de manufacturas.

Otro elemento a considerar para el análisis de la política exterior de China hacia

la región de referencia es el de carácter político y a la disputa con Taiwán por el

reconocimiento internacional, destacando el hecho de que once de los veinte países en

el mundo que actualmente sostienen relaciones diplomáticas con Taiwán como un

gobierno legítimo, se concentran en Latinoamérica. Tal es el caso de Guatemala, Belice,

Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua y hasta junio de 2017, Panamá, para el caso de

América Central; y en el Caribe, de República Dominicana, Haití, San Cristóbal y

Nieves, San Vicente y las Granadinas y Santa Lucía. En Sudamérica, solamente el

Paraguay posee vínculos diplomáticos con Taipei.

Pese a la existencia de dichas variables contextuales de la política exterior de

Beijing en la región, es preciso preguntarse si ésta se ha mantenido uniforme, tomando

en cuenta que de 2010 a 2016 han estado en el poder dos mandatarios distintos. Si bien

ambos pertenecen al mismo partido político, - al Partido Comunista Chino, - se observa

que cada uno de ellos ha dado interpretaciones distintas a sus interacciones con el

exterior.

La llegada al poder del presidente Xi Jinping, en marzo de 2013, ha exacerbado

un debate entre los estudiosos chinos de las Relaciones Internacionales, respecto al

rumbo que debe tomar la política exterior de Beijing. Durante el inicio de la década de

los 90 del siglo XX, Deng Xiaoping estableció una estrategia de política exterior

discreta basada en el lema taoguang yanghui (Ocultar capacidades y mantener un bajo




perfil); y a la cual dieron continuidad los mandatorios chinos, Jiang Zemin y Hu Jintao.

Este último, de hecho, formuló una política exterior congruente con la estrategia del

taoguang yanghui, a través de la adopción del principio “mundo armonioso”.

Sin embargo, los discursos políticos de Xi, desde el inicio de su administración a

la fecha, reflejan un claro interés en modificar la perspectiva y rumbo de la política

exterior de China desde aquellos pronunciamientos de Deng, al presentar el fenfao

youwei (esforzarse para logarlo) como la estrategia de vinculación con el exterior que

domina las relaciones internacionales de China. Al respecto, basta recordar la Iniciativa

de la Franja y la Ruta, consistente en un proyecto mundial de infraestructura que tiene

como centro el territorio chino, para construir nuevas líneas de ferrocarril y puertos;

oleoductos, gasoductos y centrales eléctricas; carreteras y toda clase de apoyos que

incidirán en más de sesenta países. Esta es sin duda una propuesta de enormes

implicaciones geo estratégicas y geopolíticas de Xi; y es a la vez, una demostración

interna de su poder y un reflejo de la voluntad por afirmar su influencia global.

Esta iniciativa proporciona fuerza y consistencia a la identidad que parece albergar

la política exterior de Xi, al referirse en sus discursos y declaraciones oficiales al “sueño

chino”, como una continuación del “desarrollo pacífico”, y como una autoconcepción

de una gran potencia mundial, a la par de los Estados Unidos. Por lo tanto, parece que

Xi es el primer líder chino desde Deng que busca impulsar un replanteamiento de la

estrategia de política exterior de China.

¿Qué significan estas declaraciones oficiales en términos de la política exterior de

China desplegada en América Latina? ¿Debemos esperar un comportamiento de

política exterior chino más agresivo y proactivo en la región que promueva sus propios

conceptos e iniciativas diplomáticas?, como el Plan de Cooperación de la Comunidad

de Estados Latinoamericanos y del Caribe (CELAC), o la recién anunciada Asociación

Estratégica Integral con Ecuador, que se suma a la serie de acuerdos de este tipo hechos

con otros países de la región, como Argentina, Brasil, México, Perú y Venezuela.

En este artículo, argumentamos que, con la llegada de Xi a la presidencia de China,

se ha puesto de manifiesto un distanciamiento de la estrategia de política exterior de

bajo perfil establecida por las administraciones anteriores, dando paso a una presencia

china tendiente a ser más proactiva en el mundo. Si bien existen semejanzas en cuanto

a la asimilación del pragmatismo como un principio ordenador central de la política

exterior de China en los dos mandatos, hay también contrastes: mientras Hu tiene como

sustento de su política exterior “el mundo armonioso”, Xi tiene en el “sueño chino” su




principal derrotero. En este sentido, cada gestión otorga una interpretación diferente a

su identidad nacional reflejada en sus políticas exteriores: Hu continuó asumiendo una

pertenencia china al mundo en desarrollo; en tanto Xi, plantea relaciones

internacionales de Beijing más ambiciosas con tintes hegemónicos. Esto incide, a su

vez, en las diferentes estrategias de inserción china en la región. En el caso del gobierno

del actual presidente chino, se observa, por ejemplo, un mayor interés en ampliar y

profundizar la relación sino-latinoamericana desde distintos niveles y bajo iniciativas

propias.

Para ello, el presente artículo consta de la siguiente estructura. El primero de los

apartados nos referiremos a las variables para el análisis comparado diacrónico de la

política exterior de China hacia América Latina. En el segundo, llevaremos a cabo una

revisión del contexto histórico de la política exterior contemporánea de China, tomando

en consideración la manera en la cual la dimensión interna, condicionó en gran medida

la política exterior y las relaciones internacionales con los países en desarrollo,

incluidos los latinoamericanos. En el tercero, se presenta el análisis comparado

diacrónico de la política exterior de China, a través de la descripción, el análisis y el

contraste de sus principios ordenadores en los dos periodos de gobierno ya señalados,

las pautas identitarias compartidas y diferenciadas, y el alcance y características propias

de sus respectivas estrategias de inserción internacional en América Latina. Por

último, en las conclusiones, se vierten los resultados preliminares más destacados de

dicho análisis en los periodos mencionados.

2. Aspectos metodológicos y conceptuales.

En el marco de la metodología del análisis comparado diacrónico, este trabajo

toma como eje conductor la serie de interrogantes clave propuestas por Giovanni Sartori

(1994: 29): “por qué comparar, qué es comparable y cómo comparar”, por lo que

emplearemos éstas mismas para el estudio de la política exterior de China en América

Latina.

¿Por qué comparar? Porque buscamos estudiar los rasgos que comparten las

políticas exteriores de China en Latinoamérica durante la presidencia tanto de Hu, como

de Xi, para que ello coadyuve a fundamentar el argumento central de este trabajo, sobre

la construcción paulatina de un orden que tiende a legitimar a China en la región de

referencia como una hegemonía alternativa.

¿Qué es comparable? La política exterior de Beijing en el periodo de 2010 a 2016,

durante los dos periodos de gobierno de los presidentes chinos antes señalados, a partir




de tres variables centrales: principios ordenadores, pautas identitarias, así como

características y alcance de las estrategias de inserción internacional con la región.

¿Cómo comparar? Por medio de la identificación de semejanzas y diferencias entre los

criterios arriba señalados de la política exterior de China durante los gobiernos de

ambos mandatarios.

Entendemos que la política exterior es el conjunto conductas, posiciones, actitudes,

acciones y decisiones que adopta un Estado en el ámbito internacional; cuya

fundamentación se encuentra en el interés nacional y en objetivos concretos, los cuales

se ponen de manifiesto en un proyecto de nación. Además, la política exterior depende

de la capacidad de negociación internacional del Estado en cuestión, así como de

numerosos factores condicionantes tanto internos, como externos (Velázquez, 2007: 20).

Por lo anterior, debe haber cierta congruencia entre los objetivos planteados y el interés

nacional del proyecto de nación con los resultados obtenidos, a partir de la capacidad

de negociación y los factores condicionantes.

Tomando como referente a Stephen Krasner, los principios son entendidos como

el conjunto de creencias y convicciones sobre los cuales descansan los fundamentos de

las políticas externas de los países en estudio (1982: 185). Por otra parte, Goldstein &

Keohane sostienen que los principios consisten en ideas normativas que distinguen lo

correcto de lo incorrecto y lo justo de lo injusto, por lo que permiten establecer una

visión del mundo y guías para la acción externa de los Estados (Goldstein & Keohane,

1999: 300). Para los fines de este estudio, se parte de la premisa de que la política

exterior de China en el periodo de estudio señalado ha estado condicionada por el

principio ordenador del pragmatismo. Si bien su contenido ha ido variando a lo largo

de los años, sigue prevaleciendo en la política exterior de Beijing desde los años 70.

Las pautas identitarias, de acuerdo con Alexander Wendt, son una cualidad

subjetiva en tanto están determinadas por el autoconocimiento –autopercepción- que el

actor tenga de sí mismo. También es una cualidad intersubjetiva que se construye a

través de las interacciones, ya que el significado los conocimientos sobre sí mismos se

relaciona también con la percepción de los otros actores (1999: 224). Las pautas

identitarias son, por tanto, el producto de la autopercepción de los actores y de los

significados que estos y los otros actores le asignan a partir de sus interacciones.

La estrategia de inserción internacional, siguiendo a Velázquez (2007), es un

conjunto de orientaciones y lineamientos de la política exterior puestos en marcha por

un Estado, para vincularse con sus pares en el sistema internacional en distintas




dimensiones (económica, política o de seguridad) y niveles (global o selectivo); y en

concordancia con un modelo desarrollo específico.

3. Contexto histórico de la política exterior de China.

Los cambios estructurales observados desde inicios del presente siglo en la política

mundial, dejan ver el auge experimentado por China y, sobre todo, su capacidad de

superación de eventos adversos, como la crisis financiera internacional de 2008, lo que

ha suscitado un debate entre especialistas procedentes de distintos ámbitos

profesionales en torno a una transformación profunda de la relación de fuerzas a nivel

global en los próximos años.

Lo anterior pone de manifiesto dos factores condicionantes que hacen de China un

actor internacional de importancia fundamental. En primer lugar, Beijing se encuentra

en un proceso de concentración de recursos relativos de poder para configurar un orden

mundial alterno al construido por los Estados Unidos tras la segunda posguerra,

derivado de la puesta en marcha desde la década de los setenta, bajo el liderazgo de

Deng Xiaoping, de un proyecto de nación tendiente a lograr la modernización del país,

a través de las llamadas reformas estructurales.

Por lo tanto, la política exterior coadyuvó a crear y favorecer un ambiente

internacional propicio para impulsar el crecimiento económico al interior del Estado

chino. La diplomacia de Beijing experimentó así un notable proceso de

desideologización comunista, que condujo a Deng a suavizar el discurso

antiimperialista y; por el contrario, a priorizar posiciones favorables a la integración de

China en el escenario internacional, así como a conseguir apoyos procedentes del

exterior para impulsar su proceso de modernización económica (Moncada, 2011).

Las mencionadas prioridades chinas de modernización y reforma se expresaron en

un acercamiento hacia los países en desarrollo, -entre ellos los latinoamericanos-, y

estuvieron sustentadas en el principio del “desarrollo pacífico”, con tres objetivos

concretos: continuar la reforma económica mediante la promoción de una economía de

mercado socialista, buscar apoyo en el entorno mundial para el ascenso pacífico de

Beijing y disipar temores de distintos sectores en el exterior respecto al crecimiento

económico chino (Leiteritz, 2012).

El segundo factor condicionante del contexto histórico del acercamiento chino a

América Latina es de corte político, y se pone de manifiesto en la disputa entre la




República Popular de China (China) y la República de China (Taiwán) por el

reconocimiento diplomático internacional. El principio de “una sola China, dos

sistemas”, bajo el cual no es posible para un Estado sostener relaciones diplomáticas

simultáneas con ambas repúblicas, ha motivado que Beijing tenga un interés primordial

en mantener una presencia activa en la región para contrarrestar la influencia de Taiwán.

La expresión más reciente de dicha rivalidad tuvo lugar en junio de 2017, cuando los

gobiernos de Panamá y China anunciaron el establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas;

lo cual forzó la suspensión de vínculos oficiales de la nación centroamericana con

Taiwán tras 107 años de duración. Esto supone una gran pérdida de liderazgo en la

región para la República de China y un acierto indiscutible para la presencia de la

República Popular en Centroamérica; que es el segundo usuario del Canal de Panamá,

y cuenta con proyectos de inversión de 1.1 mil millones de dólares, en la construcción

de una terminal de portacontenedores en la provincia de Colón, a cargo de la empresa

China Landbridge Group (Ríos, 2017).

En suma, dichos elementos de contexto son fundamentales para entender la

influencia mutua entre la política interna y la externa; y para percatarse que, si bien las

relaciones internacionales de Beijing en esencia siguen rigiéndose prácticamente bajo

los mismos principios e intereses, lo que se ha ido transformando durante las gestiones

de Hu y de Xi es la manera en la cual éstos se interpretan y se llevan a la práctica.

Mientras que el primero acuñó el principio de “mundo armonioso” bajo el lema de Deng:

“ocultar capacidades y mantener un bajo perfil”, en aras de seguir avanzando en el

desarrollo y crecimiento económico sin levantar suspicacias frente a otros Estados

asiáticos limítrofes a China y ante potencias mundiales, como los Estados Unidos; Xi,

en contraste, continua teniendo como prioridad el desarrollo económico interno, pero

parece estar planteando una ruptura con el “ascenso pacífico”, mostrando al mundo un

Estado chino proactivo y globalizado, decidido a asumir un rol de mayor protagonismo

internacional, como lo demuestra su reciente presencia diplomática en Panamá, sin

importar que dicho Estado ha sido determinante para el ejercicio de la hegemonía

estadounidense en la región. En el ámbito global, la iniciativa de la llamada “ruta de la

seda” o el financiamiento de proyectos de infraestructura a través del Banco Asiático

de Inversión en Infraestructura (AIIB), demuestran este nuevo ímpetu de la política

exterior de China bajo la administración Xi.

Dimensión económica: El modelo de desarrollo chino.

El crecimiento económico alcanzado por China durante los últimos treinta y ocho años

(1978-2016) no tiene parangón en la historia económica mundial de los siglos XIX y




XX, dados los logros económicos reportados. Si bien en los últimos lustros la tasa de

expansión de la economía china se ha desacelerado a un rango entre el 6% y 7% anual,

Beijing sigue siendo una de las economías de mayor crecimiento en el planeta. De

hecho, la economía mundial (si se excluye a China y a la India) está creciendo a un

ritmo cercano al 1.5% anual. (CEPAL, 2016)

De las diversas explicaciones en relación a esas altas tasas de crecimiento

económico, así como al hecho en torno al cual Beijing en tan solo tres décadas se ha

transformado de un Estado agrícola a uno de las economías más relevantes en el mundo,

consideramos que son las reformas estructurales económicas puestas en marcha desde

finales de los años 70, las que han contribuido a alcanzar dicho crecimiento económico,

mediante una progresiva inserción de China en la economía mundial.

Entre 1949 y 1978, China fue una economía centralmente planificada con periodos

combinados de crecimiento y años de decrecimiento económico, pero con indicadores

bajos en el desarrollo económico y el bienestar social. De 1966 a 1976, el deterioro de

la economía china fue evidente, el crecimiento económico se tornó negativo y los

índices de pobreza se incrementaron de manera acelerada. Después de la muerte de Mao

Zedong, en 1976, y luego de un periodo de inestabilidad y cambio durante el gobierno

de Hua Guofeng, se abandonó por completo el modelo de desarrollo económico

soviético y se aplicó uno nuevo orientado hacia el exterior, basado en la combinación

de mecanismos de mercado – Estado, donde el segundo ha mantenido una firme

dirección e intervención en el sistema económico (González, 2007). Aunado a ello, se

han puesto en marcha estrategias de desarrollo regional, para aprovechar la inversión

extranjera, introducir técnicas y experiencias administrativas avanzadas y formar

personal especializado (Cornejo, 1985)

Fue Deng Xiaoping, quien en 1978 propuso la reforma y la apertura a la economía

mundial. Estaba convencido de que “pobreza no es socialismo” y que salir de ella

debería ser la principal prioridad del país. Desde su perspectiva, cualquier medida que

condujera a ese objetivo debería ser considerada correcta. Su filosofía: “la práctica

como último criterio de verdad” y el eslogan “no importa el color del gato, sino que

cace ratones” son una síntesis del pragmatismo de su pensamiento (González, 2009).

El eje fundamental de la reforma económica era, por tanto, transformar la economía

china de planificada a una socialista de mercado.

La segunda razón que explica el crecimiento en China tiene que ver con su política

de apertura económica externa, bajo la cual este Estado se ha insertado en la




globalización económica. Para los dirigentes chinos de la gran reforma de 1978, era

imposible construir una China moderna y una economía capaz de impulsar el desarrollo

económico si continuaba aislada. Debido a lo anterior, se inició la aplicación de una

política de apertura económica externa, a fin de recibir capital, tecnología y recursos

humanos calificados.

Ambas estrategias, la reforma económica y la inserción a la globalización

económica, desde el cambio de modelo de desarrollo de 1978, están interconectadas y

no actúan de manera separada, es decir, forman parte de la estrategia integral china del

modelo de desarrollo económico de orientación externa: sin la reforma económica

gradual, China jamás se hubiese abierto al exterior; y sin la apertura económica,

también gradual, la reforma económica no hubiera sido viable. Por tanto, hablar de la

política de puertas abiertas en China es hablar de la reforma económica, con el

gradualismo como característica fundamental de la misma (Yongtu Long, 2005). En

síntesis, la reforma económica de China y su política de apertura externa han sido

determinantes para el éxito de su reinserción a la economía internacional con efectos

regionales internos.

En este sentido, Salvador Chamorro (2008) identifica tres etapas clave de la

estrategia integral china de desarrollo económico de orientación externa: a) de 1978

hasta mediados de los años 90, donde iniciaron las reformas estructurales en el campo,

así como la implementación de la política de puertas abiertas, mediante la creación de

las Zonas Económicas Especiales para la inversión extranjera; b) durante los años 90,

periodo en el cual las autoridades chinas buscaron mejorar el entorno legal y regulatorio,

a fin de crear nuevas reglas y condiciones acordes con la economía china de ese

entonces; y, e) de 2002 a la fecha, que se caracteriza por la respuesta al ingreso de China

a la OMC y la revaluación de los resultados del proceso de reforma económica en su

conjunto.

Dimensión política: el principio de “una sola China, dos sistemas”.

La fundación de China (la República Popular China) el 1 de octubre de 1949 por

parte del PCCh encabezado por Mao, obligó al líder del Partido Nacionalista Chino o

Kuomintang, Chiang Kai-shek, a trasladar su gobierno a la isla de Formosa, creándose

así la República de China en Taiwán. Desde entonces, China y Taiwán se han visto

envueltos en una disputa por el reconocimiento diplomático internacional. Primero por

decisión de Taiwán y luego de China, no ha sido viable seguir una política de doble

reconocimiento, por lo que ningún Estado del mundo ha podido mantener de forma




simultánea relaciones diplomáticas oficiales con ambos.

Beijing ha impuesto, desde el periodo de gobierno de Mao, la mencionada doctrina

de «una China, dos sistemas» para promover la unificación de los territorios que

reclamaba como propios (Hong Kong, Macao y Taiwán, fundamentalmente) y había

buscado la eliminación del espacio internacional de Taiwán y sus pretensiones de

soberanía; Taiwán, por el contrario, ha solicitado el reconocimiento como país ante

otros Estados soberanos y los organismos internacionales.

En 1972, con la exclusión de Taiwán de la ONU, la isla se vio obligada a abocarse

a una intensa estrategia de búsqueda de aliados internacionales, sobre todo entre

gobiernos anticomunistas y países tercermundistas, para ejercer lo que se denominó

como la “economía del reconocimiento diplomático”, es decir, el ofrecimiento de ayuda

económica y de convenios comerciales, como instrumento para consolidar relaciones

diplomáticas con distintos Estados (Burdman, 2005)

China continental, además, ejerció una política exterior encaminada a evitar que

otros Estados reconocieran a Taiwán y sostuvieran con la isla relaciones diplomáticas.

De hecho, Corea del Sur, Singapur, Arabia Saudita y Sudáfrica fueron, en los noventa,

las grandes pérdidas diplomáticas para Taiwán –las tres primeras, en 1992, y la segunda,

en 1998–. A ello siguió la ruptura de vínculos oficiales con Macedonia en 1999

(Rodriguez,2013)

En el hemisferio americano, Dominica (2004), Granada (2005), Costa Rica (2007)

y Panamá (2017) han sido las pérdidas más recientes para Taiwán. En último caso

representa una pérdida de estatus internacional para la República de China; y la

consolidación de la influencia de la China continental en Latinoamérica. Actualmente,

Taiwán mantiene relaciones diplomáticas con sólo 20 países del mundo y once de ellos

se encuentra en América Latina. Por ello, en los dos documentos de la República

Popular de China sobre política exterior hacia América Latina, tanto el de 2008, como

el de 2016, y que sirven de sustento para la interacción de ambas partes, se mantiene

como constante dicho principio (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de la República

Popular de China, 2008 y Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de la República Popular

de China, 2016).

Cabe señalar que de 2008 a 2016 hubo un periodo de “tregua” entre los gobiernos

de China y Taiwán (Ellis, 2017; Oviedo, 2015), para suspender la competencia por el

reconocimiento diplomático en aras de un mayor acercamiento económico entre ambos




actores, pero dicha distensión concluyó cuando llegó a la presidencia del gobierno

taiwanés Tsai Ing-wen, del Partido Democrático Progresista (PDP); quien busca

alcanzar la independencia y soberanía de Taiwán respecto a Beijing.

De acuerdo con Ellis (2017), el restablecimiento de vínculos oficiales entre China

y Panamá puede interpretarse como un mensaje contundente de advertencia hacia

Taiwán para persuadirlo de seguir una política más alineada a los intereses de Beijing;

y en caso de no hacerlo, este último continuará celebrando relaciones diplomáticas con

aquellos Estados de África, Oceanía y América Latina que actualmente reconocen

oficialmente a Taiwán. Es decir, es una muestra del endurecimiento del principio de

“una sola China”.

La perspectiva política, por tanto, de dos grandes transformaciones estructurales –

una China más poderosa, un Taiwán más independiente–, debe tomarse en cuenta para

analizar el acercamiento progresivo que China ha hecho hacia la región latinoamericana.

4. Aproximaciones al análisis comparado de la política exterior de China en

América Latina: De Hu Jintao Xi Jinping.

Teniendo como preámbulo histórico las reformas económicas y la necesidad de

unidad política al interior del Estado chino, así como los efectos de ambos

condicionantes en el ámbito global, y en particular en las relaciones bilaterales sino –

latinoamericanas, procedemos a continuación a revisar aquellos elementos

comparativos que nos ayudarán a entender los contrastes y similitudes observados en

la política exterior de Beijing respecto a la región.

El pragmatismo como principio ordenador de la política exterior de China .

El comunismo y el nacionalismo fueron especialmente influyentes en los años 50

y 60, cuando el régimen maoísta aplicó una política exterior confrontacional para

consolidarse en el poder. El deterioro que produjo en el contexto de seguridad de China

esa dicha política acabó propiciando un acercamiento entre Beijing y Washington en

los años 70. Este giro marcó el inicio del protagonismo del pragmatismo como principio

ordenador para la configuración de la política exterior china, cuyo peso se acentuó con

la llegada al poder de Deng Xiaoping y su programa reformista de 1978 (Rodríguez,

2016).

Desde su perspectiva, cualquier medida que condujera a la reforma debería ser




considerada correcta. Su filosofía: “la práctica como último criterio de verdad” es una

síntesis del pragmatismo de su pensamiento. El eje fundamental de su reforma

económica fue transformar la economía china de planificada a una socialista de

mercado. (González, 2009)

La política exterior de China, por tanto, sufrió una transformación radical, al

coadyuvar a crear y favorecer un entorno mundial capaz de impulsar el desarrollo

económico, en concordancia con la estrategia integral de desarrollo económico de

orientación externa.

Podemos aseverar que el pragmatismo político sigue siendo la orientación

principal de la agenda política china, tanto en el interior como en el exterior. El objetivo

de sacar adelante la reforma económica y avanzar en el desarrollo del país se mantiene

como la prioridad absoluta. La política exterior china seguirá estando inspirada en el

mismo principio que anunció Deng desde los años ochenta, de crear un ambiente de

paz y estabilidad favorable en el exterior, que garantizara una puesta en marcha sin

problemas de la reforma en el interior (Rodríguez, 2016).

En consonancia con el pragmatismo, el ámbito económico es el más importante

para la política exterior de Beijing en América Latina. En este sentido, el comercio

continúa siendo el propulsor de las relaciones bilaterales y, sobre su estructura, se

expanden los vínculos políticos y culturales. Al respecto, varios autores han descrito la

importancia del mercado chino y cómo sus autoridades, desde el inicio de la República

Popular China en 1949, utilizaron esta fuente de poder –actualmente de 1,360 millones

de consumidores– para atraer a las economías latinoamericanas hacia sus diferentes

estrategias políticas (Oviedo, 2015)

Pautas identitarias.

Tomando como punto de partida que el principio del pragmatismo es el que orienta

en mayor medida la política exterior de China desde la década de los 70, se podría

pensar que no deben existir grandes diferencias respecto a las pautas identitarias. Sin

embargo, si se incorporan las especificidades de los periodos de estudio en la

administración tanto de Hu, como de Xi, se comprenderán mejor sus diferencias. Las

dos pautas identitarias compartidas son, según la autopercepción de ambos gobiernos

chinos, la pertenencia al mundo en desarrollo, como elemento promotor de un contexto

internacional pacífico; y el carácter hegemónico de la política exterior, puesto en

marcha, sobre todo, durante la gestión de Xi Jinping.




Pertenencia al mundo en desarrollo.

En concordancia con la estrategia integral de desarrollo económico de orientación

externa arriba expuesta, Beijing llevó a cabo un profundo replanteamiento de sus

relaciones internacionales a finales de los años 70, consistente en propiciar una

percepción en el exterior favorable, con la finalidad de alentar el desarrollo económico

interno. Después de la tercera sesión plenaria del Partido Comunista del XI Congreso

Nacional en 1978, China implementó importantes cambios en sus estrategias de política

interna y externa bajo el liderazgo de Deng Xiaoping. En la esfera nacional, el objetivo

era permitir que las fuerzas del mercado jugaran un papel más destacado en la economía,

al reducir el alcance de la intervención del gobierno; mientras que, en la internacional,

se esperaba que la liberalización económica atrajera más capital extranjero, promoviera

las transferencias de tecnología y estimulara el crecimiento de los sectores de

exportación de mano de obra intensiva (Jiang, 2008).En síntesis, la política exterior

dejó de ser un instrumento ideológico de promoción de la revolución china, para

convertirse en una pieza clave en la construcción del proyecto económico planteado por

Deng.

Después de la muerte de Mao en 1976, Deng Xiaoping se convirtió en el principal

estadista chino del período posterior a la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Deng fue

responsable de formular una nueva perspectiva sobre el socialismo, el estado y la

economía, en la que se priorizó un desarrollo económico bajo el control político del

PCCh, en el contexto de una población en rápida expansión, y en virtud de la cual se

sumaron el resto de los objetivos nacionales e internacionales (Leiteritz, 2012).

Sin embargo, Deng buscaba que China mantuviera un bajo perfil en el ámbito

internacional, para recuperarse de la devastadora situación económica y social que

enfrentó el país a raíz de la Revolución Cultural de Mao. La estrategia de Deng, por

tanto, identificaba la paz y el desarrollo como dos desafíos mundiales más apremiantes,

clasificándolos como el problema Este-Oeste (paz) y el problema Norte-Sur (desarrollo)

(Jiang, 2000).

Las reformas institucionales puestas en marcha por Deng desde finales de los años

setenta, por tanto, plantearon una revisión de la política exterior de Beijing y sentaron

las bases del “desarrollo pacífico”.

Otro aspecto externo que no debe soslayarse al referir las razones por las cuales

Beijing adoptó el “desarrollo pacífico” como sustento de su política exterior fue la




extinción de la URSS. Si bien Deng tenía la intención de que China conservara un bajo

perfil internacional, con el fin de evitar conflictos mientras fuera una nación débil; el

país asiático ya había potenciado para entonces sus capacidades, por lo que requería de

un argumento más contundente que aquel vertido por los demás Estados para encontrar

a un nuevo enemigo capaz de reemplazar a la URSS. En este contexto es cuando

surgieron términos como “la amenaza china”, “la amenaza amarilla” o “choque de

civilizaciones” (González García & Morales Lizárraga, 2014).

De acuerdo con González García y Morales Lizárraga (2014), la evolución del

término “desarrollo pacífico” se puede periodizar en tres etapas: 1) la aparición de la

teoría de ascenso pacífico de China, entre 2002 y 2003; 2) el debate sobre el uso del

concepto de ascenso pacífico y su sustitución por la doctrina de desarrollo pacífico,

entre 2004 y 2005; 3) a partir de 2004, el uso creciente de los términos “sociedad

armoniosa” (política interior) y “mundo armonioso” (política exterior) como partes de

una misma unidad.

Al respecto, es importante distinguir las razones por las cuales las autoridades

chinas decidieron reemplazar el “ascenso pacífico” al “desarrollo pacífico”; así como

definir los conceptos de “sociedad armoniosa” y “mundo armonioso”.

En relación con el primer punto, si bien es difícil otorgar el término a una sola autoría,

en razón de que es reflejo de un proceso político e intelectual amplio, Zheng Bijian, -

intelectual que fue director de la Escuela Central del Partido PCCh y posteriormente

director de un centro de investigación gubernamental orientado al estudio del proceso

de modernización denominado Foro de la Reforma de China (FRC)-, fue el primer

encargado de difundirlo en organismos y mecanismos internacionales a partir de 2003

(Rocha, 2009).

Al poco tiempo de la introducción del concepto de ascenso pacífico, el entonces

Presidente Hu Jintao (2003-2013) y el Primer Ministro Wen Jiabao lo habían incluido

en sus declaraciones públicas durante los primeros meses de 2004, y en ese año se

realizaron numerosos seminarios y foros de debate sobre la utilización del concepto;

pero el resultado, al concluir las discusiones, fue desfavorable, puesto que el término

ascenso podría ser considerado demasiado agresivo por los miembros de la ASEAN, al

mismo tiempo que podría mandar equivocadas señales “pacificadoras” al gobierno pro

independentista de Chen Shuibian en Taiwán.

Por lo anterior, el concepto de ascenso desapareció del discurso oficial en marzo

o abril de 2004, y en agosto de 2004, durante la celebración del 110 aniversario del




nacimiento de Mao Zedong, el presidente Hu pronunció un discurso en el que

enfatizaba que durante su gobierno se continuaría con el proyecto de “paz y desarrollo”

de Deng. Sin embargo, a finales de 2005, los lineamientos generales del concepto de

“ascenso pacífico” sirvieron para construir la base del principio de “desarrollo pacífico”,

oficializada el 22 de diciembre de 2005 (Rocha, 2009).

En cuanto al segundo aspecto, es decir, distinguir los conceptos de “sociedad

armoniosa” y “mundo armonioso”, en febrero de 2005 el Presidente Hu Jintao inició

una campaña nacional para promover la idea de una “sociedad más armoniosa”, algo

que sin duda comenzó a estimular el atractivo de los estudios confucianos entre el

público en general y el mundo académico, y el concepto de “mundo armonioso”

comenzó a ser ampliamente difundido en la escena internacional como una propuesta

formulada por el Presidente Hu, durante la Cumbre Asia-África realizada en mayo de

aquel año. Posteriormente, Hu reiteró el concepto durante la cumbre anual sino-rusa

efectuada en julio, y el concepto fue incorporado en la Declaración Conjunta sobre el

Orden Mundial del Siglo XXI, en el contexto de la asociación estratégica sino-rusa.

Finalmente, en septiembre de 2005, Hu basó su discurso ante la Asamblea General de

la ONU sobre la misma idea. La concepción del mundo armonioso como parte de la

política exterior de China fue oficializada durante la Sexta Sesión del Comité Central

del XVI Congreso del PCCh en octubre de 2006.

De acuerdo con Yuan Peng (citado en Rocha, 2009) la idea del mundo armonioso

es articulada por cinco relaciones:

1.- La relación entre “un mundo armonioso y una sociedad armoniosa”. La última es el

fundamento del primero, y el primero es la garantía del último. “Los asuntos domésticos

e internacionales deberían ser como un todo”.

2.- La relación entre un mundo armonioso y la paz y el desarrollo. Construir un mundo

armonioso es la meta, la paz y el desarrollo son los medios.

3.- La relación entre un mundo armonioso y la práctica diplomática: Un mundo

armonioso “...es tanto un concepto abstracto como una hoja de ruta para la práctica

diplomática”.

4.- La relación entre un mundo armonioso y los principios diplomáticos de China (como

refutación al pragmatismo): Crear un mundo armonioso no significa obtener una

armonía a todo costo y bajo cualquier circunstancia.) Estos principios se encuentran

contenidos en los Cinco Principios de Coexistencia Pacífica.

5.- La relación entre un mundo armonioso y la diplomacia en beneficio del pueblo: La

diplomacia de China debe servir para los intereses del pueblo chino, como en el caso

de la asistencia a los ciudadanos chinos en el extranjero, en un momento en que los




intereses chinos en el exterior están en expansión continúa: de acuerdo con Yuan Peng

“la humanidad y la diplomacia para el pueblo son características distintivas de la nueva

diplomacia china”.

“Mundo armonioso” en el gobierno de Hu Jintao.

La principal innovación política de Hu Jintao estriba en haber generado un nuevo

discurso político inspirado en ideas de la cultura tradicional china. El elemento base de

este nuevo enunciado político es la referencia a la cultura de armonía, en la cual está

implícita la idea de un proceso que consiste no en eliminar diferencias, sino en conciliar

la diversidad para que el resultado final sea armónico. Hu Jintao se planteó como

objetivo de su política interior la consecución de una “sociedad armoniosa”, y su reflejo

en política exterior fue el de contribuir a la creación de un mundo igualmente

“armonioso” (Moncada, 2011).

La creación de un mundo armonioso es una formulación novedosa en las

relaciones internacionales, en tanto que durante el mandato de Hu se hace el intento de

presentar a la comunidad internacional una alternativa china al modelo de

gobernabilidad global, en un contexto de endurecimiento del unilateralismo

estadunidense a raíz de los atentados del 11 de septiembre y en el cual China es

percibida como una amenaza a sus intereses mundiales.

Con el enunciado de su “mundo armonioso”, se desvanece por completo la

terminología marxista de Mao para dar paso a una identidad en la que Hu consigue

eliminar lo que hasta ahora había sido una constante en la diplomacia china: el

componente de oposición o lucha, y que había persistido tras la Guerra Fría en las

formas de “antihegemonismo”, “antiunipolaridad” y “antiamericansimo”. Treinta años

después de que Deng Xiaoping anunciara su política de apertura al exterior, China

finalmente abandonó su perspectiva de confrontación con Occidente y optó por el

compromiso y la participación por alcanzar la paz y el desarrollo, como elementos

centrales de identidad de su política exterior y de seguridad (Rocha, 2009).

Con sustento en la pauta identitaria del “desarrollo pacífico”, durante la gestión de

Hu se emitió por primera vez un policy paper en 2008, donde se establecían las

directrices de la política exterior de China hacia América Latina. Se trata de un

documento que busca unificar la postura de Beijing respecto a los países de la región,

y en el que se establecen los distintos temas de la agenda bilateral que al estado asiático

le interesa concretar; todo ello, bajo la auto percepción de un país que busca un entorno




favorable para continuar con su propio desarrollo interno.

Conforme este documento, la política exterior en la región tiene por objetivos:

establecer una estrategia de ganar-ganar (win-win); alcanzar el desarrollo pacífico; el

principio de una sola China; el respeto a la diversidad; la cooperación y la coordinación,

y la coexistencia pacífica (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de la República Popular

de China, 2008). Por medio de esta identidad, China ha ampliado y profundizado sus

vínculos comerciales, de inversión y cooperación entre los Estados americanos sin

atentar con la hegemonía estadounidense que históricamente ha prevalecido en América

Latina.

Como resultado de lo anterior, Beijing es: 1) observador en varios organismos y

mecanismos regionales americanos; 2) uno de los principales socios comerciales de

América Latina y el Caribe; 3) tiene un récord creciente como inversionista en diversos

sectores económicos; y, 4) se perfila como un aliado en el ámbito militar (Ellis, 2009).

Carácter hegemónico en el gobierno de Xi Jinping.

A partir del 14 de marzo de 2013, que llega al poder Xi Jingping como presidente

de China, se observa un cambio contundente en la manera bajo la cual este Estado

asiático se ve a sí mismo y quiere ser percibido por el resto del mundo. La política

exterior de ese país desde entonces ha tomado un enfoque mucho más pro activo que

los anteriores gobiernos, especialmente en cuanto al rumbo que debe tomar para

alcanzar su desarrollo económico. La frase de: “el sueño chino” envuelve el rumbo que

Xi desea otorgar al manejo de su política al interior, como al exterior del territorio chino.

La realización del “sueño chino” equivale al "gran rejuvenecimiento de la nación china".

A la luz de la narrativa histórica del Partido Comunista, ello implica librar a China de

las humillaciones pasadas, provocadas por las potencias y las guerras coloniales. La

realización del “sueño chino” consta de dos momentos: El primero es el centenario de

la fundación del Partido Comunista en 2021 y el segundo es el centenario del

establecimiento de la República Popular en 2049. Para el primer centenario, el nivel de

vida de la población china debe alcanzar el nivel de una "sociedad moderadamente

acomodada", un objetivo fijado por Deng desde el lanzamiento de sus reformas

económicas. Esto subraya la importancia del desarrollo económico, que se considera el

fundamento más importante de la legitimidad del Partido (Kalio, 2016).

Para el segundo centenario, el rejuvenecimiento de China debe estar concluido, lo

que significa que, para entonces, China debe convertirse en una superpotencia, no sólo




en términos económicos, sino también políticos y militares.

Dichos planteamientos parecen significar un distanciamiento de la pauta creada

por Deng, en el sentido de mantener un bajo perfil en la arena internacional y

concentrarse en la construcción de una economía interna sólida. Xi, por el contrario, ha

propuesto la proactividad como línea de acción, dejando atrás el lema “ocular

capacidades y obtener un bajo perfil”, reemplazándolo por el “esforzarse para lograrlo”.

De acuerdo con Sorensen (2015), el “sueño chino” es una expresión diferenciada del

principio del pragmatismo chino enfocando en el desarrollo pacífico y en el ganar –

ganar, reflejado en tres vertientes, a saber: una presencia china más amplia y profunda

en el ámbito mundial, deseo de ser tratado como igual, y nacionalismo, entendido como

defensa a ultranza de su soberanía y de intereses nacionales clave.

Esta nueva línea proactiva de política exterior se ha puesto de manifiesto

especialmente en las interacciones de China con sus vecinos territoriales y el resto de

Asia oriental; así como en la ya mencionada iniciativa de infraestructura un cinturón,

una ruta.

En el caso concreto de la relación sino - latinoamericana, sobresale el esfuerzo por

actualizar los lineamientos de la política exterior china por medio de la emisión de un

nuevo documento de directrices de comportamiento externo hacia la región; en el cual

se establece que China busca expandir sus intereses comunes con otros países,

promover la construcción de un nuevo tipo de relaciones internacionales sustentadas en

la cooperación win – win, y forjar una comunidad con un futuro compartido. Para ello,

sin embargo, es necesario el auxilio de otros países en desarrollo, entre ellos, los

latinoamericanos, lo que implica el planteamiento de nuevos objetivos, ideas y

propuestas de acercamiento entre las dos partes para alcanzar un mayor grado de

cooperación internacional (China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean,

2016).

Características y alcance de las estrategias de inserción de la política exterior

de China en América Latina.

Las estrategias de inserción empleadas por las gestiones de Hu y de Xi muestran

continuidad en la política exterior, pero con esta última, se consolida la búsqueda por

legitimar ante los países de la región una hegemonía que es clara en términos de poder

material. Por medio de conceptos vertidos en ambos documentos de política exterior,

tales como: “desarrollo”, “complementariedad, “diversificación”, “consenso” y




“cooperación Sur-Sur”, (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de la República Popular

de China, 2008 y 2016), China busca legitimar la construcción de su proceso de

construcción hegemónica mundial, involucrando a sectores económicos y políticos

clave en Latinoamérica.

De esta manera, observamos que Beijing ha desplegado tres estrategias claramente

diferenciadas y escalonadas en función de los actores a quienes pretende influir y de

sus intereses en la región y de carácter global.

Estrategia selectiva.

De los conceptos arriba señalados se deriva la categoría de asociaciones

estratégicas que China ha suscrito con numerosos países latinoamericanos. De acuerdo

con Rodríguez Aranda (2014), estos acuerdos le permiten al Estado asiático construir

lealtades políticas en la región sin generar conflictos con otras potencias (léase Estados

Unidos), dando un nuevo contenido al principio de “pragmatismo chino”, que consiste

en afianzar el ascenso y consolidación de un liderazgo global en un sistema mundial

multipolar.

Las características fundamentales de tales asociaciones estratégicas establecidas por

China con diversos países del mundo, en este caso con aquellos de América Latina son

las siguientes:

1) Se trata de alianzas no tradicionales, al no estar dirigidas hacia terceros.

2) Se enfocan en aspectos económicos.

3) Sustentadas en la suscripción de acuerdos, tratados o declaraciones conjuntas

bilaterales, que en varios casos incluyen la cláusula de “socios estratégicos”.

4) Refuerzan los intereses chinos en la región, al buscar asociar a la mayor cantidad de

países a su crecimiento económico mediante la cooperación.

5) Construyen alianzas sin un componente ideológico.

6) Al carecer de un sistema político democrático, China no lo exige como condición en

sus relaciones internacionales (Rodríguez Aranda, 2014).

El “Documento sobre la Política Exterior de China hacia América Latina y el Caribe”

(en adelante el Documento), publicado en noviembre de 2008, es el texto donde se




plasma por primera vez una política exterior integral y homogénea hacia la región

(Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de la República Popular de China, 2008).

Asimismo, hace alusión al hecho de que la serie de grandes cambios en la estructura

del sistema internacional ha vuelto irreversible la multipolarización del mundo, lo cual

establece la culminación del esquema unipolar liderado por Estados Unidos.

Pese a la existencia de un nuevo “Documento de la Política Exterior china hacia

América Latina y el Caribe” de 2016 durante la actual gestión de Xi, no todos los

Estados de la región se relacionan de la misma manera con China. Por tanto, si bien

dicho documento pareciera expresar que la política exterior china hacia la región es

integral y uniforme, ésta al ponerse en marcha en realidad es claramente selectiva y se

lleva a cabo en un plano multidimensional con numerosos matices y heterogeneidades,

de manera tal que la estrategia china debe operar de modo que se adapte al contexto y

dependiendo del actor a la cual está dirigida.

Las estrategias de política exterior selectivas son dos claramente diferenciadas: las

asociaciones bilaterales y los tratados de libre comercio.

Asociaciones bilaterales.

El concepto de asociación surgió dentro de la diplomacia china después del final

de la Guerra Fría. Desde entonces, la creación de este tipo de alianzas se ha convertido

en una de las características más notables de la diplomacia china, al jerarquizar y

diferenciar el nivel del vínculo en función de los intereses perseguidos por Beijing, y

valorar el grado de respuesta y afinidad de su contraparte en temas sustanciales para su

diplomacia (Rocha, 2015).

China ha establecido asociaciones con 47 países y cuatro organizaciones

internacionales: la Unión Europea (UE), la Asociación de Naciones del Sudeste

Asiático (ASEAN), la Unión Africana (UA) y la Comunidad de Estados

Latinoamericanos y caribeños (CELAC). Para ello existe una serie de términos a partir

de los cuales la diplomacia china define los distintos estatus de asociación que

caracterizan su política exterior. Cuatro de ellos son centrales: “socio”, “cooperativo”,

“estratégico” e “integral”, existiendo otros siete que son secundarios: “amistoso”,

“importante”, “tradicional”, “de beneficio mutuo”, “multidimensional”, “de todo

tiempo” y “de colaboración” (Ramón-Berjano, Malena & Velloso, 2015).

Los cuatro términos centrales tienen un fuerte valor simbólico, debido a que cada




uno evidencia una conducta en materia internacional. El ser reconocido como “socio”

significa para la diplomacia china, que la contraparte es un Estado amigo (y por lo tanto

su conducta no será hostil). Esta concepción se enmarca en la lógica de amigo- enemigo.

Para la diplomacia china, el ser “socio” conlleva la práctica de la cooperación por

encima de la competencia, de donde deriva el carácter de tener una conducta

“cooperativa”. A estos dos términos se les suma el de “estratégico”, el cual alude a que

los socios cooperando entre sí lo harán tanto en los asuntos internacionales como a favor

del crecimiento económico. Esta visión evidencia la realización de acciones conjuntas,

tanto en el marco del ámbito internacional, como en el interno. Por último, el término

“integral”, se refiere a que la relación bilateral abarcará no solo los aspectos políticos y

económicos, sino también las dimensiones científico-tecnológica, cultural, militar,

deportiva, etcétera (Ramón-Berjano, Malena & Velloso, 2015).

A partir de estos cuatro términos centrales, la diplomacia china define cuatro

categorías de asociación, combina dos o tres de los mencionados términos. Dichas

categorías, en orden de menor a mayor importancia, son: “asociación cooperativa”,

“asociación estratégica”, asociación estratégica integral” y “asociación cooperativa

estratégica”.

Por último, existen otros siete términos secundarios (“amistad, “importante”,

“tradicional”, “de beneficio mutuo”, “multidimensional”, “de tiempo” y

“colaboración”), con los cuales se matizan los cuatro estatus de asociación principales,

estableciendo una serie de categorías intermedias

En consecuencia, se observa que la diplomacia china reconoce unos catorce estatus de

asociación, las cuales otorga a los países y organizaciones internacionales que considera

“amigos” en el sistema internacional.

Con sustento en la evolución de las relaciones de China con los países que la

reconocen oficialmente, Beijing ha otorgado a cincuenta y cuatro países y cuatro

organizaciones intergubernamentales alguno de los catorce estatus de asociación

mencionados.

Tratados de libre comercio.

Este tipo de acuerdos comerciales establece zonas en las cuales los países

miembros eliminan tarifas, cuotas y preferencias en la mayor parte (o en la totalidad)

de los productos y servicios comerciados entre los países. China concibe este tipo de

tratados como una nueva plataforma o una segunda etapa del proceso de apertura




iniciado en 1978 para acentuar su apertura al exterior. De esta manera, busca continuar

el proceso de reforma iniciado hace casi cuatro décadas, reforzando la cooperación con

otras economías, insertándose e integrándose a la economía mundial mediante el

sistema multilateral de comercio (IICA, 2009).

En 2015, China tenía firmados trece Tratados de Libre Comercio, de los cuales

tres son con Estados Latinoamericanos. Con Chile lo suscribió en 2005, pero entró en

vigor un año más tarde, en octubre de 2006. Según este acuerdo, ambos países se

comprometen a bajar sus tarifas a casi la totalidad de sus productos (97%) en un lapso

de diez años. Cabe destacar que éste fue el primer acuerdo que China realiza con un

país latinoamericano. En 2008 se firmó el Acuerdo Suplementario y en estos momentos

se están llevando a cabo negociaciones en el ámbito de las inversiones (Ramón-Berjano,

Malena & Velloso, 2015).

Con Perú en 2009, fue el segundo tratado que China firma con un país

latinoamericano y el primero con la región que incluye las áreas de servicios e inversión.

Por último, con Costa Rica en 2011, después de tres años de negociaciones. Este país

es el segundo socio comercial de China en la región de Centroamérica y China es, a su

vez, el segundo socio comercial de Costa Rica.

Es de destacar que de los trece TLC que China ha firmado, tres se encuentran en

América Latina, dos de ellos con miembros de la Alianza del Pacífico y un tercero Costa

Rica que actualmente es observador y candidato a miembro pleno de la Alianza del

Pacífico.

Podemos concluir que la categoría de las “relaciones estratégicas” y otras variantes

propias de las presentes estrategias de inserción internacional de China implican una

nueva hegemonía. Por razones de intereses comerciales y financieros, los países de la

región aceptan estos conceptos, lo que le permite a China mantener la iniciativa

diplomática; es decir, le permite establecer las reglas del juego. Consideramos que la

identidad china de una gran potencia pacífica en ascenso requiere crear un discurso

integrador, cooperativo, igualitario, que genere confianza, legitime y distinga a ese

Estado como hegemonía ante otras potencias.

Estrategia regional.

En las dos últimas décadas, el gobierno de China ha desplegado una estrategia de

acercamiento e inserción en mecanismos y organismos regionales y sub-regionales




latinoamericanos. Al respecto, cuenta con lazos formales con la Comunidad del Caribe

(CARICOM). Asimismo, es miembro observador de la Alianza del Pacífico desde julio

de 2013, observador permanente en la Organización de los Estados Americanos y

miembro no prestatario del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo. Mantiene un régimen

de diálogo con el Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) y la Comunidad Andina de

Naciones (CAN). Además, interactúa con los países de la región por medio del Foro

América Latina – Asia del Este (FOCALAE). Además de entrar en contacto con los

Estados latinoamericanas en el marco del sistema de Naciones Unidas, el Grupo de los

77 y otras organizaciones internacionales, China integra el G20 junto con Argentina,

Brasil y México. Asimismo, Beijing participa en el APEC, al igual que Chile, México

y Perú; e interactúa con Brasil a través de BRICS. No obstante, en la última Cumbre

BRICS celebrada en China en septiembre de 2017, México participó como país invitado

(Ramos, 5 septiembre 2017).

Pese a la serie de interacciones arriba descritas, China viene prestando suma

atención a su relación con la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y caribeños

(CELAC). El Foro CELAC-China fue establecido en la Segunda Cumbre de

Presidentes de países de la región realizada en La Habana, Cuba en enero de 2014. De

conformidad con el Plan de Acción de CELAC 2014, se menciona la necesidad de

avanzar en el desarrollo del diálogo y la cooperación de la CELAC con sus contrapartes

extra regionales, creando el Foro CELAC – China y realizar la I reunión durante 2014

(CELAC, 2014, p. 22).

De esta forma, la Primera Reunión Ministerial, que reúne a los Ministros de

Relaciones Exteriores de China y de los Estados miembros de la CELAC, se llevó a

cabo en la capital china en enero de 2015; y concluyó con la firma de tres documentos:

la Declaración de Beijing, el establecimiento de un Plan Quinquenal de Cooperación,

y el Mecanismo y Reglas de Operación del Foro.

El Plan Quinquenal de Cooperación fue propuesto por el presidente Xi Jinping a

los líderes del Cuarteto de la CELAC (formado por Costa Rica, Antigua y Barbuda,

Ecuador y Cuba) en el mes de junio de 2014 en la capital de Brasil, bajo el esquema

1+3+6, es decir, "un plan, tres motores y seis campos", a efecto de profundizar la

cooperación entre ambas partes (Ramón-Berjano, Malena, & Velloso, 2015).

"Un plan" se refiere a la elaboración de un Plan de Cooperación entre China,

América Latina y el Caribe para 2015-2019, con el fin de lograr el crecimiento inclusivo

y el desarrollo sostenible. "Tres motores" se refiere al comercio, las inversiones y las




finanzas, con los cuales se promueve el desarrollo integral de la cooperación práctica

entre ambas partes y se pretende elevar, en un margen de 10 años, el volumen del

intercambio comercial a los 500,000 millones de dólares anuales, frente a los 261, 600

millones de dólares de 2013 (Ramón-Berjano, Malena & Velloso, 2015).

Por último, "seis campos" se refiere a: energía, construcción de infraestructuras,

agricultura, manufactura, innovación tecnológica y tecnología de la información,

sectores en los cuales se hará hincapié para lograr un mayor desarrollo de la

cooperación de beneficio mutuo entre China y América Latina.

Volviendo al Plan, que definirá los vínculos de cooperación transpacífica entre

China y los Estados de América Latina y el Caribe de 2015 a 2019, éste abarca una

agenda de trece rubros de colaboración, entre los cuales resaltan: seguridad, política,

comercio, inversión, finanzas, infraestructuras, desarrollo, energía, recursos, industria,

agricultura, ciencia e intercambios entre pueblos y culturas (CELAC – II Cumbre

CELAC La Habana 2014, 2014, p. 22). Paralelamente, China invitó a los países de

América Latina y el Caribe a participar activamente en la construcción del Fondo de

Cooperación China-América Latina y el Caribe y a hacer buen uso de los préstamos

concesionales concedidos por China, de acuerdo con las necesidades y prioridades de

los países receptores (Oviedo, 2015). La Segunda Reunión Ministerial está

contemplado realizarla en enero de 2018 en Chile.

Este foro CELAC - China es, por tanto, un mecanismo que institucionaliza la

relación de poder de China, como gran potencia, entre los Estados de América Latina.

Asimismo, establece un orden regional que incluye a todos los países de la región,

incluidos aquellos con los cuales no mantiene relaciones diplomáticas, por lo que se

trata de un complemento de la diplomacia bilateral prevaleciente en la estrategia de

inserción china en Latinoamérica

Cabe mencionar que dicha estrategia de política exterior surgió en 2008, con la

publicación del Documento sobre la Política de China hacia América Latina y el Caribe,

luego de años de profundizar los vínculos interestatales; y cuyo enfoque se sustenta en

el latino-americanismo, contrapuesto al americanismo, con la finalidad de excluir a

Estados Unidos y Canadá, y apuntalar a China como una potencia que despliega una

hegemonía alternativa bajo la cual se concibe de manera discursiva a Beijing como un

país en desarrollo y una economía emergente.




Estrategia global.

La hegemonía estadounidense ha perdido el carácter absoluto que tenía a finales

del siglo XX con el llamado Consenso de Washington; y, paralelamente, se observa una

creciente hegemonía de China en la región latinoamericana.

Lo anterior puede ilustrarse en Sudamérica, sub región caracterizada por una

mayor autonomía en su política exterior que la de los países centroamericanos o de

México, por lo que China inició su acercamiento de manera más rápida en esa sub

región que en América Central y el Caribe, a pesar que en los últimos años China ha

profundizado su estrategia económica, con la planeación de la construcción del Canal

de Nicaragua, el intento trunco de construir el ferrocarril de alta velocidad en México,

la dependencia de Cuba respecto de China y, fundamentalmente, la posibilidad de que

varios países centroamericanos cambien el reconocimiento hacia la República Popular

China.

Estas estrategias de inserción de China en la zona de seguridad directa

estadounidense deben ser consideradas como un medio político para contrarrestar la

influencia de Estados Unidos en Asia. Es decir, a inicios del siglo XXI, había un alto

desequilibrio entre Estados Unidos y China en materia de presencias en zonas de

seguridad directa, en tanto que Estados Unidos tenía una presencia económica, política

y militar en el continente asiático, especialmente en el Noreste y Sureste Asiáticos, y

China escasa presencia en América Latina (Oviedo, 2015).

Sin embargo, desde que China se ha transformado en gran potencia a fines del

siglo XX, su diplomacia lentamente comienza a alterar ese desequilibrio con su

creciente presencia económica y financiera en América del Sur y su cada vez mejor

posicionamiento estratégico en América Central, tras el restablecimiento de las

relaciones diplomáticas con Costa Rica y Panamá; y el abandono de estas naciones

centroamericanas de sus lazos formales con Taiwán. Es decir, se observa que se transita

de la penetración unilateral de Estados Unidos en la zona de influencia china a la mutua

penetración de zonas de seguridad directa, aunque aún existen incuestionables

desequilibrios entre el carácter de la penetración económica, militar y política de

Estados Unidos en el Este asiático y la naciente presencia china en materia económica

y política en ALC.




5. Conclusiones.

En el presente trabajo, presentamos un contexto histórico, en el cual es posible

percatarse de la manera en la cual la política interna condiciona a la externa. En el caso

de China, la serie de reformas económicas impulsadas por Deng desde 1978, con miras

a que ese país alcance su desarrollo, han sido el sustento bajo el cual se articula el interés

nacional de la política exterior, y que ha influido en la manera en la que Beijing se

relaciona con América Latina.

En términos generales, puede aseverarse que, si bien la política exterior de China

hacia la región posee un perfil multifacético, en el entendido de que cuenta con intereses

de distinta índole, aquellos de comercio y cooperación sin duda son los primordiales,

dado el proceso de apertura antes expuesto, para la consagración de su desarrollo

económico interno. Por ello, varios de los países latinoamericanos sean pieza clave para

el comercio y traslado de materias primas y alimentos, así como para la exportación de

manufacturas.

China se encuentra en un proceso de fortalecimiento como potencia global en

ascenso, lo cual propicia que este Estado busque incrementar y robustecer su presencia

e influencia mundial mediante principios, pautas identitarias y estrategias de inserción,

tendientes a evitar un conflicto con potencias hegemónicas que puedan interpretar este

ascenso como una amenaza a sus intereses y a su zona de influencia natural, como lo

es América Latina.

De esta forma, desde Deng ha ido evolucionando una política exterior

caracterizada por la no confrontación y por tener como principios centrales la paz y el

desarrollo. Esto se expresa claramente en el primer documento chino de política exterior

emitido en 2008.

No obstante, el actual mandato del presidente Xi parece plantear un cambio o un

replanteamiento de la política exterior de ese país, en el que se pretende identificar a

China como una potencia global que está decidida a ser más pro activa e influir

claramente en la gobernanza global. El reflejo de ello se observa en las nuevas

directrices de política exterior de Beijing hacia la región de 2016.

No es posible aseverar que en este momento China es una hegemonía, pero

consideramos que sí es válido anotar que los lemas acuñados por Deng a principios de

los años noventa: “ocultar el potencial esperando el momento oportuno” y “llevar a

cabo acciones de carácter modesto”, son cada vez menos apropiados para describir el




perfil de la política exterior de China; puesto que una vez consolidado su estatus de

gran potencia, y a medida que sus intereses de seguridad son progresivamente más

complejos, es cada vez más difícil que este país se mantenga pasivo. Por tanto, la

máxima de “esconder potencial y aguardar el momento” no es ya factible.

Un reto sin duda para el Estado asiático será la manera en la que será posible

conciliar la pauta identitaria de “desarrollo pacífico” con el “sueño chino”. Al respecto,

los líderes chinos han cultivado ambas fuentes de legitimidad para reforzar su

popularidad. El problema es que haciendo esto fomentan dos lógicas de actuación que

pueden resultar contradictorias. Por un lado, el desarrollo económico de China sigue

estando supeditado al mantenimiento de un orden internacional pacífico y de buenas

relaciones con otros estados; por otro, el creciente carácter hegemónico de su política

exterior, que se refleja en la forma en que América Latina acepta sin objeción alguna

las reglas del juego inducidas por China, tales como los términos de sus asociaciones

estratégicas y los acuerdos de libre comercio.




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Cuadros.

Estados en el mundo que reconocen y sostiene relaciones diplomáticas con

Taiwán.

Región. Número. Estados.

América Central. 5 • Nicaragua.

• Honduras.

• El Salvador

• Guatemala

• Belice.

Caribe. 5 • Haití.

• República Dominicana.

• San Cristóbal y Nieves.

• Santa Lucía.

• San Vicente y las Granadinas.

América del Sur. 1 • Paraguay.

Oceanía. 6 • Palau.

• Islas Marshall.

• Kiribati.

• Nauru.

• Islas Salomón.

• Tuvalu.

África. 2 • Burkina Faso.

• Suazilandia.

Europa. 1 • Ciudad del Vaticano.

Total: 20

Elaboración propia con sustento en: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of China

(Taiwan) (s.f.) Recuperado de

http://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/AlliesIndex.aspx?n=DF6F8F246049F8D6&sms=A76B

7230ADF29736

Tipo de asociaciones de China con distintos Estados de América Latina.

Estatus.

De menor a mayor importancia.

Socios.

De América Latina y el Caribe.

Asociación Estratégica Chile

Asociación Estratégica Integral Argentina, Brasil, Ecuador, México, Perú y






Venezuela

Asociación de Cooperación

Estratégica Integral

Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y

Caribeños (CELAC)

Elaboración propia con sustento en: Ramón-Berjano, C; Malena, J.E.; y Velloso, M.

A. (2015) El relacionamiento de China con América Latina y Argentina. Significado

de la Alianza Estratégica Integral y los recientes acuerdos bilaterales, Documentos de

Trabajo (96), CARI Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales, Buenos

Aires, Argentina, 121 pp. Recuperado de: http://www.cari.org.ar/pdf/dt96.pdf;

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana del Ecuador (2016), Ecuador

y China establecen Asociación Estratégica Integral. Quito, Ecuador, Recuperado de:

http://www.cancilleria.gob.ec/ecuador-y-china-establecen-asociacion-estrategica-

integral/

Tratados de Libre Comercio suscritos por China con América Latina y el Caribe.

Estado latinoamericano. Año de suscripción.

Chile 2005

Perú 2009

Costa Rica 2011

Elaboración propia con sustento en: Ramón-Berjano, C; Malena, J.E.; y Velloso, M. A.

(2015) El relacionamiento de China con América Latina y Argentina. Significado de la

Alianza Estratégica Integral y los recientes acuerdos bilaterales, Documentos de Trabajo

(96), CARI Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales, Buenos Aires,

Argentina, 121 pp. Recuperado de: http://www.cari.org.ar/pdf/dt96.pdf

http://www.cari.org.ar/pdf/dt96.pdf



http://www.cari.org.ar/pdf/dt96.pdf




拉美專題

Labor Markets in Mexico: concepts and methodologies

Gabriel Ramírez

Abstract

In Mexico, unemployment rates have been relatively low compared to other

countries. However, this does not mean that jobs allow workers to satisfy their needs.

The term underemployment has been used since the 60’s to describe underutilization

of the productive capacity of workers. It has been argued that informal economy, being

unproductive, is the main cause of the bad quality of jobs. However, development of

technology has shown that small scale enterprises, characterized as informal sector,

can be in fact productive.

In the last decades labor markets studies have focused on the quality of jobs from the

workers’ perspective, meaning that the employment must provide a good quality of life

to the population. The concept of precariousness has been widely used because it

relates to both, formal and informal jobs. In Mexico, an important proportion of jobs

are precarious, according to indicators constructed by using kind of contract data.

Labor markets studies, from a gender perspective, have shown that domestic work has

to be included when analyzing workload, as women devote much of their time to

domestic and caregiving duties. Besides, it is shown that commuting time can be seen

as a factor of precariousness.

Key words: Labor markets, work, precariousness, use of time.

Gabriel Ramírez (Ph.D. candidate in Urban Studies, El Colegio de México, [email protected]).




Introduction

The concept of work has changed, and labor markets have been studied from

different perspectives during the last decades in Mexico. This article aims to depict

broadly how the quality of jobs has been measured in the country. Following

International Labor Organization’s recommendations, official Mexican institutions

have developed data and indicators. However, some researchers have questioned if

these are appropriate for understanding Mexican labor markets.

Changes in the way labor markets are conceptualized, as well as how its quality is

measured, are due to two main causes. Firstly, labor markets themselves have changed

as a consequence of the evolution and transformation of the Mexican and global

economy, namely, migration from rural to urban areas and the opening of Mexican labor

markets to global markets have shaped different kinds of jobs. Secondly, some

researchers have proposed new ways of assessing work, as some perspectives are shown

to be inadequate.

This article is divided into four parts. First, the concepts of unemployment and

underemployment are presented, and it is argued that they are not adequate to assess

workers’ wellbeing. Second, it is shown how precariousness and non-standard

employment are terms that have been increasingly used to measure the quality of work.

Third, some data about Mexican labor markets as well as methodological limitations

are presented. Fourth, it is shown how use of time surveys have allowed to broaden the

concept of work, including in it caregiving work and domestic work. At the end of the

article data regarding commuting time in Mexico City are presented and it is argued

that long journeys can be seen as a factor of precariousness.

Low unemployment does not mean welfare

Compared to many countries, unemployment rates1 in Mexico have been low over

the past decades. However, it has been observed that the quality of life of workers and

their families are not satisfactory. In Graph 1, historical unemployment rates (1987-

2015) for some countries which are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-

operation and Development (OECD) are shown, including Mexico, Chile, Germany,

1 Unemployment rate is defined as the percentage of the labor force that is trying to find a job. The

meaning of labor force is the people of working age working or looking for a job.




Japan, United States and the average for all OECD countries2.

Unemployment rates in Mexico oscillated between 2.5% (in 1999) and 6.3% (in

1995), the latter corresponding to an economic crisis in the country. However, with the

exception of Japan, the unemployment rates in the rest of the selected countries,

including the average of all OECD-countries, have been considerably higher than in

Mexico between 1987 and 2015. According to Rojas and Salas (2011), although there

have been phases in Mexico characterized by economic growth, wellbeing has not

increased at the same pace. This is because of the particularities of labor markets in

México.

Rojas and Salas (2011) point out three main characteristics of labor markets in

Mexico. First, historical rates of salaried work have been stable. Considering only non-

agricultural work, the authors show that approximately 2/3 of the jobs in the country

correspond to people working for a salary, while only 1/5 of the work are self-

employment. The latter are characterized by not having workplaces and correspond

mainly to low-scale commerce and craftsmanship, although some are technicians and

professionals. Second, unemployment rates have been low. However, according to

Rojas and Salas (2011), it has been argued that unemployment in Mexico is measured

using different criteria than in the rest of the OCDE countries, being this the reason for

having low unemployment rates3. Besides, it has been pointed out that migration to the

United States affects the rates of unemployment, as people stop looking for jobs in

Mexico. Third, small scale activities are extensive in the Mexican economy. Between

1994 and 2004 micro enterprises, defined as having 5 workers or fewer, rose from 42%

to 46% of the total. Many of these enterprises have almost no capital and are not very

profitable, so their workers usually have low wages.

Having low unemployment rates and an important percentage of salaried work in

Mexico does not imply that the majority of people have satisfactory quality of life.

Since 2010 poverty and extreme poverty are officially measured by Coneval, a national

office (Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social)4. According

to data provided by Coneval, almost half of the population live in poverty and around

10% in extreme poverty (Graph 2).

2 The indicator used in the graph was developed by the OECD and designed with the purpose of making

comparisons among countries possible. 3 Nonetheless, as was shown on Graph 1, even when the countries are compared using the Harmonised

Unemployment Rate, developed by the OECD, unemployment in Mexico appears to be lower. 4 National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policies.




Since the 60’s some researchers in Latin America have questioned whether

“unemployment” is the right word or concept to use in analyzing labor markets in the

region. They have proposed other terms like “unproductive occupation” and “redundant

work,” both referring to underemployment (García, 2011). For the International Labour

Organization (ILO, 1998), “Underemployment reflects underutilization of the

productive capacity of the employed population, including those which arise from a

deficient national or local economic system. It relates to an alternative employment

situation in which persons are willing and available to engage”. According to ILO

guidelines regarding the measurement of underemployment (ILO, 1998), there are two

types of underemployment, time related underemployment and inadequate employment

situations. The former refers to insufficient hours of work (part-time jobs when the

worker would work more hours if he had the opportunity) and the latter to conditions

in the job that limit the worker’s capacities, skills and wellbeing (mainly jobs that are

placed in low-productivity enterprises).

Rendon (1978) criticizes the concept of underemployment because it could be

misleading when trying to explain the reasons why an employment is inadequate. For

instance, a person would work more hours if he had the opportunity to do so even if he

is working full-time, because his income is not enough to provide a good quality of life.

Thus, a situation defined as underemployment, like this one, could be in fact

exploitation. According to García (2011), from the enterprise perspective the quality of

an employment refers to the necessity of being competitive. However, good-quality jobs,

from the workers perspective, need to have fringe benefits, social security, contracts,

established workday (in terms of the number of hours worked), controlled risk factors

and autonomy in some decision making (García, 2011).

Other concepts were developed in the 60’s and the 70’s to analyze labor markets,

such as marginal sectors, non-typically capitalist sectors and informal sectors (García,

2011). As agricultural labor is usually studied independently from non-agricultural

work, the term urban informal sector has been widely used, and it refers to the

heterogeneity in production in labor markets (García, 2011). In the 15th International

Conference of Labour Statisticians of the International Labour Organization (ILO, 1993),

resolutions concerning statistics of employment in the informal sector were adopted.

An informal sector enterprise was characterized by being unicorperated, meaning that

“It is not constituted as a legal entity separate from its owners.” Besides, the informal

sector enterprise is owned and controlled by members of a household and does not have

a complete set of accounts. Other characteristics of enterprises in the informal sector

are that the number of employees is below a threshold (determined by the country), they




are not registred and their employees are not registered either (ILO, 1993). In Mexico,

the enterprise of informal sector is defined by having 5 or fewer workers led by non-

professional and non-technician workers (García, 2011).

According to García (2011), in the perspective of ILO some aspects of the informal

sector are evident: a) informal enterprises do not hire workers (or they do so

sporadically and under precarious conditions); b) the goal of the enterprise is not to

maximize earnings but to generate income; c) capital is limited and technology is rather

simple; d) labor division is not complex; e) the limits of the duration of the workday

and the pace of production are set by the worker and his/her family. Along the same

line, for Cota and Navarro (2015), the urban informal sector, from the firms’ perspective,

is characterized by: a) not needing highly qualified employees, capital and organization;

b) a familial organization; c) small scale; d) labor-intensive; e) non-regulated and non-

competitive markets.

It has been argued for decades that low productivity in enterprises is one of the

most important causes of having low-income jobs, and many researchers have assumed

that more qualified workers are needed in order to increase enterprises’ productivity,

producing higher salaries. In México, in 2000 52.44% of the population 15 years old or

older had not completed basic education, 8.21% of the kids from 6 to 14 years old were

not attending school and 9.46% of the population 15 years old or older were illiterate.

By 2015, this numbers declined to 35.29%, 3.51% and 5.49%, respectively (Table 1).

However, it is not clear, especially in the current century, that the level of education and

productivity are the key factors for explaining low wages. According to García (2011),

there are alternative perspectives that assert that small-scale non-productive enterprises

are not the cause of unsatisfactory employment, but changes in international production

system are. Pérez Sáinz (1998) points out that informality can be viewed as small-scale

rudimentary enterprises, but also as non-regulated by social institutions employments.

For this author, development of technology makes it irrelevant the assumption that

small enterprises can not be productive, as they have access to microelectronics, among

other progress. On the other hand, there have been an ongoing process of deregulation

of labor markets, that is called flexibility, in which social institutions intervene less in

the relationship between capital and labor force.

Although the term “flexibility” has several meanings, in regards to labor markets

it is used to describe the flexible mechanisms for setting salaries, hiring and firing

workers, and everything else that affects labor costs. According to Cota and Navarro

(2015), firms take advantage of deregulation of labor markets in order to cut costs,




reducing workers’ fringe benefits and social protection. For García (2011), workers are

becoming hidden employees, as they could be not registered in official institutions.

As the term informality became less pertinent when describing employment, other

concepts emerged. From the workers’ perspective, the quality of a job depends on the

wellbeing it allows. The ILO, for instance, has been using the concept of “decent work”

during the last decades.

Decent work sums up the aspirations of people in their working lives. It involves

opportunities for work that is productive and delivers a fair income, security in the

workplace and social protection for families, better prospects for personal development

and social integration, freedom for people to express their concerns, organize and

participate in the decisions that affect their lives and equality of opportunity and

treatment for all women and men (ILO, 2017).

While the concept of decent work is part of the ILO’s agenda for “achieving a fair

globalization and poverty reduction”, researchers have widely used term

precariousness to refer to jobs that do not provide social security, adequate income and

good quality of life.

Precariousness and Non-standard employment

Since established enterprises in formal economy do not guarantee good labor

conditions anymore, it was necessary to define new concepts that made it possible to

assess work. “Precariousness” is extensively used because it encompasses what

traditionally has been understood as informal sector and formal economy, including

midsize and large enterprises. In general, precariousness implies instability, lack of

social security, as well as emphasizes low income levels (García, 2011).

According to Rojas and Salas (2011), as a consequence of economic changes in

the 70’s in developed countries, labor relationships between labor force and capital

started to change, and the concepts of non-standard employment and precariousness

emerged. The latter has its origins in Europe, in the 80’s, when transformations in the

productive process brought about deterioration in labor rights. Precarious work was

defined as the opposite of standard work, which is permanent, well-paid, has a contract,

is full-time, entails a clear relationship between the employee and employer, and is




protected is by law (Rojas and Salas, 2011).

The term precariousness was initially associated to non-standard employment, as

standard employment implied stability and dignified work. However, in further

discussions it was established that precariousness and non-standard employment are not

synonyms. The latter refers to work in which the relationship between the employer and

the employee is not permanent or the worker does not have an unique employer nor a

workplace where he/she interacts with other workers. Examples of non-standard

employment are part-time jobs, outsourcing and self-employment (García, 2011).

Although non-standard employment contrasts with the industrial work, the former is

not necessarily precarious. Rojas and Salas (2011) point out that high-qualified self-

employment could be non-standard work, yet not-precarious. However, the main

interest of labor markets researches in Mexico, as in Latin America, has been

precariousness or precarious work. Importantly, De Oliveira (2011) remarks that

precarious employment has to be differentiated from precarious work. The former

relates to the relationship between capital and workforce (employer and employee),

while the latter refers to all work, salaried and self-employed jobs.

Labor markets in Mexico

One main characteristic of Mexican labor markets regarding quality of jobs is

heterogeneity, meaning that there are important differences among regions of the

country, rural and urban areas, economic sectors, size of the firms, workers’ age, gender,

education and occupation, as well as the kind of contract, when it exists (De Oliveira,

2011). According to Cota and Navarro (2015), there have been two main changes in

labor markets in Mexico. The first one, after World War II, was originated as a

consequence of migration from rural to urban areas. The Mexican state developed

policies focused on industrializing the economy of the country in order to increase the

demand of workforce in the cities. The second important change came about in the 80’s

as a consequence of the opening of the Mexican labor markets to global markets, which

led to flexibility.

For González (2010), in order to assess labor markets in Mexico, four variables

have to be taken into account: unemployment, formal employment, informal

employment and migration. The author remarks that flexibility of labor markets must

be incorporated to researches as it is the cause of the reduction of benefits and salaries




in Mexico. Some of the benefits are healthcare, maternity, controlled risk factors, day

care center, vacations and pension.

Rojas and Salas (2011) studied precariousness in México using only one indicator.

For them, the variable “kind of contract” can be used to determine whether a job is

precarious or not. Jobs with indeterminate contracts, which guarantee continuity, are

not precarious, while jobs with temporary contract and without contract are. Rojas and

Salas (2011) showed that in 1995, 45.6% of the jobs had permanent or indeterminate

contract. This number increased to 48.4% in 2004. On the other hand, 46.0% and 43.7%

of the jobs had no contract (or they were verbal contract) in 1995 and 2004,

correspondingly. Jobs with temporary contracts were fewer than 10% of the total in

both years (Table 2). In the same study, the authors found that there are some activity

branches in which permanent contracts prevail: public administration, defense,

extractive industry, electricity, oil and gas industry.

According to de Oliveira (2011), although the kind of contract and fringe benefits

have been widely used as indicators when studying precariousness, they are applicable

only to analyze jobs, but not self-employment. The author uses occupation critical

conditions rates, developed by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Inegi),

as they can be applied to salaried work and self-employment. These critical conditions

are: a) fewer than 35 hours of paid work a week; b) more than 48 hours a week with an

income of 1 to 2 minimum wages; c) 35 or more hours a week with an income of less

than one minimum wage. Additionally, the author includes a fourth category: people

who work without being paid (de Oliveira, 2011).

According to Rojas and Salas (2011), there are 3 factors which have prevented

precarious work to be studied more deeply: 1) Lack of consensus about what precarious

work is; 2) limited data; 3) The prevalence of the concept of informal sector for

determining the quality of work. The authors point out that although surveys about work

in Mexico are available since the 80’s, stability of work, measured as the kind of

contract, can only be observed since 1994.

Caregiving work, domestic labor and Commuting time

From a gender perspective, it was noted that not only income-oriented activities

should be considered as work. Domestic and caregiving work, carried out mainly by




women, would be included in work studies in order to compare appropriately workload

between genders. On the one hand, not-remunerated work had to be visible and

recognized as such. On the other hand, women are increasingly participating in labor

markets. For Pedrero (2013), “while women’s participation in income-generating

activities has increased, the distribution of household chores has not changed much.

Domestic work remains as a female responsibility. Therefore, the incorporation of

women into the labor market frequently means a double working day” (p. 57)

Use of time data has allowed researchers to compare paid and unpaid work. It has

been found that there are gender inequalities as women’s global workload “defined as

the sum of time spent working for the market and the time devoted to domestic tasks”

(Pedrero, 2013) is higher than men’s.

Pioneer [use of time] studies developed a very strong line of thought revolving around

labor market inequalities, focusing both on the constraints for their access as well as

the discriminatory working conditions affecting women.

[…]

In recent decades a methodological and theoretical breakthrough has taken place: the

recognition that time distribution by sex is the origin of many problems and generates

many aspects of gender inequality (p. 56)

Pedrero (2013) studied workers’ use of time in Ecuador, Mexico and Peru and

found that there are gender inequalities in the three Latin American countries. Adult

women spend much of their time doing unpaid work, and as a consequence their

workload is much higher than men’s.

An advantage of using use of time data is that comparisons among different

activities can be made, either they are work or not. Pedrero (2013) found that there is

not much difference in time devoted to personal needs (eating, personal hygiene and

rest) between genders. However, workload inequalities cause that men are able to spend

more time in leisure activities.

As the use of time perspective is being increasingly used to assess work, other

aspects of daily life have been taken into account. Damián (2014) states that commuting,

even if it is not work, must be considered as part of the workday, as the time spent

moving from dwellings to workplaces can not be used in other activities. It is important




to note that in most cases moving to another house is not an option.

Data from the Use of Time Survey for the Federal District (ENCUT-DF, 2011) allows

to compare and sum the time spent in work (domestic, care and paid) and commuting

in Mexico City. Because of its size and urban organization, this metropolis is

characterized by long commuting distances, so the time spent in this activity can be a

factor of precariousness of the employment.

In Table 3 working time is presented dividing the employed population by sex and

by the condition of participating or not in caregiving work. The average daily working

time for women who do participate in this kind of work is 14.4 hours, while for men

this number is 12.1 hours. The difference of more than two hours between genders is

the consequence of the inequality in the distribution of household chores. In fact, men

spend more time on paid work. On the other hand, the gap between genders closes when

comparing workers who do not look after other members of the household. Women and

men spend on average 9.7 and 9.3 hours, correspondingly, summing up housework and

paid work on working days.

It is important to note that both, men and women’s workload exceeds the limit of

8 hours a day, which is considered the norm for maximum working time. This limit,

widely used by international organisms and specified in Mexican law for paid work,

was set considering that people need to do many activities during the day. This is why

spending much time commuting from home to work affects the quality of life. As said

before, most workers do not have any opportunity to move to another house nor change

job.

On average, workers in Mexico City spend 1:46 hours a day commuting. However,

there is a gap between genders. Adding up the journeys from home to work and vice

versa, the numbers for men and women are 1:54 hours and 1:35 hours, correspondingly.

Moreover, 30.9% of men and 27.5% of women spend more than 2 hours and half

commuting every day (Table 4). In Graph 3 the sum of working time (paid, domestic

and care) as well as commuting time for men and women is shown. Even when women

spend less time commuting, the sum of all four activities is higher for them (almost

thirteen hours and half versus twelve hours).

As people spend a considerable amount of time commuting in some cities, newer

perspectives are needed to provide additional information on the workers’ daily life. In

recent studies (Damián, 2014), people’s wellbeing has been observed from the use of




time perspective, including workers’ commuting time. However it was only until recent

years that adequate data is being developed by official institutions in Mexico.

Additionally, it is important to mention that the concept of work has been discussed

in the 19th International Conference of Labour Statisticians of the ILO in 2013. It was

established that new data regarding work has to be developed in order to make it visible

all kind of work, namely own-use production work, paid work, unpaid interning work,

volunteer work and other activities that might be considered work, according to each

country.

Discussion

Labor markets have been traditionally studied from a perspective centered on the

productivity of the enterprises. It has been stated that formal economy allows workers

to be productive and as a consequence to have good quality jobs. However, in the last

decades it has been shown that regardless the kind of sector an enterprise belongs to,

formal or informal, an important percentage of jobs in Mexico is precarious.

From a gender perspective, use of time researches have shown that women devote

much time to domestic chores, being this a cause of gender inequalities. It has been

remarked that unpaid work has to be visible and measured in order to assess workload

appropriately. In this article, data regarding commuting time in Mexico City was

presented, as it is assumed that jobs entail journeys from the houses to the workplaces

that can not be avoided. Thus, it can be said that in some cities long journeys can be

seen as a factor of precariousness.

More researches on labor markets in terms of income and fringe benefits have to

be carried out, as in both formal and informal sectors jobs do not provide a good quality

of life. However, use of time studies are also important because they show not only how

paid work can define wellbeing, but also unpaid work and commuting can.




Footnotes

Bibliography

Damián, Araceli (2014) El tiempo, la dimensión olvidada en los estudios de pobreza y

bienestar, México: El Colegio de México.

García, Brígida (2011), “Las carencias laborales en México: Conceptos e indicadores”,

en Pacheco, Edith, Enrique de la Garza y Luis Reygadas, Trabajos atípicos y

precarización del empleo, México: El Colegio de México.

González, Gerardo (2010), “El mercado de trabajo y los salarios en México” in Alfonso

Bouzas (coord.), Perspectivas del trabajo en México, México: Instituto de

Investigaciones Económicas, UNAM.

International Labour Organization (1999), Resolution concerning the measurement of

underemployment and inadequate employment situations, adopted by the Sixteenth

International Conference of Labour Statisticians.

(www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---

stat/documents/normativeinstrument/wcms_087487.pdf)

International Labour Organization (2017), http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-

work/lang--en/index.htm

de Oliveira, Orlandina (2011), “El trabajo juvenil en México a principios del siglo XXI”,

en Pacheco, Edith, Enrique de la Garza y Luis Reygadas, Trabajos atípicos y

precarización del empleo, México: El Colegio de México.

Pedrero, Mercedes (2013), “Time Use and Gender Inequalities. Some Evidence from

three Latin American Countries”, Acta Colombiana de Psicología, 16 (2), 55-62.

Rojas, Georgina and Carlos Salas (2011), “Precariedad laboral y la estructura del

empleo en México, 1995-2004”, en Pacheco, Edith, Enrique de la Garza y Luis

Reygadas, Trabajos atípicos y precarización del empleo, México: El Colegio de

México.




Graphs and tables

Table 1: Total population, education and healthcare in Mexico, 2000, 2005, 2010 y

2015

Year 2000 2005 2010 2015

Population 97,483,412 103,263,388 112,336,538 119,530,753

Population (15 years old or

older) illiterate

9.46% 8.35% 6.88% 5.49%

Population (6 to 14 years old) not

attending school

8.21% 5.29% 4.77% 3.51%

Population (15 years old or

older) with basic education

incomplete

52.44% 45.98% 41.11% 35.29%

Population without healthcare 56.99% 49.78% 33.85% 17.28%

Calculations by National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policies

(CONEVAL) using micro data from XII Population and Housing Census 2000, II

Population and Housing count 2005 and Population and Housing Census 2010.

Table 2: kind of contract of employment in México, 1995 and 2004

(Percentages)

Kind of contract 1995 2004

Permanent 45.6% 48.4%

Temporary 8.0% 7.7%

Verbal 46.0% 43.7%

Not specified 0.4% 0.3%

Table taken from Rojas and Salas (2011). The authors used the Encuesta Nacional de

Empleo (National Survey for Employment). This chart refers to salaried workers,

excluding self-employment.




Table 3: Average daily working time (domestic, care and paid work

and global workload) by the employed population, by sex and

participation in caregiving work: Mexico City, 2011 (Hours)

Domestic

work

Caregiving

work Paid work

global

workload

Participate in caregiving work

Men 1.2 2.2 8.6 12.1

Women 2.8 4.2 7.4 14.4

Do not participate in caregiving work

Men 0.9 0.0 8.5 9.3

Women 2.4 0.0 7.3 9.7

Note: Calculations base on the micro-data of the Use of Time

Survey for the Federal District (ENCUT-DF), 2011

Table 4: Commuting time by sex, Mexico City: 2011

(percentages)

Commuting time Men Women Total

0 a 59 minutes 28.5 36.6 31.9

60 to 149 minutes 40.7 36.0 38.7

150 minutes or more 30.9 27.5 29.4

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

average (minutes) 114.6 94.9 106.3

Note: Calculations based on the micro-data of the Use of Time

Survey for the Federal District (ENCUT-DF), 2011




Graph1: Harmonised unemployment rate (HUR) (1987-2015)

Source: OCDE https://data.oecd.org/unemp/harmonised-unemployment-rate-hur.htm5

Graph 2: Poverty and extreme poverty in Mexico, 2010,2012, 2014 and 2016

5 “Harmonised unemployment rates define the unemployed as people of working age who are without

work, are available for work, and have taken specific steps to find work. The uniform application of this

definition results in estimates of unemployment rates that are more internationally comparable than

estimates based on national definitions of unemployment. This indicator is measured in numbers of

unemployed people as a percentage of the labour force and it is seasonally adjusted. The labour force is

defined as the total number of unemployed people plus those in civilian employment”.

0.0

1.0

2.0

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Chile Germany Japan

Mexico OECD - Total United States




Calculations by National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policies

(CONEVAL) using the National Household Income and Expense Survey, 2010, 2012,

2014 and 2016.

Graph 3: Average daily working time (paid, domestic and caregiving work) and

commuting time, by sex, Mexico City, 2011 (hours)

Calculations base on the micro-data of the Use of Time Survey for the Federal District

(ENCUT-DF), 2011

0

10

20

30

40

50

2010 2012 2014 2016

Extreme poverty Poverty

0

1

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Commuting

Care work

Domestic work

Paid work




拉美新聞分析

NAFTA 重新談判何去何從

向駿

從地緣經濟角度看拉丁美洲受川普就職影響最大的當屬「北美自由貿易協定」

(NAFTA)重新談判，墨西哥受影響最大的官員應屬今年 1 月就任墨西哥外交部長

的比德加賴(Luis Videgaray)。一則由於墨西哥不希望談判破局成為川普退出

NAFTA 的藉口，再則希望美國不要取消對所謂「夢想者」—即在孩童時抵美的

墨西哥移民—的保護。

儘管墨西哥長期以來採取不干涉他國事務的外交原則，但比德加賴不僅驅逐

了北韓駐該國大使，更在拉美國家中帶頭向委內瑞拉總統馬杜羅(Nicolás Maduro)

施壓。但根據 11 月 17-21 日已進行的前五輪重新談判，墨西哥似乎未能獲得相

對的利益。

7 月 17 日美國貿易代表辦公室公佈了《北美自貿協定重新談判目標摘要》

(Summary of Objectives for the NAFTA Renegotiation)。報告指出，自該協定 1994

年生效以來，美、加、墨三國貿易額提高了 3 倍，到 2015 年超過 1 萬億美元。

但美國對墨西哥貨物貿易從小額順差轉變為去年的 640 億美元逆差，美國對加拿

大貨物的貿易逆差也明顯擴大，去年已接近 110 億美元。美國貿易代表萊特希澤

(Robert Lighthizer)認為，「太多的美國人因工廠關閉、工作外包以及政治諾言破

滅而受到傷害」，川普總統將繼續兌現他的承諾，為全體美國人爭取到一份更好

的北美自貿協定。

NAFTA 重新談判三方代表分別為美國貿易代表萊特希澤、加拿大外交部長

弗雷蘭(Chrystia Freeland) 和墨西哥經濟部長瓜哈爾多(Ildefonso Guajardo)。首輪

重新談判於 8 月 16~20 日在美國華府舉行。談判重點有三，其一是美國希望刪除

NAFTA 第 19 章有關爭端解決的內容，但墨西哥和加拿大表示反對。第 19 章規

定，非法補貼與傾銷裁決的任何變動必須經過兩個國家的審查。其二是美國和加

拿大敦促墨西哥提高薪資，並抱怨墨西哥現有的低薪導致美、加企業紛紛跑去墨

向駿，紐約大學拉丁美洲研究碩士、美國克萊蒙大學政治經濟學碩士、政治學博士，中華戰略

學會理事，研究專長是政治經濟學、國際關係、拉美研究. [email protected]




西哥建廠。但瓜哈爾多表示墨西哥的最低薪資不是談判討論的話題。其三是美國

還希望修改原產地規則，以增加對車輛和汽車零部件的本地成分要求，墨西哥經

濟部長稱實施國別計畫(country- by- country scheme)是「不可能」的。首輪談判結

果是一事無成。

第二輪談判於 9 月 1~5 日在墨西哥市舉行。川普在談判前指墨西哥「故意刁

難」，而美國「最終很可能廢掉」此一對美國產業與就業是災難的協定。根據美

國全國商會(US Chamber of Commerce)統計，美國約 1400 萬個就業機會仰賴與

加墨兩國的貿易，NAFTA 最核心的部分—汽車製造根本沒有納入談判的話題。

第二輪談判黯然結束。

第三輪談判於 9 月 23-27 日在加拿大渥太華舉行，各方雖在小企業和金融服

務規定問題上取得了一定進展，但爭論重點在奶製品。美國表示將與墨西哥共同

消除加拿大供應管理系統(supply management system)，該系統使部分產品進口至

加拿大需增收 270％的關稅。加拿大則指責美國以不公平的補貼政策過度保護自

家乳品業，爭執點在超濾乳製品(ultra-filtered milk，即牛奶以特殊過濾方式取得

牛奶蛋白濃縮物方式），該類產品以新技術製作並不屬於北美自貿協定關稅課稅

項目，因此美國得以低成本大量輸出引起加拿大不滿。第三輪談判淪為各說各話。

第四輪談判於 10 月 12-17 日在美國舉行，談判前川普在白宮接見杜魯多並

交換意見。由於川普堅信 NAFTA 只對墨西哥有利並威脅退出，但可以考慮美加

另設一份貿易協定取代三國的多邊協定。川普表示「我想杜魯多明白這點，若

我們未能達成協議，談判會結束，(協定)要對兩國公平。」

此輪談判美國所提增加 5 年自動失效的「落日條款」、修改汽車原産地規則、

廢除爭端解決機制等均引發巨大爭議。17 日談判結束後加拿大外交部長表示，

美國提出了一係列「非常規要求」可能逆轉北美自貿區 23 年來的開放和合作，

甚至可能有違世貿組織規定。目前汽車原産地規則要求在北美銷售的汽車至少有

62.5%的零部件來自北美地區才可免除進口稅，而川普要求將免稅門檻提高到

85%，同時要有 50%來自美國，美國商會指特朗普政府試圖以「毒丸提案」(Poison

Pill Proposals)破壞談判。墨西哥則作最壞打算，外長比德加賴表示不會接受「受

限制及操控」的貿易，必要時會離開談判桌。第四輪談判結果是不歡而散，各方

同意將談判截止期限延長到明年 3 月。

11 月 17-21 日第五輪談判重點在縮小第四輪談判出現的「巨大觀念差異」，

如「毒丸方案」包括的製造業加強美國製造條款、廢除加拿大的奶類製品供應管

理系統、限制獲得美國政府採購合約、取消第 19 章爭議解決程序等。針對美國

商務部所提對加拿大進口木材加徵約 20%或更高的關稅，加拿大將加大法律抗爭




力度。

影響北美供應鏈

由於跨境供應鏈如何改變企業損益分配遠比傳統貿易更複雜，退出該協定可

能帶給美國的實質損害可能比特朗普的估算要嚴重。美國達特茅斯學院

(Dartmouth College)布蘭夏德(Emily Blanchard)教授在《不能光說 NO：如何力抗

災難資本主義，贏取我們想要的世界》(No Is Not Enough: Resisting Trump’s Shock

Politics and Winning the World We Need)書中總結了「貿易衝擊」辯論：「儘管《北

美自由貿易協定》(NAFTA)可能不怎麼有助於提振或損害北美大陸的整體經濟增

長和富裕，但它對於重新界定產品如何生產以及在哪裡生產產生了強大影響」。

川普總統在感恩節演說中曾向駐外美軍說：「我們在家鄉做得不錯，經濟狀況很

好，你們是為了這些實質勝利而戰，你們是為了美國的利益而戰。」北美自由貿

易協定重新談判成敗將影響川普說的是否正確!




拉美史話

我在薩爾瓦多軍校的一些回憶（一）

陳敬忠

我從民國六十年九月二日進陸軍官校預備班十六期當學生兵，到九十九年元

旦退伍，總共當了三十八年軍人。很幸運近六十年台海未發生戰事，國人享受了

歷史上少有的長期和平紅利，我戎裝一輩子也沒有真正上過戰場，軍旅生涯中雖

然跟大部分陸軍軍官一樣駐防過金門馬祖，也執行了多年的演訓及軍事教育任務，

但實在沒有甚麼與眾不同的豐功偉績值得書寫紀念，如果說有一點特別之處的話，

那就是我在官校一年級時被派到中美洲薩爾瓦多軍校當了四年的交換學生，那四

年的點點滴滴是我軍人生涯重要的養成教育，也是難忘的記憶，或許可以擷取其

中片段當故事聊聊，不過還是要從離開馬祖到鳳山讀陸軍官校說起。

一、赴台讀陸軍官校當學生兵

步入花甲之年後體會到，在歷史長河裡，某一個世代的人，究竟會顛沛流還

是可以安穩過日子，除了個人的天份和努力外，時代大環境的力量，對這世代多

數人的命運，確實有關鍵性的影響。就以生長在馬祖的我們為例，那一代人約以

四十五年為分界，之後出生的比兄姊要幸運得多，因為國民義務教育從六年延長

為九年，他們能夠在民國五十七年夏天國小畢業後，有機會免試進入國民中學第

一屆就讀。三年之後這群將近兩百人的青年，分別從各島搭補給艦到台灣就讀公

私立高中職，其中有九個進了鳳山陸軍官校預備班十六期，當起了學生兵，我就

是其中之一。

在陸官預備班三年，讀的是普通高中課本，生活上則是軍事管理，要早晚點

名，集合帶隊唱軍歌進教室進餐廳，要整理內務，也就是棉被蚊帳要摺得方方正

正，銅環皮鞋擦得光光亮亮，領有補給證，一年級每個月薪餉二百四十元。三年

的預備班過得相當平順，六十三年夏我們預十六期畢業，放完暑假後回到官校接

受正式的入伍訓練。其實對經過三年預備班的我們，除了以前沒有帶槍戴鋼盔出

操打野外，其它讓聯招進來的同學手忙腳亂的內務整理和基本教練等，對我們都

致理科技大學副教授，薩爾瓦多科技大學政治研究所碩士，中國文化大學大陸問題研究所碩士、

拉美研究. 電子信箱 [email protected]




已經不成問題。入伍訓練結束接著學年教育開始，陸海空三軍官校一年級生混合

編連在陸官校上大學共同必修課程，每天上課下課作息正常。在十二月的某一天，

學校選了二、三十個一、二年級的陸官學生送到高雄衛武營請美軍顧問口試英語，

我是其中之一。要做什麼？沒人知道，也不敢問。

留著金色小鬍子的美軍少校第一個問題是：「你知道薩爾瓦多在哪？」，我回

答「中美洲」。「薩爾瓦多主要產品有哪些？」，「棉花咖啡玉米香蕉」，我腦中閃

過的是地理課本而不是英語。主考官的第三個問題出乎我意料，「你家住哪？」，

「馬祖」。主考官面帶笑容說：「我不久前剛從馬祖調回來，我在你家鄉駐防過！」。

從三題答案之簡短可以知道當時我的英語表達並不高明，後來得知那次我是第二

名，我猜想，除了地理問題答對之外，家住馬祖讓我的成績加了點印象分數吧。

接下來幾個星期都沒人提起這檔事，直到寒假前不久連上長官通知，一位二

年級的葉永斌學長和一年級的我，兩個人被選送薩爾瓦多軍校當交換學生。薩爾

瓦多長什麼模樣？沒有人知道！聽說講西班牙語呢！哇！我一句也不會，也來不

及學了。校長秦祖熙中將召見鼓勵並贈三千元程儀以壯行色。學三連同學用軍歌、

擁抱和一盒裝了連集合場邊的泥土為我送行，讓我淚流滿面走出校門。學校派了

位少校長官陪我們到台北用五天時間就辦好了出國手續，我寫給父母的信還沒到

家，人已經從松山機場搭飛機出國了。

二、赴薩爾瓦多軍校當交換學生

飛機在夏威夷加油後直飛洛杉磯，抵達後在機場旅館過了夜，一早就搭泛美

航空班機往南飛，過境瓜地馬拉，到達薩爾瓦多時天色已漸昏暗。出了海關把外

交部給的駐薩大使館地址交計程車司機，直駛市區。到了大使館一看傻眼了，下

班鎖門了！這下怎麼辦？還是那個計程車司機反應快，他把我們帶到一家中國餐

廳，這下沒問題了吧？我們付了車資並向他比個大拇指，回頭就跟老闆表明身分

來意，老闆卻一副茫然狀，原來他聽不懂普通話。我拿筆寫下身分和來意，「哦！」

他看懂了，馬上撥電話給我們的使館長官。原來他是來薩爾瓦多好幾代的廣東僑

胞，西班牙語流利，會講廣東話，普通話就「唔識講」了。

過一會兒，大使館的林盤石秘書載著國安局駐薩代表修子政上校來到「中國

皇宮」餐廳，原來國防部和外交部都沒有發電報，所以他們不知道兩個學生抵達

的確定時間。吃了林太太特別準備的晚餐，才吃飽放下筷子，修上校就說：「趕

快去學校報到吧，明天就要開學了。」不過十多分鐘車程，林秘書和修上校就帶

著我們到了學校。看到他們兩位和當天值高勤的副校長用西班牙語嘰哩瓜拉地寒

暄溝通，心中好生羨慕。這時學校有二年級和四年級的學生剛好在收假集合，聽

他們立正靠腿聲非常清脆整齊，立正姿勢挺拔而且身體還向前傾，看過去像拉滿

的弓一樣充滿張力，這是我對學長們的第一印象。由於時差加上旅途勞頓，即使




學長們還在進行晚點名，我們很快就在被安排的學生大寢室床上沉沉睡去。

不知過了多久，我被嘈雜的吆喝聲吵醒，一看錶才清晨四點！惺忪睡眼望去

都是著白色運動裝動作敏捷的學長忙著要集合。有人示意我們繼續睡，不關我們

的事。他們很快就整隊跑走了，我們也又睡著了。當我再次被吵醒時，一看之下

大吃一驚，剛才的隊伍是白白淨淨地跑出去，現在是渾身濕透筋疲力盡髒兮兮地

回來，再一看錶，整整操了一個小時。我和葉學長面面相覷，我心裡想，完了！

我們可能上了賊船了！

後來我才知道，學校剛剛放了一個月的長假，昨天晚上四年級和二年級的學

長才收假，今天早上這玩意是收心操，每天四點到五點，不停地跑步、草皮運動、

超越障礙，要連續一個星期，軍官們要把學生在長假中可能喝的酒、抽的菸、睡

到飽的舒爽慵懶，這些不該有的「精神汙染」，透過最原始的體能運動，從肉體

和心理上徹底逼退消除。如果不是這些學長有練過有底子，一般人被這樣連續操

一個小時會出事的。

當天是 1975 年 2 月 1 日，早上八點，學校小小的中庭擠滿了家長和已經理

了鍋蓋頭穿著西裝來報到的新生。86 個新生很快就按名單編成兩個排，我是第

一排第一班第三名兵，葉學長被編在第二排。我們兩個穿著中華民國陸軍軍常服

的東方人與穿西服的洋人站在一起，引起在一旁觀看的家長議論紛紛。事實上我

們是黃埔軍校在鳳山復校後第一批被派到美洲大陸上進行交換訓練的學生。在很

快地聽懂了西班牙語立正和稍息的預令和動令後，我的動作馬上比左右尚未受過

軍訓的鄰兵更為標準，我可是在台灣受過陸軍官校入伍生團訓練的呢！

不過我很快就明白，我從小在學校裡學會的知識，在師長同學心目中的印象，

所有的人際網絡與支援體系，都留在台灣，遙遠的太平洋彼岸，一時之間在此地

派不上用場，我的人生被切斷了，過往的一切跟我今後在薩爾瓦多軍校的表現優

劣幾乎無關，我被「歸零」了，現在要重新設定從頭開始。當我意識到將要孤獨

無援地面對一個全然陌生、未知、艱苦而毫無把握的未來時，頓時感到無助和徬

徨。擺在眼前的當務之急是，趕快進入狀況適應環境學會西班牙語，才能在此地

存活下去。

三、從頭開始學西班牙語

第一個要面對的是語言問題。多年以來都有朋友問我，「你是多久學會講西

班牙話的？」，還有就是「你是怎麼學的？」

〈一〉、環境有利於語言學習

對第一個問題通常我會說，「我第一天就聽懂了西班牙語的立正稍息的口令，




但是到今天有時候都還會覺得不能夠完整表達意思。」因為語言學習是持續漫長

無止境的過程，不會有明顯的里程碑，不可能在某月某日之前一句話都不會，第

二天突然能夠變得流利順暢，這過程必然是點滴累積的，先得聽懂該字或句的意

思，再模仿發音和判斷使用的時機。比如說，當有人喊「Alto！」時，大家就肅

立不動且要面向發令者，我就猜想那應該是「動作暫停」的口令。晚自習時再根

據發音去查字典，果然，alto 除了是「高」，也有「停止不動」的意思，我就把這

個字的西文和中文都寫在筆記本裡。同樣的，「Tenderse！」口令一出，就看到全

體就地臥倒，毫無疑問，那必然是中文「臥倒」的西班牙語。起先用猜的多，主

要看那句話或口令下去後其他人的反應，去推想大概得中文意思，後來是在教室

拿著字典查課本上的單字，筆記本中的單字就慢慢累積，我聽得懂的話也一點一

點地增加了。

那又是怎樣開口說話表達意思呢？同樣也是漸進的。剛開始是用英文夾雜著

少數西語單字加上肢體語言，漸漸地講話中的英語部分慢慢減少，西語的單字片

語持續增加，幾個月後，發現自己差不多可以聽得懂，也能夠應對在軍校規律生

活的基本用語，從早上起床到就寢，一天要做些甚麼，會聽到哪些口令，做哪些

動作，基本上不是問題了。至於上課，一開始我真不知道老師或教官在說甚麼，

鴨子聽雷，完全聽不懂啦！

至於是怎樣能夠較快地學到西班牙語的聽說讀寫呢？我想主要是環境因素。

軍校是個時間緊張凡事要求快速的地方，不容許你聽不懂裝傻，一旦慢了跟不上

要求的時間，就立刻被處罰，才不管你是外國人。「所有人到內務櫃拿出鞋油鞋

刷坐在床前小板凳上擦長筒皮鞋，五秒鐘開始！三、二、一、停！還沒就位

的臥倒，伏地挺身三十個開始！」類似這樣的口令聽了幾次，做過幾十個伏地挺

身後，你一定會很快就聽懂每一個字的意思。每天從早上起床，耳中就充斥著學

長的吆喝聲和值日官的命令，一下是三十秒給我沖好澡，一下是我數到十給我刮

好鬍子，然後集合整隊早點名，大聲背誦「我的誓詞」，接著早自習，然後集合

進餐廳用早餐，學長們對一、二年級的動作永遠不滿意，永遠都在碎碎唸，直到

第一節上課了，耳根才清淨點，接著又是教授或教官開始上課。在這樣的環境哩，

任何人的語言學習能力都會很強。

上課用到的西班牙文跟日常生活聽到的或說的就不盡相同了，一開始很難聽

得懂。記得一年級時有大法官來上薩國憲法，學校不發講義也沒有課本教材，用

聽寫的，大法官順口唸出條文，同學們振筆疾書作筆記，我只有發呆，完全不知

所云。到了晚上借同學的筆記來抄，可是法條條文之艱深全世界都一樣，抄是抄

了還是看不懂。主要原因是西班牙文發音容易學，難在動詞變化，所有法律條文

或其他各科課本裡使用的動詞，都因為主詞、時態、語氣的不同而作了變化，不

再是原型動詞了，怪不得我翻字典也查不到。




在日常環境中先聽別人怎麼說，跟著學著講，這種方式，對模仿發音和揣摩

何時是正確使用的時機固然很好，但是如果缺乏對西班牙語複雜的動詞變化有系

統的學習，只靠背單字，且侷限於軍校生活所需的用語，很快就碰到進步的瓶頸。

對我們這種十幾歲才開始接觸外文的人，有老師、有系統、有課本的文法訓練，

還是能快速進步的必要途徑。學校也看出我們的困境和快速補強的需要，給了我

們兩個外國學生大大的方便，一是每個星期天都讓我們外出去找中國老師補習，

二是請學校的英文老師有空時，單獨給我們兩個上西文課。

第一個大大的方便，讓我的薩爾瓦多同學和學長們羨慕得要死。因為各年級

學生在每個月的四個禮拜天當中，能夠有兩次獲得外出的機會，那已經是很不簡

單了，何況即使沒有被禁假，等到他們經過值日官一遍又一遍的服儀檢查，折騰

到能夠跨出校門時，大概都已經中午了，那能夠像我們兩個八點鐘不到，就由修

上校把我們帶出去上西語課。校外西語老師是一位廣東老僑梁先生，已經七十多

歲了，退休前是小學老師。梁老師手邊也沒有中西對照的課本可用，他會準備一

些常用的單字片語讓我們抄寫，另外就是我們把看不懂的文章或課文請他解釋，

比如說每天一大早就要大聲朗誦的「我的誓詞」，以及既長又深奧的薩國國歌歌

詞，如果不知道它的意思，就很難背得下來更難唱出來。到梁老師家裡上課還有

個福利，就是梁師母總是費盡心思為我們準備豐盛的午餐，讓我們得以飽餐一頓。

第二個方便讓我們每個星期都有幾個小時家教式的西語課，也挺讓同學羨慕

的，因為可以避開學長找麻煩。羅老師用的課本是美軍學習西班牙語的英西對照

本，編得簡單易懂，因為和中文比較，英文和西文的相似度較高，文法的解說，

各種詞類，時態，用華語就不容易解說，用英文對照說明就容易觸類旁通。羅太

太只教了半年左右，就向學校報告，她的西班牙文基本文法已經教完，我可以不

必再單獨跟她上課了。這下我就不能在小教室避風頭，而完全和其他同學一樣，

一下課就被學長的口令耍得團團轉了。我說「單獨」，是因為五月間葉學長已經

因為在超越障礙時從塔上摔下來傷及腰椎，無法再待下去而回國，這時學校裡只

剩下我孤苦伶仃一個中國人了。

講西班牙話要聽起來流利道地，有個 rr 的音，通常對以中文為母語的人在學

習初期會是個困難，其實能不能抖得起來沒那麼要緊，我的薩國同學裡也有兩個

抖得並不明顯順暢，雖然因而會被人謔稱「啞巴」，但在語言溝通上完全不礙事。

我在那樣的環境裡每天都在說西班牙語，也沒有因此加速學會發出這個音，而是

到了三年級才能夠順暢地「抖起來」。西班牙語的發音比英語的要簡單多了，五

個母音的發音固定不變，重音的規則非常明確，基本發音三兩個小時就能掌握，

困難的是動詞變化。




西班牙文的原形動詞尾端一定是 ar 或 er 或 ir，動詞的字尾會因為主詞是第

一、第二、第三人稱及其單複數，以及要敘述事情的時間的過去、現在、未來，

還有語氣的肯定、假設、疑問等等而變化，大部分的動詞變化方式是規則的，但

例外、不規則的也為數不少。動詞變化確實是學西班牙語的難關，但是掌握了變

化的規則後其實也沒那麼難，關鍵在多練習，也就是多看多聽多講。我一個東方

人在學校裡，不論是教室上課操場出操寢室餐廳生活早晚點名，眼裡看的耳裡聽

的，全都是經過正確變化的西班牙語動詞，所謂耳濡目染，自然那是最好的語言

學習環境，加上當時年輕和積極的學習心態，我的西語聽說讀寫能力快速進步是

正常的應該的，假使換成是其他同學來到此地，相信他也一樣學得又快又好。

我在一年級的前半年因為語言能力實在太差，學校沒有要我參加大小考試，

到了下半年，才要我試著參加考試，不及格的也算我及格，如果英文和數學考得

較好，就以我考到的成績算分數，總之，課業上是保送過關。但是我記得期末考

時我的軍事地理考得不錯，題目只有一題，B3 大的白紙上只畫了薩爾瓦多地圖

的外部輪廓，要求我們把所知道能記得的十四個省的界線、大小城市、道路、河

流、山峰、湖泊等都畫下來，雖然是「外國人」，我考了八十幾分。另外就是戰

術課，都是些問答題，比如單兵變換射擊位置要考慮那些事項？伍長受命後動作

為何？班搜索命令如何下達等等，這些內容已經反覆實地練習了幾十遍了，而且

都是熟悉的軍語，考八十分也是應該的。

〈二〉、過河卒子向前衝

薩國軍校一年級學生被叫做 reclutas，意為新生、新兵、入伍生，頗有輕蔑意

味。這也難怪，因為任何一個再優秀的 recluta，都沒有人敢保證他可以平安升到

二年級，因為只要他在操場上拐到腳就有可能導致退訓；而任何一位二年級學長，

那怕他在同學中表現平平，也比一年級新生多熬過三百多個日子。三百多個日子

是甚麼概念？是要多跑幾千公里多做幾萬個起立蹲下！reclutas 要跟二年級學長

比？還早得很呢！reclutas 只能對學長仰望、讓路、敬禮、服從，因為打心裡羨慕

啊！升上二年級以後就是 antiguos，學長、資深者之意，能進化到學長之列，是

所有 reclutas 夢寐以求，卻只有少數能夠到如願達到的夢想。

我升上二年級時剩下 33 位同學，只夠編成一個排。開學第一天排長單獨找

我對我說：「你來薩爾瓦多已經過了一年，現在已經是 antiguos，從現在開始我們

不會把你當成外國人，你也不再有任何優待，以後考試幾分就算幾分。」他拍拍

我的肩膀，這在軍校是長官對學生難得的親善動作，他又加上一句「好自為之吧！」

我口中回答：「是的！我的排長！」心裡想「完了！這怎麼可能？」這「國民待

遇」來者不善啊！

應該是有了西班牙文的文法基礎，加上考不及格會被淘汰的壓力，我在二年




級時西文進步得更明顯，學年過一半後各科考試成績已經逐漸脫離後段。大小考

試後老師都會將改過的考卷發給學生，讓我們知道錯在何處順便確認分數，習慣

上都是從最高分開始依次唱名。有一天考過「教學法」後老師發考卷，她問：「各

位猜猜看我會先叫誰的名字？」「Grijalva？」不是，「Abrego？」不對，「Mojica？」

她搖頭，「Koch？」她繼續搖頭。那會是誰呢？她說「Chon！」哇！全班譁然！

大家都回頭看我，我自己也十分意外，那是我第一次考全班最高分，印象深刻。

從此之後我大概都是前幾個從老師手中領考卷，我和前面被點到名的四位同學，

後來各方面的表現都在伯仲之間，一直到畢業前五個人都難分軒輊。

二年級結束時，我是以第三名的成績與其他 23 個同學一起升到三年級。這

一年我在各方面的表現慢慢「恢復水準」，體能跟上了，克服語言障礙後課業成

績也逐漸找回了自信心，才開始覺得再過兩年應該可以從薩爾瓦多軍校畢業。過

河的卒子繼續向前衝！

四、最難克服體能關

除了要克服語文障礙，更難適應的是學校對體能的要求。1980 年代之前，中

南美洲軍權高漲，各國總統都是將軍或政變上台的中上校。胸懷「大志」的青年

都知道通往總統府的捷徑是經過軍官學校。薩爾瓦多軍校每年都在近千名合乎條

件的高中生當中，挑選比較中意的十分之一大約一百人為入伍生，再用四年的嚴

格訓練，篩選其中最優秀的二十個上下成為軍官。被淘汰的七八十人，大部分是

因為跟不上體能的要求，或者是受不了沒完沒了的折騰而自動求去，也有不少是

受傷後退學，因為功課不及格被淘汰的反而不多。

（一）每天下午的操場課

學校正常的作息是早上 0440 起床，晚上 2200 就寢，一年四季都不變。每天

上午除早自習外有四節教室課，下午還有兩節教室課，接下來的 1600 到 1800 兩

個小時是操場課。星期一、三、五是穿長袖操作服帶槍上軍事課，二、四、六著

短袖短褲運動服上體育課。這樣的課表看來非常普通，但是如果你有機會在現場

觀看，一定會對操場上的情景印象深刻。

不論是出操的科目或是體育課的內容，對學生來說都不是關心的重點，重點

在上課一開始的三、四十分鐘「暖身活動」，以及結束之前約三十分鐘的「收操」。

暖身活動通常是全連先端著槍跑個十分鐘，接下來各排帶開架槍，展開五百公尺

障礙超越，或者是草皮運動。所謂草皮運動就是不停地在地上翻滾爬跳，或者是

扛著同伴跑，或是一個人騎著同伴肩上像騎馬打仗那樣跑，然後是美國海軍陸戰

隊式的樹榦操，這時已經操得你快要撐不住了，才接著正式出操。所謂出操在一

年級時不過就是點名報數、橫隊換縱隊、伍戰鬥隊形變換等，在不算大的場地上，

勉強可以施展的動作，但是排長會很有經驗地掌握節奏，讓我們動作快速緊張，




從開始到收操都沒有休息，不過比起暖身活動的馬不停蹄，相形之下出操當中難

免還有分組分班練習的時候，還有機會可以喘喘氣。

最後上場的是由連長主持的收操前跑步。連長親自下口令，「向右轉，跑步

走！」跑多久？不一定，可能二十分鐘，也可能六十分鐘。當過兵的都知道以端

槍的姿勢跑步滋味如何，尤其已經經過近一個半鐘頭不停地動作，早就已經到了

一般人體力的極限，這個時候每個人都渾身濕透累得差不多了，在一圈又一圈繞

著操場跑的時候，大家心中都在祈禱今天少跑一圈吧老天爺！那種讓人覺得沒完

沒了不知何時才是終點的長跑，真的會教人心慌，不知道今天能否撐得下！每次

都要跑到好像再跑一圈就要倒下去的時候，降旗號聲才終於在操場邊響起，接下

來連長那一聲「全連 alto」的口令，真是全世界最悅耳的聲音！

星期二、四的體育課過程跟軍訓課差不多，只差服裝較輕便不帶槍，但照樣

操得我們全身濕透筋疲力盡。星期六下午的體育課就輕鬆些，因為最可怕的「前

戲」與「後戲」都免了，通常大家在做完體操或十分鐘跑步後就分別帶開，由學

校聘請的民間體育教練指導各類運動。被操了一個禮拜後，真的也須要讓年輕人

好好的紓壓一下。

記得一年級時，每周一三五下午那兩節教室課都是單兵伍班戰鬥教練的原則

講解，教官就是本排排長拉莫斯少尉。他有相當英俊立體的五官，非常有氣勢的

鷹勾鼻配上炯炯有神的鷹眼，讓人望而生畏。他中等身材但腳力過人，非常機伶，

學生時代曾經是中美洲運動會的競走冠軍。每次帶隊跑步都是一馬當先，讓全連

跟得非常吃力，跑完後他很快就能恢復正常呼吸，然後在隊伍前後穿梭以睥睨群

雄的目光掃視大家，那種鷹視狼顧的態勢真是霸氣十足。他在下午的教室課中，

一邊在黑板上畫圖解說待會兒在操場要進行的動作要領，一邊會在木板釘的講台

上用力地以腳跟著地踱著方步，摳、摳、摳，一聲聲敲打著大家的耳膜和心臟。

那兩節課我總是聽得心不在焉，滿腦子都是等一下在操場被他整得死去活來的畫

面，胃都糾成一團。到了高年級時跟同學聊起那段壓力十足的經驗，才知道不只

是我，其實全班同學都是一樣被嚇得，唉！那真是一種精神虐待！

如果學校的體能要求只是每天下午在操場兩個小時這樣就結束了，那麼我那

些來自薩國各高中足球和田徑代表隊的天生運動好手，且對軍校訓練很嚴格早有

心理準備，一心一意要當神氣的軍官的同學，才不會因為受不了而主動退學。白

天操場上的只是正餐而已，凌晨的操場以及寢室的走廊上還有更嗆辣的點心等著

呢！

（二）清晨特別操

所謂特別操，就是比正常起床時間 0440 更早的 0400 被叫起床，著運動裝到




滿是露水的操場上，不停地被操一個小時的草皮運動。經過忙碌勞累的一天後，

需要在夜間好好地睡上七八個小時來恢復體力，但是通常晚上我們能夠躺下去時

大概已近十一點，第二天一早五點不到就起床，睡眠已經處於不足狀態，何況每

三天就有一班衛哨勤務，一班就要兩個小時，加上要提早十五分鐘起床著裝接受

任務提示，下哨後也要回報和卸裝，這樣就去掉快兩個半小時。本來這些長期不

足的睡眠大家多是靠上課打瞌睡來彌補一些。特別操不但讓你又少睡了一個小時

而且大量消耗體力，嚴重的體力透支又得不到適度休息，會使人當天下午的操場

表現更不好，有可能又被點到出下一次的特別操或其他額外的體能處份，如果這

樣惡性循環下去，不出兩個禮拜這個學生就會受不了。

晚點名時士官長會宣布當晚的衛兵、巡查，明天各種值日人員，還有就是大

家最關心的特別操名單，是犯了甚麼滔天大錯嗎？其實也不是。每天中午下課到

進餐廳之前，有十分鐘時間整理服裝儀容後接受檢查，是被登記出特別操的高危

險時間。檢查項目多且近乎嚴苛，比如鬍子要刮到用 A4 紙在你的下巴刮來刮去

刮不出聲音；指甲不能剪到底，必須留 0.2 公分左右白色的部分，且不得有任何

汙垢；褲袋中需有兩條雪白手帕；有時會要求脫下靴子檢查襪子是否有破洞；銅

環的前後上下甚至內部都要擦得亮晶晶，皮靴當然要油亮油亮，至於茶綠色軍便

服要燙得筆挺不得有任何線頭或汙點，就不在話下了。可怕的是你不知道今天排

長檢查的重點是哪一項，因為時間有限，通常一天只檢查一樣，但是你不能跟排

長賭，必須樣樣都準備好，但是這麼多項目十分鐘怎麼來得及準備？

所以第四節下課鈴一響，大家都以最快速度跑回寢室，拿起刮鬍刀在下巴周

邊再刮一次，接著拿起指甲刷衝到盥洗室刷洗指甲，因為早上上課時我們眼睛看

著黑板，手邊可沒停著用銅油、絨布、掏耳朵的棉花棒在擦銅環，加上被罰跑操

場，做伏地挺身等，指甲溝裡早就髒兮兮，檢查前一定得刷洗乾淨。回到寢室再

把內務櫃裡另一雙擦得波亮的靴子換上，拿一件乾淨的汗衫把已經穿在身上一個

上午溼答答又有汗臭味的換下，再拿出香水噴一噴，集合接受檢查的時間已經到

了。服儀檢查由各排排長親自執行，所以四年級學長也要入列受檢。檢查過程中

聽到三個排長此起彼落的「登記某某某明天早上特別操！」接著這位某某某還要

高聲答應「是的我的排長，明天早上我去出特別操！」排長們在嘻笑怒罵中登記

這個登記那個，我們立正站好挺胸貼手繃腿連大氣都不敢出。檢查完畢後進餐廳

吃午飯，被登記的學生那頓午餐一定消化不良。

另外一個會被登記出特別操的危險點，是在每天下午全連收操前跑步將要結

束的時候。我們從來不知道今天要跑多久，要訣是要勉力跟上主力，不能掉隊。

通常跑到響起降旗號，連長喊停之後部隊就由士官長帶回去洗澡用晚餐，但是一

個月總會有幾次，連長喊停，然後走到後半段，右手高舉往下一切，「從這裡以

後的明天出特別操！」值星人員馬上登記姓名，到晚點名時士官長就會宣布黑名




單。連長哪一天心情不好我們不會知道，所以每一天都盡最大的努力不掉隊，因

為四點被叫起床的代價太大。

清晨四點大家都正睡得酣甜，寢室內衛兵按著名單將受罰者一一叫醒，起床

後立即輕聲快速著短袖短褲運動裝到走廊集合清查人數，由值星班長帶到操場，

清晨四點天色未亮草地上鋪滿露水，值星軍官已經兩臂抱胸殺氣騰騰等著那裡，

通常是先跑個十幾二十分鐘然後接著草皮運動，最後以超越障礙收場，其實這樣

還不錯，身體的各部器官都分擔一些工作，也可以適時的調節呼吸喘口氣。有幾

次是光跑步跑到底，也有幾次從頭到尾都對著操場旁的五個台階衝上去跑下來，

那些台階的高度都近六十公分，跑上去時還好，跑下來時膝蓋會承受很大的壓力，

一個小時這樣子折騰下來，膝蓋焉有不受內傷的道理？

當特別操進行到將近尾聲，受罰者的體力消耗到極致，同時也是意志力最脆

弱的時刻，有的排長會對著正在地上爬行或滾進的某個掉隊的學生精神喊話。「我

看你不要浪費時間早點退學吧！我在你全身上下找不到一點可以當軍官的細胞！

你絕對畢不了業的，死心了吧你這隻蟑螂！」，「你這個沒用的傢伙，不但體能差

頭腦笨，還長得這麼醜！你趕快滾出我們軍校，免得我們都跟著沒面子！」，「上

個星期天你被禁足，我在街上看到你的女朋友跟別個男人走在一起，有說有笑可

親熱得很！你還在地上爬甚麼？你的堅持有甚麼意義？」諸如此類的話聽來當然

不舒服，在平時你可能會一笑置之，然而在四點多的清晨，全世界都還在夢鄉而

你卻在草地上翻滾掙扎得筋疲力盡的當下，聽在出身中上家庭和高中名校，離開

軍校明年仍然可以申請讀國立大學的薩爾瓦多本國學生耳裡，確實具有心理殺傷

力，足以變成壓垮意志力的那根稻草。

一年當中會有幾段時間全連學生都要連續出一個禮拜的特別操，那就是年初

開學後，及四月復活節及八月救世主節各放一個星期長假收假之後。薩國軍校這

些天之驕子放連假時在外的吃香喝辣泡妞跑趴，受到周邊男女老幼的欣羨追捧，

做為過來人的隊職官豈有不知之理，所以，那三次在放完長假後長達一個星期全

連無人倖免的特別操，隊職幹部下的整人口令毫不留情，我當然也要陪公子們受

罪，真的是很累人。

其實每個星期天晚上八點收假時就有小型的收心操。最簡單的就是交互蹲跳

一百下後立正站好，然後在排長走過你面前時要大口吐氣，讓他檢查你有沒有在

校外吸菸或飲酒。理論上這時你還在喘氣，殘留在肺中的煙味和胃裡的酒味，應

該會控制不住地隨氣而出，可是那些平常調皮搗蛋在軍官心目中八成會在假日抽

上兩根的，通常體能特別好，他們硬是能不讓菸味吐出來，我就見過有排長在要

某生吐氣再吐氣，還聞不到菸味或酒味後，忽然用手肘猛地在該生肚子上一頂，

這下當然甚麼味道都吐出來了，而該生脹紅著臉，還不敢露出痛苦的表情。收心




操當然不只這樣，值日留校沒有外出的排長，好像總是要操得今天外出休假的人

滿身大汗才夠本。每個星期天在校外晚餐時，想到等一下就要收假回學校，還有

等著我們的收心操，心情就盪下來了。

〈三）蹲下起立腿部運動

跟在操場的特別操一個小時不停地跑跳翻滾爬相較，晚點名後的原地蹲下起

立是另一種靜態的特別操。預令是雙手抱頸，動令是腿部運動開始！為什麼要做？

不為什麼，就是加強學生的腿力嘛！記得第一次做時，士官長在數，數到了九十

時，我雙腿已經痠麻，我猜大概數到一百會停吧？我猜錯了，他繼續往下數，到

快兩百時，我已經全身濕透雙腿痠痛，左右鄰兵也是滿頭大汗一臉通紅，當他在

兩百這個關口過門不停時，我有他會數到五百的不祥感覺，這次我猜對了！沒錯，

五百下。第五百下之後他還讓我們原地蹲著約三十秒，我感覺兩條大腿的肌肉都

在不自主地跳動。當士官長下令全連跑步回寢室就寢時我差一點滑倒，原來地板

上全是我們滴下的汗水。有一天晚點名時，值日的上尉參謀說「最近我看全連體

力都很差，今天晚上蹲下起立做一千下！」一千下？有沒有搞錯？沒有！從此以

後晚點名後如果要做腿部運動的基數就變成是一千下，再也沒有哪一個軍官會同

情我們減碼為五百下，跟今天民主政治政客競相討好群眾完全相反。

多少個夜晚，我在列子裡雙手抱頸反覆不斷地蹲下起立蹲下起立，汗水從手

肘滴下，從胸背流下，連襪子都濕透。向左右望去，每個人的頭上都冒著蒸氣，

耳邊只有士官長的數數聲，到後來他也懶得數了，就以配刀敲打排水管發出一下

一下的東東聲，或者乾脆叫我們一起大聲數，一百多人就這樣的上上下下，規律、

單調，沉悶，燥熱地度過漫長無奈的時光。一年級時我不知道問過自己多少遍，

如果今後四年的夜晚都要這樣過，我撐得下去嗎？我要不要繼續待下去？我為什

麼這麼倒楣被派到薩爾瓦多！在一年級每天追趕跑跳碰的日子裡，我所有的精力

心思都花在避免受處罰和學西班牙語，已經容不下其他念頭，甚至來不及產生想

家的念頭，白天沒有時間想，晚上上床幾秒就睡著來不及想，只有在漫長的蹲下

起立之間，腦筋可以放空，可以乘這個時間想家，讓淚水和著滿臉汗水流下來，

也不會有任何人發覺。

（四）托槍罰站與場邊觀察

在學校的作息時間表裡，中餐後是全連在走廊擦槍，然後約有三十分鐘的午

休時間。早上那麼早起床，還有一些人起得更早去參加特別操，再經過早自習、

上午四節課、課間學長的騷擾、進餐前緊張萬分的服儀檢查，午餐後有這個時段，

可以小睡一下補充體力，為下午的操場課充電準備那有多好！但是表定的午休是

給軍官和高年級學長專用的，好讓他們養足精神後，能在下午的操場展現充沛的

體力和旺盛的企圖心。一、二年級可以睡午覺的不到一半，大部分的中午時間是

托著剛擦完的槍，在大廳的走廊上立正罰站。




按規定任何一位四年級的學長都可以對學弟下達中午罰站的命令，不過基於

尊重他人指揮權的原則，通常不會命令別班的班兵如何如何，除非該員犯了眾怒，

或則下令的是連士官長或排士官長。所以罰站的指令通常是由排士官長或連士官

長、自己的班長，或則侵略性特別強的別班班長下達的。擦槍的時候就會宣布罰

站名單，擦完槍後有些人去享受甜蜜的午覺補充體力，有些人提槍快跑去罰站，

心情的落差當然很大。

罰站的地點就在衛兵司令值班位置旁邊。衛兵司令由四年級擔任，二十四小

時值一班，值日期間要掌握學校所有的人員車輛進出紀錄、管制夜間衛哨執行，

任何校內外軍官進入學校他都要立即上前將當前狀況以口頭簡報，另有要填寫撰

述的各種簿冊十多本，座位旁的槍架上還放著三把彈匣滿裝填的半自動步槍，隨

時要應付不意狀況，是四年級學長很重要且具挑戰的實習勤務，執勤的任何疏失

都會讓該生的勤務實習項扣分，甚至被禁足。中午罰站的人員近在咫尺自然就由

他就近監管，因為這時其他的值日官都在休息。少數性格比較溫和的衛兵司令在

清查人數並下達托槍口令後，便回到他的執勤桌前去處理讓他頭疼他的簿冊，只

會偶而走過來，提醒罰站的人「挺胸」、「收下顎」、「眼睛睜大」，等時間到了就

叫罰站的人離開。不過「好人」不多，沒有學長想被學弟當成好人。大部分衛兵

司令會準備小紙頭，讓罰站者夾在托槍的右手手肘和身體之間，你必須從頭到尾

依準則要求夾緊手肘，稍一鬆懈那紙頭就掉下來了。

紙頭掉下來的後果是再回寢室取一把步槍，變成左右手各托一把槍，成了雙

槍俠，這時衛兵司令不會忘記在你的左右兩個手肘上各夾一片紙頭。如果不幸又

有紙頭掉下來，那你就再回去取一把，他會幫你將槍橫放在腦袋後頭，這時你的

兩個手肘要更用力夾緊，否則馬上又會有一把槍橫在你腦後。那三十分鐘的時間

說來不算很長，但挺累人的，因為雖然只是站著不動，卻要從頭到尾繃緊肌肉，

稍一鬆懈後果會越來越嚴重。

〈五〉場邊觀察嚇跑人

還有另一種罰站會讓人內心天人交戰，那就是星期一三五出操時的場邊觀察。

軍校的病號分為全休和半休，住院或躺在醫務所床上休養的叫全休；可以上教室

課但無法上操場課的叫半休。半休者雖不能出操卻必須站在操場邊台階上觀察學

習。其實觀察還不就是看著全連在操場上追趕跑跳碰，沒啥好學的，但是站在那

邊看著全連在操場上超越障礙、跑步滾爬，被操得上氣不接下氣，不管他是真的

傷病，如骨折打上了石膏，還是有一點裝病的成分，大概心中都會有很複雜的感

受，主要應該是恐懼感。

會產生恐懼感是因為全程「看到」出操的場景。以前自己也跟著同學一起在




隊伍裡跑到要死要活，但身在塵土飛揚與吆喝聲中，只顧著使出全身力氣向前衝，

不知道自己臉上是啥表情，也看不清整個場面。但現在居高臨下是旁觀者清，在

觀察兩個小時近乎像拍攝電影的場景當中，他一定會覺得「哇哩列！原來以前我

在操課中是這個模樣！」接著他應該會估算自己的傷病要多久才會好，屆時已經

衰退的體力在歸隊初期必然跟不上，而還要再花許多被處分的代價後才能再度跟

上隊伍。想想這樣昏天黑地的日子要過四年才能當上軍官，掂掂自己的斤兩能熬

得過嗎？他站在那邊內心必定不斷翻騰。所以經過幾次場邊觀察後，大部分的傷

病新生就主動報退了。

因傷報退的人員中有不少人是腿部受傷，大部分是膝蓋傷，少部分是骨折。

記憶中很多人的膝蓋都有過或大或小的囊腫，通常獲得適時獲得休息的話，過一

陣子就會慢慢消失。但有些人的運氣就是不好，正常的操課之外連續幾天被出了

特別操，加上晚點名後的一千下蹲下起立又不能免，可能是在短時間內累積起來

的運動量，大到膝蓋內的軟骨組織承受不了，使膝蓋紅腫到據說可以抽出一個大

針筒的血水。一旦膝蓋傷到那個程度或是腿部在運動時拐到或骨折，就需要長時

間的修養才得以恢復，可是校規明訂學生在學期中半休或全休累計超過一定時數

就要退訓，該生自己算一算時數就知道這學年是待不下去而主動退學了。我一年

級時第二排有一位同學因骨折而退訓，到第二年他又出現在新生行列裡重新再來

入伍，他非常積極樂觀，後來得以順利畢業，那種精神毅力實在讓人敬佩，一般

人很少有這樣的勇氣。

五、經常處於半飢餓狀態

我們軍校有一句大家拿來自我調侃的話，「軍校學生永遠吃不飽睡不飽」。這

是事實，每天那麼大的運動量只給五個小時的睡眠怎麼夠，不夠怎麼辦？只有上

課打瞌睡補一點回來。軍事課教官多是學校隊職官，在他上課時膽敢打瞌睡的下

場不是特別操就是五百或一千下起立蹲下，最起碼也會叫你去跑操場十分鐘，偷

雞不成蝕把米。因此文人老師的課，成了很多同學的補眠時間，老師都瞭解也同

情我們的狀況，通常睜隻眼閉隻眼不太在意，但上課沒聽講到考試時成績就不會

太好，同學們大部分不太在意是否考高分，考試能過關就好，他們都知道能否畢

業的決勝點在操場不再教室。我很少上課打瞌睡，不會睏嗎？當然會！我是不敢

睡。他們是本國人沒有語言問題，我不能跟他們一樣，上課再不聽講我怎麼考得

及格？我在瞌睡蟲來的時候怎麼讓自己不睡？我是用手掐大腿內側，有效。

吃不飽跟睡不飽一樣難過。軍校的主食是米飯、紅豆。早餐是一小杯牛奶、

一個煎蛋、半碗的煮紅豆，加四個小圓麵包。中餐和晚餐大概就是一碗量的紅豆、

一碗量的米飯、一片碗面大小的牛肉，加四個小圓麵包，餐餐如此少有變化，偶

而會有羅宋湯，但從來沒有整盤的蔬菜，一年也吃不到三次魚。米飯紅豆和牛肉

分裝在三個腎形盆子哩，開動後要先將食物傳給長桌兩端的四年級，再依次給三、




二，一年級，通常高年級都先將肥美的肉塊連汁取走了，輪到一年級時剩下乾瘪

的肉片和許多味道平淡的紅豆，我還要不要吃？當然要！我早餓扁了！但急不得，

當食盆在面前傳來傳去，四年級學長在挑精撿肥時，你得正襟危坐，動手協助傳

送食物時眼睛要正視前方，可不能露出饞相。等到我可以動刀叉時，四年級學長

都快要吃到一半了。士官長看大部分四年級學長已用餐完畢就會示意值日班長下

達下餐廳口令。下餐廳從一年級開始，然後是二、三年級，所以一年級新生的用

餐時間最短，能吃到七八分飽就不錯了。那用餐動作快一點不就行了嗎？不行！

餐桌禮儀也是非常重要的訓練項目，右手刀左手叉，切好一小塊肉，左手將叉交

給右手，左手放回左大腿的餐巾上，右手叉好肉，垂直上舉到與嘴同高，轉直角

送入口中，然後細嚼，慢嚥，動作務求優雅。眼看值星班長就要下達「一年級動

作暫停」的口令，而盤中還有一半的食物來不及吃，內心真是著急。三餐伙食提

供的量本就不夠多，低年級時又吃得很倉促，對運動量大，熱量消耗多的軍校生，

就常常覺得才一下餐廳肚子就開始餓了。

正餐吃不飽只好靠零食補充，有一位救星叫 Chacon，一位頭髮花白動作緩

慢，在學校賣了三十多年零食的老先生，每天上午第二節課下課前幾分鐘，他就

會推著裝滿巧克力棒、糕餅、麵包等高熱量零食的販賣車，咕嚕咕嚕地經過教室

旁然後停在走廊盡頭轉角等候。第二、三節課間休息二十分鐘，先下課的年班就

會一窩蜂奔過去買吃的，我也曾去排過幾次隊，後來就不去了。因為人多時間短，

老先生拿東西慢，找零錢更慢，急死人了！其實不去的主要原因是學長的騷擾。

比如說某一天上午，四年級有事出門不在校，二年級上課的教官說得正起勁還沒

下課，而我們剛好先下課了，這是難得的機會我們趕快衝去排隊，一邊喊 Chacon

先生快點快點給我麵包！一邊在口袋掏錢，一邊屢屢回頭，生怕這時二年級的下

課過來了。果不其然，才買到第三個，就看到一群二年級學長大踏步而來，嘴裡

喊著「讓開讓開！一年級入伍生統統給我跑步離開！」。正在排隊的一年級快要

到嘴的鴨子飛了，難免面露失望。「啊哈！不高興了？統統臥倒！50 個伏地挺身

開始！」這樣在場的所有一年級新生，包括少數滿嘴塞滿麵包的以及其餘兩手空

空的，都趴在地上數一二三四。我經歷了幾次這種狀況後，就再也不去自討苦吃

惹一肚子氣了。一直到升上四年級以後，才會在第二節下課時從容自在地吃麵包

喝汽水。「噯！以前都沒看到你來買東西吃，怎麼現在變得〝貪吃〞了？」我的

同學問我。我便說出一年級時的經驗，「這個我們都知道啊！難道當時你不會餓

嗎？」「我在禮拜天收假回校時會帶一包糖果放在內務櫃，你們在排隊買吃的，

其實大部分時間都是在做伏地挺身時，我在寢室吃糖果補充熱量。」「哇！你們

中國人好聰明！」

軍校學生零食的另外一個來源是禮拜四會客時親友帶來的食物。星期四對軍

校生是個好日子。首先它意味那個星期已過了一半，其次那天下午是體育課而不

是軍事出操課，更重要的是那天晚餐後的 1900-2000 是會客時間。當年軍校的管




理不重視人權，動不動就扣假禁足，通常星期天假日能夠外出的學生人數不到一

半，有些人甚至連續三四個週末被禁足，但即使是被禁足的人依然可以接受家人

及女朋友星期四晚上來會客，這是他們被關在門禁森嚴的軍校內唯一可以跟外界

接觸的機會。會客時親友可以攜帶麥當勞、炸雞、糕餅、飲料等食物來慰勞子弟

或男友，一則解饞補充營養，更可以說說體己話，給受苦受難的軍校生鼓勵打氣，

這對受盡委屈的低年級生能夠繼續堅持下去有非常重要的作用。

家住在比較遠方的，或者家境普通家中沒有汽車代步，沒有親友來探望送食

物的學生，當然會有些落寞，除非有同學邀請他分享食物一起聊天，他就只能利

用這一小時可自由支配的時間，做些平時該做想做而沒時間處理的事，比如整整

內務櫃擦擦皮鞋等。我一年級時，會課時間是不會受到干擾在教室寫家書最寶貴

的時間，平常哪裡會有機會可以讓我跟國內的家人同學寫信？我都用郵簡，因為

可用時間有限，那可真是要不假思索振筆疾書，才能在會客時間結束前寫好，寄

出去以後十幾二十天可以到台灣。那個年代國際電話貴得要命更沒有網際網路，

書信往來是唯一可以和在台親友聯絡的方式，是我的精神食糧，比麥當勞更重要。

六、萬事開頭難

薩爾瓦多軍校的成績計算並不是以功課成績為主，而是學業、體能、品行、

勤務實習四項各佔 25%，構成我們在軍校的學習總成績。事實上我能從一年級升

到二年級，是學校對我這個來自台灣的交換學生法外開恩，學業成績特別計算，

體能也是勉強跟得上過關而已，至於操行成績和勤務實習分數都還不錯，那是因

為隊職官和學長們感受到我本性規矩，沒有惡整我將單獨的處分加在我身上，沒

有造成連續的體能透支和心理不平衡，給了我調適學習的空間與時間，否則的話

我早就打包回國了。因為在面對日復一日把人推到體能極限的訓練中，一旦萌生

退意，出現了「放棄」的念頭，那一口堅持下去的氣沒了，在操場上馬上就會掉

隊跟不上。說白了，就是你想不想、要不要、能不能堅持下去的問題。合理正常

的答案當然是要堅持到底啊！但是當人常常被逼到體能與意志的極限又孤立無

親，更糟糕的是，當你老是感覺這種日子遙遙無期的時候，你的答案恐怕不是每

一天都那麼堅定。因為往前看去，那是四年耶！我們在台灣不管受甚麼訓，事先

大家都知道苦個兩個月撐個三個月就結束了，心中可以有個底，可我在薩爾瓦多

軍校一年級上操場課，被草皮運動、樹幹操磨得七葷八素、在不知要跑多久的隊

伍中上氣不接下氣，以及在昏暗的晚上不停地蹲下起立的時候，我的感覺是，四

年太過漫長，我看不到隧道盡頭的光！

記得 1975 年 12 月 1 日，是當年的四年級學長畢業授階的大日子，神采飛揚

的準軍官們，穿上別了所有徽章的軍常服，個個挺胸昂首顧盼自雄，校園中庭充

滿盛裝蒞臨觀禮的家長親友，盈耳所聞都是恭喜恭喜，國防部的軍樂隊也來了，

全校顯得喜氣洋洋。我們一至三年級的學生著典禮服列隊當禮兵，準備在總統進




場時行舉槍禮。我可以強烈感覺到三年級學長的興奮，再過幾個小時他們就是學

生王子了！我也看到二年級學長掩蓋不住的喜色，因為升上三年級放完年假後，

他們就要去巴拿馬受訓五六個月，可以脫離學校的苦日子每個月又有五十塊美金

零用錢可領，多麼美好的期待！我被這喜悅的氣氛感染，跟所有的一年級學生一

樣，為自己即將升上二年級而暗暗高興。我慶幸這一年平安過關沒有受傷生病，

我想像著明年初新生來報到時看到我這個東方人學長的訝異與敬佩，我甚至幻想

在自己的畢業典禮上，大步上台從總統手中接過雕鏤精緻的銀色指揮刀，全場響

起如雷掌聲的場景。我的白日夢被「Atencion Firrrrrrr！」的立正口令驚醒，總統

率國會議長最高法院院長國防部長等人到校，我舉槍擺頭行注目禮，在軍樂聲中

回到現實，驚覺這一年經歷了這麼多的滾爬跑跳蹲站，吃了那麼多三餐不變的紅

豆飯，熬過那麼多睏得要命但不敢打瞌睡的夜衛兵和教室課，瘦到只剩下六十幾

公斤，我這小命都快沒了，原來才熬過漫漫長路的四分之一，前頭還有三年等著！

我徹底地清醒了，恐懼之情油然而生替代了剛才的美夢。但再一轉念，我初到此

地時啥也不會，連滾帶爬的不也熬過了最辛苦的第一年？我深吸一口氣把胸脯挺

得更高，我告訴自己：「不怕不怕！一年級都能過關，二年級我一定也會過！加

油！」。




拉美經貿書評或重要文獻介紹

Title 題目特朗普面臨三個陷阱

Keyword

關鍵詞

Author 作者向駿教授 Antonio C. Hsiang，致理科技大學國際貿易系

Attribute 屬性新聞專題

Publish Date

出版日期

2017 年 10 月 9 日聯合早報

Abstract:

摘要

中共十八大以來，中國國家主席習近平在不同場合多次談到三

個陷阱定律，即塔西佗陷阱、中等收入陷阱與修昔底德陷阱。

這兩個陷阱靠國內的政策應可避開，但修昔底德陷阱恐須由中

美共同努力才能克服。此外，美國總統特朗普還面臨著金德爾

伯格陷阱和國際信用陷阱。

參閱網站 http://www.zaobao.com.sg/forum/views/opinion/story20171009-

801531

Title 題目學者觀點－破除裴隆主義魔咒阿根廷重返國際

Keyword

關鍵詞

Author 作者向駿教授 Antonio C. Hsiang，致理科技大學國際貿易系

Attribute 屬性新聞專題

Publish Date

出版日期

2017 年 10 月 31 日工商時報/ 財經要聞/

Abstract:

摘要

阿根廷總統馬克里（Mauricio Macri）領導的「變革聯盟」

（Cambiemos, Let’s Change）在 10 月 22 日的期中選舉獲

41.76％選民支持，馬克里表示「最困難的階段已過」。裴隆主

義走入歷史？《經濟學人》認為期中選舉「正破除裴隆主義的

魔咒」（breaking the spell of Peronism），裴隆主義是拉美最能

代表民粹主義（populism，大陸也譯為民眾主義）的思潮。

參閱網站 www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20171031000158-260202

Title 題目台灣不重視拉美研究大陸快速崛起




Keyword

關鍵詞

臺灣、中國與拉丁美洲

Author 作者黃文杰

Attribute 屬性新聞

出版日期中評社、新北 11 月 12 日電、

Abstract:

摘要

過去台灣對於拉美研究相當權威，頗受到中國大陸學界的重視，

特別是發行拉丁美洲經貿季刊，全面深入研究拉美經貿，兩岸

經常有學術交流。

參閱網站 http://hk.crntt.com/crn-

webapp/search/allDetail.jsp?id=104872139&sw=%E5%90%91%E

9%AA%8F

Title 題目向駿：特朗普搞不定 NAFTA 中國是贏家

Keyword

關鍵詞

RCEP、NAFTA、中國、美國

Author 作者向駿教授，致理科技大學國際貿易系

Attribute 屬性新聞簡析

Publish Date

出版日期

2017 年 11 月 20 日中評社>> 中評智庫網 ->> 臺灣智庫觀點

Abstract:

摘要

沒有 NAFTA，中國就會贏，特朗普不推 TPP，讓中國主導的

RCEP 更有競爭，繼續搞不定 NAFTA，中國還是贏家。事實上

中國愈來愈有希望扛起拉美「自由貿易」角色。

參閱網站 http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1048/7/2/1/104872133.html




Title 題目一帶一路新支點大陸拉美戰略浮現

Keyword

關鍵詞

拉丁美洲、巴拿馬、瓦雷拉、中國、美國

Author 作者向駿教授，致理科技大學國際貿易系

Attribute 屬性新聞簡析

Publish Date

出版日期

2017 年 11 月 20 日，民意論壇 / 評論 /聯合新聞網

Abstract:

摘要

六月宣布與中國建交的巴拿馬總統瓦雷拉於本月十六到廿二日

訪問大陸期間，除主持巴國駐北京大使館和駐上海總領事館揭

幕儀式外，更與習近平共同規劃中巴關係發展藍圖。

參閱網站 https://udn.com/news/story/7339/2828321




拉丁美洲經貿研究中心活動剪影

2017 年 11 月 1-2 日本中心副研究員馮慕文(Fabricio Antonio Fonseca)參加第二屆

「一帶一路」上海國際論壇-《一帶一路與擴員中的上海合作組織》研討會

副研究員馮慕文(Fabricio Antonio Fonseca)在議題三場次「上海合作組織發展的新

機遇」以「21 世紀海上絲綢路”與上海合作組織: 中國期望及對拉丁美洲的借鑑

意義」(21st Century Maritime Silk Road and Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

Chinese Expectations and Lessons for Latin America) 報告情形




2017 年 11 月 16-17 日向駿教授參加於廣州舉行的

第二屆「東亞地區拉美研究夥伴對話」國際會議。

向駿教授與中國社會科學院拉丁美洲研究所吳百乙所長合影




麗雅老師接受法國母校專題訪問分享暢談在致理科技大學及拉丁美洲經貿研究

中心服務情形

https://semilasorbonne.com/2017/07/06/silvia-medina-une-ancienne-du-master-a-

taiwan/

拉丁美洲經貿季刊首次納入巴西 Qualis Journals Platform「人文及社會科學期刊

收錄平台」名單之內，Qualis 是一個巴西教育部研究論文科學分類平台。由巴

塞羅納協調中心（CAPP）維護。1近類似「臺灣人文及社會科學期刊收錄」運作

模式，該平台由巴西教育部創建，實用於每兩年評估巴西研究學者發表學術研究

和文章，依評量標準將世界各國期刊區分為 A1、A2、B1、B2、B3、B4、B5 和

C 等級。本刊 30 期之巴西專刊經評量列為 C 的等級。期昐未來季刊能夠得到更

好的評價。

Qualis is a Brazilian official system with the purpose of classifying scientific

production. It is maintained by the Coordenadoria de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de

Nível Superior (CAPES)

1

https://sucupira.capes.gov.br/sucupira/public/consultas/coleta/veiculoPublicacaoQualis/listaConsultaGe

ralPeriodicos.jsf

https://semilasorbonne.com/2017/07/06/silvia-medina-une-ancienne-du-master-a-taiwan/

https://semilasorbonne.com/2017/07/06/silvia-medina-une-ancienne-du-master-a-taiwan/




https://sucupira.capes.gov.br/sucupira/public/consultas/coleta/veiculoPublicacaoQuali

s/listaConsultaGeralPeriodicos.jsf




《拉丁美洲經貿季刊》投稿須知及體例

壹、投稿須知

一、本刊為針對拉丁美洲區域研究學術刊物，歡迎與拉丁美洲經濟、貿易、政治、

教育、文化、書評及歷史等相關稿件。自民國 99 年 6 月 1 日創刊，每年區

分春（3 月 1 日）夏（6 月 1 日）秋（9 月 1 日）冬（12 月 1 日）四季出版。

並經收錄於國家圖書館「臺灣期刊論文索引系統」與國內知名遠流出版集團

智慧藏公司之「TAO 台灣學術線上」(www.lib.ntu.edu.tw)、凌網數位出版品

營運平台之HyRead台灣全文資料庫(www.hyread.com.tw/publisher/)及華藝線

上圖書館(http://www.airitilibrary.com/)期刊資料庫。

二、來稿請示作者基本資料註明作者姓名(中、英、西文)、服務機構(中、英、西

文)，職稱、地址、聯絡電話、傳真、Email 及主要學經歷(中、英、西文)。

三、來稿請依一般學術論文格式撰寫，文章分節並附小標題，包括中英西文論文

名稱，文首請撰寫中英西文摘要 500 字以內及關鍵詞 4~6 個，加註釋及參考

文獻。為求本刊的完整性、一致性和嚴謹性，請作者依本刊規定進行文章格

式的編排及內容的增減。全文依據本刊格式規定後，以三萬字為限(含註腳文

字)。

四、作者投稿請自負文責，並注意著作權法等相關法律規定。經送審核准採用者，

得依編輯需求刊載或加以刪修潤飾，若不同意者，請預為註明。

五、本刊設有審稿制度，分初審及複審，聘請專家學者以匿名審稿方式審閱，以

決定採用稿件，並視審稿情形，提出審稿意見供作者參考。審查時間原則不

超過一個月，並在審查通過後，依論文刊登期數，編排刊登。

六、投稿文章，若通過審查程序可獲刊之篇數超過當期篇幅容量，編輯委員會得

斟酌領域平衡以及該稿件之時效性等因素，決定當期刊登之稿件及其順序。

七、本刊典藏於中華民國國家圖書館「臺灣期刊論文索引系統」，請同意將來稿

之合法權利以採取無償之非專屬授權方式供國家圖書館及其他本刊物授權

之資料庫、數位典藏業者，進行重製，透過網路提供服務、授權用戶下載、

列印等行為。或並得酌作格式之修改。經本刊刊載之文稿，版權歸本刊所有，

除作者自用外，授權轉載須徵得本刊同意。

八、歡迎以電子郵件投稿，電郵：[email protected]。如以紙本請寄新北

市板橋區文化路一段 313 號，致理科技大學商貿外語學院-拉丁美洲經貿研

究中心。

九、《拉美經貿季刊》接受中、英、西文稿件，經常性專欄列舉如下：Regular Columns

as follow, new Column is welcomed!

（一）特稿：(如歐部長談外交休兵)Special Invitation (Ex. Francisco Ou on

Diplomatic Truce across the Strait) (Articles from Center's Conference)

（二）專題：如拉美獨立 200 週年。Feature Articles

（三）拉美新聞分析：如拉美財長會議、總統大選。News Analysis (Ex. Peru's

Presidential elections)




（四）拉美經貿分析：如拉美投資趨勢分析。Analysis of Latin American

Economy and Business (Ex. Article from Fund Managers)

（五）拉美經貿書評或重要文獻介紹：如大陸的拉美政策白皮書。Book

Reviews or Literatures Presentation on Latin American Economy and Business.

（六）拉美與兩岸：拉美對中國大陸、臺灣或兩岸關係的影響。China, Taiwan

and Latin American (Changing relations between Latin American and

China/Taiwan, and Impacts on Relations across the Strait)

（七）拉美人物側寫：如拉美國家駐中華民國大使、代表、拉美傑出人物、

華商等。Personal Profiles: ( Ambassadors and Representatives from Latin

America)

（八）拉丁美洲史話：如兩岸與拉美關係變遷、拉美重要歷史事件回顧等，

特別歡迎有派駐拉美經歷者供稿。Latin American History (Articles from

former Ambassadors to Latin America)

（九）拉美經貿統計：表列重要經貿資料。Statistics on Latin American Economy

and Business

（十）拉美經貿新聞： (重要經貿新聞選粹) News on Latin American Economy

and Business

（十一）拉美中心剪影： (拉美文化活動、研討會等照片) Photos of Center's

Activities.

貳、體例

一、內文文字請依照以下規定：

中文字型一律採用新細明體、英文字型一律採用 Times New Roman；內文字

型大小：12pt；章節標題字型大小：14pt、粗體；字元間距：標準。

二、行間距：單行間距。段落與之間務必加一行空行間。

參、註腳（頁註）格式

一、本刊以橫式編排，採頁下註，作者姓名列於題目之下，作者介紹列於註

釋前，並以＊號表示，註腳方式如下。

二、註腳編號，使用阿拉伯數字，以每篇論文為單位順次排序，文中(含註腳)字

體應統一採用新細明體，英文字型一律採用 Times New Roman；字型大小：10pt。

三、專書

(一) 中文：作者姓名，《書名》（出版地：出版者，出版年），頁 x 或頁 x-x。

(二) 外文：Author’s Full Name, Complete Title of the Book (Place of Publication:

Publisher, Year), p. x or pp. x-x.

四、專書譯著

(一) 中文：Author’s Full Name 著，譯者姓名譯，《書名》(書名原文)（出版地：

出版者，出版年），頁 x 或頁 x-x。

(二) 外文：Author’s Full Name, Complete Title of the Book (Original Title of the




Book), trans., Translator’s Full Name (Place of Publication: Publisher, Year), p.

x or pp. x-x.

五、專書論文

(一)中文：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，編者姓名編，《書名》（出版地：出版者，出版年），

頁 x 或頁 x-x。

(二)外文：Author’s Full Name, “Title of the Article,” in Editor’s Full Name, ed.,

Complete Title of the Book (Place of Pubation: Publisher, Year), p. x or pp. x-x.

六、專書論文譯著（請依個別刊物實際出版項，完整臚列）

(一) 中文：Author’s Full Name 著，譯者姓名譯，〈篇名〉（篇名原文），編者姓名

編，譯著者姓名譯著，《書名》（書名原文）（出版地：出版者，出版年），頁

x 或頁 x-x。

(二) 外文：Author’s Full Name, “Title of the Article,” in Editor’s or Author’s Full

Name, (ed.,) Complete Title of the Book (Original Title of the Book), trans.,

Translator’s Full Name (Place of Publication: Publisher, Year), p. x or pp. x-x.

七、期刊論文（請依個別刊物實際出版項，完整臚列）

(一) 中文：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，《刊物名稱》，第 x 卷第 x 期，年月，頁 x 或頁

x-x。

(二) 外文：Author’s Full Name, “Title of the Article,” Name of the Journal, Vol. x,

No. x, Month Year, p. x or pp. x-x.

八、期刊論文譯著

(一)中文，外文：：Author’s Full Name 著，譯者姓名譯，〈篇名〉（篇名原文），

《刊物名稱》，第 x 卷第 x 期，年月，頁 x 或頁 x-x。

九、學位論文

(一) 中文：作者姓名，《學位論文名稱》（發表地：學校及系所名稱博／碩士論

文，出版年），頁 x 或頁 x-x。

(二) 外文：Author’s Full Name, Title of the Dissertation (Diss./Thesis, The Name of

the Department, the Name of the Degree- University, Year), p. x or pp. x-x.

十、研討會論文

(一) 中文：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，發表於「研討會名稱」研討會（地點：主辦單位，

年月日），頁 x 或頁 x-x。

(二) 外文：Author’s Full Name, “Title of the Article,” paper presented at the Complete

Name of the Conference (Place of the Conference: Conference Organizer, Date),

p. x or pp. x-x.

十、報紙（若為社論、短評、通訊稿或作者匿名，則可不列作者欄）

(一)中文：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，《報紙名稱》，年月日，版 x。

(二)外文：Author’s Full Name, “Title of the Article,” Name of the Newspaper, Date,

Section or Page Numbers.

十一、網際網路依線上實際資訊完整臚列，須註明上網查詢年月日及時間。




(一) 中文

1. 專書：作者姓名，《書名》（出版地：出版者，出版年），頁 x 或頁 x-x，《網

站名稱》，<網址>。

2. 論文：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，《刊物名稱》，第 x 卷第 x 期，年月，頁 x 或頁

x-x，《網站名稱》，<網址>。

3. 報導：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，《網站名稱》，年月日，<網址>。

(二) 外文

1. 專書：Author’s Full Name, Complete Title of the Book (Place of Publication:

Publisher, Year), p. x or pp. x-x, Name of the Website, <URL

http://www.atimes.....>.

2. 論文：Author’s Full Name, “Title of the Article,” Name of the Journal, Vol. x,

No. x, Date, p. x or pp. x-x, Name of the Website, <URL http://www.atimes....>.

3. 報導：Author’s Full Name, “Title of the Article,” Name of the Website, Date, <

URL http://www.atimes.....>.

http://www.atimes/

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