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Belief-thatandBelief-in:WhichReductiveAnalysis?

UriahKriegel

ForthcominginA.Gzrankowski&M.Montague,Non-PropositionalIntentionality(OUP)

Abstract.Letpropositionalismbethethesisthatallmentalattitudesarepropositional.Anti-

propositionaliststypicallypointatapparentlynon-propositionalattitudes,suchasfearingadog

andlovingaspouse,andplaydefenseagainstattemptsatpropositionalanalysisofsuch

attitudes.HereIexploretheanti-propositionalist’sprospectsforgoingontheoffensive,tryingto

showthatsomeapparentlypropositionalattitudes,notablybeliefandjudgment,canbegiven

non-propositionalanalysis.Althoughthenotionthatbeliefisanon-propositionalattitudemay

seemludicrousatfirst,itisadmirablydefendedbyFranzBrentano,whoseanalysisIproposeto

expound,update,anddeepenhere.Thebasicstrategycanbethoughtofasfollows.First,

althoughthegrammarofbelief-thatreportsclearlysuggestsapropositionalattitude,the

grammarofbelief-inreportssuggestsinsteadan‘objectual’attitude.Second,withsome

ingenuityallbelief-thatreportscanbeparaphrasedintobelief-inreports.Third,givencertain

generalconsiderations,thisparaphraseabilityrecommendstheviewthatthepsychological

realityofbeliefstatesisobjectualratherthanpropositional.Nonetheless,Iwillargue,thereare

twoveryrealcostsassociatedwiththisnon-propositionalanalysisofbelief.

Introduction

Onthefaceofit,someofourpsychologicalattitudesarepropositionalandsomeare

objectual.Judgingthattheweatherisniceispropositional,likingicecreamis

objectual.1Somephilosophershaveclaimedthatthisisanillusion,andinfactall

attitudesarepropositional.Thus,JohnPerrywrites:

Thephenomenonofintentionalitysuggeststhatattitudesareessentiallyrelationalin

nature:theyinvolverelationstothepropositionsatwhichtheyaredirected…Anattitude

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seemstobeindividuatedbytheagent,thetypeofattitude(belief,desire,etc.),andthe

propositionatwhichitisdirected.(Perry1994:387-8)

Otherphilosophershaveinsistedthatnotallattitudesarepropositional–someare

objectual.HereisMichelleMontague:

Simplyput,objectualattitudesresistapropositionalistanalysis.MarylovesNancy.Sheseeks

thefountainofyouth.Shehasyouinmind.Shecontemplatesthesky.ShewantsNancy’scar.

Theseintentionalattitudesappeartoberelationsthatholdsimplybetweenthinkersand

non-propositionalobjects,ratherthanbetweenthinkersandpropositions.(Montague2007:507)

Veryfewphilosophershaveheldthatinfactnoattitudesarepropositional–thatall

areobjectual.PerhapsHumeheldthisview.Onephilosopherwhocertainlydidis

FranzBrentano.Brentanoexplicitlywritesthat‘Allmentalreferencesreferto

things’(Brentano1911:291),wherea‘thing’isanindividualobjectorconcrete

particular.Hisargumentforthiscannotbeappreciatedwithoutadetailedaccount

ofhisentirephilosophyofmind.Shortonspace,hereIwillrestrictmyselftohis

caseforthethesisthatjudgmentisanobjectualattitude.Thisthesiswouldalready

beoffirstimportance,sincejudgmentandbeliefarecustomarilytakentobethe

paradigmaticpropositionalattitudes.Thisseemsantecedentlyveryplausible:you

canloveJane,butyoucannotjudgeJane(intherelevantsense),orjudgethatJane.

Andyet,Iwillargue,Brentano’scaseforanobjectualistaccountofjudgmentis

surprisinglycompelling.Althoughthecasehassomelocalholesinit,Iwillargue

thattheycanbefilledreasonablysatisfactorily.

Istart,in§1,withsomebackgroundonBrentano’snotionofjudgment,asit

emergesfromhisclassificationofmentalstates.In§2,Iofferaninitialexpositionof

hisobjectualistaccountofjudgmentforanalyticphilosophers.In§3,Ireconstruct

andtightenBrentano’scasefortheobjectualistaccount.In§4,Iconsidersomekey

objections.

1. JudgmentinBrentano’sTaxonomyofMentalStates

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ThetaskofChap.5-8ofBookIIofBrentano’sPsychologyfromanEmpirical

Standpoint(Brentano1874)istoidentifythe‘fundamentalclasses’ofmentalstates.

Hisassumptionisthatthementaldomainisstructuredbygenus/speciesrelations,

sothatsomekindsofmentalstatearespeciesofothers.Forexample,color

experienceisaspeciesofvisualexperience,whichinturnisaspeciesofperceptual

experience.Thehighestgenusissimplymentalstate.WhatBrentanocallsthe

‘fundamentalclasses’aretheclassesorkindsofmentalstatewhicharespeciesof

onlyonehighergenus.Thatis,theyarespeciesonlyofthegenusmentalstate.

(Comparecolorexperience,whichisaspeciesofthegenusmentalstateaswell,but

alsoofothergenera,suchasvisualexperienceandperceptualexperience.)What

Brentanoseeksinhis‘fundamentalclassification,’then,arethehighestmental

generasavethehighestone,i.e.thesecond-to-highestmentalgenera.

AccordingtoBrentano,therearethreesuchclasses:presentationor

apprehension(Vorstellung),judgment(Urteil),and‘interest’(Interesse)or‘emotion’

(Gemütsbewegungen)(Brentano1874:198).Healsoclaimsthatjudgmentand

interestare‘groundedin’presentations(1874:80,198),2butappearstoalsoallowa

presentationtooccurwithoutgroundingotherstates.Unlikepresentation,

judgmentandinterestareeachdividedintotwoopposingkinds:judgmentinto

acceptance(Anerkennung)andrejection(Verwerfung),interestintolove(Liebe)and

hate(Hasse).3Letusconsidereachclassinturn.4

ThefundamentalclassBrentanocallsjudgmentcoversanymentalstatethat

inthefirstinstancepresentswhatitdoesastrueorfalse(veridicalorfalsidical,

accurateorinaccurate,andsoon):5

By‘judgment’wemean,inaccordancewithcommonphilosophicalusage,acceptance(as

true)orrejection(asfalse).(Brentano1874:198)

Importantly,thisincludesnotonlytheproductsofconceptualthought,suchasbelief

andjudgmentinthemorefamiliarsense,butalsoperceptualexperience.Avisual

experienceofayellowlemonhasveridicalityconditionsinthesamesensebeliefhas

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truthconditions.Bothareinthebusinessofgettingthingsright.Accordingly,

Brentanowritesthat‘allperceptionsarejudgments,whethertheyareinstancesof

knowledgeorjustmistakenaffirmations’(Brentano1874:209).Whatcharacterizes

judgmentisthiskindoftruth-directedness.Notewell:thisisanidiosyncraticuseof

theterm‘judgment,’butitdoesnotunderminethesignificanceofthethesisthatall

judgmentsareobjectualattitudes.Asauniversalthesis,itappliesalsotojudgments

inthemorefamiliarsense,thatofaproductofconceptualthoughtcanonically

reportedwiththeuseof‘that’-clauses.Inotherwords,judgmentsinthefamiliar

senseformasubsetofjudgmentsinBrentano’ssense;soBrentano’sobjectual

accountofthelatteriseoipsoanobjectualaccountoftheformer.

Brentano’ssecondfundamentalclasscoversalargegroupofphenomena,

includingemotion,affect,thewill,andalgedonicexperiencesofpleasureandpain.

Brentanolamentstheabsenceofasatisfactorynameforthisclass,andcallsit

alternately‘interest,’‘emotion,’or(often)‘phenomenaofloveandhate’(Brentano

1874:199).Whatunifiesthephenomenainthiscategoryisthattheypresentwhat

theydoasgoodorbad.Thedeepnatureofthiscategorythuscontrastswiththe

truth-directednessofjudgmentandischaracterizedbygoodness-directedness:

Justaseveryjudgmenttakesanobjecttobetrueorfalse,inananalogouswayevery

phenomenonwhichbelongstothisclasstakesanobjecttobegoodorbad.(Brentano1874:

199;seealso1874:239)

Wantingabeerpresentsbeerasgood,butsodoestakingpleasureinthebeer,

wishingforbeer,likingbeer,decidingonbeer,andsoon.Intruth,themodern

technicalnotionsof‘proattitude’and‘conattitude’areperfecttermsforBrentano’s

positive(‘love’)andnegative(‘hate’)kindsofintereststate.

Brentano’sotherfundamentalclassispresentationorapprehension.6Thisis

supposedtobeanintentionalstatethatinitselfpresentswhatitdoesneitheras

trueorfalsenorasgoodorbad,butinanentirelyneutralmanner.Itsmostgeneral

characterizationisthusthis:‘Wespeakofapresentationwheneversomething

appearstous’(Brentano1874:198).Thisisthesenseinwhichpresentation

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groundsjudgmentandinterest:everystateofjudgmentorinterestisalsoa

presentation,butnoteverypresentationiseitherajudgmentoraninterest.Forto

presentsomethingastrueorgoodyoumustpresentitatall,butyoucanpresent

somethingwithoutpresentingitastrueorgood.Paradigmaticexamplesofthisare

actsofmerelyentertainingorcontemplatingsomething–whenyoucontemplate

something,itappearstoyouneitherastrue/falsenorasgood/bad;itjustappearsto

you.Importantly,however,anymentalstatethatencodescommitmentneitherto

thetruth/falsitynortogoodness/badnessofwhatitpresents(e.g.,supposition)will

qualifyasamerepresentationinBrentano’sclassification.7

ThenotionofpresentationalmodeiscrucialtoBrentano’sclassification.The

ideaisthatdifferentkindsofmentalstatepresentwhattheydoindifferentways.

Thedifferencebetweenthemisnotinwhattheypresentbutinhowtheypresent.

Importantly,Brentano’spresentationalmodesarenotFrege’s–theyarenotaspect

ofastate’s(fine-grained)content,butofitsattitude.Whenyoujudgethat2+2=4,

youarementallycommittingtothetruthof2+2=4.Butthiscommitmentisbuiltinto

theattitudeyouaretakingtoward2+2=4,itdoesnotshowupinthecontentofyour

judgment.Wemightputthisbysayingthatthejudgmentthat2+2=4doesnot

present2+2=4astrue,butratherpresents-as-true2+2=4.Presenting-as-trueisa

modeormodificationofthepresenting.Similarlyfortheotherpresentational

modes.Whenyoudenythat2+2=5,youarementallycommittingtothefalsityof

2+2=5,butthecommitmentisbuiltintotheattitudeofyourdenial:yourdenialdoes

notpresent2+2=5asfalse,butratherpresents-as-false2+2=5.Likewise,yourlove

oficecreampresents-as-goodicecream(ratherthanpresentingicecreamasgood)

andyourdisapprovalofjingoismpresents-as-badjingoism(ratherthanpresenting

jingoismasbad).

Brentano’snotionofjudgment,then,isthenotionofamentalstate

employingthepresentationalmodeofeitherpresenting-as-trueorpresenting-as-

false.Thisincludesmentalstatesthatwedonotnormallycountasjudgments,such

asperceptualexperiences,butinadditionitincludeswhatwedonormallycountas

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judgments–conceptualthoughtscommittedtotheveracityoftheircontents.All

thosestates,accordingtoBrentano,areobjectualattitudes.

2. TheBelief-InTheoryofJudgment

ThecoreofBrentano’stheoryofjudgmentcanberepresentedastheconjunctionof

twotheses.Thefirstisthatalljudgmentsareexistential,thesecondthatthe

existence-commitmentinvolvedinexistentialjudgmentsisanattitudinalpropertyof

theirs.Thatis:

EXISTENTIAL::ForanyjudgmentJ,Jisanexistentialjudgment.

ATTITUDINAL::ForanyexistentialJudgmentE,E’sexistence-commitmentisan

attitudinalpropertyofE.

Inthissection,Iofferapreliminaryexplanationandmotivationofthetwotheses.

Theremainderofthechapterwillconsiderthecasefortheminmoredetail.

AccordingtoEXISTENTIAL,everyjudgmentisinthebusinessofaffirmingor

denyingtheexistenceofsomething.Thusthejudgmentsthattherearemarine

mammalsandthattherearenoflyingdogsareparadigmatic.Weareaccustomedto

thinkthatnotalljudgmentsarelikethis–someareinthebusinessofdoingmore

thanjustaffirmingordenyingtheexistenceofsomething.Many,itisnaturalto

think,involveanelementofpredication:ratherthancommentingonwhatthereis,

theymakeaclaimaboutwhatsomethingislike,whatpropertiesithas.Thus,the

judgmentthatalldogsarecutepredicatescutenessofdogs,thereby‘claiming’that

dogshaveacertainproperty,not(just)thattheyexist.Brentano,however,insists

thatpredicationisanaccidentoflanguagethatdoesnotreflectthepsychological

realityofjudgments.(Moreonthatin§4.)Inreality,judgingthatalldogsarecuteis

justjudgingthatthereisnonon-cutedog.Itthuscommentsonwhatthereisafterall.

Toshowthatthisgeneralizes,Brentanosystematicallygoesoverthefour

typesofcategoricalstatementinAristotle’ssquareofopposition(A,E,I,andO)and

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showsthattheyareallreducibleor‘traceableback’(rückführbar)toexistential

statements(Brentano1874:213-4,1956:121):

(A) <Alldogsarecute>istraceableto<Thereisnotanon-cutedog>.

(E) <Nodogsarecute>istraceableto<Thereisnotacutedog>.

(I) <Somedogsarecute>istraceableto<Thereisacutedog>.

(O) <Somedogsarenotcute>istraceableto<Thereisanon-cutedog>.

Brentano’stalkofstatements‘beingtraceableback’tootherstatementssuggestshe

hassomethinglikeparaphraseinmind:‘Alldogsarecute’isparaphraseableinto

‘Thereisnotanon-cutedog.’Suchstatementscanexpressjudgments,ortheycanbe

embeddedintocorrespondingstatementsthatreportjudgments:‘Sjudgesthatall

dogsarecute’isparaphraseableinto‘Sjudgesthatthereisnonon-cutedog.’8

Onceallcategoricalstatementsareshowntoparaphraseintoexistential

ones,itiseasytoshowthathypotheticalsfollowsuit(Brentano1874:218).9For

example:

(H)<Ifsomedogisthree-legged,thenitiscute>isreducibleto<Thereisnota

non-cutethree-leggeddog>.

Conclusion:

Thereducibility/traceability(Rückführbarkeit)ofcategoricalstatements(Sätze),indeedthe

reducibilityofallstatementswhichexpressajudgment,toexistentialjudgmentsistherefore

indubitable.(Brentano1874:218)

Morecautiously,allstatementsofAristotelianlogicturnouttobedisguised

existentials.Wewillhavetoconsiderothertypesofstatementin§3.

AccordingtoEXISTENTIAL,then,allactsofjudgingareformsofmentally

committingtosomething’sexistenceornonexistence.AccordingtoATTITUDINAL,

now,theexistence-commitmentwhichexistentialjudgmentscarryisanaspectof

theirattituderatherthancontent.Onthisview,mentalcommitmenttotheexistence

ofxisnotanaspectofwhatthejudgmentpresentsbutofhowitdoesthepresenting.

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Inotherwords:anexistentialjudgment’scommitmenttotheexistenceofxisnota

matterofpresentingxasexistent,butamatterofpresenting-as-existentx.Thus,to

judgethatsomedogsarecuteistoperformamentalactthatpresents-as-existent

cutedogs,thatis,presentscutedogsinanexistence-affirmingmanner.10

Theattitudinalaccountofmentalexistence-commitmentisunsurprising

giventhat,forBrentano,whatcharacterizesjudgmentinthefirstinstanceisthe

attitudinalpropertyofpresenting-as-true.Ifallpositivejudgmentspresent-as-true

andalltruthisexistential,itstandstoreasonthatpositivejudgmentsshouldturn

outtobecharacterizedbypresenting-as-existent.

Moregenerally,ifthecommitmenttosomething’sexistenceornonexistence

doesnotshowupinjudgments’content,thenthecontentisexhaustedbythe

individualobjectwhoseexistenceisaffirmedordenied.Ifajudgmentthatathree-

leggeddogexistssimplypresents-as-existentathree-leggeddog,thenwhatis

presented(inthatmode)isexhaustedbyacertainkindofindividualobject:athree-

leggeddog.Onthisview,then,judgmentturnsouttobeanobjectualratherthan

propositionalattitude.Tothatextent,Brentano’stheoryofjudgmentcastsitas

continuouswithsuchstatesaslovingJaneandfearingadog.Judgmentsarealways

directedatsomesortofindividualobject,butpresent-as-existent/nonexistentthat

object.Theobjectatwhichone’sjudgmentisdirectedcanbequitecomplicated–a

cutedog,acuteflyingdog,athree-leggednon-cuteflyingdog,etc.–butinanycase

whatispresentedbythejudgmentisalwayssomekindofindividualobject.Itis

neveranyentityofadifferentontologicalcategory,suchasapropositionorastate

ofaffairs(Brentano1930:108).Accordingly,forBrentanothetruthmakersof

existentialsarenotstatesofaffairsconsistinginthings’existence,butthethings

themselves.Hewrites:

…thebeingofAneednotbeproducedinorderforthejudgment‘Ais’tobe…correct;allthat

isneededisA.(Brentano1930:85)

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Inaslogan:thetruthmakersof(positive)existentialsarenotexistencesbut

existents.11Thereasonthisispossibleisthatthecontentofjudgmentsisexhausted

byindividuals,notindividuals’existence.

Itmightseemoddtopositacognitiveattitudedirectedatobjectsandnot

propositionsorstatesofaffairs.Typicalobjectualattitudessuchasloveandfearare

emotionalattitudes,andthesuspicionmayarisethattheobjectualstructureis

specialtosuchattitudes.Butinfact,wedospeaknotonlyofbelief-thatbutalsoof

belief-in–asin‘JimmybelievesinSantaClaus.’Belief-inisclearlyacognitive

objectualattitude:thecontentofJimmy’sstateisexhaustedbysomeindividual

object,SantaClaus,thecommitmenttowhoseexistencecomesinatthelevelof

attitude,throughtheattitudeofbelieving-in.12Soessentially,Brentano’stheoryof

judgmentcanbesummarizedthus:

BIT::Allpositivejudgmentsareoccurrentactsofbelieving-in;allnegative

judgmentsareoccurrentactsofdisbelieving-in.13

Judgingthatsomedogsarecuteisjustperformingamentalactthatpresents-as-

existentacutedog,thatis,occurrentlybelievinginacutedog;judgingthatnodogs

canflyisjustperformingamentalactthatpresents-as-nonexistentaflyingdog,that

is,occurrentlydisbelievinginaflyingdog.

Tobesure,becauseofalongphilosophicaltraditionoftreatingpropositional

attitudesasfundamentalincognition,itisnaturalforustodaytothinkof‘Sbelieves

inx’asshorthandfor‘Sbelievesthatxexists.’14ForBrentano,thisgetstheorderof

analysisexactlywrong.Themorefundamentalnotionisbelief-in,preciselybecause

itcapturescorrectlythepsychologicalstructureofjudgments,inparticularthelocus

ofexistence-commitmentintheattituderatherthancontent.Accordingly,Brentano

wouldproposetotake‘Sbelievesinx’asfundamentalandconsider‘Sbelievesthatx

exists’acumbersomeandmisleadingwayofsayingthesamething.Thisallowsusto

paraphrasethereportsofAristoteliancategoricalandhypotheticaljudgmentsmore

straightforwardly:

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(A*)‘Sjudgesthateverydogiscute’ó‘Sdisbelievesinanon-cutedog’

(E*)‘Sjudgesthatnodogiscute’ó‘Sdisbelievesinacutedog’

(I*)‘Sjudgesthatsomedogiscute’ó‘Sbelievesinacutedog’

(O*)‘Sjudgesthatsomedogisnotcute’ó‘Sbelievesinanon-cutedog’

(H*)‘Sjudgesthatifadogisthree-leggedthenheiscute’ó‘Sdisbelievesina

three-leggednon-cutedog’

Here,‘ó’justmeans‘canbeparaphrasedinto.’Thearrowisbidirectionalbecause

paraphraseabilityisasymmetricrelation:if‘p’isagoodparaphraseof‘q,’then‘q’is

anequallygoodparaphraseof‘p.’ItisthephilosophicalsubstanceofBrentano’s

theoryofjudgmentthatineachcaseitistheright-hand-sidereportthatcaptures

correctlythestructureofjudgment,eventhoughitistheleft-hand-sidereportthat

ismorecommonineverydayspeak.

IcallBrentano’stheoryofjudgmenttheBelief-InTheory,orBITforshort.15

AccordingtoBIT,alljudgmentsareconsciousactsof(dis)believinginsomething

(somekindofindividualobject).Brentano’sterminologyisdifferent,ofcourse.He

callsthecognitiveobjectualattitudethatembodiesmentalcommitmentto

something’sexistence‘acceptance’or‘acknowledgement’(Anerkennung)andthe

cognitiveobjectualattitudeembodyingcommitmenttononexistence‘rejection’or

‘denial’(Verwerfung).However,theassociatedverbs(‘accepting,’‘acknowledging,’

‘rejecting,’‘denying’)canperfectlygrammaticallytakepropositionalcomplements.

‘Believingin’and‘disbelievingin’havethisadvantage,thattheycanonlytake

objectualcomplements.TheyarethusbetterforexpressingBrentano’stheory.16

Whatevertheterminology,acrucialaspectofBITisthatjudgmentisan

objectualattitude:

OBJECTUAL::Alljudgmentsareobjectualattitudes.

OBJECTUALfollowsfromEXISTENTIALandATTITUDINALgiventhat(dis)belief-inisan

objectualattitude.Wemayformulatethemasterargumentasfollows:

1) Alltokenbeliefsareexistential(EXISTENTIAL);

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2) Allexistentialbeliefsarebeliefs-in(ATTITUDINAL);

3) Allbeliefs-inareobjectualattitudes;therefore,

4) Alltokenbeliefsareobjectualattitudes(OBJECTUAL).

Ontheemergingview,thesolebusinessofcognitionistomanageone’sbeliefin

someobjectsanddisbeliefinothers.Obviously,thisisanextremelyheterodoxview

ofcognition,whichwouldrequireaverygoodargumentindeed.Inowturnto

considerthecaseforit.

3. TheCasefortheBelief-InTheory

InthePsychology,Brentanospendsconsiderabletimeandeffortarguingthat

judgmentisnotessentiallypredicative.Forexample,hearguesthatsinceperception

isakindofjudgment,andperceptionisnotessentiallypredicative(sometimeswe

justperceiveathing),judgmentneednotbepredicative(Brentano1874:209).

However,theseargumentsestablish,atmost,thatsomejudgmentsarenot

predicative(andthereforepotentiallynon-propositional).Theycannotestablish

thatalljudgmentsareobjectualratherthanpropositionalattitudes,asOBJECTUAL

requires.AsfarasIcantell,thereisnodirectargumentforOBJECTUALinthe

Psychology.Nonetheless,insomeofBrentano’s(posthumouslypublished)letters,

dictations,andlecturenotes,onecanidentifyacaseforEXISTENTIALandATTITUDINAL,

henceforOBJECTUAL.

ThestartingpointofBrentano’sargumentisasimpledispensability

consideration.Ina1906lettertohisstudentAntonMarty,hewrites:

…everyassertionaffirmingyourentiarationis[notably,propositions]hasitsequivalentin

anassertionhavingonlyrealia[i.e.,concreteindividualobjects]asobjects…Notonlyare

yourjudgmentsequivalenttojudgmentsaboutconcreteobjects(realeGegenstände),the

latterarealwaysavailable[forparaphrasingtheformer].Hencetheentiarationisare

entirelyunnecessary/superfluous(unnütz)andcontrarytotheeconomyofnature.

(Brentano1930:84;seealsoBrentano1956§17)

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Theargumentproceedsintwosteps.First:everyindicativestatementthat

expressesajudgmentcanbeparaphrasedintoanexistential,meaningthat

indicativesostensiblyexpressingbeliefs-thatcanbeparaphrasedintoones

ostensiblyexpressingbeliefs-in.Second:theontologicalcommitmentsassociated

withabelief-inarealwaysmoreeconomicalthanthoseassociatedwithits

correspondingbelief-that;forpropositionsandthelikeentiarationisaremore

ontologicallyextravagantthanconcreteobjectsandthelikeentiarealia.

Accordingly,positingbeliefs-intotheexclusionofbeliefs-thatisbothfeasibleand

commendable:feasibleinvirtueoftheavailabilityofparaphrase,commendablein

virtueofontologicalparsimony.Theupshotcanbesummarizedthus:the

conjunctionofEXISTENTIALandATTITUDINALdeliverssignificantontological

economies,andshouldbeadoptedonthatbasis.Inwhatfollows,Iconsiderfirstthe

feasibilityclaim(§3.1),thenthecommendabilityclaim(§3.2).

3.1.DispensingwithBeliefs-thatisFeasible

InBrentano,thefirststepoftheargumentreliesonproducingtheparaphrasesfor

categoricalandhypotheticalstatementsinAristotelianlogic(asseenin§2).One

maywonderwhetherparaphraseswillbeavailablewhenwemovetomodernlogic.

Inowturntoconsidertwoparticularlyimportantcases:singularstatementsand

‘molecular’or‘compound’statements.Iwillarguethatalladmitofreasonably

plausibleexistentialparaphrases,withthepotentialexceptionofcertainmolecular

statements.

Startwithsuchsingularstatementsas‘Beyoncéisfamous.’Thesehavethe

form‘aisF,’whichdoesnotimmediatelyfitintoanyofA,E,I,orO.Leibniz,whoalso

rejectedtheseparationofsubjectandpredicate(Leibniz1686§8),construed

singularsashavingtheAform.So,‘Beyoncéisfamous’amountsisanalyzedas‘All

Beyoncésarefamous,’whichisBrentano’shandsamountsto‘Thereisnotanon-

famousBeyoncé.’SometimesBrentanosoundslikeaLeibnizianonthis,butonother

occasionsheseemstotreatsingularsratherashavingtheIform.17Thisanalyzes

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‘Beyoncéisfamous’as‘SomeBeyoncéisfamous,’andultimatelyas‘Thereisa

famousBeyoncé.’Inthissecondapproach,unliketheLeibnizianone,‘aisF’commits

totheexistenceofsomethingratherthantothenonexistenceofsomething.Ifwe

followRussell(1905)intakingtheexistenceofatobeapreconditionforthetruth

of‘aisF,’theBrentaniantackshouldappealtousmorethantheLeibnizian.

Butwhatdoes‘ThereisafamousBeyoncé’exactlymean?Atraditional

descriptivistaboutnameswouldtake‘Beyoncé’topickoutwhicheverindividual

satisfiesadescriptionthatlistscertaincentralpropertiesofBeyoncé’s.Callan

individualthatinstantiatesalltherelevantpropertiesBeyoncésque.18Withinthe

descriptivistframework,then,‘ThereisafamousBeyoncé’means‘Thereisafamous

Beyoncésqueindividual.’

Itislessclearhowthiswouldworkwithinadirect-referenceapproachto

names.Accordingtothelatter,‘Beyoncé’doesnotreferbycourtesyofany

description.Rather,itpicksoutwhateverobjectisappropriatelyrelatedtoit(where

itistheburdenofthetheorytotellusexactlywhattherelevantrelationis).19

Withinthisframework,itishardertoseehowanexistentialparaphrasemight

work.20Ontheotherhand,adirect-referencetheoristmightsimplyparaphrase

‘Beyoncéisfamous’into‘Thereisfamous-Beyoncé,’where‘famous-Beyoncé’isused

asaname.Statementsoftheform‘ThereisN’(where‘N’rangesoverpropernames)

areawkward,butultimatelytheymeanthesameas‘Nexists,’whichisnot

awkward.’Sotheideaisessentiallytoparaphrase‘Beyoncéisfamous’into‘Famous-

Beyoncéexists.’Thereisstillanopenquestionastowhattheapparentname

‘Famous-Beyoncé’refersto,butletusbracketthisissuehere(seeKriegel2015fora

detaileddiscussion).21Onceweaccept‘Thereisfamous-Beyoncé’asawkward-but-

grammatical,thereiseveryreasontothinkthatitparaphrasesfaithfully‘Beyoncéis

famous.’

Iconcludethatsingularsareamenabletoexistentialparaphrase,pending

troubleinultimatelyunderstandingwhatsuchnamesas‘Famous-Beyoncé’referto.

Themorecomplicatedcaseispresentedbycompoundormolecularstatements.We

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cansimplifythetasksomewhatbyfocusingonhowtohandleconjunctionand

negation,sinceeverybinarytruth-functionisdefinableintermsofthosetwo.

Inseparation,theyarequiteeasytohandle.Whenitcomesto

straightforwardconjunctionsoftheformp&q,suchas‘Somecatiswhiteandsome

dogisbrown,’atleasttwooptionsareopen.Oneparaphrasesthemintoatomic

existentialsaboutmereologicalsums,suchas‘Thereisasumofawhitecatanda

browndog.’Thejudgmentexpressedhereisabeliefintherelevantsum.Theother

optionistotreatconjunctionsasexpressingapluralityofsimultaneous(atomic)

judgments.Onthisapproach,intruthwedonotmakeonejudgmentexpressedby

‘Somecatiswhiteandsomedogisbrown.’Instead,wesimultaneouslyperformtwo

judgments–anoccurrentbeliefinawhitecatandanoccurrentbeliefinabrown

dog–andweuseconjunctivestatementstoexpresssuchmultiplicityofjudgments.

Inaway,thefirstoptionappealstobeliefinamereologicalsum,thesecondtoa

mereologicalsumofbeliefs-in.

Asforsimplenegation,intheAristoteliansystemtherearetwoseparate

cases:theEform(‘Nodogsarecute’)andtheOform(‘Somedogsarenotcute’).The

formerBrentanohandlesthroughtheattitudeofdisbelief,whichhetakestobeasui

generisattitudeirreducibletobelief.Itiscommontodaytotake‘Sdisbelivesincute

dogs’tobejustaflowerywayofsaying‘Sbelievesthattherearenocutedogs,’but

aswehaveseen,Brentanoadoptsanonreductiveaccountofdisbeliefthatrunsthe

otherway,considering‘Sbelievesthatnodogsarecute’tobeamisleadingreport

thatwouldbebetterputas‘Sdisbelievesinacutedog.’Asforsuchnegationsas

‘Somedogsarenotcute,’wehaveseenthatBrentanoconstruesthemasexpressing

aspecialkindofpositivejudgment,inourcaseabeliefinanuncutedog.22

ge

Thingsgetmorecomplicatedwhenwecombineconjunctionandnegationoperators

inasinglestatement.Considerfirststatementsoftheformp&~q,suchas‘Somecat

iscuteandnodogcanfly.’Herethereisnomereologicalsumwhoseexistencecould

betakentobeasserted–atleastontheassumptionthatthereisnosuchthingas

15

thesumofacutecatandanabsenceofaflyingdog(indeedofcatsandabsencesin

general!).Accordingly,theonlyliveoptionistotake‘Somecatiscuteandnodog

canfly’toexpressasumoftwodistinctjudgments,thebeliefinacutecatandthe

disbeliefinaflyingdog.

Unfortunately,theoppositehappenswithstatementsoftheform~(p&q),

suchas‘Itisnotthecasethatsomecatiscuteandsomedogcanfly.’Herethereis

onlyonejudgmentthatcanbesaidtobeexpressed.Thatjudgmentisadisbeliefin

themereologicalsumofacutecatandaflyingdog.Theunpalatableresulthereis

thatBrentanohasnounifiedaccountofp&~qand~(p&q).Hemusttrotout

differenttreatmentsfordifferentcombinationsofconjunctionandnegation.Thatis

somethingofanembarrassment.

Worse,neitheraccountcanhandleastatementoftheform~(p&~q),such

as‘Itisnotthecasethatthereareflyingdogsbutnocutecats.’Ontheonehand,it

wouldbeimplausibletotakesuchastatementtoexpressadisbeliefinthe

mereologicalsumof(a)aflyingdogand(b)theabsenceofacutecat.Forthenits

negationwouldhavetobetakentoexpressabeliefinthatsum,andhenceinan

absence(whichwouldcommitthebelievertotherealityofabsences).Ontheother

hand,nordoes‘Itisnotthecasethatthereareflyingdogsbutnocutecats’seemto

expressadisbeliefintheco-occurrenceoftwoseparatejudgments,abeliefinacute

catandadisbeliefinaflyingdog.Forwhatthesubjectrejectsarenotbeliefs

themselves.(Forallsheknowsthebeliefsmaywellexist!)Tothatextent,

statementsoftheform~(p&~q)canbehandledneitherbythe‘(dis)beliefinsums’

strategynotbythe‘sumof(dis)beliefs’strategy.

Brentano’sapproachtothisproblemistotreatsuchstatementsasrejections

notjustofco-occurringjudgmentsbutofco-occurringtrueorcorrect(richtig)

judgments.Onthisview,‘Itisnotthecasethatthereareflyingdogsbutnocutecats’

istobeparaphrasedinto‘Thereisnosumofacorrectbeliefinflyingdogsanda

correctdisbeliefincutecats.’Thejudgmentexpressedhereisthedisbeliefinsucha

sumofcorrectjudgments.Theideaisthatnoonecouldcorrectlybothbelieveina

16

flyingdoganddisbelieveinacutecat–andthisiswhatastatementoftheform~(p

&~q)reallyexpresses.Whatisexpressedhereisinrealityasecond-orderjudgment

–whichisnotthatsurprisinggiventhatwearetryingtoaccountforsecond-order

negation.

Onemightreasonablycomplainthatweareleftherewithadistressingly

balkanizedtreatmentofnegation:wehaveseendifferentdevicesforhandling~p,

p&~q,~(p&q),and~(p&~q).Thesedevicesare:asuigenerisattitudeofdisbelief,

singlestatementsexpressingsumsofdifferentjudgments,singlejudgmentsabout

mereologicalsumsofobjects,andsecond-orderjudgmentsaboutcorrectfirst-order

judgments.ThislevelofdisunitylookslikeamajorcostofBrentano’stheoryof

judgment,thecomplaintmightbe.

However,itwouldseemthatoncewehaveintroducedthedeviceofsecond-

orderjudgmentaboutcorrectfirst-orderjudgment,itcanbeappliedretrospectively

tohandleuniformlyallfourcases:~pcanbeunderstoodasexpressingadisbeliefin

acorrectjudgmentthatp,p&~qcanbeunderstoodasexpressingajudgmentthatp

andadisbeliefinacorrectjudgmentthatq,and~(p&q)canbeunderstoodasa

disbeliefinasumofcorrectjudgmentsthatpandthatq.

Thereis,however,anotherobjectiontowhichBrentano’saccountofnegation

issusceptible.RecallthatBrentano’sparaphrasesarenotintendedastechnical

movesfacilitatingtheregimentationofaformallanguage.Theyareintendedto

capturethedeeppsychologicalrealityofourcognitivelife.Arguably,however,itis

psychologicallyunrealistictothinkthat‘Nodogsarepurple’actuallyexpressesthe

second-orderjudgmentthatthereisnocorrectbeliefinapurpledog.Forharboring

suchasecond-orderjudgmentwouldseemtorequirethepossessionofsuch

conceptsasBELIEFandCORRECTNESS,yetachildmaywellbelievethatnodogsare

purplewithoutpossessingthoseconcepts.Furthermore,certainbeliefsthatappear

simpleenoughthatachildcouldhavethemarecastasextraordinarilycomplexin

Brentano’stheory,againmakingthetheorypsychologicallyunrealistic.

17

Agoodexampleisdisjunctivejudgments,suchaswouldbeexpressedby

‘Somecatiswhiteorsomedogisbrown.’Chisholm(1976:92)suggestedon

Brentano’sbehalfthatwepositdisjunctiva,inthiscasetheindividualwhichiseither

awhitecatorabrowndog,andsaythat‘Somecatiswhiteorsomedogisbrown’

expressesanoccurrentbeliefinthisdisjunctivum.However,Brentanohimself

wouldlikelyfrownondisjunctivajustasmuchasonabsences(‘negativa,’ashe

calledthem).Instead,heexploitsthedefinabilityofdisjunctionintermsofnegation

andconjunction:

…anyonewhosays‘ThereisanAorthereisaBorthereisaC’expressesthefollowing:in

contemplatingthatAisnotandBisnotandCisnot,heconsiderssuchacombinationof

thoughtsincorrect.(Brentano1930:70)

Weknowthat‘pVq’isequivalentto‘~(~p&~q).’Sowecanparaphrase‘Somecat

iswhiteorsomedogisbrown’into‘Itisnotthecasethatnocatiswhiteandnodog

isbrown,’andtheninto‘Thereisnomereologicalsumofacorrectdisbeliefina

whitecatandacorrectdisbeliefinabrowndog.’23However,itisquiteplausiblethat

achildcouldgraspthenotionthatsomecatiswhiteorsomedogisbrownwell

beforeshehasthecognitiveresourcestograsptheideaofamereologicalsumof

correctdisbeliefs.

ge

Inconclusion,althoughBrentanohimselfrestshiscasefortheparaphraseabilityof

allstatementsintoexistentialsmainlyonconsiderationofcategoricaland

hypotheticalstatements,hehassomeoptionsforexistentialparaphrasesofsingular

andcompoundstatementsaswell.Theparaphrasesmaynotalwaysbeelegant,and

sometimesentrainrealcosts,notablythecontrastbetweentherelativesimplicityof

believing(e.g.)thatsomebabyorsomedogiscuteandtheevidentcomplexityof

disbelievinginamereologicalsumofacorrectdisbeliefinacutebabyandacorrect

disbeliefinacutedog.Still,itisalreadyremarkablethatanexistentialparaphraseis

alwaysavailable.ItwouldthereforenotbeunreasonabletoindulgeBrentanoand

granthimthefirststepofhisargument:dispensingwithbelief-thatisfeasible.

18

3.2.DispensingwithBeliefs-thatisCommendable

Paraphraseabilityisasymmetricrelation:if‘blah’paraphrasesinto‘bleh,’then

equally‘bleh’paraphrasesinto‘blah.’Accordingly,inshowingthatallpredicative

statementsparaphraseintoexistentialones,wewouldalsobeshowingthatallthe

relevantexistentialsparaphraseintopredicatives.Sotheparaphrasebyitselfdoes

notdemonstratethatallseeminglypredicativejudgmentsareinfactexistential.It

couldbeequallywelltakentosuggestthattherelevantseeminglyexistential

judgmentsareinfactpredicative.

Someonemightrespond,onBrentano’sbehalf,thatinterpretingthe

paraphraseabilityasshowingthatalljudgmentsareexistentialbringswithit

increasedtheoreticalunity;theoppositeinterpretationdoesnot.Inoneversion,the

claimwouldbethatalthoughallpredicativesparaphraseintoexistentials,thereare

alsosomeextraexistentialsforwhichnopredicativeparaphraseisavailable.In

anotherversion,theclaimmightbethatexistentialsasaclassaresimplymore

homogeneousthanpredicatives.However,bothclaimsaresuspect.Ontheonehand,

itisdoubtfulthatthereareexistentialsthatcannotbeputinpredicativeform,given

theavailabilityofsuchfirst-orderpredicatesas‘exists,’‘isexistent,’and‘isreal.’As

fortheclaimthatexistentialsareinherentlymorehomogeneousthanpredicatives,

itishardtoevaluatesuchclaimsintheabsenceofexplicitmeasuresoftherelevant

homogeneity.Attheveryleast,theenvisagedargumentwouldrequire

supplementationintheformof(i)providingameasureofclasshomogeneityfor

statementsand(ii)showingthat,asaclass,existentialsscorehigheronthis

measurethanpredicatives.

Brentano’sownargument,inthequoted1906lettertoMarty,isnotfrom

unitybutparsimony(‘theeconomyofnature’).Theideaseemstobethatifsome

judgmentsarepredicative,thentheircontentsarepropositional,whichwould

requireustoembracepropositionsinourontology,andtheirtruthmakersare

statesofaffairs,whichwewouldhavetoembraceaswellinourontology.In

19

contrast,Brentanoseemstoclaim,existentialjudgmentsdonotrequirea

propositionalcontent,andtheirtruthmakerscanbeindividualobjects.

Thenotionthatjudgmentsmaynotrequirepropositionsascontentis

potentiallygreatlyadvantageous,giventheforceofworriesaboutthe‘unityofthe

proposition’prominentinrecentphilosophyofmindandlanguage(King2007).But

theparsimonyBrentanopursuesmostvigorouslyconcernstruthmakers.The

truthmakerofabeliefthatsomedogsarecute,itisnaturaltosay,isthefact(orthe

obtainingstateofaffairs)thatsomedogsarecute.Incontrast,thetruthmakersof

thebeliefincutedogsaresimplythecutedogs.Eachandeverycutedogoutthere

makestruethebeliefincutedogs.24Thusthetruthmakersofbeliefs-inare

individualobjectsratherthanfactsorstatesofaffairs.Otherthingsbeingequal,

then,thethesisthatallbeliefsarebeliefs-inpavesthewaytoanominalistontology

thatdispenseswithfactsandstatesofaffairs.Thistooisgreatlyadvantageous,given

worriesaboutso-calledBradley’sregressattendingastate-of-affairsontology.25

IdevelopthisnominalisticsideofBrentano’sproposalmorefullyinKriegel

2015;whatIwanttostresshereisthatthe1906lettertoMartysuggeststhatthat

nominalistontologyisthemotivationfortheBITtheoryofjudgment.

Thekeytodeliveringnominalismisthenotionthatbeliefs-inaremadetrue

byindividualobjects,notbyexistentialstatesofaffairs(ofwhichsuchobjectsare

constituents).Itmightbeobjectedthatthebeliefindogsismadetruenotbyeach

dog,butratherbyeachdog’sexistence–whereadog’sexistenceisastateofaffairs

(thefactthatthedogexists).ButBrentanoexplicitlyrejectsthisinthesameletterto

Marty:

[T]hebeingofAneednotbeproducedinorderforthejudgment“Ais”tobe…correct;all

thatisneededisA.(Brentano1930:85)

Itistheobject,andnot(thefactof)theobject’sexistence,thatmakestruethe

relevantexistential.Inaslogan:thetruthmakersofexistentialsarenotexistences

butexistents.

20

Whatisthereasontotaketheobjectitself,ratherthanitsexistence,tomake

truetheexistentialjudgment?Onereasonisparsimonyofcourse.ButBrentanoalso

adducesaseparateargument.Itisanargumentfrominfiniteregress,presentedin

thatlettertoMarty(Brentano1930:85-6)andasubsequentlettertoHugoBergman

(Bergmann1946:84),aswellasina1914dictation(Brentano1930:108).Suppose

forreductiothatbeliefinmydogJuliusismadetruenotbyJulius,butbyJulius’

existence.TheninadditiontoJulius,wemustaddtoourontologythestateofaffairs

ofJuliusexisting.Inaddingthisstateofaffairstoourontology,now,weareclearly

committingourselvestoitsexistence.Andcommittingtotheexistenceofthestate

ofaffairsofJuliusexistingisamatterofbelievinginthatstateofaffairs.The

questionarisesthenofwhatmakesthisnewbelieftrue.Oneviewisthatitismade

truebythestateofaffairsofJuliusexistingitself.Theotherviewisthatitismade

truebynotbythestateofaffairsofJuliusexisting,butbytheexistenceofthatstate

ofaffairs(thatis,bythestateofaffairsofthestateofaffairsofJuliusexisting

existing!).Ifwetaketheformerview,thenweallowbeliefsincertainitemstobe

madetruebythoseitemsthemselves,ratherthanbytheirexistences;sowemight

aswellallowalreadythebeliefinJuliustobemadetruebyJuliushimself,rather

thanbyJulius’existence.If,however,wetakethebeliefinthestateofaffairsof

Juliusexistingtobemadetruebytheexistenceofthatstateofaffairs,thenweare

includinginourontologyanew,second-orderstateofaffairs,namely,thatofJulius’

existenceexisting.Thisontologicalcommitmentofoursrequiresustobelieveinthat

second-orderstateofaffairs–andoffweareonaviciousregress.Theonlynon-

arbitrarywaytoavoidtheregressistorecognizedogsthemselvesasthe

truthmakersoffirst-orderbeliefsindogs.

Insummary,theBITtheoryofjudgmenthastheadvantageofdispensing

withstatesofaffairsasthekindofentitiesourjudgmentsareanswerableto.More

precisely,whatwehavehereisadispensabilityargumenttotheeffectthatthe

conjunctionofEXISTENTIALandATTITUDINALresultsinadoublyparsimony-enabling

theoryofjudgment:thereis(i)noneedtopositpropositionstoaccountforthe

21

structureofjudgments,and(ii)noneedtopositfactsand/orstatesofaffairsto

accountforthetruthof(true)judgments.

ge

TheargumentisthatweshouldadopttheconjunctionofATTITUDINALand

EXISTENTIALbecausedoingsowillprovidedownstreambenefits.Theargumentis

powerful,buthastwolimitations.First,itoffersnomotivationforeither

ATTITUDINALorEXISTENTIALinseparationfromtheother,andsecond,itpresentno

upstreamconsiderationsofferingindependentsupportforeitherATTITUDINALor

EXISTENTIAL.Now,intheentireBrentanocorpusIdonotbelievethereisany

independentargumentofthesortforEXISTENTIAL.ButforATTITUDINALthereareat

leasttwo.

Themoreexplicitargumentappears,tomyknowledge,onlyinBrentano’s

lecturenotesfromhislogiccoursesinViennaat1878-9and1884-5(Brentano1956

§15).Thosewhomaintainthatanexistentialjudgment’sexistence-commitmentis

anaspectofcontent,Brentanoreasons,havethefollowingpictureinmind.When

youjudgethatthePopeiswise,youputtogethertheconceptofPopeandthe

conceptofwisdom.Likewise,whenyoujudgethatthereisapope,orthatthePope

exists,youputtogethertheconceptofPopeandtheconceptofexistence.Butnote,

saysBrentano,thatyoucannotjudgethatthePopeiswisewithoutacknowledging

(annerkenen)thePope,thatis,presenting-as-existentthePope.Bythesametoken,

youcannotjudgethatthePopeexistswithoutacknowledgingthePope.Butonceone

hasacknowledgedthePope,thereisnopointinadditionallyjudgingthatthePope

exists–thereisnothinginthelatternotalreadyintheformer.Sincethe

commitmenttothePope’sexistenceisalreadybuiltintotheacknowledging,that

commitmentismerelyreplicatedintheact’scontent.

Oneobjectionmightbethatacknowledgementisnotbuiltintojudgmentthe

wayBrentanoclaims.Forexample,onemayjudgethatAlyoshaKaramazovis

emotionallywisewithoutacknowledgingAlyoshaintherelevantsense(thesenseof

presenting-as-existent).However,forBrentanosuchstatementsas‘Alyosha

22

Karamazovisemotionallywise’areellipticalforthehypothetical‘Iftherewerean

AlyoshaKaramazov,hewouldbeemotionallywise’(seeBrentano1911:273).Aswe

sawin§2,thisinturnexpressesonlyanegativejudgment,namely,thatthereisnot

anon-emotionally-wiseAlyosha.Suchnegativejudgmentsareorthogonaltothe

argument,sincenegativeexistentialsdonotcommittoanything’sexistence

(obviously:theyratherinvolvecommitmenttononexistence).

Anotherobjectionmightbethatacknowledgementonlyappearstobea

distinctiveattitude.Intruth,toacknowledgesomethingamountstojudgingthatthe

thinghasthepropertyofexisting.Inotherwords,justasBrentanoclaimsthat

belief-thatreportsshouldbeparaphrasedintobelief-inreports,thepresentobjector

claimsweshoulddotheinverse.Whatthisobjectionshows,Ithink,isthatdeeper

(nonlinguistic)considerationsarecalledfortoshowthatexistence-commitmentis

anattitudinalratherthancontentproperty.

Brentano’smainargumentforthisisimplicitinthePsychology.26Thebasic

pointisthatactsofjudgingandactsofcontemplatingorentertainingcanhavethe

samecontent(Brentano1874:205).Yetthejudgingcommitsthesubjecttothe

realityofwhatisjudged,whilethecontemplatingfailstocommittotheexistenceof

thecontemplated.Therefore,theexistence-commitmentcannotcomefromthe

content,whichisshared.Itmustcomefromsomeotherdifferencebetweenjudging

andcontemplating.Thebestcandidate,saysBrentano(1874:221-2),isan

attitudinaldifference:thejudgingpresentsthejudgedinawaythatthe

contemplatingdoesnotpresentthecontemplated,andthatwayofpresenting

encodes(ifyouplease)commitmenttotherelevantobject’sexistence.

ConsideranepisodeinwhichIamtoldthatsomestarvelingisimmasked.

First,Iamunsurewhatwassaid.ThenIreasonthatbythesoundofit,‘starveling’

mustbeawordforsomeonewhostarvesand‘immasked’awordforsomeonewho

iswearingamask.WhathappensnextisthatIapprehendorcontemplatethenotion

thatsomestarvingpersoniswearingamask.AtthispointIamcommittedneither

totheexistencenortothenonexistenceofsuchaperson.Aftersomethinking,

23

however,Irealizethattherearesomanyhungrypeoplearoundtheworldthatitis

ratherprobableatleastoneofthemiswearingamaskrightnow.Ithencometo

accepttheexistenceofanimmaskedstarveling.Inthisstretchofinnerlife,the

changethathappenswhenInolongermerelycontemplatebutalsobelieveinan

immaskedstarvelingisnotachangeinwhatispresentedtome,butinhowitis

presented.Whatispresentedthroughoutisastarvingpersonwearingamask.But

firstheispresentedinawaythatdoesnotcommittohisexistenceandthenina

waythatdoes.Theexistence-commitmentisthusanaspectofthewaythe

presentingisdone–whatIhavecalledanattitudinalproperty.

Tomymind,thismoreimplicitargumentofBrentano’siscogent,and

demonstratesthatexistence-commitmentisindeednotacontentproperty,but

likelyanattitudinalproperty.27Itisworthmentioning,though,thatthereisanother

argumentforATTITUDINALclosetothesurfaceinthePsychology.Considerthe

Kantianclaimthat‘existenceisnotaproperty,’whichBrentanocitesapprovingly:

InhiscritiqueoftheontologicalargumentfortheexistenceofGod,Kantmadethepertinent

remarkthatinanexistentialstatement,i.e.inastatementoftheform‘Aexists,’existence‘is

notarealpredicate,i.e.aconceptofsomethingthatcanbesuperposed(hinzukommen)on

theconceptofathing.’‘Itis,’hesaid,‘onlythepositingofathingorofcertaindeterminations

[read:properties],asexistinginthemselves.’(Brentano1874:211)

Ifthereisnosuchthingasapropertyofexistence,anyattributionofexistenceto

somethingwouldbeattributionofapropertythatnothinghas.Accordingly,any

existentialbeliefthatattributedexistencetosomethingwouldperforcebe

misattributingandthereforemistaken.Butinfactnotallexistentialbeliefsare

mistaken:itiscorrect,forexample,tobelieveinducks.So(correct)commitmentto

something’sexistencecannotinvolveattributionofapropertyofexistence.If

commitmenttoFs’existenceisnotamatterofattributingexistencetoFs,itmust

insteadbebuiltintotheverynatureoftheattitudetakentowardFs.Thisisthe

attitudeofbelieving-in,anattitudewhoseverynatureistopresent-as-existent.

24

IconcludethatthecaseforbothEXISTENTIALandATTITUDINALisstrongerthan

onemightinitiallysuspect.Asnoted,togethertheyentailOBJECTUAL.Andallthree

thesestogetherconstituteBIT,Brentano’sBelief-InTheoryofjudgment.Thetheory

isveryunusual,butapparentlymoredefensiblethanmayinitiallyappear.Its

greatestcost,itseemstome,isthegapbetweentheapparentsimplicityofcertain

(notablycompound)judgmentsandtheevidentcomplexityBrentano’stheory

attributestothem.

4. ObjectionsandReplies

GivenhowunusualBrentano’sviewis,itissurprisingthatthecaseforitshouldbe

assolidasitis.Nonetheless,anumberofobjectionssuggestthemselves.Letus

considerthemorepressing.

Clearly,Brentano’stheorygoesagainstourintuitionsastwenty-first-century

philosophers‘broughtup’onacertainconceptionofthestructureofjudgmentand

belief:ashavingasubject-predicatestructureakintothestructureofthesentences

usedtoexpressthem.Butjustasclearly,Brentanowouldreplythattheseintuitions

ofoursliedownstreamoftheorizingandthereforecannotbeusedtosupportthe

theory.Wephilosophershavetheintuitionbecausewehaveacceptedthetheory,

nottheotherwayround.Weshouldrejecttheintuitionalongwiththetheory.The

objectormayinsist,however,thattheintuitiondoesnotcomeonlyfrom

philosophicaltheory,butalsofromthestructureoflanguage,asusedwellbefore

exposuretoanytheory.Itisthesubject-predicatestructureofindicativesthat

suggestsasimilarpsychologicalstructureinthejudgmentstheyexpress.

Thisisareasonableclaim,towhichBrentanorespondsbytryingtoexplain

whylinguisticexpressionsofjudgmentshavethestructuretheydo(despite

judgmentshavingacompletelydifferentstructure).28Ultimately,theexplanationis

thatlanguageandjudgmenthavedifferentfunctions:theprimary,originalfunction

oflanguage,heclaims,istofacilitatecommunication(Brentano1956:25-6),

25

whereastheprimaryfunctionofthoughtandreasoningistheacquisitionand

managementofknowledge.Insofarasstructuresderiveovertimefromfunctions,

thereisnoreasontoexpectthelattertoconvergewheretheformerdiverge.

Theobjectormaypressthatcertainsystematicityphenomenacouldnotbe

explainedwithintheBrentanianframework.Ifthestructureoflanguageand

thoughtmirroreachother,wecanunderstandwhynopersonisinapositionto

judgethatMarylovesJohnwithoutbeinginapositiontojudgethatJohnlovesMary

(Fodor1975).Brentano,incontrast,hasnoresourcestoexplainthis–hemusttreat

asmiraculousthesimultaneousemergenceofthecapacitiestomakeboth

judgments.ForthebeliefinaMary-lovingJohnandthebeliefinaJohn-lovingMary

havestrictlynothingincommonintheircontents.29

ThisisindeedaveryseriousproblemforBrentano,butperhapshecould

respondasfollows.Aswehavealreadyseen,thefactthatanintentionalstateisnon-

propositionaldoesnotmeanthatitdoesnotmobilizeconcepts.Thus,eventhough

fearisanobjectualattitude,whatasubjectcanfeardependsontheconceptsinthe

subject’spossession:ifS1possessestheconceptofaRottweilerwhileS2only

possessesthecoarser-grainedconceptofabigdog,theirfearsofthesameobject

mightbetype-differentintentionalstates.ThisisbecauseS1willapplytheconcept

ofaRottweilertotheobjecthefearswhileS2willapplytheconceptofabigdog.

Now,wecanimagineasubjectwhopossessesbothconcepts,butinwhomthetwo

aredisconnectedinsuchawaythatthesubjectisunawarethatRottweilersare

dogs.Inmostsubjectswhopossessbothconcepts,however,thetwoarelinkedin

suchawaythatitisimpossibleforthesubjecttofearaRottweilerwithoutipsofacto

fearingadog.TheBrentanianmighthopetoproduceasimilarexplanationofwhy

everynormalhumansubjectinapositiontocontemplateaMary-lovingJohnisalso

inapositiontocontemplateaJohn-lovingMary.Itisfarfromclearhowthe

explanationwouldgo,butitisnotinconceivablethatsomestorycouldbedevised.

Still,aslongasnoactualstoryisproffered,itremainsanoutstandingtheoretical

debtofBITtoshowthatitcanrecoverthephenomenaofsystematicity.

26

AcompletelydifferentobjectionisthatBITispragmaticallyproblematic,

perhapsbecauseitsacceptancewouldcomplicatetheconductofinquiry.More

specifically,itmightbeclaimedthatpredicatelogichasworkedverywellforusto

formalizelargetractsofscience,butwithBIT,predicatelogicwouldhavetobe

renouncedwholesale.Thisobjectionisimportant,butallitshowsisthatBrentano

owesusapredicate-freeformallogictogoalongwithhispredication-freetheoryof

judgment.Asithappens,Brentanodidstartonthisproject(Brentano1956),which

wasfurtherdevelopedbyhisstudentFranzHillebrand(Hillebrand1891).Suppose

asubjectjudgesboththat(i)thereisapartyandthat(ii)ifthereisapartythen

thereisbooze,whichleadshertojudgethat(iii)thereisbooze.Thevalidityofher

reasoningiscapturedintraditionalmodusponens.WithintheBrentanian

framework,thereasoningisrecastasfollows:thesubjectbothbelievesinaparty

anddisbelievesinaboozelessparty,whichleadshertobelieveinbooze.Thetask,

then,istoreformulatethefamiliarlawsoflogic,inthiscasemodusponens,sothat

thisreasoningisratifiedasvalid.Whathasbeenproposedbyvariouslogiciansisto

replacethetraditional

pàq p

q

with

Na¯b Ea

Eb

Thisreads:aisnotwithoutb(thereisnotaboozelessparty);ais(thereisaparty);

therefore,bis(thereisbooze).Withthislawinplace,wecanreadilyexplainwhy

thesubject’sreasoningtotheconclusionthatthereisboozeisvalid.Similarlyfor

otherlogicallaws.Now,whileIhavenocompetencetoaffirmthatHillebrand’s

systemworks,IhaveallthecompetenceneededtoreportthatPeterSimonsthinks

itdoes(seeSimons1984,1987).

27

Conclusion

IpersonallythinkthatBrentano’stheoryofjudgmentisamasterpieceof

philosophicalcreativity.Againsttheoverwhelminglycommonphilosophical

treatmentofjudgmentandbeliefaspropositionalattitudeswithaninternal

structuremimickingthatofsentences,outofthebluecomesBrentanoandargues

thattheseareratherobjectualattitudeswhoseonlyfunctionistoacknowledgeor

denyexistence,ormoreaccurately,present-as-existentorpresent-as-nonexistent

someindividualobject.Givenitsconsiderableoriginality,Ifindthecasefor

Brentano’stheorysurprisinglysolid.Realliabilitiesloomaroundtheissuesof

systematicityandthecomplexityofcompoundjudgments.Still,theontological

benefitsaccruingtothiskindoftheory–inparticular,thedismissalofpropositions

andnon-concretetruthmakers–willsurelyappealtomanyphilosophers.30

References

§ Bradley,F.H.1893.AppearanceandReality.London:SwanSonnenschein.

§ Brentano,F.C.1874.PsychologyfromEmpiricalStandpoint.EditedbyO.Kraus.TranslatedbyA.C.

Rancurello,D.B.Terrell,andL.L.McAlister.London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1973.

§ Brentano,F.C.1911.‘AppendixtotheClassificationofMentalPhenomena.’InBrentano1874.

§ Brentano,F.C.1928.SensoryandNoeticConsciousness.EditedO.Kraus,Trans.M.SchättleandL.L.

McAlister.London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1981.

§ Brentano,F.C.1930.TheTrueandtheEvident.EditedbyO.Kraus.TranslatedbyR.M.Chisholm,I.

Politzer,andK.Fischer.London:Routledge1966.

§ Brentano,F.C.1933.TheTheoryofCategories.EditedbyA.Kastil.TranslatedbyR.M.Chisholm

andN.Guterman.TheHague:MartinusNijhoff,1981.

§ Brentano,F.C.1956.DieLehrevomrichtigenUrteil.Bern:FranckeVerlag.

§ Brentano,F.C.1982.DescriptivePsychology.EditedandtranslatedbyB.Müller.London:

Routledge,1995.

§ Chisholm,R.1976.‘Brentano’sNonpropositionalTheoryofJudgment.’MidwestStudiesin

PhilosophyofMind1:91-95.

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§ Fodor,J.A.1975.TheLanguageofThought.CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress.

§ vonHillebrad,F.1891.DieneuenTheorienderkategorischenSchlüsse.Wien:Hölder.

§ King,J.2007.TheNatureandStructureofContent.OxfordandNewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.

§ Kriegel,U.2015.‘ThoughtandThing:Brentano’sReismasTruthmakerNominalism.’Philosophy

andPhenomenologicalResearch90:153-180.

§ Kriegel,U.Forthcoming.‘Brentano’sConceptofMind:UnderlyingNature,Reference-Fixing,and

theMarkoftheMental.’InC.PincockandS.Lapointe(eds.),InnovationsintheHistoryof

AnalyticalPhilosophy.London:Palgrave-Macmillan.

§ Kroon,F.1987.‘CausalDescriptivism.’AustralasianJournalofPhilosophy65:1–17.

§ Leibniz,G.W.1686.DiscourseonMetaphysics.Trans.D.GarberandR.Ariew.Indianapolis:

Hackett,1991.

§ Meinong,A.1902.OnAssumptions,trans.J.Heanue.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,

1983.

§ Montague,M.2007.‘AgainstPropositionalism.’Noûs41:503-518.

§ Perry,J.1994.‘Intentionality.’InS.Guttenplan(ed.),TheBlackwellCompaniontothePhilosophy

ofMind.Oxford:Blackwell.

§ Pitt,D.2004.‘ThePhenomenologyofCognition;orWhatIsItLiketoThinkthatP?’Philosophy

andPhenomenologicalResearch69:1-36.

§ Russell,B.1904.‘Meinong’sTheoryofComplexesandAssumptions.’Mind13:509-524.

§ Russell,B.1905.‘OnDenoting.’Mind14:479-493.

§ Searle,J.R.1983.Intentionality.Cambridge:CambridgeUP.

§ Simons,P.M.1984.‘ABrentanianBasisforaLeśniewskianLogic.’LogiqueetAnalyse27:279-307.

§ Simons,P.M.1987.‘Brentano'sReformofLogic.’Topoi6:25-38.

§ Sutton,J.2007.WithoutJustification.CambridgeMA:MITPress.

§ Textor,M.2007.‘SeeingSomethingandBelievingINIt.’InM.M.McCabeandM.Textor(eds.),

PerspectivesonPerception.Frankfurt:Ontos.

§ WhiteheadA.N.andB.Russell1913.PrincipiaMathematica.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity

Press.

1Tomyknowledge,theexpression‘objectualattitude’comesfromForbes2000;andtheexpression‘propositionalattitude’fromRussell1904.Buttheconceptsfarpredatetheexpressions.2Itisnotimmediatelyclearthatinclaimingthatjudgmentandinterestaregroundedinpresentation,orhavepresentationastheirgrounds/foundations(Grundlage),Brentanohasinmindthenotionofgroundingcurrentlywidelydiscussed.OnesimilarityisthatBrentaniangroundingisamatterofontologicalasymmetricdependence,orwhatBrentanocalls‘unilateralseparability’:amentalstate

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canbeapresentationwithoutbeingajudgment,butitcannotbeajudgmentwithoutalsobeingapresentation.3SeeBrentano1874IIChapters6-8,including:‘mythreeclassesarenotthesameasthosewhichareusuallyproposed.Intheabsenceofmoreappropriateexpressionswedesignatethefirstbytheterm“presentation,”thesecondbytheterm“judgment,”andthethirdbytheterms“emotion,”“interest,”or“love”.’(Brentano1874:198)Aclearerpresentationoftheviewisthis:‘Itisclearthatallmodesofrelationtoanobjectfallintothreeclasses:presentation,judgment,andemotion[interest].Thesecondandthirdmodesalwayspresupposethefirst,andinbothwefindacontrast,inthatajudgmentiseitherabelieforadenial,andamemotioniseitheraformofloveorhate.’(Brentano1928:42)4AlthoughBrentanoconsiderspresentationthemostbasicofthethree,sincetheothertwoaregroundedinit,myexpositionwillproceedinadifferentorder.Moreover,myexpositionwillbea‘dogmatic’one,inthatIwillnotpresentBrentano’sargumentfortheclassification,onlytheclassificationitself.Forreconstructionanddiscussionofhisargumentforit,seeKriegelforthcoming.5Isay‘inthefirstinstance’becauseaswewillseelater,ultimatelyBrentano’sviewisthatajudgmentpresentwhatitdoesasexistentornonexistentratherthanastrueorfalse.6Brentano’s‘Vorstellung’isvariouslytranslatedaspresentation,representation,apprehension,idea,thought,andcontemplation.HereIgomostlywith‘presentation.’7Whenonesupposesthatp,oneisnottherebycommittedtothetruthofp.Thereisasenseinwhichinsupposingthatp,onepresentsptooneselfundertheguiseoftruth,butforBrentano,thelackofcommitmenttotruthlandssuppositioninthecategoryofpresentation.HisstudentMeinongarguedthatinfactsuppositions,orassumptions(Annahmen),shareoneessentialcharacteristicwithpresentationsandanotherwithjudgments,andsoconstitutedasuigeneriscategory(Meinong1902).Brentanoarguesagainstthisinseveralplaces,forexampleBrentano1911:284-6.8Thisis,atleast,Brentano’streatmentofAristotle’sfourtypesofstatementsformostofhiscareer.Inthefinaldecadeofhislife,heseemstohavecomplicatedtheaccountconsiderably,adoptinghisso-calleddouble-judgmenttheory(seeespeciallyAppendixIXofthePsychology,aswellasBrentano1956§30).HereIwillignorethislatercomplication,wellmotivatedthoughitmaybe.9Brentanowrites:‘Theproposition,“Ifamanbehavesbadly,heharmshimself,”isahypotheticalproposition.Asfarasitsmeaningisconcerned,itisthesameasthecategoricalproposition,“Allmenwhobehavebadlyharmthemselves.”Andthis,inturn,hasnoothermeaningthanthatoftheexistentialproposition,“Amanwhobehavesbadlyanddoesnotharmhimselfdoesnotexist,”ortouseamorefelicitousexpression,“Thereisnosuchthingasamanwhobehavesbadlyanddoesnotharmhimself”.’(Brentano1874:218)10Brentanonowherestatestheattitudinalaccountofexistence-commitmentasexplicitlyasonemightwish.Buthecomescloseatvariouspoints.Forexample:‘Themostnaturalexpressionis“Ais,”not“Aisexistent,”where“existent”appearsasapredicate.…[Butsuchanexistentialstatement]meansrather“IfanyoneshouldthinkofAinapositiveway,histhoughtisfitting(entsprechend)”.’(Brentano1930:69)ThecommitmenttoA’sexistenceisanaspectoftheway(ormode)inwhichthethinkingisdone.11Thereisaquestionofhowtohandlethetruthmakingofnegativeexistentials.ThisissomethingBrentanohadnothingtosayabout.Perhapsthisisbecauseforhimtheissueisnotreallyoneoftruthmaking,butoftheontologicalcommitmentthatpositiveexistentialsinvolve.Sincenegativeexistentialsinvolvenoontologicalcommitment,thesameissuedoesnotariseforthem.

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12Thereareusesof‘beliefin’thatmaydenotenon-cognitiveattitude,asin‘believeinyourself!’or‘webelieveinthefuture’(whichseemtodenoteemotionalattitudessuchasconfidenceandhope).Butthereisalsothecognitiveusagehighlightedinthemaintext.13Toendorsethisformulation,onehastoacceptthatthereissuchathingasoccurrentbelieving-in.Ifonetakesbelieving-intobealwaysdispositional,thenBrentano'sviewwouldhavetobeformulatedmorecumbersomely:alljudgmentsareoccurrentmanifestationsofbelievings-in.Forthesakeofsmoothexpositionmorethananythingelse,Iamheretreatingbelief-inasastatethatcanbeoccurrent.14TwoexceptionsareSzabó(2003)andTextor(2007),whorejecttheanalysisof‘Sbelievesinx’intermsof‘Sbelievesthatxexists,’thoughongroundsotherfromBrentano’s.15Thenameissuboptimal,insofarasbelief-incapturesonlyonehalfofthespanofjudgments–disbelief-incapturestheotherhalf.ButBIThastheadvantageofbeingcute,andItrustthereadertokeepinmindtherelevanceofdisbelief-in.16Itmightbeobjected,tomyinterpretationofBrentano’sAnerkennungasbelief-in,thatBrentanowasadamantthattherearenodegreesofacceptance,whereasonebelief-inmayverywellvaryinconfidence(constitutingakindofobjectualcredence).However,itispossibletoaccountforthedegreeofconfidenceassociatedwithabelief-innotasanaspectofthebelief-initself,butasakindofsecond-orderstatedirectedatthelikelytruthofthefirst-orderbelief-in.Initself,then,thebelief-inwouldbeabsoluteinitsexistence-commitment.17OneplacewhereBrentanosoundsnon-LeibnizianisinhisdiscussionofmereologicalrelationsamongcoloredspotsinBrentano1982Chap.2.OneplaceinwhichhementionstheLeibnizianparaphraseinasympathetictoneofvoiceisinhisdiscussionofKant’sclassificationofutterancesinBrentano1956§28.18Whathappensifthereismorethanoneindividualwiththoseproperties?Severalavenuesareopentodescriptivists–dividedreference,referencefailure,andmore–buttheissuessurroundingthispossibilityhavenothingspecificallytodowithBrentano’sproject,soIwillsetthemasidehere.19InKripke’s(1972)causaltheoryofreference,forexample,thereisarelationofnondeviantcausalchainbetweenacurrentuseofthenameandabaptismaleventinwhichthenameisintroducedinthepresenceofthenamed.20Oneoption,ofcourse,istodenythedirectreferencetheoryofnames.Forexample,itispossibletoholdthattheinsightsassociatedwithcausaltheoryofreferencecanberecoveredthroughakindofcausaldescriptivism(Kroon1987),accordingtowhichanamereferstowhateverobjectssatisfiesthetoken-reflexivedescription‘theobjectsuitablycausallylinkedtothisveryuseofthename.’Onthisview,‘Beyoncéisfamous’meansthesameas‘Theobjectsuitablycausallylinkedtothisveryuseof“Beyoncé”isfamous.’ThiswouldallowsforthestandardBrentanianparaphrase.21TheshortansweristhatforBrentanoBeyoncéandFamous-Beyoncéaretwonumericallydistinctbutspatiotemporallycoincidingobjects.22LaterinhiscareerBrentanoadoptsthemorecomplicateddouble-judgmenttheorytohandlesuchcases(seeesp.Brentano1956§30).Therearegoodreasonsforthis,butasnotedhereIamgoingtoignorethedouble-judgmenttheoryhere.(Addressingitinbriefisnotreallypossible.)23Asimilarstrategycanbeextendedtomaterialconditionals,sincepè qisequivalentto~pVq,henceto~(p&~q).Itmightbeobjectedthatdisbeliefinsumsofcorrectjudgmentsistooweaktocapturethecontentofdisjunctiveandconditionaljudgments.Theclaimisnotjustthatnobodyhasin

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factmadetherelevantcorrectjudgments.Itisratherthatifanyonedidmakethosejudgments,theycouldnotdosocorrectly.Thislatterclaimhasamodaldepthtoitentirelymissingfromthesimplerejectionoftwocorrectjudgmentsco-occurring.Thisobjectionsmellsrighttome,butitjustinvitesdiscussionofBrentano’streatmentofmodality,onwhichBrentanohadsomeveryinterestingthingtosay,butwhichwouldtakeustoofarafield.24Theremightbesomethingoddabouttalkoftruthmakersforbeliefsin.Perhapsitmightbethoughtungrammaticaltosaythatthebeliefinducksistrue;itiscertainlymorenaturaltosaythatsuchabeliefiscorrect.Inthatcase,weshouldspeakratheroftheworldlycorrectnessmakersofbeliefs-in.Iamsympathetictoallthis,butwillstickwiththeword‘truthmaker’forsimplicity.Onthis,seeTextor2007:78-9.25Inthepresentcontext,by‘state-of-affairsontology’Imeananyontologythatadmitssuchentitiesasstatesofaffairs.AnysuchontologyfacesBradley’sregress(Bradley1893).Theproblemishowtounderstandthe‘metaphysicalglue’thatjoinsanindividualandapropertywhentogethertheycomposeastateofaffairs.Thefact(obtainingstateofaffairs)thatAlectheelectronisnegativelychargedismorethanjustthesumofthetwofactsthat(i)Alecexistsand(ii)beingnegatively-chargedisinstantiated.Itinvolvesalsosomekindof‘metaphysicalglue’that‘bringstogether’Alecandbeingnegatively-charged.Ifwetrytounderstandthis‘glue’intermsofarelationbetweenAlecandbeingnegatively-charged–‘exemplification’or‘instantiation,’say–thenwewouldrequiresomethingtoglueAlec,beingnegatively-charged,andthatrelation.Appealingtoasecond-ordermetaphysicalgluewouldonlylaunchusonaregress–Bradley’sregress.26Morespecifically,itisimplicitinBrentano’sdiscussionofthedifferencebetweenjudgmentandpresentationinChapter7ofPsychologyII.27Iwrite‘likely’becauseothercandidateexplanationsofthedifferencebetweencontemplatingandjudginghavetoberuledout(otherthanthecontentcandidate)beforewecanmoreconfidentlyassertthatthedifferenceisattitudinal.Muchoftheissueoverlapswiththequestionoftheirreducibilityofpresentationtojudgment,discussedinthepreviouschapter.28Ingeneral,Brentanotakesthestructureoflanguagetobeapoorguidetothestructureofourmentallife.Thisisstatedunequivocallyinashort1905fragmenttitled‘Language’(Brentano1930:71)andcanbefoundinvariousplacesintheaforementionedlogiccourses(e.g.,Brentano1956§12).29ThankstoMarieGuillotforpressingonmethisobjection.30ThisworkwassupportedbytheFrenchNationalResearchAgency’sANR-11-0001-02PSL*andANR-10-LABX-0087.Forcommentsonapreviousdraft,IamgratefultoGéraldineCarranante,AnnaGiustina,AlexGzrankowski,FranzKnappik,MichelleMontague,andKevinMulligan.IalsobenefitedfrompresentingrelatedmaterialsattheAustralianNationalUniversity,ColumbiaUniversity,ÉcoleNormaleSupérieure,theUniversityofGirona,andatIHPSTandIJNinParis;Iamgratefultotheaudiencesthere,inparticularDamianoCosta,ImogenDickie,NemiraGasiunas,ThibautGiraud,AnnaGiustina,VincentGrandjean,ErickLlamas,MyrtoMilopoulos,MichaelMurez,BenPhillips,DavidPineda,MariavanderSchaar,BenjaminSchnieder,MoritzSchultz,RobertStalnaker,DanielStoljar,EricTremault,AgustínVicente,andespeciallyMarieGuillot.