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Belief-thatandBelief-in:WhichReductiveAnalysis?
UriahKriegel
ForthcominginA.Gzrankowski&M.Montague,Non-PropositionalIntentionality(OUP)
Abstract.Letpropositionalismbethethesisthatallmentalattitudesarepropositional.Anti-
propositionaliststypicallypointatapparentlynon-propositionalattitudes,suchasfearingadog
andlovingaspouse,andplaydefenseagainstattemptsatpropositionalanalysisofsuch
attitudes.HereIexploretheanti-propositionalist’sprospectsforgoingontheoffensive,tryingto
showthatsomeapparentlypropositionalattitudes,notablybeliefandjudgment,canbegiven
non-propositionalanalysis.Althoughthenotionthatbeliefisanon-propositionalattitudemay
seemludicrousatfirst,itisadmirablydefendedbyFranzBrentano,whoseanalysisIproposeto
expound,update,anddeepenhere.Thebasicstrategycanbethoughtofasfollows.First,
althoughthegrammarofbelief-thatreportsclearlysuggestsapropositionalattitude,the
grammarofbelief-inreportssuggestsinsteadan‘objectual’attitude.Second,withsome
ingenuityallbelief-thatreportscanbeparaphrasedintobelief-inreports.Third,givencertain
generalconsiderations,thisparaphraseabilityrecommendstheviewthatthepsychological
realityofbeliefstatesisobjectualratherthanpropositional.Nonetheless,Iwillargue,thereare
twoveryrealcostsassociatedwiththisnon-propositionalanalysisofbelief.
Introduction
Onthefaceofit,someofourpsychologicalattitudesarepropositionalandsomeare
objectual.Judgingthattheweatherisniceispropositional,likingicecreamis
objectual.1Somephilosophershaveclaimedthatthisisanillusion,andinfactall
attitudesarepropositional.Thus,JohnPerrywrites:
Thephenomenonofintentionalitysuggeststhatattitudesareessentiallyrelationalin
nature:theyinvolverelationstothepropositionsatwhichtheyaredirected…Anattitude
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seemstobeindividuatedbytheagent,thetypeofattitude(belief,desire,etc.),andthe
propositionatwhichitisdirected.(Perry1994:387-8)
Otherphilosophershaveinsistedthatnotallattitudesarepropositional–someare
objectual.HereisMichelleMontague:
Simplyput,objectualattitudesresistapropositionalistanalysis.MarylovesNancy.Sheseeks
thefountainofyouth.Shehasyouinmind.Shecontemplatesthesky.ShewantsNancy’scar.
Theseintentionalattitudesappeartoberelationsthatholdsimplybetweenthinkersand
non-propositionalobjects,ratherthanbetweenthinkersandpropositions.(Montague2007:507)
Veryfewphilosophershaveheldthatinfactnoattitudesarepropositional–thatall
areobjectual.PerhapsHumeheldthisview.Onephilosopherwhocertainlydidis
FranzBrentano.Brentanoexplicitlywritesthat‘Allmentalreferencesreferto
things’(Brentano1911:291),wherea‘thing’isanindividualobjectorconcrete
particular.Hisargumentforthiscannotbeappreciatedwithoutadetailedaccount
ofhisentirephilosophyofmind.Shortonspace,hereIwillrestrictmyselftohis
caseforthethesisthatjudgmentisanobjectualattitude.Thisthesiswouldalready
beoffirstimportance,sincejudgmentandbeliefarecustomarilytakentobethe
paradigmaticpropositionalattitudes.Thisseemsantecedentlyveryplausible:you
canloveJane,butyoucannotjudgeJane(intherelevantsense),orjudgethatJane.
Andyet,Iwillargue,Brentano’scaseforanobjectualistaccountofjudgmentis
surprisinglycompelling.Althoughthecasehassomelocalholesinit,Iwillargue
thattheycanbefilledreasonablysatisfactorily.
Istart,in§1,withsomebackgroundonBrentano’snotionofjudgment,asit
emergesfromhisclassificationofmentalstates.In§2,Iofferaninitialexpositionof
hisobjectualistaccountofjudgmentforanalyticphilosophers.In§3,Ireconstruct
andtightenBrentano’scasefortheobjectualistaccount.In§4,Iconsidersomekey
objections.
1. JudgmentinBrentano’sTaxonomyofMentalStates
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ThetaskofChap.5-8ofBookIIofBrentano’sPsychologyfromanEmpirical
Standpoint(Brentano1874)istoidentifythe‘fundamentalclasses’ofmentalstates.
Hisassumptionisthatthementaldomainisstructuredbygenus/speciesrelations,
sothatsomekindsofmentalstatearespeciesofothers.Forexample,color
experienceisaspeciesofvisualexperience,whichinturnisaspeciesofperceptual
experience.Thehighestgenusissimplymentalstate.WhatBrentanocallsthe
‘fundamentalclasses’aretheclassesorkindsofmentalstatewhicharespeciesof
onlyonehighergenus.Thatis,theyarespeciesonlyofthegenusmentalstate.
(Comparecolorexperience,whichisaspeciesofthegenusmentalstateaswell,but
alsoofothergenera,suchasvisualexperienceandperceptualexperience.)What
Brentanoseeksinhis‘fundamentalclassification,’then,arethehighestmental
generasavethehighestone,i.e.thesecond-to-highestmentalgenera.
AccordingtoBrentano,therearethreesuchclasses:presentationor
apprehension(Vorstellung),judgment(Urteil),and‘interest’(Interesse)or‘emotion’
(Gemütsbewegungen)(Brentano1874:198).Healsoclaimsthatjudgmentand
interestare‘groundedin’presentations(1874:80,198),2butappearstoalsoallowa
presentationtooccurwithoutgroundingotherstates.Unlikepresentation,
judgmentandinterestareeachdividedintotwoopposingkinds:judgmentinto
acceptance(Anerkennung)andrejection(Verwerfung),interestintolove(Liebe)and
hate(Hasse).3Letusconsidereachclassinturn.4
ThefundamentalclassBrentanocallsjudgmentcoversanymentalstatethat
inthefirstinstancepresentswhatitdoesastrueorfalse(veridicalorfalsidical,
accurateorinaccurate,andsoon):5
By‘judgment’wemean,inaccordancewithcommonphilosophicalusage,acceptance(as
true)orrejection(asfalse).(Brentano1874:198)
Importantly,thisincludesnotonlytheproductsofconceptualthought,suchasbelief
andjudgmentinthemorefamiliarsense,butalsoperceptualexperience.Avisual
experienceofayellowlemonhasveridicalityconditionsinthesamesensebeliefhas
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truthconditions.Bothareinthebusinessofgettingthingsright.Accordingly,
Brentanowritesthat‘allperceptionsarejudgments,whethertheyareinstancesof
knowledgeorjustmistakenaffirmations’(Brentano1874:209).Whatcharacterizes
judgmentisthiskindoftruth-directedness.Notewell:thisisanidiosyncraticuseof
theterm‘judgment,’butitdoesnotunderminethesignificanceofthethesisthatall
judgmentsareobjectualattitudes.Asauniversalthesis,itappliesalsotojudgments
inthemorefamiliarsense,thatofaproductofconceptualthoughtcanonically
reportedwiththeuseof‘that’-clauses.Inotherwords,judgmentsinthefamiliar
senseformasubsetofjudgmentsinBrentano’ssense;soBrentano’sobjectual
accountofthelatteriseoipsoanobjectualaccountoftheformer.
Brentano’ssecondfundamentalclasscoversalargegroupofphenomena,
includingemotion,affect,thewill,andalgedonicexperiencesofpleasureandpain.
Brentanolamentstheabsenceofasatisfactorynameforthisclass,andcallsit
alternately‘interest,’‘emotion,’or(often)‘phenomenaofloveandhate’(Brentano
1874:199).Whatunifiesthephenomenainthiscategoryisthattheypresentwhat
theydoasgoodorbad.Thedeepnatureofthiscategorythuscontrastswiththe
truth-directednessofjudgmentandischaracterizedbygoodness-directedness:
Justaseveryjudgmenttakesanobjecttobetrueorfalse,inananalogouswayevery
phenomenonwhichbelongstothisclasstakesanobjecttobegoodorbad.(Brentano1874:
199;seealso1874:239)
Wantingabeerpresentsbeerasgood,butsodoestakingpleasureinthebeer,
wishingforbeer,likingbeer,decidingonbeer,andsoon.Intruth,themodern
technicalnotionsof‘proattitude’and‘conattitude’areperfecttermsforBrentano’s
positive(‘love’)andnegative(‘hate’)kindsofintereststate.
Brentano’sotherfundamentalclassispresentationorapprehension.6Thisis
supposedtobeanintentionalstatethatinitselfpresentswhatitdoesneitheras
trueorfalsenorasgoodorbad,butinanentirelyneutralmanner.Itsmostgeneral
characterizationisthusthis:‘Wespeakofapresentationwheneversomething
appearstous’(Brentano1874:198).Thisisthesenseinwhichpresentation
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groundsjudgmentandinterest:everystateofjudgmentorinterestisalsoa
presentation,butnoteverypresentationiseitherajudgmentoraninterest.Forto
presentsomethingastrueorgoodyoumustpresentitatall,butyoucanpresent
somethingwithoutpresentingitastrueorgood.Paradigmaticexamplesofthisare
actsofmerelyentertainingorcontemplatingsomething–whenyoucontemplate
something,itappearstoyouneitherastrue/falsenorasgood/bad;itjustappearsto
you.Importantly,however,anymentalstatethatencodescommitmentneitherto
thetruth/falsitynortogoodness/badnessofwhatitpresents(e.g.,supposition)will
qualifyasamerepresentationinBrentano’sclassification.7
ThenotionofpresentationalmodeiscrucialtoBrentano’sclassification.The
ideaisthatdifferentkindsofmentalstatepresentwhattheydoindifferentways.
Thedifferencebetweenthemisnotinwhattheypresentbutinhowtheypresent.
Importantly,Brentano’spresentationalmodesarenotFrege’s–theyarenotaspect
ofastate’s(fine-grained)content,butofitsattitude.Whenyoujudgethat2+2=4,
youarementallycommittingtothetruthof2+2=4.Butthiscommitmentisbuiltinto
theattitudeyouaretakingtoward2+2=4,itdoesnotshowupinthecontentofyour
judgment.Wemightputthisbysayingthatthejudgmentthat2+2=4doesnot
present2+2=4astrue,butratherpresents-as-true2+2=4.Presenting-as-trueisa
modeormodificationofthepresenting.Similarlyfortheotherpresentational
modes.Whenyoudenythat2+2=5,youarementallycommittingtothefalsityof
2+2=5,butthecommitmentisbuiltintotheattitudeofyourdenial:yourdenialdoes
notpresent2+2=5asfalse,butratherpresents-as-false2+2=5.Likewise,yourlove
oficecreampresents-as-goodicecream(ratherthanpresentingicecreamasgood)
andyourdisapprovalofjingoismpresents-as-badjingoism(ratherthanpresenting
jingoismasbad).
Brentano’snotionofjudgment,then,isthenotionofamentalstate
employingthepresentationalmodeofeitherpresenting-as-trueorpresenting-as-
false.Thisincludesmentalstatesthatwedonotnormallycountasjudgments,such
asperceptualexperiences,butinadditionitincludeswhatwedonormallycountas
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judgments–conceptualthoughtscommittedtotheveracityoftheircontents.All
thosestates,accordingtoBrentano,areobjectualattitudes.
2. TheBelief-InTheoryofJudgment
ThecoreofBrentano’stheoryofjudgmentcanberepresentedastheconjunctionof
twotheses.Thefirstisthatalljudgmentsareexistential,thesecondthatthe
existence-commitmentinvolvedinexistentialjudgmentsisanattitudinalpropertyof
theirs.Thatis:
EXISTENTIAL::ForanyjudgmentJ,Jisanexistentialjudgment.
ATTITUDINAL::ForanyexistentialJudgmentE,E’sexistence-commitmentisan
attitudinalpropertyofE.
Inthissection,Iofferapreliminaryexplanationandmotivationofthetwotheses.
Theremainderofthechapterwillconsiderthecasefortheminmoredetail.
AccordingtoEXISTENTIAL,everyjudgmentisinthebusinessofaffirmingor
denyingtheexistenceofsomething.Thusthejudgmentsthattherearemarine
mammalsandthattherearenoflyingdogsareparadigmatic.Weareaccustomedto
thinkthatnotalljudgmentsarelikethis–someareinthebusinessofdoingmore
thanjustaffirmingordenyingtheexistenceofsomething.Many,itisnaturalto
think,involveanelementofpredication:ratherthancommentingonwhatthereis,
theymakeaclaimaboutwhatsomethingislike,whatpropertiesithas.Thus,the
judgmentthatalldogsarecutepredicatescutenessofdogs,thereby‘claiming’that
dogshaveacertainproperty,not(just)thattheyexist.Brentano,however,insists
thatpredicationisanaccidentoflanguagethatdoesnotreflectthepsychological
realityofjudgments.(Moreonthatin§4.)Inreality,judgingthatalldogsarecuteis
justjudgingthatthereisnonon-cutedog.Itthuscommentsonwhatthereisafterall.
Toshowthatthisgeneralizes,Brentanosystematicallygoesoverthefour
typesofcategoricalstatementinAristotle’ssquareofopposition(A,E,I,andO)and
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showsthattheyareallreducibleor‘traceableback’(rückführbar)toexistential
statements(Brentano1874:213-4,1956:121):
(A) <Alldogsarecute>istraceableto<Thereisnotanon-cutedog>.
(E) <Nodogsarecute>istraceableto<Thereisnotacutedog>.
(I) <Somedogsarecute>istraceableto<Thereisacutedog>.
(O) <Somedogsarenotcute>istraceableto<Thereisanon-cutedog>.
Brentano’stalkofstatements‘beingtraceableback’tootherstatementssuggestshe
hassomethinglikeparaphraseinmind:‘Alldogsarecute’isparaphraseableinto
‘Thereisnotanon-cutedog.’Suchstatementscanexpressjudgments,ortheycanbe
embeddedintocorrespondingstatementsthatreportjudgments:‘Sjudgesthatall
dogsarecute’isparaphraseableinto‘Sjudgesthatthereisnonon-cutedog.’8
Onceallcategoricalstatementsareshowntoparaphraseintoexistential
ones,itiseasytoshowthathypotheticalsfollowsuit(Brentano1874:218).9For
example:
(H)<Ifsomedogisthree-legged,thenitiscute>isreducibleto<Thereisnota
non-cutethree-leggeddog>.
Conclusion:
Thereducibility/traceability(Rückführbarkeit)ofcategoricalstatements(Sätze),indeedthe
reducibilityofallstatementswhichexpressajudgment,toexistentialjudgmentsistherefore
indubitable.(Brentano1874:218)
Morecautiously,allstatementsofAristotelianlogicturnouttobedisguised
existentials.Wewillhavetoconsiderothertypesofstatementin§3.
AccordingtoEXISTENTIAL,then,allactsofjudgingareformsofmentally
committingtosomething’sexistenceornonexistence.AccordingtoATTITUDINAL,
now,theexistence-commitmentwhichexistentialjudgmentscarryisanaspectof
theirattituderatherthancontent.Onthisview,mentalcommitmenttotheexistence
ofxisnotanaspectofwhatthejudgmentpresentsbutofhowitdoesthepresenting.
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Inotherwords:anexistentialjudgment’scommitmenttotheexistenceofxisnota
matterofpresentingxasexistent,butamatterofpresenting-as-existentx.Thus,to
judgethatsomedogsarecuteistoperformamentalactthatpresents-as-existent
cutedogs,thatis,presentscutedogsinanexistence-affirmingmanner.10
Theattitudinalaccountofmentalexistence-commitmentisunsurprising
giventhat,forBrentano,whatcharacterizesjudgmentinthefirstinstanceisthe
attitudinalpropertyofpresenting-as-true.Ifallpositivejudgmentspresent-as-true
andalltruthisexistential,itstandstoreasonthatpositivejudgmentsshouldturn
outtobecharacterizedbypresenting-as-existent.
Moregenerally,ifthecommitmenttosomething’sexistenceornonexistence
doesnotshowupinjudgments’content,thenthecontentisexhaustedbythe
individualobjectwhoseexistenceisaffirmedordenied.Ifajudgmentthatathree-
leggeddogexistssimplypresents-as-existentathree-leggeddog,thenwhatis
presented(inthatmode)isexhaustedbyacertainkindofindividualobject:athree-
leggeddog.Onthisview,then,judgmentturnsouttobeanobjectualratherthan
propositionalattitude.Tothatextent,Brentano’stheoryofjudgmentcastsitas
continuouswithsuchstatesaslovingJaneandfearingadog.Judgmentsarealways
directedatsomesortofindividualobject,butpresent-as-existent/nonexistentthat
object.Theobjectatwhichone’sjudgmentisdirectedcanbequitecomplicated–a
cutedog,acuteflyingdog,athree-leggednon-cuteflyingdog,etc.–butinanycase
whatispresentedbythejudgmentisalwayssomekindofindividualobject.Itis
neveranyentityofadifferentontologicalcategory,suchasapropositionorastate
ofaffairs(Brentano1930:108).Accordingly,forBrentanothetruthmakersof
existentialsarenotstatesofaffairsconsistinginthings’existence,butthethings
themselves.Hewrites:
…thebeingofAneednotbeproducedinorderforthejudgment‘Ais’tobe…correct;allthat
isneededisA.(Brentano1930:85)
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Inaslogan:thetruthmakersof(positive)existentialsarenotexistencesbut
existents.11Thereasonthisispossibleisthatthecontentofjudgmentsisexhausted
byindividuals,notindividuals’existence.
Itmightseemoddtopositacognitiveattitudedirectedatobjectsandnot
propositionsorstatesofaffairs.Typicalobjectualattitudessuchasloveandfearare
emotionalattitudes,andthesuspicionmayarisethattheobjectualstructureis
specialtosuchattitudes.Butinfact,wedospeaknotonlyofbelief-thatbutalsoof
belief-in–asin‘JimmybelievesinSantaClaus.’Belief-inisclearlyacognitive
objectualattitude:thecontentofJimmy’sstateisexhaustedbysomeindividual
object,SantaClaus,thecommitmenttowhoseexistencecomesinatthelevelof
attitude,throughtheattitudeofbelieving-in.12Soessentially,Brentano’stheoryof
judgmentcanbesummarizedthus:
BIT::Allpositivejudgmentsareoccurrentactsofbelieving-in;allnegative
judgmentsareoccurrentactsofdisbelieving-in.13
Judgingthatsomedogsarecuteisjustperformingamentalactthatpresents-as-
existentacutedog,thatis,occurrentlybelievinginacutedog;judgingthatnodogs
canflyisjustperformingamentalactthatpresents-as-nonexistentaflyingdog,that
is,occurrentlydisbelievinginaflyingdog.
Tobesure,becauseofalongphilosophicaltraditionoftreatingpropositional
attitudesasfundamentalincognition,itisnaturalforustodaytothinkof‘Sbelieves
inx’asshorthandfor‘Sbelievesthatxexists.’14ForBrentano,thisgetstheorderof
analysisexactlywrong.Themorefundamentalnotionisbelief-in,preciselybecause
itcapturescorrectlythepsychologicalstructureofjudgments,inparticularthelocus
ofexistence-commitmentintheattituderatherthancontent.Accordingly,Brentano
wouldproposetotake‘Sbelievesinx’asfundamentalandconsider‘Sbelievesthatx
exists’acumbersomeandmisleadingwayofsayingthesamething.Thisallowsusto
paraphrasethereportsofAristoteliancategoricalandhypotheticaljudgmentsmore
straightforwardly:
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(A*)‘Sjudgesthateverydogiscute’ó‘Sdisbelievesinanon-cutedog’
(E*)‘Sjudgesthatnodogiscute’ó‘Sdisbelievesinacutedog’
(I*)‘Sjudgesthatsomedogiscute’ó‘Sbelievesinacutedog’
(O*)‘Sjudgesthatsomedogisnotcute’ó‘Sbelievesinanon-cutedog’
(H*)‘Sjudgesthatifadogisthree-leggedthenheiscute’ó‘Sdisbelievesina
three-leggednon-cutedog’
Here,‘ó’justmeans‘canbeparaphrasedinto.’Thearrowisbidirectionalbecause
paraphraseabilityisasymmetricrelation:if‘p’isagoodparaphraseof‘q,’then‘q’is
anequallygoodparaphraseof‘p.’ItisthephilosophicalsubstanceofBrentano’s
theoryofjudgmentthatineachcaseitistheright-hand-sidereportthatcaptures
correctlythestructureofjudgment,eventhoughitistheleft-hand-sidereportthat
ismorecommonineverydayspeak.
IcallBrentano’stheoryofjudgmenttheBelief-InTheory,orBITforshort.15
AccordingtoBIT,alljudgmentsareconsciousactsof(dis)believinginsomething
(somekindofindividualobject).Brentano’sterminologyisdifferent,ofcourse.He
callsthecognitiveobjectualattitudethatembodiesmentalcommitmentto
something’sexistence‘acceptance’or‘acknowledgement’(Anerkennung)andthe
cognitiveobjectualattitudeembodyingcommitmenttononexistence‘rejection’or
‘denial’(Verwerfung).However,theassociatedverbs(‘accepting,’‘acknowledging,’
‘rejecting,’‘denying’)canperfectlygrammaticallytakepropositionalcomplements.
‘Believingin’and‘disbelievingin’havethisadvantage,thattheycanonlytake
objectualcomplements.TheyarethusbetterforexpressingBrentano’stheory.16
Whatevertheterminology,acrucialaspectofBITisthatjudgmentisan
objectualattitude:
OBJECTUAL::Alljudgmentsareobjectualattitudes.
OBJECTUALfollowsfromEXISTENTIALandATTITUDINALgiventhat(dis)belief-inisan
objectualattitude.Wemayformulatethemasterargumentasfollows:
1) Alltokenbeliefsareexistential(EXISTENTIAL);
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2) Allexistentialbeliefsarebeliefs-in(ATTITUDINAL);
3) Allbeliefs-inareobjectualattitudes;therefore,
4) Alltokenbeliefsareobjectualattitudes(OBJECTUAL).
Ontheemergingview,thesolebusinessofcognitionistomanageone’sbeliefin
someobjectsanddisbeliefinothers.Obviously,thisisanextremelyheterodoxview
ofcognition,whichwouldrequireaverygoodargumentindeed.Inowturnto
considerthecaseforit.
3. TheCasefortheBelief-InTheory
InthePsychology,Brentanospendsconsiderabletimeandeffortarguingthat
judgmentisnotessentiallypredicative.Forexample,hearguesthatsinceperception
isakindofjudgment,andperceptionisnotessentiallypredicative(sometimeswe
justperceiveathing),judgmentneednotbepredicative(Brentano1874:209).
However,theseargumentsestablish,atmost,thatsomejudgmentsarenot
predicative(andthereforepotentiallynon-propositional).Theycannotestablish
thatalljudgmentsareobjectualratherthanpropositionalattitudes,asOBJECTUAL
requires.AsfarasIcantell,thereisnodirectargumentforOBJECTUALinthe
Psychology.Nonetheless,insomeofBrentano’s(posthumouslypublished)letters,
dictations,andlecturenotes,onecanidentifyacaseforEXISTENTIALandATTITUDINAL,
henceforOBJECTUAL.
ThestartingpointofBrentano’sargumentisasimpledispensability
consideration.Ina1906lettertohisstudentAntonMarty,hewrites:
…everyassertionaffirmingyourentiarationis[notably,propositions]hasitsequivalentin
anassertionhavingonlyrealia[i.e.,concreteindividualobjects]asobjects…Notonlyare
yourjudgmentsequivalenttojudgmentsaboutconcreteobjects(realeGegenstände),the
latterarealwaysavailable[forparaphrasingtheformer].Hencetheentiarationisare
entirelyunnecessary/superfluous(unnütz)andcontrarytotheeconomyofnature.
(Brentano1930:84;seealsoBrentano1956§17)
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Theargumentproceedsintwosteps.First:everyindicativestatementthat
expressesajudgmentcanbeparaphrasedintoanexistential,meaningthat
indicativesostensiblyexpressingbeliefs-thatcanbeparaphrasedintoones
ostensiblyexpressingbeliefs-in.Second:theontologicalcommitmentsassociated
withabelief-inarealwaysmoreeconomicalthanthoseassociatedwithits
correspondingbelief-that;forpropositionsandthelikeentiarationisaremore
ontologicallyextravagantthanconcreteobjectsandthelikeentiarealia.
Accordingly,positingbeliefs-intotheexclusionofbeliefs-thatisbothfeasibleand
commendable:feasibleinvirtueoftheavailabilityofparaphrase,commendablein
virtueofontologicalparsimony.Theupshotcanbesummarizedthus:the
conjunctionofEXISTENTIALandATTITUDINALdeliverssignificantontological
economies,andshouldbeadoptedonthatbasis.Inwhatfollows,Iconsiderfirstthe
feasibilityclaim(§3.1),thenthecommendabilityclaim(§3.2).
3.1.DispensingwithBeliefs-thatisFeasible
InBrentano,thefirststepoftheargumentreliesonproducingtheparaphrasesfor
categoricalandhypotheticalstatementsinAristotelianlogic(asseenin§2).One
maywonderwhetherparaphraseswillbeavailablewhenwemovetomodernlogic.
Inowturntoconsidertwoparticularlyimportantcases:singularstatementsand
‘molecular’or‘compound’statements.Iwillarguethatalladmitofreasonably
plausibleexistentialparaphrases,withthepotentialexceptionofcertainmolecular
statements.
Startwithsuchsingularstatementsas‘Beyoncéisfamous.’Thesehavethe
form‘aisF,’whichdoesnotimmediatelyfitintoanyofA,E,I,orO.Leibniz,whoalso
rejectedtheseparationofsubjectandpredicate(Leibniz1686§8),construed
singularsashavingtheAform.So,‘Beyoncéisfamous’amountsisanalyzedas‘All
Beyoncésarefamous,’whichisBrentano’shandsamountsto‘Thereisnotanon-
famousBeyoncé.’SometimesBrentanosoundslikeaLeibnizianonthis,butonother
occasionsheseemstotreatsingularsratherashavingtheIform.17Thisanalyzes
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‘Beyoncéisfamous’as‘SomeBeyoncéisfamous,’andultimatelyas‘Thereisa
famousBeyoncé.’Inthissecondapproach,unliketheLeibnizianone,‘aisF’commits
totheexistenceofsomethingratherthantothenonexistenceofsomething.Ifwe
followRussell(1905)intakingtheexistenceofatobeapreconditionforthetruth
of‘aisF,’theBrentaniantackshouldappealtousmorethantheLeibnizian.
Butwhatdoes‘ThereisafamousBeyoncé’exactlymean?Atraditional
descriptivistaboutnameswouldtake‘Beyoncé’topickoutwhicheverindividual
satisfiesadescriptionthatlistscertaincentralpropertiesofBeyoncé’s.Callan
individualthatinstantiatesalltherelevantpropertiesBeyoncésque.18Withinthe
descriptivistframework,then,‘ThereisafamousBeyoncé’means‘Thereisafamous
Beyoncésqueindividual.’
Itislessclearhowthiswouldworkwithinadirect-referenceapproachto
names.Accordingtothelatter,‘Beyoncé’doesnotreferbycourtesyofany
description.Rather,itpicksoutwhateverobjectisappropriatelyrelatedtoit(where
itistheburdenofthetheorytotellusexactlywhattherelevantrelationis).19
Withinthisframework,itishardertoseehowanexistentialparaphrasemight
work.20Ontheotherhand,adirect-referencetheoristmightsimplyparaphrase
‘Beyoncéisfamous’into‘Thereisfamous-Beyoncé,’where‘famous-Beyoncé’isused
asaname.Statementsoftheform‘ThereisN’(where‘N’rangesoverpropernames)
areawkward,butultimatelytheymeanthesameas‘Nexists,’whichisnot
awkward.’Sotheideaisessentiallytoparaphrase‘Beyoncéisfamous’into‘Famous-
Beyoncéexists.’Thereisstillanopenquestionastowhattheapparentname
‘Famous-Beyoncé’refersto,butletusbracketthisissuehere(seeKriegel2015fora
detaileddiscussion).21Onceweaccept‘Thereisfamous-Beyoncé’asawkward-but-
grammatical,thereiseveryreasontothinkthatitparaphrasesfaithfully‘Beyoncéis
famous.’
Iconcludethatsingularsareamenabletoexistentialparaphrase,pending
troubleinultimatelyunderstandingwhatsuchnamesas‘Famous-Beyoncé’referto.
Themorecomplicatedcaseispresentedbycompoundormolecularstatements.We
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cansimplifythetasksomewhatbyfocusingonhowtohandleconjunctionand
negation,sinceeverybinarytruth-functionisdefinableintermsofthosetwo.
Inseparation,theyarequiteeasytohandle.Whenitcomesto
straightforwardconjunctionsoftheformp&q,suchas‘Somecatiswhiteandsome
dogisbrown,’atleasttwooptionsareopen.Oneparaphrasesthemintoatomic
existentialsaboutmereologicalsums,suchas‘Thereisasumofawhitecatanda
browndog.’Thejudgmentexpressedhereisabeliefintherelevantsum.Theother
optionistotreatconjunctionsasexpressingapluralityofsimultaneous(atomic)
judgments.Onthisapproach,intruthwedonotmakeonejudgmentexpressedby
‘Somecatiswhiteandsomedogisbrown.’Instead,wesimultaneouslyperformtwo
judgments–anoccurrentbeliefinawhitecatandanoccurrentbeliefinabrown
dog–andweuseconjunctivestatementstoexpresssuchmultiplicityofjudgments.
Inaway,thefirstoptionappealstobeliefinamereologicalsum,thesecondtoa
mereologicalsumofbeliefs-in.
Asforsimplenegation,intheAristoteliansystemtherearetwoseparate
cases:theEform(‘Nodogsarecute’)andtheOform(‘Somedogsarenotcute’).The
formerBrentanohandlesthroughtheattitudeofdisbelief,whichhetakestobeasui
generisattitudeirreducibletobelief.Itiscommontodaytotake‘Sdisbelivesincute
dogs’tobejustaflowerywayofsaying‘Sbelievesthattherearenocutedogs,’but
aswehaveseen,Brentanoadoptsanonreductiveaccountofdisbeliefthatrunsthe
otherway,considering‘Sbelievesthatnodogsarecute’tobeamisleadingreport
thatwouldbebetterputas‘Sdisbelievesinacutedog.’Asforsuchnegationsas
‘Somedogsarenotcute,’wehaveseenthatBrentanoconstruesthemasexpressing
aspecialkindofpositivejudgment,inourcaseabeliefinanuncutedog.22
ge
Thingsgetmorecomplicatedwhenwecombineconjunctionandnegationoperators
inasinglestatement.Considerfirststatementsoftheformp&~q,suchas‘Somecat
iscuteandnodogcanfly.’Herethereisnomereologicalsumwhoseexistencecould
betakentobeasserted–atleastontheassumptionthatthereisnosuchthingas
15
thesumofacutecatandanabsenceofaflyingdog(indeedofcatsandabsencesin
general!).Accordingly,theonlyliveoptionistotake‘Somecatiscuteandnodog
canfly’toexpressasumoftwodistinctjudgments,thebeliefinacutecatandthe
disbeliefinaflyingdog.
Unfortunately,theoppositehappenswithstatementsoftheform~(p&q),
suchas‘Itisnotthecasethatsomecatiscuteandsomedogcanfly.’Herethereis
onlyonejudgmentthatcanbesaidtobeexpressed.Thatjudgmentisadisbeliefin
themereologicalsumofacutecatandaflyingdog.Theunpalatableresulthereis
thatBrentanohasnounifiedaccountofp&~qand~(p&q).Hemusttrotout
differenttreatmentsfordifferentcombinationsofconjunctionandnegation.Thatis
somethingofanembarrassment.
Worse,neitheraccountcanhandleastatementoftheform~(p&~q),such
as‘Itisnotthecasethatthereareflyingdogsbutnocutecats.’Ontheonehand,it
wouldbeimplausibletotakesuchastatementtoexpressadisbeliefinthe
mereologicalsumof(a)aflyingdogand(b)theabsenceofacutecat.Forthenits
negationwouldhavetobetakentoexpressabeliefinthatsum,andhenceinan
absence(whichwouldcommitthebelievertotherealityofabsences).Ontheother
hand,nordoes‘Itisnotthecasethatthereareflyingdogsbutnocutecats’seemto
expressadisbeliefintheco-occurrenceoftwoseparatejudgments,abeliefinacute
catandadisbeliefinaflyingdog.Forwhatthesubjectrejectsarenotbeliefs
themselves.(Forallsheknowsthebeliefsmaywellexist!)Tothatextent,
statementsoftheform~(p&~q)canbehandledneitherbythe‘(dis)beliefinsums’
strategynotbythe‘sumof(dis)beliefs’strategy.
Brentano’sapproachtothisproblemistotreatsuchstatementsasrejections
notjustofco-occurringjudgmentsbutofco-occurringtrueorcorrect(richtig)
judgments.Onthisview,‘Itisnotthecasethatthereareflyingdogsbutnocutecats’
istobeparaphrasedinto‘Thereisnosumofacorrectbeliefinflyingdogsanda
correctdisbeliefincutecats.’Thejudgmentexpressedhereisthedisbeliefinsucha
sumofcorrectjudgments.Theideaisthatnoonecouldcorrectlybothbelieveina
16
flyingdoganddisbelieveinacutecat–andthisiswhatastatementoftheform~(p
&~q)reallyexpresses.Whatisexpressedhereisinrealityasecond-orderjudgment
–whichisnotthatsurprisinggiventhatwearetryingtoaccountforsecond-order
negation.
Onemightreasonablycomplainthatweareleftherewithadistressingly
balkanizedtreatmentofnegation:wehaveseendifferentdevicesforhandling~p,
p&~q,~(p&q),and~(p&~q).Thesedevicesare:asuigenerisattitudeofdisbelief,
singlestatementsexpressingsumsofdifferentjudgments,singlejudgmentsabout
mereologicalsumsofobjects,andsecond-orderjudgmentsaboutcorrectfirst-order
judgments.ThislevelofdisunitylookslikeamajorcostofBrentano’stheoryof
judgment,thecomplaintmightbe.
However,itwouldseemthatoncewehaveintroducedthedeviceofsecond-
orderjudgmentaboutcorrectfirst-orderjudgment,itcanbeappliedretrospectively
tohandleuniformlyallfourcases:~pcanbeunderstoodasexpressingadisbeliefin
acorrectjudgmentthatp,p&~qcanbeunderstoodasexpressingajudgmentthatp
andadisbeliefinacorrectjudgmentthatq,and~(p&q)canbeunderstoodasa
disbeliefinasumofcorrectjudgmentsthatpandthatq.
Thereis,however,anotherobjectiontowhichBrentano’saccountofnegation
issusceptible.RecallthatBrentano’sparaphrasesarenotintendedastechnical
movesfacilitatingtheregimentationofaformallanguage.Theyareintendedto
capturethedeeppsychologicalrealityofourcognitivelife.Arguably,however,itis
psychologicallyunrealistictothinkthat‘Nodogsarepurple’actuallyexpressesthe
second-orderjudgmentthatthereisnocorrectbeliefinapurpledog.Forharboring
suchasecond-orderjudgmentwouldseemtorequirethepossessionofsuch
conceptsasBELIEFandCORRECTNESS,yetachildmaywellbelievethatnodogsare
purplewithoutpossessingthoseconcepts.Furthermore,certainbeliefsthatappear
simpleenoughthatachildcouldhavethemarecastasextraordinarilycomplexin
Brentano’stheory,againmakingthetheorypsychologicallyunrealistic.
17
Agoodexampleisdisjunctivejudgments,suchaswouldbeexpressedby
‘Somecatiswhiteorsomedogisbrown.’Chisholm(1976:92)suggestedon
Brentano’sbehalfthatwepositdisjunctiva,inthiscasetheindividualwhichiseither
awhitecatorabrowndog,andsaythat‘Somecatiswhiteorsomedogisbrown’
expressesanoccurrentbeliefinthisdisjunctivum.However,Brentanohimself
wouldlikelyfrownondisjunctivajustasmuchasonabsences(‘negativa,’ashe
calledthem).Instead,heexploitsthedefinabilityofdisjunctionintermsofnegation
andconjunction:
…anyonewhosays‘ThereisanAorthereisaBorthereisaC’expressesthefollowing:in
contemplatingthatAisnotandBisnotandCisnot,heconsiderssuchacombinationof
thoughtsincorrect.(Brentano1930:70)
Weknowthat‘pVq’isequivalentto‘~(~p&~q).’Sowecanparaphrase‘Somecat
iswhiteorsomedogisbrown’into‘Itisnotthecasethatnocatiswhiteandnodog
isbrown,’andtheninto‘Thereisnomereologicalsumofacorrectdisbeliefina
whitecatandacorrectdisbeliefinabrowndog.’23However,itisquiteplausiblethat
achildcouldgraspthenotionthatsomecatiswhiteorsomedogisbrownwell
beforeshehasthecognitiveresourcestograsptheideaofamereologicalsumof
correctdisbeliefs.
ge
Inconclusion,althoughBrentanohimselfrestshiscasefortheparaphraseabilityof
allstatementsintoexistentialsmainlyonconsiderationofcategoricaland
hypotheticalstatements,hehassomeoptionsforexistentialparaphrasesofsingular
andcompoundstatementsaswell.Theparaphrasesmaynotalwaysbeelegant,and
sometimesentrainrealcosts,notablythecontrastbetweentherelativesimplicityof
believing(e.g.)thatsomebabyorsomedogiscuteandtheevidentcomplexityof
disbelievinginamereologicalsumofacorrectdisbeliefinacutebabyandacorrect
disbeliefinacutedog.Still,itisalreadyremarkablethatanexistentialparaphraseis
alwaysavailable.ItwouldthereforenotbeunreasonabletoindulgeBrentanoand
granthimthefirststepofhisargument:dispensingwithbelief-thatisfeasible.
18
3.2.DispensingwithBeliefs-thatisCommendable
Paraphraseabilityisasymmetricrelation:if‘blah’paraphrasesinto‘bleh,’then
equally‘bleh’paraphrasesinto‘blah.’Accordingly,inshowingthatallpredicative
statementsparaphraseintoexistentialones,wewouldalsobeshowingthatallthe
relevantexistentialsparaphraseintopredicatives.Sotheparaphrasebyitselfdoes
notdemonstratethatallseeminglypredicativejudgmentsareinfactexistential.It
couldbeequallywelltakentosuggestthattherelevantseeminglyexistential
judgmentsareinfactpredicative.
Someonemightrespond,onBrentano’sbehalf,thatinterpretingthe
paraphraseabilityasshowingthatalljudgmentsareexistentialbringswithit
increasedtheoreticalunity;theoppositeinterpretationdoesnot.Inoneversion,the
claimwouldbethatalthoughallpredicativesparaphraseintoexistentials,thereare
alsosomeextraexistentialsforwhichnopredicativeparaphraseisavailable.In
anotherversion,theclaimmightbethatexistentialsasaclassaresimplymore
homogeneousthanpredicatives.However,bothclaimsaresuspect.Ontheonehand,
itisdoubtfulthatthereareexistentialsthatcannotbeputinpredicativeform,given
theavailabilityofsuchfirst-orderpredicatesas‘exists,’‘isexistent,’and‘isreal.’As
fortheclaimthatexistentialsareinherentlymorehomogeneousthanpredicatives,
itishardtoevaluatesuchclaimsintheabsenceofexplicitmeasuresoftherelevant
homogeneity.Attheveryleast,theenvisagedargumentwouldrequire
supplementationintheformof(i)providingameasureofclasshomogeneityfor
statementsand(ii)showingthat,asaclass,existentialsscorehigheronthis
measurethanpredicatives.
Brentano’sownargument,inthequoted1906lettertoMarty,isnotfrom
unitybutparsimony(‘theeconomyofnature’).Theideaseemstobethatifsome
judgmentsarepredicative,thentheircontentsarepropositional,whichwould
requireustoembracepropositionsinourontology,andtheirtruthmakersare
statesofaffairs,whichwewouldhavetoembraceaswellinourontology.In
19
contrast,Brentanoseemstoclaim,existentialjudgmentsdonotrequirea
propositionalcontent,andtheirtruthmakerscanbeindividualobjects.
Thenotionthatjudgmentsmaynotrequirepropositionsascontentis
potentiallygreatlyadvantageous,giventheforceofworriesaboutthe‘unityofthe
proposition’prominentinrecentphilosophyofmindandlanguage(King2007).But
theparsimonyBrentanopursuesmostvigorouslyconcernstruthmakers.The
truthmakerofabeliefthatsomedogsarecute,itisnaturaltosay,isthefact(orthe
obtainingstateofaffairs)thatsomedogsarecute.Incontrast,thetruthmakersof
thebeliefincutedogsaresimplythecutedogs.Eachandeverycutedogoutthere
makestruethebeliefincutedogs.24Thusthetruthmakersofbeliefs-inare
individualobjectsratherthanfactsorstatesofaffairs.Otherthingsbeingequal,
then,thethesisthatallbeliefsarebeliefs-inpavesthewaytoanominalistontology
thatdispenseswithfactsandstatesofaffairs.Thistooisgreatlyadvantageous,given
worriesaboutso-calledBradley’sregressattendingastate-of-affairsontology.25
IdevelopthisnominalisticsideofBrentano’sproposalmorefullyinKriegel
2015;whatIwanttostresshereisthatthe1906lettertoMartysuggeststhatthat
nominalistontologyisthemotivationfortheBITtheoryofjudgment.
Thekeytodeliveringnominalismisthenotionthatbeliefs-inaremadetrue
byindividualobjects,notbyexistentialstatesofaffairs(ofwhichsuchobjectsare
constituents).Itmightbeobjectedthatthebeliefindogsismadetruenotbyeach
dog,butratherbyeachdog’sexistence–whereadog’sexistenceisastateofaffairs
(thefactthatthedogexists).ButBrentanoexplicitlyrejectsthisinthesameletterto
Marty:
[T]hebeingofAneednotbeproducedinorderforthejudgment“Ais”tobe…correct;all
thatisneededisA.(Brentano1930:85)
Itistheobject,andnot(thefactof)theobject’sexistence,thatmakestruethe
relevantexistential.Inaslogan:thetruthmakersofexistentialsarenotexistences
butexistents.
20
Whatisthereasontotaketheobjectitself,ratherthanitsexistence,tomake
truetheexistentialjudgment?Onereasonisparsimonyofcourse.ButBrentanoalso
adducesaseparateargument.Itisanargumentfrominfiniteregress,presentedin
thatlettertoMarty(Brentano1930:85-6)andasubsequentlettertoHugoBergman
(Bergmann1946:84),aswellasina1914dictation(Brentano1930:108).Suppose
forreductiothatbeliefinmydogJuliusismadetruenotbyJulius,butbyJulius’
existence.TheninadditiontoJulius,wemustaddtoourontologythestateofaffairs
ofJuliusexisting.Inaddingthisstateofaffairstoourontology,now,weareclearly
committingourselvestoitsexistence.Andcommittingtotheexistenceofthestate
ofaffairsofJuliusexistingisamatterofbelievinginthatstateofaffairs.The
questionarisesthenofwhatmakesthisnewbelieftrue.Oneviewisthatitismade
truebythestateofaffairsofJuliusexistingitself.Theotherviewisthatitismade
truebynotbythestateofaffairsofJuliusexisting,butbytheexistenceofthatstate
ofaffairs(thatis,bythestateofaffairsofthestateofaffairsofJuliusexisting
existing!).Ifwetaketheformerview,thenweallowbeliefsincertainitemstobe
madetruebythoseitemsthemselves,ratherthanbytheirexistences;sowemight
aswellallowalreadythebeliefinJuliustobemadetruebyJuliushimself,rather
thanbyJulius’existence.If,however,wetakethebeliefinthestateofaffairsof
Juliusexistingtobemadetruebytheexistenceofthatstateofaffairs,thenweare
includinginourontologyanew,second-orderstateofaffairs,namely,thatofJulius’
existenceexisting.Thisontologicalcommitmentofoursrequiresustobelieveinthat
second-orderstateofaffairs–andoffweareonaviciousregress.Theonlynon-
arbitrarywaytoavoidtheregressistorecognizedogsthemselvesasthe
truthmakersoffirst-orderbeliefsindogs.
Insummary,theBITtheoryofjudgmenthastheadvantageofdispensing
withstatesofaffairsasthekindofentitiesourjudgmentsareanswerableto.More
precisely,whatwehavehereisadispensabilityargumenttotheeffectthatthe
conjunctionofEXISTENTIALandATTITUDINALresultsinadoublyparsimony-enabling
theoryofjudgment:thereis(i)noneedtopositpropositionstoaccountforthe
21
structureofjudgments,and(ii)noneedtopositfactsand/orstatesofaffairsto
accountforthetruthof(true)judgments.
ge
TheargumentisthatweshouldadopttheconjunctionofATTITUDINALand
EXISTENTIALbecausedoingsowillprovidedownstreambenefits.Theargumentis
powerful,buthastwolimitations.First,itoffersnomotivationforeither
ATTITUDINALorEXISTENTIALinseparationfromtheother,andsecond,itpresentno
upstreamconsiderationsofferingindependentsupportforeitherATTITUDINALor
EXISTENTIAL.Now,intheentireBrentanocorpusIdonotbelievethereisany
independentargumentofthesortforEXISTENTIAL.ButforATTITUDINALthereareat
leasttwo.
Themoreexplicitargumentappears,tomyknowledge,onlyinBrentano’s
lecturenotesfromhislogiccoursesinViennaat1878-9and1884-5(Brentano1956
§15).Thosewhomaintainthatanexistentialjudgment’sexistence-commitmentis
anaspectofcontent,Brentanoreasons,havethefollowingpictureinmind.When
youjudgethatthePopeiswise,youputtogethertheconceptofPopeandthe
conceptofwisdom.Likewise,whenyoujudgethatthereisapope,orthatthePope
exists,youputtogethertheconceptofPopeandtheconceptofexistence.Butnote,
saysBrentano,thatyoucannotjudgethatthePopeiswisewithoutacknowledging
(annerkenen)thePope,thatis,presenting-as-existentthePope.Bythesametoken,
youcannotjudgethatthePopeexistswithoutacknowledgingthePope.Butonceone
hasacknowledgedthePope,thereisnopointinadditionallyjudgingthatthePope
exists–thereisnothinginthelatternotalreadyintheformer.Sincethe
commitmenttothePope’sexistenceisalreadybuiltintotheacknowledging,that
commitmentismerelyreplicatedintheact’scontent.
Oneobjectionmightbethatacknowledgementisnotbuiltintojudgmentthe
wayBrentanoclaims.Forexample,onemayjudgethatAlyoshaKaramazovis
emotionallywisewithoutacknowledgingAlyoshaintherelevantsense(thesenseof
presenting-as-existent).However,forBrentanosuchstatementsas‘Alyosha
22
Karamazovisemotionallywise’areellipticalforthehypothetical‘Iftherewerean
AlyoshaKaramazov,hewouldbeemotionallywise’(seeBrentano1911:273).Aswe
sawin§2,thisinturnexpressesonlyanegativejudgment,namely,thatthereisnot
anon-emotionally-wiseAlyosha.Suchnegativejudgmentsareorthogonaltothe
argument,sincenegativeexistentialsdonotcommittoanything’sexistence
(obviously:theyratherinvolvecommitmenttononexistence).
Anotherobjectionmightbethatacknowledgementonlyappearstobea
distinctiveattitude.Intruth,toacknowledgesomethingamountstojudgingthatthe
thinghasthepropertyofexisting.Inotherwords,justasBrentanoclaimsthat
belief-thatreportsshouldbeparaphrasedintobelief-inreports,thepresentobjector
claimsweshoulddotheinverse.Whatthisobjectionshows,Ithink,isthatdeeper
(nonlinguistic)considerationsarecalledfortoshowthatexistence-commitmentis
anattitudinalratherthancontentproperty.
Brentano’smainargumentforthisisimplicitinthePsychology.26Thebasic
pointisthatactsofjudgingandactsofcontemplatingorentertainingcanhavethe
samecontent(Brentano1874:205).Yetthejudgingcommitsthesubjecttothe
realityofwhatisjudged,whilethecontemplatingfailstocommittotheexistenceof
thecontemplated.Therefore,theexistence-commitmentcannotcomefromthe
content,whichisshared.Itmustcomefromsomeotherdifferencebetweenjudging
andcontemplating.Thebestcandidate,saysBrentano(1874:221-2),isan
attitudinaldifference:thejudgingpresentsthejudgedinawaythatthe
contemplatingdoesnotpresentthecontemplated,andthatwayofpresenting
encodes(ifyouplease)commitmenttotherelevantobject’sexistence.
ConsideranepisodeinwhichIamtoldthatsomestarvelingisimmasked.
First,Iamunsurewhatwassaid.ThenIreasonthatbythesoundofit,‘starveling’
mustbeawordforsomeonewhostarvesand‘immasked’awordforsomeonewho
iswearingamask.WhathappensnextisthatIapprehendorcontemplatethenotion
thatsomestarvingpersoniswearingamask.AtthispointIamcommittedneither
totheexistencenortothenonexistenceofsuchaperson.Aftersomethinking,
23
however,Irealizethattherearesomanyhungrypeoplearoundtheworldthatitis
ratherprobableatleastoneofthemiswearingamaskrightnow.Ithencometo
accepttheexistenceofanimmaskedstarveling.Inthisstretchofinnerlife,the
changethathappenswhenInolongermerelycontemplatebutalsobelieveinan
immaskedstarvelingisnotachangeinwhatispresentedtome,butinhowitis
presented.Whatispresentedthroughoutisastarvingpersonwearingamask.But
firstheispresentedinawaythatdoesnotcommittohisexistenceandthenina
waythatdoes.Theexistence-commitmentisthusanaspectofthewaythe
presentingisdone–whatIhavecalledanattitudinalproperty.
Tomymind,thismoreimplicitargumentofBrentano’siscogent,and
demonstratesthatexistence-commitmentisindeednotacontentproperty,but
likelyanattitudinalproperty.27Itisworthmentioning,though,thatthereisanother
argumentforATTITUDINALclosetothesurfaceinthePsychology.Considerthe
Kantianclaimthat‘existenceisnotaproperty,’whichBrentanocitesapprovingly:
InhiscritiqueoftheontologicalargumentfortheexistenceofGod,Kantmadethepertinent
remarkthatinanexistentialstatement,i.e.inastatementoftheform‘Aexists,’existence‘is
notarealpredicate,i.e.aconceptofsomethingthatcanbesuperposed(hinzukommen)on
theconceptofathing.’‘Itis,’hesaid,‘onlythepositingofathingorofcertaindeterminations
[read:properties],asexistinginthemselves.’(Brentano1874:211)
Ifthereisnosuchthingasapropertyofexistence,anyattributionofexistenceto
somethingwouldbeattributionofapropertythatnothinghas.Accordingly,any
existentialbeliefthatattributedexistencetosomethingwouldperforcebe
misattributingandthereforemistaken.Butinfactnotallexistentialbeliefsare
mistaken:itiscorrect,forexample,tobelieveinducks.So(correct)commitmentto
something’sexistencecannotinvolveattributionofapropertyofexistence.If
commitmenttoFs’existenceisnotamatterofattributingexistencetoFs,itmust
insteadbebuiltintotheverynatureoftheattitudetakentowardFs.Thisisthe
attitudeofbelieving-in,anattitudewhoseverynatureistopresent-as-existent.
24
IconcludethatthecaseforbothEXISTENTIALandATTITUDINALisstrongerthan
onemightinitiallysuspect.Asnoted,togethertheyentailOBJECTUAL.Andallthree
thesestogetherconstituteBIT,Brentano’sBelief-InTheoryofjudgment.Thetheory
isveryunusual,butapparentlymoredefensiblethanmayinitiallyappear.Its
greatestcost,itseemstome,isthegapbetweentheapparentsimplicityofcertain
(notablycompound)judgmentsandtheevidentcomplexityBrentano’stheory
attributestothem.
4. ObjectionsandReplies
GivenhowunusualBrentano’sviewis,itissurprisingthatthecaseforitshouldbe
assolidasitis.Nonetheless,anumberofobjectionssuggestthemselves.Letus
considerthemorepressing.
Clearly,Brentano’stheorygoesagainstourintuitionsastwenty-first-century
philosophers‘broughtup’onacertainconceptionofthestructureofjudgmentand
belief:ashavingasubject-predicatestructureakintothestructureofthesentences
usedtoexpressthem.Butjustasclearly,Brentanowouldreplythattheseintuitions
ofoursliedownstreamoftheorizingandthereforecannotbeusedtosupportthe
theory.Wephilosophershavetheintuitionbecausewehaveacceptedthetheory,
nottheotherwayround.Weshouldrejecttheintuitionalongwiththetheory.The
objectormayinsist,however,thattheintuitiondoesnotcomeonlyfrom
philosophicaltheory,butalsofromthestructureoflanguage,asusedwellbefore
exposuretoanytheory.Itisthesubject-predicatestructureofindicativesthat
suggestsasimilarpsychologicalstructureinthejudgmentstheyexpress.
Thisisareasonableclaim,towhichBrentanorespondsbytryingtoexplain
whylinguisticexpressionsofjudgmentshavethestructuretheydo(despite
judgmentshavingacompletelydifferentstructure).28Ultimately,theexplanationis
thatlanguageandjudgmenthavedifferentfunctions:theprimary,originalfunction
oflanguage,heclaims,istofacilitatecommunication(Brentano1956:25-6),
25
whereastheprimaryfunctionofthoughtandreasoningistheacquisitionand
managementofknowledge.Insofarasstructuresderiveovertimefromfunctions,
thereisnoreasontoexpectthelattertoconvergewheretheformerdiverge.
Theobjectormaypressthatcertainsystematicityphenomenacouldnotbe
explainedwithintheBrentanianframework.Ifthestructureoflanguageand
thoughtmirroreachother,wecanunderstandwhynopersonisinapositionto
judgethatMarylovesJohnwithoutbeinginapositiontojudgethatJohnlovesMary
(Fodor1975).Brentano,incontrast,hasnoresourcestoexplainthis–hemusttreat
asmiraculousthesimultaneousemergenceofthecapacitiestomakeboth
judgments.ForthebeliefinaMary-lovingJohnandthebeliefinaJohn-lovingMary
havestrictlynothingincommonintheircontents.29
ThisisindeedaveryseriousproblemforBrentano,butperhapshecould
respondasfollows.Aswehavealreadyseen,thefactthatanintentionalstateisnon-
propositionaldoesnotmeanthatitdoesnotmobilizeconcepts.Thus,eventhough
fearisanobjectualattitude,whatasubjectcanfeardependsontheconceptsinthe
subject’spossession:ifS1possessestheconceptofaRottweilerwhileS2only
possessesthecoarser-grainedconceptofabigdog,theirfearsofthesameobject
mightbetype-differentintentionalstates.ThisisbecauseS1willapplytheconcept
ofaRottweilertotheobjecthefearswhileS2willapplytheconceptofabigdog.
Now,wecanimagineasubjectwhopossessesbothconcepts,butinwhomthetwo
aredisconnectedinsuchawaythatthesubjectisunawarethatRottweilersare
dogs.Inmostsubjectswhopossessbothconcepts,however,thetwoarelinkedin
suchawaythatitisimpossibleforthesubjecttofearaRottweilerwithoutipsofacto
fearingadog.TheBrentanianmighthopetoproduceasimilarexplanationofwhy
everynormalhumansubjectinapositiontocontemplateaMary-lovingJohnisalso
inapositiontocontemplateaJohn-lovingMary.Itisfarfromclearhowthe
explanationwouldgo,butitisnotinconceivablethatsomestorycouldbedevised.
Still,aslongasnoactualstoryisproffered,itremainsanoutstandingtheoretical
debtofBITtoshowthatitcanrecoverthephenomenaofsystematicity.
26
AcompletelydifferentobjectionisthatBITispragmaticallyproblematic,
perhapsbecauseitsacceptancewouldcomplicatetheconductofinquiry.More
specifically,itmightbeclaimedthatpredicatelogichasworkedverywellforusto
formalizelargetractsofscience,butwithBIT,predicatelogicwouldhavetobe
renouncedwholesale.Thisobjectionisimportant,butallitshowsisthatBrentano
owesusapredicate-freeformallogictogoalongwithhispredication-freetheoryof
judgment.Asithappens,Brentanodidstartonthisproject(Brentano1956),which
wasfurtherdevelopedbyhisstudentFranzHillebrand(Hillebrand1891).Suppose
asubjectjudgesboththat(i)thereisapartyandthat(ii)ifthereisapartythen
thereisbooze,whichleadshertojudgethat(iii)thereisbooze.Thevalidityofher
reasoningiscapturedintraditionalmodusponens.WithintheBrentanian
framework,thereasoningisrecastasfollows:thesubjectbothbelievesinaparty
anddisbelievesinaboozelessparty,whichleadshertobelieveinbooze.Thetask,
then,istoreformulatethefamiliarlawsoflogic,inthiscasemodusponens,sothat
thisreasoningisratifiedasvalid.Whathasbeenproposedbyvariouslogiciansisto
replacethetraditional
pàq p
q
with
Na¯b Ea
Eb
Thisreads:aisnotwithoutb(thereisnotaboozelessparty);ais(thereisaparty);
therefore,bis(thereisbooze).Withthislawinplace,wecanreadilyexplainwhy
thesubject’sreasoningtotheconclusionthatthereisboozeisvalid.Similarlyfor
otherlogicallaws.Now,whileIhavenocompetencetoaffirmthatHillebrand’s
systemworks,IhaveallthecompetenceneededtoreportthatPeterSimonsthinks
itdoes(seeSimons1984,1987).
27
Conclusion
IpersonallythinkthatBrentano’stheoryofjudgmentisamasterpieceof
philosophicalcreativity.Againsttheoverwhelminglycommonphilosophical
treatmentofjudgmentandbeliefaspropositionalattitudeswithaninternal
structuremimickingthatofsentences,outofthebluecomesBrentanoandargues
thattheseareratherobjectualattitudeswhoseonlyfunctionistoacknowledgeor
denyexistence,ormoreaccurately,present-as-existentorpresent-as-nonexistent
someindividualobject.Givenitsconsiderableoriginality,Ifindthecasefor
Brentano’stheorysurprisinglysolid.Realliabilitiesloomaroundtheissuesof
systematicityandthecomplexityofcompoundjudgments.Still,theontological
benefitsaccruingtothiskindoftheory–inparticular,thedismissalofpropositions
andnon-concretetruthmakers–willsurelyappealtomanyphilosophers.30
References
§ Bradley,F.H.1893.AppearanceandReality.London:SwanSonnenschein.
§ Brentano,F.C.1874.PsychologyfromEmpiricalStandpoint.EditedbyO.Kraus.TranslatedbyA.C.
Rancurello,D.B.Terrell,andL.L.McAlister.London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1973.
§ Brentano,F.C.1911.‘AppendixtotheClassificationofMentalPhenomena.’InBrentano1874.
§ Brentano,F.C.1928.SensoryandNoeticConsciousness.EditedO.Kraus,Trans.M.SchättleandL.L.
McAlister.London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1981.
§ Brentano,F.C.1930.TheTrueandtheEvident.EditedbyO.Kraus.TranslatedbyR.M.Chisholm,I.
Politzer,andK.Fischer.London:Routledge1966.
§ Brentano,F.C.1933.TheTheoryofCategories.EditedbyA.Kastil.TranslatedbyR.M.Chisholm
andN.Guterman.TheHague:MartinusNijhoff,1981.
§ Brentano,F.C.1956.DieLehrevomrichtigenUrteil.Bern:FranckeVerlag.
§ Brentano,F.C.1982.DescriptivePsychology.EditedandtranslatedbyB.Müller.London:
Routledge,1995.
§ Chisholm,R.1976.‘Brentano’sNonpropositionalTheoryofJudgment.’MidwestStudiesin
PhilosophyofMind1:91-95.
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§ Fodor,J.A.1975.TheLanguageofThought.CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress.
§ vonHillebrad,F.1891.DieneuenTheorienderkategorischenSchlüsse.Wien:Hölder.
§ King,J.2007.TheNatureandStructureofContent.OxfordandNewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.
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andPhenomenologicalResearch90:153-180.
§ Kriegel,U.Forthcoming.‘Brentano’sConceptofMind:UnderlyingNature,Reference-Fixing,and
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AnalyticalPhilosophy.London:Palgrave-Macmillan.
§ Kroon,F.1987.‘CausalDescriptivism.’AustralasianJournalofPhilosophy65:1–17.
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§ Meinong,A.1902.OnAssumptions,trans.J.Heanue.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,
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§ Russell,B.1905.‘OnDenoting.’Mind14:479-493.
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§ Simons,P.M.1984.‘ABrentanianBasisforaLeśniewskianLogic.’LogiqueetAnalyse27:279-307.
§ Simons,P.M.1987.‘Brentano'sReformofLogic.’Topoi6:25-38.
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1Tomyknowledge,theexpression‘objectualattitude’comesfromForbes2000;andtheexpression‘propositionalattitude’fromRussell1904.Buttheconceptsfarpredatetheexpressions.2Itisnotimmediatelyclearthatinclaimingthatjudgmentandinterestaregroundedinpresentation,orhavepresentationastheirgrounds/foundations(Grundlage),Brentanohasinmindthenotionofgroundingcurrentlywidelydiscussed.OnesimilarityisthatBrentaniangroundingisamatterofontologicalasymmetricdependence,orwhatBrentanocalls‘unilateralseparability’:amentalstate
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canbeapresentationwithoutbeingajudgment,butitcannotbeajudgmentwithoutalsobeingapresentation.3SeeBrentano1874IIChapters6-8,including:‘mythreeclassesarenotthesameasthosewhichareusuallyproposed.Intheabsenceofmoreappropriateexpressionswedesignatethefirstbytheterm“presentation,”thesecondbytheterm“judgment,”andthethirdbytheterms“emotion,”“interest,”or“love”.’(Brentano1874:198)Aclearerpresentationoftheviewisthis:‘Itisclearthatallmodesofrelationtoanobjectfallintothreeclasses:presentation,judgment,andemotion[interest].Thesecondandthirdmodesalwayspresupposethefirst,andinbothwefindacontrast,inthatajudgmentiseitherabelieforadenial,andamemotioniseitheraformofloveorhate.’(Brentano1928:42)4AlthoughBrentanoconsiderspresentationthemostbasicofthethree,sincetheothertwoaregroundedinit,myexpositionwillproceedinadifferentorder.Moreover,myexpositionwillbea‘dogmatic’one,inthatIwillnotpresentBrentano’sargumentfortheclassification,onlytheclassificationitself.Forreconstructionanddiscussionofhisargumentforit,seeKriegelforthcoming.5Isay‘inthefirstinstance’becauseaswewillseelater,ultimatelyBrentano’sviewisthatajudgmentpresentwhatitdoesasexistentornonexistentratherthanastrueorfalse.6Brentano’s‘Vorstellung’isvariouslytranslatedaspresentation,representation,apprehension,idea,thought,andcontemplation.HereIgomostlywith‘presentation.’7Whenonesupposesthatp,oneisnottherebycommittedtothetruthofp.Thereisasenseinwhichinsupposingthatp,onepresentsptooneselfundertheguiseoftruth,butforBrentano,thelackofcommitmenttotruthlandssuppositioninthecategoryofpresentation.HisstudentMeinongarguedthatinfactsuppositions,orassumptions(Annahmen),shareoneessentialcharacteristicwithpresentationsandanotherwithjudgments,andsoconstitutedasuigeneriscategory(Meinong1902).Brentanoarguesagainstthisinseveralplaces,forexampleBrentano1911:284-6.8Thisis,atleast,Brentano’streatmentofAristotle’sfourtypesofstatementsformostofhiscareer.Inthefinaldecadeofhislife,heseemstohavecomplicatedtheaccountconsiderably,adoptinghisso-calleddouble-judgmenttheory(seeespeciallyAppendixIXofthePsychology,aswellasBrentano1956§30).HereIwillignorethislatercomplication,wellmotivatedthoughitmaybe.9Brentanowrites:‘Theproposition,“Ifamanbehavesbadly,heharmshimself,”isahypotheticalproposition.Asfarasitsmeaningisconcerned,itisthesameasthecategoricalproposition,“Allmenwhobehavebadlyharmthemselves.”Andthis,inturn,hasnoothermeaningthanthatoftheexistentialproposition,“Amanwhobehavesbadlyanddoesnotharmhimselfdoesnotexist,”ortouseamorefelicitousexpression,“Thereisnosuchthingasamanwhobehavesbadlyanddoesnotharmhimself”.’(Brentano1874:218)10Brentanonowherestatestheattitudinalaccountofexistence-commitmentasexplicitlyasonemightwish.Buthecomescloseatvariouspoints.Forexample:‘Themostnaturalexpressionis“Ais,”not“Aisexistent,”where“existent”appearsasapredicate.…[Butsuchanexistentialstatement]meansrather“IfanyoneshouldthinkofAinapositiveway,histhoughtisfitting(entsprechend)”.’(Brentano1930:69)ThecommitmenttoA’sexistenceisanaspectoftheway(ormode)inwhichthethinkingisdone.11Thereisaquestionofhowtohandlethetruthmakingofnegativeexistentials.ThisissomethingBrentanohadnothingtosayabout.Perhapsthisisbecauseforhimtheissueisnotreallyoneoftruthmaking,butoftheontologicalcommitmentthatpositiveexistentialsinvolve.Sincenegativeexistentialsinvolvenoontologicalcommitment,thesameissuedoesnotariseforthem.
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12Thereareusesof‘beliefin’thatmaydenotenon-cognitiveattitude,asin‘believeinyourself!’or‘webelieveinthefuture’(whichseemtodenoteemotionalattitudessuchasconfidenceandhope).Butthereisalsothecognitiveusagehighlightedinthemaintext.13Toendorsethisformulation,onehastoacceptthatthereissuchathingasoccurrentbelieving-in.Ifonetakesbelieving-intobealwaysdispositional,thenBrentano'sviewwouldhavetobeformulatedmorecumbersomely:alljudgmentsareoccurrentmanifestationsofbelievings-in.Forthesakeofsmoothexpositionmorethananythingelse,Iamheretreatingbelief-inasastatethatcanbeoccurrent.14TwoexceptionsareSzabó(2003)andTextor(2007),whorejecttheanalysisof‘Sbelievesinx’intermsof‘Sbelievesthatxexists,’thoughongroundsotherfromBrentano’s.15Thenameissuboptimal,insofarasbelief-incapturesonlyonehalfofthespanofjudgments–disbelief-incapturestheotherhalf.ButBIThastheadvantageofbeingcute,andItrustthereadertokeepinmindtherelevanceofdisbelief-in.16Itmightbeobjected,tomyinterpretationofBrentano’sAnerkennungasbelief-in,thatBrentanowasadamantthattherearenodegreesofacceptance,whereasonebelief-inmayverywellvaryinconfidence(constitutingakindofobjectualcredence).However,itispossibletoaccountforthedegreeofconfidenceassociatedwithabelief-innotasanaspectofthebelief-initself,butasakindofsecond-orderstatedirectedatthelikelytruthofthefirst-orderbelief-in.Initself,then,thebelief-inwouldbeabsoluteinitsexistence-commitment.17OneplacewhereBrentanosoundsnon-LeibnizianisinhisdiscussionofmereologicalrelationsamongcoloredspotsinBrentano1982Chap.2.OneplaceinwhichhementionstheLeibnizianparaphraseinasympathetictoneofvoiceisinhisdiscussionofKant’sclassificationofutterancesinBrentano1956§28.18Whathappensifthereismorethanoneindividualwiththoseproperties?Severalavenuesareopentodescriptivists–dividedreference,referencefailure,andmore–buttheissuessurroundingthispossibilityhavenothingspecificallytodowithBrentano’sproject,soIwillsetthemasidehere.19InKripke’s(1972)causaltheoryofreference,forexample,thereisarelationofnondeviantcausalchainbetweenacurrentuseofthenameandabaptismaleventinwhichthenameisintroducedinthepresenceofthenamed.20Oneoption,ofcourse,istodenythedirectreferencetheoryofnames.Forexample,itispossibletoholdthattheinsightsassociatedwithcausaltheoryofreferencecanberecoveredthroughakindofcausaldescriptivism(Kroon1987),accordingtowhichanamereferstowhateverobjectssatisfiesthetoken-reflexivedescription‘theobjectsuitablycausallylinkedtothisveryuseofthename.’Onthisview,‘Beyoncéisfamous’meansthesameas‘Theobjectsuitablycausallylinkedtothisveryuseof“Beyoncé”isfamous.’ThiswouldallowsforthestandardBrentanianparaphrase.21TheshortansweristhatforBrentanoBeyoncéandFamous-Beyoncéaretwonumericallydistinctbutspatiotemporallycoincidingobjects.22LaterinhiscareerBrentanoadoptsthemorecomplicateddouble-judgmenttheorytohandlesuchcases(seeesp.Brentano1956§30).Therearegoodreasonsforthis,butasnotedhereIamgoingtoignorethedouble-judgmenttheoryhere.(Addressingitinbriefisnotreallypossible.)23Asimilarstrategycanbeextendedtomaterialconditionals,sincepè qisequivalentto~pVq,henceto~(p&~q).Itmightbeobjectedthatdisbeliefinsumsofcorrectjudgmentsistooweaktocapturethecontentofdisjunctiveandconditionaljudgments.Theclaimisnotjustthatnobodyhasin
31
factmadetherelevantcorrectjudgments.Itisratherthatifanyonedidmakethosejudgments,theycouldnotdosocorrectly.Thislatterclaimhasamodaldepthtoitentirelymissingfromthesimplerejectionoftwocorrectjudgmentsco-occurring.Thisobjectionsmellsrighttome,butitjustinvitesdiscussionofBrentano’streatmentofmodality,onwhichBrentanohadsomeveryinterestingthingtosay,butwhichwouldtakeustoofarafield.24Theremightbesomethingoddabouttalkoftruthmakersforbeliefsin.Perhapsitmightbethoughtungrammaticaltosaythatthebeliefinducksistrue;itiscertainlymorenaturaltosaythatsuchabeliefiscorrect.Inthatcase,weshouldspeakratheroftheworldlycorrectnessmakersofbeliefs-in.Iamsympathetictoallthis,butwillstickwiththeword‘truthmaker’forsimplicity.Onthis,seeTextor2007:78-9.25Inthepresentcontext,by‘state-of-affairsontology’Imeananyontologythatadmitssuchentitiesasstatesofaffairs.AnysuchontologyfacesBradley’sregress(Bradley1893).Theproblemishowtounderstandthe‘metaphysicalglue’thatjoinsanindividualandapropertywhentogethertheycomposeastateofaffairs.Thefact(obtainingstateofaffairs)thatAlectheelectronisnegativelychargedismorethanjustthesumofthetwofactsthat(i)Alecexistsand(ii)beingnegatively-chargedisinstantiated.Itinvolvesalsosomekindof‘metaphysicalglue’that‘bringstogether’Alecandbeingnegatively-charged.Ifwetrytounderstandthis‘glue’intermsofarelationbetweenAlecandbeingnegatively-charged–‘exemplification’or‘instantiation,’say–thenwewouldrequiresomethingtoglueAlec,beingnegatively-charged,andthatrelation.Appealingtoasecond-ordermetaphysicalgluewouldonlylaunchusonaregress–Bradley’sregress.26Morespecifically,itisimplicitinBrentano’sdiscussionofthedifferencebetweenjudgmentandpresentationinChapter7ofPsychologyII.27Iwrite‘likely’becauseothercandidateexplanationsofthedifferencebetweencontemplatingandjudginghavetoberuledout(otherthanthecontentcandidate)beforewecanmoreconfidentlyassertthatthedifferenceisattitudinal.Muchoftheissueoverlapswiththequestionoftheirreducibilityofpresentationtojudgment,discussedinthepreviouschapter.28Ingeneral,Brentanotakesthestructureoflanguagetobeapoorguidetothestructureofourmentallife.Thisisstatedunequivocallyinashort1905fragmenttitled‘Language’(Brentano1930:71)andcanbefoundinvariousplacesintheaforementionedlogiccourses(e.g.,Brentano1956§12).29ThankstoMarieGuillotforpressingonmethisobjection.30ThisworkwassupportedbytheFrenchNationalResearchAgency’sANR-11-0001-02PSL*andANR-10-LABX-0087.Forcommentsonapreviousdraft,IamgratefultoGéraldineCarranante,AnnaGiustina,AlexGzrankowski,FranzKnappik,MichelleMontague,andKevinMulligan.IalsobenefitedfrompresentingrelatedmaterialsattheAustralianNationalUniversity,ColumbiaUniversity,ÉcoleNormaleSupérieure,theUniversityofGirona,andatIHPSTandIJNinParis;Iamgratefultotheaudiencesthere,inparticularDamianoCosta,ImogenDickie,NemiraGasiunas,ThibautGiraud,AnnaGiustina,VincentGrandjean,ErickLlamas,MyrtoMilopoulos,MichaelMurez,BenPhillips,DavidPineda,MariavanderSchaar,BenjaminSchnieder,MoritzSchultz,RobertStalnaker,DanielStoljar,EricTremault,AgustínVicente,andespeciallyMarieGuillot.
