Gegen Torheit gibt es kein Mittel

Few issues in modern history have received as much attention

as assigning blame for the outbreak of the World War in 1914.  The

blame debate began during the War as each side tried to lay

responsibility on the other and blame became part of the "war

guilt" question after 1918. The responsibility debate went through

a phase of revisionism in the 1920s, and revived in the 1960s

thanks to the work of a German historian best known for his

analysis of the causes of World War I, Fritz Fischer. His

contemporary and fellow historian, Joachim Remak, has stated,

quite succinctly, “Modern research on the origins of the First

World War, led by Fritz Fischer and his students, has distorted

our view while expanding our knowledge…the search for more

profound causes of the war has tended, to make us miss the forest

for the roots).1 World War I was really the Third Balkan War. It

arose from the last of a long series of local Austro-Serbian

quarrels, none of which had led to war before; it involved a

series of political maneuvers and gambles typical of the great

power politics of that time, maneuvers which previously had not

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issued in general conflict. Only the particular events of 1914

caused this particular quarrel and this diplomatic gamble to end

in world war.2

This paper examines the causes of World War I, but does so

from a Balkan perspective.  Certainly, Great Power tensions were

widespread in 1914, and those tensions caused the rapid spread of

the war after it broke out, but many previous Great Power crises

had been resolved without war.  Why did this particular episode, a

Balkan crisis that began with a political murder in Bosnia, prove

so unmanageable and dangerous?

What was the purpose of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in

Sarajevo? Who was responsible for the killing, besides the

assassins themselves? Was a war inevitable after the murder, or did

policy-makers let the crisis escape control? Finally, why did a

Balkan crisis lead to a world war in 1914, when other crises had

not, and who deserves the collar of guilt?

Historical Context:

More than 9 million combatants and 7 million civilians died

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because of the war, a casualty rate exacerbated by the

belligerents' technological and industrial sophistication, and

tactical stalemate. It was one of the deadliest conflicts in

history, paving the way for major political changes, including

revolutions in many of the nations involved.3 There were many

issues in Europe during the early part of last century that made

Europe a very volatile place. These issues coupled with some

major and some minor events contributed greatly to the outbreak of

the First World War. Historians have different views on which

issues and events were of the greatest cause and which countries

are to blame for the outbreak of the Great War.

Throughout the 1800’s, many national groups driven by

nationalism tried to unite by governments controlled by their own

people. However, this desire to unite all the people of a nation

under one government had devastating possibilities in Europe,

where one government often ruled many nationalities. This is one

important reason for the start of the Great War.

Another reason for the start of the war was the practice of

imperialism by many countries. Imperialist countries narrowly

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avoided war many times, as they struggled to divide Africa among

themselves in the early 1900's. Two of these countries, France

and Germany, were on the brink of war several times when the

argued about claims to Morocco. Between 1905 and 1911, they

settled each argument with a temporary compromise that left one of

the two countries dissatisfied.

Although imperialism played an important role in starting the

war, militarism was even a greater factor. Militarism controlled

the thinking of many European Leaders before the war. These

leaders thought that only the use of force could solve problems

along nations. These leaders also thought that a military strong

nation usually got what it wanted, and weaker nation usually lost

out. As international rivalries, each nation in Europe made their

armed forces stronger and larger.4 The arms race between Britain

and Germany eventually extended to the rest of Europe, with all

the major powers devoting their industrial base to producing the

equipment and weapons necessary for a pan-European conflict.5

Between 1908 and 1913, the military spending of the European

4

powers increased by 50%. 6

During the late 1800's the system of alliances was a forth

factor that lead to the start of the war. Otto Von Bismarck, the

powerful German chancellor, was afraid that France would seek

revenge for its defeat to Germany back in 1871. He then decided

to keep France isolated and without allies. He particularly

wanted to keep France from becoming allies with Russia. Bismarck

wanted to do this in case of a war, Germany would not have to

defend both its east and west boundaries. In 1881, Bismarck set

up the Three Emperors' League, a secret agreement among the

emperors of Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary.7  Bismarck

considered Italy a weak link in the Alliance, however it isolated

France. France, meanwhile, had been trying to gain allies. Their

opportunity arose after William II, Germany's new leader, allowed

the Reinsurance Treaty to crumble. An economic disaster later hit

Russia, and the Russian czar sought a loan. The French quickly

loaned Russia money, and then took several other steps to become

friends Russia. This alliance between France and Russia finally

formed in 1894. Later in 1907, the triple Entente was formed, an

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alliance between Russia, France, and Great Britain.8

These new alliances became extremely dangerous, because if

any to rival powers fought, all six nations dragged themselves

into war.

As all these things began to build up the spark that set off

the explosion and led to the war was the assassination of Archduke

Francis Ferdinand.9 While the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne

and his wife were visiting Sarajevo, they were both shot and

killed by Gavrilo Princip. Princip belonged to the secret

society, Black Hand. Black Hand was a group of Serbian

nationalists opposed to Austro-Hungarian rule.10 Even though

Princip acted without the authority of the Serbian Government, a

few Serbian leaders were aware of his plans and gave him guns and

ammo. This assassination began a long struggle between Serbia and

Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian government wanted to punish

the Serbs, but before they could act, they wanted to make sure

that Germany still supported them in case Russia attempted to help

Serbia. Austro-Hungarian authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina

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imprisoned and extradited approximately 5,500 prominent Serbs, 700

to 2,200 of whom died in prison. Four Hundred Sixty Serbs

sentenced to death and a predominantly Muslim11 special militia

known as the Schutzkorps was established and carried out the

persecution of Serbs.12

During the era of Imperialism, industrial nations expand

their power and influence to include overseas territories. This

drive for greater power and influence created competition between

many European nations. This competition was a driving force for

European countries to build up arms, develop new technology and to

create alliances. It is in this period that leaders of Industrial

nations utilized nationalism. Leaders used nationalism to support

their entry in war. This generation taught this was not only

fitting, but also glorious for young men to die for their country.

Hence, many young men like Wilfred Owen willingly and happily

marched off to war in 1914.

The following poem, How do you Fight, by British poet R. Aitchison

Wotherspoon was widely known in Britain before the outbreak of WW

I.1914 and illustrates this competition:13

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Did you tackle that trouble that came your way With

Resolute heart and cheerful? Alternatively, Hide

your face from the light of day with craven soul

and fearful?

A trouble’s a ton, or a trouble’s an ounce,

Or a trouble is what you make it; And it isn’t the fact

that you’re hurt that counts, But only how did you take

it?

You are beaten to earth? Well, well, what’s that? Come up

with a smiling face;

It’s nothing against you to fall down flat, But to lie

there—that’s disgrace.

The harder you’re thrown, why, the higher you bounce,

Be proud of your blackened eye! It isn’t the fact that

you’re hit that counts, It’s how did you fight—and why?

And though you be done to death, what then? If you

battled the best you could;

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If you played your part in the world of men, Why, the

critics will call it good.

Death comes with a crawl, or comes with a pounce, And

whether he’s slow or spry, It isn’t the fact that your

dead that counts, But only, how did you die?

Nationalism and extreme patriotism were significant

contributing factors to the outbreak of World War I. Every one of

Europe’s Great Powers developed an excessive belief in its own

cultural, economic and military supremacy giving birth to a fatal

fallacy: that in the event of war in Europe, one’s own country

would be victorious inside a few months; and every country’s press

drove this arrogance. Newspapers, packed with stories and

editorials filled with nationalist rhetoric and ‘saber-rattling’

served to incite ethnic passions. Cultural expressions reflected

intensified nationalism in literature, music, and theatre.

European societies became confident of three points: their nations

and governments were spot-on, their military would win every

struggle, and in the demonization of other nations. As these

feelings toughened, the probability of war increased. Royals,

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politicians, and diplomats contributed to the public appetite for

war, and some vigorously added to it with inflammatory commentary

or confrontational policy.

Serbian nationalism was causing great friction in Europe as

she sought independence and autonomy from the political domination

of Austria-Hungary. Serbia wanted to take parts of Austria-

Hungary to form a ‘South Slav Kingdom’. However, Austria-Hungary

feared that if Serbia succeeded in this it could affectively

destroy the Habsburg Empire. This kind of nationalism easily

sustained through 400 years of Turkish rule. Serbs’ identity was

defined by religious, economic, social, and cultural difference –

not just different from their Muslim overlords but also distinct

from other Christians. Serbian pig farmers grew rich as

neighboring Austria-Hungary expanded, but proximity highlighted

divergences between Catholic Christianity and Serbian Orthodoxy.

The Serbian Orthodox Church incubated an old Slavonic faith, a

language, an administrative system, and an Archbishopric.14

There had been much conflict in the Balkan region for years

before 1914. In 1908, Austria-Hungary annexed the Turkish

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province of Bosnia, shortly after a revolution in Turkey. The

Serbians wanted to take Bosnia for themselves because Bosnia

contained almost three million Serbs. Serbia appealed to its

Slavic ally Russia for help, and Russia called a European

conference with its ‘team’, the Triple Entente (the Triple

Alliances would include Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy). 15

Russia’s two major allies France and Britain both withdrew

from supporting Serbia after learning that Germany would support

Austria-Hungary in the case of a war. France and Britain did not

want to become involved in a war in the Balkans and did not want

to come into conflict with Germany, leaving Serbia with even more

reason to be hostile to Austria-Hungary. It also initiated Russia

into rebuilding its armed forces so they could help Serbia in the

future.

After the Bosnian Crisis came two Balkan Wars. The first in

1912, came about when Serbia, Greece, Montenegro and Bulgaria

attacked Turkey in an effort to expand, they did so by capturing

most of Turkey’s European land. The land, divided with the help

of the German and English governments. Serbia however wanted

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Albania, which would have granted them access to the sea. They

were disallowed this by Austria-Hungary however, with the backing

of Germany and Britain.

The Second Balkan War started in the following year by

Bulgaria.16 They attacked Serbia to annex Macedonia from them.

Macedonia transferred to Serbia after the first Balkan War.

Unfortunately, for Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Turkey supported

Serbia and Bulgaria was defeated. It may have been different if

Austria-Hungary had joined the conflict in support of Bulgaria,

but England and Germany held the Hapsburgs back. This marked

twice in two conflicts where Anglo-German relations had been good,

further illustrating if the will was there, WW I could have been

prevented. This may have lead Germany to accept that the Alliance

of France, Britain and Russia may not be steadfast. The outcomes

of the Balkan Wars had made Serbia a much stronger nation and this

made Austria-Hungary eager to put an end to the Serbian’s

ambitions. Anti-German literature in Britain focused on a future

war with Germany and even a future German invasion.17 German

nationalism, predicated on the belief that Britain sought to

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deprive Germany of her ‘place in the sun.’ Joachim Remak, a

German historian, refers to the First World Was as the Third

Balkan War that got out of hand.18 It got out of hand because the

great European powers got involved, on opposite sides. On 6 July,

eight days after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, the German

Kaiser promised support to Austria-Hungary in a war against

Serbia. This came a year after the German’s had held back

Austria-Hungary in the second Balkan War. Historians have varying

views on why Germany’s tact changed. Fritz Fischer of Germany

wrote in 1961 that Germany, by handing Austria-Hungary a ‘Blank

Cheque’, were deliberately provoking war.19 The reasons he believed

Germany wanted war, were to become the greatest power in Europe

and to unify a country that at the time was struggling with

domestic tensions.

Another German, Gerard Ritter, believed the Germans only risked

war and refuted the claim that they strove for world power.20

Many historians believed that Germany’s actions came about

out of paranoia. Believing that the German’s felt encircled by

their so-called enemies, the Entente, made up off France, Britain,

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and Russia. This I believe is true, but I also think Germany

probably felt Austria-Hungary had a genuine reason for wanting war

with Serbia after the assassination and felt it should aid one of

its closest allies. Although numerous historians felt that

Germany was trying to break the ‘iron ring of encirclement’, they

do not agree on how the German’s actions would break it. Fischer

believed the German’s plan was to break the Entente with a

deliberate war.21 While Karl Erdman said that by supporting

Austria-Hungary, the Germans were attempting to divide the Entente

through bluff. Hoping that either Russia would not support Serbia

thus keeping the war localized or Russia supported Serbia but

France and Britain not agreeing with Russia’s support.  Thee

unreliable alliance system contributed to Germany taking such a

risk in an effort to break the Entente.

Other authors such as Arno Mayer, in 1967, agreed with some

aspects of the theory, but felt it isolated Germany from its

historical context. Mayer believes that all states acted more or

less, as Germany did in the years before the war.22 In a 1972 essay

"World War I as a Galloping Gertie", the American historian Paul W.

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Schroeder blamed Britain for the First World War. Schroeder argued

that the war was a "Galloping Gertie", and that it got out of

control, sucking the Great Powers into an unwanted war.23 Schroeder

thought that the key to the European situation was Britain's

“encirclement" policy directed at Austria-Hungary.24 Schroeder

argued that British foreign policy was anti-German and even more

anti-Austrian.25 Schroeder argued that because Britain never took

Austria-Hungary seriously, it was British policy to always force

concessions on the Dual Monarchy with no regard to the balance of

power in Central Europe. 26

Schroeder claimed that 1914 was a "preventive war" forced on

Germany to maintain Austria as a power, which was faced with a

crippling British "encirclement policy" aimed at the break-up of

that state.27

The American historian Samuel R. Williamson, Jr. lays most of

the blame with the Austro-Hungarian elites rather than the Germans

in his 1990 book, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War.

Another recent work is Niall Ferguson's The Pity of War, which rejects

the Fischer thesis, laying most of the blame on diplomatic

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bumbling from the British. Ferguson echoes Hillgruber in

asserting that the German government attempted to use the crisis

to split the Entente.

Recently, American historian David Fromkin has blamed

elements in the military leadership of Germany and Austria-Hungary

in his 2004 book Europe's Last Summer.28 Fromkin's thesis is that

there were two war plans; a first formulated by Austria-Hungary

and the German Chancellor to start a war with Serbia to

reinvigorate a fading Austro-Hungarian Empire; the second secret

plan was that of the German Military leadership to provoke a wider

war with France and Russia.29 He thought that the German military

leadership, in the midst of a European arms race, believed that

they would be unable to further expand the German army without

extending the officer corps beyond the traditional Prussian

aristocracy. Rather than allowing that to happen, they

manipulated Austria-Hungary into starting a war with Serbia in the

expectation that Russia would intervene, giving Germany a pretext

to launch what was in essence a preventive war.30 Part of his

thesis is that the German military leadership were convinced that

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by 1916–18, Germany would be too weak to win a war with France,

England and Russia. Notably, Fromkin suggests that part of the

war plan was the exclusion of Kaiser Wilhelm II from knowledge of

the events, because the German General Staff as inclined to

resolve crises short of war regarded the Kaiser. Fromkin also

argues documents are widely destroyed or forged to distort the

origins of the war in all countries but particularly Germany and

Austria.31 Samuel R. Williamson lays most of the blame with the

Austro-Hungarian elites rather than the German in his 1990 book,

Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War.32 Another recent work is

Niall Ferguson's The Pity of War, which completely rejects the Fischer

thesis, laying most of the blame on diplomatic bumbling from the

British.33

In 1904, Britain and France signed an agreement to become

friendly. Part of this agreement was for Britain to let France

take over Morocco. The Germans did not think the Anglo-French

alliance would be strong considering the two country’s turbulent

past. However, when Germany decided to help Morocco keep its

independence they met with opposition not just from Britain, but

17

also from Russia, Italy, and Spain as well. In 1907 when Britain

formed a new alliance with Russia, the Germans felt this was a

deliberate ploy to encircle them; in fact, it was more an

economical alliance. Nonetheless, the Entente was now complete;

France and Russia had been allies since 1894.34

The British again joined forces to help France during the

Agadir Crisis of 1911. The Germans were putting pressure on

France for compensation for annexation of Morocco. However, when

the British stepped in, this solved reasonably diplomatically.

Therefore, although this suggests the Entente, fairly united, but

at other times mentioned previously in this essay, when the

alliance was less reliable, especially where possible conflict

with Germany was involved.35

Once the Germans voiced their support of Austria-Hungary, it

left the Russians in a dangerous position. The Russians did not

know of the Serbian government’s involvement in the Black Hand and

were heavily in support of Serbia. After talks between German and

Russian governments went nowhere, Russia ordered a general

mobilization of its armed forces on 29th of July. Though many

18

acknowledge this move as making a localized war impossible, I

think Russia had to mobilize to make sure they felt protected from

a possible German attack, considering Austria-Hungary had declared

war on Serbia the previous day. Two days later Germany declared

war on Russia after they refused to immobilize, they then declared

war on France, who had voiced support of Russia.

On fourth of August Germany instigated the Schlieffen Plan,

some thing I think proved fatal. I agree with historians K.D

Erdman36 and A.J.P Taylor,37 it seems the German Commander in Chief

Moltke, ordered the plan to be instigated without the full backing

of the German Chancellor or Kaiser. It involved Germany capturing

France before heading east to battle the Russians. However, the

Schlieffen plan involved crossing Belgium to get to France.

Britain saw this as a chance to enter the war as they had sworn to

protect Belgian neutrality almost 100 years before, thus meaning

all the great European powers had entered the war. I think the

reason Britain really joined was to destroy the rising power of

the German Empire and to show off its impressive naval fleet by

defeating Germany.38

19

In sum, my view of who caused World War I is in this quote from Joachim Remak. ‘Serbia was right in wanting to expand,Austria in wanting to survive. Germany was right in fearing isolation, Great Britain in fearing German power. Everyone was right. And everyone was wrong.’ Not enough to prevent the war because there are no great wars fought in that generation, meaningno one could predict the destruction that was to come. Therefore,everyone must take the blame, though Britain and Germany risked most. “. I agree with Fischer, that Germany deliberately startedthe war in order to become a great power.

However, Schroeder is correct to lay the lion’s share of the blame at the foot of Westminster and Herbert Henry Asquith, the Liberal Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.39 As the dominant world power, Britain could have should been more assertive in maintaining the fragile balance of power in 1914.

This does not account for the level of support that Germany

gave Austria-Hungary- that is, the "blank cheque". Again I agree

with Fischer, that Germany deliberately started the war in order

to become a great power, but to quote Schroeder, “The attitudes

behind it all, in any case, were universal-the same short-sighted

selfishness and lack of imagination, the same exclusive

concentration on one's own interests at the expense of the

community. Everyone wanted a payoff; no one wanted to pay.

Everyone expected the system to work for him; no one would work

for it. All were playing he same game-imperialism, world policy,

Realpolitik, call it what you will-all save Austria, and she also

20

would have played it had she been able”.40

In conclusion, I think that the war was a result of long-

standing imperial and commercial rivalries. The alliance system

made it more likely that an incident could not be prevented from

spreading. Without the long-standing rivalries the Balkan Crisis

would never have happened, so the outbreak of World War One cannot

be blamed in full upon the Balkan Crisis.

Responsibility for WWI – Schools of thought

GERMANY WAS RESPONSIBLE:

Germany planned the war to become a greater power, encouraged A-H to war

with Serbia; they had a clear set of aims that would give territorial gains.

Historians: Fritz Fischer (Immanuel Geiss, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Jürgen

Kocka – supporters)

Fischer:

German desire for territorial expansion led to war

Germany encouraged A-H to start a war with Serbia

This was done in order to become a world dominating power

Also done with the idea of directing attention from domestic discontent

21

Geiss:

Germany driven by “Westpolitik” – desire for world power – this resulted

in increase in tension in years preceding July crisis

GERMANY WANTED DEFENSIVE WAR – STILL RESPONSIBLE:

Germany did not cold-bloodedly plan the war, they just were trying to

defend and, if possible, expand their territory, and many of their bluffs did

not work.

Historians: Egmont Zechive, Karl Erdman

Zechlin:

Germany’s support for quick preventative war grew after the Balkans War

resulted in increase in Serbian power

Germany decided to take opportunity to give A-H blank cheque – realized

Russia was stronger in the Balkans that A-H

Wanted to bluff Russia but if this failed, wanted war only to replace

alliance system with new balance of power

Erdmann:

New evidence – Germany’s major consideration was keeping A-H as a major power

Both of above accepts G’s responsibilities but reject domestic importance and aggressive intent

NATIONALISM

22

This view argues that WWI grew from the struggle between Slav nationalism

and Austria-Hungary and the other powers dragged into a third Balkan war.

However there is also belief that the Balkans caused the occasion of war, but

was not the cause.

Historians: Martel, Joachim Remak, John Leslie, and John Jowe

Martel:

WWI a clash between Slav nationalism and multi-ethnic A-H

Remak:

WWI was 3rd Balkan War that got out of hand – A-H and Serbia didn’t care if

anyone else got dragged in and must take the major responsibility for the

war – thus Slav nationalism and A-H response to it was key cause of WWI

BUT

Remak goes further – points out that Germany gave A-H a blank cheque,

Russian mobilization meant localized war was impossible, France didn’t do

enough to restrain Russia and was driven by desire for revenge over

Alsace-Loraine, which in turn was driven by nationalism – thus, everyone

was at fault but the key underlying cause was nationalism

Nationalism also made it possible to gain popular support for war in the

lead up to it

ALLIANCES

The alliance system, which was supposed to help peace, turned a local

23

quarrel into a general war, or the lack of a fully effective balance of power –

not it’s existence caused the war.

Historians: Bernadette Schmitt, A.J.P. Taylor, and James Joll

Schmitt:

July crisis was attempt to decide balance of power between Triple

Entente and Triple Alliance

Alliances then converted localized war into general one BUT

A.J.P. Taylor:

Claims that alliances were fragile – couldn’t be the cause of major war

Major powers made plans based on alliances but each nation made decision

to fight on national interest alone.

MILITARISM, ARMAMENTS AND WAR PLANS

A view that the arms race, (escalation of), brought about the war and

military aims and a want for a balance of power. There is also a theory where

the military planners who caused the fast-mobilization are to blame.

Historians: Michael Howard, Niall Ferguson, LFC Turner, and AJP Taylor

Howard:

24

Each armament increase before the war is seen as a threat – increase in

mutual fear and suspicion

BUT argument that an increase in arms expenditure led to war has been

criticized – A-H spent least of GDP on war (1.9%) yet was determined to

fight

Ferguson:

Role of arms race has been greatly exaggerated – Britain spent most and

wanted war least

Taylor:

It was plans for war that were significant – considerations within

mobilization were major reason – Russia could only mobilize fully which

led to Schlieffen Plan, which led to France and Britain being involved –

this has been criticized – leaders were taking major decisions, not

generals

IMPERIALISM

That WWI started because of the imperial rivalry and the growth of

empires. However, these claims never fully backed, as there is not enough

evidence to support that there would be economic growth because of the war.

Historians: Marxist writers, Vladimir Lenin

Has been perceived as creating sense of tension and competition amongst

25

European nations

Zilliacus:

Sees foreign policies as being by business interests – war was caused not

by treaties, etc., but by need to defend imperial interests

However, no record of any business interest abdicating war – Marxist view

generally rejected

COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY

Is the theory that all the Great Powers were to blame for war? “Germany

did not plot the war but was a casualty of its alliance with Austria-Hungary.

Austria-Hungary acted in self-defense against the expansion of Serb nationalism.

Serbia believed it is forced to fight. Russia is partly responsible for

encouraging Serbia and mobilized troops. France shares the blamed for support

in Russia and Britain did hardly anything to restrain Russia or France.” (Fay)

Historians who argue this theory: Sidney Fay, G.P. Gooch, and Gerhard

Ritter

26

1 Endnotes

Joachim Remak, The Origins of World War I, 1871-1914 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), bk.2 Paul W. Schroeder, "World War I as Galloping Gertie”, and The Outbreak of World War I: Causes and Responsibilities (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1991),142-151.3 H. P. Willmott, World War I (New York: DK 2003), 307.4 Robin Prior, Trevor Wilson, and John Keegan, The First World War (London: Cassell, 1999), 18.5 Ibid.6 Ibid.7 John Keegan, The First World War (New York: A. Knopf, 1999), 52.8 Willmott, 15.9 Martin Gilbert, First World War (London: HarperCollins, 1995), 20-24.10 A. J. P. Taylor, The First World War, and Its Aftermath (London: Folio Society, 1998), 80-93.11 Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation andCollaboration (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 485.12 Herbert Kröll, Austrian-Greek Encounters over the Centuries: History, Diplomacy, Politics, Arts, Economics (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2007), 55.13 Aitchison R. Wotherspoon, "How Do You Fight," The Boy’s Own Paper (London),July 1914, 36th ed., sec. 9.14 John Meyendorff, The Orthodox Church: Its past and Its Role in the World Today(New York: Pantheon Books, 1962), 12-16.15 Keegan, 52.16 Willmott, 2–23.17 Kröll, 5518 Remak, (1967).

19 Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967), bk.20 “Anti-Fischer: A New War-Guilt Thesis””, in The Outbreak of World War I: Causes and Responsibilities, ed. Holger H. Herwig, by Gerhard Ritter (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and, 1991), 142-147.21 William D. O'Neil, The Plan That Broke the World: The "Schlieffen Plan" and World War I (United States: Whatweretheythinkingwilliamdoneil.com, 2014), 143.22 Arno J. Mayer, The Outbreak of World War I: Causes and Responsibilities, ed.Holger H. Herwig, by Gerhard Ritter (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and, 1991), 42-47.23 Dwight Erwin Lee and Holger H. Herwig, The Outbreak of World War I: Causes and Responsibilities (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1991), 40-47.24 Schroeder, 142-151.25 Ibid.26 Ibid.27 Ibid.28 David Fromkin, Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914? (New York: Knopf, 2004), 94.29 Ibid.30 Ibid.31 Ibid.32 Samuel R. Williamson, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1991), bk.33 Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1999), bk.34 A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), 417.35 Margaret MacMillan, The War that Ended Peace: The Road to 1914. (Random House, 2013), 439.

36 Karl Dietrich Erdmann, 9th ed., vol. 18 (Munich, 1991), 42.37 Taylor, Ibid.38 Fromkin, 251–253.39 David R. Woodward, "Review of Cassar”, Albion 27, no. 3 (1995), 529.40 Schroeder, 151.

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