Increased Shipping in the International Arctic? An Overview (2012)

Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce, Vol. 43, No. 3, July, 2012

Increased Shipping in the Internationai Arctic?An Overview

Barret Weber*

IINTRODUCTION

During the summer of 2010, reports circulated about the grounding of alarge Arctic adventure ship called "Clipper Adventurer." The ship hit a rockover 50 nautical miles from Kugluktuk, Nunavut, putting Canada's rescuecapacities in the far north to the test. A Canadian Coast Guard icebreakersuccessfully travelled 500 nautical miles to assist the adventure ship.Luckily weather conditions were favourable - no one was injured and fueldid not leak into the sea. But the lesson was made sufficiently clear that traf-fic through the Northwest Passage has increased in recent years but theinfrastructure needed to support this traffic is underdeveloped. It is notablethat there were 24 complete trips through the Northwest Passage in 2009and, by comparison, fewer than 100 in total throughout the entire centurybefore.'

Analysts are asking us to think again about trans-Arctic marine shippingin several parts of the Arctic Ocean. The prospect of increased shippingmobility through Arctic waters raises debate about Arctic challenges broad-ly in recent academic, media, industry, and policy discussions. Thesedebates can be understood as deliberations over Arctic sustainable develop-ment, a matter of concern that views the sea as "a space of 'finite economi-cal assets,' the commodification of its environment should be guided by

*Ph.D. Candidate (ABD) Department of Sociology, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta,Canada [email protected] I would like to thank Ondine Park, Philip Steinberg, and my supervisor RobShields for assistance on earlier versions of this paper. I would also like to thank participants at theDFAIT Circumpolar World Fellowship: Canada'a Role in the Circupolar World meeting held inSaskatoon in March 17th, 2011, especially Heather Exner-Pirot, Greg Poclzcr, and Ken Coates.

'Donat Pharand and Leonard H. Legault, The Northwest Passage: Arctic Straits (Dordrecht: MartinusNijhoff Publishers, 1984); Brian D. Smiley, "Marine Mammals and Ice-Breakers," in The Challenge ofArctic Shipping: Science, Environmental Assessment, and Human Values, ed. David L. VanderZwaag andCynthia Lamson (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990); Donat Pharand,"Canada's Arctic Sovereignty and the Northwest Passage," Meridian Spring/ Summer(2009).

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long-run planning for maximum efficiency and productivity."^ In the Arctic,however, the turn to sustainable development has been ever more heighteneddue to increasing awareness of the dramatic retreat of Arctic sea ice that hasoccurred over the past several decades as a consequence of a rapidly warm-ing Arctic climate and waters. In any case, Steinberg is correct to assert thatthe world's oceans are seen as a "resource-rich (but fragile) arena for sus-tainable development" (407).

From one perspective, the prospects of greatly increased shipping in theArctic region, like the prospect of a much-touted new 'race for resources,'remains speculative; this view proposes that much more remains to be donein the realm of systematic policy development, or governance schemes, anddecision making to actualize these speculations. Others argue that the stakesof these disputes are primarily economic and thus dramatic increases inArctic shipping is at this point only a theoretical possibility because ship-ping "might be too difficult and costly to be worth the effort."' The frequen-cy of shipping through the Arctic would be modest and "destinational" - inother words, "don't expect a new Panama or Suez Canal" (74). Taken togeth-er, these two challenges to the prospect of a rapid increase in shipping in theArctic—one governance oriented, the other economic—remind us that spec-ulation over shipping has its limits and we should therefore seek to under-stand the real possibilities and conditions of increased shipping traffic. AsOran Young rather fatefully argued over two decades ago, sudden growth inArctic shipping is hardly an inevitable outcome but rather significantly relieson several intertwined factors, including the prospects of hydrocarbonextraction, various political considerations, as well as a number of alterna-tives for transporting these resources to southern markets.*

The final section of the chapter reflects on Inuit views. These views havebeen collaborative in spirit, yet cautious and well aware that significanthuman security risks exist. As the 2009 report from the Arctic MarineShipping Assessment (AMSA) identified, there exist significant concernsthat the marine mammals, which Inuit rely on for subsistence and the localeconomy, will be affected by changes in shipping frequency. Inuit commu-nities will also be directly affected. Inuit therefore argue that they should beinvolved in any existing regimes and proposed changes to the shippingindustry. This includes considerations that range from regulations of when

Thilip E, Steinberg, "The Maritime Mystique: Sustainable Development, Capital Mobility, andNostalgia in the World Ocean," Environment & Planning D: Society & Space 17(1999): 405,

'Lawson W, Brigham, "Think Again: The Arctic," Foreign Policy, no, September/ October (2010): 73.'Oran R, Young, "Arctic Shipping: An American Perspective," in Politics of tiie Nortiiwest Passage,

ed. Franklin Griffiths (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987),

July 2012 Increased Shipping in the International Arctic

Sailing Routes and Arctic Sea Ice 2010 including EEZs

303

Figure 1 : Source: Arctic Portal, http://www.arcticportal.org

Observed Arctic Temperaturei 1900 to Present

1*10 IMO I « « IfW »00

Annual average change in near surface air temperature fromStations on land relative to the average for 1961-1990. for theregion from 60 to 9O'N.

Figure 2: Source: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, Public Education and Outreach Centre,Finding 1 "Arctic climate is now warming rapidly and much larger changes are projected."http://www.taiga.net/acia/findingO6.html

ship ballasts are to be drained to limit the introduction of invasive species,'to the critical need for more marine infrastructure (such as loading docks

'AMSA, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report (Arctic Council, 2009), 62, 150.


and secure Sealift staging zones), to the possibilities of generating increasedeconomic development in Nunavut.'* The Nunavut case provides a revealingexample of the intertwined nature of Arctic challenges: political leaders inNunavut have not been passive about the opportunities of shipping in Arcticwaters, but have instead attempted to turn the rather disturbing realities ofclimate change into an economic adaptation strategy for the future. Shippingregulations and resource exploitation represent opportunities for these sortsof pragmatic sustainability strategies.

nARCTIC MARINE SfflPPING ASSESSMENT

Awareness of the challenges involved in regulating Arctic shipping—the"complicated mosaic" as the AMSA articulated it—has increased dramati-cally in recent years.^ Not only is this a consequence of a growing aware-ness of the effects of climate change on Arctic climate and waters, it is alsoa product of scientific studies that clearly demonstrate the extent of waningmulti-year sea ice to a global audience tuned into climate change researchresults. On this basis, we should bear in mind that the climate change dis-course is not simply limited to the realm of scientific conclusions aboutmeasurements of the concrete. Climate change is also indeed a political andsocial grammar that has already done a great deal to aid in broad efforts toraise awareness about the effects of macro transformations occurring in aglobalized world, for example, in regards to the effects of economic growthand population growth on the physical environment. In straightforwardterms, it is important that political leaders and policy makers, at least rhetor-ically, demonstrate that they are willing and able to respond to scientificwarnings about the effects of climate change on future realties. Climatechange in this sense becomes a problem of the future.

Yet, a less commonly discussed point is that one of the ensuing risks ofclimate change, particularly in the more explicit political sense of the term,has to do with the dramatic rise, efficacy, and perhaps even need for specta-cle: the sheer hype associated with some media reports and even recentscholarship has only helped to create a variety of misconceptions about whata rapidly warming Arctic climate might ultimately mean for the world inconcrete terms (a good legal example was the Canadian, on Hans Island, andRussian, on the North Pole seabed, flag planting episodes in 2005 and 2007respectively). Without question, speculation about dramatic increases in the

"Government of Nunavut, "Ingirrasiliqta Let's Get Moving: Nunavut Transportation Strategy,"(Department of Economic Development & Transportation, 2009).

'AMSA, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report.

July 2012 Increased Shipping in the International Arctic 305

volume of shipping is connected to the political and empirical changes asso-ciated with environmental impact assessments "coming of age" in the1970s.*' A key aspect of recent discussions have been to speculate on thebasis of the theory that an increasingly ice-free Arctic will allow shippers tocut off thousands of kilometers with the creation of a shipping route betweenEurope and Asia through the Arctic Ocean in one way or another, and tothereby decrease the focus on Suez and Panama canals. We might wish toask how much reality there is to all the increased shipping hype (or theory)via Arctic waters.

The idea that the frequency of marine shipping will increase is based onsome key assumptions. For one, this speculation assumes that the currentmelting trends underway will continue. It also assumes that the political (ifnot social) deadlock associated with climate change too will remain in placeand will remain ineffective to slow certain climate changes. Thus, there is agrowing broad-based perception suggesting that human beings are incapableof affecting real positive change in the environment, that is, to reduce glob-al greenhouse gas emissions to slow the disturbing warming trends. Thisbecomes not only a scientific problem of sustainable development, but alsoa deeply political one.

The optimistic pole of speculative views assumes that the melting trendswill be favorable for 'business as usual,' or maybe 'business not so usual'which is what innovation usually implies. The optimistic view assumes thatmelting trends will not simply bring about other debilitating risks, such asmore unpredictable waters where errant icebergs loom large, a lack of prop-er infrastructure at ports that serve Arctic shipping lanes, and the adequatecharting of Arctic waters to only skim the surface.^ In short, the most opti-mistic projections assume that proper governance schemes will be in placeto secure commercial and military shipments and tourist activities. Theseassumptions all leave much to be desired. They show the need for moresocial and natural-science research to be conducted on the topic of Arcticshipping in a world in which the effects of climate change are beginning tobe better understood and registered in our collective/ political psyches.

There are some important implications here for the development of soundtheory and policy to help better understand and thus perhaps better regulate

*David L. VanderZwaag and Cynthia Lamson, eds.. The Challenge of Arctic Shipping: Science,Environmental Assessment and Human Values (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's UniversityPress,1990).

'Jane George, "Arctic Shipping Fraught with Danger, Operators Say," Nunatsiaq News, 07 May 2010;Randy Boswell, "Inuit Back Controversial Arctic Shipping Rules," The Star Phoenix, July 24 2010; RobHuebert, "The Shipping News Part Ii: How Canada's Arctic Sovereignty Is on Thinning Ice,"International Journal December(2003); Franklyn Griffiths, "The Shipping News: Canada's ArcticSovereignty Not on Thinning Ice," International Journal Spring (2003).


shipping. We can see that massive collaborative scientific studies over thepast decade have helped to create a good database for further insights andperhaps even spaces of collaboration and disagreement between differentparties and stakeholders involved and even in the so-called global or inter-national community more broadly (many non-Arctic coastal states, such asChina, Korea, Germany and so on, show unprecedented interest in Arcticdevelopments).

A productive document to consult in light of the politics of governance inthe context of climate change is Arctic Council's impressive Arctic MarineShipping Assessment 2009 Report. This document is deserving of closeattention as an important index of recent conditions of Arctic shipping.Written by the Arctic Council working group called Protection of ArcticMarine Environment (PAME), the AMSA achieved a break-through analysisof Arctic marine activity as it currently stands. On this basis it developssome projections into the future to 2020 and 2050 and even 2100 in somecases from the perspective of 2009 on the basis of data generated from 2004.The AMSA develops both a macro and local analysis of challenges thataffect shipping, and, in particular, to respond to one of the "key challengesto increased marine use of the Arctic Ocean - how best to work with theglobal maritime industry and find ways to balance the traditional freedom ofnavigation of the oceans while ensuring that effective marine safety andenvironmental protection measures are in place in the Arctic Ocean."'"

This is quite obviously no small order to achieve, in part because it valuesthe development of freedom within the constraints of prospective shippingregimes. These regimes would be expected to ensure environment protectionwhile still being open for business. This shows precipitously the linkbetween environment and the economy or market. As Brigham argued basedon the projections of the Arctic Council's monumental Arctic ClimateImpact Assessment (ACIA, 2005), the most viable route, all things consid-ered, is the Northern Sea Route due to resource developments in Russia.Perhaps surprisingly, the next most viable but seasonal route would be rightthrough the central Arctic Ocean, and the least viable in the short term wouldbe the 'Canadian' Northwest Passage. Let us briefly review these shippingroutes in order.

'"Lawson W. Brigham, "Keynote Speech" (paper presented at the Breaking the Ice: ArcticDevelopment and Maritime Transportation, Akureyri, 27-28 March 2007), 7.


Figure 3: Source: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, Public Education and Outreach Centre,Finding 6 "Reduced sea ice is very likely to increase marine transport and access toresources." http://www,taiga.net/acia/findingO6.html

mNORTHERN SEA ROUTE (NSR)

The Northern Sea Route, historically called the Northeast Passage outsideof Russia, is of key strategic interest for the Russia Federation but it hasimportant implications far beyond it." Based on the unique economic geog-raphy of Russia's north, Moscow understands the Northern Shipping Route"as the sole means of transportation for the important industries located inRussian coastal and insular Arctic regions."'^ This route would includetransport from the Kara Gate in the Barents Sea to the Bering Strait. Furtherstrategic development of the NSR over the next five years, but to a degreeaffected by the ongoing global financial downturn, is aimed to "develop aninfrastructure and system of management of communication for the NSR tosecure Euro-Asiatic transit" (105). The development of infrastructure tocontinue to develop NSR in the east and west is crucial to Russia's long-standing interests to have the north, particularly in regards to energy pro-duction, continue to represent as much as 20 percent of Russia's total GDP

"Claes Lykke Ragner, "The Northern Sea Route," in Barents - Et Gränsiand I Norden, ed, TorstenHallberg (Stockholm: Arena Norden, 2008).

'^Katarzyna Zysk, "Russia's Arctic Strategy: Ambitions and Constraints," Joint Eorce Quarterly 57,no. 2d Quarter (2010): 105.

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and 22 percent of total Russian export (105). This is also essential to takeadvantage of Russia's economic geography that includes significant largenorthern cities with the marine infrastructure in place to grow the NSR fur-ther.

Russia considers the entirety of the NSR and several straits near to it asouter extensions of its territorial waters legitimated under Article 234 of the1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) framework (it has320 Articles in total). Arctic Ocean facing states can claim rights to seabedand subsoil resources beyond its 200 nautical miles territorial waters.Russia is currently working on its second submission to the United Nationsto demonstrate the geophysical extensions of its continental shelves into theArctic Ocean. Under this international legal framework, yet to be effective-ly legitimized in the Arctic to enhance the territorial "legibility" of an Arctic"lively space,"" a large portion of the NSR is clearly included in Russia'scoastal state jurisdiction Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) under Article 234"Ice-covered areas.'"" Article 234 reads: "Coastal States have the right toadopt and enforce non-discriminatory law and regulations for the preven-tion, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-coveredareas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone" (115). This impliescertain rights of environmental regulatory powers under the entire Part XII"Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment" of UNCLOS (98).The NSR is to be used for its own domestic and international shippingneeds, but the NSR would remain open for international transit as part of thehigh-seas for use by the international community. This is because in theEEZs, "coastal states have exclusive rights to living and non-livingresources, but for all other purposes high-sea freedoms prevail."" As Ragnerpointed out, however, Russia has not exactly created the conditions for theunprecedented opening of the NSR to the international community:"Russia's mandatory ice-breaker fees are high, and the fees are not directlylinked to actual services rendered . . . the Russian authorities have yet todesign a system that encourages the use of the route even under otherwiseideal conditions."""

Famously, however, other Arctic coastal states do not fully agree with theextent of Russian freedoms in the NSR that could potentially limit transit by

"Klaus Dodds, "Flag Planting and Finger Pointing: The Law of the Sea, the Arctic and the PoliticalGeographies of the Outer Continental Shelf," Poiiticai Geography 29, no, 2 (2010); Christopher C,Joyner, "The Legal Regime of the Arctic Ocean," / of Transnational Law & Poiicy 18, no, 2 (2009).

"United Nations, "The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,"(1982), http://www,un.org/Depts/los/convention_agrecments/convention_overview_convention.htm.

"Philip E, Steinberg, The Social Construction of the Ocean (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2001), 149.

"Ragner, "The Northern Sea Route," n.p.


the international community. The US has not acceded to UNCLOS (anddebate continues about if and when it will), and has not even started the longprocess of submitting continental claims to the Commission on the Limits ofthe Continental Shelf (CLCS). The formal purpose of the CLCS is "to facil-itate the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of theSea in respect to establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelfbeyond 200 nautical miles (M) from the baselines from which the breadth ofthe territorial sea is measured."" The US appears to understand the NSR tobe partially under Russia's domestic authority and also part InternationalStrait. Thus the NSR is also, in part, an open sea, which therefore allows forthe right of innocent passage under customary law for the international com-munity. This is consistent with UNCLOS, depending on where Russia'scontinental baselines are ultimately determined in international law, andhow much Russia seeks to regulate the NSR in the name of pollution con-trol. In terms of the US response to these possibilities, a policy directiveissued by George W. Bush would very clearly state that:

Freedom of the seas is a top national priority. The Northwest Passage is astrait used for international navigation, and the Northern Sea Route includesstraits used for international navigation; the regime of transit passage appliesto passage through those straits. Preserving the rights and duties relating tonavigation and overflight in the Arctic region supports our ability to exercisethese rights throughout the world, including through strategic straits.'*

Although Russia has a fairly secure title for control over most parts of theNSR, we can see here that the nature of the route is not altogether uncon-tested. According to the US it would seem we should begin to speak of theNorthern Sea Route as "including straits used for international navigation,"and thus to think about the NSR as having several routes within it. It is stillunclear how this might all play out since, as mentioned, the US has not as ofyet signed onto the UNCLOS framework that would provide a broad admin-istrative and even political framework in which to debate particular areas ofcontention, in particular the status of the NSR.

IVCENTRAL ARCTIC OCEAN (CAO)

Only to a degree like the other sea routes, the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO)route (sometimes called the Trans Arctic Ocean) would continue to remain

"CLCS, "Purpose of the Commission," http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_purpose.htm#Purpose).

"George W. Bush, "The National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security PresidentialDirective, Arctic Region Policy," (The White House, 2009).

310 Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce Vol. 43, No, 3

Northern Sea Rout« Navigation Season

Projectkm fm 2000-2100

The graph shows theprojected increase ind a ^ of Oiï na\riga-tion season throughthe Northern SeaRoute as an averageof fivne ACtA modelprojections.

Figure 4: Source: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, Public Education and Outreach Centre,Finding 6 "Reduced sea ice is very likely to increase marine transport and access toresources." http://www.taiganet/acia/fmdingO6.html

basically impassable without major icebreaker technologies for most times ofthe year. Also like the other sea routes, this route is a viable option primarilybecause of quite recent technological and economic advances. It is alreadybeing used, for example, as a route for scientific research voyages and tripsto the north poles for various reasons such as tourism and scientific research.Increasingly, we might begin to see CAO as being a viable option for ship-ping through the Arctic Ocean, albeit an expensive and invasive one in termsof cutting through the ice. CAO is unique in that it has no persistent conflictsover sovereignty related issues (it is clearly high seas), which might be con-sidered as one of its most attractive features. The AMSA predicts that if cur-rent trends continue the Arctic Ocean might become entirely ice-free in thesummer months by 2040. But it would still have considerable ice-cover in thewinter months even well into 2100. The AMSA reported eight trips to theNorth Pole in 2004 (the database the AMSA used), five Russian nuclear ice-breakers used for tourism, and three research vessels.'^

NORTHWEST PASSAGE (NWP)

Particularly given the current low level of infrastructure development anda lack of sustained initiative from the Canadian Federal Government,

"AMSA, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report, 90,


increased marine transit through the Northwest Passage is a longer-termprospect. It is currently used primarily for community re-supply for thegrowing populations in the Central and Eastern Arctic. The most viableroute through the NWP is the route taken by the first commercial shipthrough the NWP (demarcated in green on the first shipping map), the(in)famous experimental US Manhattan voyage in 1969 (40). Canadaclaims the entire NWP as an internal water and territorial sea using straightbaselines around the entire archipelago (established in 1986), which also canonly be ultimately decided under international law. Canada is to submit itscontinental shelf claim by 2013 (ten years after it signed onto the UNCLOSframework).

Like the NSR for Russia, the NWP is of considerable strategic interest interms of questions of national identity. An individual we interviewed atDepartment of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) called theNWP "the Boston Tea Party to Canada" that is "absolutely at the heart of theCanadian psyche" (interview June 18, 2008, Ottawa). This seems to encap-sulate the Government of Canada's strong belief that the NWP is a crucialpart of national identity, and something that is distinctly Canadian beyonddispute. However, climate change has made the status of Northwest Passagesusceptible to certain challenges in terms of the maintenance of Canadiansovereignty in the context of potential increases (at this point theoretical) inshipping through those waters, as well as in regards to surveillance and secu-rity deficiencies.^" Nunavut has made passing references to the NWP as partof its responsibility to work with the federal government and internationalagencies "to identify and minimize the negative impacts of increased ship-ping."^' The Canadian Federal Government has exerted significant energiesin its Arctic foreign policy throughout the past decade.^- Understanding theNWP as being distinctively "Canadian," even passing parliamentary legisla-tion in the House of Commons to rename it the "Canadian NorthwestPassage," and has future aspirations to appropriate the Inuit 'traditional'name "Tallumtik."^' These efforts have been aimed to 'shore up' Canada'sambivalent relationship with its north and to understand the NWP and theArctic archipelago as its own internal waters.

°̂Rob Huebert, "Climate Change and Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest Passage," Isuma 2, no.4 (2001).

^'Government of Nunavut, "Ingirrasiliqta Let's Get Moving: Nunavut Transportation Strategy."^^Govemment of Canada, "Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty in

Promoting Canada's Northern Strategy Abroad," (Department of Foreign Affairs and International TradeCanada, 2010).

'̂Randy Boswell, "Arctic Sea Route to Be Renamed 'Canadian Northwest Passage,"' Canwest NewsService, December 3 2009; Michael Byers, "The Northwest Passage Is Already Canadian," Globe andMail, October 26 2009.

312 Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce Voi. 43, No, 3

VIECONOMIC ISSUES

These discussions often reveal that the economic and the governance per-spective are deeply interrelated. The economic issues involved in ocean gov-ernance are vast and often take precedence over other considerations, suchas rigorous pollution controls.̂ "* Transit through various parts of the Arcticocean have some serious economic aspects; in an important sense, this iswhat for the most part sustains interest in rethinking how we look at and actupon the new situation in the Arctic Ocean given the realities of climatechange. The EEZ's, or outer limits of territorial seas, are a perfect exampleof how important the connection between questions of governance and reg-ulation and that of economics.

One of the big findings of the AMSA is that most Arctic shipping remains"destinational" because it involves "moving goods into the Arctic for com-munity re-supply or moving natural resources out of the Arctic to world mar-kets" (91). The AMSA found that winter ice-cover affects Arctic marinetravel significantly, meaning that there is far more traffic in the summermonths than that of the winter.

This leads to the final perspective outlined in this paper.

VIIINUIT AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES

There is no optimum mechanism for addressing this cluster of issues with par-ticular reference to the Arctic Ocean. But, in my judgment, the place to beginis with the idea of stewardship at the conceptual level and with the work of theArctic Council and especially as it is most relevant for working groups at theapplied l ^ '

One of the real lessons of recent developments has been the strong emer-gence of indigenous voices in these discussions. Young suggests this in thepassage above. In this regard, it seems essential that indigenous perspec-tives, including their views of stewardship and what being local means, arenot simply 'tacked' onto the end of policy and scientific research. These per-spectives ought to be integrated aspects of considerations of events unfold-

"Steinberg, The Social Construction of the Ocean, 110-58; Brigham, "Think Again: The Arctic.""Oran R. Young, "If an Arctic Ocean Treaty Is Not the Solution, What Is the Alternative?," Polar

Äecord FirstView Article(2010): 8,


Sea Ice ExtentDifferences

Figure 5: AMSA Map 5.6 "Sea Ice Extent Differences," 2004 baselines (85)

ing in the international Arctic.̂ ^ The Arctic Council, which grants indigenousNGOs permanent member status, is a brilliant example of how to integratescientific, indigenous, and political aspects of governance into a largeumbrella organization capable of responding to a variety of desires, inter-ests, and demands. Yet, the theory and practice of the Arctic Council can bevery different things. The very strength of the Arctic Council is precisely its

'̂Peter JuU, "Inuit Concerns and Environmental Assessment," in The Challenge of Arctic Shipping:Science, Environmental Assessment and Human Values, ed. David L. VanderZwaag and Cindy Lamson(McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990).


weakness because action becomes very difficult when so many considera-tions need to be made at all phases of consultation, research, and the report-ing of results to wider audiences. Supporting indigenous peoples in terms ofresources has been difficult. Mary Simon has commented, in term of theArctic Council, that "[a] lot of times the permanent participants don't havethose kinds of resources so they've become marginalized in the process.""Furthermore, reporting of research results can be rather cumbersome tounderstand beyond the bullet points that are usually issued for today's read-ers short of time for reading. Following these debates can become a full timejob.

The tendency too often is to think about indigenous concems as lying onanother level from that of 'serious' policy deliberations. This is partiallybecause the problems that indigenous peoples face in a rapidly globalizingworld are staggering. Increased shipping would surely represent increasedenvironmental risk, and the opportunities for benefits such as job creationwould be modest at least in the shorter-term. Of course, the Govemment ofCanada could change direction and work to effectively build marine infra-stmcture in the north (such as developing a Marine Council as per theNunavut Land Claims Agreement). In other words, once again indigenouspeoples stand to take great risks and have the least to gain from significantchanges in the volume of shipping occurring. Mary Simon of the InuitTapiriit Kanatami (ITK), representing the Inuit in Canada, has argued per-suasively that Inuit who live in coastal communities should be involved inall aspects of any new monitoring processes: Simon objected to the lack ofInuit consultation during the creation of the Govemment of Canada's new"Northem Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone" in force as of July 1, 2010,legislation that ensures all foreign and domestic vessels in Canadian watersof 300 tonnes or over report to the Canadian Coast Guard.^* The motivationshere are mixed, being both govemance and regulation oriented as well aspragmatic and focused on economic factors. After all, increased shippingmight create possibilities for increased industry but it could also simplyignore indigenous views about the eft'ects of these changes on their commu-

"Simon quoted in Rynor. Backy Rynor, "Indigenous Voices 'Marginalized' at Arctic Council: InuitLeaders," iPolitics, 1 November 2011; Peter Kikkert, "Rising above the Rhetoric: Northem Voices andthe Strengthening of Canada's Capacity to Maintain a Stable Circumpolar World," Northem Review,2011 Spring 2011.

^'Canada, "Govemment of Canada Response to the Report of the Standing Committee on Fisheriesand Oceans: Small Craft Harbours: An Essential Infrastructure Managed by and for FishingCommunities," (Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2010); Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, "Inuit See Valuein New Federal Arctic Shipping Regulations - Insist on Greater Inuit Involvement," 20 July (2010);Boswell, "Inuit Back Controversial Arctic Shipping Rules."


nities and environments, such as the way that pollution protects health andsea mammal health. As the former Premier of Nunavut has claimed,

[S]overeignty is not just about military presence, surveillance and enforce-ment. From a Nunavut perspective, sovereignty would be enhanced by fulfill-ing the opportunities to build capacity in the North and to create a vision ofCanadian Arctic stewardship in which Nunavummiut place a significant rolefor Canada.^'

Nunavut in this sense is an illustrative example of the Arctic shipping"complicated mosaic." There are many other examples that could be con-sidered in future research, including indigenous perspectives in otherregions. The real key in my mind is to think about indigenous perspectivesas interlinked with global or macro perspectives that often overlook howindigenous social and political movements are an integral part of what wecall 'the global.' Sustainable development, although at times unclear as aconcept to legitimate capitalist exploits, that attempts to enable job creation,might still have much to teach us in the realms of critical debates about pub-lic policy, theory construction, and everyday life.

Debates surrounding climate change have deeply impacted the scienceand politics of the twenty-first century, and perhaps the impact on the issueof shipping is one of the most interesting, complicated, and still yet to befully understood. In the context of the pressures, consequences, and oppor-tunities associated with globalization, being able to move goods and peoplefrom one region of the globe to another in a quick fashion has been integralto all of the world's economies. This alone could be sufficient ground tothink again. Shipping through the Arctic has become a serious option thatcould potentially change how we move goods and people from one place toanother, perhaps taking some of the pressure off of the Suez and Panamacanals. Yet, as the deep history of these routes would reveal, the politicsassociated with shipping are no easy matters to contend with. The mainchallenge in the Arctic today is to learn from some of these comparativespaces, and to theorize the rethinking of the world that is occurring as aresult of what we call climate change

'̂Paul Okalik, "Nunavut Needs 'Provincial-Like' Authority to Help Manage Canada's ArcticSovereignty," Hill Times (2006).


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Increased Shipping in the International Arctic? An Overview (2012)

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