Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review

Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review

2006KOSOVO 2006

Copyright © 2006

by the ISSR

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission.

Katalogimi në botim - (CIP)Bibloteka Kombëtare dhe Universitare e Kosovës351.751 (496.51)ISBN: 9951-498-01-9

Production: Rrota, www.rrota.com Layout: Arbër Matoshi Ardian Veliu Korab Etemi Cover: Kushtrim Balaj Photo: Astrit Ibrahimi, UNMIK DPI

Printed: Grafika Rezniqi - Prishtina, Kosovo

The ISSR Research Team:

Anthony C. Welch, CoordinatorLundrim AliuIzabella CooperAriana HasaniBesnike JakaArton KamberiBilbil KastratiSokol KondiDana StinsonValon TolajDr. Michael Von Tangen Page

This report is dedicated to all the people of Kosovo – for their past struggles and their future successes.

The ISSR research team would like to acknowledge the following countries and indi-viduals for their support in producing this report:

The Government of the Netherlands; The Government of Sweden; The Government of Switzerland; The Government of the United Kingdom; The Government of the United States of America; The United Nations Development Programme.

Rame Arifaj; Nathan Bein; Piet Biesheuvel; Steve Burfitt; Professor Sir John Dalgleish; Ilir Dugolli; Rod Evans; Colonel Xhavit Gashi; Chris Goostrey; Colonel Robert Jordan; Dr. Markus H.F. Mohler; Dzenet Peci; Lulzim Peci; Pascal Jones; Colonel James Playford; Kevin Rousseau; Lieutenant General Sulejman Selimi; Major General Christopher Steirn; Colonel Iain Smailes; Helena Vazquez.; Kim Vetting; Enzo Vullo; Peter Wilson; DCAF; KIPRED; SSDAT; and the staff of the Office for Public Safety.

Cleland, Welch, A.; Kondi, S; Stinson, D; Von Tangen Page M (eds); (2006). Internal Secu-rity Sector Review Kosovo. Pristina: UNDP.

The ISSR Secretariat received a number of comments on the final draft of this report from the ISSR Steering Committee and other interested parties. All comments received were taken into consideration. The recommendations and opinions expressed in this report do not reflect those of the UN Development Programme, donors supporting the ISSR project, or individual members of the ISSR Steering Committee.

CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 2

Section 1.1 Background ISSR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2Section 1.2 Methodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...4Section 1.3 Kosovo’s Security Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

CHAPTER 2 - Public Perceptions of Security 18

Section 2.1 Public Opinion Findings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18Section 2.2 Lower Level Threats and Common Themes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .20Section 2.3 Freedom of Movement Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21Section 2.4 ISSR Public Outreach Campaign Findings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

CHAPTER 3 - Kosovo Threat Assessment 26

Section 3.1 Background and Methodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 26Section 3.2 Identified Threats in Detail. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Section 3.3 Other Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41

CHAPTER 4 - Functional Analysis of Governance Institutions 48

Section 4.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48Section 4.2 Institutional Actors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50Section 4.3 Informal Oversight Actors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78

CHAPTER 5 - Functional Analysis of Security Institutions 88

Section 5.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .88Section 5.2 Security Institutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .88Section 5.3 Non-institutional Security Related Subjects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..109

CHAPTER 6 - Gap analysis 118

Section 6.1 Methodology and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .118Section 6.2 Identification of Institutional Gaps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .119Section 6.3 Gap Analysis Matrix. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .120

CHAPTER 7 - Proposed Kosovo Security Architecture 134

Section 7.1 Background and Chapter Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .134Section 7.2 New Security Institutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .136Section 7.3 Legal Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147Section 7.4 Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .149

Table of Content

CHAPTER 8 - ISSR Security Sector Development Proposals 154

Section 8.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .154Section 8.2 Capacity Building Projects by Theme. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .155Section 8.3 Modalities of Implementation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .158

CHAPTER 9 - Conclusions and Recommendations 164

ANNEXES

ANNEX I Annex i Sources Consulted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .169

ANNEX II List of Acrynoms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .176

ANNEX III List of Members of The ISSR Steering Committee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .179

ANNEX IV ISSR Bus Questionnaire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

ANNEX V ISSR Structured Interview for the PISG Governance/Security Dimension. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .181

ANNEX VI UNMIK Regulations Cited in Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .182

ANNEX VII List of Institutions and People that ISSR Consulted in Regard of the Institutional Analyis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..183

ANNEX VIII Threat Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 188

ANNEX IX ISSR Recommendations Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

ANNEX X Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

ISSR Consultative Meetings Ques. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198

Map of Kosovo

VIII

foreword

IX

Kosovo is entering a new era in its history; an era which will bring many challenges and rewards. However, the rewards will not come easily and will have to be worked for by the Government and people of this land. The days ahead will determine if Kosovo is to become a peaceful, prosperous and multi-ethnic state, at ease with itself and its neigh-bours. The next few months will show if, by working together, the Government and Peo-ple of Kosovo can create a multi-ethnic society that all who live here deserve. A major challenge to this dream is the security of Kosovo in all its guises.

The Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR), which has taken place over the last year, has sought to provide the template on which the security of Kosovo can be constructed. The Review has taken the thoughts, fears, and aspirations of all the people of Kosovo and translated them into positive recommendations as to how the threats to our security can be dealt with. But the recommendations are not a panacea for all the ills that plague us. They are not an instruction manual for building Utopia; rather they are a road-map point-ing the Government and People of Kosovo in the right direction for their joint destination – a viable, peaceful and prosperous future.

The ISSR Steering Committee has approved this Report and its Recommendations. How-ever, this is only the first step in the long road. Many people across Kosovo must work together to make our aspirations a reality, therefore we wish to send a message about the findings and Recommendations in this Report and the subsequent implementation process:

First, to all Kosovo Assembly colleagues: the ISSR recommendations will assist our Gov-ernment to build a better Kosovo. The implementation of its recommendations, many of which rest solely in the hands of Ministers and Parliamentarians, will increase public confidence in the internal security environment and the Government.

Second, to the ministers of the Kosovo Government: we believe that the ISSR has given Kosovo an opportunity to move into the future with confidence. Improving overall security will greatly assist development and economic regeneration. Many of the recommendations in this Report do not need vast sums of money or complicated capacity building initiatives: they need thought, hard work and rationalisation within the institutions of Government. We will be working with our colleagues over the coming months, to ensure that these institutions are ready and able for the task ahead of them.

Third, to the International Community and donor partners: the recommendations of the ISSR spring directly from the wishes of the people of Kosovo, regardless of ethnicity. The broad consultative and inclusive nature of the Review has served as a confidence building meas-ure, so necessary at this time in Kosovo’s history. However, Kosovo will need assistance in fulfilling these wishes and the ISSR process has provided an opportunity for harmonisa-tion at an affordable price. Development needs security just as security needs develop-ment, but in the short term Kosovo requires wider assistance in the security field so that it can learn and grow into an able entity within the wider region.

To Civil Society, the Media and the Public: All of you have been a party to the Internal Se-curity Sector Review: this process was always for the people of Kosovo, by the people of Kosovo, for the future of Kosovo. You now have a key role in the realisation of the Review recommendations. We will continue to involve you in the implementation, because the ISSR and its outcomes are there to serve you. Security is not a secret; it is a public service requiring public support.

FOREWORD

X On behalf of the ISSR Steering Committee, we wish to express our sincere gratitude to the Core Consultative Group members, the citizens who contributed through the Munici-pal Outreach Meetings and all those who gave their views and comments through many channels of communication over the last months. This Report is truly the result of your interest and contributions.Similarly, we wish to thank the Security Sector Development Advisory Team (SSDAT) and UNDP for their professional guidance and for facilitating the process. The Review could not have taken place without the generosity of the governments of the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States of America and the United Kingdom, together with the UNDP, to all of whom we owe a large debt of gratitude.The Internal Security Sector Review is concluded; now the responsibility is passed to the People of Kosovo to build a bright and secure future for all.

Agim ÇekuPrime Minister of Kosovo

Fatmir SejdiuPresident of Kosovo

XI

XII

summary

XIIIExecutive Summary

The Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) initiated by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Søren Jes-sen-Petersen, in 2005 and guided by the principles and methodology devised by the Security Sector Development Advi-sory Team (SSDAT) has taken a holistic ap-proach to examination of internal security in Kosovo. Furthermore, the ISSR Kosovo program was built on a threat assessment based on the most extensive public con-sultation ever undertaken in a security sector review. This outreach was conduct-ed across the ethnic divide and sought the views and aspirations of the population, as to both their personal and collective security. In essence, the Review has been designed for the benefit of the people of Kosovo; to be informed by the people of Kosovo for their future security.

Overall, the security environment in Ko-sovo has improved significantly since 1999; however, this environment has also become more complex. Today these com-plexities are more internal than external and focus mainly on long-term develop-ment issues such the economy and so-cial issues. Nonetheless, external factors remain influential and the progression of Kosovo’s relationship with its neighbours will be an important feature in its future security landscape.

Kosovo’s relationship with Serbia will largely pivot on the outcome of the current status negotiations and the ability of the parties to reach a form of understanding regarding the future of Kosovo. Ethnic ten-sions remain and the three municipalities north of the Ibar/Ibër River and the north-ern part of the city of Mitrovica/Mitrovicë are the areas where possible future insecu-rity, internal and external, may rest.

As the South East Adriatic region contin-ues to grapple with issues of national iden-tity, borders, and cross-border ethnic ties, Kosovo will face threats to its external se-curity which may manifest itself within its territory. That being said, a balance must be struck between Kosovo’s ability to cope diplomatically and politically with

these challenges and its ability to maintain peace and security within its borders. The continued presence of KFOR, in the shorter term, is a vital factor in securing Kosovo.

The Review had the challenge of running parallel with the talks on the determination of a final status for the Kosovo, conducted in Vienna and led by the United Nations Special Envoy to Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari. It was also undertaken at a time when the responsibilities for internal security in Kos-ovo lay primarily with the United Nations mission (UNMIK), although a number of competencies in the area of security had been devolved to the Provisional Institu-tions of Self-Government (PISG).

The ISSR has made a number of recom-mendations. These are all designed to as-sist a future Government of Kosovo meet the security threats which have been identified by the population as a whole, through the ISSR threat assessment proc-ess. Most of the ISSR recommendations point to initiatives that can be taken at any time; however, there are some that can only be considered in the event of a cessa-tion of the UNSCR 1244 mandate and the implementation of decisions on Kosovo’s future status. These are clearly delineated in the report.

Identified Threats

Although the international community has largely focused on the issue of inter-ethnic violence, the ISSR found that for the people of Kosovo high unemployment, a lack of economic development and wide-spread poverty have created an atmos-phere of insecurity. Economic instability has exacerbated problems such as ethnic violence, corruption, increased crime rates and contributed to a growth in mistrust of Kosovo’s key institutions of government, both international and indigenous (Chap-ter 1, Sections 2.1.2-2.1.5).

The ISSR found that the economic situ-ation and current demographic trends mean that the greatest security challenge lies in promoting economic development.

XIV The dangers of political and ethnic ex-tremism, organised crime and social dis-cord will all be significantly diminished if, by working in partnership with immediate neighbours and the rest of Europe, Kos-ovo can reinvigorate the current stagnant economy. Further, the threat of internal division in Kosovo remains present and may increase if economic and unemploy-ment issues are not comprehensively ad-dressed. Infrastructure problems, such as the inadequate provision of electric power, undermine economic growth and have the capacity to spark public protest. The greatest hurdle will be to ensure that the current high unemployment rate is re-duced. Economic integration, within both South Eastern Europe and the wider Euro-pean Union, will be an important measure in assisting the economic development vital to Kosovo’s future security and also in building networks of interdependence in the region (Chapter 3, Sections 3.2.2-3.2.16).

Through the Standards process Kosovo is currently addressing deficiencies in the rule of law. The ISSR found that public con-fidence in the judiciary remains low and, despite having an efficient and generally highly regarded police service, there re-mains a widespread lack of confidence in the criminal justice system (Chapter 3, Sec-tions 3.2.17-3.2.24).

At the international level, the threat of ter-rorism exists but has yet to manifest itself within Kosovo. Nonetheless, the region remains volatile and Kosovo’s relationships with its neighbours, particularly Serbia, re-quire close attention and would benefit from support from the international com-munity (Chapter 3, Section 3.2.57-3.2.65).

Security Related Institutions

The ISSR found through its public outreach programmes that the citizens of Kosovo are concerned not only with those ac-tors that directly provide internal security within Kosovo but also with the ministries and organisations that impact on their daily lives. Therefore, matters of trade and industry, the provision of energy, health, education all played their part in deter-mining if the people of Kosovo feel secure

in their homes and their society (Chapter 2, Sections 2.1 and 2.2).

The ISSR, in the spirit of the holistic ap-proach determined by the SSDAT me-thodology, reviewed the roles and capability gaps of each of the Ministries and Organisations that were mentioned in the Threat Analysis conducted under Stage 3 of the Review. They also dealt with non-institutional subjects such as Private Security Companies and the regulation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, gender issues, and freedom of movement.

Much has been achieved, in recent years, to move Kosovo towards a provisional self administering status but, as can be ex-pected given the artificial governmental structure of present day Kosovo, there are many areas that require attention, capac-ity building, investment and development. In order to ensure that Kosovo’s future, re-gardless of status, is one that encourages enterprise and growth, and a secure envi-ronment, consideration must be given to a range of areas not directly related to tra-ditional security sector reform but which, nevertheless, have a telling impact on the lives of all Kosovo’s citizens. In short, there is little merit in having a well regulated and efficient security sector if the population is ill-educated, unhealthy and unemployed, with little or no prospects for the future.

The key findings and recommendations in the area of security related institutions are:

1. Employment and Economy. Of the pri-mary security concerns to the popula-tion as a whole, the most important revolved around the economic situa-tion in Kosovo. This not only resulted in major fears regarding job security, lack of job prospects, and growing poverty, but also the perception that the consequences of this situation were increased crime and corruption. Kosovo’s main challenge now lies in developing a solid, job creating econ-omy able to support its fast growing population. Another aspect to economic secu-rity in Kosovo is the weak system of public utilities, particularly electric-ity generation and distribution. This

XVaspect is also closely linked to the perception of the government’s abil-ity to provide adequate services and build trust with its citizens. The World Bank estimates that businesses lose an average of 5 percent of sales due to electricity challenges. Unreliable electrical supply is not only a social inconvenience, but also an economic deterrent for, without reliable electri-cal generation and distribution, Kos-ovo cannot demonstrate the kind of stable governance systems required to support investment and guarantee a return on that investment.

The ISSR believe that the path to strengthening Kosovo’s economy and setting the basis for sustainable de-velopment encompasses three major challenges and recommends:

A further strengthening of the Min-istry of Trade and Industry’s capaci-ties to create a favourable business climate and implement an effective economic policy both at central and regional level;

The strengthening of Kosovo busi-nesses, comprising mainly of SMEs, that should become a source of em-ployment generation and for the inclusion of those disadvantaged groups that have difficulties partici-pating in economic activities and;

The attraction of foreign direct invest-ment in order to stimulate economic progress and development leading to increased job creation.

In addition, the ISSR recommends that urgent attention be given to the improvement to the energy sup-ply to Kosovo through cooperation with neighbouring states and urgent planned investment leading to the provision of a new Power Generation Plant to replace the moribund exist-ing facilities. At the same time the Ko-sovo Energy Corporation (KEK) should take all necessary technical steps to improve the collection of payments for energy supplied. (Chapter 1, Section 1.3.18).

2. Health Sector. The health sector in Kosovo is struggling against the leg-acy from the past, particularly at the institutional level. Whilst substantive steps have been undertaken by the PISG with the adoption of several basic laws after year 2002, the estab-lishment of the Ministry of Health by UNMIK constitutes the only signifi-cant institutional step forward. There are no formalised, over-arching emer-gency procedures in the area of health care. A parallel health sector exists in the Serbian majority municipalities, which is funded simultaneously by KCB and Belgrade. Coordination be-tween the PISG and the parallel sector in the areas of policy and operations is non-existent.

The ISSR recommends that:

Steps are made to unify the existing parallel systems, at least at the policy and funding levels, not only for politi-cal reasons, but also for policy coor-dination, sharing of information, and monitoring for security risks such as epidemics.

Emergency planning coordination within the PISG and the Office of the Prime Minister should include health issues as a concern and a health co-ordination mechanism should be established accordingly to prepare for emergency-situations (Chapter 4, Section 4.2.97).

3. Education Sector. The education sys-tem in Kosovo is currently caught be-tween reform, institutional infighting, and parallel structures. The restructur-ing undertaken by UNMIK since 1999 has been radical and necessary as the informal education system, that had supported Kosovo during a decade of turmoil, has left significant gaps in educational curriculum, teaching methods and access to information.

The ISSR recommends that:

The unification of the education sys-tem for all employees. The existence of a Serb parallel system in educa-

XVI tion constitutes the main source of fragmentation in the system and the ethnic friction created by this parallel system often takes on political conno-tations;

Professional standards need to be matched with educational curricu-lum, particularly in higher education. Curricula should include practical ex-perience requirements such as intern-ships to ensure that students gradu-ate with skills required to contribute to their professional development. Educational policy at all levels should be directed towards the challenges of Kosovo’s vulnerable communities; women, rural poor, and others with less of a voice in Kosovo’s political and economic development;

The education system needs to join with other institutions in the region and in Europe to expand the op-portunities for the brightest among Kosovo’s citizens (Chapter 4, Section 4.2.88).

Kosovo’s Security Architecture

The ISSR recognises that, depending on the continued transfer of competencies and decisions on status, Kosovo will need to develop indigenous security architecture.

The ISSR recommends that the Kosovo security architecture be constructed by building upon institutions established as part of the PISG under UNSCR 1244 and may also include competencies currently reserved by the SRSG that are logically connected to security related tasks.

It is recommended that the overall secu-rity architecture for Kosovo be made up of the following entities:

1. The executive level should include the Kosovo Security Council and the Min-istries of Defence, of Internal Affairs, of Justice, and Finance and Economy;

2. The security actors should include the Kosovo Defence Force, Kosovo Police Service, the Security Service and the Department of Emergency Manage-ment;

3. At the oversight level, the Assembly of Kosovo should have specific com-mittees on security, for example, on Defence and on Security Services.

The diagram at the end of this section illus-trates the proposed overall future security architecture.

It is recommended that the Communities Security Council (CSC), established on 16 June 2006, serve as the basis for a Kosovo Security Council (KSC). The Prime Minis-ter should chair the KSC and membership should be drawn from appropriate minis-tries (Chapter 7, Section 7.2.5).

A Kosovo Security Council Secretariat (KSCSEC) be coordinated by the Prime Minister’s Security Adviser and act as the Executive Committee to the KSC. A Joint Security Committee (JSC) should be cre-ated to translate the policy decisions of the KSC into formal security requirements. The JSC will be supported by a Joint As-sessment Team (JAT), which collates and assesses information on each subject of security concern. In order to best coordi-nate local security concerns with the cen-tral security institutions, Municipal Secu-rity Committees (MSCs) should be formed at Municipal level, drawing on existing lo-cal Safety Committees (Chapter 7, Sections 7.2.7-7.2.12).

A Security Framework for Kosovo

If Kosovo is to be granted further control of the competencies that pertain to the secu-rity sector, attention must be given to the creation of a viable security framework and new institutions within that framework.

The ISSR recommends that any reforms applied to the security sector be instigated through a Security Act. The security law will describe required competencies regarding security and frameworks for setting up ap-propriate security institutions (Chapter 7, Section 7.3).

It is recommended that measures be in-stigated, as soon as is practicable, to en-sure that the legal framework for a future Kosovo security structure will clearly es-tablish civilian oversight and control, and

XVIIthat mechanisms are put in place to guar-antee that security services do not exceed the competencies assigned to them by law (Chapter 7, Section 7.3).

It is recommended that the Kosovo As-sembly create specialised oversight com-mittees, such as defence and security serv-ices, to deal with each component of the security sector. These committees should have the power to hold inquiries and regu-lar hearings, ratify budgets, make procure-ment decisions and consider international treaties (Chapter 7, Section 7.2.37-7.2.44).

It is recommended that, in order to effec-tively exercise control and oversight of the internal security architecture, the Kosovo Assembly be provided with relevant infor-mation from the security related organi-sations on a regular basis. The Assembly should also require that a Security Plan be prepared by the Prime Minister annually (Chapter 7, Section 7.2.45-7.2.47).

It is recommended that the Kosovo As-sembly take part in the security structure by executing such functions as:

Establishing mechanisms for adopt-ing legislation on the purposes, func-tions, size, structure, limitations of the components of the security organisa-tion;Rstablishing mechanisms to regulate the use of any security forces as well as to control access of foreign security institutions onto Kosovo territory; Drafting legislation protecting human, economic, and social rights of security sector employees, their family mem-bers, and security sector retirees.

The framework for any new security plan-ning structure should guarantee the su-premacy of the democratic political and civilian component (Chapter 7, Sections 7.2.37-7.2.44).

It is further recommended that key provi-sions in the security law prescribe the mech-anisms supporting legislative approval of security expenditures based on a due re-gard for security requirements, and provide for transparency and public access to secu-rity information (Chapter 7, Section 7.3).

It is recommended that the Kosovo As-sembly approve the appointment of senior security sector leaders nominated by the President or Prime Minister. The Assem-bly should also have a role in decisions to seek support from NATO or the EU during emergency situations, as well as for rein-forcement of internal security capabilities (Chapter 7, Section 7.2.43).

Ministerial Responsibilities

Ministry of Internal Affairs and

Ministry of Justice.

The Ministries of Internal Affairs and Jus-tice are in the process of overcoming start-up challenges, with substantial assistance from the international community.

The ISSR recommends that both Minis-tries take a major role in the future security architecture of Kosovo, particularly in the following areas:

They should be key members of the KSC ensuring a collegial approach to security matters; They should ensure compliance of the security institutions with the prin-ciples of inclusiveness, impartiality, accountability, transparency and fair and effective access of all people of Kosovo to the above institutions;They should have a key role to play in developing policies in their respec-tive fields of responsibility in line with the EU Acquis Communautaire and in support of Kosovo’s longer term aspi-rations for EU and NATO membership.The Ministry of Justice should ensure that fair and equitable treatment, be-fore the law, is afforded all of Kosovo’s citizens, regardless of ethic origin, re-ligious affiliation or gender. The com-petencies of all Officers of the Court should be of the highest order (Chap-ter 7, Section 7.2.50).

Ministry of Defence.

Dependent on the outcome of status ne-gotiations, Kosovo may be entitled, under international law and convention, to as-sume responsibility for its own self-de-fence mechanisms.

XVIII The ISSR recommends that, subject to relevant status decisions, a Ministry of De-fence be created with responsibility for en-suring civilian control over defence forces as well as with primary responsibility for defence policy and strategy.

However, the ISSR also recommends

that the Ministry of Defence come into be-ing only when the relevant training and organisation of security forces and the ci-vilian officers for the Ministry have been completed. It is further recommended

that under new civilian leadership the Of-fice of the KPC Coordinator (OKPCC) act as an embryo Ministry and coordinate the training of officials to form the final entity (Chapter 7, Sections 7.2.17-7.2.19).

Security Actors

The Kosovo Protection Corps and a

Kosovo Defence Force.

The ISSR believes that, should the interna-tional community attempt to deny an in-dependent Kosovo its own defence force, action would be taken to create such a force. The ISSR further believe that such an outcome would work against the progress that has been made to bring security to Kosovo and the region as a whole. In addi-tion, ISSR public outreach revealed a deep mistrust of the KPC among Kosovo’s mi-nority communities, based on their provi-dence leading back to the Kosovo Libera-tion Army (KLA). This has led the ISSR to conclude that, should a defence force be created, it would be counterproductive to internal security if it were to be solely based on the existing KPC structures. In addition, it is axiomatic that the Kosovo Consolidated Budget (KCB) cannot afford both a defence force and the KPC.

The ISSR recommends that planning for a viable, affordable, democratic, civilian controlled defence force be undertaken. It would be to the advantage of the interna-tional community, the region, and Kosovo if this force is closely affiliated with, and supervised by international forces, within Kosovo (Chapter 7, Sections 72.20-7.2.27).

It is recommended that the recruitment of members of any new defence force be

open to all members of Kosovo society, regardless of ethnic origin or gender. It is

further recommended that following a period of downsizing and transfer of lim-ited capacities to the new defence force, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) be dis-banded and that a resettlement training and pensioning scheme supported by the international community be implemented (Chapter 7, Sections 7.2.23-7.2.24).

The Kosovo Police Service.

Surveys completed by ISSR and other or-ganisations conclude that the Kosovo Po-lice Service (KPS) is one of the most trusted institutions in Kosovo. However, there is a danger that the early success of the KPS may have served to mask some problems. The population of Kosovo’s reservations, regarding the KPS, centre on their per-ceived failure to ensure the rule of law, creeping politicisation of the service, and corruption. Such issues need to be con-fronted through the promotion of a thor-ough internal disciplinary regime which would include a counter corruption unit sitting within the KPS, jointly answerable to the Police Commissioner and the Of-fice of the Ombudsman. Similarly, the lack of effective parliamentary oversight from the Assembly contributes to issues such as creeping politicisation of the Police Serv-ice, which should be addressed (Chapter 5, Sections 5.2.28-5.2.43).

The ISSR recommends that the Ministry of Internal Affairs be further developed to discharge its policy-making and executive mandate as regards the KPS. There is an ur-gent need to draft a new KPS law, by which it can be better regulated. Continued ca-pacity building of the Police is required – particularly in the area of management. Senior officers who have been rapidly pro-moted should be encouraged to remain in positions longer in order to test their skills and contribute to the overall capacity building of their commands. There is also a mismatch in the training of Police Officers and the requirements of the Service and, in some cases, individual Officers. Training and recruitment of the KPS are two of the most important aspects of its future ef-fectiveness; the centralisation of training should be reviewed and should be more

XIXrelative to the specific local requirements of the police regions. It is further recom-

mended that the PISG examine the link-ages between the KPS and Judiciary to ensure that the execution of the law is up-held throughout all its relevant stages and that justice is seen to be done at all levels (Chapter 5, Section 5.2.43).

Security Services

Kosovo’s provisional governing authorities do not have official security service struc-tures or capacities. The possibility of es-tablishing a legislatively mandated secu-rity service, within the Office of the Prime Minister, has been discussed in the Kosovo Assembly and civil society. Although the need for a service is largely agreed, the concept has caused some concern among the Kosovo population, as many associate the concept of a security service with the authoritarian excesses of Yugoslav history.

The ISSR recommends that current inter-national activities to craft outline struc-tures and organisations, which could lead to a democratic and regulated Security Service, be expedited. Development of competence criteria for selection of mem-bers of a new security service should be created in line with best practice from EU and NATO states (Chapter 7, Sections 7.2.34-7.2.36).

It is recommended that, given the impor-tance of expanding civil awareness related to Security Service issues, that the interna-tional community expand and accelerate plans for increasing security awareness within the civil population, to ensure that debate does not become dominated by misconceptions about the nature of secu-rity services (Chapter 7, Section 7.4.2).

The Kosovo Correctional Services.

The administration of Correctional Serv-ices in Kosovo is, generally, up to European standards. However, some competences are yet to be transferred to the Kosovo authorities and it is recommended that these are done so in due time. It is also

recommended that the Kosovo Correc-tional Service (KCS) continue to operate in an open and transparent manner, ensuring

that all due diligence is applied to their du-ties and that requests for oversight of their activities are promptly accommodated. It

is recommended that the International Civilian Office (ICO) consider monitoring duties post UNSCR 1244 (Chapter 5, Sec-tion 5.2.76-5.2.77).

The Border and Customs Services.

Kosovo faces a number of threats to its in-ternal security that are largely related to organised crime. The UNMIK Police and KFOR have provided support, and con-ducted operations, in the domain of bor-der security and control. However, many of these competencies have now been handed over to the Kosovo authorities.

At present, because of Kosovo’s unique si-tuation, the Border and Boundary Police are confined to working at designated bor-der/boundary gates. Border surveillance and patrolling are currently the responsi-bility of KFOR, although some joint patrols with the Kosovo Border and Boundary Po-lice have taken place. Plans are currently being prepared to increase the role and responsibilities of the indigenous unit.

The Customs Service remains under the di-rect control of the SRSG and is overseen by an international Director General, although he is required to consult with the PISG before implementing operational policy through Administrative Instructions.

It is recommended, given the regional and global nature of the threats faced by Kosovo’s Border and Boundary Police and Customs Service that, depending on sta-tus, the Government swiftly establish rela-tionships with regional and international police organisations including EUROPOL, INTERPOL, and Southeast Europe Coop-erative Initiative (SECI) (Chapter 5, Section 5.2.86).

Future Action

The ISSR has identified a range of threats, public perceptions of the security sector and gaps in the current security architec-ture and security related institutions of Ko-sovo. A significant number of these gaps are already being addressed by both the

XX PISG and the international community. However, given the fact that, to date, the security sector in Kosovo has been largely under the control of the international com-munity there are areas specific to the ISSR recommendations and the security sector which require attention. A matrix listing all of ISSR key recom-mendations, current donor support, and recommended future donor activity can be found at Annex IX.

It is recommended, in order to assist the Government of Kosovo with prioritisation and implementation of the recommenda-tions contained in this Report, that build-ing on existing PISG institutional structures

an implementation body be formed with a Steering Committee, chaired by the Prime Minister and including all the key security related Ministers, directing its activities. This Committee could also include repre-sentatives of the international community, as well as representatives of the principal donors to a Trust Fund set up to finance projects within the security sector. The pro-posed projects could be implemented by a range of different agencies but are part of the ISSR security sector development plan and thus linked directly to identified secu-rity threats in Kosovo and the recommen-dations outlined in this Report (Chapter 8, Section 8.3).

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

Introduction

2

1.1.1 An atmosphere of security, sup-ported by a strong foundation of rule of law is an essential underpinning for any successful democratic state. The Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) was a consultative process designed to pro-vide Kosovo the opportunity to consider issues that would form a definition of se-curity as it was engaged in the challenging process of determining final status. The process was also designed to analyse ex-isting and identify new institutional capac-ity required to address threats compiled through a consultative process with local experts and citizens. In addition, the ISSR identified some policymaking processes and structures that can support Kosovo’s internal and external security needs fol-lowing the determination of final status.

1.1.2 Security Sector Review (SSR) proc-esses are an essential part of understand-

ing the impact of changes in the security sector and establishing society’s overall reform of governing institutions. Often these reviews are limited either by scope or methodology to internal institutional reviews with limited public consultation. Sometimes SSRs focus on singular security issues – such as policing or strengthening civil-military oversight and interface.1

1.1.3. In the case of Kosovo, the pro-cess of reviewing the security sector was unique as security remains a power re-served by UNMIK and KFOR is responsible for external defence issues in the territory. Therefore, Kosovo’s process became an internal review with many of the recom-mendations dependent on the resolution of final status. That said, Kosovo’s ISSR has been one of the most ambitious and ho-listic efforts undertaken in recent years, both in scope and methodology. Kosovo’s ISSR faced two significant gaps. First, Ko-sovo has no existing indigenous security institutions or policies beyond the police and judiciary structures which have been

1 Kosovo is the first example of a holistic review prior to security sector engagement. For example, in Sierra Leone the review was only conducted after the reform process had started. In terms of limited scope, the Paton Report on Policing in Northern Ireland was restricted to one security area.

The OECD has described the security system (also known as sector) as comprising of the following actors:

Core security actors: armed forces; police; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards, intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, militias).Security management and oversight bodies: the Executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal af-fairs, foreign affaires; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units);and civil society organisations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).Justice and law enforcement institutions: judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human right commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems.Non-statutory security forces, with whom donors rarely engage; liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private body-guard units; private security companies; political party militias.”

Source: Security System Reform and Governance, Paris: OECD, 2005, pp 20-21.

Security sector re-form must account for the overall se-

curity context and address the fundamentals as well as the specifics. Effective management, transpar-ency and accountability of the security sector is just as necessary as with any oth-er part of the public sector. Resources need to be man-aged efficiently to allow the provision of security that does not threaten de-mocracy or human rights or undermine de-velopment goals.

Source:

Understanding and Supporting

Security sector Reform: London:

DFID, 2001 p. 7.

CHAPTER I The Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) – An Introduction

Section 1.1

Background Regarding the

Origins and Process of ISSR

Introduction

3developed by the international communi-ty. Second, the ISSR team was required to consider the kinds of security institutions required for Kosovo and make recommen-dations for those institutions prior to the determination of final status. However, despite the unusual circumstances of the review, Kosovo’s ISSR took on the entire scope of the security architecture. In ad-dition, and in order to more completely verify findings and recommendations, the ISSR incorporated a widespread public consultation and public outreach process as well as an extensive and unprecedented review of existing institutions.

1.1.4 The initiative behind the Kosovo ISSR originated as a collaborative effort between the United Nations Mission in Ko-sovo (UNMIK) Office of the Special Repre-sentative of the Secretary General (SRSG)

and officials of Kosovo’s Provisional Insti-tutional of Self-Government (PISG). The idea was to begin a security review com-plementary to final status negotiations for Kosovo. In order to put the idea in motion, the Government of the United Kingdom supported a scoping mission, which was undertaken by the Security Sector Devel-opment Advisory Team (SSDAT) in March 2005. The scoping mission produced a re-port made in consultation with Kosovo ex-perts that provided recommendations for the structure, objectives, and work plan of Kosovo’s ISSR.

Structure and Work Plan of the ISSR

1.1.5 During the research and report process the ISSR structure consisted of a Steering Committee (ISC) with high-level representatives from UNMIK, the PISG, party leaders, religious leaders, and minor-

ity community representatives, a Secretar-iat and a research team headed by the ISSR Coordinator located in the Office for Public Safety within the Office of the Prime Min-ister.2 The ISSR team is funded by interna-tional donations managed under the aus-pices of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The ISSR process also included a high level of coordination and cooperation between various internation-al and local governing agencies, particu-larly in the area of public consultation and research. As an example, the two stages of public consultative meetings in each mu-nicipality in Kosovo would not have been possible without the organisation and functional support of the OSCE Democra-tisation Department and OSCE municipal teams working in coordination with local participants.

1.1.6 The ISSR has been completed in 8 stages:

1.1.7 The first two stages of the con-sultation process were completed in April 2006. The findings of these stages became the basis for a wide-scale public outreach programme. Stages 3, 4 and 5 were drawn from the findings of the Institutional functional analysis completed in coordi-nation with PISG Institutional counter-parts. Stages 6, 7, and 8 were completed as part of the overall analysis and conclu-sions incorporated in the final stages of the project. The ISSR process in general was completed with an view to providing proposals regarding a Kosovo security ar-chitecture and a foundation for the future security needs for Kosovo.

1.1.8 The basis of this report is the Threat Analysis completed in Stage 2 of

The whole issue of security sector re-

form is at the heart of the work that NATO does, both for its own countries but also in association with others.

Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General,

Source: ITAR-TASS press agency,

Moscow: 9 December 2002

(http://www.nato.int/docu/

speech/2002/s021209c.htm)

2 A list of members of the ISC can be found at Annex III.

Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Stage 6 Stage 7 Stage 8

Environmental Review

Threat Analysis

Roles and CapabilitiesNeeded

Functional Analysis

Gap Analysis

Review of Proposed Sector Projects

BudgetAnalysis

SSR Strategies

Table 1: Stages of the ISSRSource: ISSR 2006

Introduction

4 the process, which incorporated an exami-nation of Kosovo’s security environment as summarised in Stage 1. All of the analysis for each stage of the process was complet-ed in coordination with a range of local experts from governmental and non-gov-ernmental institutions. These individuals, as well as members of the ISSR Steering Committee and Secretariat have created not only analysis of security issues facing Kosovo, but also recommendations for the way forward for Kosovo’s future security structures.

Section 1.2

Report Methodology

and Background

Background

1.2.1 This report consists of a discus-sion of the threats to security as per-ceived by the people of Kosovo and an analysis of existing PISG institutions that have an impact on or oversight regarding the perceived threats identified through the ISSR process. Kosovo is a United Na-tions protectorate established under the auspices of UN Security Council Resolu-tion 1244 (1999) following the end of hostilities in the territory.3 The PISG is an interim government structure outlined in UNMIK Regulation 2001/9 that was first formed after Kosovo parliamentary elec-tions held in November 2001.

1.2.2 Since that time the PISG has evolved as a governing institution – re-sulting in the majority of governance activities being undertaken by Kosovo’s elected officials. With this transfer of authorities from UNMIK international administration, and with the final status negotiations process underway, the ISSR

has undertaken a detailed review of Kos-ovo’s institutions in order to create a more sophisticated dialogue about current and future security needs and institutions, as well as to consider the bearing of govern-ance issues on security.

ISSR Conceptual Methodology

1.2.3 The ISSR process used two key concepts to form the underpinnings of this stage of the project. First, the per-ceived threat analysis completed in the first two stages of the programme pro-vided the platform for consultation across the PISG, public outreach, as well as for the functional analysis and recommenda-tions contained in this report.

1.2.4 The second was the Copenhagen Criteria4. Given the aspirations of Kosovo to be a part of the European community, ISSR utilised the Copenhagen Criteria as a necessary political benchmark for the development of Kosovo’s institutions, as well as background for formulation of security policy. This approach was rein-forced in July 2006 by statements made by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in a joint report with the Commissioner for EU Enlargement. This report notes in part that, “the EU has sent a clear message to Kosovo’s authorities that fulfilment of the UN standards is not only needed to pave the way for a status settlement, but also for the fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria in the longer term.”5

1.2.5 The objective of the ISSR report is to outline the findings of each stage of the process. Each stage has a bearing on the ultimate result of recommenda-tions for the future security structure and

A good state in-stitution is one

that transparently and ef-ficiently serves the needs of its clients – the citizens of the state.

Francis Fukuyama, State Build-

ing: Governance and World Or-

der in the 21st Century, 2004.

3 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) created the necessary conditions for a political settlement of the future status of Kosovo. Paragraph 11 of the Resolution outlines the general authority of UNMIK to create interim governing institutions by “organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including holding of elections.”

4 In June 1993, the Copenhagen European Council recognized the right of the countries of central and Eastern Europe to join the European Union when they have fulfilled three criteria. Firstly, political: stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for minorities; secondly, economic: a functioning market economy; thirdly, incorporation of the Community acquis: adherence to the various political, economic and monetary aims of the European Union. Europa Glossary (accessed on 19 June 2006) http://www.europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_en.htm5 EU Press Office, Information for Journalists Summary Note on the Joint Report on the future EU Role and Contribution in Kosovo, July 2006.

Introduction

5policy process for Kosovo.6 Stages 3 and 4 took the process to the next level through a detailed functional analysis of Kosovo’s Institutions as well as an extensive pub-lic consultation and outreach project to begin to expand public dialogue about security in Kosovo. Stages 5 and 6 iden-tified gaps or Institutional needs required to address threats to security as well as de-velopmental recommendations. Stage 7 reviewed budget requirements and Stage 8 provided overall strategies to address identified threats.

Methodology – Public Consultation and

Outreach

1.2.6 A core goal of the ISSR was to expand public awareness and dialogue regarding issues of security in Kosovo. In addition to the municipal meetings con-ducted in Stages 1 and 2 of the process, a public outreach strategy was developed to coincide with the ISSR process. The out-reach campaign included several phases:

1. Awareness Raising through consulta-tive town hall meetings and media tools such as TV and radio spots, bill-boards, press conferences and inter-views explaining the ISSR to citizens, with the aim of encouraging public participation in the public consulta-tion process.

2. Deepening Understanding and En-couraging Public Ownership of ISSR process and Security Issues through use of direct outreach tools such as publications and TV material explain-ing the process, a series of debates on public service television RTK and on local radio stations.

3. Collection of Public Input through a “Have Your Say” Bus travelling in urban and rural areas of Kosovo dis-tributing information material and taking direct comment from citizens, interviews with ISSR members on Ko-sovo radio and TV stations with a tel-ephone-in-option allowing the listen-ers to make their comments, distribu-tion of “suggestion boxes” in public

buildings across Kosovo and opening of an “ISSR hotline” allowing the pub-lic to express their opinions either via telephone or via email.

4. Verification of Initial Findings relating to threat analysis and soliciting pub-lic opinion regarding those threats in order to further ground the findings through consultative town hall meet-ings, public debates, discussions and opinion-editorials.

1.2.7 The goal of the public outreach strategy was to ensure that all of Kosovo’s communities were not only aware of, but had the opportunity to be engaged in the ISSR process. Furthermore, the public outreach campaign aimed to enhance the level of public dialogue about security and encourage transparency among Kosovo’s security institutions and policymaking process.

Methodology – Environmental and

Threat Analysis

1.2.8 While designing an analytical ap-proach to the security environment and threats for Kosovo, ISSR team benefited greatly from UNMIK’s and KFOR’s experi-ence in the security area over the last seven years. In this regard the Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan (KSIP) of 13 March 2004 constitutes a comprehensive ap-proach to addressing the main challenges faced by Kosovo on the road towards Final Status. The Standards for Kosovo docu-ment, as approved by the UN Security Council on 12 December 2003, had the objective to create:

“A Kosovo where all – regardless of ethnic background, race or religion – are free to live, work and travel without fear, hostility or danger and where there is tolerance, justice and peace for everyone.”

1.2.9 In terms of ISSR methodology the identified standards imply the main threats identified by UNMIK, as the pri-mary security policy actor in Kosovo since 1999. The ISSR team took into account all

6 The threat matrix compiled from the analysis completed in Stage 2 can be found at Annex VIII. The threat analysis was commissioned from the international NGO, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Kosovo-based NGO, Kosovo Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED).

We are so isolated here and all deci-

sions are taken by the peo-ple in Pristina. Politicians just don’t listen to the peo-ple. I think it is a really good thing that the bus came to our village to ask what we think about security. It has never happened before and I think people here appreci-ate the possibility of giving their opinions. I wrote a letter because I don’t want to be on television, who knows, maybe somebody important will read it and something will change?

Kosovo Albanian teacher, Gjilan/

Gnjilane area

Introduction

6 the challenges identified in the KSIP docu-ment and on that basis built a threat ma-trix (attached as Annex VIII). In addition, to ground-truth these findings a series of structured consultations with citizens were held.7 The results of these structured consultations and opinions gathered from the population at large was a grounded evaluation of identified threats on which the rest of the ISSR process could be built.

1.2.10 The first two stages of the ISSR process were completed in partnership with the Kosova Institute for Policy Re-search and Development (KIPRED) and The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). The two institutes completed extensive research and the threat analysis detailed above as well as drafting reports on their findings.8

1.2.11 The objective of these initial stag-es of the ISSR process was to identify key drivers that would likely shape Kosovo’s strategic environment in addition to iden-tifying specific threats. In order to further verify the findings of the DCAF and KIPRED studies, the OSCE organised 32 Municipal Consultations across Kosovo where ap-proximately 800 people participated in discussions regarding their views on what issues concerned them most in terms of Kosovo’s security. In addition, one hundred invited Kosovo experts took part in two Core Consultations in Prishtinë/Priština to further enhance the dialogue and discus-sion regarding threats and security needs. The ISSR team also approached specialists in a variety of areas including the KPC, gen-der-issues, non-governmental organisa-tions, and members of the Assembly. The findings of these consultations were then further correlated with data from a house-hold survey of 1200 people conducted by the Gani Bobi Institute at the University of Prishtinë/Priština and by Saferworld for the South Eastern European Small Arms Clearing House.

1.2.12 These activities helped not only to verify the data and the findings of the two research institutes, but also data gath-ered from the UNDP Early Warning Report-ing system, as well as KPS crime statistics. As described above, the resulting threat matrix was used as a foundation for later stages of research and analysis. The matrix is further illustrated in the diagram below:

Figure 1: Interrelationship between identified threats

Source: ISSR 2006

1.2.13 The above diagram demonstrates the interlocking nature of all the ISSR iden-tified threats. As the threat identification process was grounded in public consul-tation, this diagram illustrates the views of most citizens who place the current economic situation in Kosovo at the cen-tre of all threats. Most see other identified threats as linked in some way to poor eco-nomic conditions. This not only results in major fears based around job security, lack of job prospects, and generalised poverty, but also the indirect consequences such as increased crime and corruption. Further-more, as the threats are interlocking, the major priority for Kosovo post status will have to be to address the threats in a holis-tic way in order to diminish overall threats to Kosovo’s security.

7 OSCE’s Department of Democratisation and municipal teams built and executed the structure of public consultations process at the municipal level.

8 To review copies of the DCAF and KIPRED reports please visit www.ks.undp.org/issr

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Introduction

7Methodology – Functional, Capabilities,

Gap, and Developmental Needs Analysis

1.2.14 The analysis regarding function, capabilities, gaps, and developmental needs of Kosovo’s Institutions contained in this report is drawn from review of the data gathered through the threat and en-vironmental analysis completed in the first two stages of the project and extensive in-terviews and research conducted by teams of international and local ISSR research experts working at the ISSR Secretariat.9 Recognising that good governance is an essential element to a stable and demo-cratically-controlled security sector, dur-ing these stages of the process identified threats were directly assessed against the capacity of Kosovo’s institutions.

1.2.15 To complete the analysis, in refer-ence to the identified threats, the research team began work on evaluating Kosovo’s security institutions. Research teams iden-tified relevant institutions across Kosovo at the local, regional, and territory-wide levels to be targeted for interviews and more de-tailed investigation. The ISSR researchers constructed a list of common themes and questions to serve as a basis for all inter-views and data collection. The research teams also conducted an extensive securi-ty document review that included Kosovo and International institutional reports and official documents.10

1.2.16 Overall the ISSR team completed more than seventy interviews with a vari-ety of regional, local, and Kosovo-wide of-ficials both national and international. The teams also visited more than twenty insti-tutions across Kosovo. The structure used in the institutional review was constructed from UNDP and World Bank methodolo-

gies for institutional analysis in the gov-ernance sector. A list of individuals inter-viewed and institutions visited is included at ANNEX VII. Upon completion of draft institutional reports, the ISSR team requested direct review and comment from the individual PISG institutions and those comments were incorporated in the final institutional analysis contained in chapters 4 and 5 of this report.

1.2.17 The ISSR Gap Analysis is based on OECD’s “DAC Development Partner-ship Forum: Managing for Development Results and Aid Effectiveness” of Decem-ber 2002.11 The rationale behind this ap-proach is that the Internal Security Sector Review took place in the context of and bore the characteristics of a development programme rather than a traditional secu-rity one. In addition, the implementation phase projects included in the report flow from the current gap analysis of the PISG, which uses as a premise the perceived threats and the institutional analysis com-pleted during stages one thorough four of the process.

1.2.18 Finally, an Interim Report was produced based on the first four stages of the ISSR process and initial Institutional investigation. This interim report was re-viewed by the ISSR Steering Committee12

and comments solicited. This final report is the result of the investigation, research, and analysis of the ISSR team of all avail-able data plus a consolidation of com-ments from Steering Committee members arising from the Interim Report. Readers should note that the analysis and recom-mendations published in this report were subject to final review by the ISSR Steering Committee.

9 Kosovo experts working on the team were grounded in experience working with the PISG ministries as well as other organizations concerned with security issues. International experts also brought a wealth of governmental, non-governmental, academic and security organization experience. Biographical material on ISSR staff is available at www.issrkosovo.org

10 A bibliography of materials directly relevant to this report can be found at Annex I.

Security to me means simply be-

ing free – everybody should be free to go to work, or to school. No parent in Kosovo should ever be afraid that something could happen to their kids until they final-ly make it home from school.

Albanian woman,

Prishtinë/Priština

11 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development “DAC Development Partnership Forum: Managing for Development Results and Aid Effectiveness Room Document 3: Guidelines for the use of indicators in country performance assessment” 11 – 12 December 2002.12 A list of members of the ISSR Steering Committee can be found at Annex III.

Introduction

8 Section 1.3: Security Situation

Overview - Kosovo’s Security

Environment

1.3.1 Kosovo has been administered as a United Nations protectorate since the end of hostilities in the spring of 1999 and the adoption of United Nations Security Coun-cil Resolution 1244. The first elections for Kosovo’s Assembly were held in November 2001 at which time the process of handing over governing authorities from United Na-tions officials to locally elected authorities began.

1.3.2 At the time of the ISSR, Kosovo re-mained a UN protectorate, but governance authorities were administered by the peo-ple of Kosovo through the Provisional Insti-tutions of Self Government (PISG). Howev-er, under the provisions of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Constitutional Framework (UNMIK Regulation 2001/9), the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) reserved a number of key govern-ing authorities, including final approval of new laws and regulations or changes to existing ones, financial authorities, control over security policy, control of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), appointment of the judiciary, foreign relations, and regulation of the privatization of public properties.13

1.3.3 As power has been transferred to local authorities, the (UNMIK) has set up a system of Standards – the Kosovo Stand-ards Implementation Plan (KSIP) - which are benchmarks of development and achieve-ment that Kosovo’s governing institutions are striving to meet and are designed to conform to accepted European standards.14 Progress related to the Standards has also been accepted as a basis for the final status negotiation process led by United Nations Special Envoy, former President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari.

1.3.4 Overall, the security situation in Kosovo has improved significantly since

1999. However, the security environment has also become more complex as the situ-ation internally and externally has changed. Today those complexities are more internal than external and focus mainly on long-term development issues such as economic insecurity, however, external issues remain, and improvement of Kosovo’s relationship with its neighbours will be important to its long-term security environment.

Internal Security Situation

1.3.5 Kosovo has remained in a post-conflict, transitional phase of develop-ment since becoming a UN protectorate in 1999. This transitional status has meant stunted development for Kosovo socially, politically, and economically. Although it is recognised that many of the challenges faced by Kosovo will take time to over-come, the transitional nature of Kosovo in terms of political, economic, and social is-sues has created a number of complexities in the security environment.

Political Aspects

1.3.6 Kosovo’s democratic political de-velopment is in an early stage. Kosovo’s political nature can be defined by regional alliances and fragmentation and is rooted in a winner-take all mentality. This foun-dation is further reinforced by the overlay of a post-communist system and a post-conflict society. The resulting political at-mosphere is one of extreme competition whereby the winners hold not only all the power, but also the financial resources of the state. This atmosphere also results in a decision making authority which is focused on self-preservation rather than planning and preparation for long term needs of the state. The situation also has resulted in a weak civil service, with little interest in investing in a longer term cadre of professional technocrats able to weath-er the storms of political competition.

13 The SRSG’s reserved power provisions can be found in section 8 of UNMIK Regulation 2001/9 at http://www.unmikonline.org/constframework.htm#8 .

14 There are 8 standards of implementation including: functioning democratic institutions, rule of law, freedom of movement, sustainable returns and rights of minorities, economic development, property rights, dialogue between PISG and Belgrade authorities, and KPC. More information regarding the Standards is available at http://www.unmikonline.org/standards/priorities.htm.

Security for me means to have a

reason to remain in Koso-vo. I don’t feel safe and I am not the only one who feels this way in Kosovo. We all know that the reasons for that is the interethnic violence, unemployment, education, health services and many more.

Serb Young Male,

Shillovë/Šilovo

Introduction

91.3.7 Research conducted in support of this report concluded that the weakness of the political system lay not only in the nature of competition but also on the elec-toral system that, “fails to provide a true link between elected representative and

their constituents. Instead, it puts (a) pre-mium on party loyalty.”15 Furthermore, the relative weakness of Kosovo’s Parliamen-tary Assembly to fulfil its oversight role and the lack of effective government coordina-tion within the structures of UNMIK and PISG further contribute to weak governing structures. These issues are further exam-ined in the institutional analysis and gap analysis sections of this report.

1.3.8 The extensive public consulta-tions, public outreach activities, and re-search conducted by ISSR showed a grow-ing lack of trust in the governing institu-tions of Kosovo – both national and inter-national. This lack of trust is based in part on the government’s poor record of service provision in the areas of energy, health, education, and social welfare. In addition, a severe lack of trust in the judiciary and a

perception of a weak rule of law contribute heavily to public disillusionment. Given this lack of trust, the team was able to con-clude that the legitimacy of these Institu-tions may be at risk from threats that might otherwise be considered insignificant.

1.3.9 OSCE-organised public meetings held in support of the ISSR process further validated these ideas.16 Participants in these forums expressed a general lack of respect for government institutions, uni-versal dissatisfaction with UNMIK authori-ties, as well as disappointment and disdain for the weakness of PISG structures. Lack of accountability of governing officials, national and international, is a common theme in Kosovo. OSCE forums regularly brought out the clear public belief that the closed-list electoral system was largely to blame for the lack of accountability of Kosovo’s elected officials, as the system ensures candidates are not required to answer directly to the electorate for their positions.

1.3.10 Kosovo’s political environment also makes it difficult to address signifi-

15 KIPRED, ISSR Stage 1 and 2, Executive Summary, Pristina, March 2006.

20

40

60

80

100

Nov-02 Mar-03 Jul-03 Nov-03 Mar-04 Jul-04 Nov-04 Mar-05 Jun-05 Sep-05 Dec-05 Jun-06

Time

UNMIK SRSG PISG Assembly KFOR KPS

Figure 2: Satisfaction with Political InstitutionsSource: UNDP Kosovo 2006

16 A list of questions used in the OSCE meetings can be found at Annex X.

Introduction

10

cant concerns such as minority rights and participation. As at the time of the ISSR, the Serbs had largely refused to partici-pate in the interim governing authorities, although many have been elected or ap-pointed to positions at the local, regional, and territory-wide level.17 Other minor-ity groups have chosen to participate in positions to which they have either been elected or appointed. The difficulty of ad-dressing minority issues, particularly Ser-bian-based issues, effectively in Kosovo’s politically charged atmosphere makes it hard to understand how these issues will move forward in any significant way with-out continued international intervention and support.

Economic Aspects

1.3.11 Kosovo’s economy has recovered exceedingly slowly since 1999. Although the reconstruction effort and the large in-ternational community presence in the ter-ritory have helped spark economic activ-ity, badly needed investment in industrial

capacity has not materialized and privati-zation of public assets has been slow. Cur-rently unemployment rates is estimated at 54.3%.18

1.3.12 According to ISSR research, the future prospects for the poverty level in Kosovo are not good. UNDP data show that approximately 12% of the popula-tion lives in “extreme poverty,” or poverty conditions considered as long term and structural.19 Population growth in Kosovo among all resident groups has expanded since 1999 and is predicted to continue to grow. Data from the Statistical Office of Kosovo show that the highest number of unemployed people is between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five.

1.3.13 Kosovo’s budget is currently high-ly reliant on border fees and taxes, illustrat-ing the unhealthy nature of the economy and the government’s tax base. The break-down of fees collected at the border in 2006 is illustrated below:

17 Serb representatives left positions in the Kosovo Assembly after the March 2004 riots. 18 Figure courtesy of the Statistical Office of Kosovo.

0

20

40

60

80

100

15-2420032004

25-54

male

per

cen

t

female all

55-64 15-24 25-54 55-64 15-24 25-54 55-64

Figure 3: Unemployment rates by sex and age groups, 2003-2004Source: Statistical Office of Kosovo

There are some things that

can influence security – for example, if the living standard is good and people do well financially, then security would be better. I am convinced that poverty and bad financial situation can have a dramatic impact on security

Kosovo Albanian Respondent,

ISSR Public Outreach Campaign

Customs fees 1st quarter of 2006 Structure

VAT Import 28.93 million Euros 34.3%

Excise 20.70 24.5%

Customs’ duties 21.82 25.8%

Other 1.48 1.7%

Unspecified entries 11.51 13.6%

Entries from border fees 84.43 million Euros 100%

Table 2: Kosovo Border Fees 2006Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy, 2006

19 UNDP HDR Kosovo 2002, p. 28.

Introduction

111.3.14 Looking at the overall govern-ment revenue base, out of the total€ 115.1 million collected, border fees con-stituted more than 73% of the total.

1.3.15 Furthermore, Kosovo’s depend-ence on foreign donors, not only to finance reconstruction, but also to support employ-ment is problematic. The level of donor support has been steadily declining since 1999. However, based on 2004 figures, Kosovo remains the highest recipient of donor aid per capita in the region:

1.3.16 The World Bank estimates that donors committed approximately € 1.25 billion to Kosovo during the period 1999-2004. However, as of 2000, approximately€ 1 billion had already been committed and,

since that initial period of reconstruction, donor funds have fallen nearly 73 per-cent.20 The breakdown of donor commit-ments is illustrated in the table below:

1.3.17 Although donor support will likely level off over time, donor presence will inev-itably decrease as final status is determined. Given the high levels of unemployment and poverty present in Kosovo, the economic vacuum created will likely be filled by illegal activity via organised crime already present in Kosovo and across the region.

1.3.18 Another aspect to economic security in Kosovo is the weak system of public utilities, particularly electricity generation and distribution. This aspect is also closely linked to the perception of

20 Ibid.21 Figures on Kosovo are extrapolated from data provided by the World Bank, World Bank, International Development Association Interim Strategy Note for Kosovo for the period FY06-FY07, March 30, 2006. Per capita figure is based on the Statistical Office of Kosovo’s population figure of 1.9 million, however this is a rough estimate given no official census has been completed for Kosovo.

Entries from Tax Administration 1st quarter 2006 Structure

Income tax (on wages) 4.88 million Euros 15.9%

Tax on profit 0.92 3%

Basic tax (“pre-judged”) 0.69 2.3%

Tax on profit (interest, rent, dividends, lottery)

0.76 2.5%

Tax on small individual business 1.88 6.1%

Tax on large individual business 1.23 4%

Tax on leased property 0.1 0.3%

Tax on small corporations 0.04 0.1%

Tax on big corporations 5.94 19.4%

Local VAT 6.87 22.4%

Unspecified local tax 7.38 24.1%

Income from local tax 30.67 million Euros 100%

Table 3: Kosovo Government Revenue Breakdown 2006Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy, 2006

Country Official development

assistance and official aid

(current US$) (millions)

Aid per capita

Albania 362 116

Bosnia and Herzegovina 671 172

Croatia 121 27

Macedonia 248 122

Kosovo21 732 385

Table 4: Development Assistance - Regional Breakdown Source: World Bank 2004

Introduction

12

the government’s inability to provide ad-equate services and build trust with its citizens. Despite huge donor support for Kosovo’s utilities, electricity remains un-reliable across the territory. According to available data, over € 700 million in donor funds has been provided to the energy sector in Kosovo via the Kosovo Energy

Company (KEK). Unfortunately, this effort has not produced lasting results, as the relative reliability of the service has only minimally improved. As of 2005, Kosovo’s average electricity outage was 4 hours per day, versus 6 hours in 2006.21Unreliable electrical supply is not only a social incon-venience, but also an economic deterrent. The World Bank estimates that businesses lose an average of 5 percent of sales due to electricity challenges.22 Furthermore, without reliable electrical generation and distribution, Kosovo cannot demonstrate the kind of stable governance systems re-quired to support investment and guaran-tee return on that investment.

Social Aspects

1.3.19 Socially Kosovo remains a tradi-tional society – leading to some social, developmental problems such as educa-tion of women, particularly in rural areas, and a small percentage of women actively involved in the economy.23 In general, il-

21 Figures on Kosovo are extrapolated from data provided by the World Bank, World Bank, International Development Association Interim Strategy Note for Kosovo for the period FY06-FY07, March 30, 2006. Per capita figure is based on the Statistical Office of Kosovo’s population figure of 1.9 million, however this is a rough estimate given no official census has been completed for Kosovo.

22 Data in this statement and others in this paragraph are from The World Bank, International Development Association Interim Strategy Note for Kosovo for the period FY06-FY07, March 2006.

23 According to UNDP Kosovo’s Human Development Report 2002, the percentage of women active in Kosovo’s economy is approximately 30.1% rather than 69.9% among men. UNDP attributes this difference largely to the small number of women involved in the workforce. It should be noted, however, women are a high percentage of persons employed in professional positions.

Social welfare3%

Police serviceand justice

5%Transport andInfrastructure

6%

Education andheath

9%

Democraticgovernance

and civilsociely

5%

Economyemployment

trade andindustry

13%

Housing16%

Public utilities26%

Other13%

Agriculture4%

Source: World Bank, International Development Asso-ciation Interim Strategy Note for Kosovo FY06-FY07

Figure 4. Donor disbursements fot 1999-2004 by sector

Table 5: Data on import and export of energy 2000-2005Source: KEK Official Exchange with ISSR 2006

Kind of

energy

2000 2001 2002

ImportMWh

ExportMWh

ImportMWh

ExportMWh

ImportMWh

ExportMWh

Exchange -3890 1440 -96610 236190 -140920 564015

Emergency 0 0 0 0 -2000 0

Contracts -778870 0 -921485 0 -627265 0

Total -782760 1440 -1018095 236190 -770185 564015

2003 2004 2005

ImportMWh

ExportMWh

ImportMWh

ExportMWh

ImportMWh

ExportMWh

-261265 277635 -152172 194665 -141297 185275

-61216 0 -160215 0 -160035 0

-314794 0 -338253 0 -189300 40690

-637275 277635 -650640 194665 -490632 225965

Kind of

energy

Exchange

Emergency

Contracts

Total

Introduction

13literacy in Kosovo is among the highest in Europe, and many experts believe this low level of education desperately impacts the potential for economic development.

1.3.20 In addition, although Kosovo’s primary population is Albanian in culture and language, it also hosts a variety of mi-nority cultures each of which speaks their own language and follows their own tradi-tions.24 The lack of integration of minority and majority communities into a common “Kosovo” identity has been problematic on a number of fronts including full inclusion of minorities in educational, social serv-ices, and economic activities. Most promi-nent among the minorities are the Serbs, who are completely non-integrated into Kosovo’s society and live independently in enclaves or in municipalities north of the River Ibër/Ibar.25 Serbs who participated in ISSR public outreach activities indicated that their isolated state is mainly due to freedom of movement concerns – which contribute to a general feeling of insecurity in their communities. Finally, although op-portunities for political participation have been provided to the Serbian community, Belgrade has continually called for and di-rected disengagement of Kosovo’s Serbs in PISG and international institutions.26

1.3.21 Internal conflicts between Ko-sovo’s Serbian minority and Albanian ma-

jority populations have flared into periodic violence since the formal end of hostilities in 1999. Directly following the end of the war, population movements were evident among Serbs and other minorities, both forced and unforced, particularly from ma-jor urban areas. The movement of popula-tions also included a number of Albanians who were displaced from municipalities north of the River Ibër/Ibar and particular-ly from the north side of Mitrovicë/Mitro-vica city. In addition, the constant stream of returning Albanians, some returning after years of absence, was significant in the period immediately following the war, putting strains on services and newly ap-pointed international officials across the territory. As a result, law and order took some time to establish in this early post-conflict period.

1.3.22 Since the initial period following the conflict, smaller-scale violent incidents, including bombings of Orthodox religious sites, ethnically-motivated killings, and rioting have occurred throughout the seven year period of international ad-ministration of Kosovo. The most serious and widespread inter-ethnic violence oc-curred in March 2004 when territory-wide rioting and lawlessness led to destruction of minority (mostly Serb) property and displacement of people. The riots were sparked by singular incidents of violence

24 Kosovo’s diverse ethnic communities include Serbs, Roma, Bosniaks, Turks, Gorani, and Croat.25 Serbs living in some enclaves south of the River Ibër/Ibar have become less isolated since the March 2004 riots and in some areas of Kosovo travel outside enclaves freely. However, Serb parallell institutions and resistance to integration with PISG and UNMIK structures is supported by Belgrade and remains part of daily life for Serbs across Kosovo.

26 For example, according to OSCE Mission in Kosovo report to the Permanent Council, June 2006, in April 2006 the Coordination Centre for Kosovo directed that Kosovo Serbs forgo PISG salaries or risk loosing Belgrade-sponsored funds.

0

10

20

30

40

50

illit

erac

y

60

70

80

1953 1961 1971 1981 1991 20001948

total

male

female

Figure 5: Illiteracy Rates in Kosovo 1948-2000Courtesy of UNDP Human Development Report 2002

Introduction

14 against Serbs and Albanians from which rumour and revenge-incited anger boiled over into violence directed by Albanians against minority communities. According to a Human Rights Watch report approxi-mately 550 homes and 27 Orthodox-reli-gious buildings were destroyed. In addi-tion, an estimated 4,100 people were dis-placed from minority enclaves.27

1.3.23 Despite the ethnic nature of the 2004 violence, it should be noted that riot-ing also turned against international insti-tutions – demonstrating building frustra-tion with the lack of political progress and generally with international community in Kosovo. It should be noted that the 2004 riots show not only the insecure nature of minority relations in Kosovo, but also how internal violence could quickly spread and turn against governing authorities. What-ever the spark of an internal threat may be, the ineffective response of both local and international officials in 2004 demon-strated a clear need for improvement in the ability to respond not only quickly, but with clarity and determination to restore rule of law and order.

External Security Environment

1.3.24 Despite the relative calm of recent years, Kosovo remains in a volatile neigh-bourhood of countries transitioning to de-mocracy and regional threats to rule of law such as organised crime. Although some experts would argue that the threat of re-gional conflict is now low, there remains a need to be concerned about the delicate nature of relationships between countries in the region.28

1.3.25 Kosovo was always somewhat less integrated into the Former Yugoslav system than other parts. Although Ko-sovo was a part of the Former Yugoslavia, the nature of the conflict in the territory is different from conflicts in other parts of the region due to the clear separations of language and culture between Albanians and Serbs. Located at a geographic and

historical cross-road, Kosovo hosts a rich heritage of language, culture, and religion, which due to the majority presence of Albanians is unique to other parts of the Former Yugoslavia. This distinct nature of-ten resulted in special attention and treat-ment of the territory by authorities in Bel-grade due to a concern over linkages with Albanians across state boundaries.

1.3.26 Thus the nature of conflict in Ko-sovo cannot be explained in simple terms of religion or inflated differences in cul-tural heritage carried on the shoulders of nationalists – as some experts might characterize other conflicts in the region. Instead, the conflict is more rooted in the national identity of Kosovo’s Albanians. In addition, regional concerns about Alba-nian nationalism and national borders cre-ate a focus among neighbouring states on maintenance of current borders, among other issues.

1.3.27 These concerns continue today, not only with Serbia, but also with Mace-donia, a country that grapples with its own internal conflicts over Albanian identity as well as memories of confronting suspect-ed insurgents from Kosovo in 2000-2001. Furthermore, Serbia’s particularly complex relationship with Kosovo is not only root-ed in differences over national identity, but also in cultural and religious aspects, which take on an emotional and political nature, making it inherently difficult to ap-proach.

1.3.28 In the event independence be-comes a reality, Kosovo’s relationship with its neighbours will be complicated and likely will require international monitoring - if not diplomatic mediation. Being land-locked, Kosovo depends on its neighbours for passage of goods and people. As an example of the problems of inter-border relationships, closure of the border be-tween Macedonia and Kosovo in 1999 caused international concern as thou-sands of Kosovo refugees were stranded in a no-man’s land between the two borders

Violence in Kosovo is spasmodic sec-

tarian violence. It is on a lesser scale than Northern Ireland today where we have a peace pro-cess.

Dr. Theresa Callan, author ofManaging Conflict in the New

Europe. 28 September 2006

27 Human Rights Watch, “Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004.” Available at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/.

28 Research completed in support of the ISSR project by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forced (DCAF) makes some credible arguments that the military threats in the region have significantly decreased since 2000.

Introduction

15for days with little access to humanitarian assistance. Overall, the limitations of the travel routes and difficult border relations at key crossing points will impact Kosovo’s economic development.

1.3.29 Although some argue that over time better access across the border be-tween Albania and Kosovo might allevi-ate some border dependence problems for Kosovo, this solution has not come to reality in the seven years of international administration - and given the terrain in-volved - will likely continue to be a long-term possibility. Stronger relations with a newly independent Montenegro will also likely benefit both Kosovo and Montene-gro, although that travel route also has its limitations.

1.3.30 However, normalisation of rela-tions with Kosovo’s neighbours stretches beyond these obvious issues. Currently Kosovo is also highly dependent on impor-tation of energy from its neighbours. Fur-thermore, shared public resources in areas like Mitrovicë/Mitrovica city could become difficult in the event of continued tension with Serbia, as resources such as water or electricity could be cut off from one side or the other.

Figure 6: Sources of Electricity Import to Kosovo 2000-2005

Source: Data Provided by KEK on request by ISSR 2006

1.3.31 The likelihood of military con-flict across borders is low given the larger concerns of nations about issues such as European Union membership and their own internal challenges, but that does not preclude nationalist insurgent activi-ties or small scale interventions. Certainly

threats against Serbs in northern Kosovo would likely provoke some form of armed response from Serbia in the event no inter-national troops were present in the area. Similarly, activity such as wide scale Alba-nian attempts to reclaim their property in north Mitrovicë/Mitrovica city might be considered by Serbia as a threat. Short of a long-term settlement between Serbia and Kosovo coupled with a long period of peaceful co-existence, some international military presence in northern Kosovo will likely be required.

1.3.32 The threat of the growth of terror-ism in Kosovo is currently low. Kosovo is a relatively open society, far from the failed state scenario that allows the growth of terrorist influence. Studies commissioned by ISSR during Stages I and II from KIPRED indicated that a “failed state” scenario in Kosovo is possible. The ISSR team took into account this view, but determined that such a statement is difficult to analyse at this time given Kosovo’s unique status, the presence of NATO forces, and wide-scale international efforts towards capac-ity building for governance institutions. Kosovo is also a generally religiously tol-erant society; however, given the largely rural and traditional nature of Kosovo, the threat exists that if the economic situation worsens extreme Islamist factions may penetrate these more closed, traditional communities.

1.3.33 More important to external secu-rity concerns for Kosovo are inter-regional threats such as organised crime, trafficking in persons, human smuggling, internation-al terrorism, and weapons smuggling.29 If Kosovo is unable to establish working relationships with its neighbours it will become a weak link in any regional coop-erative effort to combat these common threats. The ability of international secu-rity structures to include Kosovo in region-al and European training, exercises, and activities designed to fight these threats will provide opportunities to strengthen regional relationships and deter overall external insecurity.

0

20

40

60

80

100

OtherAlbaniaSerbiaSwitzerlandMontenegroBulgaria

29 More detailed information regarding these threats can be found in the ISSR threat assessment, Chapter 3 of this report.

Map of Kosovo

CHAPTER II

Public Perceptions of Security


18

2.1 Solicitation of public opinion and increasing the public dialogue regarding security was an overall goal of the ISSR process. To achieve this goal, the ISSR team engaged in a number of activities in-cluding:

Public opinion surveys completed by approximately 800 homes.Comment boxes located in every municipality building, or in cultural centres in areas inhabited by minority groups.Recorded commentaries from citizens gathered by the “Have Your Say” Bus.Emails sent directly to ISSR address.Phone calls made to ISSR call line.Questionnaires completed by indi-vidual citizens.30

Public debates among Kosovo’s key security figures regarding issues out-lined in the ISSR report.Public meetings facilitated by OSCE across all 30 of Kosovo’s municipali-ties and in 2 of Kosovo’s “Pilot” munici-palities.31

2.2 Kosovo’s ISSR process is the first security sector review undertaken in a post-conflict situation that has included such an extensive public outreach and public participation. Previous security re-view processes in countries such as Sierra Leone have been limited in their incorpo-ration of public consultations. In Kosovo public engagement has been a major ele-ment throughout the ISSR process.

2.3 Public meetings were organised on behalf of ISSR by the OSCE Democrati-sation Department and facilitated by OSCE municipal teams in each municipality. This local engagement was divided into two phases. The first phase involved organisa-

tion of public meetings whereby citizens were asked to comment directly on threats identified in Stage 2 of the ISSR process through studies completed by KIPRED and DCAF. The second phase involved return-ing to the communities to follow up on some of the issues raised in the first meet-ing and to delve more deeply into those concerns.

2.4 ISSR also organised its own methods of engaging the public through the “Have Your Say” campaign. Through the campaign the public was invited to write comments and drop them in a com-ment box located in each municipality, call a comment hotline, fill out an ISSR ques-tionnaire, respond via the ISSR website, or record comments via the “Have Your Say” bus which visited the majority of munici-palities in Kosovo. ISSR outreach activities, both self-directed and those promoted by OSCE, included members of all communi-ties of Kosovo and touched all areas of Ko-sovo.

Section 2.1:

Overall Public Opinion Findings

2.1.1 Through the course of Kosovo’s ISSR public discussion, opinion has focused on a number of threats identified in Stage 2 of the process. However, the main focus of citizen comments has been on three of the identified security issues or threats:

1. Economic Security2. Weak Rule of Law or Lawlessness/Lack

of Judicial Recourse3. Political Instability

2.1.2 Of these primary security con-cerns, the most important cluster revolved around the economic situation in Kosovo. This not only resulted in major fears re-

CHAPTER II Public Perceptions of Security and Security Issues

The ISSR bus has been a resound-

ing success and has given an opportunity for many different communities to have their voices heard for the first time.

Maria-Therese Keating, Pro-

gramme Portfolio Manager for

Returns, UNDP Kosovo

30 A copy of the ISSR bus questionaire can be found at Annex IV.31 In 2004 UNMIK began the process of exploring alternative local governance solutions. A working group on the subject was formed and resulted in the establishment of 5 “pilot” municipalities with devolved powers of governance from their constituent municipality. Of the 5 “pilot” municipalties, only 3 were actually established and continue to function: Junik/Junik, Hani i Elezit/Deneral Jankovic, Mamushe/Mamusa.


19garding job security, lack of job prospects, and growing poverty, but also the percep-tion that the consequences of this situa-tion were increased crime and corruption. However, this increase in crime and cor-ruption was often viewed by citizens as a way of adopting survival strategies in re-sponse to dire economic threats.

2.1.3 Economic security seemed to weave its way through each of the other recognised high-risk threats. Unemploy-ment and lack of economic activity was seen as a threat by all communities, and most felt that it fed other issues such as organised crime and even localised issues like environmental degradation through actions such as illegal woodcutting and indiscriminate dumping of rubbish.

2.1.4 The weak rule of law was seen to be a serious issue that was further im-pacted by the poor economy. The inability of the state to provide for the basic needs of the population was viewed as an essen-tial contributor to the lack of respect for the rule of law. Many people expressed a belief that the chance of achieving justice through the judicial process in Kosovo is very low regardless of ethnicity.32 There were clear perceptions that those with a higher social or economic status are effec-tively free to act at will. A widespread fear of corruption and political interference in the criminal justice process, and with Kosovo’s governmental institutions more generally, was frequently expressed. Ad-ditionally, there was a perception that the security institutions cannot guarantee the protection of any person wishing to ad-dress these problems, whether through an effective witness protection programme, or on the level of protecting local officials carrying out basic functions such as en-forcing building regulations.

2.1.5 More importantly there was the significant drop generally in public trust in Kosovo institutions – and specifically in

the judiciary. The ISSR found general sat-isfaction with the level of police develop-ment – although corruption of the police is viewed as a possible threat.33 The OSCE outreach programme, held on behalf of the ISSR, further concluded that the electoral process is viewed as a major contributor to the problem of weak institutions. Accord-ing to OSCE’s Democratisation Depart-ment, “repeated criticism of the closed list electoral system was made as participants felt this made their elected representatives unaccountable and encouraged laziness and ineffectualness.”34

Figure 7: The chart represents the number of times in ISSR questionnaires an in-stitution was graded with the lowest grade of 1 (respondents were asked to grade three institutions from 1-5). According to this “straw poll” judici-ary scores lowest on the list with a total of 217 extremely negative opin-ions (grade 1).

Source: ISSR Questionnaires 2006 collected by ISSR bus, audience participation in debates, and online.

2.1.6 The issue of political instabil-ity encompasses different issues for differ-ent communities in Kosovo. The issue of violence against minorities is most often raised in the context of the March 2004 ri-ots. According to research completed for this report, minority communities fear a repeat of the violence against their com-

32 Minority community members, particularly Serbs, express concerns regarding personal security and freedom of movement issues that affect their ability to access courts. In addition, many note that the record of courts to address crimes against their communities since 1999 has not instilled confidence that the system will actively pursue cases that directly impact their communities.33 ISSR research and public outreach found that the Serbian community is distrustful of KPS as a multi-ethnic force. The community has pushed for monoethnic policing, meaning that Serbian KPS serve Serbian communities.

34 OSCE Democratisation Department Summary Report of Findings from first stage of ISSR public outreach.

Judiciary, 217

MunicipalAssembly, 82

Assembly, 104UNMIK, 133

KPC, 93

KPS, 147

AssemblyMunicipal AssemblyJudiciary

KPSKPCUNMIK

I think people don’t report

crimes because they don’t trust the police. But on the other hand, how can po-lice investigate the crimes they don’t know about?

Albanian young man, Podujevë/

Podujevo


20 munities seen during these riots. Further-more, the presence of KFOR is viewed by minority communities as essential to their security. In contrast, the concerns of the Kosovo Albanian population centred more on internal discord within their commu-nity. Albanians expressed fears that divi-sions between the major political parties, especially related to the existence of paral-lel intelligence structures within the main political parties, could result in internal se-curity problems if rival groups take politi-cal discord into physical action.35

2.1.7 It should be noted that during the course of the public outreach campaign and as the final status talks drew closer to conclusion, researchers found that Serbian communities became increasingly pes-simistic regarding their future and their community’s security in Kosovo. It is rec-ommended that following the resolution of final status, the issue of public attitudes regarding security is revisited, particularly in the Serbian community.

2.1.8 Overall public outreach efforts found that blame for the lack of develop-ment of all governing institutions was placed squarely on the international com-munity. That said, as the final status process moves forward and international institu-tions fade in influence, issues of dissatisfac-tion with governing institutions will have to be dealt with directly by local officials with-out the benefit of having the international community as a target for blame.

Section 2.2:

Lower Level Threats and Common

Themes Among Communities

Lower Level Threats

2.2.1 Some issues that were not raised as frequently by Kosovo’s citizens, but are of concern to them include:

Violence against women (including domestic violence and rape) Organised CrimeThreats to the environmentTrafficking of personsInadequate public services (particu-larly health, education, social welfare)

2.2.2 Organised crime is a recognised threat, but in comparison to other issues – such as economy - many people feel it un-necessary to voice this publicly as a major threat to their own security.36 Trafficking in persons falls into a similar category.37

2.2.3 External threats figure less sig-nificantly than internal threats for most of those citizens surveyed by the ISSR team. The threat of terrorism is predicted as a longer term threat linked directly to a declining economy - as poor economic conditions are believed to be the path on which radical Islamic groups might begin to make inroads in Kosovo, particularly in rural areas.

2.2.4 ISSR public consultation and sur-veys found that most people believe that the presence of KFOR/NATO troops leaves the threat of external aggression as a very low priority. Most people believe interna-tional military presence will continue long beyond any change of status and thus they do not believe aggression from any neighbour is possible. Similarly, minority communities, particularly Serbs, see KFOR presence as necessary to maintain any form of security for their communities and therefore cannot imagine Kosovo without international military presence.

2.2.5 Other issues raised included the unreliability of electricity supplies and distribution, which combined with inad-equate education and health provision, results in a loss of public confidence in both UNMIK and PISG. Unreliable elec-tricity supply was also seen as a threat to

35 The issue of political assassination has been controversial and is not well documented in Kosovo. The most known case of a politically motivated murder is the case of Xhemajl Mustafa, a longtime aide of Ibrahim Rugova who was killed in November 2000. 36 ISSR questionaires collected from the public indicated that Serb and Albanian respondents rank organised crime lower than other threats. 11% of Serbs felt organised crime was a top threat whereas 7% of Albanians ranked it among the top threats.37 Trafficking is also considered largely as a problem brought with the international community and a resultant increase in the sex trade in the territory.

I believe that with-out security no

country can make prog-ress. Nobody will invest in Kosovo for as long as peo-ple think this place is run by criminal gangs.

Turkish young man,

Prizren/Prizren


21economic growth and security. Health issues were raised in the context of failed governing institutions not having the ca-pacity to cope with epidemics. Education is also linked to economic security and in-stitutional development issues. According to OSCE findings, “high expectations for education results in disillusionment when people fail either to get to university or find employment.”

The Most Common Security Themes

among Kosovo’s Communities

2.2.6 Given the multi-ethnic composi-tion of the public engagement process, it is interesting to note the issues that were common to all communities. There was universal disappointment with UNMIK and the international community’s engage-ment in Kosovo generally. All citizens of Kosovo seemed to hold disdain for UNMIK, which was viewed to not only have failed in its mandate but also to have actually held back Kosovo’s post-war development.38 The one exception to this negative reac-tion was KFOR, which all communities rec-ognise as the present foundation of peace and security in Kosovo. All communities clearly assume that KFOR presence will be continued in Kosovo for the foreseeable future, regardless of the outcome of the final status process. According to OSCE findings, “the clear assumption (is) that there needs to be an international military presence in Kosovo for the foreseeable fu-ture.”39

2.2.7 Somewhat surprising was the wide level of acceptance of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), which most commu-nities felt had improved significantly over time. That said, OSCE’s engagement with Serb communities found some split opin-ions. Whereas some Serbs felt that, the KPS was performing well, many believed that KPS did not adequately serve the needs of their community and were quite reluctant to have multi-ethnic police representation.

That said, displaced Serbs returning to visit their enclaves expressed positive views re-garding KPS’s professionalism in escorting their convoys – despite underlying issues of trust with KPS. Overall, all communities expressed concern regarding a “creeping politicisation” of the police and the high potential for corruption.

Section 2.3: Freedom Of

Movement

2.3.1 Throughout ISSR’s public out-reach campaign, minority communities, particularly the Serbs, expressed concern over the issue of freedom of movement outside their communities. Early on in its mission UNMIK attempted to address the issue of freedom of movement by issuing a Kosovo-wide license plate designed to provide anonymity to vehicles travelling in Kosovo – but the Serbian government’s unwillingness to accept the plate and re-sistance of Serbian communities in Kosovo to use the plate has hampered this initia-tive.

2.3.2 Kosovo’s Albanian community argues that Serbs are free to travel in Ko-sovo and their fears are more perception than reality. However, although the secu-rity situation has improved significantly in Kosovo over time, small scale incidents of harassment – such as vandalism of property – have a psychological impact. As noted by Special Envoy Kai Eide in his October 2005 report on Kosovo, “minority communities – and especially the Kosovo Serbs – suffer from more than a perceived insecurity. It is indeed a mixture of reality and perception. To combat this situation it will be important to prosecute crime more vigorously. When perpetrators remain at large, the sense of impunity prevails.”40 It is clear that whatever the result of final status negotiations, the issue of freedom of movement of minorities must be vigor-ously addressed by Kosovo’s leaders.

38 See UNDP Early Warning Report chart on p. 13 of this report, which indicates citizens are least satisfied with UNMIK among Kosovo’s current institutions. It should also be noted that in October 2005 Special Envoy Kai Eide submitted his report to the UN Security Council in which he addressed the issue of UNMIK’s political stagnation by saying, “the international community was increasingly being seen as engaged in a holding operation ... there was a growing sense of frustration and stagnation.” (p.2)39 Comment provided by OSCE Democratization department.

40 United Nations, Report of Special Envoy Kai Eide on UNMIK. New York: 2005, p.9.

For me security is a word that I quite

often forget about, be-cause for me it means that I should be able to move freely, to get in the bus or taxi and go wherever I want to. Unfortunately this doesn’t exist here. There is still no trust between Alba-nians and Serbs in this part of Kosovo. There are still “hot” heads that haven’t cooled down yet that think about committing crimes. I sometimes go to the Alba-nian part of Rahovec and mostly there are no prob-lems, but some-times they swear at us.

Kosovo Serb Female, Rahovec/

Orahovac


22 Section 2.4: ISSR Public Outreach

Campaign Findings

2.4.1 As noted above, ISSR conducted its own, wide reaching public outreach campaign. While it is difficult to estimate the exact number of people who were reached by the ISSR effort, over 800 peo-ple participated in consultative townhall meetings, 700 took part in the TV debates aired on RTK41, 20,000 leaflets were distrib-uted to the inhabitants of urban and rural areas, over 70 billboards were placed on Kosovo’s main and secondary roads, and over 800 TV spots encouraged the public to “Have Their Say” on security. Moreo-ver, for the period of 3 months, the ISSR Bus travelled throughout Kosovo collec-ting input either by videotaped message, through sealed letters or by responses to a questionnaire.42 In addition, 40 suggestion boxes were placed in Municipal and other Public Buildings (such as Cultural Centres and schools) as a method of gathering informal, anonymous comment. Quanti-tative results were gained from the 1,039 questionnaires received by ISSR.

2.4.2 It should be stressed that the quantitative results presented in this re-port should not be considered a statistical-ly significant opinion poll as the data was collected randomly. The results below are

more in line with a “straw poll”, which pro-vides an indicative range of opinions. The ISSR reached out to all communities in Ko-sovo and findings are based on responses from a range of participants representing all of Kosovo’s diverse communities. The findings presented here, however, are particularly focused on the views of the majority Albanian and Serb communities regarding their perceptions of security is-sues and threats. As a result, findings are delineated among these communities.

2.4.3 In line with the overall ISSR find-ings, respondents of both Albanian and Serbian communities listed poverty and unemployment among their top three biggest threats to security (18 and 19 per cent respectively of Albanian population indicated these two factors as top two security threats and 15% each for Serbs). However, it should be noted that, for the Serbian population, ethnic violence was the top security concern with 20% of Ser-bian respondents considering it the high-est threat (only 4% of Kosovo Albanian population considered it a threat at all)43. For Kosovo Albanians, corruption was the third biggest threat (16%) while this cat-egory garnered only 5% of preferences in the list of security-related concerns of the Serbian population.

41 RTK is estimated to have a viewership of approximately 80% of Kosovo’s population. The majority of Kosovo’s citizens recieve information regarding news and current events from television versus print or other electronic media.42 The “Have Your Say” Questionnaire can be found at Annex IV.

43 The ISSR Team noted that the Serbian fear of ethnic violence increased as the Final Status negotiations neared their conclusion.

Crime9%

CrimeEthnic ViolencePovertyEnvironmentOrganised CrimeTerrorismCorruptionDiseasesUnemploymentTraff ic SafetyElectricity Provision

Figure 8: Issues considered to be greatest threats by Kosovo Albanian respondentsSource: ISSR public outreach 2006


23

2.4.4 These findings are in line with the general conclusions of this report, how-ever, the viewpoint of the different com-munities, particularly regarding the fear of

ethnic violence and freedom of movement issues among Serbs, is germane to the consideration of the future security priori-ties for Kosovo.

Crime11%

Ethinc Violence20%

Poverty15%

Environment4%

Organised Crime11%

Terrorism11%

Corruption5%

Diseases4%

Unemployment15%

Traff ic Safety3%

Electricity Provision1%

CrimeEthnic ViolencePovertyEnvironmentOrganised CrimeTerrorismCorruptionDiseasesUnemploymentTraff ic SafetyElectricity Provision

Figure 9: Issues considered to be greatest threats by Kosovo Serb respondentsSource: ISSR public outreach 2006.

CHAPTER III

ISSR Kosovo

Threat Assessment

ISSR Kosovo Threat Assessment

26

Section 3.1: Background

3.1.1 Stage Two of the ISSR process iden-tified a number of threats facing Kosovo, both internal and external, which were then grounded in public consultation. The proc-ess of threat identification was commis-sioned from the international NGO, the Ge-neva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Kosovo NGO, Kosova Institute for Policy Research and De-velopment (KIPRED). In order to verify the findings of the DCAF and KIPRED studies, the OSCE organised, on behalf of the ISSR Secretariat, 32 Municipal Consultations across Kosovo in which citizens participat-ed in discussions on what issues concerned them most in terms of Kosovo’s security. In

addition, 100 invited Kosovo experts took part in two Core Consultations in Pristina to further enhance the dialogue and discus-sion regarding threats and security needs. The ISSR team also approached specialists in a variety of areas including the KPC, gen-der-issues, non-governmental organisa-tions, and members of the Assembly. The findings of all of these consultations were then correlated with data from a household survey of 1200 people conducted by the Gani Bobi Institute at the University of Pris-tina and by Saferworld for the South East-ern European Small Arms Clearing House.

3.1.2 These consultations helped verify the data gathered not only through the studies, but also from the UNDP Early Warn-ing Reporting system, as well as crime sta-tistics gained from the KPS. The completed threat assessment then made it possible to identify key trends and threats with a high degree of confidence.

3.1.3 The ISSR ascertained that there are three major threats citizens of Kosovo con-sider to be the most significant: Economic

Security, Weak Rule of Law/Lack of Judi-

cial Recourse and Political Instability. In addition, a number of other threats were also identified. The Threat Matrix in Ap-pendix VIII outlines the identified threats, and each threat is also examined in the in-dividual sections of this chapter.

Section 3.2: Identified

Threats in Detail

3.2.1 The threats identified in the threat assessment process, grouped according to their perceived threat level are:

A detailed examination of each of the above threats follows.

Threat: Economy and

Unemployment

Economy

3.2.2 Through the ISSR process Kos-ovo’s citizens have expressed fears regard-ing poor economic conditions. Most peo-ple believe that without economic reform the security sector of Kosovo will fail. An endemic part of Kosovo’s weak economic performance is high levels of unemploy-ment. Although experts disagree about the exact levels of unemployment in the territory due to “grey” economic activ-ity, available data shows that since 1999 unemployment in Kosovo has soared to 54.3%, with 70% of 16-24 year olds out of work.44

Social and eco-nomic condition

is a very big problem which can generate violence. Whether this violence will be on the scale of that of 17 March - bigger or smaller - depends on many fac-tors but it is critical that the social and economic situa-tion in Kosovo im-prove.

Kosovo Albanian man,

Klinë /Klina

CHAPTER III ISSR Kosovo Threat Assessment

HIGH MEDIUM MEDIUM-LOW LOW

Economic InstabilityUnemploymentRule of LawCorruption

Political InstabilityOrganised Crime

EpidemicsNatural Disasters

DrugsExternal AggressionTerrorism

44 World Bank (2005) Poverty Assessment Report, Kosovo. Pristina: World Bank.


27

3.2.3 The economic sector in Kosovo is confronted by a series of significant barri-ers to growth. Many of these are historic in nature and include a former commu-nist structure, which was hostile to a free market model, an underdeveloped entre-preneurial culture, and scarcity of business management skills. Furthermore, after nearly two decades of neglect and conflict following the death of Tito,Kosovo’s role as a pawn in the political power struggles of the Former Yugoslavia led it to suffer from serious economic decline and deteriora-tion of industrial infrastructure.

3.2.4 Today Kosovo’s economy is highly dependent on reconstruction activities and the service sector (café bars, restau-rants, shops). According to a study com-

pleted by Kosovo’s Economic Strategy and Project Identification Group (ESPIG), the boom cycle of economic growth following the end of the war has“had an effect simi-lar to what the discovery of oil might have had. Without raising the productivity of the work force, producing goods competi-tive at home or abroad or changing the na-ture of a backward rural economy, Kosovo could (suddenly) afford massive imports.”45 In short, the result of this boom cycle has been growth of imports and low level eco-nomic activity without a growth in internal economic productivity and/or exports.

3.2.5 Unfortunately, this boom, brought by an influx of cash from the international community presence, remittances from the diaspora,46 and reconstruction

Kosovo has the youngest popu-

lation and also the high-est unemployment rate in Europe. Will they have the opportunities they deserve to make full use of their energy and skills? I won-der especially about the young women …will they be given an equal chance to become businesspeople or doctors, journalists or computer programmers, even future presidents and prime ministers of Kosovo?

Madeleine Albright,

Address to Kosovo Assembly,

July 2005.

Sex Urban%

Rural%

Total%

Male 34.6 43.9 41.1

Female 65.2 85.2 78.4

Total 46.4 57.8 54.3

Table 6: Kosovo Unemployment Rates by Residence and SexSource: Statistical Office of Kosovo

National Accounts

Real GDP growth -0.1 -0.5 2.0 -1.5 2.0

GDP per capita (in Euros)1 1306 1292 1294 1243 1244

Investment (% GDP) 23.7 22.9 26.3 28.2 28.9

Gross Domestic savings (%GDP) -7.1 -5.7 -4.2 -8.3 -5.3

General Government Budget /2

Overall balance (millions of Euros) 98 47 -138 -67 -77/3

Overall balance (% of GDP) 4.0 1.9 -5.4 -2.9 -3.0

External Accounts

Current account balance (%)/4 -32.8 -26.6 -26.3 -31.5 -29.2

Foreing assistance (millions of Euros) 887 688 570 553 546

Workers remittances (millions of Euros) 341 341 341 345 347

Prices

CPI Inflation 3.6 1.2 -1.5 -2.1 -1.8Notes : e = estimate, p= projection. 1/ Includes methodogical shift to treat UNMIK as a resident rather than interna-tional organization, leading to falling GDP as UNMIK presence declines.2/ Excludes donor-desingnated grants and off-budget UNMIK and donor expenditures.3/From MTEF. 4/ Before donor grants.

Table 7: Kosovo Main Economic Indicators 2002-2006Source: World Bank and IMF staff estimates

45 ESPIG Report: “Towards a Kosovo Development Plan – The State of the Kosovo Economy and Possible Ways Forward,” Pristina: August 2004.

46 According to World Bank estimates, remittances from abroad could contribute as much as 15% to Kosovo’s GDP, one of the highest levels of remittance dependency in the world. Source: World Bank, International Development Association Interim Strategy Note for Kosovo for the period FY06-FY07, March 2006.


28 activities has steadily declined and Kos-ovo’s economy has stagnated across most sectors. IMF reviews of the situation have found that economic indicators, as well as data regarding government expenditures versus revenues, show that Kosovo’s eco-nomic growth is not sustainable.47

3.2.6 Throughout Kosovo, the combi-nation of irregular Diaspora payments and small family businesses facilitate subsist-ence living for many. However, the early massive influx of funds into Kosovo from the international community distorted domestic spending patterns, resulting in an actual threat to the economic stabil-ity. People’s expectations were raised, and now the impact of those expectations is being felt by a weak political system with an even weaker leadership.48

3.2.7 The most significant indications of this problem are underinvestment in all of Kosovo’s major industries leading to the near collapse of its small manufactur-ing sector and negligible investment in its primary industries: agriculture, mining, and energy. Mining and agriculture have historically been the main components of Kosovo’s economy. However, since the 1999 start of international administration in Kosovo, the mining sector in Kosovo has not attracted foreign investment for modernisation. In addition, maintenance of Kosovo’s lignite coal mines, the primary source of energy and one of the largest re-serves in the world, has only continued on pace to fuel the territory’s power plant.49

3.2.8 Similarly, Kosovo’s agricultural sector has not modernised or expanded. Agriculture in Kosovo is primarily based in subsistence farming. Despite strong agri-cultural land resources and a rural popula-tion estimated at over 50%, the sector has not moved towards higher levels of pro-

duction compatible with agribusiness. The net result of Kosovo’s lack of investment in both agriculture and mining is low levels of productivity and persistent high unem-ployment with almost no export sales.

3.2.9 Support for the growth of smaller businesses is provided by an immature, if stable and well managed, financial servic-es sector. The sector struggles to provide debt financing at rates and on terms which can support small and medium-sized en-terprise (SME) growth. However, growth in the SME sector is also threatened by in-adequate skills and training programmes, leading to implications for competitive-ness and attraction of foreign investment. This said, there are an increasing number of private education institutions dedicated to providing skills training and business management education, but the cost of those institutions can be prohibitive and the quality has been questioned in some cases.

Employment

3.2.10 Kosovo has the youngest and fastest growing population in Europe. Ac-cording to EU studies, Kosovo has more than 36,000 young people entering the employment sector every year – most of whom are unable to find work.50 Moderni-sation of the mining and agricultural sec-tors in order to create a revitalised produc-tion capacity and increase employment prospects has not occurred. In addition, government revenues are not sufficient to help kick-start economic activities. Des-perately needed foreign investment has yet to materialize due to difficult condi-tions in which to attract investment in-cluding: intermittent electricity supplies, a slow privatisation process, and a relatively unstable political situation given the un-certainty regarding Kosovo’s final status.

In the Municipal-ity of Strpce the

security situation is good as there were no incidents, however, in Kosovo the sit-uation is not like that and we all know the reasons. Economy is the main fac-tor that affects se-curity.

Serb Middle-aged Male

Shtërpcë /Štrpce

47 ESPIG report p.9

48 World Bank (2001) Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro): Economic and Social Reforms for Peace and Reconciliation. Vol.1.Chap.3. Washington DC: World Bank.49 Kosovo’s mining resources include above ground and below ground mines. Kosovo’s mines are considered valuable, although the pace of privatization and political concerns related to the mines have been obstacles to their modernization. Information about Kosovo’s mines is available at http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/focuskos/sept05/focuskeco5.htm A report on the political nature of the mines of Trepca can be found at the International Crisis Group website, “Trepca: Making Sense of the Labyrinth,” http://www.crisisgroup.org .50 EU UNMIK Pillar publication, “Kosovo Outlook 2004.”


293.2.11 In the past, young people in Ko-sovo approached the problem of unem-ployment at home by moving abroad and sending remittances home. This large Di-aspora community has contributed signifi-cantly to the reconstruction over the last seven years. Unfortunately, as immigra-tion to Europe and the United States has been restricted in recent years, economic migration possibilities for young people in Kosovo have been cut.

3.2.12 To date, job creation in Kosovo has been somewhat dependent on the international community – either directly or indirectly. The UN Mission in Kosovo indicates that it has contributed between €75m and €120m to Kosovo’s GDP annu-ally since 1999 and its local employees make up less than 1% of the official em-ployment rate.51 UNMIK also postulates that it has indirectly supported creation of approximately 2,600 service-related jobs, particularly in Prishtinë/Priština where nearly 65% of its staff reside and work.52 Regardless of the figures, however, down-sizing of the international presence in Kos-ovo will have both a financial and psycho-logical effect on the economy – something that is already being felt in areas outside of Prishtinë/Priština where most interna-tional agencies have already significantly decreased their presence.

3.2.13 According to the August 2004 ESPIG report, the largest employers in Kos-ovo include: KEK, the PTK, and other public and government offices. Manufacturing employment capacity is limited to small reconstruction firms for timber and brick, as well as some agricultural or beverage producers.

3.2.14 Given the low level of productiv-ity and the small manufacturing sector in Kosovo, employment prospects appear weak for the future. Kosovo’s citizens are highly aware of the economic uncertain-ties facing the territory, and the idea of political collapse linked to economic col-

lapse is a concern that is close to the sur-face for many people in Kosovo. Further-more, high expectations that resolution of the status issue and forward motion on the privatisation process will solve the employment problem are likely to be met with disappointment. However, the deter-mination of the people of Kosovo to im-prove the possibilities for economic devel-opment in the territory through education and investment from abroad can serve its long-term prospects well. Beyond the en-trepreneurial spirit of Kosovo’s population, reduction of the economic and unemploy-ment threats facing Kosovo will require significant institutional, legislative, and policy reform supported by international donors and investors.

Potential Manifestations of Economic

and Unemployment Threats

3.2.15 Short Term

Increased social upheaval against governing authoritiesGeneral criminality

3.2.16 Long Term

Social UpheavalIncrease in Organised CriminalityVulnerability to international terrorist infiltration

Threat: Weak Rule of Law

3.2.17 Kosovo’s ISSR process found weak public trust in the judicial system in Ko-sovo – regardless of an individual’s com-munity.53 There was also a widespread fear of corruption and political interference in the criminal justice process. The failure of the international community to guarantee the rule of law in Kosovo is a major long term barrier to stability which needs to be urgently addressed.

3.2.18 Kosovo’s citizens often tie the lack of trust in the judicial system to a general

51 EU Pillar Report, “UNMIK’s Impact on the Kosovo Economy.” Prishtina, July 2006, p4.52 Ibid, p4.53 ISSR found that minority community members frequently expressed concerns regarding access to courts and concerns regarding the system’s ability to address cases affecting their communities.


30

lack of trust in governing authorities. The fact that authorities are unable to provide for the basic needs of the population is seen as a major contributor to general lack of respect for the rule of law. 54 Judicial au-thorities, however, are universally loathed, and security institutions such as the po-lice are sometimes seen as weak for be-ing unable to protect those who attempt to strengthen rule of law institutions or enforce their governing mandates due to personal safety fears.

3.2.19 The system of rule of law in Kos-ovo faces a number of challenges, not the least of which is structural. Kosovo has a civil law system, but the present system is a mix of legal provisions from the former Yugoslavia, UNMIK regulations, and PISG laws that in some cases are contradictory or confusing.55 Although the present court structure is largely that of the pre-conflict system, it was re-authorised and re-consti-tuted as part of the provisional governing authorities by UNMIK Regulation 2001/9. In addition, in April 2004 a major change was made to the judicial system whereby investigative responsibilities were re-moved from judges and given to prosecu-tors.

3.2.20 Kosovo’s legal structure as de-scribed above is under the direct supervi-sion of UNMIK. The SRSG holds reserved powers over the functioning of the various aspects of the system, but also dictates policy and retains financial control of the judiciary. Finally, there is no effective proc-ess of judicial review in Kosovo as Consti-

tutional provisions are laid out by UNMIK and review of adherence to those provi-sions is carried out by UNMIK.

3.2.21 For the people of Kosovo the vul-nerability of the judicial system to politi-cal influence and corruption is considered a serious threat. Although people may express some level of confidence in the newly formed Kosovo Police Service, they express little confidence in the process of justice to protect their rights. In reality, the system is weak with an overburden of cases, and prosecutors or judges are often afraid to pursue difficult cases for personal safety or political reasons.56

3.2.22 In general, judicial institutions have made some progress since 1999, but overall the sector requires a signifi-cant amount of development. ISSR public outreach showed that the judiciary is cur-rently not considered by citizens to be an impartial body that has the ability to meas-ure the fairness or appropriate application of legislative or regulatory codes. As the sector develops, judges and prosecutors will be required to stand more strongly on its principles and mandate, regardless of threat, in order to gain the respect and trust of the people of Kosovo.

Potential Manifestations of Rule of Law

Threats

3.2.23 Short Term

Undermined public faith in the justice system encourages vigilantism

The rule of law is a basic precondition for political, social and economic develop-ment. A legal system based on the principle of rule of law is reliable and predictable. Both qualities are necessary for the creation of an economic system where property is protected and investments are safe. Furthermore, the rule of law makes a society more stable and secure as criminality is prosecuted and human rights are respected. OSCE Mission in Kosovo Introduction to Rule of Law Programme http://www.osce.org/kosovo/13217.html

54 The Department of Justice noted that the Kosovo Special Prosecutor’s Office (KSPO) established in September 2006 is a major capacity-building initiative on serious crimes cases, including terrorism, drugs, corruption and organised crime cases.55 It should be noted that especially early in the post-war period decisions regarding which Yugoslav laws should be followed created a lot of problems as Kosovo’s Albanian and Serbian communities disagreed about the applicability of laws created during the Milosevic era. The issue of contradictions in code continues to be a challenge in Kosovo’s judicial system today.

56 Discussions with citizens as well as judges, prosecutors, and others involved in the judicial system indicated deep concern regarding unequal treatment of persons with money or social influence, as well as fear of prosecuting individuals tied to organised crime. Some judges expressed fear of threats against them by individuals prosecuted in their courtrooms.


31

Institution Acceptable Rather Acceptable

Rather Unacceptable

Unacceptable

Bidding tender 6% 5% 5% 69%

Hospital 14% 8% 6% 71%

Applying for a job 8% 6% 5% 73%

Customs 6% 4% 6% 74%

Tax office 5% 5% 5% 76%

School/University 8% 5% 5% 76%

Courts 6% 4% 4% 77%

Municipal Office 8% 4% 4% 78%

PTK 4% 5% 5% 79%

Police 6% 5% 5% 80%

Table 8: Tolerance for corruptionSource: UNDP Kosovo Report Combating Corruption in Kosovo

Lack of trust in the system discour-ages individuals from bringing com-plaints or cases forward.Lack of faith in prosecution under-mines enforcement regimes.

3.2.24 Long Term

Collapse of governing authorityCollapse of police authority and en-forcementCollapse in rule of law creates at-mosphere of failed state and allows growth of organised crime, trafficking in persons and weapons, and terror-ism.

Corruption

3.2.25 The threat of corruption is be-lieved by many in Kosovo to be some-where between a necessary part of life to survive and an endemic problem that contributes heavily to the dysfunction of governmental authorities, business, and general life in the territory. Like most de-veloping nations, Kosovo does not have adequate systems to combat corruption and people generally feel helpless about how to confront the problem.

3.2.26 In general people in Kosovo iden-tify corruption as a problem that requires

immediate attention and as illustrated in the table above the levels of acceptance of different kinds of corruption is low.57 Fur-thermore, institutions within the civil soci-ety such as media outlets and non-govern-mental organisations are increasingly vo-cal and active on the subject. In addition, according to a study completed on behalf of USAID, the perception of the problem of corruption in Kosovo may be greater than the reality of the problem:

“In comparison to other countries in the region, the survey results suggest that the corruption situation in Kosovo is more op-timistic. Corruption does not appear to be as widespread among public officials, the demands of corrupt officials are lower, and the extent of citizen involvement in corrupt transactions is lower in Kosovo than in oth-er countries of Southeast Europe.”58

3.2.27 A lack of public trust in institutions and a weak rule of law contribute to the perception that corruption is a large scale problem. Kosovo citizens do not feel they have the opportunity to be treated fairly or equally under the law due to corruption and a malfunctioning system. People also feel that economic and employment op-portunities are restricted by endemic cor-ruption. The gap between rich and poor is growing in Kosovo and those who seek

By the broadest definition, cor-

ruption means the abuse of public power in order to make private profit.

(Transparency International

Hungarian Chapter, http://www.

c3.hu/~tihun/eng/ accessed on

4 Sept 2006 2006)

57 UNDP Report, “Combating Corruption in Kosovo: A Citizen’s Perception Survey In Support of the Kosovo Anti-Corruption Strategy.” Survey results on tolerance of corruption can be found on p.13.

58 Management Systems International report, “Corruption in Kosovo: Observations and Implications for USAID.” USAID Report available at www.usaid.gov


32

opportunities to improve their lives often confront obstacles that could be viewed as low level corruption, such as difficulties in gaining access to employment opportuni-ties because of favouritism and nepotism.

3.2.28 Although it is difficult to ascer-tain the scale of corruption in Kosovo, its impact on daily life is evident in public surveys completed by a number of inter-national and local institutions where the issue ranks as important among identified problems in Kosovo.59

3.2.29 As illustrated in the UNDP table below, low salaries are perceived as the biggest source of corruption among Ko-sovo's leaders.

3.2.30 Kosovo’s current system of gov-ernmental regulation does not provide

for public oversight of government of-ficials through Assembly review of ap-pointees or disclosure of financial records of public officials. Furthermore, Kosovo’s weak economy and relatively low salaries for all levels of public officials and police creates opportunity for those interested in gaining favour or expediting required processes for business, building, or other publicly regulated entities. Therefore the problem of corruption is not simply a reg-ulatory or legislative issue, it is also linked to economic development. Kosovo has made some progress in the area of legisla-tion, with the Kosovo Assembly passing an anti-corruption law in May 2005 (UNMIK Regulation 2005/26), which also provided authority to establish an Anti-Corruption

Agency. However, more needs to be done in terms of enforcement and demonstra-

Some people believe that corruption affects different spheres of life in this country. In your view does corruption affect: ( :”Not at all” ... 4: “To a large extent”)

Political life The business environment

Your personal and family life

Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.6 3.5 3.3

Bulgaria 3.6 3.4 2.0

Croatia 3.5 3.6 2.3

Kosovo 2.9 2.7 2.2

Macedonia 3.4 3.2 2.6

Serbia 3.2 2.9 2.3

Table 9: Regional Representation of Corruption’s impact on political life, the business environment, and personal and family lifeSource: Table Provided Courtesy of Transparency International, Report of Transparency International Global Cor-ruption Barometer 2005, December 2005.

59 As an example public surveys on corruption conducted by USAID indicated the problem was second only to economic issues for nearly 40% of people surveyed. UNDP project on combating corruption found that 90% of people surveyed viewed corruption as a problem in their every day life.

0 10 20 30 40 50

imperfect legislation

judicial inefficiency

moral crisis

fast personal enrichment

low public sector salaries

Most imporant factor affecting the proliferetion ofcorruption

(Kosovo wide)

5,3%

6,3%

7,2%

9,9%48.1%

48,1%

Figure 10: Causes of Corruption in KosovoSource: UNDP Report, Combating Corruption in Kosovo.


33

tion of commitment to anti-corruption efforts by Kosovo’s leadership.

3.2.31 Finally, the issue of corruption in Kosovo also is clearly an issue of percep-tions versus realities. A more robust effort among Kosovo’s leaders to address accusa-tions and concerns over corruption would contribute to gaining more public trust in institutions.

Potential Manifestations of Corruption

Threats

3.2.32 Short Term Threats

Public trust in governing institutions is low.Public confidence in economy and economic opportunities is low.Increased criminality and growth of organised crime activity

3.2.33 Long Term Threats

Criminalised state institutionsBreakdown of rule of law and in-creased atmosphere of failed state.

Threat: Political Instability

3.2.34 Since 1999 the OSCE has helped to organise four elections including two municipal level and two central elections.60 Elections scheduled for 2006 have been postponed due to pending conclusion of final status negotiations.

3.2.35 Political transitions in Kosovo have been peaceful since 1999, with rival political parties taking their turns in pow-er. That said, Kosovo’s political culture is dominated by a winner-take-all mentality.

As power has changed hands at the Mu-nicipal, Assembly, and Prime Ministerial levels, PISG ministries have been subject to vicious battles to control their resources for use as rewards to loyalists. In addition, political rivalries run deep and on occasion have led to violence through a number of what some believe to be political assassi-nations.61

3.2.36 Kosovo has enjoyed wide scale international political and financial sup-port throughout its post-conflict period. As Kosovo moves forward towards inde-pendence from international intervention, its political leadership will need to assume full responsibility for decisions – both good and bad. The international commu-nity will no longer control key Kosovo gov-ernance authorities and will not be a con-venient scapegoat on which to lay blame for failures. Kosovo’s leaders will need to not only assume full political responsibil-ity, but also be prepared to deal with the consequences.

3.2.37 It is unclear if rivalries between Kosovo’s political entities will explode into violence or if failures of leadership will lead to social unrest. However, the current eco-nomic and political weaknesses present in Kosovo will require strong leadership to steer the territory through what will be a difficult transitional stage.

3.2.38 One political challenge facing Kosovo’s leadership is the relationship be-tween the majority Albanian community and other constituent minority groups in Kosovo, particularly the Serbian commu-nity. In part, the relationship between Ko-sovo’s Serbs and Albanians will be dictated

Most of the regime shifts in democracies occur through electoral defeats of incumbents, while most dictatorships relinquish power only through violence. Democracy requires consent of the citizenry, and consent requires political legitimacy.

- Ali and Isse from their essay Political Freedom and the Stability of Economic Policy, CATO Journal, Fall 2004.

60 2004 elections were organized by Kosovo’s Central Election Commission with OSCE’s support. These were the first elections managed directly by local authorities.61 The issue of political assassination has been controversial and is not well documented in Kosovo. The most known case of a politically motivated murder is the case of Xhemajl Mustafa, a longtime aide of Ibrahim Rugova who was killed in November 2000. In 2004, heads of political parties, as well as the Council for Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF) chastised then UNMIK Police Commissioner, Stefan Feller, for raising the possibility of political assassinations as a potential threat to elections that year.


34 by the ability of Kosovo’s Serbs to take the lead rather than looking to Belgrade to determine their future. In addition, Kos-ovo’s Albanian leadership will be required to look at effective means of building re-lationships with minority communities and seeking methods of addressing their needs as this is a role that has largely been assumed by international donors and UN-MIK to date.

3.2.39 This is particularly true in Serbian communities north of the Ibër/Ibar River, where a de facto partition of the territory has emerged over the period of interna-tional administration.

3.2.40 Serbs living in the municipalities of Leposaviq/Leposavić, Zveçan/Zvečan, and Zubin Potok/Zubin Potok have main-tained strong ties to Belgrade and man-aged parallel governing structures, despite UNMIK efforts to encourage participation in new municipal structures and Kosovo-wide structures. Guarantees for the po-litical and economic security of all ethnic minorities in Kosovo will be dependent on their ability to work directly with the ma-jority Albanians to create a secure future for all residents of Kosovo.

3.2.41 The problem is particularly acute in north Mitrovicë/Mitrovica City, where resources such as the city hospital are con-trolled by one party and others, such as water utilities, are split. The city has faced a simmering low-intensity conflict since 1999, with occasional flare ups that have led to significant violence requiring KFOR intervention. Regardless of the outcome of final status negotiations, northern Kosovo and Mitrovicë/Mitrovica City will require special attention to resolve the ongoing conflict between Serbs and Albanians, which despite the relative calm elsewhere in the territory is a direct threat to any long term peace in Kosovo.

3.2.42 The process of decentralisation is a proposed solution to address ethnic divi-

sions, currently under consideration at the final status talks in Vienna.62 Decentralisa-tion is a process whereby local governing authorities would be devolved in certain ethnic communities – thus avoiding the question of partitioning Kosovo, a solution that has been universally dismissed by the Contact Group in official statements.

3.2.43 Decentralisation has its own po-litical implications, however, as it would place firm lines of political division in com-munities, some of which are gradually beginning to address problems of multi-ethnic communication. As described in a report issued by the U.S. Institute for Peace in August 2006 the Serbian definition of “decentralisation” will, “provide Serbs with the separate governance on clearly de-fined territory that they seek ... it should be clear that whatever Serbs get in the set-tlement will set a potentially destabilizing standard for what Albanians in southern Serbia and Macedonia will seek.”63

Potential Manifestations of

Political Instability and Ethnic

Violence Threats

3.2.44 Short Term Threats

Demonstrations, rioting, political in-stabilityInter-ethnic violenceGrowth of paramilitary structures

3.2.45 Long Term Threats

Collapse of government/failed stateCross-border violence in reaction to inter-ethnic violence

Threat: Organised Crime

3.2.46 Organised crime networks ex-isted in Kosovo prior to 1999 and have grown over the initial period of Kosovo’s post-conflict development. In addition, the ethnic tensions that pervade political life in Kosovo do not obstruct criminal ac-

Security means that the popula-

tion is safe starting from freedom of movement, when people are able to move freely wherever they want to. Security is a very volatile feeling: most of the time I feel safe, but then something happens to the Serbs here, and you don’t feel that safe anymore. In-terethnic violence as far as I’m concerned is the main element affecting security. There is criminality every-where, but interethnic vio-lence is number one issue.

Serbian Female Graçanicë/

Gračanica

62 Proposal regarding decentralisation were first forwarded with UNMIK’s initiative to reform local self-government following the March 2004 riots, upon the request of the UN Security Council via a Presidential Declaration in April 2004 to explore, "efficient local governance through devolution of non-reserved central responsibilities to local governments" and with an invitation to interested parties in Kosovo to develop concrete reform proposals.

63 Bajraktari, Yll and Serwer, Dan, Kosovo: Ethnic Nationalism at Its Territorial Worst, Washington: August 2006. p. 6.


35tivity. Kosovo Serbs and Albanian criminal elements work freely across ethnic divides. Furthermore, as elsewhere in the world, organised crime in Europe has become a truly globalised institution with influence from China, Russia, Nigeria, Turkey, and South Eastern Europe. Kosovo’s organised crime networks fall along the lines of the “Balkan Route,” which is a traditional smug-gling route for heroin run mostly by Turk-ish organised crime networks stretching from Afghanistan via Pakistan into the Bal-kans and then onto Europe.64 Historically, Albanian crime networks have supported the route, which was largely controlled by Turkish and Yugoslav interests, but in re-cent decades Albanians have moved for-ward to have a controlling interest in the trade rather than only a facilitating one.65 The development of the role of Kosovo Al-banians in the route is described in a U.S. Institute for Peace special report:

“Owing to the region’s strategic location on the heroin trafficking route running from Afghanistan into Europe, Turkish criminal clans increasingly turned to Albanians to act as drug couriers as in-stability engulfed the Balkans during the 1990’s. A ready pool of unemployed and alienated Kosovars was also available in Western Europe and some of them were recruited to run heroin and prostitution

rings. Inevitably, Kosovars went into business for themselves, since their clan culture and obscure language made them highly resistant to penetration by law enforcement.”66

3.2.47 Growth of organised crime ac-tivities in Kosovo has followed the Balkan Route and expanded into human traffick-ing, human smuggling, counterfeit cur-rency production, cigarette smuggling, and trade in other illicit materials such as pirated CDs and DVDs. Given Kosovo’s lack of status there is no immigration service; thus organised crime has been able to use the territory successfully as a transit point for human smuggling and human traffick-ing from a variety of countries. Organised crime proceeds have been “invested” in property development in Kosovo, which some believe has spurred the boom in ille-gal building throughout the territory. The diagram below is a very simple illustration of the Balkan Route and some of the main illicit activities in Kosovo as well as some of the other players in activities such as hu-man smuggling.67

3.2.48 Kosovo’s nascent governing insti-tutions and inexperienced police force will require support to combat further growth of organised crime activities. In addition, possible links to both internal and external

64 According to Department of Justice data international prosecutors to date have indicted twelve defendants on charges of organised crime; of them, eight have been convicted of organised crime and drug traf icking. 65 Information for this section is largely drawn from Europol’s 2004 EU Organised Crime Report. Additional sources include: US Institute for Peace Special Report, Lawless Rule Rather than Rule of Law, and the Centre for Peace in the Balkans, Balkan-Albania-Kosovo-Heroin-Jihad.66 US Institute of Peace, Lawless Rule Rather than Rule of Law in the Balkans, Special Report No. 97. 2002.67 The diagram is meant to provide a sketch of organised crime in Kosovo, not to depict the entire picture.

Figure 11: Organized Crime Activity In KosovoSource: ISSR 2006

Balkan Route

KosovoTurkey

Romania Russia

Albania

WesternEUROPE

Multiple Activities

Including

Weapons and

Human Smugglng

TraffickingCommoditiesSmuggling

Drugs

TraffickingHuman Smuggling Counterfeit Goods


36 terrorist groups must continue to be moni-tored effectively in order to ensure Kosovo does not develop as a terrorist transport route into Western Europe via existing human smuggling networks. Given the networks of organised crime across the Balkans, Kosovo will need to improve its internal ability to combat the problem, in concert with regional and EU efforts.

Manifestations of the Threat of

Organised Crime:

3.2.49 Short Term

Discourages international investment.Increased criminality.Corruption of government institutions.

3.2.50 Long Term

Criminalization of the stateRisk for international investment means level of investment near zeroIncreased corruption and political in-stabilityWeak rule of law allows criminal-ity to flourish and create atmosphere where other threats such as terrorism can grow.

Threat: Drugs

3.2.51 The drug trade in Kosovo, par-ticularly heroin, is conducted by organ-ised crime along the Balkan route. Ac-cording to law enforcement sources, the trade is managed through family networks throughout Europe and transportation is largely by road. In addition, according to a report published by the United States Institute for Peace (USIP), early in the Ko-sovo conflict there were possible connec-tions between the KLA, Balkan Route drug trade, and weapons supply for the KLA.68 Therefore, the presence of the drug trade in Kosovo is considered a threat to rule of law not only via criminal elements, but potentially also as a source of revenue and arms for political extremists.

3.2.52 There is little official data publicly available on drug trade or use in Kosovo. The two tables below can provide a snap-shot of the drug trade in Kosovo, but a full picture of the scale of drug operations in Kosovo is largely unknown. Police sources estimate that large quantities of drugs, usually heroin, are transported to Kosovo from Turkey and then broken down into smaller quantities for movement to Eu-rope. Furthermore, given the porous na-ture of Kosovo’s borders the data in the Ta-ble below is likely to illustrate only a small portion of the local drug trade.

Table 10: Drug Dealing/Possession Of-fences Recorded by Region69

December-July 2005Table 11: Drug Seizures (in grams) Janu-ary-May 200670

68 The USIP Report referenced above speculates that nearly half of KLA weapons and finance resources came from illicit activities. US Institute of Peace, Lawless Rule Rather than Rule of Law in the Balkans, Special Report No. 97. 2002. It should be noted that at the ISSR Steering Committee meeting on 16 October 2006 a representative of PDK refuted these allegations.

69 Data compiled by Kosovo Police Information System (KPIS)

70 Data compiled by the Narcotics Investigation Section.

Period Mitrovicë/Mitrovica

Prizren/Prizren

Pejë/Peć

Prishtinë/Priština

Gjilan/Gnjilane Border Police Total

01/07/05-31/12/05 10 10 17 55 24 2 118

Table 10: Drug Dealing/Possession Offences Recorded by Region69 December-July 2005Source: UNMIK Police Criminal Investigation Unit

Type Heroin Marijuana Cannabis Resin Cocaine Other

Total 5807.10 261.60 16164 3.8 1788

Table 11: Drug Seizures (in grams) January-May 200670

Source: UNMIK Police Criminal Investigation Unit


373.2.53 Little comprehensive study has been completed on drug-abuse as a threat to Kosovo society or on the increase/de-crease of use in Kosovo since 1999. Given the presence of the drug trade in Kosovo, drugs are readily available and studies completed by UNICEF and INDEX Kosova in 2004 reveal that young people in Kos-ovo consider drug abuse to be a threat to their generation.71 According to the UNICEF study:

“…the problem of drugs is obviously one that is gaining a lot of attention among young people, and the Kosovo society as a whole. It is not yet clear how impor-tant the problem is in terms of drug use, but the fear that surrounds it is quite high. The taboo may be so high as to discourage any young drug user to ad-mit it in a survey.”72

3.2.54 Overall, the threat of drug use and abuse to Kosovo’s traditional society is likely to grow if economic conditions con-tinue to deteriorate. If young people con-tinue to lack opportunities to work or take a positive role in the society, drug abuse will contribute to the breakdown in rule of law and also the supportive family net-works which are integral to Kosovo’s social structure.

Possible Manifestations of

the Drug Threat:

3.2.55 Short Term:

Criminal networks continue drug activities relatively unhindered as Kosovo’s Police are in transition and international security authorities are limited in capacity to deal with the is-sue.Rule of law is challenged. Corruption grows.

71 UNICEF Kosovo, “Youth In Kosovo.” Pristina: June 2004.72 Ibid, p. 17.

3.2.56 Long Term:

Increased criminality Social upheaval Terrorist or political extremist presence strengthens

Threat: Terrorism

3.2.57 The potential for growth of inter-national terrorism is a regional concern in the Balkans. In Kosovo there are both internal73 and external terrorist threats. Prior to September 11, 2001, experts had warned that the collapse of the Former Yugoslavia and the fall of communism in Albania had opened the Balkan region up as a haven for international terrorists.74 In addition, accusations of terrorist influ-ence or “terrorist acts” have been part of the verbal landscape between the various component parts of the Former Yugoslavia over the last decade.75

3.2.58 Of particular concern to the inter-national community was the presence of Jihadi fighters in Bosnia-Herzegovina dur-ing the war and the suspected presence of Al Qaeda terrorists in Albania. In reality, however, the influence of international ter-rorists has been weak throughout the Bal-kans, thanks in large part to the resistance of the secular Muslim communities in Bos-nia, Kosovo, and Albania to recruitment by Al Qaeda and other groups. According to a Congressional Research Service report on Islamic Terrorism in the Balkans:

“Opposition to terrorism has been strong among Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and Albanians, the largest indigenous Muslim groups in the Balkans. These groups are generally more secular in outlook than Muslims elsewhere. Most view them-selves as part of Europe and are grateful for the perceived U.S. role in defending them against Serbian aggression in the 1990’s…”76

73 According to data provided by the Department of Justice to date international prosecutors have indicted twenty five individuals on charges of terrorism; of those, five defendants have been convicted and sentenced for terrorism.

74 Woehrel & Steven, Islamic Terrorism and the Balkans. Washington: Congressional Research Service Report, July 2005.

75 Serbian officials used the word “terrorist” to describe KLA insurgents and also to describe perceived threats from Bosnian Muslims in the 1990s. Kosovo Albanians have frequently spoken of “terrorist acts” committed by Serbian military and police during the conflict.

76 Woehrel, Steven, Islamic Terrorism and the Balkans.” Washington: Congressional Research Service Report, July 2005, p2.

Description of Terrorism as, ‘Any

action, in addition to ac-tions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council reso-lution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combat-ants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an interna-tional organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.

Report of the High-level UN

Panel on Threats, Challenges and

Change,

A/59/565, December 2004


38 3.2.59 Most international experts be-lieve that the regional threat of terrorist incubation in the Balkans is low, although the idea that the Balkans, particularly Al-bania and Kosovo, might serve as a point of transit for terrorists or terrorist financ-ing along established underground trade routes such as the “Balkan Route” is a real concern.

3.2.60 This is not to say that the po-tential incidents of terrorism and terror-ist presence have not been threatening. With the help of the international com-munity, Bosnia has negated Islamic chari-ties that were suspected to have terrorist financing links. In a similar fashion, Alba-nia has also strengthened its opposition to terrorism after the 1998 foiled attack on the US Embassy in Tirana. In addition, UNMIK has stepped up its efforts to com-bat terrorists’ financial links in Kosovo by establishing a financial crimes monitor-ing unit. Such efforts are credited with keeping potential links between terror-ists and organised crime in the region at bay.77

3.2.61 Beyond external terrorist threats, Kosovo does face a number of potential threats from internal extremists represent-ing different ethnic groups. UNMIK Regu-lation 2001/12, established a legal frame-work to address terrorism threats. In addi-tion, there are a number of Yugoslav codes dealing with the issue. Furthermore, SRSG Administrative Directive 2003/9 provided the ability to identify groups as “terror-ist.” To date, the only group named un-der the directive is the Albanian National Army (AKSh).78 However, Kosovo may face increased threats from extremists repre-senting its various ethnic communities dependent on the outcome of final sta-tus and a worsening economic situation. Such groups already occasionally threaten violence or are suspected of small-scale at-tacks on international targets.

3.2.62 Another issue related to terror-ism and organised crime is the traffick-ing of weapons. Although illicit arms trafficking has been a concern across the Balkans since the break-up of Yugoslavia and the looting of Albanian armouries in 1997, Kosovo is considered a destination of many of the illicit arms. It is believed that similar routes and methods, used for drugs trafficking, are used for weapons trafficking. Furthermore, international intelligence sources believe that impor-tation of high quality weapons such as rocket launchers coming from China or Russia may be underway by various ex-tremist groups in Kosovo.79

3.2.63 In March 2006, the Kosovo Police established the Organised Crime and Ter-rorist Acts Investigation (OCTAIS) section, which at the time of this Report was still being developed. In addition, the Kos-ovo Islamic Council (KIC) has reviewed a number of international NGOs operating in Kosovo and has prohibited the use of public facilities to those groups believed to be inciting extremist views.80

Potential Manifestations of Terrorist

Threat

3.2.64 Short Term

Threat of attack against international and local institutional targets in Kos-ovo.Weak border controls facilitates a gateway for terrorists into Western Europe via human smuggling routes.

3.2.65 Long Term

Poor economic conditions provides opening for influence of terrorists in population.Weak border enforcement, inexperi-enced police, and disintegrating rule of law break down ability of officials to combat external terrorist threats.

77 Ibid, p. 8.78 AKSh is an extremist, militant group which became active in cross-border insurgent attacks into Macedonia and Preshevo Valley from Kosovo during 2001. The group supports the concept of a Greater Albania and is believed to be headed by Gafurr Adili..

79 Data regarding weapons imported in Kosovo is difficult to come by in open source. ISSR consulted a number of agencies and individuals to confirm data, but due to classification issues was unable to make specific citations.

80 Data included in this paragraph courtesy of US Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism, April 2006, Available at www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64342.htm


39Internal insurgent groups receive support required to incite political violence and destabilize government.

Threat: Epidemics/Disasters

Figure 12: Seismic Activity in Kosovo and Serbia 2005Courtesy of Belgrade Institute for Seismology

3.2.66 Kosovo faces a number of poten-tial emergencies including epidemics, and natural and man-made disasters. Fear of the spread of avian flu in the autumn of 2005 spurred the PISG and UNMIK officials to review the capacity of Kosovo’s emer-gency response and health institutions.81 The findings were in somewhat surprising, in that some institutions were better pre-pared to respond than was originally be-lieved, but most revealed severe shortfalls in capacity to address disaster response. In addition, communication and manage-ment problems were endemic within and across both Kosovo and international in-stitutions. Furthermore, Kosovo-specific

81 In response to Avian Flu threat a Task Force was set up in 2005 with the participation of UNMIK and several PISG Ministries, including the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development (MAFRED), the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the Department of Emergency Management (DEM) under the chair of MAFRED. Three exercises have been organized so far with the participation of KPS, KPC and other relevant actors under the leadership of DEM. The Task Force is still operational. 82 As an example, KFOR moved to shut down a smelting factory in north Mitrovica in the fall of 2000 based on international community concerns over lead pollution emitted by Serbs continuing to operate without international access. Those concerns were also linked to political issues raised by the symbolic nature of Serbs continuing to operate part of the Trepca mining company without Albanians having the ability to access the perceived wealth of the company.

83 For more information about this earthquake and the municipal and international community response view the UNMIK Regional Administration report on the earthquake at http://www.kosovo.undp.org/news/eqmonrep.pdf .

problems, such as the need to communi-cate to Serbian parallel institutions, could cause significant breaks in information and response capacity.

3.2.67 Beyond health issues, Kosovo faces threats from industrial waste and decay of industrial infrastructure, particu-larly in the city of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica and in mining areas in northern Kosovo.82 Fur-thermore, Kosovo sits in the middle of an active earthquake zone with seismic fault lines running along the Adriatic littoral and the Vardar Valley. The most recent significant earthquake in Kosovo occurred in 2002 in the Gjilan/Gnjilane region and measured 5.7 on the Richter scale.83

3.2.68 Currently Kosovo is poorly pre-pared to coordinate disaster response, regardless of the origin of the emergency. Attempts to create basic facilities for infor-mation gathering and coordination, such as setting up a Situation Centre in the Of-fice of the Prime Minister, have been de-layed. Although training and exercises have been arranged for various institu-tions and entities required to respond in an emergency situation preparation has largely been undertaken in an isolated way. For example, training for implement-ers such as KPC, KPS, and Department of Emergency Management has been funded by international donors and is an integral part of their development. Nevertheless, cross-institutional training between im-plementers and political actors for crisis management is largely non-existent. Im-proving Kosovo’s capacity to respond to disasters will not only involve improving governing institutions’ competencies, but also will involve issues such as improving capacity for public information and cross-community cooperation and communication.


40

Figure 13: Illustration of Hazardous Zones in KosovoSource: OSCE, UNEP, UNDP. Environment and Security – Transforming Risks Into Cooperation – The Case of Central Asia and Southeastern Europe, 2003.

Potential Manifestations of Epidemics/

Disasters

3.2.69 Short-Term

Significant mortality rates in disaster zoneRioting in response to perception of incompetent response by authorities

3.2.70 Long-Term

Significant mortality rates in disaster zonePoor government response leads to collapse of public trust in institutionsSocial violence and political unrest

Threat: External Aggression

3.2.71 Kosovo faces a number of immedi-ate external threats that encompass some of the threats mentioned above, includ-ing organised crime, terrorism, and drugs trade. In terms of cross-border military threats, as described in the security envi-ronment section of this report, relations with Kosovo’s neighbours have improved in recent years. It should also be noted that Kosovo’s citizens have put this threat as a low priority, largely due to the belief that an international military presence will remain in the territory for the foresee-able future. However, the region remains volatile and Kosovo’s relationships with its neighbours, particularly Serbia and poten-

tially Macedonia, will require attention. 3.2.72 Kosovo’s relationship with Serbia will hinge on the outcome of final status negotiations and the ability of the parties to reach agreement regarding the future of Kosovo. In large part, the three munici-palities north of the River Ibër/Ibar84 and the northern part of the city of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica are the pivotal point on which the future security, internal and external, of Kosovo rests.

3.2.73 The city of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica has been a flashpoint since the start of in-ternational administration of Kosovo. As hostilities ended in Kosovo, Albanian and Serb communities consolidated their con-trol of certain areas of the territory. Mem-bers of both communities were forced from their homes as this consolidation oc-curred and an effective division of the terri-tory was instituted. This “division” was not a clean one, however, as it left a number of minority enclaves across the south of Kosovo and divided the city of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, creating a conflict point that flares regularly.

3.2.74 The low-intensity conflict that has been brewing over Mitrovicë/Mitrovica and in a larger sense the north of Kosovo, since 1999, has manifested itself in the final status negotiation process.85 As the region continues to grapple with issues of na-tional identity, national borders, and cross-border ethnic ties, Kosovo will face threats to its external security. That being said, a balance must be struck between Kosovo’s ability to cope diplomatically and politi-cally with these challenges and its ability to maintain peace and security within its borders. Most experts believe that region-al conflicts may be overcome by a mutual desire of countries to ascend to European Union membership, but part of that proc-ess will have to include willingness, at the national political level, to accept the prob-lems of the past and find solutions for the future.

84 The three municipalities are Zubin Potok/Zubin Potok, Zveçan/Zvečan, and Leposaviq /Leposavić.

85 A January 2006 statement the Contact Group outlined principles for negotiation on all issues including that there should be: no return of Kosovo to the pre-1999 situation, no partition of Kosovo, and no union of Kosovo with any or part of another country.”

Hazardous industrial site

Mining site

Nuclear power generation site

Waste disposal site

Heavy polluted water

Pristina

Gilan

Jegunovce

Kumanov

TetovoGostivar

Skopje

Rozaje

Berane

Trepca

Zvecane

Kosova

Serbia


41Potential Manifestations of

External Threats

3.2.75 Short Term

Riots or acts of political violence encouraged by Serb and Albanian extremists.

3.2.76 Long Term

Cross-border insurgency

Section 3.3: Other Concerns:

Vulnerable Sectors of Society and

Marginalised Groups

3.3.1 Kosovo has two sectors of the population which are vulnerable and un-der-represented within the political and security infrastructure. The first are Kos-ovo’s women and the second are its youth. In addition, marginalised groups, such as Kosovo’s returning minorities and resident minorities also have concerns that leave them without full representation of their views in the political and social mecha-nisms available.

3.3.2 On all fronts these vulnerable and marginalised sectors of the population are less educated, unemployed, and under-represented in the leadership of the terri-tory. Furthermore, the problems that face these sectors of society are often common, regardless of ethnic group.

Women

3.3.3 Kosovo’s Albanian women have a long history of participation in rebellion, which provided them access to leading roles in political parties and NGOs in the territory. Unfortunately, Kosovo’s long history of struggle also resulted in high unemployment levels and closure of aca-demic institutions, leaving a generation

of young women across all ethnic groups with serious gaps in education and pro-fessional leadership opportunities. Today women in Kosovo face significant barriers to education, employment, and advance-ment within the political and economic structures.

3.3.4 The approximate percentage of women in Kosovo is 49.5%.86 In terms of the current and future security architec-ture of Kosovo, participation of women is essential to address not only threats spe-cific to gender, such as rape and domestic violence, but also to ensure that all the voices of the citizens of Kosovo are heard on these important issues. ISSR attempt-ed to involve women across Kosovo in its public outreach activities by reaching out in communities as well as through wom-en’s networks, but a relatively low percent of the overall participants in the process were women.

3.3.5 Women have an important role to play in developing a secure Kosovo, both politically and economically. Women in post-conflict nations generally play an im-portant role in peace-building and often bring new perspectives to peace negotia-tions.87 Although Kosovo’s active women’s NGOs have successfully brought forward a number of important issues over the course of the last six years, women’s voices in governmental institutions generally and specifically in the security sector remain low.

3.3.6 For rural women the participation levels are much lower. According to avail-able figures, the percentage of rural wom-en participating in community meetings is less than 5%, whereas for men the figure is 65%.88 As illustrated in the chart below, leadership and decision making roles in Kosovo’s communities are usually made by men:

The situation for internally dis-

placed persons inside Koso-vo is frequently neglected. The continued existence of camps inside Kosovo is a disgrace for the governing structures and for the in-ternational com-munity.

Special Envoy Kai Eide, Report

to the Security Council, October

2005

86 Figure courtesy of Statistical Office of Kosovo, Kosovo and Its Population 2000 (revised version 2004).

87 Resources on women’s roles in peace and conflict resolution can be found in the bibliography at Annex I. Specific information regarding women’s roles in SSR can be found in the International Alert and Women Waging Peace publication, “Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A Toolkit for Advocacy and Action.” www.womenwagingpeace.net

88 UNMIK Office of Gender Affairs, “Women and Men in Kosovo,” p.56.


42

Figure 14: Decision Making in the Household (Men and Women)Source: Survey of Domestic Economies, Statistical office of Kosovo, 2001

Youth

3.3.7 Kosovo features one of the young-est populations in Europe. Sources put the population under the age of nineteen at nearly 42%.89 Kosovo has a large rural population and it is estimated only 32% of women in rural areas completed second-ary school and only 50% of men. Approxi-mately 60% of the rural population in Kos-ovo is under the age 30.90

Indicator Date of Data

Collection

Value

Proportion of women taking part in community decision-making structures

on a permanent basis

2001 5%

Proportion of women members of Kosovo Assembly 2006 28.3%

Proportion of women members of Municipal Assemblies 2001 28.8%

Proportion of women ministers in the Kosovo government 2006 6.5%

Proportion of women permanent secretaries 2003 10%

Proportion of women mayors

Proportion of women deputy mayors

20062006

0%3%

Proportion of women chairs of Parliamentary Committees 2006 18%

Proportion of women integrating the leadership structure of LDK 2003 20%

Proportion of women integrating the leadership structure of the Democratic

Party of Kosovo

2003 10%

Proportion of women integrating the leadership structure of the Alliance for

the Future of Kosovo

2003 10%

Table 12: Women and Leadership in KosovoSource: UNMIK Office of Gender Affairs Report, “Women and Men in Kosovo” 2003, p18. 2006 Figures Courtesy of OSCE Democratisation Department

3.3.8 According to UNDP project docu-ments, youth in Kosovo face significant obstacles to effective participation in their society:

“Threatening developments and cir-cumstances in the youth sector include: expansion of organised crime and threat of trafficking in young women; unemployment due to lack of opportu-nities, vocational training, or education; narcotics and alcohol abuse; prevalence of violence amongst youth; inadequate educational resources; and, disaffection from the current process of democrati-sation and governance building.”91

3.3.9 Experts on youth in post-conflict and/or developing nations note that the combination of a youth bulge92, such as the one faced by Kosovo, poor economic conditions, and high unemployment can lead to vulnerabilities of the population to terrorism, organised crime, and infiltra-tion of drug trade and culture. Dr. Carol

0

20

40

60

80

100

Nev

er

Som

etim

es

Mai

nly

Alw

ays

Nev

er

Som

etim

es

Mai

nly

Alw

ays

Nev

er

Som

etim

es

Mai

nly

Alw

ays

Marriages Divorces Community Meetings

Men

Women

89 The Statistical Office of Kosovo (SOK) places the percentage of those under fourteen at 33%. Other sources range to those under twenty from 40-45%.

90 SOK, “Series 2: Agriculture and Environment Statistics – Agricultural Household Survey 2004.”p 8. It should be noted that the report indicates that the statistics for rural populations north of the Ibër/Ibar river illustrate a much higher percentage of older people (between 30-40%) due to the migration of young people into Serbia and other places.

91 UNDP Kosovo website, http://www.kosovo.undp.org/Projects/YPCPP/ypcpp.htm

92 Richard Cincotta defines the term “youth bulge” as “high proportions of 15-to-29 year olds relative to the adult population”. See “State of the World 2005 Global Security Brief #2: Youth Bulge, Underemployment Raise Risks of Civil Conflict.”


43Lancaster of the Woodrow Wilson Cen-tre notes that poverty and youth do not always equal proper breeding grounds for terrorism, but she notes, “in some cir-cumstances, reducing poverty could well increase the pool of potential terrorists – if educated young people who are angry because they lack job or life prospects buy into ideologies or religious movements that urge them to violence.”93

3.3.10 As discussed in previous sec-tions of this report addressing the threat of drugs, economic issues, and organised crime, youth in Kosovo feel vulnerable to the challenges facing their communities. In the past the release valve of immigra-tion to Western Europe helped alleviate the pressure on Kosovo’s young popula-tion by providing opportunities for work and education outside the territory. How-ever, these opportunities have significant-ly reduced since the late 1990’s, and for the foreseeable future the issue of integrating youth into not only the economic culture of Kosovo, but also the political one, rests on Kosovo’s leadership.

Other Marginalised Groups

3.3.11 In addition to the generalised groups mentioned above, a number of other groupings of Kosovo citizens are often marginalised from political and eco-nomic processes in Kosovo. Kosovo’s other minority groups, particularly the Roma, are often excluded from wider discourse on is-sues that impact their communities and have faced violence directed against them in the post-conflict period. In addition, al-though the process of returns has been a focus on the international community and facilitation of the process a key standard to be met by the PISG, returning refugees still face obstacles in terms of integration in the wider Kosovo community and representa-tion of their views.94 Minorities in Kosovo

generally face challenges in terms of inte-gration into the wider Kosovo society due to differences in language, perceptions of the role of certain groups in war-time events, and the poor economic conditions which make job prospects and economic opportunities even more difficult to come by for these communities. Marginalised groups such as Roma and returnees of all minority communities, however, face the steepest climb towards a secure and sta-ble future in post-conflict Kosovo and ef-forts to include their concerns in the wider plan for a secure future will be a long term responsibility of Kosovo’s leadership.

Common Challenges of All Vulnerable

and Marginalised Groups

3.3.12 Women, youth, and marginalised groups in Kosovo all share common chal-lenges regarding obstacles to education, vocational training, employment oppor-tunities, and isolation from the political processes that impact their lives. Across Kosovo’s communities these vulnerable and marginalised sectors of society carry a common sense of despair for the future and lack of trust in leaders or institutions to help change the situation. According to UNDP Project statements, “Youth must have the opportunity to develop the so-cial values and skills needed to contrib-ute effectively to civic life. Despite these observations, youth as a group has been denied an integral place in the reconstruc-tion, governance, and socio-economic processes now occurring in Kosovo.”95 The same statement might also be applied to a degree to all the groups mentioned in this section.

3.3.13 Efforts have been made by the in-ternational community to reach out to vul-nerable and marginalised communities in Kosovo to ensure they have a foundation on which to build their productive role in

Here in Fushë Kosova the securi-

ty is on a good level-all the Roma citizens go out freely in the city, not just here, but in other cities as well. But unemployment is the biggest problem for Roma people in Kosovo.

Roma middle aged

man, Fushë Kosova/Kosovo Polje

93 Lancaster, Carol, “Poverty, Terrorism, and National Security.” Woodrow Wilson Center Publication, 2003.

94 The exact number of those displaced in the Kosovo conflict interested to return to the territory is an issue of dispute and is highly politicised. According to UNHCR’s 2005 Global Refugee Trends there are approximately 2,158 refugees from Kosovo under the care of UNHCR. Estimates of the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) range from 80,000 to 235,000 depending on the source. Those displaced include Serbs and other minorities. In addition a number of Albanians have been internally displaced from Serb-majority areas. According to a 2003 USAID assessment of the returns situation in Kosovo, many of the Serbs displaced to Serbia have resettled there. In addition, some were actually settled in Kosovo during the Milosevic regime and thus do not intend to return. Since the riots of 2004, efforts to support returns to Kosovo have continued and have met some limited success.

95 UNDP, Youth Post-Conflict Participation Project.


44 Kosovo’s transition from conflict. For ex-ample, youth programmes and support for youth in political parties have given a road to participation for youth leadership and quotas for women on party lists have provided an opportunity to gain political experience at the municipal and Kosovo Assembly levels of government. In terms of the security sector involvement of differ-ent voices is essential. The Women Waging Peace96 Toolkit for security sector reform notes, “the societal dimensions of SSR con-cern the role of civil society in monitoring

the development of security policies and the actions of security services, and ensur-ing transparency and accountability on all issues.”97 Kosovo’s future will depend on its leaders finding a way to capitalised ini-tiatives started in its transitional phase to build structural and institutional change in the education, employment, and profes-sional leadership sectors to ensure that all the people of Kosovo have a voice and a role to play in important issues, including their security.

96 The Women Waging Peace Network is a network of women peacemakers from conflict areas around the world, ranging from Sudan to Sri Lanka, Colombia to Bosnia, and the Middle East to Sierra Leone. The Network was launched in 1999 to connect these women with each other with the goal of advocating on peace and security issues to policymakers around the world.97 Women Waging Peace/International Alert toolkit p.32.


45

CHAPTER IV

Functional Analysis of

Governance Institutions

Functional Analysis of Governance Institutions

48

Section 4.1: Introduction

4.1.1 This chapter examines Kosovo’s governing institutions with direct refer-ence to the security threats previously identified in this report. Throughout the compilation of this section of the report, the ISSR team has used not only the per-ceived threat analysis falling out of ISSR Stages One and Two, but also the Copen-hagen Criteria, as the necessary bench-marks for the development of Kosovo in-stitutions. In this manner, ISSR team sug-gest the way forward for Kosovo in terms of improving their internal security sector architecture and providing a stable gov-ernance platform for the growth of a safe, secure and financially viable future.

4.1.2 Recognizing that good gover-nance is an essential element to a stable and democratically-controlled security sector, ISSR’s approach is founded on the principle that good governance and se-curity are intertwined and mutually affect each other. Studies of conflict situations in the post-Cold War era have continuously given evidence on the important role of solid and accountable institutions in the social and political stability of countries. For this reason UNDP has concluded that “good governance is by nature preven-tive.”98 Following on this approach, the ISSR sought to review institutions relevant to the threats identified in Chapter 3 of this

report and then complete the institutional gap analysis found in Chapter 6.

4.1.3 ISSR team also took into con-sideration the significant developments which have taken place over the last dec-ade in the area of governance studies and institutional analysis. Based on the UNDP99

extensive work since early 1990s, and the recent research of The World Bank100 on governance indicators, consensus is being built around six well defined dimensions: voice and accountability, political instabil-ity and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and, control of corruption. These indicators revolve around three main issues: the process by which governments are selected and re-placed; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens for rules which govern their interactions. In the se-curity sector, consensus has been built around the following indispensable dimen-sions of governance: legitimate legislative basis, transparency and accountability, and coordination.101 These constitute the basis of ISSR’s analysis of the Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG).

4.1.4 With the establishment of the PISG through UNMIK Regulations 2001/9 and 2001/19 the legislative and executive au-thority, including the administration of the judiciary, were partially transferred to the Kosovo institutions.

What is governance?

Development agencies, international organizations and academic institutions definegovernance in different ways. Moreover, the indicator sources also operate with various notions of governance.

CHAPTER IVFunctional Analysis Of Governance Institutions

98 Governance for sustainable development. A UNDP policy document. http://magnet.undp.org/policy99 Governance Indicators: A user’s guide, UNDP 2004; UNDP National Human Development Reports (NHDR) and the use of Democratic Governance Indicators, UNDP, September 2004. 100 Governance Matters: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004. Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. The World Bank, May 2005. The data, as well as a web-based graphical interface, are available at: www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/ The Appendices and a synthesis of the paper are available: at: www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters4.html .101 National Security Sector Decision-Making Structures and Security Sector Reform. Technical Report, Susanna Bearne, Olga Oliker, Kevin A. O’Brien, and Andrew Rathmell, TR-289-SSDAT June 2005. Prepared for the United Kingdom’s Security Sector Development Advisory Team.

UNDPGovernance is the system of values,

policies and institutions by which a society manages its economic, political and social affairs through interactions within and among the state, civil society and private sector. It is the way a society organ-ises itself to make and imple-ment decisions — achieving mutual understanding, agree-ment and action. It comprises the mechanisms and pro-cesses for citizens and groups to articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations.It is the rules, institutions and practices that set limits and provide incentives for indi-viduals, organizations and firms. Governance, including its social, politicaland economic dimensions, operates at every level of human enterprise, be it the household, village, municipality, nation, region or globe.

UNDP Strategy Note on Governance for

Human development, 2004

WORLD BANKWe define gover-

nance as the traditions and institutionsby which authority in a coun-try is exercised for the com-mon good. This includes (i) the process by which those in authority are selected, moni-tored and replaced, (ii) thecapacity of the government to effectively manage its re-sources and implement sound policies, and (iii) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions thatgovern economic and social interactions among them.

—World Bank Institute website 2004:

ttp://www.worldbank.org/wbi/gov-

ernance/


494.1.5 In 2002 the following areas were de jure transferred to the Provisional Insti-tutions of Self-Government (PISG) through UNMIK Regulation 2001/9:

(a) Economic and financial policy;(b) Fiscal and budgetary issues;(c) Administrative and operational cus-

toms activities;(d) Domestic and foreign trade, industry

and investments;(e) Education, science and technology;(f ) Youth and sport;(g) Culture;(h) Health;(i) Environmental protection;(j) Labour and social welfare;(k) Family, gender and minors;(l) Transport, post, telecommunications

and information technologies;(m) Public administration services;(n) Agriculture, forestry and rural devel-

opment;(o) Statistics;(p) Spatial planning;(q) Tourism;(r) Good governance, human rights and

equal opportunities; and(s) Non-resident affairs;(t) Responsibilities in the field of local

administration;(v) Responsibilities in the field of judicial

affairs;

4.1.6 Chapters 4 and 5 examine a number of the institutions set up under UNMIK Regulations 2001/9 and 2001/19, as well as some of the institutions working in coordination with the international com-munity in governing areas that fall within the SRSG’s reserved areas of governance. Chapter 4 is an analysis of the governance institutions which are related to the larger concept of human security, while Chapter 5 is an analysis of existing PISG and UNMIK governing security institutions.

4.1.7 The format used for review of each institution is generally the following:

Background on institution and legal frameworkIdentified ChallengesRecommendations

4.1.8 The gap analysis in Chapter 6 examines challenges to the institutions analysed in Chapters 4 and 5 and possible methods to address these shortfalls. Over-all recommendations and current and fu-ture programs to address them are found at Annex IX.

4.1.9 The following issues and institu-tions are examined in Section 2 of Chapter 4:

Civil Service Oversight ActorsBudget Processes and Financial IssuesJudiciary Trade and Industry Education Health

4.1.10 Kosovo’s civil society and informal oversight actors are examined in Section 3 of Chapter 4, as follows:

Media Civil society and social movements

4.1.11 Chapter 5 examines the following security institutions:

Crisis and Emergency ManagementKosovo Police ServiceKosovo Protection CorpsKosovo Correctional ServiceBorder Control

4.1.12 A separate section in Chapter 5 on non-institutional security related subjects examines the issue of small arms and light weapons and the private security compa-nies.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Governance concerns the state’s ability to serve the citizens. It refers to the rules, processes, and behaviors by which interests are articu-lated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in society. The way public func-tions are carried out, public resources are managed and public regulatory powers are exercised is the major issue to be addressed in this context.In spite of its open and broad character, governance is a meaningful and practical concept relating to the very basic aspects of the function-ing of any society and political and social systems. It can be described as a basic measure of stability and performance of a society.As the concepts of human rights, democratization and democracy, the rule of law, civil society, decentralised power sharing, and sound public administration, gainimportance and relevance as a society develops into a more sophisticated political system, governance evolves into good gover-nance.

—Communication on Governance

and Development,

October 2003, COM (03) 615


50

Institutional Background

4.2.1 The foundation of the civil serv-ice in Kosovo is promulgated by UNMIK Regulation 2001/19, UNMIK Regulation 2001/36, the UNMIK Administrative Direc-tion 2003/2, and 13 Administrative Instruc-tions issued by the Ministry of Public Serv-ices.

4.2.2 With the establishment of the PISG and the creation of the reserved ar-eas, as per the Constitutional Framework (UNMIK Regulation 2001/9) Kosovo Civil Service came under two separate authori-ties, the PISG and UNMIK. In contrast, the Municipal Civil Service came into exist-ence one year before the adoption of the relevant legislation on the civil service, the establishment of the PISG, and the forma-tion of the central institutions. In addition, from the conceptual point of view the mu-nicipal civil service was influenced by a dif-ferent system (Swedish) from the central civil service (British). This has contributed to a fragmented approach to civil adminis-tration.

4.2.3 The Civil Service law defined civil servants as “any employee of an em-ploying authority, whose salary is paid from the Kosovo Consolidated Budget, ex-cept for the members of the Independent Oversight Board, exempt employees, and the members of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC).”102 It also defined the govern-ing principles of the Civil Service, and the code of conduct of the civil servants. The law also further developed the provisions for the functioning of SPAC and estab-lished the Independent Oversight Board (IOB).

4.2.4 There are two main institu-tions which deal with the oversight of the civil service; the Ministry of Public Serv-ices (MPS) and the Independent Oversight Board (IOB). The MPS has a central role in developing and overseeing the implemen-tation of policies through its Department of Civil Service Administration (DCSA). While the IOB functions as an appellate mechanism and organizes regular assess-ments of the PISG on civil service matters. Civil Servants appointed by the Senior Public Appointments Committee (SPAC), and those categories of civil servants ex-cluded from the competence of the Board by a subsequent legislative issuance, are outside the jurisdiction of the Board.

4.2.5 UNMIK Administrative Direc-tion 2003/2 defined the procedure for re-cruitment and the terms and conditions of employment of civil servants, which were further developed in specific Administra-tive Instructions.

4.2.6 The above legislation was de-veloped in the context of a United King-dom, Department for International Devel-opment (DFID), supported project (2001-2004), in a time of transition from UNMIK administration to PISG. The local institu-tions which emerged from the 2002 gen-eral election general did not have much say in the negotiations leading to the basic legislation and the shaping of the institu-tional framework of the civil service. With the consolidation of the local institutions, further changes are expected in the above legislation and institutional set-up. A new draft civil service law is in the process of being prepared by the Ministry of Public Services.

UNDPThe notion of Hu-

man Security was first in-

troduced in UNDP Human

Development Report 1994.

In the report, an entire chap-

ter was given to analyse Hu-

man Security as an essential

aspect of sustainable human

development. The concept

of human security equates

security with people rather

than territories, with develop-

ment rather than arms.

Human security is not a con-

cern with weapons – it is a

concern with human life and

dignity. Human security can

be said to have two main

aspects. It means, first, safety

from such chronic threats as

hunger, disease and repres-

sion. And second, it means

protection from sudden and

hurtful disruptions in the pat-

terns of daily life – whether in

homes, in jobs, or in

communities.

UNDP Human Development Report

1994 UNDP website:

http://www.undp.org

102 UNMIK Regulation 2001/36.

Source: Governance Indicators: A

user’s guide, UNDP 2004;

Issue:Civil Service

PISG Institutions:Ministry of Public

Services (MPS) Independent

Oversight Board (IOB)

Senior Public Appoint ments Committee (SPAC)

SECTION 4.2: Institutional Actors


514.2.7 With a difficult conception and minor adjustments of the rules of proce-dure in 2003, the SPAC appointed most of Permanent Secretaries and Chief Execu-tive Officers in line with the civil service legislation. Political changes in 2004 had an adverse impact especially on the sen-ior levels of civil service. The above trend is most evident in the Ministries and Munici-palities where there has been a change of leadership along party lines. The Ministry of Public Services, responsible of civil serv-ice matters, experienced one of the most radical shake-ups with the dismissal of over 95% of civil servants at senior level posi-tions including the Permanent Secretary. Similar problems were experienced in the Ministry for Communities and Return and in the municipalities after the local elec-tions. An April 2003 UNMIK report, which was based on a survey of 22 municipali-ties, noted that “the Chief Executive Offic-ers and the Boards of Directors are the first casualties of the municipal elections.”103

4.2.8 Out of 11 Permanent Secretar-ies appointed by the SPAC only one is still in place, and two others are effectively

demoted. The rest have been discontinued or dismissed for allegedly violating the UN-MIK Regulation 2001/19 which stipulates that the SPAC can only “remove the above officials solely on grounds of professional

incompetence or misconduct or after hav-ing been convicted of a criminal offence and sentenced to serve a prison term of six months or more” and “in consultation with the Special Representative of the Secre-tary-General”. In fact, only two years after its establishment (in year 2005) the SPAC was de facto transformed from an appoint-ing institution and guarantor of stability to a rubber stamp for dismissals by Ministers and, therefore, has contributed to the in-stability of the civil service.

Data

4.2.9 Currently there are over 71,000 civil servants, of which approximately 70% were put in place by the UNMIK administra-tion before the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) were established.104

Over 55% of the total are employed by the Municipal civil service. The remaining civil servants are employed by the PISG Minis-tries and other central institutions. The larg-est representation of civil servants is found in the areas of education and health. De-tailed figures by qualification, ethnicity and gender are presented below:

4.2.10 In terms of oversight of the civil service, the case load of the Independent Oversight Board (IOB) has increased from 8 cases in 2003 to 169 cases in 2005.105 Of a total of 20 cases solved in 2005, and another

104 Figures are provided by the Ministry of Public Services. As of September 2005 there were approximately 71,685 civil servants in Kosovo.105 Figures are drawn from IOB’s Annual Report 2005 and an interview with the IOB Secretariat. Note to reader: the figures for 2006 are partial as the research in support of this report was completed prior to the end of the IOB reporting period.

103 Internal report, MPS Monitoring Mission: Compliance with the Civil Service Law in the Municipalities, Office of the Principal International Officer, Ministry of Public Services. Prishtina: April 2003.

0

10.000

20.000

30.000

40.000

50.000

60.000

70.000

80.000

Central Institutions Municipalities Total num ber of em ployees

Num ber of em ployees

Albanians

Serbs

Turks

Others

Male

Fem ale

Figure 15: Civil Servants in Kosovo by Location and EthnicitySource: Ministry of Public Services Department of Civil Service Administration


52

54 solved in 2006, only eight were decided in favour of the plaintiff, and another eight partially in his/her favour.

4.2.11 The IOB has also conducted 74 assessments on compliance with the princi-ples of the Civil Service Law, and another 49 assessments to determine whether the ap-pointment of directors has been in accord-ance with the law.

4.2.12 Institutional Challenges

Although the SRSG and UNMIK have a final authority on oversight of PISG UNMIK has failed to respond to abus-es of power by individuals in the PISG, thus contributing to the deterioration in the efficiency of the civil service. (Please check paragraphs 4.2.8 and 4.2.9)

Flaws in the design of Kosovo civil service have contributed to fragmen-tation. Specifically, the division of authority between the areas trans-ferred to the PISG and those reserved to UNMIK, a mismatch in timing of the establishment of the municipal and central civil service, and finally politicisation of the nature of the civil service by parties controlling the PISG have encouraged fractionalisation.

While a DFID sponsored project con-tributed to putting in place unified legislation and the institutionalisa-tion of roles, the lack of political will in UNMIK and the PISG to implement the recommendations have brought significant instability to the system and contributed to a reduction in public trust in the civil administration of Kosovo.

There is no Assembly committee dealing with civil service and public administration matters.

The continuation of a pay and grade system based on multipliers, de-signed by UNMIK in 2000, and the fail-ure to move to a new pay and grading system has led to the perpetuation of an ad hoc system of remuneration without any provision of periodic in-creases in salary. This has adversely af-fected the morale of the civil service.

Since 2005 the large turnover of Per-manent Secretaries has resulted in a lack of continuity and loss of expe-rience, expertise, and institutional memory at the highest levels of the civil service which in turn impacts on the functioning of the ministries.

Figure 16: The Above Charts Show the Proportion of Civil Servants to the Population of Kosovo and the Estimated Overall Population Breakdown.Source: UNMIK Communities Section Updated as of April 2006.

Albanians

Serbs

Others

87.7%

8.3%

4%

Chart A: Civil Servants

Albanians

Serbs

Others

90.2%

5.8%4%

Chart B: Kosovo Population

106 “In 2004 a new pay and grade review study was conducted by HELM Corporation. The recommended salary system provides for a systematic and transparent salary scheme across the administration. It provides some incentives so that good staff should be recruited and retained more easily than before. The new salary system is in line with good European practice; it is simple and transparent.” Source: UNDP’s Assessment of Administrative Capacity in Kosovo, April 2005. UNMIK/EU Pillar IV note that this pay and grade system has not been implemented largely due to cost. It is estimated changes recommended would cost in excess of € 14 Million. Based on IMF recommendations the Government of Kosovo will undertake a new review of pay and grade in 2007 based on affordability criteria.


534.2.13 Recommendations

In order to address some of the frag-mentation issues present in the civil service, administration in the trans-ferred and reserved areas should come under the unified authority of PISG institutions.

The institution of the SPAC should be reviewed since this institution has often been used to rubber-stamp politically motivated decisions. Fur-thermore, since the common practice since 2004 has been for the newly elected representatives to dismiss senior civil servants and replace them with people of their choice, consid-eration might be given to the practice of the political appointment of Per-manent Secretaries/Chief Executive Officers.

The role of the Independent Over-sight Board (IOB) should be strength-ened. The IOB should become an in-dependent body accountable to the Assembly of Kosovo in line with EU

best practice. In addition, IOB deci-sions should be strictly enforced.

The Kosovo Civil Service should move towards a permanent and stable civil service system, whereby contracts are not used to terminate civil servants at the politicians’ will. Termination of contracts should be strictly related to the performance appraisal system.

The pay and grade review which has been designed by an international firm and approved by the Govern-ment in 2004 should be introduced.106

This will contribute to engendering a professional, and merit based, civil service and to increasing the public trust in the institutions.

The Assembly of Kosovo should con-sider establishing a public service/public administration committee, which would assume an oversight role related to the Ministry of Public Services and the IOB.

Issue: Oversight

PISG Institutions: Ombudsperson

Assembly of Kosovo


4.2.14 The Ombudsperson is the only existing PISG institution with oversight powers and explicit authorities. On the first anniversary of UNMIK administration in Kosovo, the Institution of Ombudsper-son was established under international di-rection, “for the purpose of enhancing the protection of human rights in Kosovo”107.This institution was tasked to “provide ac-cessible and timely mechanisms for the review and redress of actions constituting an abuse of authority by the interim civil administration or any emerging central or local institution.”108

4.2.15 In contrast the Assembly of Kos-ovo was established by UNMIK Regulation 2001/9 as “the highest representative and legislative Provisional Institution of Self-Government of Kosovo.”109 However, no provision has been made for the Assembly Committees to exercise oversight powers. Out of the three main functions of the As-sembly, namely representative, legislative and oversight,110 only the first two are laid out in detail in the Constitutional Frame-work.

4.2.16 Although UNMIK Regulation 2001/9 provides for “each person claiming to have been directly and adversely affect-

107 UNMIK Regulation 2000/38 108 Ibid.109 UNMIK Regulation 2001/9110 Parliamentary Control of the Security Sector, Teodora Fuior ASI Assembly Support Initiative Newsletter, February 2006, No. 21, p.22.


54 ed by a decision of the Government or an executive agency under the responsibility of the Government shall have the right to judicial review of the legality of that deci-sion after exhausting all avenues for ad-ministrative review”, there is no specific Ko-sovo institution mandated to exercise the judicial review. The powers of the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court to “decide (…) on whether any law adopted by the Assembly is incompatible with the Consti-tutional Framework” are overshadowed by the authority of the SRSG to “oversee the PISG”, and to “take appropriate measures whenever their actions are inconsistent with UNSCR 1244 (1999) or the Consti-tutional Framework” (UNMIK Regulation 2001/9), and “to interpret the scope and any other parameters of the executive re-sponsibilities” of the PISG (UNMIK Regula-

tion 2001/19). Furthermore, UNMIK regu-lations and administrative directions are beyond the reach of current judicial review arrangements.

Ombudsperson Institution

4.2.17 There are two regulations on the Ombudsperson Institution, both is-sued by UNMIK. The first, UNMIK Regula-tion 2000/38, created for the first time in Kosovo an institution of this kind and its establishment was done largely with OSCE direction and support. The second, UNMIK Regulation 2006/6, established six years later, transferred its functions to Kosovo institutions.

4.2.18 The Ombudsperson does not substitute the courts and cannot directly

Figure 17: Number of Cases and Ethnic Background of ClaimantsSource: Ombudsperson Institution Annual Reports 2001-2006

Figure 18: Nature of Cases Brought Before OmbudspersonSource: Ombudsperson Institution Annual Reports 2001-2006

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

2000-2002 2003 2004 2005

Number of Claimants by

ethnicity background

Albanian

Serbian

Other

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

2000-2002 2003 2004 2005

Total Number of

applications

Judiciary

Property Issues

Administrative Issues

Human Rights


55investigate crimes, change court decisions, or make binding decisions itself. The Om-budsperson does not deal with disputes between the international administration and its staff, or cases involving UNMIK. However, according to UNMIK Regulation 2006/6, “(the) Ombudsperson Institution may enter into a bilateral agreement with the Special Representative of the Secre-tary-General on procedures for dealing with cases involving UNMIK.” To date this authority has not been exercised.

Ombudsperson Institution Data

4.2.19 The caseload and the nature of the cases of the Ombudsperson Institution for the period 2000-2005 have been as follows111:

4.2.20 The following may be deduced from the above illustrations:

Number of cases is slightly growing over the years.Property related cases constitute a significant portion of cases, which is understanding given the post-con-flict situation and the movement of populations (particularly the Serbs). However judicial-related issues are also on the rise, which is in line with ISSR findings especially on the lack of trust in the judiciary and minority ac-cess to courts.

Assembly of Kosovo

4.2.21 The Assembly of Kosovo was established by UNMIK Regulation 2001/9 and no specific provisions were made in the Regulation for Assembly Committees to perform oversight duties. According to best parliamentary procedure in the secu-rity sector:

“Committees exercise broad oversight powers to investigate major public policy issues, defective administration, and accusations of corruption or scan-dal. The concrete actions undertaken

by a Committee to control the execu-tive include holding hearings or inquir-ies; summoning military personnel, civil servants or experts to testify at com-mittee meetings; questioning ministers and other executive representatives; re-questing documents from the executive; examining petitions and complaints from military or civilian personnel; and visiting and inspecting army bases and other security sector premises.” 112

4.2.22 Furthermore an Assembly Com-mittee on Security was established in September 2006, and the functions of the committee remain to be established.113

Municipal Level Oversight

4.2.23 UNMIK Regulation 2005/54 established two mechanisms at the mu-nicipal level with advisory/oversight func-tions:

Municipal Community Safety Councils (MCSC), in which each ethnic com-munity residing in the municipality nominates one member. The MCSC have a mandate to discuss any mat-ters relating to policing, public safety and order within the municipality, but shall in each case be consulted on the selection of Kosovo Police Service sta-tion commanders and the composi-tion of police deployed in the munici-pality.

Local Public Safety Councils (LPSC) in designated communities within mu-nicipalities, “having regard, in particu-lar, to the geographical situation and demographic composition of the area in question.” The membership of each LPSC shall be appointed by a majority vote of the Municipal Assembly after consultation with the local station commander, the MCSC and the resi-dents of the locality.

LPSCs may discuss any matters relat-ing to policy and public safety and

111 Data are drawn from the Annual Reports of the Ombudsperson Institution for the years 2001-2006. 112 Parliamentary Control of the Security Sector, Teodora Fuior ASI Assembly Support Initiative Newsletter, February 2006, No. 21, p.23. 113 ISSR recommendations in this area can be found in Chapter 7.


56 order within the locality, but shall in each case be consulted on the plan for policing in the locality, and the composition of police deployed with-in the locality.


Generally, no link has been formed among Kosovo’s institutions in the form of oversight or even communi-cation between the formerly UNMIK reserved areas and the transferred ones. The gap is quite visible espe-cially in the recently transferred insti-tutions, such as the PISG Ministry of Internal Affairs vis-à-vis the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), and the PISG Ministry of Justice vis-à-vis the Judici-ary. The insular development of KPS and the Judiciary over the years as in-dependent entities from the PISG will be an obstacle towards their organic integration in the Kosovo institutional structure following the determination of status.

A functional link is missing between Ministries and their respective Assem-bly Committee, especially with regard to exercising the oversight function of the Assembly.

It is not clear how the newly estab-lished MCSCs and LPSCs will function in relation to the elected Municipal Assembly. There is a danger that the Councils will face overlapping, ac-countability and under-funding prob-lems.

The mal/non-functioning of the judi-ciary and other institutions has impli-cations for the work of the Ombud-sperson Institution, since it results in the Ombudsperson addressing cases which should have been solved by other institutions.

There is a missing link between the Ombudsperson Institution and the Judiciary in the follow-up of the cases, which is gradually creating a culture of impunity for violations. Further-more, Ministries of the PISG often are not discharging their functions in

exhausting first and second levels of appeal under their competences, in-stead throwing the cases to the Om-budsperson Institution for resolution.

Although the Assembly of Kosovo has developed its committee struc-tures, their role as oversight bodies for PISG ministries is not stipulated in the legislation and is generally unde-veloped.

4.2.25 Issues to be addressed and

Recommendations

The responsibility of the Assembly of Kosovo in overseeing the security sector should be clearly spelt out in legislation, for example Kosovo’s new Constitution, the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, and Assembly Com-mittee rules of procedure.

The Committee on Security should establish sub-committees to provide policy and budgetary oversight in specific security areas such as disaster management. As new security institu-tions are established other Assembly Committees may be required with specific mandates such as defence and security services.

It is recommended that the same structure should be replicated at the Municipal Assembly level, by setting up a Committee on Security com-posed of members of the Municipal Assembly. Attention should be paid to the relationship of this committee with the current MCSCs and LPSCs, with in view to increase the account-ability and ensure proper oversight of the security structures at the local level.

In order to ensure the independence of the Ombudsperson Institution, ad-ditional provisions should be made so that the budget and the appointment of its leadership are made outside the influence of the political parties.

Since the international actors operat-ing in Kosovo fall outside the current mandate of the Ombudsperson Insti-


57tution, mechanisms should be put in place to address the abuse of power by KFOR, UNMIK Police, or UNMIK international staff in cases involving residents of Kosovo.

Procedures should be put in place for institutions to discharge their func-

tions before the cases are taken over by the Ombudsperson Institution. In light of the adoption of UNMIK Regu-lation 2006/33 regarding adminis-trative procedure, special attention should be made to address the cul-ture of impunity taking root in the PISG institutions.

Issue: Budget Process and Financial

Issues

PISG Institutions:Ministry of Finance and Economy (MFE)

UNMIK:Economic and Fiscal Council (EFC)

Background – Kosovo’s

Financial Authorities

4.2.26 Financial and budgetary mecha-nisms in Kosovo have been under tight control and close mentoring by UNMIK from the very beginning of international administration in Kosovo. Kosovo’s budget-ary and financial institutions have evolved over time through versions of interna-tional, local, and combination entities with responsibility for budgetary and financial management and oversight.

4.2.27 The Law on Public Financial Man-agement and Accountability adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo (through Kosovo Assembly Law 2003/3, and UNMIK Regu-lation 2003/17 later amended by UNMIK Regulation 2005/27) constitutes the basic legal framework for budget and financial matters.

4.2.28 Until 2002, the leading institu-tion of policy and decision making was the Central Fiscal Authority (CFA) which washeaded by UNMIK international staff. The CFA was established by UNMIK Regulation 1999/16 and acts under the authority of the Special Representative of the Secre-tary-General (SRSG). The CFA was “respon-sible for the overall financial management of the Kosovo Budget and the budgets un-der the responsibility of the municipalities, which together form the Kosovo Consoli-dated Budget.”

4.2.29 With the shift of authorities from international to local in 2001, the Ministry

of Finance and Economy was established by UNMIK Regulation 2001/19. The Minis-try is responsible for developing the PISG budget and performing economic analy-sis. In addition UNMIK regulation 2002/10 transferred the policy-making functions of the former CFA to the Economic and Fiscal Council (EFC), a mixed body composed of representatives of UNMIK and PISG. This Council was created as an advisory body to the SRSG on economic, financial or fis-cal matters. The Council’s de facto role is to make a final decision on economic, financial or fiscal matters and to act as a watchdog for the Government. The body was presided over by the SRSG and com-prised of his Deputies, the Prime Minister, the President of the Assembly and three PISG Ministers, including one represent-ing the Serb community. Its principal func-tions are the following:

(a) Setting the financial and policy parameters for and approving the Kosovo Consolidated Budget;

(b) Regulating public and socially owned enterprises; and

(c) Such other economic, financial or fis-cal matters that may be referred to the Council by the SRSG on his own initiative or on the request of other members of the Council.

4.2.30 In 2005, changes were again insti-tuted when the SRSG passed authority for chairing the EFC to the Prime Minister of Kosovo. UNMIK Regulation 2005/35 stipu-lated that:


58 “The Prime Minister shall serve as Chair-person in the meetings of the Council, acting under and without prejudice to the authority of the SRSG pursuant to the Constitutional Framework. The Prin-cipal Deputy SRSG shall act as the repre-sentative of the SRSG in the meetings of the Council.”

Under the new regulation the functions and the composition of the Council remain the same.

Kosovo Assembly Budget

Committee, Auditor-General, and

Customs Service

4.2.31 There are two additional bodies which work closely with the EFC on budget matters, the Budget Committee of the As-sembly and the Grants Commission. Their composition is similar: the Prime Minister, the Chairman of the Budget Committee, the Minister of Finance, representatives from Municipalities, and representative of UNMIK’s Economic Reconstruction Pillar. However, the issues they deal with are dif-ferent. The Budget Committee (established by UNMIK Regulation 2001/9) debates and makes recommendations in relation to the “budget ceilings”, while the Grants Com-mission (established by UNMIK Regula-tion 2003/17 and Assembly Law 2003/3), “establishes a formula, based on objective criteria, for the allocation to the municipal-ities of funds appropriated as general op-erating grants.” It also makes recommen-dations in connection with grant support for municipalities.

4.2.32 The Auditor-General and the Audit Office of Kosovo were established by UNMIK Regulation 2002/18 (later on amended by UNMIK Regulation 2005/33) to “annually conduct a Regularity Audit of the Kosovo Consolidated Budget, the As-sembly, the Office of the President of Ko-sovo, each Ministry and executive agency of the Executive Branch of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, as well as

each municipality, the Banking and Pay-ments Authority of Kosovo (BPK), and oth-er entities that are either publicly owned or receive funding from, or provide dividends or other non tax revenue to, the Kosovo Consolidated Budget including the UNMIK Customs Service, the Kosovo Trust Agency, the Ombudsperson and all other entities under UNMIK authority that receive fund-ing from the Kosovo Consolidated Budg-et.” The SRSG is currently responsible for making appropriate independent audit arrangements, and the auditors are man-dated to report to the SRSG.

4.2.33 Finally, the Customs Service, which generates more than 73% of the total revenues in Kosovo (figure of first quarter of 2006),114 remains under interna-tional management. The Customs Service of Kosovo is one of the first institutions set up by UNMIK under regulation 1999/3. All authorities related to the Customs service, including policy and staffing, remain an UNMIK reserved function.

Kosovo’s Budget structure115

4.2.34 Kosovo’s budget has the follow-ing characteristics:

(a) Kosovo’s budget is financed from its own sources of revenue, however, since 2004 the budget has carried deficits which are covered by previ-ous years’ budget surpluses. Details regarding the budget are illustrated in the diagrams below.

(b) The budget is prepared on an annual basis, starting on January 1st till 31 De-cember of each year.

(c) The budget is divided between PISG institutions and UNMIK reserved ar-eas (in 2005 UNMIK reserved areas composed about 29% of the budget).

(d) The Government has shifted as of 2005 from a “commitment” budget

114 Figure of 73% is taken from Ministry of Finance and Economy figures 2006, as cited in Chapter 1, Section 1.3.19 of this report. 115 Information on the budget cycle and other data is drawn from the booklet “To Kosovo Citizens from the Ministry of Finance and Economy,” published in 2005. Additional data is drawn from the Monthly Economic Monitor published by Macroeconomic Policy Department of MFE in April 2005, and MFE Interim Budget Report Second Quarter 2006.


59to an “expenditure” budget, meaning there is no ability to carry forward previous appropriations from year to year. This change was made to im-prove budget estimates of surplus and deficit.

(e) Per IMF advisement, in 2005 the first Medium Term Budget Framework for 2006-2008 was developed. This was done to move Kosovo’s government into multi-year planning rather than annual planning.

4.2.35 As an example of Kosovo’s rev-enue stream, in 2006 the total revenue is estimated at €656.2 million. Budgeted expenditures are €700 million. Per the graph below, during 2004-2005 65% of the budget was generated by border taxes (customs), 19% by domestic taxes, 5% by municipal-source revenue116, and 7% by non-tax revenue.

4.2.36 Non-tax revenues are composed of the following elements:

4.2.37 In terms of expenditures, wages and salaries constitute the single highest line in the Kosovo budget. Following an in-itial surge during the setting up of the PISG institutions, goods and services line have decreased over the last two years. The dia-gram below provides a general illustration of Kosovo’s budget expenditures.

4.2.38 Defence, public order and safety combined currently constitute 19% of the KCB, with defence accounting for about 3% of the budget. A sectoral overview of expenditures for year 2006 is included in the table and the diagram below:

4.2.39 Identified Challenges

While the budget planning process is well organised between UNMIK and the PISG, the implementation of the budget lacks the necessary control mechanisms that ensure proper expenditure. Once KCB funds have been allocated to re-served and transferred areas there is no mechanism for accountability – either at the Assembly level or within the min-istries. Moreover, gaps exist between UNMIK reserved areas of authority and the PISG that have budgetary implica-tions. This is particularly true in the are-as of justice and minority programmes.

Kosovo’s Assembly does not exercise a decision making and over-sight role in the budget process, which is normal for a parliamentary body. In addition, the potential role of the Budget Committee as the final author-ity to decide on the budget is currently taken by the SRSG. Furthermore, the EFC is de facto exercising powers such as fiscal and economic policy and over-sight that should rest with the MFE. To

116 Municipal revenues are sourced in the municipality, channeled through the Kosovo Consolidated Budget (KCB) and then spent in the municipality

-50

0

50

100

150

200

250

Border Tax Tax Refunds Non TaxRevenues

MunicipalRevenues

Domestic Tax

2004 Actual 2005 Actual

Revenues - comparison of the same period 2004 - 2005

Figure 19: Kosovo Consolidated Budget Revenues 2004-2005Source: MFE Booklet, To Kosovo Citizens from The Ministry of Finance and Economy, Prishtina: 2005.


60

date, moves by the international com-munity to build these competencies within Kosovo authorities have been limited.

The existences of Serb parallel struc-tures in the areas of education, health, judiciary and police, which are funded by Belgrade, create serious difficulties for a coordinated approach. Further-more, these structures result in budg-etary imbalances between munici-palities and between ethnic groups, something that could have serious political and security implications.


The strength of the sector is in the generation of resources and budget planning. The major weakness is management of resources by the in-dividual PISG institutions. Public ac-countability mechanisms should be put in place, in order to curtail the absolute powers of officials to misuse/abuse public funds. Accountability must be built into the budget alloca-tion and expenditure process. Cur-rently Kosovo’s media is the only true “watchdog” in the system, but there is no government or Assembly system of accountability or review of ques-

Courts17%(13%)

BusinessRegistration1%(4%)

MinistriesRevenues42%(27%)

Other3%(13%)

TravelDocuments9%(9%)

VehicleRegistration18%(24%)

Traffic fines10%(10%)

Structure of non -tax revenues for Q1 2005 (Q1 2004)

Figure 20: Kosovo Non-Tax RevenuesSource: MFE Monthly Bulletin, April 2005

Figure 21: Structure of general budget expenditures by economic activity for the first quarter 2005 in proportion with the first quarter 2004Source: MFE Monthly Bulletin, April 2005

Goods andservices

23%(29%)

Wages and salaries32%(34%)

Other capitalexpenditures

7%(6%)

Capitalexpenditures for

enterprise2%(1%)

Other transfers2%(1%)

Subsidies forenterprises

7%(14%)

Social Transfers/paymentshouseholds27%(15%)

I consider corrup-tion as a cancer

which has attacked Kosovo society - I'm talking about all public institutions. The scary thing is that, al-though you cannot see it, it keeps expanding and it gets deeper and deeper in the society. Kosovo will not be able to develop if a dras-tic cure is not done immediately.

Kosovo Albanian man,

Prishtina/Priština


61

General Services 12.95 11.87 1.12 1.54 2.50 29.97

Defense 4.12 1.44 0.24 0.00 0.33 6.13

Public Order and Safety 14.83 9.89 1.14 0.07 2.52 28.44

Economic Matters 1.54 6.71 0.15 5.47 6.41 20.29

Environmental Protection 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.66 0.78

Housing and Property Amenities 0.20 0.48 0.05 0.00 4.05 4.78

Heath 8.37 7.64 1.16 0.10 0.12 17.39

Recreation Culture and Religion 0.60 0.13 0.01 1.48 0.14 2.36

Education 6.42 2.68 1.05 0.76 0.02 10.93

Social Protection 1.16 0.88 0.12 58.95 0.00 61.11

TOTAL Million € 50.22 41.78 5.06 68.36 16.75 182.17

Wages

and

Salaries

Goods

and

Services

Utilities Subsides

and

Transfers

Capital

Expenditure

Total

Economic Classification

Table 13: Kosovo Government Expenditure by Economic and Functional ClassificationSource: Ministry of Finance and Economy, Interim Budget Report, Second Quarter 2006

Func

tiona

l Cla

ssifi

catio

n

Utilities3%

Goocs and Services23%

Wage sand Salaries28%

Capital Outlays9%

Subsidies and Transfers

37%

Defense3%

General Services16%

Social Protection34%

Education6%

Recreation,CultureAnd Religion

1%

Health10%

Housing and CommunityAmenities

3%

EnvirormenalProtetcton

0%

EconomicMatters

11%

Public Order and Safety16%

Figure 22: Structure as a % for central government expenditures by economic activitySource: Ministry of Finance and Economy, Interim Budget Report, Second Quarter 2006

Figure 23: Structure as a % of Central Government Expenditure by Economic FunctionSource: Ministry of Finance and Economy, Interim Budget Report, Second Quarter 2006


62 tionable expenditures. Furthermore, the accountability institutions that do exist – such as the Auditor-General – do not appear to function properly.117 Given the low level of trust most Kos-ovo citizens have for their institutions and the existing threat of corruption, this is an issue that should be immedi-ately addressed.

Government auditing mechanisms that exist often reach findings or make recommendations that are not fol-lowed up by institutions being audit-ed and mechanisms for enforcement are weak.

Capacity building is required at the leadership level of budget and finan-cial institutions in Kosovo. Given UN-MIK’s primary role in policy-making, decision-making, and oversight, there is a dearth of local leadership in these essential areas that needs to be ad-dressed.

The Assembly should be empowered to exercise their decision making and

oversight role currently curtailed by the EFC and the SRSG.

An institutional link should be estab-lished between the office of the Audi-tor-General and the Office of the Pub-lic Prosecutor of Kosovo.

A political decision is needed on the future of Serb parallel structures and how to integrate them with Kosovo wide structures.118

Kosovo’s budget is small and does not generate enough revenue to sup-port a large new security architecture. Other sections of this report review this question in greater detail.119

MFE needs to have more sophisti-cated data management, analysis and publicly available resources regarding Kosovo’s budget. Public accountability and more democratic oversight need more transparency on available data and proportional representations of sectoral data.

117 The media report daily on cases of abuse of public funds. One example that emerged during the ISSR process was the case of the Minister of Public Services who reportedly transferred one million Euro to the Presidency from MPS to buy cars.118 UN Special Envoy Kai Eide noted in his October 2005 report that, “parallel structures for health and educational services located in Kosovo Serb populated areas are mainly financed by the Serbian Government. The continued existence of these structures is a political demonstration as well as a reflection of mistruct between the two communities.”(p.5)

119 Readers interested in this issue should review the section on a future Kosovo Security Architecture in Chapter 7.

Issue:Judiciary

PISG Institutions:Ministry of Justice, Courts, Office of the Prosecutor

Kosovo Assembly Committee for Judiciary, Legislation

and Constitutional Issues

UNMIK:Kosovo Judicial Council (KJC)

UNMIK Department of Justice (Pillar I)

Background – Kosovo Judicial

Authorities

4.2.41 Kosovo is a civil law system. Since the beginning of international administration the judiciary and the legal system in Kosovo have been frequently subjected to UNMIK regulation. In fact, the first UNMIK regulation, UNMIK

Regulation 1999/1, defined the following judicial issues:

All legislative and executive author-ity with respect to Kosovo, including the administration of the judiciary, is vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the Special Representative of the Sec-retary-General.


63The SRSG may appoint any person to perform functions in the civil adminis-tration in Kosovo, including the judici-ary, or remove such person. Such func-tions shall be exercised in accordance with the existing laws and any regula-tions issued by UNMIK.

The laws applicable in the territory of Kosovo prior to 24 March 1999 shall continue to apply in Kosovo insofar as they do not conflict with international standards, the fulfilment of the man-date given to UNMIK under United Na-tions Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), or any other regulation issued by UNMIK. This provision was later changed to “the law in force in Kosovo on 22 March 1989” (UNMIK Regulation 1999/24).

4.2.42 Although the justice system in Kosovo has been the subject of the high-est number of UNMIK regulations and ad-ministrative directions, it constitutes one of the least transformed areas of the Kos-ovo institutions. Most of Kosovo’s judges and prosecutors are educated in the old Yugoslav system, the court infrastructure remains the same, and it operates on the basis of three different legislations.120

4.2.43 Former UNMIK Pillar I of Police and Justice was the primary rule of law and justice player in Kosovo.121 Although Pillar I has now been dissolved, the SRSG retains control of the justice system through re-served powers. As a result UNMIK not only holds reserved powers over the function-ing of the various aspects of the system, but also shapes policy through the institu-tions that answer directly to it. UNMIK also retains financial control of the judiciary and control of overall policy decisions.

4.2.44 According to UNMIK officials interviewed in support of this report there are two serious issues facing Kosovo’s judi-cial system, namely first, the lack of trust of the public in judges and prosecutors, and

secondly, the lack of independence of the judiciary as a governing institution.

4.2.45 Furthermore, Kosovo’s judiciary faces a credibility gap, in that the system is considered to be very slow, with thou-sands of backlog cases and accusations of corruption.122 Part of the problem concerns the circumstances of the appointment of both judges and prosecutors, as some be-lieve these individuals were assigned too rapidly without proper administration or verification of qualifications.

4.2.46 With the establishment of the PISG through UNMIK Regulation 2001/9, and the executive branch provisions in UN-MIK Regulation 2001/19, the legislative and executive authority, including the adminis-tration of the judiciary, were partially trans-ferred to the Kosovo institutions. However, the office of the SRSG and UNMIK’s Depart-ment of Justice continued to control the development of the justice system and the appointment of the judiciary.

4.2.47 The SRSG is further advised by the Kosovo Judicial and Prosecutorial Coun-cil (KJPC), now Kosovo Judicial Council, “on matters related to the appointment of judg-es, prosecutors and lay-judges, as required.” The council has also the mandate to hear complaints against any judge or prosecutor, decide on disciplinary sanctions, and also recommend removal of justice officials to the SRSG.

4.2.48 Significant institutional chang-es took place in the judicial system in 2005, which mainly related to the transfer of the competences to the PISG and the reshaping of former UNMIK Pillar I of Police and Justice. As a result the KJPC was replaced by the Ko-sovo Judicial Council (KJC) through UNMIK Regulation 2005/52, with the following func-tions:

Setting the administrative policies and provides administrative oversight for the judiciary and the courts.

120 The Yugoslav legislation of pre-1989; UNMIK created legislation of post-1999; and PISG legislation of post-2003.121 Pillar I was dissolved in May 2006.122 According to SSDAT report on Kosovo’s judiciary completed in support of this report, there have been 4 successful prosecutions of judges since 2000, with further cases pending. During the same period 13 judges or prosecutors were dismissed for breaches of internal rules on non-professional behaviour.


64 Setting policy and promulgating rules and guidelines for the judiciary and the courts.

4.2.49 With the establishment of the KJC, the SRSG retained the authority to ap-point and remove judges from office. The wide remit of the Kosovo’s Judicial Council cuts across the responsibilities normally to be found within a Ministry of Justice leading to some confusion of roles within the overall judicial sector. The Council em-powers judges beyond their normal court competency and will need to be handled carefully if the judiciary is to be seen as be-ing properly accountable. The Council is chaired by the President of the Supreme Court and comprises: 5 local judges; 2 in-ternational judges; and single representa-tives from the Ministry of Justice, Kosovo Assembly, Kosovo Advocacy Chamber and the Law Faculty of Prishtinë/Priština.123

4.2.50 The present court structure is largely that of the pre-conflict system, with one important change. That change arises from the reforms of April 2004, which re-moved investigative responsibilities from judges and gave them to prosecutors. At the top of the system there is a Supreme Court with appellate and original jurisdic-tion. The Supreme Court has a broad man-date to supervise the work of the lower courts, but given UNMIK’s control over these issues it has not exercised this func-tion since 1999.124

4.2.51 At Assembly level there is a Par-liamentary Committee for Judiciary, Leg-islation and Constitutional Issues, which can debate the legal basis of laws issued by the Assembly, prioritize Kosovo legisla-tion that requires harmonization with the Constitutional Framework, submit chang-es to be considered in the Constitutional Framework, and discuss issues related to the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly. The Committee is composed of 12 Assem-bly members including representatives of the Serb minority.

4.2.52 In April 2004 the Provisional Crimi-nal Procedure Code of Kosovo was amend-ed through UNMIK Regulation 2003/26 to incorporate a new criminal procedure code, which “fundamentally restructured the criminal justice system in Kosovo, giving prosecutors, rather than investiga-tive judges, primary responsibility for the conduct of investigations, and creating a new branch of the police to support their efforts.”125 Unfortunately, as some experts point out, improper institutional support was given to making operational the new responsibilities of prosecutors and the po-lice, making implementation of the new regulation difficult.

Legal Framework

4.2.53 The principles and the organi-sation of the Kosovo judicial system are defined in UNMIK Regulation 2001/9. The court structure in Kosovo is inherited from the old Yugoslav system and it is com-posed of the following layers:

(i) The Supreme Court of Kosovo, (ii) The District Courts, in five regions(iii) The Municipal Courts, in 26 munici-

palities including two branches in Graçanicë/Gračanica and Shtërpcë /Štrpce, and

(iv) The Minor Offence Courts: one High Minor Offence Court in Prishtinë/Priština and 25 Municipal Minor Of-fence Courts in the municipalities.

4.2.54 There also is an Office of the Pub-lic Prosecutor, organised as follows:

(i) The Office of the Public Prosecutor for Kosovo

(ii) District Prosecutor in five districts (iii) Municipal Prosecutors in seven mu-

nicipalities

4.2.55 Furthermore, the administration of the judiciary and courts, previously un-der the transferred functions of the Min-istry of Public Service, was placed within

123 SSDAT Report on Police and Judiciary.124 Not on the Agenda. The Continuing Failure to Address Accountability in Kosovo Post-March 2004, Human Rights Watch, May 2006, Volume 18 No. 4(d).125 Human Rights Watch, Not on the Agenda. The Continuing Failure to Address Accountability in Kosovo Post-March 2004.


65the mandate of the KJC with the goal of making it independent from political influ-ence.

4.2.56 In addition, in 2005 the Ministry of Justice was established under UNMIK Regulation 2005/53. This new PISG minis-try inherited functions previously reserved by the SRSG relating to policy making and correctional service including policies on public prosecution, training of prosecu-tors, developing qualification standards for prosecutors, managing coordination of issues related to correctional services, and providing expertise on preparation of in-ternational agreements and cooperation. 4.2.57 Although this was considered a major change within the process of handover of competencies to Kosovo of-ficials, Human Rights Watch notes that “(whereas) some of the Department of Justice’s powers are in the process of being transferred to MOJ, the bulk of the MOJ’s new responsibilities will initially be admin-istrative in nature. It is expected that UN-MIK will continue to exercise responsibility for sensitive cases (such as those involving interethnic conflict or organised crime) for the near and mid-term future. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNMIK will also retain re-served powers over highly sensitive or po-litical issues.”126

Continued Judicial Reform

4.2.58 UNMIK is undertaking a whole-sale renewal of the judiciary in two phases; firstly, UNMIK launched a reappointment procedure in the summer of 2006 through Regulation 2006/25, which is foreseen to last till the end of 2007. In this context, all judges and prosecutors will undergo a comprehensive procedure of vetting based on the verification of their educa-tional, professional and personal back-ground. Secondly, those who will pass the first stage will undergo one year of inten-

sive training before they start practicing. Despite the high expectations, this under-taking with the professional temporary void and potential delays is likely to have implications for both the security and the political arenas.

4.2.59 Kosovo’s Judiciary - Facts and

Figures

Kosovo currently has 390 judges and prosecutors serving in its courts system.

Their salaries range from multiplier127

9.6 to multiplier 18, which coincides to the upper end of the salary scales in the public service.128

The judges and the prosecutors are trained by the Kosovo Judicial Insti-tute (KJI), which was established and initially funded by the OSCE. KJI is currently funded through the Kosovo Consolidated Budget.

The Kosovo Judicial Council is cur-rently implementing a reform pro-gramme, supported by the US gov-ernment, which is being driven by EU standards and requirements. Ac-tivities conducted include attempts to recruit additional judges from minority groups, measures to re-duce court backlogs, reviewing the legislative framework and assessing performance. The Council has also set stringent guidelines for case dis-posal consistent with those adopted by countries in the region. Whether these timelines are realistic remains to be seen129.

Promulgation of Laws

4.2.60 The legislative process in Kosovo is divided between the SRSG’s Office of the Legal Adviser (OLA) and the Kosovo As-sembly. Therefore, promulgation of laws

126 Not on the Agenda. The continuing failure to address accountability in Kosovo post-March 2004. Human Rights Watch May 2006 Volume 18 No. 4 (D).127 The multiplier is equivalent to approximately € 31.128 Currently there are 69 different salary levels in Kosovo due to the fact that ministries have introduced a number of additional multipliers between the ranges of 3 to 10. In December 2004, the base (multiplier) for the calculation of the salary was € 31. The salary of a Permanent Secretary was fixed at around € 600. For the judiciary special additional multipliers of 12 to 18 applied. For some positions, salaries are set on an individual basis, e.g., senior jobs in the judiciary. Source: UNDP’s Assessment of Administrative Capacity in Kosovo, April 2005.129 SSDAT Report on Police and Judiciary


66 comes from two sources. In the case of the SRSG OLA, laws are proposed by ei-ther UNMIK representatives within PISG ministries or are initiated directly by the OLA. In the case of the Kosovo Assembly, Ministries channel their proposals through the Office of Legal Support Services in the Office of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister’s Office of Legal Support Services provides guidance and advice to the PISG and reviews all draft legislation for submis-sion to the Assembly. With the establish-ment of the Ministry of Justice, this role is eventually expected to be assumed by the Ministry.

4.2.61 The coordination between the UNMIK and PISG processes is weak; the Assembly laws reach the OLA/SRSG only at the final stage whereby the SRSG’s ap-proval is needed in order for the law to be promulgated. Regulations proposed directly by the SRSG are not subject to re-view or approval by the Kosovo Assembly.


There is a separation between the national and international prosecut-orial systems.

“One national prosecutor described the current interaction between national and international prosecutors as “a parallel system.” International pros-ecutors confirmed the separation of the two prosecutorial systems, suggesting

that this was largely due to the nature of their work on different cases and the logistical set-up of their office space. In practice, then, each national prosecuto-rial office works autonomously from the national system and from the interna-tional prosecutors working in Kosovo. The lack of coordination between pros-ecutors’ offices exacerbates the difficul-ties that prosecutors already face with a large caseload and insufficient numbers of staff.”130

Administration of justice is an area where there is confusion and lack of coordination. The Department of Ju-dicial Administration (DJA) has tech-nical responsibility for the adminis-tration of the national judiciary, but in practice this has not happened. DJA has primarily acted as a conduit between the courts and the UNMIK Department of Justice with regard to material and personnel needs. The DJA maintains some statistics on the

work of the courts, but does not carry out management or administrative functions over them. These functions are performed by individual court administrators and/or presidents.131 Although recently the DJA was trans-ferred from MPS to the KJC, some of the policy functions of the DOJ have been transferred to the newly created Ministry of Justice creating a split in responsibilities and functions in the sector.

130 Not on the Agenda. The continuing failure to address accountability in Kosovo post-March 2004Human Rights Watch May 2006 Volume 18 No. 4 (D). The Department of Justice noted that KSPO, which was established in

September 2006, will help address the need for greater coordination.131 Not on the Agenda. The continuing failure to address accountability in Kosovo post-March 2004. Human Rights Watch May 2006 Volume 18 No. 4 (D)

Figure 24: PISG-Initiated Legislative ProcessSource: ISSR 2006


67The following problems have been identified in the area of judicial ad-ministration:

(i) Kosovo has a low number of judges compared to the number of cases filed in court;132

(ii) Kosovo needs to appoint professional people as judges and prosecutors;

(iii) Problems with mismanagement of funds and tenders must be ad-dressed;

(iv) Lack of transparency on court case decisions including public informa-tion about decisions

(v) An electronic system for the manage-ment of cases is still to be established although 6.5 million Euros had been allocated by the European Agency of Reconstruction to address this matter;

(vi) An incomplete and fragile legal infra-structure

Some of these issues might have se-curity implications, in the future, if not properly addressed, specifically:

(i) The huge backlog of cases not solved by the courts might push people to take justice in their own hands.133

(ii) Lack of oversight of judges and pros-ecutors contributes to corruption opportunities, breakdown of trust in institutions, and breakdown of rule of law.

The linkage between KJC and the ex-isting Parliamentary Committee on Legal Issues does not reach PISG min-istries, and UNMIK. In addition, there is no established practice of Govern-ment Ministers appearing in front of the parliamentary committee, and in general communication between them in the view of Assembly officials is weak.

Public trust in the judiciary is extreme-ly low. An ISSR household survey

conducted for SEESAC by Gani Bobi Institute/Saferworld in June 2006 with 1,200 families all over Kosovo found that those who consider the judiciary to be “unfair” or “very unfair” are almost twice the number of those who have trust in the system. Fur-thermore, as illustrated below, those surveyed believe that corruption and political interference are major chal-lenges facing the judiciary.


The Supreme Court of Kosovo is man-dated to handle issues related to the compatibility of the laws with the Con-stitutional Framework and disputes between entities of the PISG, but the SRSG has the final authority on justice matters, which de facto curtails the authority of the Court. Final transition of these authorities from UNMIK to Kosovo’s Supreme Court will require coordination and capacity-building to ensure a smooth transfer.

Amendments to UNMIK Regulation 2003/23 created important reforms to the process of prosecution and criminal investigation in Kosovo. Most specifically the regulation cre-ated a “judicial police” branch within the Kosovo Police Service to work with prosecutors to investigate cases. However no training was provided on this new police role nor was its rela-tionship with prosecutors clearly de-fined. No protocols were established to streamline relations between po-lice and prosecutors. In addition, no further guidance has been provided by UNMIK or the DOJ on the role and functions of the judicial police. The is-sues of definition, training, and roles and responsibilities of “judicial police” need to be addressed in order to en-sure proper function.

As a parallel measure, it is foreseen that international judges and pros-

132 According to the Department of Justice, the Judicial Assessment group report of 2003-2004 recommended that Kosovo should have a total of approximately 420 judges and prosecutors.133 According to UNMIK officials the current pace of work, it will take over five years to solve the existing case load if no additional cases are filed.

In the words of one senior UNMIK

officer: “the concept [of ju-dicial policing] was a spiri-tual baptism—hail Marys, some water, and everybody was a judicial po-lice [officer].”

Source: Not on the Agenda.

The continuing failure to ad-

dress accountability in Kosovo

post-March 2004, Human Rights

Watch May 2006.


68 ecutors will continue to work along-side local ones following final sta-tus. However, according to UNMIK officials interviewed for this report, capacity building, to date, through international judges and prosecutors has shown little success.

The existence of the parallel courts system in the Serb areas has also con-tributed to undermining the Kosovo justice system. A priority of UNMIK in the justice system has been to build in guarantees for the minorities since there has been a chronic under-repre-sentation of the Serbs in the Kosovo courts. To this end UNMIK set repre-sentational criteria for non-Albanian communities, among the judges and prosecutors, with a minimum of 15% for members of non-Kosovo Albanian Communities, and 8% for members of the Kosovo-Serb Community.134 It is recommended these representation-al issues as well as access to courts are addressed directly and followed up by the PISG.

UNMIK’s intention to reform the en-tire judicial system, as authorised by UNMIK Regulation 2006/25, should proceed carefully. It is agreed that Kosovo’s current judicial system does not reflect the recent changes of the

Kosovo society. In order to properly address the system in a holistic way, it is recommended that an analysis of the entire system takes place. That said, some of the issues which need urgent attention are:

(i) Built-in guarantees for the separation of powers: the legislative, the execu-tive and the judiciary;

(ii) The unification of the legislative process;

(iii) The alignment of the local legislation with the acquis communautaire of the EU;

(iv) The completion of the legal frame-work in the area of court administra-tion, including the functioning of the Court and Prosecutors Offices, the in-ternal organisation of the courts, the court fees;

(iv) The criteria and the process of the appointment of the judges and the prosecutors in line with EU standards; the status of judges;

(vi) The review of the structure of the judiciary, the number of the courts, their jurisdiction and the allocation of judicial resources;

The judicial system needs a more ef-fective apparatus to fight corruption

134 UNMIK Regulation 2006/25.

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15

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25

What is the greatest challenge for the judiciary in Kosova?

Corruption Incompetence Over work andunder resources

Subjection to political interference

I don’t know ref/naother

21.6

11.7

3.1

12.9

1.62.2

0.2

Figure 25: Illustration of Challenges for the Judiciary in KosovoSource: SEESAC Gani Bobi Institute/Saferworld survey, June 2006.


69and malpractice amongst judges and prosecutors. Immediate steps need to be put into place for procedures that will ensure genuine oversight of the judiciary. It is also necessary to clarify publicly the role of institutions, both international and national, in-volved in achieving this goal. Reform along these lines is needed to begin to build trust between Kosovo’s citi-zens and their judiciary. Oversight of court function should include the

mandated use of a computerised da-tabase and case management tools in all courts.

There is urgent need to establish proper institutional linkages, includ-ing checks and balance between the police and the judiciary in the fight against crime. It is recommended that Kosovo review the best practices from EU countries in their fight against or-ganised crime.


4.2.64 The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) was established in March 2002 under Regulation 2001/19. The responsibilities of MTI are laid out in Annex III of Regulation 2001/19. According to the regulation the main functions of the ministry are to devel-op policies to encourage fair competition, administer the business registration system, develop promotion strategies for Kosovo’s business and industrial interests, facilitate tourism, and encourage sustainable devel-opment of the mining and energy sectors.

4.2.65 The MTI is responsible for the crea-tion of opportunities for development of economic activities in the industrial sector, trade sector, construction, tourism, catering, and crafts among other areas. The MTI mis-sion is the creation of an efficient policy sys-tem aimed at successful mid term and long term economic development. In general, the MTI bases its orientation on private sec-tor development policies, in order to estab-lish favourable conditions for its incorpora-tion in the current trend towards the market economy.

4.2.66 The mission concentrates on the harmonious development of the private sector economy in both urban and rural ar-eas, in order to meet the most effective eco-nomic indicators, for creation of new jobs,

which would lead to higher living standards and a more developed market as well as in-creased purchasing power.

4.2.67 The basic objective of the MTI is to put in place the necessary legal and plan-ning infrastructure as the basis for a success-ful economic development. Though imple-mentation of legal norms in business devel-opment and other spheres of economy, con-ditions will be created for easy assessment of forecast and achieved results. 4.2.68 To achieve their aims, the MTI has built up a functional outlook, where the staff is able to determine their objectives and then achieve them. They have devel-oped an action strategy that stimulates the development of the private sector. Strate-gic goals are coupled with improvements in knowledge through training of staff.

4.2.69 In order to reach identified objec-tives, ways are found for the promotion of investments within individual unit of the Ministry. For example, the Agency for Ex-port Advancement combines both internal strategic and business elements, in other words the strategy for industrial develop-ment, tourism, innovations, through which new opportunities are created to support and strengthen export as one of the pri-mary tasks influencing the development of production in Kosovo. The aim of these strategies is to phase in a change of eco-

Issue: Trade, Industry and Business

Development

PISG Institutions: Ministry of Trade and Industry

UNMIK:Foreign Trade Policy Development and Execution

(SRSG Reserved Power)


70 nomic structure in Kosovo, whereby the solely consuming society that exists today, would be transformed into one with a pro-ductive capability.

4.2.70 The MTI hosts a number of de-partments including private sector devel-opment, industrial development, trade, tourism, construction and emergency re-sources. In addition, the MTI has responsi-

bility for four agencies including the Office for Business Registration, the Agency for Standardisation and Licensing, the Invest-ment Promotion Agency, and the Agency for Export Stimulation. The MTI has 5 Re-gional Offices under the supervision and co-ordination of the Division for Enterprise Development and Regional Development Programme of Private Sector Develop-ment. The main role of the Regional Offices is to be the main contact point for the MTI with the regions and to provide outreach and support to regional businesses.

Small and Medium Size Enterprises in

Kosovo (SMEs)

4.2.71 The number of companies existing in Kosovo is hard to determine – the Provisional Business Registry (PTB) records some 57,000 businesses whilst the Registry of Business Organisations

and Trade Names of Kosovo has registered some 45,000 enterprises.135 As the table below suggest, the overwhelming majority of registered companies are small private companies. The number of larger companies is significantly smaller and the majority are public companies. However, SMEs and large companies alike face a difficult business climate which restrains development and consolidation of effort.

4.2.72 It is also useful to consider the sectoral distribution of these companies. Only a small number of them operate in “production” sector such as agriculture and manufacturing. The vast majority work in what can be broadly considered the serv-ices sector, which is also in proportion with the number of jobs created. According to figures for 2003136, 71% of job placements corresponded to the services sector.

4.2.73 Finally, it should be noted that when asked which are the most important constraints to their operations, business-men have pointed primarily to the unre-liability of the power supply, followed by unfair and informal competition and high uncertainty in terms of economic/regula-tory policy.137

Table 14: Quantitative Data – Private Businesses in Kosovo Source: Monthly Macroeconomic Monitor, January 2004 Ministry of Economy and Finance, PISG

Private enterprises Small 52,132

Medium 4,822

Large 116

Subtotal 57,070

Public enterprises Small 133

Medium 306

Large 234

Subtotal 682

Agriculture 821

Industry 5,965

Construction 3,708

Trade 33,734

Transport 8,002

Finance 1,721

Services 3,801

Registered companies, 2003 by ownership and size

Registered companies, 2003 by economic activitity

Total 57,752

Total 57,752

135 However the lower figure, 45,000 is probably nearer the actual number of businesses in Kosovo.

136 Annual Report 2003, Department of Labour and Employment, PISG.137 Poverty assessment report, June 2005 and Kosovo Monthly Economic Briefing May 2005– World Bank

I believe that we have to change

the laws so that they can have a real impact and the government should pro-vide the maximum legal security for the investors in Kosovo not only from abroad but also from Kosovo.

Young Kosovo Albanian man,

Prizren


71

4.2.74 Identified Challenges

The MTI suffers from a lack of a fully developed legal mandate, vital for a core institution that deals with elabo-rating trade policies. It also lacks the right framework to undertake its role. Due to these limited competencies (UNMIK has had exclusive authority over the decision-making and execu-tion of foreign trade policies) the MTI has relied on UNMIK resources and capacities. However, it is anticipated that once status is resolved the proc-ess of transferring authorities from UNMIK to PISG will change this situ-ation and MTI capacities will be en-hanced. Currently, however, there is an increasing need to handle a large number of issues arising from Kos-ovo’s developing private industries but the Ministry’s human resources are not yet great enough to under-take this role.The staff of the MTI is relatively young and lacks experience in the field of foreign trade. Problems occur as a result of hiring staff, changes in struc-ture, the lack of competitiveness of the public sector with the non-pub-lic sector, and a lack of basic English language skills. In addition, the level of training in the field of negotiation and policy making is inadequate.

The Department further suffers from a lack of analytic dimension. It should perform economic/commercial anal-ysis in order to advise policy and de-cision makers, both in executive and legislative terms. Currently little fo-cus has been given to these essential ministry functions.Finally, there is a shortage of training to help with staff capacity building. A training programme should be devel-oped in order to fulfil staff needs both in technical and managerial terms. In addition, special courses should be provided to improve staff knowledge of business English, organisational roles and responsibilities, and policy making and analysis.


Kosovo’s main challenge now lies in devel-oping a solid, job creating economy able to support its fast growing population. The path to strengthening Kosovo’s economy and setting the basis for sustainable deve-lopment encompasses 3 challenges:

The further strengthening of the Min-istry of Trade and Industry’s capaci-ties to create strategies and legal re-quirements for a favourable business climate and implement an effective economic policy both at central and regional level;

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

Electricity

Unfair and informal competit ion

Regulat ion and policy uncertainty

Corruption

Transportat ion

Crime, theft and disorder

Cost of financing

Customs and fiscal regulat ions

Tax rates

Legal resolution of conflict

Access to financing

M acroeconomic instability

Tax administrat ion

Telecommunications

Skills and education of workers

Access to land

Labour regulat ions

Business licensing

Figure 26: Illustration of General constraints to operations % of firms ranking constraints as “major” or “very severe”Source: MFE Monthly Macroeconomic Monitor January 2005


72 The strengthening of Kosovo busi-nesses, comprising mainly of SMEs, to become a source of employment generation and to include those dis-advantaged groups that have difficul-ties participating in economic activi-ties;

The attraction of foreign direct invest-ment in order to stimulate economic progress and development leading to increased job creation particularly in the manufacturing sector.

Issue: Education

PISG Institutions:

Ministry of Education Science and Technology

University of Prishtinë/Priština

University of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica

Institutional and Legal Background

4.2.76 The education system in Ko-sovo is currently caught in a process of reform, institutional infighting, and paral-lel structures. When Slobodan Milosevic stripped Kosovo of its autonomy and initi-ated a forced restructuring of public insti-tutions, resulting in the firing of Albanian civil servants, schools and the University of Prishtinë/Priština were also closed to Alba-nian students.

4.2.77 As a result of these events Alba-nian students at all levels were enrolled in a parallel, underground system of informal schooling. As Kosovo slowly emerged from a decade of informal education systems, fundamental issues of re-organisation, staffing, curricula and resources needed to be addressed. In addition, with the in-ternational administration of Kosovo, Serb parallel structures, including education in-stitutions, were set up, resulting again in a de facto division of the education system along ethnic lines. According to a study completed by UNESCO’s International In-stitute for Educational Planning, “Educa-tion remains at or near the centre of the conflict between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo (…). More controversy surrounds education issues in Kosovo, in fact, than any other post-conflict situation.”138

4.2.78 In April 2006 Belgrade request-ed that the Kosovo Serb employees in the

education and the health sector leave the PISG institutions of Kosovo. In response the SRSG said, “I am deeply disturbed by Belgrade’s continued policy to urge Kos-ovo Serbs to boycott and now to leave the institutions in Kosovo.”139 OSCE described the situation as follows:

“Kosovo Serbs have continued to com-ply with the Coordination Centre for Kosovo (CCK) directive stating Kosovo Serbs should remove themselves from the payroll of Kosovo PISG institutions. As a result of the directive almost 100% of the Kosovo Serb municipal employees in the education sector and almost 70% in healthcare have either officially re-signed or requested to be removed from the PISG payroll.”140

4.2.79 Ongoing with these issues was the restructuring of the education system undertaken by UNMIK since 1999. Given the informal system of education that had supported the territory during the previ-ous decade of turmoil, it was necessary to address significant gaps in educational curriculum, teaching methods, and access to information. The UNMIK administra-tion’s “task of restarting education in Ko-sovo was staked out as nothing less than reinvention. Little from Kosovo’s educa-tional heritage was considered worthy of mere alteration. Dramatic reform, even re-newal, became the order of the day.”141 The “reform/renewal” approach tackled every-

138 Parallel Worlds: Rebuilding the education system in Kosovo. Marc Sommers, Peter Buckland International Institute for Educational Planning, p. 17, UNESCO 2004.139 OSCE Mission in Kosovo Weekly Report 15/2006: 05-11 April.140 Ibid.141 Parallel Worlds: Rebuilding the education system in Kosovo. Marc Sommers, Peter Buckland International Institute for Educational Planning, p. 20, UNESCO 2004.


73thing from soft to hard issues, including in-stitutions, curricula, teachers’ professional-ism, and school buildings. Unfortunately at first the approach proved to be more focused on setting up central institutions and later on at creating the necessary legal framework for education. In the words of one teacher it “tried to construct the build-ing from the roof. It should have started from the foundations.”142

4.2.80 With the establishment of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Govern-ment (PISG) the Ministry of Education, Sci-ence, and Technology was founded under UNMIK Regulation 2001/19 to develop educational policies and promote inclu-siveness.

4.2.81 I addition, two of the first laws adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo con-cerned the education system, namely the Law on Primary and Secondary Educa-tion in Kosovo (Assembly of Kosovo Law 2002/2) promulgated as UNMIK Regula-tion 2002/19, and the Law on Higher Edu-cation in Kosovo (Assembly of Kosovo Law 2002/3) promulgated as UNMIK Regula-tion 2003/14.

4.2.82 The Inspection of Education was established by UNMIK Regulation 2004/55. The regulation provides for the creation of an oversight body within the Ministry of Education, with the function to inspect, ini-

tiate administrative procedure on violations, and provide sanctions. Adult education and training, preschool education, and scientific research are also regulated under this provi-sion.

4.2.83 Finally, there is a Committee of the Assembly of Kosovo on Education, Sci-ence, Technology, Culture, Youth and Sports, composed of 12 members, including one Serb. The Committee’s main function is to participate in the drafting of laws in the sec-tor. They also address issues related to the reform of education and issues of funding.

Fact and Figures – Kosovo’s Education

System

4.2.84 The impact of the disintegration of the education system in Kosovo in the 1990s and the conflict in Kosovo can be illustrated in the chart below showing lit-eracy rates between 1948 and 2000. Al-though the rate has dropped steady since 1948, the rate dropped precipitously in the 1980, 1990s and 2000.4.2.85 Gender issues enter the picture when considering educational issues. In the chart below the enrolment of females drops sharply after primary school age, although dropout rates level off more for women who remain in the system to the higher levels of education, whereas the rates drop off more sharply for men.

142 Ibid, p.113

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60

80

100

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

malefemales

Figure 27: Educational Enrolment Rates By GenderSource: UNDP Human Development Report Kosovo 2002


74 4.2.86 Regarding rural populations, according to the UNMIK Gender Affairs office report Women and Men in Kosovo,“men in rural areas are better educated than women, with almost half having at-tended secondary education. The per-centage of women with no education is (6.6%) double that of men (3.1%).”143 How-ever, the percentage of illiterate rural men (3.1%) is actually higher than the territory-wide (2.3%) of illiterate men and the per-centage for rural women (6.6%) is higher than the Kosovo-wide overall percentage of 6.5%.144

4.2.87 Currently in Kosovo:

There are 422,819 students in all pre-university levels of education and 26,561 teachers including the sup-port staff. There are 1,109 schools all over Kos-ovo. There are 20 faculties and branches of the University of Prishtinë/Priština all over Kosovo, and 954 teaching staff. Funding: 14% of the Government ex-penditures went to education in 2005 compared to 17% in 2004. Donor assistance for health and edu-cation constitute 11% in 2004 of the total (compared to 9% in 2003), which brings both sectors in the third place after public utilities and other catego-ry. According to available data145, north of the River Ibër/Ibar 815 Serbs are employed in higher education facili-ties and 649 in primary and secondary education. These employees receive salaries both via UNMIK civil adminis-tration and a salary from the Ministry of education in Belgrade. In addition, these individuals receive a “Kosovo supplement” between 40-100% of the base salary paid by Belgrade.146


The parallel education system has shifted ethnic sides in Kosovo. Whilst during the 1990s it was the Kosovo

Albanians who were thrown into an informal parallel system at the mar-gins of the public institutional space, a decade later the Serbs decided to occupy the public space at the mar-gins of the PISG. As a result, instead of a unified system, two separate worlds have again emerged in education.

The existence of a Serb parallel sys-tem in education constitutes the main source of fragmentation in the education system and the ethnic fric-tion created by the parallel system often takes on political connotations particularly in the realm of debate over public funding.

Given the long cycle of institutional breakdown and conflict in Kosovo the education system faces a long recov-ery process to bring standards up to modern, European levels. Problems facing Kosovo’s education system in-clude teacher salaries and the teach-ers union exercises periodic pressure on the government by threatening general strikes and a collapse of the school system.


Whilst the competencies on educa-tion are transferred to the PISG, issues related to the communities are still handled by UNMIK officials, especially complaints. There is a need to unify the system for all employees and students by disbanding parallel systems.

Proliferation of students with diplomas and higher education institutions not related to Kosovo’s professional needs might prove in the medium term to be a serious threat to stability. Further-more, the explosion of private educa-tional institutions of questionable qual-ity has exacerbated the problem. PISG institutions should explore institutional certification standards that will allow di-plomas awarded in Kosovo to meet the standards of European Universities. This

145 It should be noted that conclusive data on this subject is not available. Furthermore, given the Belgrade directive to Serb employees in the sector not to accept PISG salaries – the figures may not represent all the employees.146 A post-industrial future? Economy and Society in Mitrovica and Zvecan, European Stability Initiative, 2004. ISSR efforts to meet with Mitrovica University authorities led to no results.


75would reduce the inflation of diplomas and proliferation of students with high-er level degrees, but few job prospects.

Professional standards need to be matched with educational curriculum, particularly in higher education. Cur-ricula should include practical experi-ence requirements such as internships to ensure that students graduate with skills required to contribute to their professional development.

Educational policy at all levels should be directed towards the challenges of Ko-

sovo’s vulnerable communities – such as illiteracy. Participation of women, rural poor, minorities, and others with less of a voice in Kosovo’s political and economic development requires these sectors of society have the confidence to assert their views. Education is a key element towards achieving this goal.

The education system in Kosovo needs to cultivate depth and resource sharing for its students by joining with other in-stitutions in the region and in Europe to expand the opportunities for the best and brightest among Kosovo’s citizens.

Issue: Health

PISG Institutions: Ministry of Health

University Clinic Centre Prishtinë/Priština


4.2.90 The health sector in Kosovo is struggling against a post-socialist poorly-maintained legacy from the past, par-ticularly at the institutional level. Whilst substantive steps towards modernisation have been undertaken by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) with the adoption of several basic laws after year 2002, and the establishment of the Ministry of Health by UNMIK Regula-tion 2001/19 (later on amended by UNMIK Regulation 2002/5) these are the only sig-nificant step in the institutional direction.

4.2.91 The healthcare sector in Kosovo comprises a number of public and private institutions, with the Ministry of Health (MoH) at the centre. The Ministry of Health (MoH) was established in 2001 to develop policies, coordinate activities and oversee implementation of standards in the sec-tor. Its primary role is to monitor, supervise and support both the hospitals and prima-ry health care.

4.2.92 However important decisions on the direction of the health sector took place prior to the creation of MoH. The work for the future legislative framework

was initiated by the former Department of Health of UNMIK’s Joint Interim Adminis-trative Structure, which preceded the PISG. In this context an Interim Health Policy for Kosovo was drafted in September 1999, and a final one was developed in 2001 as the Health Policy for Kosovo. Both frame-work documents were created with the support of the World Health Organisation (WHO) and were intended to launch a comprehensive reform programme which “foresaw a complete restructuring of Kos-ovo’s health system (…) outlining a health system based on primary care, where fam-ily physicians act as gatekeepers to special-ised health services and hospital care.”147

4.2.93 Despite these bold steps towards reform, the system had to be based on the existing Yugoslav network of health insti-tutions and a cadre of health professionals; which since the early 1980s were either ed-ucated in a resource-less system or pushed to operate in an informal parallel system. In this context the institutional response to the reform is unclear and the effectiveness is hindered.

4.2.94 Since 1999 private medical care has exploded in the territory. The European Journal of Public Health describes “a bur-

147 “Ministerial challenges: post-conflict, post-election issues in Kosovo’s health sector” by Jim Campbell, Val Percival and Anthony Zwi in European Journal of Public Health 2003, 13 p.177-181.


76 geoning private sector exists, (completely) unregulated, that diverts scarce human and financial resources from the public sector.”148

UNMIK Regulation 2005/1 regulates private healthcare in Kosovo. The regulation stipu-lates the conditions of care, the licensing requirements, and inspection regimes for private health facilities.

4.2.95 In terms of parliamentary legisla-tion and oversight, the Kosovo Assembly Committee on Health, Work and Social Welfare has the following functions:

Defining and overseeing the imple-mentation of policies for the health sector in Kosovo;Defining the general strategy for the protection of health of Kosovo citizens in line with international standards;Contributing to the involvement of the Kosovo institutions in interna-tional organisations.

4.2.96 Data149

Primary Health Care (PHC) services are provided by more than 30 Health Houses (now referred to as Fam-ily Medicine Centres) and 162 health punctas (small health centres), which are smaller facilities in rural areas of-fering basic primary care services.

There are also seven mental health centres.

Secondary Health Care services are provided by five regional hospitals (450-550 beds each) and the univer-sity hospital (2500 beds) in Prishtinë/Priština. Hospital services are compro-mised by poor facilities, lack of equip-

ment, and a lack of adequately trained staff. Hospital capacity in Kosovo, measured by total bed numbers, is low by regional or European averages. The average length of stay is 12 days, and there is a low average bed occu-pation rate of 69.5%, which suggests inefficient use of existing resources.

Kosovo mirrors other countries in the region in that up to 30% of public health sector staff are administrative rather than professional. Health sec-tor staff make up approximately 19% of the overall civil service sector in Ko-sovo.

The health sector is largely financed from the consolidated budget of Ko-sovo (KCB), although donations from the international community, gov-ernmental and non-governmental organisations, and a small percentage from co-payment also contribute to the operating costs.

An average of 4% of GDP has been spent on health over the same period.

As an example only 42 cases of AIDS have been reported since 1986. Ko-sovo lacks any sentinel surveillance capacity. This number is probably sig-

nificantly under-estimated. No data is available about the number of HIV positive cases.


In the words of a senior civil servant of the Ministry of Health “the current situation of the health sector is alarm-

148 Ibid, p.179149 The information is taken from Kosovo Health Profile by DFID, UNICEF, Open Society Institute, 2003, and Kosova Health System by Dr. Arben Cami of Ministry of Health, Kosovo, 2004.

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2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5

Health

Figure 28: Percentage of Kosovo Consolidated Budget Spent on Health: Source: ISSR 2006


77

ing and constitutes a real threat to the security.”150 The challenges presented by the inherited and the current sys-tem can be summarised as follows151:

Little or no strategic planning particu-larly in the area of epidemic or disas-terresponse;Poor distribution of human resources with too many staff at hospital level and in urban areas and an under pro-vision in rural areas.Lack of adequately trained human re-sources compared with European

Standards.Lack of health management skills.Poor facilities, equipment, and infra-structure at the three levels of care provision.Lack of access for minority groups to the full range of available health serv-ices and existence of parallel institu-tions that do not coordinate or com-municate with central system;.Intervention of politics in the civil service threatens to destabilize the whole sector.

A parallel health sector exists in the Serbian majority municipalities, which is funded simultaneously by KCB and Belgrade. There are no exact figures on health workers and funds

provided by Belgrade authorities, as there is no oversight exercised by the PISG over these facilities. Coordina-tion between the PISG and the par-allel sector on policy and operations is non-existent. As in the education sector, the Belgrade-sponsored Ko-sovo Coordination Centre asked the Serbs working in the health institu-tions who are receiving salaries both from Serbia and the PISG to renounce their salaries from the Kosovo budget by the end of March 2006. This lack of communication and coordination could prove dangerous in the event of an epidemic or disaster situation.


The existence of the parallel system in health sector might have serious se-curity and political implications if not properly addressed. Steps should be made in the direction of unifying both systems at least at the policy and fund-ing levels not only for political reasons, but also for policy coordination, shar-ing of information, and monitoring for security risks such as epidemics.

To date there is little capacity to ad-dress emergency situations, such as the avian flu. It is recommended

150 Interview with the Permanent Secretary of MoH. 151 Many of the issues raised here are summarised from Kosovo Health Profile, 2003

Figure 29: Regional GDP per capita for health:Source: ISSR 2006

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

USD per capita

USD per capita


78 that plans for response in such cases are envisaged in the context of secu-rity emergency planning. Emergency planning coordination within the PISG and the Office of the Prime Min-ister should include health issues as a concern and a health coordination mechanism should be established ac-cordingly to prepare for emergency-situations.152

SECTION 4.3:

Informal Oversight Actors

4.3.1 Kosovo’s civil society and informal oversight actors are examined in this sec-

tion. These actors play an important role in ensuring the good governance of the security sector; in their “watch-dog” role as external actors, they help hold public of-ficials accountable for actions and expose misconduct. In addition, they often require definition or explanations of policy deci-sions outside the realm of normal political process or call into question policy proc-esses followed by different branches of government. Finally they provide a forum for individuals and citizens to express their views. As an example, an impartial media may provide a forum for activists and gov-ernment officials to present their positions for the information of the citizens, particu-larly in a crisis or post-crisis situation.

152 In response to Avian Flu threat a Task Force was set up in 2005 with the participation of UNMIK, and several PISG Ministries, including the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development (MAFRED), the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the Department of Emergency Management (DEM) under the chair of MAFRED. The Task Force is still operational and could be integrated into crisis management planning.

153 Numerous local and international officials complained about being misquoted or misrepresented as well as journalists often arriving for interviews unprepared and unaware of the topic. The ARD report, Kosovo Media Assessment, March 2004, mentions that journalists published allegations without offering the individual in question the right of reply.

Sector Background

4.3.2 The media play a critical role in modern democracy, particularly in the process of democratic transition, and in conflict prevention. Without a relatively autonomous media, free from government control, it is difficult for citizens to acquire sufficient information to make political choices and hold politicians accountable for their decisions. The media can also play a positive role in security by providing well-verified and unbiased information by:

Acting as an independent informal oversight actorPromoting the end of hostilities and maintain democratic discourse Serving as watchdog by keeping poli-ticians accountable for their actionsGuarding against abuses such as cor-ruption through investigative reporting Bringing together otherwise discon-nected sectors of society and facili-tate reconciliation

Giving voice to those who have no other outlet for expression.

4.3.3 However, media can also have a destabilising effect by:

Stirring unrest by exacerbating fear and creating panicInciting to violence Publishing hate speech, causing tar-geted killings or fleeing of popula-tionsLegitimising a violent or negative message (people assume that since something was aired on the TV, it must be true). Exacerbating existing conflict though sensational reporting

4.3.4 Since 1999 Kosovo media have played a mixed role in promoting democ-racy and creating a fertile ground for stable security.153 Kosovo’s developing media sec-tor ranges from sound and credible journal-ism to cases of abuse, misinformation and

Issue: Media and Security

Actors & Institutions:Broadcast and Print Media

Ministry Spokespeople

The lack of secu-rity for the state

and for its citizens is a ma-jor obstacle to political, social, and economic de-velopment. To escape from a downward spiral where insecurity, criminalisation, and underdevelopment are mutually reinforcing, social, economic, gover-nance, and security dimen-sions of the domestic envi-ronment must be addressed simul-taneously.

Source: Regional Conference of

the Special Co-ordinator of the

Stability Pact for South Eastern

Europe, Working table III Security

and Defence Issues- Security Sec-

tor Reform. Bucharest, 25 & 26

October 2001


79in some cases, incitement to violence. In ad-dition, on numerous occasions, the Kosovo press published names of protected wit-nesses in sensitive trials, which resulted in their intimidation and eventual withdrawal of their statements during trials.

4.3.5 The coverage provided by Kos-ovo-wide media of the March 2004 riots is an example of the catalysing role of televi-sion in fostering violence. On 16 March the Kosovo media reported the alleged delib-erate drowning of three boys in the River Ibër/Ibar near Mitrovicë/Mitrovica which was broadcast by three main television stations. This coverage had the immedi-ate effect of increasing the interethnic tensions, not just in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica but throughout Kosovo. According to the report issued by the Kosovo Temporary Media Commissioner, the public service broadcaster carried some responsibility for stirring up the conflict.154

Media Sector Data

4.3.6 In the post-conflict period the Kosovo media have made a remarkable transition from state-controlled to mar-ket-oriented free press. With significant donor assistance, print and broadcast me-dia have burgeoned rapidly. According to existing research, currently 85% of citizens rely on television as their primary source of information, followed by 7% who draws their information from the radio, while only 6% consider newspapers as their main source.155 Currently there are 117 television and radio stations operating in Kosovo with virtually ever ethnic commu-nity enjoying access to a variety of media outlets in their own language.156

4.3.7 The print media scene is equally varied and diverse with nine daily papers in the Albanian language, as well as a wide variety of regularly printed weekly and monthly magazines. There are also a signif-icant number of publications in a variety

of minority languages. It should be noted though that with the exception of one daily paper printed in Prishtinë/Priština all Serbian press is printed in Belgrade.

Legal Framework

4.3.8 Independent Media Commis-

sion (IMC) and Broadcasting – this law on broadcasting was approved by the As-sembly on 21 April 2005 and promulgated by SRSG with amendments on July 2005. This law transformed the office of the Tem-porary Media Commissioner, headed by an international staff member, into a per-manent regulatory agency, now headed by a Kosovo expert. The law sees the crea-tion of three main bodies: the Council, re-sponsible for “setting up and amending” of Broadcasting Policy, the Office of the Ex-ecutive Chief, responsible for “administer-ing all Broadcasting Policy” and the Media Appeals Board, which deals with appeals to granting or revoking of a license, viola-tions of licence conditions and the broad-cast code of conduct.

4.3.9 The law also obliges the IMC to regulate the Broadcasting Frequencies Spectrum in Kosovo as well as licensing of public and private broadcasters according to best European practices. The IMC’s main tasks are "to promote a diversity of infor-mation and opinion" and "promote uni-versal standards of ethics, civility and de-cency in broadcasting by enforcing a code of broadcast conduct". The law obliges the Council to establish a Broadcasting Policy that “shall promote local production and promote a diverse range of quality broad-casting which will serve all Communities in Kosovo" ensuring that the programming aired “reflects requirements for equality between citizens and communities”.

4.3.10 Broadcast Code of Conduct,

initially issued in 2000 by the Temporary Media Commissioner, the code remains a binding condition for obtaining a broad-

153 Numerous local and international officials complained about being misquoted or misrepresented as well as journalists often arriving for interviews unprepared and unaware of the topic. The ARD report, Kosovo Media Assessment, March 2004, mentions that journalists published allegations without offering the individual in question the right of reply. 154 TMC Report, 23 April 2004.155 Media Survey in Kosova, Wave 14, May 2006 http://www.indexkosova.com/156 The breakdown of eletronic media outlets by language include: 75 Albanian, 35 Serbian, 3 Bosnian, 3 Turkish, and 1 Gorani.


80 cast license. The code defines a set of jour-nalistic standards and aims at preventing hate speech and incitement to violence. The Code of Conduct does not refer to sin-gle journalists, but to “those with ultimate and final editorial control of programmes” to avoid broadcasting any material that “encourages crime or criminal activities or which carries imminent risk of causing death, or injury, or damage to property or other violence” or that would denigrate “an ethnic or religious group or imply that an ethnic or religious group is responsible for criminal activity”157.

4.3.11 The Code also addresses issue of privacy ordering broadcasters not to broadcast “any material that by intent or effect attributes criminal responsibility to any individual prior to a finding of guilt by a lawfully constituted tribunal158”. It also explicitly bans the media from revealing personal details of any individual alleged to have committed a crime, unless other-wise so authorised, or unless the individu-al has been indicted or found guilty of the crime by a lawfully constituted tribunal.”159

Hate speech law

4.3.12 UNMIK Regulation 2000/4 on Hate Speech was a reaction to an incident in 2000 whereby an unsubstantiated claim was made against a Serb regarding war crimes in the paper Dita. This individual was then murdered. Although the regu-lation does not make explicit reference to the media, it foresees a penalty of up to ten years of imprisonment for those who “take advantage of their position or authority in spreading such speech (…) publicly incites or publicly spreads hatred, discord or intol-erance between national, racial, religious, ethnic or other such groups living in Kos-ovo which acts are likely to disturb public order through coercion, jeopardizing of safety, exposing to derision of national,

racial, ethnic or religious symbols, damag-ing belongings of another, or desecrating monuments or graves.”

Print media regulation

4.3.13 UNMIK Regulation 2000/37 on the print media was also promulgated in reac-tion to the incident of “hate speech” men-tioned above. The regulation authorised the TMC to issue sanctions ranging from warning, requirement to publish a correc-tion or apology, economic fines or closing down of premises of the newspapers. This controversial regulation had temporary validity of 90 days and was subject to re-newal. It has not been extended since 16 September 2005.

Criminal Law and Defamation

4.3.14 Provisions against libel and defa-mation are part of the Kosovo Criminal Code foreseeing sanctions ranging from fines to imprisonment. The criminalisation of defamation law has raised serious con-cerns of numerous Human Rights organi-sations who have urged the Kosovo As-sembly Media Committee and the PISG to change it160. The main concerns were that criminalisation of defamation is inconsist-ent with democratic practice and might be used as a means of repressing the free-dom of the media or criminalisation of an individual journalist rather than also pun-ishing the editorial structure responsible for managing such issues.161 Most experts agree that issues of libel are best addressed by civil law “directed against the media or-ganisation itself.”162 To date, no changes have been made to Kosovo’s libel laws.

Challenges

4.3.15 Most observers agree that Kosovo enjoys a relatively free and diverse press. In the words of the OSCE Representative

157 Broadcast Code of Practice issued by TMC Section 2.3.

158 Broadcast Code of Practice issued by TMC Section 3.1.159 Broadcast Code of Practice issued by TMC Section 3.2.

160 Article 19, OSCE Representative on Freedom of Speech, IMC, Open Society Institute, ARD have all expressed concern after promulgation of the new Kosovo criminal code in the year 2004.

161 http://www.imc-ko.org/article.php?id_article=82. The OSCE Freedom of Media Representative stated that “Punishing libel with prison sentence is a disproportionate measure – an obsolete over-reaction – in the 21st century”.

162 Ibid


81on Freedom of the Media, “Press free-dom in Kosovo is in good shape (…) Ko-sovo media “can work with few obstacles and their rights are largely respected and guaranteed,”163 and their professionalism “is comparable to media throughout the South East European region.” That said the sector does face a number of challenges.

Transparency of Institutions – The implementation of legislation presents challenges to independent media, professional journalism, and ultimately transparent institutions. For example, the Administrative Di-rection on the Implementation of the Law on Access to Official Documents does not make a classification of of-ficial documents which cannot be accessed – leaving this to the discre-tion of the ministries.164 In the period January-February 2006 a group of hu-man rights NGO activists conducted a transparency test filing a total of 346 requests for official documents to Ko-sovo public institutions and received only 16 answers.165

ISSR research regarding the relative trans-parency of various security institutions in Kosovo revealed the following:

Kosovo Police Service (KPS)The Kosovo Police Service has a developed system of public information. The Informa-tion Office is headquartered in Prishtinë/Priština and has branches in all five regions of Kosovo. Reporters do complain that KPS is sometimes slow with providing journal-ists and the public with information and its information is often very general.

Kosovo Correctional ServiceJournalists see UNMIK Department of Jus-tice and Penal Management as the most in-accessible security-related institution. Fur-thermore, the Kosovo Correctional Service lacks spokespeople and prison directors do not grant interviews or allow access to prisons upon request from journalists. At

present all media inquiries regarding the Correctional Service are handled by the UNMIK Press Office.

Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of JusticeThe recently established Ministries of In-ternal Affairs and Justice have established information offices. Unfortunately both ministries face the problem that although those hired may have journalistic experi-ence, they have no security, justice, or le-gal background. Furthermore, at present all media enquiries regarding trials are handled by UNMIK press office.

CourtsAccess to court information is limited since Kosovo courts do not have spokespeople and journalists can only obtain relevant information through UNMIK press office. While the trials are open to the public, jour-nalists have difficulty obtaining information about specific proceedings. Planning is also difficult for journalists due to the fact that the trial schedule is not made public.

Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)Kosovo Protection Corps has a well-devel-oped public communications system with branches in all organisational units. As much as their internal regulations permit, information officers at KPC are responsive to journalist queries, but they do not hold regular press conferences. The Informa-tion Office has an annual strategy which is approved by the KPC commander, which includes crisis management and is devel-oped in cooperation with KFOR.

Ministry of Finance and EconomyMinistry of Finance and Economy is a

media-responsive institution. It has two press officers trained in communication. Banking and Payment Authority of Kosovo (BPK) and Kosovo Pensions Savings Trust (KPST) also have their own spokespeople. Journalists do complain about BPK’s refus-al to give out information using the excuse of “protecting banking secrecy.”166

163 Statement issued by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of Media during visit in Kosovo on 27 April 2006. The Representative on Freedom of Media regularly conducts assessment visits in the OSCE region.164 APJK,http://www.apjk.org/Njoftime/Njoftime.htm#AGPK_kërkon_liri_të_informacionit [3.08.2006]165 Interview with staff from Kosovo Office of Youth Initiative on Human Rights.166 Ibid.


82 Freedom of Expression – Accord-ing to interviews conducted by ISSR staff, Kosovo journalists sometimes feel limited in their freedom of re-searching and reporting. Journalists feel the weight both of censorship and the occasional self-censorship. Censorship is mainly exercised by the editors, but journalists confess being subjected to indirect forms of censor-ship often due to pressure from pow-erful politicians. Journalists feel that the self-censorship derives from fear of personal safety, but also includes political considerations, editorial preferences, and/or expectations of receiving some sort of benefit. Kos-ovo journalists lament lack of a clear mechanism in place to protect those who conduct investigative journalism or those who report critically.

Professionalism – Kosovo journalism is slowly moving towards self-regula-tion. Regulation 2000/37 regulating the conduct of print media was su-perseded at the end of 2005 with the signing of the Statute of the Kosovo Press Council in August 2006. This is meant to serve as a self-regulatory system for print media of Kosovo167.Following two attempts to establish journalist associations, a more sus-tainable and active association of journalists was established in Novem-ber 2002, with assistance of IREX/US-AID.168 Most of the active journalists in Kosovo are young people, often with no formal training or even university degrees.169 With some positive excep-tions, the overall quality of reporting is fairly low.

Kosovo lacks specialised journalists and most reporters covering security issues have no prior training in the field of security or rule of law. Some journalists have participated in train-

ing on the functioning of the justice system and investigative journalism, provided by such organisations as OSCE or IREX, but have little practi-cal experience or training. Only a few major newspapers employ jour-nalists specialised in security sector coverage. It is of concern that the TV stations (which constitute the main source of information for over 85% of Kosovo population), lack specialised staff.

Financial pressure – Kosovo’s eco-nomic circumstances have implica-tions for editorial independence and journalistic professionalism. ISSR re-search revealed that low salaries cur-rently leave Kosovo journalists prone to financial influences, thus affecting both professionalism and the overall quality of reporting. There are journal-ists who admit having been offered financial gains in exchange for writ-ing a positive article or dropping an investigation. Editors also mentioned cases where advertisers, including the government agencies, withdrew their regular adverts after critical coverage of them was broadcast or printed.

Minority Concerns – A number of minority publications are distributed in Kosovo in a variety of languages. Generally Serbian media south of the River Ibër/Ibar generally tend to be more interested in the events in Kos-ovo, while the media operating north of River Ibër/Ibar tend to be oriented towards Belgrade. Increasing the orientation of all of Kosovo’s citizens towards issues of concern within Ko-sovo could contribute to a more con-structive dialogue regarding mutual issues of concern.

167 The Press Council was registered as a non-governmental organization in September 2005.168 See APJK: http://www.apjk.org/English.htm [8.08.2006] In a July 2006 report, the OSCE Freedom of the Media Representative described the Association of Professional Journalists of Kosovo as an organization that yet needs to consolidate in the media industry and also recommended ‘further work on developing a representative professional interest group.’169 These are the division of journalism at the University of Pristina, faculty of media and mass communication at the private university ABB; and the most promising, an English language graduate school – Kosovo Institute of Journalism and Communication, funded by the Norwegian Government.



Editorial Boards of the media should assign dedicated journalists to cover the security sector and training for specialised journalists should be pro-vided. Greater awareness of editors, in particular in the broadcast media, of the need for and benefits of coverage of security issues should be encour-aged. Donor support for this speciali-zation of journalists should be sought from organisations already engaged in both the security sector and media development in Kosovo.

Kosovo’s security environment effects media coverage. Difficulties in free-dom of movement mean that access to direct information in certain areas of Kosovo for both Serbs and Albanian journalists is a problem. Such restric-tions can contribute to un-sourced information being used in reporting and also could impact the way criti-cal events effecting security in Kos-ovo are covered. Efforts towards the creation of a truly independent news agency, credible to all citizens of Kos-ovo would not only improve the qual-ity of information but also may con-tribute to more balanced reporting on key issues.

The Ministry of Justice should nomi-nate spokespeople to handle two areas: a) Courts and b) Correctional Service

a) The Courts and the Office of the Public Prosecutor of Kosovo should appoint a specialised and trained spokes-people to deal with press inquiries.

Furthermore texts of indictments, verdicts, and notifications of arrests should be made publicly available. Data such as a regularly updated trial schedule, updated statistics on com-pleted trials, verdicts, and indictments should also be made available to the public. Finally, regulations need to be developed that protect witnesses and criminalise the publication of in-formation about protected witnesses as well as other criminal proceedings material.

b) Correctional ServiceThe system needs a spokesperson to address media issues. Prison directors should undergo spe-cialised media training to answer to queries and to prepare them to deal with crisis situations. Journalists should be allowed to ap-ply for access to correctional facilities. A clear and transparent policy must be established whereby such access can be considered, based on reason-able grounds for the request.

Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOIA)- Due to the thin line between the

competencies of MOIA and the Police, a clear media relations policy must be established defining the areas in which police and the Ministry should comment without interfering in each others’ areas. As a matter of general principle, the Ministry should com-ments on policy/political issues of in-ternal security and the Police should comment on operational matters.

- Crime statistics should be made pub-lic and available for regular distribu-tion.


84

Political Parties

Background170

4.3.17 The requirements for political party registration in Kosovo have been laid out in UNMIK Regulation 2000/16, which regulates the registration, operation, and the dissolution of political parties. Through UNMIK Regulation 2002/8, the SRSG gave the OSCE the operational authority to register political parties in advance of 2002 municipal elections. The regulatory framework permits parties to open bank accounts and to engage in a number of other basic activities typical of registered organisations, such as hiring staff or sign-ing contracts in the name of the party. Also, the registration statute provides for public and financial transparency of party activities, regular congresses, and party democracy, and is therefore a key element in the democratic political development of Kosovo.

4.3.18 While political parties register only once with the party registration of-fice, they must meet a series of ongoing requirements that are laid out in UNMIK Regulation 2002/8. All parties and other political entities must certify with the Cen-tral Election Commission (CEC) in advance of every election.

4.3.19 Furthermore, UNMIK Adminis-trative Direction 2004/1 established rules to improve transparency and financial reporting by political parties. Specifically, parties must report all contributions over 1,500 € and all expenses over 10,000 € and designate a financial contact person. In ad-dition, parties need to maintain financial records for a period of five years. Financial reports are audited by the auditing cell of the registration office, composed of three international auditing experts. Fines are

imposed in case of irregularities. Party fi-nancial reports are also made available to the public.

4.3.20 All ethnic groups in Kosovo have political party representation. Thirty-three political entities contested the Kos-ovo Assembly elections of year 2004, and seventeen of those won seats in the 120-member Assembly. OSCE has given exten-sive assistance to Kosovo political parties through its Political Party Service Centre.

4.3.21 Challenges

Most of the current political parties in Kosovo came to life in the post-conflict environment and need time to build and develop as true political parties with a national programme and Kosovo-wide outreach.

In addition, the political programme of all Kosovo Albanian political parties re-volves around the issue of independ-ence, with little focus on other issues of importance of the day-to-day life of their constituencies. In the immedi-ate post-status period parties need to refocus their political programmes in order to reflect not only the long-term development needs of Kosovo, but also the aspiration of making Kosovo home for all the communities.

Non-governmental Organisations

Background171

4.3.22 During the repressive years of the Milosevic era, Kosovo’s Albanians devel-oped a history of providing for themselves via an active civil society sector with vol-unteer supported social, cultural, and ba-sic community services. As a result, NGOs in Kosovo enjoy a positive public image.

Issue: Civil Society and Social

Movements

Actors:

Political Parties

Non-Governmental Organisations

“Self-determination Movement”

170 Information on the political parties in Kosovo is drawn from the OSCE Kosovo website.

171 Information is drawn mainly from the USAID studies Kosovo NGO Sustainability Index.


854.3.23 UNMIK Regulation 1999/22 and UNMIK Administrative Direction No. 2000/10 set forth provisions for local and foreign NGOs to operate in Kosovo. This legal framework is largely based on in-ternational best practice and establishes a favourable operating environment for NGOs, as the process of registration is sim-ple and the government has limited au-thority to deny registration. Furthermore, associations and foundations are allowed to engage in economic activities to sup-port themselves.

4.3.24 The large presence of donor fund-ing in Kosovo has meant the number of NGOs has mushroomed since 1999. A few organisations in the sector have been in existence since before the conflict and are relatively experienced and sophisticated. However, there are currently over 3,400 local NGOs registered in Kosovo, of which approximately 150 are well established and active. Furthermore, although the more experienced groups have developed strong networks, clear missions, and stra-tegic plans, there is a wide gap with the less experienced groups. In addition, the donor rich environment in Kosovo means that the majority of NGOs are likely to de-sign their initiatives in response to foreign donor interests and priorities rather than domestically motivated ones. Finally, many NGOs have been created in response to do-nor announcements of grant programmes, ceasing operations when funding ends or fails to materialize.

4.3.25 Challenges

The large number of active versus reg-istered NGOs in Kosovo (approximately 150 active and 3,400 registered) indi-cates the fluctuating nature of the NGO community and points to a need for review of NGO registration and regu-lation to ensure the sector develops properly.

Advocacy and engagement in policy is-sues is a weak point for Kosovo’s NGOs. Prior to the conflict Kosovo’s NGOs were the basis for a parallel system of

services and had no interaction with Belgrade authorities. In addition, Kos-ovo has a tradition of opposing govern-ment authority, rather than lobbying and working with authorities to imple-ment specific policies or make effective change to existing policies. In addition, there is little capacity among the local NGOs on security sector issues from an academic or policy perspective.172

In the context of lack of funds and little government control over NGOs activi-ties, there is potential for terrorist infil-tration into Kosovo’s NGO community. Kosovo's PISG, in cooperation with UN-MIK, increased monitoring of foreign NGOs suspected of extremism and is-sued regulations restricting their activi-ties, including the appropriation of one mosque. It also required each NGO to submit documentation that explains its projects and shows its bank accounts. The Kosovo Islamic Community (KIC) evaluated foreign NGOs and prohibit-ed them from using public facilities for gatherings if their views were found to be extremist.

There is a need for development of minority-representation and advocacy networks in the NGO community that focus on issues all communities can work together.

Social Movements

4.3.26 Kosovo’s history of civil resistance and protest has been continued by a new generation of protest groups including the Kosovo Action Network (KAN), Levizja Vet-evendoja (self-determination) movement, and the Organisation for Democracy, Anti-Corruption, and Dignity or ÇOHU (Stand-Up!). Kosovo’s history of social protest is based on grassroots organization of citizens into genuine citizen movements. Although there is always a danger that protest may turn violent and contribute to social un-rest, the fact remains that the experience of Kosovo’s citizens in expressing their views through protest versus violence is a valu-able tool for democratic development.

172 KIPRED seems to be the only existing NGO which has developed expertise in the area of security during the post-conflict period.

CHAPTER V

Functional Analysis

of Security Institutions

Functional Analysis of Security Institutions

88


5.1.1 Recognizing that good govern-ance is an essential element to a stable and democratically-controlled secu-rity sector, ISSR’s approach is founded on the principle that good governance and security are intertwined and mutu-ally affect each other. Studies of conflict situations in the post-Cold War era have continuously given evidence on the im-portant role of solid and accountable in-stitutions in the social and political sta-bility of countries. For this reason UNDP has concluded that “good governance is by nature preventive.”173

5.1.2 As discussed in the previous chapter and in the introduction of this report the security sector can be divid-ed into several different segments. This chapter covers those sections of the secu-rity sector which have a security provision role. The rational for separating the sector

in this way is that these institutions are the direct providers of security and are re-sponsible for traditional security policy.174

Most of these agencies and institutions are what the OECD would define as ‘Core Security Actors’ although the chapter also includes institutions falling outside that definition such as the Correctional Service and private security companies as these sectors are also direct providers of secu-rity.

Section 5.2: Security Institutions

5.2.1 The following existing security in-stitutions and issues are examined in this section:

Crisis and Emergency ManagementKosovo Police Service Kosovo Protection Corps Kosovo Correctional Service Border Control Private Security Companies

Issue:Crisis and Emergency

Management

Other Institutions:Kosovo Protection Corps

Municipalities

PISG Institutions:Office of the Prime Minister - Office for Public Safety

Department for Emergency Management

Ministry of Internal Affairs

173 Governance for sustainable development. A UNDP policy document. http://magnet.undp.org/policy

174 In addition, all these organisations have the authority to use force, or threat of force to protect the state and its citizens.

Background

5.2.2 Emergency preparedness is a PISG responsibility outlined in section 5.5 of UNMIK Regulation 2001/9:

The Provisional Institutions of Self Govern-ment shall also have the following respon-sibilities in the field of emergency prepared-ness:

(a) Developing and implementing a strat-egy for emergency planning and civil protection services;

(b) Directing and coordinating fire and res-cue services in close cooperation with the municipalities.

5.2.3 Although a Department of Emergency Management has been in ex-istence since 2002, coordination of emer-gency management is a relatively new function assumed by the PISG in June

CHAPTER V

Functional Analysis Of Security Institutions


892004. A coordinating body for crisis man-agement was created in the form of the Of-fice of Public Safety (OPS), established by UNMIK Administrative Direction 2004/16. OPS was established within the Office of the Prime Minister with the mandate to provide information to the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and the PISG on in-cidents affecting public safety, serve as a point of contact for the OPM regarding reform of the Kosovo Police Service, serve as a liaison and point of contact between UNMIK and OPM on incidents related to security, coordinate work of the Crisis Ac-tion and Emergency Team, and serve as a liaison between the OPM and the Depart-ment of Emergency Preparedness.

5.2.4 At present, the OPS is responsi-ble for manning the Crisis Control Room / Situation Centre but this Centre has failed to materialise due to a lack of staff, equip-ment, and training. The Crisis Control Room / Situation Centre was meant, by a decision of the Prime Minister, to function as the point of contact for receiving infor-mation from law and order institutions, acting as a briefing centre for the Prime Minister and the PISG, and for drafting re-ports and exchanging information on se-curity related matters.

Other Crisis and Emergency

Management Players

5.2.5 The functional responsibilities for crisis and emergency management fall across a number of PISG and other Kosovo institutions, as outlined below.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs was established by UNMIK Regulation 2005/53 in December 2005. Some of the ministry functions relevant to emer-gency preparedness and response include policy making authorities re-garding police and law and order.

Department of Emergency Man-

agement with the establishment of the PISG, specific authorities in the area of emergency preparedness were transferred to the newly established Department of Emergency Manage-ment (DEM) in the Ministry of Public Services. According to the Constitu-

tional Framework (UNMIK Regulation 2001/9) its responsibilities consisted of, “developing and implementing a strategy for emergency planning and civil protection services”, and, “direct-ing and coordinating fire and rescue services in close cooperation with the municipalities.” DEM was recently transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (UNMIK Regulation 2006/26). DEM has developed a Threat Assess-ment Plan and an Action Plan at the municipal and region levels, while plans at the Kosovo level constitute an UNMIK reserved area function. It has also developed specific plans of action for flood and earthquake situ-ations, and one for the Avian Flu. In line with the above, a unique system of response is established at the mu-nicipal level with a number of actors involved including DEM, KPC, KPS, the Medical Emergency Unit, Kosovo Red Cross and other NGOs. A draft law on emergency response has been adopt-ed by the Assembly of Kosovo and is in the process of being vetted by the Office of the Legal Adviser (UNMIK).

KPC mandate in disaster/emergency response is to conduct emergency relief operations alongside local re-sponders, provide technical expertise and equipment not available locally, and in some cases re-establish law and order alongside KPS to ensure rescue and recovery operations can function.

KPS mandate in the area of disas-ter/emergency response is to ensure that law and order is maintained, that emergency services can work in an unrestricted manner, and that the normal policing duties related to crowd control, traffic movement and evacuation are executed.

Kosovo Assembly Committee on Security exercises limited oversight powers on emergency related activi-ties and drafts emergency plans.

Kosovo’s Municipalities host a number of committees designed to coordinate issues of safety and secu-


90 rity including the Local Public Safety Committee and the Municipal Com-munities Safety Council. To date reg-ular communication links between OPS/the Situation Centre and munici-palities have not been established.

Relevant PISG Ministries and Min-

istry Spokespeople175 Different ministries will be involved in disaster response, dependent on the type of emergency. Coordination between the lead ministry and the situation centre will be required, particularly in terms of information flow. Public Af-fairs spokespeople in relevant minis-tries are required to provide the pub-lic and media with information in a crisis situation. Coordination of state-ments and facts is currently done by individual ministries directly with the Office of the Prime Minister as the Sit-uation Centre is not yet a functioning coordination point.


A number of coordination issues have emerged since the establishment of the Office for Public Safety (OPS). Some of them are related to the po-litical changes and others with the ongoing structural changes of the PISG. On the political level, recent ex-perience has shown that the position and role of OPS are bound to be af-fected by the coalition of the political parties in the government. Secondly, as the transitional nature of Kosovo’s government continues and UNMIK is handing over reserved functions, the structure of the PISG is changing in a piecemeal manner. In the case of emergency and crisis management these changes have brought overlap-ping responsibilities and created con-fusion.

In view of the above, the scope of OPS’ work has been reduced to the

coordination of the Crisis Action and Emergency Team and the Crisis Con-trol Room / Situation Centre without an alternative institutional actor as-suming the role. From the perspective of the current changes and with the intention of transforming OPS into a key actor in the future institutional structure, it is necessary to refocus the office in line with the recommen-dations on the institutional arrange-ments of the Kosovo Security Sector.


In order to best coordinate and man-age emergency response some be-lieve that the Department of Emer-gency Management (DEM) should become an independent, specialised agency within Kosovo’s governing structures. This type of agency is a feature of some EU countries and is believed to help isolate such a spe-cialised function of governance from politicisation.176 It is recommended that the issue is explored further.

Communication links between OPS and other players in crisis/emergency response need to be established as soon as possible. This would include not only ministries of the PISG and the Department of Emergency Man-agement, KPC, KPS, and the Munici-palities. The establishment of regular communication links is required to ensure that information is available and processed properly in prepara-tion for incidents that might occur and require management.

ISSR recommend that OPS integrates itself in the role of the Secretariat of the Communities Security Council, and then on the resolution of Final Status, the Kosovo Security Council with three major functions: first, to coordinate the proceedings of the above Councils; second, to undertake

175 Dependent on the crisis different ministries would be involved. For example, an epidemic situation would involve the Ministry of Health and an agricultural disaster would involve the Ministry of Agriculture.

176 In some countries, such as Denmark, emergency management is implemented via an executive agency within a larger ministry. This arrangment provides greater budgetary and operational autonomy to an institution often required to work in crisis situations.


91research on specific security related matters as requested by the Council; and third, to perform any additional tasks assigned by the Council. In addition, it will act as the focal point for all briefings to the Prime Minister and the Security Adviser to the Prime Minister on security and emergency related issues.

The structure and staffing of OPS and eventually the Kosovo Security Coun-cil Secretariat should be consistent with its future role and a long-term capacity building programme should be designed and implemented in accordance with a reputable institution in the area of security.

An appropriate international actor, potentially from the new Internation-al Civilian Office (ICO), should play a key role in delivering the capacity building programme for the future OPS and Kosovo Security Council Sec-retariat. In view of the above, the ap-propriate international organization should undertake measures to en-sure the proper delivery of such pro-grammes. This should include closer liaison with the OPS and, possibly, the secondment of international experts to help activate the Prime Minister’s Situation Centre (SITCEN).

Issue:KPS – Kosovo Police Service

PISG Institutions: OPS- Office of Public Safety

Ministry of Interior (MOIA)

UNMIK:CIVPOL OSCE:KCPSED - Kosovo Centre of Public Safety

Education and Development

DPED - Department of Police Education

and Development

Legal and Institutional Framework

5.2.8 The Kosovo Police Service (KPS) was established under the authority of UNSCR 1244 (1999). Until May 2006, the KPS was completely under the authority of CIVPOL and was part of UNMIK Pillar I (Po-lice and Justice).177 On the disbandment of Pillar I it came under the direct control of the SRSG. At the end of the UNMIK man-date, the EU will assume responsibility for international policing in Kosovo and take over responsibility for much of the insti-tutional development, monitoring and capacity building needs of the police and justice sector.

5.2.9 The legal basis for the estab-lishment of the KPS relied on two interna-

tional documents adopted respectively by the United Nations Security Council and OSCE Permanent Council. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), paragraph 11/i stated that:

“the main responsibilities of the inter-national civil presence …maintaining civil law and order, including establish-ing of local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of internation-al police personnel serve in Kosovo”.

OSCE Permanent Council Decision Nr. 305, operative paragraph 11 states that:

The OSCE mission in Kosovo will concen-trate its work on “human resources ca-pacity-building, including the training

177 UNMIK Pillar I has ceased to exist in May 2006.


92 of a new Kosovo police service within a Kosovo Police School which it will estab-lish and operate, the training of judicial personnel and the training of civil ad-ministrators at various levels, in co-op-eration, inter alia, with the Council of Europe;”178

5.2.10 Furthermore, the authority of the SRSG over CIVPOL and the KPS is en-compassed in UNMIK Regulation 1999/1, which in section 1, paragraph 1.1 states:

“All legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo, including the adminis-tration of the judiciary, is vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the Special Representa-tive of the Secretary-General”

5.2.11 Within the UNMIK organisational structure, responsibility for the operation of the KPS was divided between UNMIK Pillar I of Police and Justice and UNMIK Pil-lar III of Democratisation and Institutional Building lead by the OSCE. Since disband-ment of Pillar I KPS has come under the au-thority of UNMIK Police Commissioner with oversight by the SRSG. OSCE has always concentrated its work on the training of KPS members through the Police School in Co-ordination with Police Commissioner.

5.2.12 As with other parts of UNMIK’s mandate there is now an ongoing process of transferring of competencies to the PISG. The first concrete step towards trans-fer was made by establishing the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) under Regulation 2005/53. MoIA has been established to in-herit several previously reserved functions relating to internal security policy making. The MoIA’s mandate relevant to KPS in-cludes:

Developing policies within the scope of its responsibilities, facilitate prepa-ration of and implement legislation in the field of public order and safety; Administering financial and budget-ary affairs of the Kosovo Police Service and the Ministry in cooperation with

the Ministry of Finance and Economy; In coordination with UNMIK, being responsible for the implementation of Integrated Border Management in respect of the established border/boundary crossing arrangements in accordance with standards set by the European Union, and in particular for the effective coordination between the police and other public authorities involved in border crossing control; Cooperating, through UNMIK, with external services, agencies and inter-national organisations which have responsibilities in the field of public order and safety; Performing functions in disciplinary proceedings against police officers, in conformity with the applicable law and the Senior Police Appointments and Discipline Committee (SPADC); Developing and implementing a strat-egy on the public relations of the Min-istry and on the cooperation between the Ministry and other public bodies with responsibilities in the field of public order and safety.

5.2.13 The full transfer of competencies related to KPS will occur in the post status period and will be dependant on the out-comes of the ongoing status negotiations in Vienna. At the same time, the nature and mandate of the EU mission related to KPS will need to be agreed.

Command Structure and the Transfer of

Competencies

5.2.14 KPS has a three tier command structure including:

Police HeadquartersRegional Commands (total of 6)Municipal Stations (total 35 munici-pal stations, plus sub-stations)

5.2.15 All municipal police stations and regional commands of the KPS (excluding the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica region)179 have been transferred to local control and re-

178 OSCE Permanent Council Decision Nr. 305, 237th Plenary Meeting PC Journal No. 237, Agenda item 2, July 1, 1999.179 In Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, the regional commander’s position is still filled by an international police officer, although his deputy is a member of the KPS. Given the ongoing community tensions within the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica region, a date for full transition has yet to be determined.


93port to the Department of the Public Or-der within the Police Headquarters.

5.2.16 Dealing with everyday incidents such as traffic accidents, minor crimes or disputes between neighbours, is well within the capabilities of the KPS. A sys-tem is in place, though not adhered to universally by the Municipal Community Safety Councils (MCSC), to allow police information on incidents and operations to be passed to the municipalities. In some localities formalised meetings are held between station commanders and communities, and the concepts of com-munity based policing (CBP) have been adopted and are in their early stages of development. It is hoped, however, that this will develop into a mature and mutu-ally responsible relationship providing a foundation for the establishment of com-munity safety programmes.

5.2.17 Currently Regional police com-manders do not have any real form of fi-nancial autonomy. Instead all budgetary matters are dealt with by UNMIK from Prishtinë/Priština.180 This is clearly an is-sue to be addressed in the longer term development of the MoIA and its budget-ary management.

5.2.18 The organisational structure of the Central Police Headquarters is as follows:

5.2.19 A major stage of the transfer of competencies from UNMIK to KPS is com-

plete and included the appointment of a local Deputy Police Commissioner and four assistants. It is anticipated that these four assistants will ultimately take the position of Deputy Police Commissioners post sta-tus, whilst the first Kosovan Deputy Police Commissioner will in turn become the KPS Commissioner. Currently ninety percent of the senior KPS posts are transferred to Kosovo officials.

5.2.20 Currently the main concentra-tion of senior UNMIK civilian police can be found at central headquarters in Prishtinë/Priština.181 UNMIK Police also continue to hold executive positions within the De-partment for Organised Crime and other specialised or sensitive units. It is likely that both the national Commissioner and the Heads of these specialised units will remain in the hands of international post holders for the foreseeable future as local capacities are developed.

Oversight - Police Inspectorate of Kosovo

5.2.21 The Police Inspectorate of Kosovo (PIK), an Executive Agency of the newly-established Ministry of Internal Affairs, was formally launched by the Ministry in July 2006. The PIK represents a new approach to KPS oversight and is intended to maintain the confidence of all communities that the service will be held accountable for miscon-duct and ineffective management.

5.2.22 As an independent civilian over-sight mechanism, the Police Inspectorate

180 Individual commanders do have a discretionary expenditure of € 66, 000 per annum for small projects.181 There are currently approximately 2,000 CIVPOL’s in Kosovo, expected to drawdown to 860 by the end of 2006.

DeputyCommissioner for

Crime(International)

Department forCrime

DeputyCommissioner for

Operations(International)

Department ofAssistance

Department ofBorder Police

(Local)

Department ofPublic Order

Department ofSpecial Police

Department forTraining

DeputyCommissioner

(Local)

PoliceCommissioner(International)

Figure 30: Structure of KPS HQ PristinaSource: ISSR 2006.


94 has two primary functions. First, it inspects the performance of the KPS in a range of defined management functions in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and compliance with applicable law. Second, the Inspec-torate investigates all allegation of serious misconduct by KPS officers, regardless of rank. Where a serious allegation is substan-tiated, the case is sent to the Senior Police Appointments and Discipline Committee (SPADC) for a disciplinary hearing.

5.2.23 Using a range of powers under Administrative Direction 2006/9, the PIK will conduct 12-14 ordinary inspections in every fiscal year. Each inspection fo-cuses on a specific area of management performance (e.g. Crime Investigation, Detention, Vehicle Fleet Management) and is conducted through use of highly structured data gathering tools (known as ‘Protocols’). Upon completion of each inspection the PIK collates and analyses the data, then prepares an Interim Report that describes areas of strength and weak-ness, with the goal of making realistic and achievable recommendations for future change. In addition to the principles of effectiveness and efficiency, PIK reports emphasise compliance with the standards set out in the European Code of Police Eth-ics (ECPE). The OSCE is taking the lead in supporting the development of the PIK through an extensive training programme. Since the training programme is based on ‘action learning’, the PIK has already con-ducted three police inspections and pro-duced corresponding performance reports on Road Traffic Management, Vehicle Fleet Management and Buildings Management.

Data

5.2.24 As of September 2006 there were approximately 7,150 KPS police officers along with 1150 civilian staff. The KPS is 86.20% male and 13.80% female. Given the female population of Kosovo is approximately 49.5%, female representa-tion within the police ranks is low relative to the population but according to OSCE experts the number is actually high in terms of regional representation and also for many countries in Europe. 182 Social and cultural constraints, together with a lack of sufficient recruits, means that it is unlikely that the police will reach a representative number of women in the near future. It is, therefore, necessary that work be under-taken to attract more female applicants

5.2.25 The KPS is one of the most repre-sentative of all Kosovo institutions with re-gards to minority communities. Currently, 84.50% of KPS Officers are Albanian, 9.66%

182 Statistics regarding the population of Kosovo can be found at the Statistical Office of Kosovo website http://www.ks-gov.net/esk/

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Male Female

Figure 31: KPS Gender BalanceSource:Kosovo Police 2006

Albanians

Serbs

Others

84.5%

9.7%

5.8%

Chart A: Employment in KPS

Albanians

Serbs

Others

90.2%

5.8%4%

Chart B: Kosovo Population

Figure 32: The Above Charts Show the Proportion of KPS Officers to the Population of Kosovo and the Estimated Overall Population Breakdown. Source: UNMIK Communities Section Updated As of April 2006.


95are Serbian and 5.85% are drawn from oth-er minority communities. Issues remain related to the geographic spread of minor-ity officers but this should not deflect from the success of a police service which is broadly representative of the population.

Public Perceptions of the Police

5.2.26 Surveys completed by ISSR and other organisations conclude that the KPS is one of the most trusted institutions in Kosovo. However, there is a danger that the early success of the KPS may have created a blind spot to early signs of problems that now exist. In a recent survey (June 2006) of 1200 households conducted by Gani Bobi and Saferworld on behalf of the South Eastern European Small Arms Clearing House (SEESAC) 37.5% of those surveyed estimated the KPS to be very efficient or efficient. In a similar survey conducted by the UNDP for the 2004 report ‘Light Blue,’ 56% of respondents viewed the KPS as “excellent” or “good”. Although these two surveys were conducted independently without parallel methodologies, the general drop in public perceptions regarding KPS points to possible issues of trust for

further examination.

5.2.27 As described in other sections of this report, citizen fears regarding the police focus on the perceived failure of the KPS to ensure the rule of law in Kos-ovo, creeping politicisation of the service, and corruption. Such issues need to be confronted through promotion of a thor-ough internal disciplinary regime which

would include a counter corruption unit within the KPS, likely jointly answerable the Office of the Ombudsman and the Police Commissioner. Similarly, the lack of effective parliamentary oversight from the Assembly also could contribute to issues such as creeping politicisation to grow without effective public review.

5.2.28 However, as table 15 (below) demonstrates public trust in the KPS is significantly higher than its trust in the UNMIK CIVPOL component. Such results demonstrate a preference of the majority of the population to be policed by locals rather than internationals.

Institutional challenges

Police Training

5.2.29 Recruitment of KPS officers fol-lows a number of criteria. Applicants must be over 21 years of age, have completed secondary school education, and are sub-ject to a thorough background check. Fol-lowing a short-listing process, successful applicants are subject to interview, fitness testing and medical, and psychological ex-amination.

5.2.30 The Department of Police Education and Development (DPED) and KCPSED (Kosovo Centre of Public Safety Education and Development) at Vush-trri/Vučitrn can be considered a success story. KCPSED was established by OSCE in 1999 with an aim to ‘create a modern po-lice service that would restore confidence in law enforcement and effectively apply community based policing principles’. To

Figure 33: Public Perceptions of Police EfficiencySource: SEESAC Survey, Gani Bobi Institute/Saferworld, June 2006

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

very efficient efficient neither efficientnor inefficient

inefficient veryinefficient

I don't know

ref/na

9.9

27.6 27.6

2.6

19.6

12.4

0.2

How efficient do you judge the police to be in solving crime and protect people?


96

date more than 8,000 officers have gradu-ated from KCPSED, all of whom have un-dergone a broad and relevant police based training programme. The recruit curricula matches comparable international stand-ards and is delivered by training profes-sionals. Basic training at KCPSED takes 20 weeks, and thereafter a further 20 weeks of field training is conducted.183

5.2.31 The DPED in coordination with KPS also deliver a number of advanced and specialist training programme includ-ing criminal investigation, higher level management, and leadership for execu-tive officers. Currently DPED is moving away from being a pure police training facility towards that of a public safety col-lege. Training is now delivered to the Fire and Rescue Service,184 Kosovo Correctional Service, Customs, Court and Buildings Se-curity Departments and others. This broad-er outlook on the delivery of development and training is noteworthy in terms of

creation of a joined-up approach to public safety.5.2.32 Whether training is supply or demand driven seems to be an issue. It is hoped that the decentralisation process will further empower operational com-manders, allowing them to determine indi-vidual training needs and availability. In the future it is likely that the DPED will become more involved in curricula design, teacher training and evaluation, as opposed to de-livering hands-on training. While develop-ment and training can only be considered a sub-component of institutional reform, most observers agree the DPED/KCPSED has contributed greatly to the overall pro-fessionalism of the emergent KPS.

Management and Leadership

5.2.33 Despite the best efforts of UNMIK and the high level of training provided by KCPSED, concerns remain regarding the quality of KPS leadership, management

183 Responsibility for basic training has been transferred to KPS officers, while training needs assessment, curriculum development, training of trainers, and testing evaluation are responsibilities transferred to PISG civil servants.

184 The Department of Emergency Management also coordinates fire and safety training.

Frequency PercentValid NONE

142 11.3

LITTLE 260 20.7AVERAGE 494 39.3VERY MUCH 190 15.1COMPLETELY 126 10.0I DON’T KNOW 19 1.5REF/NA 27 2.1TOTAL 1258 100.0

Table 15 - Public Trust in UNMIK PoliceSource: SEESAC Survey Completed by Gani Bobi Institute/Saferworld, June 2006

Frequency PercentValid NONE

96 7.6

LITTLE 176 14.0AVERAGE 279 22.2VERY MUCH 331 26.3COMPLETELY 348 27.7I DON’T KNOW 13 1.0REF/NA 15 1.2TOTAL 1258 100.0

Table 16 - Public Trust in KPSSource: SEESAC Survey Completed by Gani Bobi Institute/Saferworld, June 2006


97and supervision. While there are examples of sound leadership and management skills at senior or middle ranking levels, these are the exception rather than the rule. Approximately 80% of the total KPS have been appointed over the last six years, resulting in the best officers form-ing a small pool from which all transfers to specialist departments and promo-tions are drawn. Many of these officers have been transferred or promoted on too regular a basis.185 This constant movement of key personnel is inhibiting institutional stability and preventing strategic thinking from being implemented. Furthermore, the individuals concerned are never in place long enough to either gain the mas-tery of their new role or have any lasting influence on their staff.

5.2.34 Approximately twenty percent of KPS personnel have previous police expe-rience from the Former Yugoslavia. Many of the senior officers within this group have established good relationships with municipalities and communities, thus bringing their previous experience to bear, particularly when dealing with sensitive police/political relationships. However, problem solving is not the strength of this group. Instead there is a reliance on the chain of command, a deferment of deci-sion making and a reluctance to introduce innovation.5.2.35 Station level management ap-pears to be relatively strong and focused on problem solving and dispute resolution approaches. Within the various bands of KPS management, station level managers may be the most effective. Yet concerns have been expressed regarding the expe-rience and quality of junior supervisors, both at station level and within specialist units. Given the close family and commu-nity ties, which are a defining feature of Kosovo’s society, management and super-vision difficulties can emerge at the local level.

5.2.36 KPS leadership generally is di-vided between two groups. On one side there is a bright but youthful group whose inexperience and brief post tenure makes for a limited institutional impact. While

on the other, a much more experienced and worldly-wise group seem reluctant to think strategically or make decisions. Time will allow talent to surface, although care will need to be taken to prevent a genera-tion of ‘butterfly managers’’ developing, meaning managers never being in one place long enough to either to make an impression or live with the consequences of their decisions. To this end, further effort needs to be focused on supporting human resource policies for the KPS, which should include annual assessment, selection, pro-motion, and discipline criteria.

5.2.37 Overall the long-term picture of leadership and management capabili-ties within the KPS is positive. However, as emphasised above, it is important that those younger leaders are encouraged to stay in place and build up their experi-ence. Furthermore, they should be per-mitted to develop specific specialisations that will be of use in their future careers. At the same point the older generation must not be permitted to be a block to develop-ment and those who are totally resistant to change should be considered for retire-ment.

Decentralisation

5.2.38 Decentralisation is regarded as being one of a number of essential com-ponents of the discussions on final status. The KPS are affected by decentralisation, as regional commanders will be expected to operate in a more autonomous environ-ment, delivering effective police services appropriate to local community needs. Currently there is little evidence to dem-onstrate sufficient autonomy of regional command, direction, prioritisation or budgetary controls to carry out such a re-mit. Regional commanders will therefore need to change their relationship with KPS Headquarters and become more reliant on local consultation and decision mak-ing processes. Enhanced levels of author-ity will need to be passed to the regions and individual commanders will, of neces-sity, be held accountable for their actions and performance. In the same context, concerns over the politicisation of police should also be taken into consideration.

185 Research conducted by SSDAT, on behalf of ISSR, shows that some KPS officers have been promoted as many as eight times in six years.


98 All these changes will need to be support-ed by relevant KPS policies.

5.2.39 Decentralisation should be viewed by the KPS as de-concentrated po-licing model. The benefits of a de-concen-trated approach will be more responsive and consultative policing answerable to local municipality and community needs rather than a path towards the Balkani-zation of the police force. There will be a need to strengthen the capacity of indi-vidual commanders and their support teams if such an approach is to work, al-lowing decision making to be transferred from the centre and brought nearer to the point of delivery. However,, there are examples of units that have been passed to the regions which are no longer meet-ing previous high standards and are now considered to be under-performing. This demonstrates the need to build the ca-pacity of regional commanders before the decentralised (de-concentrated) model is adopted. Furthermore, appropriate mod-els of local public accountability need to be developed through reviewing the roles and mandates of the existing Municipal Community Safety Councils and Local Public Safety Committees.

Specialist Units

5.2.40 The KPS can be described as a functioning police service, able to provide more than adequate policing at station level. At the Central Headquarters level there are a small number of specialist units which will likely require international lead-ership and close support for a longer pe-riod.

5.2.41 As discussed in the threat assess-ment portion of this report, organised crime poses a significant internal and re-gional threat to Kosovo. The Directorate of Organised Crime (DOC) is confronted with challenges that would daunt any es-

tablished European police service. Trans-national crime, human trafficking, human smuggling, drugs and money laundering are among the more serious and every-day issues faced. In addition, crime is be-ing committed with impunity by certain sections of the Kosovo elite, and to cope with this effectively a future Kosovo will need to join regional and European crime structures and gain from the support of in-ternational donors and experts.

5.2.42 Furthermore, levels of intimida-tion are such that international technical support may have to be delivered through executive function. Discussions have tak-en place as to the necessity of establish-ing an International Executive Police Unit (IEPU). This unit, if approved, would be es-tablished outside of the KPS structure and be staffed only by internationals (police, prosecutors and judges). Many observers see institutionalised, well-organised crime as the major impediment to future eco-nomic, political and socio-development in Kosovo, thus these type of extraordinary measures may be required until not only Kosovo’s, but regional police capacity can cope with the challenges.


UNMIK Regulation 2005/54 does not fulfil the legal requirements for the KPS. There is an urgent need to draft a new KPS law through which the le-gal framework for the service can be better regulated.186

The gradual transfer of the compe-tencies from UNMIK to the PISG could cause a vacuum in KPS competency. Up to the present the members of KPS have been limited in completely fulfilling their obligations by their UN-MIK Police counterparts, resulting in a capacity deficit. Furthermore, PISG officials and KPS officers have been excluded from many decision proc-

186 As of September 2006 a new KPS law was being drafted by the Working Group for the Law on Police. Upon consultation with legal experts the ISSR team believes the drafters should consider issues such as: distinguishing between political oversight (Assembly) and monitoring (government/ministry); professional leadership not allowing political interference with policing strictly bound to constitutional principles and pertinent laws; preconditions for any infringement of fundamental freedoms and human rights; the limits to it as well as the procedures and requirements for judicial warrants for legally allowed investigative means (in full compliance with the ECHR); regulation of search and seizure; issues of data protection and sharing; issues related to audio and video recording in public spaces; and finally regulation of the issue of cooperation and information sharing with police services of other countries and international policing organisations, such as ICPO Interpol, SECI Centre, etc.

Security in Kosovo is not as good as it

should be. Maybe if the KPS gets stronger, more profes-sional, and the people co-operate more closely with the police, security situa-tion would defi-nitely improve.

Albanian elderly man,

Gjilan/Gnjilane


99esses, and the relationship between MoIA and KPS should be clearly de-fined on the basis of best practices. The UNMIK police and their EU succes-sors should recognise that expertise will only come by learning through doing rather than just training, and capacity building and monitoring is still required in many areas.

Decentralisation will have impor-tant implications for the KPS. The es-tablishment of the new substations based upon political agreements rather than policing needs will be in direct conflict with principles and in-vestment that up to now has defined the international support for the KPS. On the other hand, the current cen-tralisation of the majority of services will in the context of decentralisation create an imbalance and inefficiency in the coordination of the police serv-ice. Therefore, it is extremely impor-tant that the status negotiations are explicit about the extent of, and the mandates for, a decentralised police force. This has to ensure that finan-cial autonomy is granted to regional or local police commanders in the context of their revised role and man-date and explicit frameworks in terms of responsibilities are established between headquarters and the de-volved stations.

Police officers who worked originally as officers in the Communist period make up the majority of command-ing officers in the KPS regions. This has resulted in some difficulties for the officers in adjusting to the current policing environment which expects greater individual autonomy. Indeed, in some cases junior officers are not permitted to make appropriate deci-sions while other decisions are con-stantly and inappropriately referred up the command chain.

Some KPS officers see policing as the expression of power and therefore feel the KPS should be a ‘force’ and not a ‘service’. This contradiction with the stated aim of the KPS has the poten-tial to damage the reputation of the service, its relationship with citizens, and with civil society. Given Kosovo’s desire to join Europe and meet inter-national policing standards, such con-cept can not be allowed to develop.

Training and recruitment of the KPS are two of the most important aspects of its future effectiveness. The centrali-sation of training should be reviewed and should be more relative to the specific local requirements of the re-gions. At the moment, there appears to be a uniform approach to the selec-tion of candidates for training. Officers often are drawn, seemingly at random, to attend courses at the Police School regardless of their current or future post and role. There also exists a need to pay attention to staff deployment issues, ensuring that police officers work in the fields in which they were trained.187

Coordination of KPS with the rest of the criminal justice sector, especially between the prosecutors and judici-ary, while still relatively good, is a pri-ority issue. The action procedure must be redrafted to enhance efficiency in the war against crime.

The current system of promotions and salary levels are an issue that must be urgently reviewed. Such a review could enhance effective management and police efficiency.

With reference to the promotions system, accusations that promotions are based on political biases exist but they may be over stated. However, there are questions about the way in which many police officers are pro-

187 The issue of creating a separate training for Serb police officers has been considered and limited training for Serb officers has been undertaken in the north part of Mitrovica city. Special Representative Kai Eide noted in his October 2005 report that, “Caution is also required with regard to the future of the Kosovo Police Service School. This is one of the most successful endeavours of the international community in Kosovo .... The police force must be, and seem to be, training in a politically-neutral environment. Only then will the multi-ethnic composition of the KPS be ensured, and the level of acceptance by all communities enhanced.”


100 moted. Further, talented officers have often been promoted too quickly, in some cases every year for the last six years, preventing the development of

professional experience. It is therefore suggested that a review of the past roles and conduct of police officers be built into an efficient system of pro-

Issue: KPC/TMK – Kosovo Protection

Corps

KFOR: KIKPC- KFOR Inspectorate for the KPC

PISG Institutions: OPS- Office for Public Safety

Ministry of Internal Affairs

Department of Emergency Management

UNMIK:

KPC-Coordinator’s Office

KPC TRADOC

OSCE:KCPSED-Kosovo Centre of Public Safety Education

and Development

Kosovo Law Centre

motions in accordance with existing European standards and local needs.

Background

5.2.44 The Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) - Trupat Mbrojtëse Të Kosovës (TMK) - was officially established on the 20 Sep-tember 1999.188 KPC’s origins lie in the Un-dertaking of Demilitarisation and Transfor-mation by the UCK signed between Hashim Thaci on behalf of the KLA leadership and COMKFOR General Michael Jackson on 21 June 1999. The KPC endeavoured to hand its weapons over and also comply with Commander Kosovo Force’s Statement of Principles. The KPC’s personnel were drawn initially from members of the former Kos-ovo Liberation Army (KLA) but the Corps was intended to become a civilian agency charged with providing emergency re-sponse and reconstruction services to Kosovo.189 Modelled on the French Sécu-rité Civile, the KPC's mission is to protect the population of Kosovo against natural or man-made disasters and to assist in the rebuilding of Kosovo. It has a military structure and military style uniforms but its armed functions are limited to ceremonial

and security guard duties. At present, the KPC holds 2000 weapons, which are stored by KFOR, and only 200 weapons can be drawn at any one time with the permission of COMKFOR.

5.2.45 The Special Representative of Secretary-General (SRSG) exercises over-all authority over the KPC. The KPC Co-or-dinator (KPCC) provides policy guidance and administrative support on behalf of SRSG. The KPCC plays a role approximately akin to that of a government minister. The COMKFOR exercises day to day supervi-sion and advice, mainly through KFOR In-spectorate for the KPC (KIKPC) in accord-ance to the SRSG’s priorities and policies. The COMKPC commands the Corps and is locally recruited.

Legal Framework

5.2.46 The Commander Kosovo Force Statement of Principles for the KPC of June 1999 identified the mandate of the KPC as:

“…to provide assistance to the United Nations Mission In Kosovo in the event of natural disaster or similar emergency, in the reconstruction of the Kosovo civilian

188 KPC was established via UNMIK Regulation 1999/8 later amended by UNMIK Regulation 2006/3.

189 Erik Petrson, Kosovo Protection Corps In Search of a Future, Groningen: Centre for European Studies, September 2005, pp. 6-9.


101infrastructure and other assistance as may from time to time be requested by the United Nations Mission In Kosovo.”

5.2.47 The Statement of Principles defined KPC’s mission as:

“(…) the only multidisciplinary, multi-ethnic, indigenous emergency service agency that will undertake to:

a. Respond to any disaster affecting the population of Kosovo.

b. Conduct search and rescue operations.c. Assist in rebuilding the infrastructure

and community of Kosovo.d. Provide assistance to the United Nations

Mission in Kosovo and Kosovo Force when required.

e. Perform ceremonial duties.

in order to serve all the people of Ko-sovo in keeping with the transitions to a democratic and free society.”

5.2.48 The Statement of Principles further states that the Corps is to consist of:

One Central Headquarters, six region-al headquarters and tasks groups, one Guard and Rapid Reaction Group;Support units specialised in training, communications, engineering, chem-ical decontamination, search and res-cue, medical assistance, transporta-tion and supply and maintenance. No member of the KPC will be permit-ted to carry arms of any kind unless authorised to do so by the SRSG.2000 weapons in total are held in trust for the KPC. 200 will be in use at any one time.

5.2.49 The mandate of KPC was also en-shrined in UNMIK Regulation 1999/8 and its amended version UNMIK Regulation 2006/3, which included also the additional tasks to:

Provide humanitarian assistance in isolated areasDe-miningContribute to rebuilding infra-structure and monitor unoccupied

reconstructed homes in minority communities

5.2.50 KPC’s mandate is defined as fol-lows in the Constitutional Framework (UN-MIK Regulation 2001/9):

“The Kosovo Protection Corps is a civilian emergency organisation, established under the law, which carries out in Ko-sovo rapid disaster response tasks for public safety in times of emergency and humanitarian assistance.”

5.2.51 Oversight Actors

KFOR Inspectorate for the KPC - The KIKPC acts as an inspectorate of the KPC providing day-to-day supervision, inspections, reports and recommenda-tions. The tasks of KIKPC are; to conduct Roll Calls; conduct Emergency Readi-ness Tests; inspection of training; logis-tic inspections and recommendations; and to monitor and ensure compliance with the KPC Disciplinary Code. 190

KPC Coordinator- The Office of the KPC Coordinator (OKPCC) was estab-lished on 28 August 2002, as an Office within UNMIK. The KPC Coordinator (KPCC) is responsible for advising the SRSG on the exercise of his control and authority over the KPC. The KPCC is responsible for policy formulation, advice and co-ordination of all mat-ters pertaining to the KPC in order to support the KPC fully in its develop-ment into a professional and disci-plined organisation operating within their legal mandate.

Assembly Level - At the parliamenta-ry level, the Assembly Committee on Security exercises limited oversight powers on emergency related activi-ties and drafts emergency plans. This committee consists of 12 members of the Assembly, two from which are mi-nority representatives. However, the Committee does not have the neces-sary mandate to exert its democratic

190 http://www.nato.int/kfor/chronicle/2005/chronicle_03/09.htm


102 control and oversight role due to UN-MIK reserved powers in the area of se-curity.

5.2.52 Despite the lack of direct oversight or management links between the PISG and KPC, the Department of Emergency Management, OPS, and other branches of Kosovo’s government are mandated to coordinate with the Corps for emergency management purposes.

Data

5.2.53 Personnel: the KPC consists of an active corps of 3052 members and a re-serve of 2,000. The KPC is working towards a target of ten percent of its members to be drawn from minority communities. In February 2005, minorities accounted for about 5% of active KPC personnel of which fewer than 2% were Serbs. Figures from April 2006 quoted in a recent ICG report191

indicate that the policy of minority recruit-ment has had some benefit raising the mi-nority total to 6.8%. Minority participation remains a problem although hostility from within the Serbian community members and from Belgrade is contributory factor to the lack of Serbian participation.192

5.2.54 The significant challenges related to budget limitations in Kosovo and the lack of a pension scheme, as well as the minority representation targets required by the Kosovo Standards mean that for the last two years no Kosovo Albanians have been able to join the KPC. There has also been a lack of mobility inside the ranks from the Corps, meaning essentially the ranks of the KPC have largely ossified. This failure to provide solid career progression is a major barrier to professionalism.

5.2.55 Presently, the rank structure con-sists of a preponderance of middle rank-ing and senior officers. This will be an issue that the KPC will need to address regard-less of the future direction of the Corps.

5.2.56 Recruitment and training: Origi-nally, KPC personnel were largely (but not exclusively) drawn from the demobilised KLA. Having coordinated the initial appli-cation process in 1999, the IOM was tasked with coordinating KPC training. All appli-cants were tested for a variety of skills and abilities and screened for criminal records and illegal activities. Through its Informa-tion Counselling and Referral Service, the IOM developed jobs for former combat-ants who did not join the KPC.193

KPC cannot be (the only one) re-

sponsible for security of the minorities – it will take generations - if it will ever happens - for the Kosovo minorities to feel safe in their pre-sence.

Kosovo Albanian Participant in

ISSR Public Outreach Campaign

Rank Active Reserve TotalLt. General 1 0 1Maj. General 2 0 2Brig. General 14 0 14Colonel 50 2 52Lt. Colonel 119 2 121Major 209 13 222Captain 356 60 416Lieutenant 440 136 576Staff Sergeant 439 96 535Sergeant 366 188 554Corporal 1,035 1,438 2,473Private 21 65 86Total 3,052 2000 5052

Table 17: Ranking structure of KPC as of June 2006Source: International Crisis Group, An Army for Kosovo?, Europe Report No: 174, July 2006.

191 ICG (2006, July 28.) An Army for Kosovo? Europe Report No: 174. Brussels and Pristina: International Crisis Group.192 Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo Security Council S/2005/88,New York: United Nations, 14 February 2005.193 Andreas Heinmann-Guder & Wolf-Christian Paes, Wag the Dog- The Mobilisation and Demobilisation of the KLA Bonn: BICC, 2001 pp 22-24.


1035.2.57 Responsibility for training has now passed onto the KPC training centre (TRADOC) under the guidance of the KPC Coordinator.194 In addition, the OSCE sup-ported NGO, Kosovo Law Centre, provides

KPC legal officers with specialist train-ing.195 A training gap lies in the area of jun-ior management, especially at the platoon leader level. The US KFOR has started a se-ries of platoon leader courses addressing this deficiency.

5.2.58 Public Perceptions. ISSR research indicates that among the Kosovo Albani-ans, the KPC is probably the most popular of all institutions. In the case of the Serbian community the association of the KPC with the KLA is still strong and attitudes remain hostile. However, ISSR consultations sug-gest in areas where the KPC has played a part in public works or reconstruction the Serb view is more nuanced than in areas where the KPC has not been permitted to operate.196

5.2.59 Organisational Structure and

Internal Regulations. The regulation com-mand structure of the KPC for all levels/

ranks is covered by the KPC Regulation of 2001, the Regulation on Promotion System 2006 and the Regulation on Personnel Pro-cedures 2006. The current organisational structure of the KPC is as follows.

5.2.60 Emergency Response. Among the operations provided by KPC to date, the most complex was the 2002 earthquake in Gjilan/Gnjilane.197 The KPC worked closely with the KPS, KFOR, and UNMIK in responding to the disaster. 198 The KPC has also provided valuable infrastructure reconstruction projects which have been important in terms of building links with minority communities. In addition, an im-portant confidence building mechanism for the KPC has been its role in assisting re-turning IDPs and refugees with rebuilding projects.

5.2.61 Kosovo Standards. Standard eight of the Kosovo Standards Imple-mentation Plan covers the KPC. The key requirement is that the KPC fulfils its con-stitutional role and operates in a transpar-ent, accountable, disciplined, and pro-fessional manner. The Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan (31 March 2004) re-

194 Peterson (2005) pp 4-5.195 http://www.osce.org/item/7644.html.196 Serb respondents in these areas will admit that KPC had a positive impact on their communities, but these communities still hold concerns regarding the KPC and its perceived connection to the former UCK.197 James Pettifer, Kosovo Protection Corps in Transition. London: Conflict Studies Research Centre, July 2003, p3.198 UNMIK, IOM, KFOR, The Kosovo Protection Corps Plan 2004, Pristina: UNMIK, November 2003, Chapter II p.7.

Directive

Funding

Administration

Day to Day

Supervision

KOSOVO PROTECTION

CORPS HQ

CENTRAL STAFFCOMMANDER

DEPUTY COMMANDERGENERAL INSPECTOR

CHIEF OF STAFF PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT

INFO / ANALYSIS DEPARTMENTOPERATION DEPARTMENT

TRAINING DEPARTMENTLOGISTIC DEPARTMENT

COMMUNICATION DEPARTMENTCIVILIAN / LIASION AFFAIRSRESOURCE MANAGEMENT

OKPCC

TRADOC LOG COMMAND CIVIL PROTECTION-BRIGADE

GUARD OFKOSOVO

ZONES OFPROTECTION

COMMUNICATIONS& SIGNAL BATTALION

AIRBATTALION

BATALION 90 OFINSPECTORIAT

MEDICALBATALION

ENGINEERBRIGADE

SRSG UNMIK

KIKPC

COMKFOR

Figure 34: Organizational Structure of KPC


104 quired that KPC fulfil its role as defined in the Constitutional Framework as an effec-tive civil defence organisation. It further requires that the KPC works to improve minority representation within its ranks with a target of 10% of total manpower.199

In regular reports on the implementation of the Standards the KPC has been praised for its development. Minority participa-tion continues to be a major challenge caused in part by the lack of willingness of minorities to join. In June 2006, the Con-tact Group identified additional points for progress, under which the PISG deter-mined that KPC should provide assistance to returnees in Svinjarë/Svinjare.

Recommendations on KPC

5.2.62 ISSR believes the following issues require immediate consideration:

The differing levels of expertise and equipment between the KPC region-al zones are apparent. Training and equipment needs to be improved and brought up to comparative standards across Kosovo. These areas need to be reviewed with the aim of assessing if the KPC is able to provide equal services across all operational zones.The career structure of the KPC needs rationalisation. A compulsory retire-ment age needs to be introduced, along with redundancies for surplus personnel. In order to achieve nec-essary downsizing a pension and resettlement package needs to be introduced along the lines of the IOM trust fund which was used during the demilitarisation of the KLA.200

5.2.63 As discussed above, the present size and structure of the KPC is too large for Kosovo’s budgetary limitations and

operational needs. The active and reserve rank structure does not lend itself to an ef-ficient and cost-effective entity. The civil emergency role that has been developed over the last three years is one that has great benefit to Kosovo society, and the requirement to downsize for efficiency reasons should not result in a loss of in-vestment in skill base and capacity.

5.2.64 ISSR proposes that the KPC be downsized to a level that is commensu-rate to its current role. Downsizing should also include a review of rank structure, professionalism, skills, equipment and basing. The ISSR believes that a reduction of approximately 30% in the active and reserve strength of the KPC would be ap-propriate.201 Recruitment to balance the appropriate new structure could then take place to achieve an efficient Emergency Response cadre.

5.2.65 Given the sensitivity towards the KPC among the Albanian population, it will be important that any reduction in the size of the KPC be conducted with care. ISSR research has revealed that, with an adequate pension scheme, resettlement training, and support, most KPC members will accept a downsizing process.202

5.2.66 Training for the Civil Emergency Response role should continue with equip-ment / training supplied by donor nations. In particular, assistance with:

Demining equipment and training,Search & Rescue equipment and train-ing,Transportation / driver training,Engineering Plant,Medical equipment and training,Winter survival equipment and training

199 Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan, Pristina: UNMIK, 31 March 2004. pp. 110-111.200 An example is the career counseling, training and a micro credit scheme for former NCOs and Officers in the Bulgarian army that the Resource Centre Foundation organised. See the project description at http://www.ngorc.net/en/programs/sap/default.htm201 Suggested figure derived from discussions with the Office of the KPC Coordinator and with other KPC officials and officers.202 ISSR discussions with serving members of the KPC and former members of the KLA found that retirement and retraining schemes would be key to any downsising process.


105

Background

5.2.67 Kosovo has two Prisons and five Detention Centres including Dubravë/Du-brava Prison for men and Lipjan/Lipljan for women and juveniles. The five detention centres for remand prisoners are at Pejë/Peć, Prizren/Prizren, Prishtinë/Priština, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, and Gjilan/Gnjilane. An additional detention centre is currently being built in Lipjan/Lipljan.

5.2.68 UNMIK established a Penal Man-agement Division (PMD) which took over the Prizren/Prizren Detention Centre from German KFOR in November 1999 and the Pejë/Peć Detention Centre from Italian KFOR in November 2000. In January 2000, a Kosovo Deputy Director for Prisons was appointed to work alongside four interna-tional correctional experts.

5.2.69 In February 2005 the first two UNMIK Detention Centres, Pejë/Peć and Prizren/Prizren, were transferred to the Kosovo Correction Services (KCS) control. This process has now seen the transition of all five detention centres plus the women and juvenile prison at Lipjan/Lipljan. A lo-cally recruited Commissioner has been appointed and is in post. Dubravë/Du-brava Prison is the only facility in Kosovo for holding convicted male prisoners and remains under UNMIK authority; however, it will transition later in 2006. UNMIK will retain a small international presence at the prison (three people) and reserves the right to intervene should the prison regime breakdown. Dubravë/Dubrava Prison cur-rently holds approximately 800 inmates, though this figure is expected to rise by up to 50% as the courts backlog reduction programme comes into effect.

5.2.70 Over recent years there have been a number of problems in the administra-tion of the prisons and detention centres in Kosovo. In 2000, more than 30 defend-ants, including many indicted for ethnic crimes, escaped. In September 2003, a group of prisoners in Dubravë/Dubrava Prison rioted and five prisoners died and 15 were injured. In the subsequent exter-nal inquiry the key causes of the riot were identified as being the lack of educational and recreational facilities in the prison. Conditions in this prison remain a major challenge and it is likely that there will have to be continued assistance provided by the international community for some time after it is transferred to the KCS con-trol.

Legal basis

5.2.71 UNMIK Regulation 2001/9 out-lines the following responsibilities for the KCS:

Coordination on matters pertaining to the judicial system and the correc-tional service;Co-operating with appropriate or-ganisations regarding monitoring of the judicial and correctional systems;Protecting personal data relating to the judicial system and correctional service;Assisting in the recruitment, training and evaluation of personnel for the correctional service; Providing information and statistics on the judicial system and the correc-tional service.

5.2.72 In addition, the SRSG reserves the power to exercise authority over law enforcement institutions and the correc-tional service as may be required.

Issue:Kosovo Correctional Service

PISG Institutions:

Ministry of Justice

UNMIK Institutions:

Penal Management Division

OSCE Institutions:

KCPSED


106 5.2.73 UNMIK Regulation No. 2005/53 and UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/26 estab-lished the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Internal Affairs, together with their initial terms of reference. In this first stage, the ministries were given legal, technical, fi-nancial, and administrative responsibilities in relation to police and justice, although at this first stage no operational control over the KPS or Kosovo Correctional Serv-ice was transferred.

Data

5.2.74 In April 2006 there were 1,277 in-mates detained by the Kosovo Correction-al Service (KCS), of which 883 were con-victed prisoners. This was a slight rise from the 1,199 prisoners who were detained in April 2005 therefore there is an estimated prison population of approximately 66 per 100,000 of the population (based on 2005 estimate of population of 1.9 million). A total of 42% of prisoners are currently awaiting trial, and this ratio of remand to convicted inmates falls within internation-al norms. Approximately 5% of detainees are juveniles and 2.1% are female. The offi-cial capacity of Dubravë/Dubrava and Lip-jan/Lipljan Prisons, plus the five detention centres is 1,382.

5.2.75 The Kosovo Correction Service comprises of 1,200 prison staff and 400 civilian support workers. Approximately 18% of Kosovo Correctional Service staff are women which is an acceptable pro-portion given that women are only a small proportion of the prison population.203

5.2.76 Findings

The prison regimes run by the KCS broadly comply with international best practice. The transition from UN-MIK has gone well to date, with local

staff appearing to fully understand the requirements of international law pertaining to detention and impris-onment. Staff training is conducted at the KCPSED and there are regular in-service training days within individual establishments. A number of reviews of the UNMIK Penal Management Di-vision/KCS have been conducted and have reported positively on what has been achieved to date. There are problems associated with Dubravë/Dubrava prison and the fact authority for its management has yet to be transferred indicates that it will be one of the main challenges to the KCS and the Ministry of Justice will face in the near future. While there continue to be a limited number of internationals working in the prison following transfer this will need to be considered carefully by the European Planning Team to ensure that interna-tional support will be provided post UNSCR 1244.


The administration of Correctional Services in Kosovo is, in the main, up to the required standards for Europe. Some competencies are yet to be transferred and it is recommended that these are done so in due time ac-companied with training programmes for correctional services personnel. It is also recommended that the Kos-ovo Correctional Service continue to operate in an open and transparent manner, ensuring that all due dili-gence is applied to their duties and that requests for oversight of their activities are promptly implemented. Furthermore it is recommended that the European Planning Team consider monitoring duties post UNSCR 1244.

203 http://www.womenwarpeace.org/kosovo/kosovo.htm.


107

Background

5.2.78 Kosovo faces a number of exter-nal threats to its security that are largely related to regional organised crime, but also issues such as terrorism. The interna-tional community in Kosovo, in particular UNMIK Police and KFOR, have provided support and conducted operations in the realm of border security and control in Ko-sovo. However, as final status negotiations continue, competencies regarding border security and control are being handed over to Kosovo authorities.

Border and Boundary Police

5.2.79 The Border and Boundary Po-lice were established as a centralised unit within the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) in November 2005.204 The current structure should be considered evolutionary, as un-til Kosovo’s status is determined it does not have international borders recognised by other countries. The unit is under the com-mand of an experienced KPS Colonel, with three designated majors as border region commanders (East, West, and North). The established strength is approximately 700, with an intention (post-status) to increase to 1,700.205

5.2.80 At present, because of Kosovo’s unique situation, the Border and Bound-ary Police are confined to working at the 16 designated border/boundary gates. Border surveillance and patrol is currently the responsibility of KFOR, though some joint patrols with the Border and Bound-ary Police have taken place. Plans are cur-rently being prepared to increase the role and responsibilities of the unit. This will include the formation of a mounted rural patrol unit, a border surveillance unit, and the possibility of operating a small marine

unit on the Gazivoda Lake at Gate 1. All these plans are subject to the final status talks being successfully completed.

5.2.81 The Border and Boundary Police have taken the lead in establishing an Integrated Border Management group, (including Customs, state veterinary and health services and the police intelligence unit).

The Customs Service

5.2.82 The UNMIK Customs Service was established in September 1999, under the terms of UNMIK Reg. 1999/3. The Customs Service is under the direct control of SRSG and its current established strength is 600 people. The customs service is at present responsible for the collection at the border of approximately 73% of KCB income206.

5.2.83 The service remains under the direct control of the SRSG and is overseen by an international Director General. It remains under the control of Pillar IV (EU) although the Director General of UNMIK Customs is required to consult with the Government of Kosovo before implement-ing operational policy through Adminis-trative Instructions. The principal roles of UNMIK Customs are:

To collect and protect revenue for the Kosovo Consolidated Budget (KCB);To facilitate legitimate trade through re-establishing suspended Customs procedures and adopting modern Customs practices and techniques; andTo protect society and legitimate trade by cracking down on smug-gling and fraud.

Issue: Border Control

PISG Institutions:

Kosovo Police Service - Border and Boundary Police (KPS)

Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOIA)

204 Kosovo cannot formally have a Border Police given its lack of status. The current designation is Border and Boundary Unit.

205 Pillar IV notes that the reccommended increase in strength will have significant budgetary impacts estimated at an additional € 10-15 million per annum.

206 In 2004 UNMIK customs were responsible for the collection of €436 Million or 72.5% of KCB income of which 186 Million was in VAT, 177 Million Excise Duty and 70 Million was Customs Duty. See EU Pillar Press release PR#001/05.


108 Ministry of Internal Affairs

5.2.84 The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOIA) was established by UNMIK Regula-tion 2005/53 in December 2005. The Min-istry was given, in coordination with UN-MIK, responsibility for the implementation of Integrated Border Management and for the effective coordination between the police and other public authorities involved in border crossing control. The Ministry has a role to play not only in bor-der management issues, but also in serv-ing as a clearinghouse for data and trends emerging from Kosovo’s border enforce-ment activities. This role will be particular-ly important post-status as Kosovo begins to develop more completely its border management regimes, as well as its polic-ing competencies.


A number of provisions on asylum have been made in current legisla-tion on trafficking of people and their movement into and out of Kosovo, but to date there has been no par-ticular law adopted on asylum. UN-MIK Regulation 2001/4 provides for the authorities to grant residence to the victims of trafficking expressing a wish to not be returned to their coun-try. It also stresses that the above law shall not, “affect the protection afford-ed to refugees and asylum-seekers under international refugee law and international human rights law, in particular, compliance with the princi-ple of non-refoulement as set forth in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees.” Furthermore, UNMIK Regulation 2001/10 makes a provision for bona fide refugees or in-ternally displaced persons to not, “be refused entry into Kosovo or returned from Kosovo to any other territory if, as a result of such action, the person is compelled to remain in or return to a territory where his life or fundamen-tal freedoms would be threatened.”

UNMIK Regulation 2005/16 has the most comprehensive set of provi-sions to date on refugees. A person claiming refugee status may submit

an application to and be registered with UNMIK authorities, who decide on the application and may grant refugee status in cooperation with UNHCR. The regulation also defines the grounds for denial of the refugee status, while providing for granting of temporary stay on humanitarian grounds. Refugees are entitled to free assistance of an interpreter and medi-cal treatment.

International authorities agree that both of the above provisions have weaknesses and enforcement has been difficult. Once final status is determined Kosovo’s immigration regulations and policies will require review.

UNMIK Regulation 2001/12 definesterrorism as the commission of a number of acts “with an intent to cre-ate a serious threat to public order, to coerce a government or interna-tional organisation, or to intimidate or endanger a civilian population.” The regulation stipulates convic-tions between 5 (five) and 40 (forty) years of imprisonment for individu-als involved in terrorist acts. The only case on which the above regulation applied to date has been the one of Armata Kombëtare Shqiptare (AKSH) / Albanian National Army (ANA), which was declared a terrorist organisation by UNMIK Administrative Direction 2003/9 following the bombing of a railway bridge in Zveçan/Zvecan Municipality. It is suggested that the regulation holds a number of weak-nesses and may require review.

Corruption within the border police requires close consideration. Given the role of combating threats such as drugs and other organised crime activities, border officers are natural targets for criminal influence. Over-sight mechanisms for the Border and Boundary Police should be clear and transparent and data regarding sei-zures of materials should be publicly available.


109Lack of data protection regulations for secure information has hampered efforts towards the formation of pro-tocols for information exchange with countries and organisations dealing with cross-border criminality. Al-though UNMIK is able to overcome most of these difficulties over the transfer of information, upon transfer-ence of full competencies in this area the Kosovo government will encoun-ter difficulties in establishing informa-tion exchange protocols with agen-cies such as INTERPOL and EUROPOL, in addition to bi-lateral agreements.


Future plans for significant increases in the number of border and bound-ary police should take into account the impact of such increases on the Kosovo Consolidated Budget.

The PISG and Kosovo Assembly should begin work on data protec-tion regulations immediately to en-sure the smooth transition of working relationships related to regional and international crime fighting following resolution of final status.

Given the regional and global nature of the crimes faced by Kosovo’s bor-der police, upon resolution of status issues Kosovo’s government should immediately establish its relationship with regional and international police organisations including EUROPOL, IN-TERPOL, and Southeast Europe Coop-erative Initiative (SECI)207.

Section 5.3: Non-institutional

security related subjects

Small Arms and Light Weapons

5.3.1 There can be no doubt that Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Control poses a fundamental challenge to the

stability of Kosovo. To a large extent, the civilian possession of SALW in Kosovo is a result of the failure of the security sector to provide adequate long term security provisions for its citizens. The SALW prob-lem in Kosovo is principally a legacy of the internal weapons proliferation following the period of conflict in Kosovo in the late 90’s. According to a perception study con-ducted in May 2006, the population is still suspicious about security providers and has well articulated fears about the future stability of Kosovo. A survey completed by Saferworld and South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) July 2006 estimates that there are approximate-ly 400,000 weapons in Kosovo. Of these, 33, 936 firearms were in the legal posses-sion of individual citizens; 45,212 firearms were in the hands of official agencies and international private security companies; and a minimum of 317,000 firearms were in the illegal possessions of civilians and other groups.

Legal Context

5.3.2 UNMIK regulation 2001/7 de-fines the types of weapons that are regu-lated and people who are eligible to hold weapons in Kosovo.208 Under the regula-tion, persons authorised to hold and carry weapons for self-defence purposes are issued a Weapons Authorisations Card (WAC). Furthermore, the Provisional Crimi-nal Code of Kosovo forbids the production of SALW and also prohibits internal supply, transportation, exchange or sale of SALW unless authorised by UNMIK. Importation of SALW is also forbidden without the per-mission of UNMIK or KFOR.

5.3.3 UNMIK’s Administrative Direction 2003/1 regulates the possession of hunt-ing and recreational weapons. The regu-lation states that long barrelled rifles and shotguns (not automatic) can be regis-tered to individuals who have been issues a Weapons Registration Card (WRC). In ad-

207 Information about SECI can be found on the web at www.secicenter.org and www.secinet.info

208 These include KFOR, authorised UN security officers, UNMIK Police, KPS, the Kosovo Correctional Service, legal persons that are international security providers registered and licensed by UNMIK, and those holding KFOR authorized weapons (SALW belonging to the KPC). Since June 2006 SALW used by the officers of the Forestry and Customs Services are also exempt under the UNMIK regulation 2001/7.

I think the situ-ation is terrible - you can get a

bullet for something you say. Everybody is carrying a weapon, in the future po-lice should check more carefully.

Albanian Female

Prishtine/Pristina


110 dition, Yugoslav legislation which includes the Kosovo “Law on Acquisition, Possession and Carrying of Weapons and Ammunition 1980; Weapons and Ammunition Act 1992; and the Law on Hunting 1979 is still used in certain situations. However, while the law from 1980 is technically in compliance with UNMIK regulation 2001/7, as in other areas the question of whether the Yugo-slav laws should still be applied is a mat-ter of debate. The “Draft Law on Hunting”passed by the Assembly in 2005 is an at-tempt to introduce primary legislation on hunting, however, it has yet to be signed of by the office of the SRSG. This is problem-atic as according to UNMIK Administrative Direction 2003/1, hunting and recreational weapons can only be used during a “hunt-ing season” determined by the Ministry of Agriculture but to date no such season has been approved by UNMIK.

5.3.4 Finally, KFOR’s Standard Operat-ing Procedure (SOP) 3009 serves as the in-ternational NATO force’s SALW policy in Ko-sovo. It is primarily concerned with KFOR’s role in regulating the possession and use of SALW by KPC, civilians and criminals.

5.3.5 The legal sanctions for unlicensed SALW possession are severe, with a maxi-mum of ten years' imprisonment and fines of up to €10,000.209 The penalties for inappropriate use are similarly harsh. Un-der Article 328 of the Provisional Criminal Code, anyone who owns, controls or uses a weapon without a valid WAC is liable to a fine of €7,500 or one to eight years impris-onment. If larger numbers of weapons are involved, ten years' imprisonment may be imposed. Also, anyone who uses a weapon in a threatening, intimidating or otherwise unauthorised manner, or directs another person to do so, is liable for a fine of up to €10,000 or one to ten years imprison-ment.210

Institutional Responsibilities

5.3.6 A range of institutions share the responsibility for regulating the posses-sion and use of firearms including Kosovo Police Service, UNMIK CIVPOL, and KFOR. WAC’s and WRC’s are granted by UNMIK CIVPOL’s Weapons Authorisation Section (WAS). The final decisions on all applica-tions reside with the UNMIK Police Com-missioner who may issue or deny WAC’s entirely. WACs must be renewed on a year-ly basis.

Findings

5.3.7 Given the stringent authorisations required to acquire a WAC, and the fact that SALW must be drawn from official stocks, the illicit market for weapons is strong. This means that a substantial number of legally-registered SALW in Kosovo, includ-ing both self defence and hunting/recrea-tional weapons, are sourced from the illicit market. Thus, efforts to establish a regu-lated civilian weapons registration system have been undermined and some believe have actually become a driver for the illicit market.

5.3.8 The lack of clear regulation and an officially declared hunting season means that use of SALW outside the home (other for hunting predatory animals that threaten livestock) is illegal. Consequently, a WRC only permits possession, not use, of hunting weapons. Further, in the absence of legal channels for the acquisition of fire-arms, WAS appears to operate a ‘no ques-tions asked’ policy regarding the weapons' origins when issuing permits. Although it is clear that the majority of SALW being pre-sented for registration under WRCs have their origins in the illicit market, authorities seem to take the view that it is better that civilians legally register their SALW than to

209 ‘Provisional Penal Code of Kosovo’, Article 328(1) and (2).

210 Still harsher penalties apply where the weapon is used in the commission of crime (Articles 153(2) and 193(3)(3), 195(3)(3), 198(5)(3), 253(3), 254(2), 255(3), 256(1), 267(2), 268(2), 291(1), 316(2), 317(2)). Section 8 of UNMIK Regulation 2001/7 also sets out the penalties for breaches of the regulations on weapons possession and use. Article 329(1) of the Provisional Criminal Code states that those found to have provided false information when applying for a WAC, or who manufacture, possess, sell or purchase a fraudulent WAC, can be punished with a fine of €5,000 or imprisonment for up to 3 years. Article 329(2) details a fine of €2,500 or three months imprisonment for failing to present the authorised weapon, or provide full information on its whereabouts, on demand by police.


111continue with illegal possession. Despite this practicality, reliance of the regulatory system for SALW Control on the illicit SALW market is clearly problematic.

5.3.9 Finally, there are gaps in the pro-duction, collection and analysis of SALW related statistics by Kosovo health and law enforcement agencies. The lack of data on deaths and injuries as a result of SALW makes it difficult to measure the impact on the society and hence difficult for Kosovo institutions to formulate public policy re-sponses.


Primary and secondary SALW legisla-tion, compatible with EU standards and closely following the guidance of international SALW agreements, should be developed. The law should include provisions to regulate SALW transfer (import, export, transit, trans-shipment and brokering), hunting and recreational firearms possession, civilian possession and regulation of firearm possession for Private Secu-rity Companies. Specifically:

- SALW transfer legislation - Legislation should be developed that is compat-ible with the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. Provisions for regulat-ing transit, transhipment, interna-tional arms brokering and imports must be included on Arms Transfers

sections applicable to non-member States.

- Civilian possession - The legal frame-work must regulate the legal use, possession, acquisition of SALW in accordance with EU standards and in-ternational norms.

Coordination among Kosovo’s inter-national and local institutions must be improved in order to properly ad-dress the policies and laws required to meet Kosovo’s particular SALW problems. Institutions should create a policy that addresses all aspects of SALW control, to be framed within a Kosovo SALW Control Strategy which would attend to SALW registration, SALW collection and destruction. A SALW Commission should be set up to monitor and coordinate all SALW activities.

In view of the stringent penalties and enforcements for unlicensed SALW, legal sanctions regarding unlicensed SALW possession should be amend-ed. Lower penalties might generate a higher prosecution and conviction rate.

In view of the statistical gaps, it is recommended that data collection mechanisms on SALW related inci-dents should be improved to ensure a coherent and consistent statistical base for policy responses.


112


5.3.11 The private security industry in Kosovo is still relatively young having been founded in the immediate wake of the 1999 conflict and the start of interna-tional administration by UNMIK. Although the industry initially operated in a legisla-tive and security vacuum, during the first half of 2000 UNMIK drafted Regulation 2000/33 providing the legal framework under which the private security industry was brought under UNMIK control with monitoring through the Weapons Au-thorisation Section and Security Providers Inspection Unit (SSPIU) and the UNMIK Po-lice Commissioner. 211

5.3.12 Since 1999 there have been sig-nificant changes in the industry. At one hand, companies have professionalised into a defined part of the wider security sector, whilst on the other hand there have been increasingly strained relations between the KPS and the industry. These changes have been the result of a range of issues including the introduction of licens-ing, the initial increase and then decrease in the number of companies, and the for-mation of a unit within KPS with the role of providing facilities security. The princi-pal characteristics that define the private security in Kosovo are:

Companies operate under direct UN-MIK supervision and control through a licensing system. Creation of two classes of company in Kosovo, providing different services based on whether they are interna-tional or local companies, each with distinct licensing conditions. The major difference between local and international PSCs is in the posses-sion of fire-arms by internationals and therefore their ability to respond to a threat with lethal force if necessary.Some companies in the northern

municipalities have worked under Serbian law placing them effectively outside the legal control of UNMIK, a fact which has not assisted attempts to create a multiethnic climate in this sector.At the moment companies are not required to insure themselves or their staff. Both the authorities and private secu-rity companies have had to constant-ly repel connections with organised crime and illegal activities.

Legal Framework

5.3.13 Two UNMIK Regulations provide the legal framework which allows oversight and control over private security companies in Kosovo. UNMIK Regulation Nr. 2000/33 gives legal power to UNMIK over the control and facilitation of the private security companies. The regulation also mandates that the com-panies must register as licensed businesses. Under this regulation International Security Companies, and their employees, have no immunity and are subject to the local courts if they commit a criminal act.

5.3.14 The authorisation of firearms pos-session, their maintenance, the behaviour of persons possessing authorised arms, and the regulation of their use are covered by UNMIK Regulation Nr. 2001/7. All authorisa-tions related to SALW possession lies with the Police Commissioner, who can decide the rules and procedures on the use and storage of weapons. Both UNMIK Regula-tions Nr. 2000/33 and Nr. 2001/7 indicate that the Police Commissioner or UNMIK Po-lice are the only responsible authorities for authorising firearms possession to person-nel employed by Private Security Compa-nies. The Police Commissioner is responsible for the investigation and assessment of any request for weapon authorisation. KFOR has the authority to authorise SALW possession for KPC members only.

Issue:Private Security Companies

211 Michael von Tangen Page and Simon Ryne et al, ‘SALW and Private Security Companies in South Eastern Europe’ Belgrade: SEESAC, 2005.


1135.3.15 Data

Twenty one private security compa-nies are authorised to operate in Ko-sovo. Out of the twenty one, initially five of them were international, al-though this has now reduced to four operating companies. Ten of them dominate the market and cover most of the territory of Kosovo.

The average number of employees working in the private security sec-tor has varied from 2300 to 2800. The largest companies are Balkan Interna-tional and WDG (both local Compa-nies).

In addition, 88 individuals have been licensed to provide close protection services. These private bodyguards are not permitted to offer their servic-es through companies and are either hired on a freelance basis or are paid staff of the individual being protect-ed.

Because the international companies are authorised to carry firearms, the services they offer are:

- Transfer of money (usually banks)- Security for non-governmental and

international organisations - Close protection.

The services that local companies of-fer primarily involve static security (securing facilities):

- Securing small shops- Securing shopping malls - Securing premises where concerts are

held (stewarding) - Securing premises (governmental,

nongovernmental, banks etc).

All Private Security Companies (PSC) in Kosovo are required to develop in-ternal codes on which their day to day operations are based. On top of UN-MIK regulations, which set the criteria for their operations, the companies regulate themselves by:

- Training their staff- Work oversight - Shift timetable - Staff behaviour and procedures of

acts in specific cases. - Use of firearms (in those companies

so authorised) and other weapons (e.g. mace or a baton) for the compa-nies that do not possess firearms.


One of the main issues to be ad-dressed is cooperation between PSC’s and the KPS. Although the PSC’s were initially considered by UNMIK as “peace promotion bodies”, the situ-ation has now changed. The KPS has established its own unarmed unit to provide the facilities security services to public institutions in direct compe-tition with the private sector.212 This decision has damaged the relation-ship between KPS and PSC’s as they now see each other as commercial rivals. It is axiomatic that any overlap of responsibilities is addressed and protocols established.

All PSC employees need to have a li-cense issued by the Police and a key element in gaining a licence is the vetting procedure. The vetting proc-ess remains an UNMIK Police compe-tency under the direct oversight of the Police Commissioner. Transfer of this competency to the KPS should be done carefully, given that the vetting procedure is vital in ensuring that the private security sector is not linked to organised crime. Time will be needed to build KPS capacities in this respect prior to the full transfer of authority.

Under the provisions of UNMIK Regu-lation 2000/33, PSC employees cannot undertake their own investigations of criminal offences encountered while on duty. Rather they should report the crime to the police and then assist the police with their investigations. Unfortunately, police investigative

212 This is an unusual circumstance by EU standards. In most countries in the EU police are used to secure high-profile sites and PSC staff will be hired to secure less sensitive areas.


114 capacity remains weak, leaving the possibility that this regulation will be ignored.

Comparing the monthly salaries of KPS officers and PSC employees, PSC employees are generally better paid than KPS officers. This contrast is es-pecially notable for PSC managers. The KPS monthly salaries are between € 250 to 400, depending on position, while PSC employees receive between € 250 to 600. Thus salary differentials at the managerial level make it more likely that an experienced police of-ficer would be tempted to join the private sector.


Continued oversight and control of the private security industry by the public sector is vital and the potential for a legal vacuum is great during any transfer of competencies from UNMIK to the PISG. If the rules and procedures that are currently used by the UNMIK Administration are not adapted to PISG specifications, this could create negative consequences in short and medium term. Prior to any transfer of competencies, the SSPIU and UNMIK Police should have a capacity building role built into mandate work during the transition phase.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs should establish a special division which would make policy and draft the new rules and procedures on the Private Security Sector thus taking over the role of UNMIK SSPIU. If the control and oversight process are to be transferred to the KPS alone, then the current dif-ficult relationship between the indus-try and the police might have negative consequences. The current situation where the KPS have their own security wing also needs to be examined. This is an area where a properly regulated commercial provider might be better suited to offer such services. A clear demarcation needs to be drawn be-tween those services offered by the KPS and those offered by the private sector. While some buildings such as

the Office of the Prime Minister and the Assembly should continue to be protected by government guards, it is suggested that Police protection need not extend to all government build-ings.

The current situation where local and international companies are separat-ed is not tenable or justifiable. These policies create inequitable market conditions and the potential for a car-tel to emerge. Therefore new legisla-tion should be considered to merge the two sectors into one and ensure that competition is based on skills and services rather than nationality. There probably will continue to be a sepa-ration between companies that offer different forms of service, including both armed and unarmed guarding. However, this should not be on the basis of nationality. This would require a re-examination of current training requirements and changes to current firearms regulations.

Additional training of PSC’s employees is needed attention, especially regard-ing the use of force and weapons.

Health and safety at work is an issue for concern in an industry that includes an element of danger for employees. Compensation for work related injury and obligatory insurance should be considered as part of any new legisla-tion.

Any new legislation should recognise that the private security sector will grow in coming years and, therefore, this is an issue which should not just be limited to governmental and po-lice oversight. It is recommended that a Kosovo Assembly sub-committee on the industry should be formed within the proposed new Assembly Commit-tee on Security.

The vetting procedure and licensing system for companies and employees needs to be more strictly implement-ed. The potential for the infiltration of PSCs by organised crime is high.


115Presently, local PSC’s are not permit-ted to offer close protection services. Whilst close protection is a very per-sonal service which includes close bonds of trust between the employer and bodyguard, the problem is how to keep this service regulated. Cur-rently, all body guards have to apply

for weapons authorisation on an individual basis. Given private com-panies are easier to regulate, these entities should be given the oppor-tunity of offering these services. It is recommended that current laws on personal close protection services be reviewed.

CHAPTER VI

Gap Analysis

Gap Analysis

118

Section 6.1: Methodology and

Terminology

Methodology

6.1.1 The Gap Analysis of the Provision-al Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) constitutes Stage Five of the ISSR proc-ess and naturally follows the institutional analysis which was carried out during Stage Four of the process. For the purpose of the ISSR process, this gap analysis focus-es only on those institutional gaps, which have a direct bearing on the security sec-tor. By addressing them the PISG and the international donor community will begin to respond to the threats identified in the initial stages of the ISSR process.

6.1.2 The ISSR Gap Analysis is modelled on the OECD criteria as defined in “DAC Development Partnership Forum: Manag-ing for Development Results and Aid Effec-tiveness” of December 2002.213

“This document identifies a minimum “core set” of indicators drawn from the Millennium Development Goals to measure the countries’ performance in terms of poverty reduction and social development that would be followed in all countries. (…) We propose to use the following classification, with a view to ensure coherence with earlier work: Input => Output => Outcome => Im-

pact”

6.1.3 The rationale behind this ap-proach is that the Internal Security Sector Review takes place in the context of and bears the characteristics of a development programme rather than a strictly secu-rity one. In addition, the implementation

phase projects which will follow the cur-rent review should naturally flow from the current gap analysis of the PISG, using also as a premise the perceived threats and the institutional analysis which were complet-ed during stages one to four of the proc-ess.

6.1.4 Finally, ISSR team analysis also benefited from other United Nations stud-ies which have successfully implemented the Results Based Management approach in other areas.214

6.1.5 The above approach is reflected in a four part matrix attached herewith.

The first part focuses on the threats, as identified by the Stages One and Two of the ISSR process.

The second part presents the obliga-tions and the current role analysis of the specific institution, according to international standards and to rel-evant UNMIK legislation.

Part three focuses on the authority gaps and the resources needed to resolve them. The gaps are detailed along the dimensions identified dur-ing the institutional analysis, namely legal framework, oversight, coordina-tion, and management and leader-ship.

Part four is built around the expected results of the development interven-tion. This section is divided in two categories, namely output and out-come, addressing respectively the immediate consequences and the medium-term results at the level of the beneficiaries.

CHAPTER VI

Gap Analysis

213 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development “DAC Development Partnership Forum: Managing for Development Results and Aid Effectiveness Room Document 3: Guidelines for the use of indicators in country performance assessment” 11 – 12 December 2002.

214 “Operationalising the Human Rights Approach to Programming – Linking Rights Approach and Results Based Management” prepared by Fabio Sabatini – UNICEF CEE CIS, 2004.

Gap Analysis

119Terminology

6.1.6 In view of the above, the ISSR team is using the OECD-DAC terminology as follows:215

Output:

Immediate and concrete consequences of the measures taken and resources used. The products, capital goods and services which result from a develop-ment intervention; may also include changes resulting from the intervention which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes.

Outcome:

Results at the level of beneficiaries. The likely or achieved short-term and me-dium-term effects of an intervention’s outputs.

Section 6.2: Identification of

institutional gaps

6.2.1 ISSR identified two categories of institutional gaps:

A. Missing institutions in the future Ko-sovo Security Architecture. This cat-egory also includes those missing functions in the existing institutions

of the PISG which are related to their future competencies.

B. Gaps in existing PISG institutions.

6.2.2 The first category of gaps is dealt with separately in the context of Chapter 7, which addresses the following:

Kosovo Security CouncilMinistry of Defence Kosovo Defence ForceKosovo Security ServiceSecurity Oversight ActorsNew Executive Authorities

6.2.3 Gaps in the existing institutions are outlined in the recommendations con-tained in the narrative description of in-stitutions detailed in Chapters 4 and 5 of this report. The gaps are further examined in Chapter 8 and at Annex IX of the report where gaps are matched to suggested activities and donor-funded programs de-signed to address them.

6.2.4 Finally, in order to illustrate the progression of the gap analysis process using OECD-DAC methodologies, ISSR has constructed a matrix format outlining the gaps in existing institutions following in Section 6.3.216 217218219220

215 DAC Guidelines for the use of indicators in country performance assessment, Ibid. page 4. OECD/DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management 2002

Gap Analysis

120

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e ba

cklo

g of

cas

es;

4. N

o en

forc

emen

t mec

hani

sms

in p

lace

; Poo

r eco

nom

ic c

ondi

tions

;5.

Fra

gile

dem

ocra

tic in

stitu

tions

; Pol

itics

of v

iole

nce

in th

e re

gion

stil

l aliv

e;6.

Pov

erty

; Lac

k of

mec

hani

sms

in p

lace

to fi

ght i

t; 7.

Inab

ility

of P

ISG

/UN

MIK

inst

itutio

ns to

han

dle

a co

mpl

ex e

mer

genc

y;8.

Pov

erty

and

lack

of a

ltern

ativ

e em

ploy

men

t; 9.

Inst

abili

ty in

the

regi

on;

10. U

nem

ploy

men

t; Po

vert

y; F

ragi

le in

stitu

tions

; Lac

k of

a p

erce

ived

via

ble

futu

re fo

r Kos

ovo;

Gap Analysis

1212

. O

BL

IGA

TIO

N &

CU

RR

EN

T R

OL

E A

NA

LYS

IS3

. C

AP

AC

ITY

GA

P A

NA

LYS

IS4

. R

ES

ULT

S

INS

TIT

UT

ION

OB

LIG

AT

ION

Acco

rdin

g to

in

tern

atio

nal

stan

dard

s

CU

RR

EN

T R

OL

E

Wha

t is t

he

Inst

itutio

n ac

tual

ly

doin

g?

AU

TH

OR

ITY

GA

PS

Iden

tified

gap

s alo

ng t

he d

imen

sion

s of

soun

d le

gal f

ram

ewor

k, o

vers

ight

, an

d co

ordi

natio

n

RE

SO

UR

CE

S

Doe

s the

Inst

itutio

n ha

ve

hum

an, o

rgan

isat

iona

l and

fin

anci

al re

sour

ces t

o pe

rfor

m

the

role

acc

ordi

ng to

the

oblig

atio

n?If

not,

wha

t is m

issi

ng?

OU

TP

UT

Nec

essa

ry C

hang

e in

ca

paci

ty o

f Ins

titut

ion

OU

TC

OM

E

Expe

cted

cha

nge

in th

e Ro

le o

f the

Inst

itutio

n

6.3

.2 O

ve

rsig

ht

1. A

ssem

bly

Com

mitt

ee fo

r Pr

epar

edne

ss

and

Emer

genc

y;

2.O

mbu

ds-

pers

onIn

stitu

tion.

Ensu

re p

rope

r fu

nctio

ning

of

secu

rity

rela

ted

inst

itutio

nsth

roug

h a

syst

em o

f che

cks

and

bala

nces

.

- To

disc

uss

the

dutie

s of

PIS

G

and

to m

ake

reco

mm

enda

tions

;

- To

draf

t urg

ent

plan

s in

cas

e of

da

nger

s to

pub

lic

secu

rity;

- To

advi

se th

e PI

SG

on a

ny m

atte

rs

conc

erni

ng th

e pr

omot

ion

and

prot

ectio

n of

hu

man

righ

ts;

- To

exam

ine

and

repo

rt o

n le

gisl

atio

n an

d ad

min

istr

ativ

e pr

ovis

ions

of P

ISG

;

- To

inve

stig

ate,

re

port

on

and

atte

mpt

to re

solv

e an

y si

tuat

ion

of

viol

atio

n of

hum

an

right

s.

Le

ga

l fr

am

ew

ork

:

- No

prov

isio

n m

ade

in th

e cu

rren

t le

gal f

ram

ewor

k fo

r Ass

embl

y Co

mm

ittee

to e

xerc

ise

over

sigh

t po

wer

s;

- Lac

k of

pro

visi

on fo

r the

O

mbu

dspe

rson

Inst

itutio

n to

en

sure

inde

pend

ence

in le

ader

ship

ap

poin

tmen

t and

bud

get a

lloca

tion;

- Lac

k of

a C

ode

of A

dmin

istr

ativ

e Pr

oced

ure;

Ov

ers

igh

t:- N

o ov

ersi

ght A

ssem

bly

com

mitt

ee;

- Lac

k of

cla

rity

in th

e fu

nctio

ning

of

ove

rsig

ht/a

dvis

ory

bodi

es a

t the

m

unic

ipal

leve

l vis

-à-v

is th

e ce

ntra

l PI

SG;

Co

ord

ina

tio

n:

- Lac

k of

org

anic

link

bet

wee

n fo

rmer

ly re

serv

ed a

nd th

e PI

SG

inst

itutio

ns;

- Lac

k of

coo

rdin

atio

n m

echa

nism

be

twee

n PI

SG a

nd in

tern

atio

nal

inst

itutio

ns re

late

d to

sec

urity

.

- Ext

ensi

ve a

ssis

tanc

e ne

eded

for t

he

esta

blis

hmen

t of a

n A

ssem

bly

Com

mitt

ee o

n Se

curit

y;

- Exp

ertis

e ne

eded

for t

he

adop

tion

of le

gisl

atio

n en

surin

g in

depe

nden

ce

of th

e O

mbu

dspe

rson

In

stitu

tion,

and

a C

ode

of

Adm

inis

trat

ive

Proc

edur

e;

- Exp

ertis

e re

quire

d to

en

sure

pro

per c

oord

inat

ion

betw

een

secu

rity

over

sigh

t st

ruct

ures

at t

he m

unic

ipal

an

d lo

cal l

evel

s.

- Leg

al p

rovi

sion

s en

surin

g pr

oper

ov

ersi

ght a

t all

leve

ls

adop

ted;

- Ass

embl

y Co

mm

ittee

on

Sec

urity

est

ablis

hed;

- Cod

e of

Adm

inis

trat

ive

Proc

edur

e ad

opte

d;

- Cle

ar li

nks

of a

utho

rity

esta

blis

hed

at a

ll le

vels

fo

r ins

titut

ions

rela

ted

to s

ecur

ity.

Mid

-te

rm

- Ass

embl

y ad

opts

ov

ersi

ght r

ole;

Lo

ng

-te

rm

- Ove

rsig

ht m

echa

nism

s in

pla

ce a

ccor

ding

to E

U

and

Part

ners

hip

for P

eace

(P

fP)/

NAT

O s

tand

ards

.

Gap Analysis

122

2.

OB

LIG

AT

ION

& C

UR

RE

NT

RO

LE

AN

ALY

SIS

3.

CA

PA

CIT

Y G

AP

AN

ALY

SIS

4.

RE

SU

LTS

INS

TIT

UT

ION

OB

LIG

AT

ION

Acco

rdin

g to

in

tern

atio

nal

stan

dard

s

CU

RR

EN

T R

OL

E

Wha

t is t

he

Inst

itutio

n ac

tual

ly

doin

g?

AU

TH

OR

ITY

GA

PS

Iden

tified

gap

s alo

ng t

he d

imen

sion

s of

soun

d le

gal f

ram

ewor

k, o

vers

ight

, an

d co

ordi

natio

n

RE

SO

UR

CE

S

Doe

s the

Inst

itutio

n ha

ve

hum

an, o

rgan

isat

iona

l and

fin

anci

al re

sour

ces t

o pe

rfor

m

the

role

acc

ordi

ng to

the

oblig

atio

n?If

not,

wha

t is m

issi

ng?

OU

TP

UT

Nec

essa

ry C

hang

e in

ca

paci

ty o

f Ins

titut

ion

OU

TC

OM

E

Expe

cted

cha

nge

in th

e Ro

le o

f the

Inst

itutio

n

6.3

.3 B

ud

ge

t

c

yc

le

1. M

inis

try

of

Econ

omy

and

Fina

nce

(MEF

)

2. E

cono

mic

and

Fi

scal

Cou

ncil

(EFC

)

Dev

elop

and

ex

ecut

e a

bud-

get c

onsi

sten

t w

ith a

sses

sed

mac

roec

onom

icco

nditi

ons,

and

ensu

re p

rope

rac

coun

tabi

lity

- Coo

rdin

ate

deve

lopm

ent a

nd

ensu

re e

xecu

tion

of b

udge

t;

- Coo

rdin

ate

with

U

NM

IK C

usto

ms

Serv

ice;

- Per

form

ec

onom

ic a

naly

sis

and

rese

arch

;

- Mon

itor

com

plia

nce

of

PISG

app

licab

le

rule

s;

- Pol

icy-

mak

ing

rest

s w

ith E

FC-

UN

MIK

.

Le

ga

l fr

am

ew

ork

:

- Pro

vide

for M

EF to

fully

exe

rcis

e ex

ecut

ive

pow

ers,

incl

udin

g po

licy-

mak

ing

func

tions

;

- Pro

vide

for C

usto

ms

Serv

ice

to

com

e un

der P

ISG

aut

horit

y;

Ov

ers

igh

t:- P

rovi

de fo

r the

Ass

embl

y to

pr

oper

ly e

xerc

ise

thei

r ove

rsig

ht

pow

er;

- Lac

k of

mec

hani

sms

ensu

ring

acco

unta

ble

impl

emen

tatio

n of

th

e bu

dget

, esp

ecia

lly a

t the

sen

ior

leve

ls o

f the

PIS

G;

Co

ord

ina

tio

n:

- Pro

vide

for t

he u

nific

atio

n of

bu

dget

dev

elop

men

t pro

cess

und

er

the

PISG

lead

ersh

ip;

- Lac

k of

con

trol

mec

hani

sms

ensu

ring

prop

er e

xpen

ditu

re in

re

serv

ed a

nd tr

ansf

erre

d ar

eas;

- Lac

k of

coo

rdin

atio

n m

echa

nism

s fo

r joi

nt p

rogr

amm

ing

in tr

ansf

erre

d an

d re

serv

ed a

reas

.

- Int

erna

tiona

l exp

ertis

e ne

eded

for t

he a

dopt

ion

of

legi

slat

ion;

- Exp

ertis

e fr

om re

puta

ble

inst

itutio

ns is

nee

ded

for t

he

capa

city

bui

ldin

g of

PIS

G

lead

ersh

ip in

pol

icy-

mak

ing

and

putt

ing

in p

lace

pro

per

chec

ks a

nd b

alan

ces;

- Sup

port

for t

rans

ition

of

mon

etar

y po

licy

from

in

tern

atio

nal t

o Ko

sovo

offi

cial

s.

- Leg

isla

tion

adop

ted

on

the

pow

ers

of M

EF a

nd

Cust

oms

Serv

ice;

- Dev

elop

cap

acity

of

lead

ersh

ip p

ositi

ons

espe

cial

ly o

n po

licy-

mak

ing;

- Con

trol

mec

hani

sms

in

plac

e to

ens

ure

prop

er

expe

nditu

re in

the

rese

rved

an

d tr

ansf

erre

d ar

eas;

- Fun

ctio

nal l

ink

esta

blis

hed

betw

een

the

Offi

ce o

f the

Aud

itor-

Gen

eral

and

the

Offi

ce o

f Pu

blic

Pro

secu

tor;

- Tra

nspa

renc

y of

mon

etar

y po

licy

and

econ

omic

co

nditi

ons,

i.e. A

ssem

bly

test

imon

y, p

ublic

rele

ase

of

econ

omic

dat

a.

Mid

-te

rm

- Kos

ovo’

s in

stitu

tions

as

sum

e fu

ll po

licy

mak

ing

func

tions

;

Lo

ng

-te

rm

- Kos

ovo’

s in

stitu

tions

ad

opt s

tand

ards

of

acco

unta

bilit

y in

line

w

ith E

U b

est p

ract

ice.

Gap Analysis

1232

. O

BL

IGA

TIO

N &

CU

RR

EN

T R

OL

E A

NA

LYS

IS3

. C

AP

AC

ITY

GA

P A

NA

LYS

IS4

. R

ES

ULT

S

INS

TIT

UT

ION

OB

LIG

AT

ION

Acco

rdin

g to

in

tern

atio

nal

stan

dard

s

CU

RR

EN

T R

OL

E

Wha

t is t

he

Inst

itutio

n ac

tual

ly

doin

g?

AU

TH

OR

ITY

GA

PS

Iden

tified

gap

s alo

ng t

he d

imen

sion

s of

soun

d le

gal f

ram

ewor

k, o

vers

ight

, and

co

ordi

natio

n

RE

SO

UR

CE

S

Doe

s the

Inst

itutio

n ha

ve

hum

an, o

rgan

isat

iona

l an

d fin

anci

al re

sour

ces t

o pe

rfor

m th

e ro

le a

ccor

ding

to

the

oblig

atio

n?If

not,

wha

t is m

issi

ng?

OU

TP

UT

Nec

essa

ry C

hang

e in

ca

paci

ty o

f Ins

titut

ion

OU

TC

OM

E

Expe

cted

cha

nge

in th

e Ro

le o

f the

Inst

itutio

n

6.3

.4 J

ud

icia

ry

1. M

inis

try

of

Just

ice

(MO

J)

2. S

upre

me

Cour

t

3. K

osov

o Ju

dici

al

Coun

cil

(KJC

)

Prof

essi

onal

, in

depe

nden

t an

d ac

coun

tabl

e

judi

ciar

y

- Pro

vide

trai

ning

;

- Pro

vide

sup

port

fo

r pre

para

tion

of G

over

nmen

t ag

reem

ents

;

- Pol

icy

for

recr

uitm

ent,

trai

ning

and

ap

poin

tmen

t of

judg

es.

Le

ga

l fr

am

ew

ork

:

- Pro

vide

for a

who

le re

view

of t

he

just

ice

syst

em in

Kos

ovo,

incl

udin

g th

e tr

ansf

er o

f pol

icym

akin

g, fi

nanc

ial

cont

rol a

nd o

vers

ight

to P

ISG

;- P

rovi

de fo

r app

oint

men

t of j

udge

s an

d pr

osec

utor

s by

PIS

G w

ith s

tric

t cr

iteria

;- I

ncom

plet

e an

d fr

agile

lega

l in

fras

truc

ture

;

Ov

ers

igh

t:- L

ack

of p

roce

dure

s an

d in

stitu

tiona

l m

echa

nism

s en

surin

g ov

ersi

ght o

f ju

dici

ary;

- Ove

rsig

ht o

f cor

rect

iona

l ser

vice

s by

PI

SG;

- Lac

k of

tran

spar

ency

on

cour

t cas

e de

cisi

ons;

Co

ord

ina

tio

n:

- Lac

k of

coo

rdin

atio

n of

the

legi

slat

ive

proc

ess;

- Adm

inis

trat

ion

of ju

stic

e is

spl

it be

twee

n PI

SG a

nd U

NM

IK;

- Ins

titut

iona

l fra

gmen

tatio

n of

the

judi

ciar

y be

twee

n U

NM

IK a

nd P

ISG

, an

d ex

iste

nce

of “p

aral

lel c

ourt

s”;

- Lac

k of

che

ck a

nd b

alan

ce

mec

hani

sms

betw

een

polic

e an

d ju

dici

ary

in th

e fig

ht a

gain

st c

rime.

- The

re a

re n

ot e

noug

h pr

ofes

sion

al ju

dges

and

pr

osec

utor

s in

pla

ce;

- Sub

stan

tive

finan

cial

an

d hu

man

reso

urce

s (in

tern

atio

nal j

udge

s an

d pr

osec

utor

s, an

d le

gal

expe

rts)

will

be

need

ed

for t

he re

new

al o

f the

ju

dici

ary,

the

unifi

catio

n of

th

e le

gisl

ativ

e pr

oces

s an

d th

e al

ignm

ent o

f diff

eren

t le

gisl

atio

ns c

urre

ntly

ap

plic

able

in K

osov

o;

- MO

J will

nee

d as

sist

ance

in

set

ting

up s

truc

ture

s an

d bu

ildin

g th

e ca

paci

ty o

f its

sta

ff.

- Com

preh

ensi

ve

fram

ewor

k of

the

just

ice

syst

em in

pla

ce a

nd th

e re

new

al o

f the

judi

ciar

y is

co

mpl

eted

;

- Leg

isla

tion

proc

ess

is

coor

dina

ted

thro

ugh

the

Ass

embl

y of

Kos

ovo;

- MO

J has

full

auth

ority

to

dev

elop

and

ove

rsee

po

licie

s in

the

field

of

just

ice,

incl

udin

g pr

osec

utio

n, a

nd re

view

all

draf

t leg

isla

tion;

- MO

J’s a

nd K

JC’s

com

pete

nces

are

cle

arly

de

fined

to e

nsur

e ac

coun

tabi

lity

of ju

dges

an

d pr

osec

utor

s;

- KJC

fully

tran

sfer

red

to

PISG

;

- Int

erna

tiona

l and

nat

iona

l pr

osec

utor

ial s

yste

ms

are

unifi

ed;

- Adm

inis

trat

ion

of ju

stic

e is

car

ried

out b

y PI

SG,

incl

udin

g co

ntro

l of

finan

cial

mea

ns.

Mid

-te

rm

- Com

preh

ensi

ve

revi

ew o

f the

ju

dici

al in

stitu

tions

co

mpl

eted

;

Lo

ng

-te

rm

- Pro

fess

iona

l an

d in

depe

nden

t ju

dici

ary

func

tions

in

line

with

EU

Acq

uis

Com

mun

auta

ire.

Gap Analysis

124

2.

OB

LIG

AT

ION

& C

UR

RE

NT

RO

LE

AN

ALY

SIS

3.

CA

PA

CIT

Y G

AP

AN

ALY

SIS

4.

RE

SU

LTS

INS

TIT

UT

ION

OB

LIG

AT

ION

Acco

rdin

g to

in

tern

atio

nal

stan

dard

s

CU

RR

EN

T R

OL

E

Wha

t is t

he

Inst

itutio

n ac

tual

ly

doin

g?

AU

TH

OR

ITY

GA

PS

Iden

tified

gap

s alo

ng t

he d

imen

sion

s of

soun

d le

gal f

ram

ewor

k, o

vers

ight

, an

d co

ordi

natio

n

RE

SO

UR

CE

S

Doe

s the

Inst

itutio

n ha

ve

hum

an, o

rgan

isat

iona

l and

fin

anci

al re

sour

ces t

o pe

rfor

m

the

role

acc

ordi

ng to

the

oblig

atio

n?If

not,

wha

t is m

issi

ng?

OU

TP

UT

Nec

essa

ry C

hang

e in

ca

paci

ty o

f Ins

titut

ion

OU

TC

OM

E

Expe

cted

cha

nge

in th

e Ro

le o

f the

Inst

itutio

n

6.3

.5 T

rad

e a

nd

Ind

ust

ry

1. M

inis

try

of T

rade

and

In

dust

ry

Coor

dina

te tr

ade

and

indu

stria

l po

licy,

and

act

as re

gula

tory

in

the

field

. Put

in

plac

e le

gal a

nd

inst

itutio

nal

infra

stru

ctur

e fo

r eco

nom

ic

deve

lopm

ent.

- Dev

elop

fram

e-w

ork

cond

ition

s for

Tr

ade,

Indu

stry

and

Co

mm

erce

;

- Dev

elop

pol

icie

s an

d im

plem

ent

legi

slatio

n to

en

cour

age

fair

com

petit

ion,

SM

Es,

for p

rivat

e se

ctor

de

velo

pmen

t;

- Mak

e re

com

men

-da

tions

on

issue

s rel

ated

to

priv

atisa

tion;

- Pro

mot

e in

vest

men

ts;

- Adm

inist

er

the

busin

ess

regi

stra

tion

syst

em.

Le

ga

l fr

am

ew

ork

:

- Lac

k of

a fu

lly d

evel

oped

lega

l m

anda

te fo

r PIS

G, e

spec

ially

on

deci

sion

-mak

ing

and

exec

utio

n of

tr

ade

polic

ies;

- Lac

k of

cle

ar e

cono

mic

/reg

ulat

ory

polic

y fo

r SM

Es;

Ov

ers

igh

t:- L

ack

of o

vers

ight

from

regu

lato

ry

agen

cies

on

priv

ate

busi

ness

co

mpe

titio

n;

Co

ord

ina

tio

n:

- Gap

bet

wee

n ce

ntra

l and

regi

onal

le

vels

of P

ISG

on

econ

omic

de

velo

pmen

t act

iviti

es;

Ma

na

ge

me

nt

& L

ea

de

rsh

ip:

- Lac

k of

exp

erie

nce

in fo

reig

n tr

ade;

- Lac

k of

cap

acity

in p

olic

y-m

akin

g,

nego

tiatio

n, a

naly

tical

ski

lls.

- Exp

ertis

e in

dev

elop

ing

trad

e po

licie

s, es

peci

ally

fo

reig

n tr

ade;

-Tra

inin

g pr

ogra

mm

e to

fulfi

l M

TI s

taff

need

s in

tech

nica

l an

d m

anag

eria

l ter

ms,

and

busi

ness

Eng

lish;

- Exp

ertis

e to

str

engt

hen

the

regu

lato

ry c

apac

ities

.

- PIS

G a

ble

to fo

rmul

ate

and

exec

ute

polic

ies

in th

e ar

ea o

f for

eign

trad

e;

- Leg

isla

tion

enco

urag

ing

busi

ness

with

spe

cial

at

tent

ion

to S

MEs

ado

pted

;

- Sta

ff tr

aine

d in

tech

nica

l an

d m

anag

eria

l ter

ms;

- Kno

wle

dge

of b

usin

ess

Engl

ish

impr

oved

;

- Rea

listic

pla

ns fo

r ec

onom

ic d

evel

opm

ent

artic

ulat

ed to

pub

lic;

- MTI

sup

port

s SM

Es a

t a

requ

ired

leve

l thr

ough

es

tabl

ishi

ng n

etw

orks

, tr

aini

ng o

ppor

tuni

ties

and

othe

r res

ourc

es.

Mid

-te

rm

- Tra

nsfe

r of f

ull

com

pete

nces

;

Lo

ng

-te

rm

- Ado

ptio

n of

agg

ress

ive

econ

omic

dev

elop

men

t st

rate

gy in

clud

ing

acce

ss to

EU

mar

kets

, at

trac

tion

of fo

reig

n di

rect

inve

stm

ent

(FD

I) an

d m

embe

rshi

p in

the

Wor

ld T

rade

O

rgan

isat

ion

(WTO

).

Gap Analysis

1252

. O

BL

IGA

TIO

N &

CU

RR

EN

T R

OL

E A

NA

LYS

IS3

. C

AP

AC

ITY

GA

P A

NA

LYS

IS4

. R

ES

ULT

S

INS

TIT

UT

ION

OB

LIG

AT

ION

Acco

rdin

g to

in

tern

atio

nal

stan

dard

s

CU

RR

EN

T R

OL

E

Wha

t is t

he

Inst

itutio

n ac

tual

ly

doin

g?

AU

TH

OR

ITY

GA

PS

Iden

tified

gap

s alo

ng t

he d

imen

sion

s of

soun

d le

gal f

ram

ewor

k, o

vers

ight

, an

d co

ordi

natio

n

RE

SO

UR

CE

S

Doe

s the

Inst

itutio

n ha

ve

hum

an, o

rgan

isat

iona

l an

d fin

anci

al re

sour

ces t

o pe

rfor

m th

e ro

le a

ccor

ding

to

the

oblig

atio

n?If

not,

wha

t is m

issi

ng?

OU

TP

UT

Nec

essa

ry C

hang

e in

ca

paci

ty o

f Ins

titut

ion

OU

TC

OM

E

Expe

cted

cha

nge

in th

e Ro

le o

f the

Inst

itutio

n

6.3

.6 E

du

ca

tio

n

1. M

inis

try

of

Educ

atio

n,

Scie

nce

and

Tech

nolo

gy

2. A

ssem

bly

Com

mitt

ee

on E

duca

tion,

Sc

ienc

e,

Tech

nolo

gy,

Cultu

re, Y

outh

an

d Sp

orts

The

prom

otio

n of

a s

ingl

e,

unifi

ed, n

on-

disc

rimin

ator

y an

d in

clus

ive

educ

atio

nal

syst

em

- Dev

elop

pol

icie

s an

d im

plem

ent

legi

slat

ion;

- Pro

mot

e a

non-

disc

rimin

ator

y ed

ucat

iona

l sy

stem

;

- D

esig

n,

impl

emen

t an

d su

perv

ise

equi

tabl

e an

d eff

ectiv

e fo

rms

of e

duca

tiona

l ad

min

istr

atio

n an

d sc

hool

m

anag

emen

t.

Le

ga

l fr

am

ew

ork

:

- Lac

k of

sol

id le

gal f

ram

ewor

k an

d st

rict a

ccre

dita

tion

crite

ria fo

r de

gree

aw

ardi

ng in

stitu

tions

;

Ov

ers

igh

t:- E

duca

tion

cont

inue

s to

be

the

stag

e fo

r pol

itica

l bat

tles,

incl

udin

g th

e in

terv

entio

n of

pol

itics

at t

he

civi

l ser

vice

leve

ls;

Co

ord

ina

tio

n:

- Lac

k of

coo

rdin

atio

n be

twee

n PI

SG a

nd th

e pa

ralle

l edu

catio

n sy

stem

in th

e Se

rb a

reas

has

cr

eate

d a

de fa

cto

divi

sion

alo

ng

ethn

ic li

nes;

- Lac

k of

regi

onal

per

spec

tive;

Ma

na

ge

me

nt

& L

ea

de

rsh

ip:

- Uns

tabl

e cu

rric

ulum

;- I

nsuffi

cien

t bud

geta

ry fu

nds;

- Low

teac

hers

’ rem

uner

atio

n.

- Res

ourc

es w

ill b

e re

quire

d to

str

engt

hen

the

over

sigh

t/in

spec

tion

bodi

es;

- Exp

ertis

e to

dra

ft a

nd

adop

t leg

isla

tion,

sta

ndar

ds

and

crite

ria fo

r deg

ree

rew

ardi

ng in

stitu

tions

;

- Exp

erts

and

men

tors

to

addr

ess

man

agem

ent a

nd

curr

icul

a is

sues

;

- Add

ition

al re

sour

ces

to a

ddre

ss te

ache

rs

rem

uner

atio

n.

- PIS

G a

nd th

e Se

rb

para

llel e

duca

tion

syst

em

guid

ed b

y sa

me

polic

y an

d no

rms

and

usin

g sa

me

budg

et;

- Ado

ptio

n of

legi

slat

ion

and

stric

t crit

eria

for

degr

ee a

war

ding

in

stitu

tions

;

- Mec

hani

sms

in p

lace

en

cour

agin

g th

e re

gion

al

pers

pect

ive;

- Sta

ndar

d ed

ucat

ion

goal

s/ob

ject

ives

ado

pted

in

fo

rm o

f edu

catio

n po

licy.

Mid

-te

rm

- Kos

ovo’

s ed

ucat

ion

syst

em a

dopt

s EU

ed

ucat

ion

stan

dard

s an

d ac

cred

itatio

n cr

iteria

for

inst

itutio

ns;

Lo

ng

-te

rm

- Int

egra

tion

of a

ll Ko

sovo

ed

ucat

iona

l ins

titut

ions

un

der m

inis

try

over

sigh

t;

- Re-

orie

ntat

ion

of

educ

atio

nal i

nstit

utio

ns

tow

ards

pro

fess

iona

l de

velo

pmen

t of s

tude

nts.

Gap Analysis

126

2.

OB

LIG

AT

ION

& C

UR

RE

NT

RO

LE

AN

ALY

SIS

3.

CA

PA

CIT

Y G

AP

AN

ALY

SIS

4.

RE

SU

LTS

INS

TIT

UT

ION

OB

LIG

AT

ION

Acco

rdin

g to

in

tern

atio

nal

stan

dard

s

CU

RR

EN

T R

OL

E

Wha

t is t

he

Inst

itutio

nac

tual

ly d

oing

?

AU

TH

OR

ITY

GA

PS

Iden

tified

gap

s alo

ng t

he d

imen

sion

s of

soun

d le

gal f

ram

ewor

k, o

vers

ight

, an

d co

ordi

natio

n

RE

SO

UR

CE

S

Doe

s the

Inst

itutio

n ha

ve

hum

an, o

rgan

isat

iona

l an

d fin

anci

al re

sour

ces t

o pe

rfor

m th

e ro

le a

ccor

ding

to

the

oblig

atio

n?If

not,

wha

t is m

issi

ng?

OU

TP

UT

Nec

essa

ry C

hang

e in

ca

paci

ty o

f Ins

titut

ion

OU

TC

OM

E

Expe

cted

cha

nge

in th

e Ro

le

of th

e In

stitu

tion

6.3

.7 H

ea

lth

1. M

inis

try

of

Hea

lth (M

oH)

2. A

ssem

bly

Com

mitt

ee o

n H

ealth

, Wor

k an

d So

cial

W

elfa

re

To c

omba

t di

seas

e,

espe

cial

ly k

ey

infe

ctio

us

dise

ases

, and

to

pro

mot

e th

e ge

nera

l hea

lth o

f th

e po

pula

tion21

9

- Dev

elop

po

licie

s an

d no

rms

for a

non

-di

scrim

inat

ory

heal

thca

re

syst

em;

- Co

ordi

nate

ac

tiviti

es to

pr

omot

e th

e co

here

nt

deve

lopm

ent

of h

ealth

care

sy

stem

;

- Ove

rsee

im

plem

enta

tion

of s

tand

ards

in

the

sect

or.

Le

ga

l fr

am

ew

ork

:

- Leg

al fr

amew

ork

and

inst

itutio

nal

set-

up fo

r hea

lth in

sura

nce

is

lack

ing;

oth

erw

ise

lega

l fra

mew

ork

is re

ason

ably

in p

lace

;

Ov

ers

igh

t:- I

nter

vent

ion

of p

oliti

cs a

t the

civ

il se

rvic

e le

vel o

f hea

lth s

yste

m;

Co

ord

ina

tio

n:

- Lac

k of

coo

rdin

atio

n be

twee

n PI

SG

and

the

para

llel h

ealth

care

sys

tem

in

the

Serb

are

as;

- No

syst

em in

pla

ce fo

r em

erge

ncy

situ

atio

ns s

uch

as th

e av

ian

flu;

Ma

na

ge

me

nt

& L

ea

de

rsh

ip:

- Inh

erite

d so

cial

ist h

ealth

care

sy

stem

and

infr

astr

uctu

re s

till i

n pl

ace;

- Lac

k of

hea

lth m

anag

emen

t ski

lls;

- Lac

k of

str

ateg

ic p

lann

ing;

- Lac

k of

reso

urce

s.

- Maj

or re

sour

ces

will

be

requ

ired

to u

pgra

de th

e in

stitu

tiona

l res

pons

e to

th

e le

gal r

efor

m in

the

sect

or;

- A W

HO

pro

ject

may

ad

dres

s th

e es

tabl

ishm

ent

of a

n em

erge

ncy

resp

onse

sy

stem

;

- Tar

gete

d as

sist

ance

in

the

shap

e of

exp

erts

and

m

ento

rs m

ay a

ddre

ss

man

agem

ent a

nd s

trat

egic

pl

anni

ng is

sues

.

- Em

erge

ncy

resp

onse

sy

stem

, inc

ludi

ng a

co

ordi

natio

n m

echa

nism

, in

pla

ce fo

r inf

ectio

us

dise

ases

;

- PIS

G a

nd th

e Se

rb p

aral

lel

heal

thca

re s

yste

m g

uide

d by

sam

e po

licy

and

norm

s;

- SPA

C’s

role

is re

view

ed to

st

abili

se s

enio

r civ

il se

rvic

e (s

ee c

ivil

serv

ice

sect

ion)

.

Mid

-te

rm

- MoH

is fu

lly in

tegr

ated

in

emer

genc

y m

anag

emen

t pl

anni

ng a

nd c

oord

inat

ion;

Lo

ng

-te

rm

- Int

egra

tion

of a

ll he

alth

in

stitu

tions

into

min

istr

y’s

func

tions

;

- MoH

mee

ts in

tern

atio

nal

stan

dard

s re

gard

ing

emer

genc

y pr

epar

edne

ss

and

part

icip

ates

in w

ider

re

gion

al p

lann

ing.

219

Bas

ed o

n W

orld

Hea

lth O

rgan

isat

ion

mis

sion

sta

tem

ent.

Gap Analysis

1272

. O

BL

IGA

TIO

N &

CU

RR

EN

T R

OL

E A

NA

LYS

IS3

. C

AP

AC

ITY

GA

P A

NA

LYS

IS4

. R

ES

ULT

S

INS

TIT

UT

ION

OB

LIG

AT

ION

Acco

rdin

g to

in

tern

atio

nal

stan

dard

s

CU

RR

EN

T R

OL

E

Wha

t is t

he

Inst

itutio

n ac

tual

ly

doin

g?

AU

TH

OR

ITY

GA

PS

Iden

tified

gap

s alo

ng t

he

dim

ensi

ons o

f sou

nd le

gal

fram

ewor

k, o

vers

ight

, and

co

ordi

natio

n

RE

SO

UR

CE

S

Doe

s the

Inst

itutio

n ha

ve

hum

an, o

rgan

isat

iona

l and

fin

anci

al re

sour

ces t

o pe

rfor

m

the

role

acc

ordi

ng to

the

oblig

atio

n?If

not,

wha

t is m

issi

ng?

OU

TP

UT

Nec

essa

ry C

hang

e in

ca

paci

ty o

f Ins

titut

ion

OU

TC

OM

E

Expe

cted

cha

nge

in th

e Ro

le

of th

e In

stitu

tion

6.3

.8 E

ne

rgy

sec

tor

1. M

inis

try

of

Ener

gy

2. K

osov

o En

ergy

Co

mpa

ny (K

EK)

Dev

elop

an

ener

gy s

ecto

r, in

clud

ing

an

ener

gy p

olic

y, t

o su

ppor

t Kos

ovo’

s de

velo

pmen

t

- Dev

elop

pol

icie

s in

coo

pera

tion

with

SRS

G;

- In

coor

dina

tion

with

UN

MIK

and

re

gula

tory

bod

ies

deve

lop

and

impl

emen

t an

ener

gy s

trat

egy;

- In

coo

rdin

atio

n w

ith S

RSG

pro

-m

ote

regi

onal

in

tegr

atio

n;

- Col

lect

and

pr

oces

s st

atis

tics.

Le

ga

l fr

am

ew

ork

:

- Whi

le b

asic

lega

l fra

mew

ork

is

in p

lace

, sec

onda

ry le

gisl

atio

n is

ne

eded

;

Co

ord

ina

tio

n:

- Lac

k of

regi

onal

per

spec

tive;

Ma

na

ge

me

nt

& L

ea

de

rsh

ip:

- Poo

r man

agem

ent;

- Lac

k of

ade

quat

e st

rate

gies

;- L

ack

of p

ublic

trus

t in

inst

itutio

ns

and

serv

ices

.

- Maj

or re

sour

ces

will

be

requ

ired

to u

pgra

de

curr

ent c

apac

ity (g

iven

its

amor

tizat

ion)

;

- Mas

sive

inve

stm

ent w

ill

be n

eede

d to

est

ablis

h ne

w th

erm

o pl

ant a

nd

deve

lop

alte

rnat

ive

ener

gy

prod

uctio

n in

fras

truc

ture

;

- Exp

ertis

e to

dra

ft a

nd

adop

t a c

ompr

ehen

sive

st

rate

gy a

nd p

olic

ies

in th

e en

ergy

sec

tor;

- Exp

ertis

e ne

eded

in

man

agem

ent.

- Com

preh

ensi

ve e

nerg

y st

rate

gy in

pla

ce;

- Ene

rgy

sect

or p

art o

f th

e re

gion

al n

etw

ork;

- Pla

ns fo

r the

es

tabl

ishm

ent o

f new

th

erm

o pl

ant u

nder

way

;

- Man

agem

ent p

lan

for

the

cont

rol a

nd u

se o

f lig

nite

rese

rves

.

Mid

-te

rm

- Im

plem

enta

tion

of

Min

istr

y of

Ene

rgy

stra

tegy

;

Lo

ng

-te

rm

- Ade

quat

e ge

nera

tion

of p

ower

suffi

cien

t to

Kos

ovo’

s ne

eds

for

soci

al a

nd e

cono

mic

de

velo

pmen

t.

Gap Analysis

128

2.

OB

LIG

AT

ION

& C

UR

RE

NT

RO

LE

AN

ALY

SIS

3.

CA

PA

CIT

Y G

AP

AN

ALY

SIS

4.

RE

SU

LTS

INS

TIT

UT

ION

OB

LIG

AT

ION

Acco

rdin

g to

in

tern

atio

nal

stan

dard

s

CU

RR

EN

T R

OL

E

Wha

t is t

he

Inst

itutio

n ac

tual

ly

doin

g?

AU

TH

OR

ITY

GA

PS

Iden

tified

gap

s alo

ng t

he

dim

ensi

ons o

f sou

nd le

gal

fram

ewor

k, o

vers

ight

, and

co

ordi

natio

n

RE

SO

UR

CE

S

Doe

s the

Inst

itutio

n ha

ve

hum

an, o

rgan

isat

iona

l an

d fin

anci

al re

sour

ces t

o pe

rfor

m th

e ro

le a

ccor

ding

to

the

oblig

atio

n?If

not,

wha

t is m

issi

ng?

OU

TP

UT

Nec

essa

ry C

hang

e in

ca

paci

ty o

f Ins

titut

ion

OU

TC

OM

E

Expe

cted

cha

nge

in th

e Ro

le o

f the

Inst

itutio

n

6.3

.9 E

xe

cu

tiv

e

Se

cu

rity

Inst

itu

tio

ns

1. O

ffice

for

Publ

ic S

afet

y (O

PS) -

OPM

2. M

inis

try

of

Inte

rnal

Affa

irs

(MoI

A)

3. D

epar

tmen

t of

Em

erge

ncy

Man

agem

ent

(MoI

A)

Dev

elop

pol

icy

and

coor

dina

te

actio

n in

the

field

of p

ublic

or

der a

nd s

afet

y in

line

with

EU

st

anda

rds

OP

S

- Inf

orm

PM

and

G

over

nmen

t;

- Man

age

Situ

atio

n Ce

ntre

;

- Dev

elop

pol

icy

with

in th

e sc

ope

of

its re

spon

sibi

lity

in

the

field

of p

ublic

or

der a

nd s

afet

y;

- In

coor

dina

tion

with

UN

MIK

be

resp

onsi

ble

for

Inte

grat

ed B

orde

r M

anag

emen

t;

- Ass

ist U

NM

IK in

th

e ad

min

istr

atio

n of

cen

tral

civ

il re

gist

ry a

nd

data

base

, and

in th

e ad

min

istr

atio

n of

ID

car

ds a

nd T

rave

l D

ocum

ents

;

- Per

form

func

tions

re

latin

g to

civ

il em

erge

ncy

prep

ared

ness

.

Le

ga

l fr

am

ew

ork

:

- Lac

k of

legi

slat

ion

on th

e cu

rren

t an

d fu

ture

role

of O

PS g

iven

the

curr

ent i

nstit

utio

nal s

et-u

p;

- Lac

k of

pro

visi

ons

ensu

ring

the

prim

ary

role

of P

ISG

in p

olic

y m

akin

g an

d co

ordi

natio

n in

the

field

of p

ublic

ord

er a

nd s

afet

y;

Ov

ers

igh

t:- L

ack

of o

vers

ight

mec

hani

sm a

t th

e A

ssem

bly

leve

l;

- Civ

ilian

con

trol

of m

ilita

ry ro

le

of A

ssem

bly

and

the

Exec

utiv

e re

gard

ing

mili

tary

doe

s no

t exi

st;

Co

ord

ina

tio

n:

- Lac

k of

coo

rdin

atio

n be

twee

n PI

SG a

nd re

serv

ed o

r for

mer

ly

rese

rved

UN

MIK

are

as o

n se

curit

y;

- Com

mun

icat

ion

and

polic

y pr

oces

ses

coor

dina

tion

betw

een

orga

nisa

tions

/ ins

titut

ions

requ

ires

deve

lopm

ent;

Ma

na

ge

me

nt

& L

ea

de

rsh

ip:

- Lac

k of

inst

itutio

nal c

apac

ity d

ue

to it

s re

cent

est

ablis

hmen

t; - C

apac

ity b

uild

ing

requ

ired

for

futu

re ro

les.

- MoI

A w

ill n

eed

subs

tant

ial

assi

stan

ce in

set

ting

up

stru

ctur

es a

nd b

uild

ing

the

capa

city

of i

ts s

taff

;

- OPS

will

requ

ire e

xper

t su

ppor

t in

sett

ing

up it

s ne

w fu

nctio

nal s

truc

ture

, an

d an

ext

ensi

ve c

apac

ity

prog

ram

me

to th

is e

nd;

- Man

agem

ent a

nd

lead

ersh

ip tr

aini

ng fo

r the

se

nior

pos

ition

s of

MoI

A

and

OPS

;

- Add

ition

al re

sour

ces

will

be

requ

ired

to m

an, t

rain

, an

d eq

uip

the

Situ

atio

n Ce

ntre

.

- Leg

al fr

amew

ork

on

MoI

A a

nd O

PS a

dopt

ed;

- New

role

of M

oIA

and

O

PS c

lear

ly d

efine

d an

d in

stitu

tions

func

tioni

ng

in li

ne w

ith th

eir n

ew ro

les;

- Ove

rsig

ht a

t the

A

ssem

bly

leve

l es

tabl

ishe

d;

- Situ

atio

n Ce

ntre

set

up

and

runn

ing

in li

ne w

ith

thei

r man

date

;

- Coo

rdin

atio

n be

twee

n se

curit

y in

stitu

tions

is

func

tioni

ng th

roug

h es

tabl

ishe

d in

ter-

agen

cy

wor

king

gro

ups

or o

ther

m

echa

nism

s.

Mid

-te

rm

- Est

ablis

h lin

es o

f co

mm

unic

atio

ns a

nd

coor

dina

tion

for s

ecur

ity

issu

es;

Lo

ng

-te

rm

- Est

ablis

h eff

ectiv

e po

licy

and

coor

dina

tion

mec

hani

sms

acro

ss th

e se

curit

y se

ctor

in K

osov

o;

- Est

ablis

h eff

ectiv

e ov

ersi

ght o

f sec

tor.

Gap Analysis

1292

. O

BL

IGA

TIO

N &

CU

RR

EN

T R

OL

E A

NA

LYS

IS3

. C

AP

AC

ITY

GA

P A

NA

LYS

IS4

. R

ES

ULT

S

INS

TIT

UT

ION

OB

LIG

AT

ION

Acco

rdin

g to

in

tern

atio

nal

stan

dard

s220

CU

RR

EN

T R

OL

E

Wha

t is t

he

Inst

itutio

n ac

tual

ly

doin

g?

AU

TH

OR

ITY

GA

PS

Iden

tified

gap

s alo

ng t

he d

imen

sion

s of

soun

d le

gal f

ram

ewor

k, o

vers

ight

, an

d co

ordi

natio

n

RE

SO

UR

CE

S

Doe

s the

Inst

itutio

n ha

ve

hum

an, o

rgan

isat

iona

l and

fin

anci

al re

sour

ces t

o pe

rfor

m

the

role

acc

ordi

ng to

the

oblig

atio

n?If

not,

wha

t is m

issi

ng?

OU

TP

UT

Nec

essa

ry C

hang

e in

ca

paci

ty o

f Ins

titut

ion

OU

TC

OM

E

Expe

cted

cha

nge

in th

e Ro

le o

f the

Inst

itutio

n

6.3

.10

Po

lic

ing

1. K

osov

o Po

lice

Serv

ice

(KPS

)

2. M

inis

try

of

Inte

rnal

Affa

irs

(MoI

A)

4. M

inis

try

of

Publ

ic S

ervi

ces

(MPS

)

5. O

ffice

for

Publ

ic S

afet

y (O

PS)

6. K

CPSE

D

Mai

ntai

n ci

vil

law

and

ord

er

and

prot

ect t

he

gene

ral p

ublic

fr

om h

arm

Mo

IA:

- Dev

elop

pol

icie

s in

the

field

of

publ

ic o

rder

and

sa

fety

(with

in

the

scop

e of

its

resp

onsi

bilit

ies)

;

- Ove

rsee

KPS

su

bjec

t to

the

auth

ority

of S

RSG

;

- Ove

rsee

the

budg

etar

y an

d fin

anci

al

adm

inis

trat

ion

of K

PS in

co

nsul

tatio

n w

ith P

olic

e Co

mm

issi

oner

;

- In

coor

dina

tion

with

UN

MIK

, be

resp

onsi

ble

for t

he

impl

emen

tatio

n of

Inte

grat

ed

Bord

er

Man

agem

ent

- Ove

rsee

m

anag

emen

t an

d pe

rfor

man

ce

of K

PS

thro

ugh

Polic

e In

spec

tora

te.

Le

ga

l fr

am

ew

ork

:

- Lac

k of

a th

orou

gh le

gal

fram

ewor

k fo

r the

func

tioni

ng o

f th

e po

lice

and

lack

of m

odel

for i

ts

furt

her d

evel

opm

ent;

Ov

ers

igh

t:- L

ack

of a

n ap

prop

riate

ac

coun

tabi

lity

syst

em;

- Lac

k of

a c

lear

link

of

resp

onsi

bilit

ies,

incl

udin

g ov

ersi

ght,

of th

e M

inis

try

of

Inte

rnal

Affa

irs, a

nd A

ssem

bly

vis-

à-vi

s th

e KP

S;

Co

ord

ina

tio

n:

- Gap

of c

oord

inat

ion

betw

een

KPS

and

the

PISG

;

- Lac

k of

app

ropr

iate

regi

onal

co

oper

atio

n in

the

area

of

orga

nise

d cr

ime;

- Coo

rdin

atio

n w

ith th

e cr

imin

al

just

ice

sect

or la

cks

upda

ted

actio

n pr

oced

ure;

Ma

na

ge

me

nt

& L

ea

de

rsh

ip:

- Lac

k of

inst

itutio

nal s

tabi

lity

due

to c

onst

ant m

ovem

ent o

f key

pe

rson

nel;

- Tra

inin

g is

not

rela

ted

to th

e pr

ofes

sion

al d

evel

opm

ent.

- The

legi

slat

ive

over

view

w

ill re

quire

dep

loym

ent o

f in

tern

al e

xper

ts in

the

EU

Acqu

is Co

mm

unau

taire

;

- Spe

cial

ist t

rain

ing

will

re

quire

ext

ensi

ve re

sour

ces

espe

cial

ly in

the

fight

ag

ains

t org

anis

ed c

rime,

tr

affick

ing,

and

bor

der

man

agem

ent;

- PIS

G in

stitu

tiona

l cha

nges

(in

the

Ass

embl

y ov

ersi

ght

and

exec

utiv

e co

ntro

l) w

ill

need

exp

erts

in th

e fie

ld;

- Reg

iona

l net

wor

king

will

in

volv

e ad

optio

n of

new

le

gisl

atio

n an

d ad

ditio

nal

finan

cial

reso

urce

s to

set

up

prop

er m

echa

nism

s.

- Tho

roug

h le

gisl

ativ

e re

view

fina

lized

and

po

lice

law

ado

pted

by

the

Ass

embl

y;- A

ccou

ntab

ility

sys

tem

in

plac

e;- C

aree

r man

agem

ent i

s ad

just

ed to

ens

ure

that

tr

aini

ng, p

rom

otio

n an

d sp

ecia

lisat

ion

fit th

e ne

eds

of b

oth

the

Polic

e Se

rvic

e an

d th

e O

ffice

r;- S

peci

alis

t tra

inin

g is

link

ed

to p

rofe

ssio

nal a

nd c

aree

r de

velo

pmen

t;- L

ocal

lead

ersh

ip c

adre

is

deve

lope

d fo

r spe

cial

ist

and

bord

er u

nits

;- I

n th

e ca

se o

f fur

ther

de

cent

ralis

atio

n:

new

gov

erna

nce

and

acco

unta

bilit

y m

echa

nism

s, in

clud

ing

finan

cial

ov

ersi

ght,

to b

e pu

t in

plac

e. A

lso,

new

pol

ice

sub-

stat

ions

to b

e es

tabl

ishe

d an

d st

aff to

be

real

loca

ted;

- Kos

ovo

mem

bers

hip/

pa

rtic

ipat

ion

in e

xist

ing

regi

onal

org

anis

atio

ns/

asso

ciat

ions

.

Mid

-te

rm

- Ful

l tra

nsfe

r of

com

pete

nces

;- F

ull l

egal

bas

is fo

r op

erat

ions

of p

olic

e;- E

stab

lish

bila

tera

l and

re

gion

al re

latio

nshi

ps

and

agre

emen

ts;

Lo

ng

-te

rm

- Reg

iona

l pol

ice

coop

erat

ive

rela

tions

hips

es

tabl

ishe

d;- K

osov

o po

lice

mee

t a

num

ber o

f int

erna

tiona

l an

d EU

bes

t pra

ctic

es

stan

dard

s.

220

Add

ition

al re

fere

nce

mad

e to

Sec

urity

Cou

ncil

Reso

lutio

n 12

44 o

f Jun

e 19

99

Gap Analysis

130

2.

OB

LIG

AT

ION

& C

UR

RE

NT

RO

LE

AN

ALY

SIS

3.

CA

PA

CIT

Y G

AP

AN

ALY

SIS

4.

RE

SU

LTS

INS

TIT

UT

ION

OB

LIG

AT

ION

Acco

rdin

g to

in

tern

atio

nal

stan

dard

s

CU

RR

EN

T R

OL

E

Wha

t is t

he

Inst

itutio

nac

tual

ly d

oing

?

AU

TH

OR

ITY

GA

PS

Iden

tified

gap

s alo

ng t

he d

imen

sion

s of

soun

d le

gal f

ram

ewor

k, o

vers

ight

, an

d co

ordi

natio

n

RE

SO

UR

CE

S

Doe

s the

Inst

itutio

n ha

ve

hum

an, o

rgan

isat

iona

l and

fin

anci

al re

sour

ces t

o pe

rfor

m

the

role

acc

ordi

ng to

the

oblig

atio

n?If

not,

wha

t is m

issi

ng?

OU

TP

UT

Nec

essa

ry C

hang

e in

ca

paci

ty o

f Ins

titut

ion

OU

TC

OM

E

Expe

cted

cha

nge

in th

e Ro

le o

f the

Inst

itutio

n

6.3

.11

Ko

sov

o

Pro

tec

tio

n

Co

rps

(KP

C)

1. K

PC

2. D

epar

tmen

t of

Em

erge

ncy

Man

agem

ent

(DEM

)

Civi

lian

emer

genc

y or

gani

satio

n to

car

ry ra

pid

disa

ster

resp

onse

ta

sks

for p

ublic

sa

fety

KPC:

- Pro

vide

dis

aste

r re

spon

se

serv

ices

;

- Per

form

sea

rch

and

resc

ue;

- Pro

vide

hu

man

itaria

n as

sist

ance

in

isol

ated

are

as;

- De-

min

ing;

- Con

trib

ute

to re

build

ing

infr

astr

uctu

re;

- Per

form

ce

rem

onia

l du

ties.

Le

ga

l fr

am

ew

ork

:

- Lac

k of

a K

osov

o Se

curit

y Ac

t;- L

ack

of c

ompr

ehen

sive

le

gal f

ram

ewor

k to

regu

late

es

tabl

ishm

ent a

nd fu

nctio

ning

of

futu

re K

DF;

Ov

ers

igh

t:- L

ack

of o

vers

ight

com

mitt

ee a

t th

e A

ssem

bly

leve

l on

defe

nce

and

secu

rity

rela

ted

mat

ters

;

Co

ord

ina

tio

n:

- Lac

k of

form

al c

oord

inat

ion

with

D

EM a

nd o

ther

PIS

G s

truc

ture

s;

Ma

na

ge

me

nt

& L

ea

de

rsh

ip:

- Nee

d to

dow

nsiz

e KP

C an

d re

view

ra

nk s

truc

ture

, pro

fess

iona

lism

, sk

ills,

equi

pmen

t and

bas

ing;

- Nee

d of

a c

ompl

ete

over

haul

of

KPC

to e

nsur

e pr

oper

tran

sitio

n of

its

Civi

l Em

erge

ncy

Resp

onse

ca

pabi

lity

to K

DF;

- Fur

ther

spe

cial

trai

ning

is n

eede

d to

car

ry ra

pid

disa

ster

resp

onse

.

- Sub

stan

tial r

esou

rces

will

be

nee

ded

for r

edun

danc

y,

pens

ion

and

rese

ttle

men

t co

sts

of K

PC d

owns

izin

g;

- Sub

stan

tial fi

nanc

ial

and

hum

an re

sour

ces

(NAT

O e

xper

ts) w

ill b

e ne

eded

dur

ing

the

initi

al

esta

blis

hmen

t pha

se o

f KD

F (e

quip

men

t and

in

fras

truc

ture

);

- Ext

ensi

ve tr

aini

ng a

nd

logi

stic

al s

uppo

rt w

ill b

e ne

eded

in th

e sh

ort a

nd

med

ium

term

s in

line

with

N

ATO

sta

ndar

ds fo

r the

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Map of Kosovo

CHAPTER VII

Proposed Kosovo

Security Architecture

Proposed Kosovo Security Architecture

134

Section 7.1: Background and

Chapter Overview

7.1.1 Under Kosovo’s Constitutional Framework established by UNMIK Regu-lation 2001/9, the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) are excluded from exercising certain responsibilities reserved to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG).221 The most significant area of reserved powers is the security sector, where only some of the relevant powers have been transitioned to the PISG due to the unresolved question of Final Status. Under this arrangement, the SRSG is charged, in coordination with Kosovo Force (KFOR), with responsibility for all functions that may be attributed to the domain of defence and security pre-paredness. These reserved powers also include exercising control and authority over the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). Consequently, Kosovo Government lead-ership has been unable to develop critical experience in planning for defence and se-curity matters.

7.1.2 In addition, since 2002 capacity building activities in the area of parliamen-tary oversight of governing institutions and principles of democratic governance are underway and will be an essential part of successful transfer of security structures to Kosovo control following resolution of status. Only in 2005, with the estab-lishment of a Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA), did the SRSG begin the transfer of specific security competencies to Kosovo Government institutions.222 However, as the majority of the security sector in Kos-ovo has not been under the control of lo-cal authorities, capacity building in the se-curity arena will be paramount for future priorities of the donor community. The post-conflict transition context of Kosovo as well as the post-communist legacy has

created a unique situation where there are relatively few traditions on which to draw on with regards to democratic, civil-ian controlled security institutions, and as such the security architecture of Kosovo has been created effectively from scratch since 1999. Thus international monitor-ing, mentoring and engagement will be required regardless of the outcome of final status negotiations.

7.1.3 Given the unique circumstances described above and the provisions of UNSCR 1244, which place overall respon-sibility for the security sector within the mandates of UNMIK and KFOR, the insti-tutions addressed in this chapter largely cannot be established until after the de-termination of final status. However, the ISSR Secretariat understood that in con-ducting a security sector review it would be important to make long term recom-mendations impacting the entire security sector. Specifically, institutions such as a security services and defence needed to be addressed and thus a roadmap for the creation of these institutions is included in this chapter.

7.1.4 Another intent of this chapter is to provide a general overview of policy issues that the Kosovo Government will need to consider when establishing a legal frame-work for a Kosovo security institutions. A carefully constructed legal framework should enhance security and provide for stability by ensuring the subordination of security actors to democratically elected political authorities. The legal framework should rest on such core principles as ac-countability and transparency.223 In the wake of determination of final status leg-islation on democratic control of the de-fence forces and the security services will also need to be consistent with any new Constitutional arrangements for Kosovo.224

CHAPTER VII


221 UNMIK Regulation 2001/9. 222 UNMIK Regulation 2005/53.223 “Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, Mechanisms, and Practices” DCAF, Geneva, (2003).

224 Constitutional issues were not considered by ISSR given the unresolved status of Kosovo. However, as Status issues become more clear, security considerations such as democratic control over military forces must be considered as part of any new Kosovo Constitution or Constitutional Framework.


135

225 A more complete description of principles is established in the “Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security” OSCE, 3 December 1994.

226 Concrete measures and mechanisms available to improve legislative oversight are described in UNDP/DCAF “Recommendations for Improving Democratic Oversight and Guidance of the Security Sector” in Cole and Kinzelbach, Democratising Security, 2006.

227 An example is the U.S. Intelligence Oversight Programme. US Executive Order 12333 describes the requirement for oversight to maintain the proper balance between the acquisition of essential information by the US Intelligence Community, and the protection of individuals' constitutional and statutory rights.

228 The KLA legacy is discussed in “An Army for Kosovo?” ICG Europe Report No. 174, 28 July 2006.

229 Interviews with various Kosovo Assembly members and PISG officials; 22-30 July 2006

7.1.5 Any new legal framework regard-ing security should clearly establish ap-propriate civilian control of the defence forces and security services, and ensure that the security services do not exceed the competencies assigned to them by law. Reforms applied to the security sector should be primarily through a Kosovo Se-curity Act that includes the establishment of a clear chain of command and effective control mechanisms such as a Kosovo Se-curity Council (KSC) under the direction of the Prime Minister and relevant Kosovo Assembly committees.225 Furthermore, in designing laws related to the security sector, Kosovo’s leaders should consider provisions that encourage interaction be-tween government institutions and non-governmental experts.

7.1.6 A comprehensive Kosovo Secu-rity Act should clarify the Assembly’s role in defence and security by providing effec-tive mechanisms for parliamentary over-sight.226 Mechanisms must also be estab-lished to ensure effective oversight of the methods and techniques applied by the security bodies in their work. This could be accomplished through select commit-tees with the power to investigate secu-rity-specific issues such as defence and se-curity services. In addition, implementing legislation will be necessary to create om-budsman institutions such as an inspector general, and other oversight mechanisms that meet international standards.227

7.1.7 Budgetary oversight and moni-toring is another important component of the parliamentary role. Kosovo’s Assembly should not only hold the power to deter-mine the security sector budget, but it also needs to monitor how that budget is actu-ally spent. Assembly involvement through the budgeting process should ensure that the size and structure of Kosovo’s security

architecture are based on a careful threat analysis and a realistic assessment of what Kosovo can actually afford. Establishing a mechanism to fund and create security organisations based on such assessments will be important to handling issues such as creating a reasonably-sized Kosovo De-fence Force (KDF).

7.1.8 Some among Kosovo’s political leadership are still strongly influenced by memories of the 1990’s and the experi-ences endured by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).228 Looking to this past for se-curity guidance leads to a narrow view of defence and a flawed analysis of Kosovo’s future security needs in terms of unafford-able balance-of-power goals. Kosovo’s size and budgetary requirements make a collective security model offered through participation in regional security institu-tions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Or-ganisation (NATO) the most realistic.229 A future Kosovo security architecture should include more than the military compo-nent, and should consist of a community of institutions with varied responsibilities for internal security and defence as out-lined in Chapter Five of this report.

7.1.9 In crafting security architecture, the Assembly should prepare legislation that anticipates the eventual integration of Kosovo into regional security organisa-tions. For example, Assembly members should scrutinise domestic law for com-patibility with NATO rules and regula-tions. In order to be able to undertake the commitments of potential Partnership for Peace (PfP) participation and eventual NATO membership, Kosovo legislators should examine and become acquainted with the appropriate legal arrangements and agreements which govern coopera-tion within NATO. Legislation in Kosovo should, as much as possible, be compat-


136 ible with the arrangements and imple-mentation practices which govern NATO-wide cooperation. For example, laws can be written for the security sector so as to ensure that minimum NATO standards are met in such areas as personnel security, information security, and physical security, and provide a basis for the establishment of a corresponding system of classified in-formation. Furthermore, devising security laws with these considerations in mind is necessary not only for NATO integration, but also for regional and international ef-forts to combat organised crime and ter-rorism.

7.1.10 Finally, it should be noted that giv-en the unique situation described above, recommendations contained in this sec-tion cannot be implemented until after the resolution of Status for Kosovo and the cessation of UNSCR 1244.

Section 7.2: New Security

Institutions

Defining the Kosovo Security

Architecture

7.2.1 A Kosovo Security Act should de-scribe the organisations that constitute the security architecture. The competence of the various security institutions are gen-erally described in the Kosovo Security Act, but should be further detailed through separate implementing legislation that addresses specific security and defence matters.

7.2.2 A Kosovo security architecture should be constructed not only through the creation of new institutions, but also by building upon institutions that already exist and are logically connected to secu-rity related tasks. Some of these organisa-tions that currently exist include:

Assembly Committee on SecurityKosovo Protection Corps (KPC)Kosovo Police Service (KPS)

Ministry of Internal Affairs Department of Emergency ManagementThe Communities Security Council (CSC) PM’s Office for Public Safety/Secre-tariat to the CSC

7.2.3 Dependent on the outcome of Status negotiations, some new institutions and actors that may be required in the security sector include:

Kosovo Security CouncilMinistry of DefenceKosovo Defence Force (KDF)Security Service

7.2.4 In addition, in order to assume oversight authorities in the sector the Ko-sovo Assembly will be required to create new oversight committees and existing executive actors (the Prime Minister and President) will also be required to assume additional duties and responsibilities rel-evant to the security sector.

New Institutions and Authorities

Kosovo Security Council

7.2.5 A primary function of the Kosovo Security Act described above should be to provide for the creation of a Kosovo Security Council (KSC) responsible for the overall coordination of Kosovo’s security community.230 The Prime Minister should chair the KSC. Membership should be drawn from the appropriate ministries and other organisations as needed.231 The KSC should also receive input from the municipal authorities through Municipal Security Committees and from relevant Assembly committees, such as a Security Committee. This will ensure that matters of a security nature are subject to legislative oversight and are properly financed through the Kosovo budget process.

230 In June 2006 the Prime Minister activated the Communities Security Council (CSC). The CSC could serve as the basis for a KSC; however, the new Kosovo Security Act would have to reconstitute the body and define its membership, rights, and duties.

231 The design, functions, and institutional relationships of the Kosovo Security Council are for determination of the Government of Kosovo as they determine is appropriate to institutional needs. A Kosovar member of the ISSR Steering Committee expressed the view that the President of Kosovo should be a member of the KCS.


1377.2.6 KSC should be chaired by the Prime Minister and members should in-clude:

Minister of Defence Minister of Internal AffairsMinister of JusticeMinister of Finance and EconomyKPS CommissionerKosovo Defence Force (KDF) Com-mander (new institution)Senior Political Advisor to the Prime MinisterPolitical Advisor on Security to the Prime Minister

Director of the Security Services (new institution)Ex officio members during the initial period of transition should include representatives from the European Union (EU), OSCE, UNDP and KFOROther ex officio members as needed, such as the Legal Advisor to the Prime Minister and other profession-als and experts from various fields depending on the nature of the emergency

7.2.7 Upon determination of final status the security structure for Kosovo should be made up of the following components:

The Kosovo Security Council (KSC)The Kosovo Security Council Secre-tariat (KSCSEC)The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)The Municipal Security Committees (MSCs)

7.2.8 The diagram below illustrates the hierarchy of the new security architecture:

7.2.9 As demonstrated above, the Ko-sovo Security Council (KSC) operates on a strategic and policymaking level and is under the direction of the Prime Minister. The KSC would be the ultimate security policy body responsible for decision mak-ing and submitting coordinated security policies to the Assembly for approval.

7.2.10 The KSC is supported by the KSC Secretariat (KSCSEC). The KSCSEC would be managed by a Director and supported by a 24-hour situation centre within the Office of the Prime Minister. The KSCSEC

KOSOVO SECURITY COUNCILChaired by the Prime Minister

KOSOVO

SECURITY

COUNCIL

SECRETARIAT

(KSCSEC)

GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES

SITUATION

CENTRE

(SITCEN)

KPS KDF

National Level Local Level

SECURITY

SERVICE

MUNICIPAL SECURITY

COMMITTEESLOCAL POLICE

Figure 35: Schematic Diagram for the Kosovo Security ArchitectureSource: ISSR 2006


138 would provide daily briefings to the Prime Minister’s Security Advisor based on re-porting provided by the situation centre. The KSCSEC is the operational body re-sponsible for managing, monitoring, and prioritizing day to day security issues and policies under the direction of the Political Advisor on Security in conjunction with the Director KSCSEC, who is also respon-sible for managing reporting out of the Situation Centre. Furthermore, the KSC-SEC would advise the KSC on appropriate measures to be taken to safeguard the internal and external security of the terri-tory.

7.2.11 A Joint Security Committee (JSC) would be tasked to translate certain policy decisions of the Kosovo Security Council (KSC) into formal intelligence requirements for the intelligence and security services. It is recommended that the JSC be made up of senior representatives of all the security related agencies and seeks to enhance co-operation amongst them. It should be sup-ported by a Joint Assessment Team (JAT), which collates and assesses intelligence on each subject of security concern.

7.2.12 In concert with the central organs of coordination and control, it is recom-mended that Municipal Security Commit-tees (MSCs) be formed at Municipal level.232 The MSCs would provide for Security Com-mittees for each Municipality in Kosovo. They should be designed to provide early warning of the existence or likelihood of any security threat to the municipality or to the Government. They should also be the primary point of contact for the situ-ation centre and other bodies required to monitor the security situation and pro-duce daily reports and overall assessments for decision makers. The MSCs should also meet at regular intervals.

Key Partners of the KSC

7.2.13 Regular security sector briefings should be constructed by the situation centre and coordinated by the KSCSEC to

be provided daily to the Prime Ministers and to representatives of the KSC. Addi-tional briefings in hard copy or orally can be provided to appropriate leaders as may be required. Briefings should be informed by the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), Kosovo Defence Force (KDF), and KFOR, as well as include input from other actors such as the municipalities, EU and other international actors, relevant ministries and others as appropriate.

7.2.14 The International Civilian Office (ICO)/KFOR should, initially, assist in the passage of information to the KSCSEC/JAT until such time as the relevant bodies are established and trained to undertake these duties.

7.2.15 Donor assistance will be required to ensure that relevant bodies have the ap-propriate skills required to create the KSC-SEC. The activation plans for the CSC, an-nounced by the Prime Minister on 16 June 2006, will greatly assist in this process, but the new institutions will require additional support.

7.2.16 The Situation Centre Activation Team is expected to have the functional office operational by the end of 2006. It is envisaged that the Secretariat will be ready to shoulder its responsibilities by June 2007. If these targets are achieved it should then be possible to have the KSC procedures running by mid- 2007.

Ministry of Defence

7.2.17 ISSR research and public consul-tations show that the majority of Kosovo’s citizens believe that upon resolution of Status, Kosovo should establish its own de-fence force. Given this fact, in order to en-sure that such a future force may be estab-lished within democratic norms, including democratic, civilian oversight and control, consideration must be given to the forma-tion of a civilian controlled Ministry of De-fence within the Government of Kosovo. However, since such competencies do not

232 There are two existing local security committees designated for each municipality, the Municipal Community Safety Council and the Local Public Safety Council. The future of these bodies should be reviewed in relation to creation of an overall security architecture.


139

currently exist under the PISG structures, it is recommended that the early stages of development of such a ministry should be conducted under the direct supervision of the international community through existing mechanisms such as the Office of the KPC Coordinator.

7.2.18 In addition, the development of such an institution should be ongoing with the development of any new defence force. Therefore, whilst the strength and expertise of such a force is being grown under NATO supervision, the OKPCC un-der new civilian leadership would act as an embryo Ministry of Defence. It will oversee the training of the new defence force, in conjunction with COMKFOR and act as the base for capacity building in the Govern-ment for the eventual formation of a stand alone Ministry of Defence (MoD). It is for consideration that, as the capacity build-ing advances, the KPC Coordinator should become a civil servant with Defence Min-istry experience. Furthermore, as the new defence force trained strength reaches Bri-gade + level, the OKPCC could hand over to a newly created Ministry of Defence which by that time could have developed appropriate oversight and policymak-ing competencies. On completion of the building of the MoD the OKPCC should be disbanded.

7.2.19 Authorities and Responsibilities of a new Ministry of Defence should include:

Preparation of a Defence Security Strategy report that will be provided

to the Prime Minister for approval and forwarding to the Assembly Advising, managing, monitoring, and implementing the national defence policy Planning resources necessary for the national defence and submit related proposals through the Prime Minister to the AssemblyMaking assessments of possible threats Establishing procedures for defence force resources to be placed under authority of internal civil authorities as part of national disaster contin-gency response planningAllocating funds for the defence in accordance with the Assembly-ap-proved budget Proposing the organisation and for-mation of the Kosovo Defence ForceControlling the protection of classi-fied informationOrganising and executing defence trainingCreating curricula and programmes for defence trainingOrganising scientific and techno-logical cooperation in the area of de-fence Planning international cooperation in the area of defenceApproving regulations for recruiting and manning Appointing KDF officers to their initial rankRecommending to the Prime Minister senior officers for promotion to higher ranks

KOSOVO SECURITY COUNCILChaired by the Prime Minister

KOSOVO SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT (KSCSEC)SITUATION CENTRE

Joint Security

Committee / JATMunicipal Security

Committees

KPS / KFOR/ICO/

UN Reps

Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers and Assembly

Figure 36: Proposed Security Sector Coordination and Control FrameworkSource: ISSR, September 2006


140 Kosovo Defence Force (KDF)

7.2.20 The future of the Kosovo Protec-tion Corps (KPC) and its linkages to any possible future Army is one of the more sensitive issues within the security sector in Kosovo. ISSR public outreach activities determined that the majority of Kosovo Albanian citizens believe following de-termination of final status that the KPC should be transformed into an army. How-ever, minority populations, particularly Kosovo’s Serbs, believe that direct linkages between the KPC and the KLA preclude any such arrangement.

7.2.21 Should Kosovo be granted inde-pendence it will be entitled, under inter-national law and convention, to a self-de-fence force. It is widely held that, should the international community attempt to deny an independent Kosovo its own de-fence force, the government would take action to create such a force, as would be their right, and most likely this force would be manned by former KLA soldiers.

7.2.22 Such an outcome would actually work against progress that has been made to bring security to Kosovo and peace to the region as a whole. Therefore, planning for a viable and affordable, democratic, ci-vilian controlled military force should be undertaken. It would be to the advantage of the international community, the region, and Kosovo if this force is closely affiliated to the NATO structure within Kosovo. Such an arrangement will also ensure that any

relationships between Kosovo’s civil minis-tries, KFOR, and any future Kosovo defence force would eventually transfer seamlessly to Kosovo’s indigenous structures.

7.2.23 The sequence of events and a possible timeframe for the formation of a KDF and MOD are illustrated in figure 37

7.2.24 The ISSR recommends that theKPC, under its Civil Emergency Response mandate, could provide one source of personnel for the newly formed Kosovo Defence Force (KDF) as part of a down-sizing process.233 Strict selection proce-dures would be used in this process. The KPC’s Civil Emergency Response capabil-ity would then be transferred to the KDF, which henceforth would undertake emer-gency support to the Civil Authorities as an element of their civil defence role. Once the new KDF is established the remain-ing KPC would be disbanded with honour and the remaining personnel would either enter a resettlement training programme prior to retirement.234 The sequencing of the KPC disbandment and the creation of the new KDF is outlined in figure 38

7.2.25 The OKPCC, under the direction of appropriate civilian leadership, would continue to act in a coordination and ad-ministrative role whilst also providing ca-pacity building services to the personnel for the future Ministry of Defence (MOD). It should be considered at this time wheth-er the KIKPC might be merged with the OKPCC, which would then report to the Prime Minister/COMKFOR.

233 Kosovar leaders present at the final ISSR Steering Committee meeting expressed the view that the KPC should be the primary source of recruitment for the KDF, subject to a rigorous vetting process. They suggested that remaining positions could then be filled by recruitment from the general public.

234 The funding of the new KDF could not be initially covered by the Kosovo Consolidated Budget, rather it will need to be funded by the international community, possibly through NATO.

KPC downsizes and emergencyresponse function is absorbed by KDF. KFOR is the institutional home of the KDF.

Year 0 Year 5-8

OKPCC continues advisory and administrative roleand acts as anembryo MOD.

KPC completes handover of role and disbands

OKPCC windsdown Kosovo MOD formed

KDF deploys insupport of NATO operations

Figure 37: Possible Timeframe for Development of Kosovo Defence ForceSource: ISSR, September 2006.


141

7.2.26 KFOR/NATO, building on its al-ready substantial training support, would provide training and oversight/mentor-ing whilst the KDF acts in a support role to KFOR. At a suitable stage OKPCC would downsize and disband and the Ministry of Defence would be formed.

7.2.27 As its development reaches full potential, KDF would be deployed in sup-port of NATO operations. Finally, the KDF would take over the security tasks current-ly performed by KFOR which would down-size and subsequently withdraw. However, a residual NATO training mission will prob-ably still be required for some time after the withdrawal of KFOR troops.

Kosovo Security Service

Background

7.2.28 Kosovo’s provisional governing authorities do not have intelligence struc-tures or capacities. UNMIK does maintain some analytical capability which synthe-sises sensitive information related to is-sues such as organised crime, financial ac-tivities, and terrorism although it does not have its own information collection mech-anisms. However, a tradition of secretive Albanian groups designed to gather and disseminate information does exist. These groups are generally referred to as Albani-

an parallel structures and some are loosely affiliated with Kosovo’s political parties.

7.2.29 During the conflict of 1998-99 the fractured nature of the KLA and the secre-tive disposition of Kosovo’s Albanian par-allel government meant that there were a number of groups collecting “intelligence”. After the international intervention in 1999 a number of Kosovo Albanian politi-cal parties brought together these individ-uals into party-affiliated security organisa-tions. Of these groups the best known are the IHSOP (Institute for Strategic Research of Public Opinion) which exists within a wider framework known as “Homeland Se-curity” and is linked to the LDK, and SHIK (Kosovo Information Service) associated with the PDK. Reports have also suggested that the AAK may also have some form of intelligence wing.235

7.2.30 These organisations provide a number of different services for their po-litical parties and operate within a legal vacuum. While they are involved in provid-ing and gathering intelligence informa-tion, outside the remit of current laws and regulations, it has been alleged that they have, from time to time, collaborated with UNMIK and other international authori-ties.236 Beyond gathering information, it is also believed that the groups are used to enforce political party discipline. These or-

Figure 38: Illustration of Creation of New Kosovo Defence ForceSource: ISSR, September 2006

KosovoProtection

Corps

GeneralPublic

First KosovoDefence ForceTroops Recruited

Recruitment of KPC CivilDefence personnel intoKDF Structures

KDF becomes a fully functional force

KosovoProtectionCorps

Selection of civildefence personnel for transfer

Disbandwithhonour

Resettlementscheme andRetirement

235 Ilir Dugolli and Lulzim Peci, Intelligence Agencies of Kosovo: Dismantling, Osmosis or Integration? Pristina: KIPRED May 2006.

236 Ibid.


142 ganisations also conduct political research and analysis.237

7.2.31 Furthermore there have been re-ports on the activity of the Serbian Secrete Service in Kosovo from the first month af-ter UNMIK took charge of the territory. ICG reports that “a little over a month after the withdrawal of Serb military forces, KFOR expelled six Serbs belonging to Belgrade's intelligence services who were in posses-sion of a quantity of signalling equipment. (…) By the end of September (1999) re-ports of Serbian agents infiltrating Kos-ovo to spy on NATO forces and to provoke renewed violence were becoming wide-spread.”238 Furthermore, the local media have periodically published unsubstanti-ated reports, and Albanian politicians have openly accused the Serbian Secret Service of being the source of terrorist acts in Kos-ovo.239 However, the most direct reference to Serbian Secret Service activities was made in early 2004 by the chief of Serbia's Military Security Agency (VBA, responsible for military intelligence and counterintelli-gence) who publicly “claimed that over the previous year the VBA had re-established its network of agents in Kosovo.”240

7.2.32 All of the above groups have, at times, created an atmosphere of political instability as they have been linked to high profile assassinations and other subversive activities.241 This makes their presence po-tentially destabilising for the long term se-curity of Kosovo.

7.2.33 The possibility of establishing a legislatively mandated security service has already been discussed in the Kosovo As-sembly and the media. This has caused some concern among the Kosovo popu-lation, as many associate the concept of a security service with the authoritarian excesses of Balkan history, and thus have created the fear that the service would be

an instrument of abuse by specific inter-est groups or individuals. There has also been some confusion between a security service, which would deal with internal threats to the rule of law in Kosovo, and an “intelligence” service, which is usually defined as producing information on the policies and activities of foreign countries. Such concerns and misunderstandings contribute to people’s overall lack of trust in governing institutions and also cause concern among Kosovo’s neighbours. However, given the current situation, bringing the concept of security services out into the open for debate and legisla-tive oversight is highly preferential to the current situation.

Framework for a Future Security Service

7.2.34 A study undertaken by SSDAT, on behalf of ISSR, on security services in Ko-sovo concluded that there is widespread support amongst the PISG, political lead-ers, and international advisers that the role of any future service should primarily be to provide threat information to support security policy making and the activities of other agencies such as the police. The emerging consensus is that the new serv-ice should be based in the Prime Minister’s office242 and receive cross-departmental tasking rather than instructions from any single Ministry, thereby making it a more transparent and collaborative institution.

7.2.35 The study also identified a number of areas where information and analysis generated by such an institution would be useful including: organised crime, corrup-tion and anti-constitutional activities. The exact structure, mandate and legal frame-work for a security service would be sub-ject to decisions made on the final status of Kosovo, but whatever final agreement is reached it seems likely that a security serv-ice could provide valuable input to secu-rity policy making by Kosovo’s leaders.

237 ICG (2005) After Haradinaj. Europe Report No 163, 26 May 2005, pp21-23.Brussels & Pristina: ICG.

238 See Washington Post 22 September 1999, as reported by ICG Balkan Report No. 78, Who is killing whom in Kosovo 2 November 1999, p. 8.

239 Kosova Sot (2001) and Bota Sot (2002).240 Collapse in Kosovo, ICG Europe Report No. 155, 22 April 2004, p. 7.

241 As noted earlier in this report, cases of politically-motivated killing are not officially tracked.

242 A Kosovar member of the ISSR Steering Committee expressed the view that the institutional location and the authority lines of the Security Service should be subject to the consensus of Kosovo local institutions.


1437.2.36 In order to be effective and com-bat public misunderstandings and mis-trust, public debate on the formation of a security service should include the follow-ing issues:

Tasking and Government oversight. The security service should deal with the priority threats to Kosovo as iden-tified in the ISSR and subsequently by local democratic processes. Structures should be created to task the security service based on cross-departmental security concerns, and the service should produce reporting which di-rectly contributes to security policy making and to the operations of the police and other security agencies.

Parliamentary oversight. Members of Kosovo’s Assembly should be able to examine and make recommenda-tions on the policies, resourcing, and tasking of the security service, with-out gaining access to sensitive op-erational issues. A sub-committee on intelligence would be the most effec-tive way of addressing this need.

Legislation and legal oversight. In-ternational human rights instruments, including the European Convention on Human Rights, balance the right of the state to security with the right of the individual to privacy should be consulted by Kosovo’s leaders as they consider their own legislative needs. Issues that need to be addressed in any legislation include definition of individual’s privacy and the rights of the institution to conduct surveil-lance or telephone surveillance. Judi-cial oversight should also be an ele-ment of the process to review and ap-prove proposals for intrusive activity and/or to review operations to check that they were legal and properly authorised.

Financial oversight. In concert with other government institutions, the security service should be subject to budgetary and audit controls.

Complaints Commissioner. Consi-deration should be given to the crea-

tion of a Complaints Commissioner, often a member of the judiciary, who can investigate claims from individu-als who believe that they have been unjustifiably investigated by the security service.

Security assessments. It is essential that decision makers receive the best possible analysis based on security reporting, information from other Go-vernments departments and agen-cies, and open-source information. This could be achieved by having each agency contribute “competing” assessments; other systems prepare all-source joint assessments which are agreed by a high-level coordi-nating council, such as the Kosovo Security Council (KSC) mechanism re-commended in other parts of the ISSR report.

Political independence. Security of-ficers should respond to appropriate direction from Ministers and senior officials, but should not become polit-ically-biased or intervene in party po-litical issues. Career security officers should not change with the political leadership. This helps to achieve po-litical independence and contributes to institutional continuity.

Cooperation with foreign agen-

cies. A new security agency would benefit from the ability to cooperate with foreign agencies in order to re-ceive training and support, and to ex-change information on trans-national threats. Such cooperation could be crucial to the rapid establishment of a competent service. However it will be essential to ensure that the priorities of the service are not unduly influ-enced by such cooperation and that the service focuses on the threats that are of most concern to the people of Kosovo.

Kosovo Assembly Oversight

Responsibilities

7.2.37 The Assembly takes part in the Kosovo security structure by executing such functions as:


144 Ratifying international treaties.Establishing mechanisms for adopt-ing national legislation on purposes, functions, size, structure, and limita-tions of the Kosovo Defence Force (KDF) and other components of the security organisations.243

Establishing mechanisms to regulate the use of the KDF abroad as well as regulation of access of foreign secu-rity institutions onto the national ter-ritory.Drafting legislation protecting hu-man, economic, and social rights of servicemen, their family members, and defence force retirees.

7.2.38 The security planning structure must also guarantee the supremacy of the democratic political and civilian control.

7.2.39 The Assembly should create se-lect committees to deal with each com-ponent of the security sector, such as an Assembly Committee on Security, and others on security services or the defence.Examples may include a Committee of the Defence Force Budget244, or a specific com-mittee to consider the Kosovo Security Policy proposed by the Prime Minister. The Assembly should establish rules for the conduct of such select committees. These committees should have the powers to hold inquiries and regular hearings, ratify budgets, procurement decisions, and in-ternational treaties; and to conduct these activities in the public arena. Committees within the Assembly are proportionally represented from the all parliamentary po-litical parties including representatives of the minority communities. The Kosovo security law should ensure that balanced representation continues in the security related committees. However, the tem-poral demands of security requirements dictate additional provisions for the se-curity-related committees that guarantee

continued effectiveness in the event of a boycott by some members.245

7.2.40 Committees should have their rights and powers clearly defined, such as the power to select and appoint chairper-sons, examine and report on security poli-cy initiatives, conduct inquiries and public hearings, have access to classified informa-tion, examine budget estimates, consider draft legislation and international treaties, and the power to summon any govern-ment official and question them under oath. The Assembly should also be able to create ad hoc inquiry committees to deal with unexpected incidents.

7.2.41 Key provisions in a Kosovo secu-rity law should prescribe the mechanisms supporting legislative approval of defence expenditures based on due regard to Ko-sovo’s security requirements, and provide for transparency and public access to de-fence information. For example, defence budget approval must be followed up by accountability. A Kosovo security law should establish regular reporting require-ments to the Assembly by the respective ministries and organisations describing how defence allocations previously ap-proved have actually been spent by the receiving organisations. There should also be a prohibition on the re-allocation of funds provided by the Assembly to other purposes, thus protecting money the As-sembly has earmarked for security from being diverted to other requirements without the Assembly’s consent.246 De-fence budget information should be as publicly available as possible to ensure transparency.

7.2.42 The Assembly should ensure that the Kosovo Security Act severely restricts the use of the KDF from an internal security role. The Prime Minister should be respon-sible for announcing a state of emergency,

243 For more information regarding the proposed KDF, please see the relevant section of this report.

244 The PISG’s current practice is for all institutions to present their budgetary needs to the Committee on Economy. The Assembly could continue this practice if desired, or create a subcommittee specialising on defence budget issues.

245 For example, the ICG Report No. 174 “An Army For Kosovo?” suggests that the “international oversight mission to be established upon final status could second an official to fill any empty chair and represent the interest of the missing party” as a method to overcome boycott tactics on the National Security Council, page 35.

246 This basic principle of fiscal accountability is embodied in US law under Title 31 United States Code, Section 1301(a) which provides that appropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made except otherwise provided by law.


145and initiating the mobilisation of appropri-ate response forces. The Assembly should be required to ratify these actions, thus ensuring its participation in any decision to assign the KDF to internal security mis-sions and that the decision is arrived at in conformity with constitutional procedures. The Assembly may also establish commit-tees and other mechanisms to ensure that the KDF and other security services are not improperly used to restrict the lawful exer-cise of human and civil rights by persons or groups, and to prevent security organi-sations from being used against Kosovo citizens based on their national, religious, cultural, linguistic, or ethnic identity.

7.2.43 The Assembly should have the power to approve the appointment of senior security sector leaders nominated by the President or Prime Minister. The ap-pointment of senior general officers, com-manders, and agency directors should also be subject to the approval of the relevant Assembly committee. Legislation should establish a clear framework outlining the process for appointing senior officials. The Assembly should be required to ap-prove the appointments of senior mili-tary commanders after nomination by the President or Prime Minister. The relevant Assembly committees must play a role de-termining such details as the structure and size of the KDF, the distribution of person-nel positions and establishing appropriate salaries.

7.2.44 The Assembly should be required to ratify the decision for the KDF to partici-pate in international rescue and humani-tarian operations, as well as in exercises and manoeuvres outside of Kosovo. The Assembly should also establish procedures that allow for the efficient deployment of active-duty KDF personnel and voluntary reservists abroad in peacetime, and make these rules compatible with NATO and EU requirements. For example, there should be methods established to facilitate deci-sion making by the Kosovo government, without the need to seek Assembly ap-proval in every instance. These ‘blanket approval’ laws must define the conditions for KDF deployment outside of Kosovo in situations when the Assembly cannot be convened and approval can be granted

by the KSC or Prime Minister. Additional blanket laws should provide for the pos-sibility of the use of national airspace by allied countries and allow for the transit or stationing of foreign armed forces. The As-sembly should also have a role in the deci-sion to seek support from NATO or the EU during emergency situations, as well as for reinforcement of national defence capa-bilities during peacetime. The Assembly must also be prepared to make legislative changes in response to additional require-ments that may arise from future inter-national agreements entered into by the Government of Kosovo.

Executive Branch Reporting

Requirements

7.2.45 In order to effectively exercise control and oversight of the security archi-tecture, the Assembly should require that the various organisations provide informa-tion on a regular basis to the Assembly. These reports will provide the foundation for Assembly decisions on matters such as budgeting.

7.2.46 In addition, the Assembly should require that an annual Kosovo Security Policy be prepared by the Prime Minister on an annual basis. The Kosovo Security Policy shall determine specific national defence measures, priorities and neces-sary resources, as well as the necessary readiness and activities of the institutions implementing Government authority and administration. The Kosovo Security Policy should be elaborated in co-operation with other ministries; approved by the Prime Minister, and presented to the Assembly for approval and use in budgeting deci-sions.

7.2.47 An annual Kosovo Security Policy would be created on the basis of a threat analysis provided in the Security Strategy reports prepared by the respective minis-tries and approved by the Prime Minister. The threat analysis then helps determine the basic strategic principles, priorities and measures that must be executed by the government of Kosovo during a crisis. These reports should be also provided to the relevant Assembly committees. Finally, the Assembly should provide for assign-ment to these committees qualified ex-


146 perts as staff to advise and assist Assembly members responsible for security policy oversight and budgeting.

New Executive Authorities

Changes in Status and assumption of se-curity responsibilities by the Government of Kosovo may also require changes to ex-isting executive authorities.

7.2.48 Authorities of the President

The President shall:

perform the duties of the Command-er-in-Chief appoint KDF officers to positions of general; promote and discharge gen-eral officers (subject to Assembly ap-proval)appoint and dismiss Kosovo’s military representatives in foreign countriesrepresent Kosovo at international and regional meetings on security and de-fence decorate KDF and security service of-ficers with medals of honour, excep-tional bravery and other special serv-ices

7.2.49 Authorities of the Prime Minister

The Prime Minister shall:

Nominate senior security officials and general officers for key posts.Advise and create overall security poli-cies which address identified threats.Submit an annual report regarding a Kosovo Security Policy to the Assem-bly that shall then serve as the foun-dation for budget decisions on secu-rityPropose measures that needs to be undertaken to counter potential threats Coordinate activities of ministers in the field of security

Approve Security Strategy reports from the respective ministries on their areas of competence, and use these reports to prepare the Kosovo Security Policy Chair the Kosovo Security Council Appoint the commander of the Kos-ovo Defence Force, subject to Assem-bly approval247

Recommend senior leaders in the security organisations, subject to As-sembly approval Have the authority to declare a state of emergency when set conditions applyExercise authority to mobilise the Kos-ovo Defence Force and the reserve248

Approve documents for use of the Ko-sovo Defence Force and orders their deploymentEnsure the preparation and imple-mentation of plans for national de-fence and mobilisation

7.2.50 Authorities of Other Ministries

In Relationship to Security Policy the Min-istry of Internal Affairs (MoIA)249 shall:

Prepare an Internal Security Strategy report that will be provided to the Prime Minister for approval, and that will be forwarded to the Assembly Facilitate preparation of and imple-ment legislation in the field of public order and safetyImplement the internal security poli-cyBe responsible for the implementa-tion of integrated border manage-ment and coordination between the police and other public authorities involved in border controlProtect public order and safety Organise and accomplish exercising activities of the security agencies of the Government in the area of disas-ter planning via the Department of Emergency Management (DEM)

247 This duty may be assigned to the President under the new Constitution. Interview with member of working group drafting proposed new Constitution. 1 August 2006.

248 This might be assigned to the Assembly under the new Constitution, but with the PM capable of initiating the action. Ibid.

249 The MoIA already possesses most of these authorities, but as a relatively new ministry it will be required to adjust to the new security architecture and continue to build its competencies.


147Register natural persons, and control the lawful residence of persons Implement the applicable law on the movement of persons into and out of Kosovo and consider applications for refugee status in accordance with the applicable law Cooperate, with external services, agencies and international organisa-tions which have responsibilities in the field of public order and safetyPerform functions in disciplinary pro-ceedings against police officers, in conformity with the applicable law and the Senior Police Appointments and Discipline Committee (SPADC)In coordination with the situation centre and other security institutions establish clear lines of authority and standard operating procedures for implementation during an internal crisis or disaster responseEstablish procedures for the Kosovo Police Service to secure the site and control access for national and lo-cal responders as part of disaster re-sponse contingency planning

7.2.51 Other PISG Ministries

The ministries and other Government or-gans and administrative organisations (such as the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finance and Economy, or the Ministry of Health) accomplish the following activities in accordance with their respective com-petencies:

Monitor, direct, supervise and take measures for security preparationsCreate contingency crisis plans.Be prepared to present public infor-mation related to a crisis in their area of responsibility.

Finally, in the event of changes in Kosovo’s status, it may be necessary to create a Min-istry of Foreign Affairs with a broad outline of responsibilities that might include:

Prepare a strategy for external affairs that will be provided to the Prime Minister for approval, and that will be forwarded to the Assembly Implement the national policy of ex-ternal security

Negotiate entering into international agreements in the field of security subject to Assembly approvalEstablish diplomatic relationships and international policies regarding foreign states.

Section 7.3: Legal Framework

7.3.1 A Kosovo Security Act should be the legal starting point for any new secu-rity architecture. The overall purpose of a Kosovo security law should be to provide a comprehensive programme for security and to facilitate the establishment of in-tegrated policies and procedures for the ministries, agencies, and functions of the Kosovo Government relating to security. Such a law should also establish democratic political control of defence and internal se-curity forces, as well as of security services and police. The integration of security or-ganisations into civil society is an indispen-sable element of security and stability, par-ticularly for a post-communist, post-conflict society like Kosovo. The law will accomplish this by methods such as ensuring that secu-rity expenditures are provided transparency through legislative approval, ensuring that defence forces are politically neutral, and that security institutions are accountable to or controlled by constitutionally established authorities.

7.3.2 A Kosovo security law should follow the statement of purpose by defining the in-stitutions that constitute the state’s security structure. The law should also describe the competencies of those institutions respon-sible for Kosovo’s security architecture and the principles and procedures of coordina-tion, implementation and control of their activities.

7.3.3 The Kosovo security law should describe the competency for deploying se-curity forces in defence of national territory or within the framework of regional security organisations. It should distinguish between decisions made during normal situations and decisions made under crisis situations. For example, in the event of a natural disas-ter, the law should provide for clear lines of authority that facilitate interagency cooper-ation and ensure the efficient implementa-tion of civil protection contingency plans.


148 7.3.4 The basic principles that should be embodied in a Kosovo security law include:

Clear division between civil and defence authoritiesPresident is commander in chief The Kosovo Security Council, led by the Prime Minister, makes all crucial security decisionsThe Assembly ratifies all crucial se-curity decisions, with provisions for blanket approval under exceptional circumstances A civilian leads the Ministry of Defence Security and defence forces are po-litically neutral and limited to profes-sional rolesBalanced political and multi-ethnic participation is ensured in the security decision making process, with proce-dures established to ensure continued effectiveness in the event of potential boycotts by some members

Other Implementing Legislation

7.3.5 As Kosovo considers its new se-curity institutions and appropriate legal instruments to define the security archi-tecture there are two issues that may be considered generally:

1. Concept of legal security and safety

In view of the vulnerability of all mod-ern societies to new and increasingly dangerous forms of criminal interfer-ence, it is recommended to introduce a constitutional principle of security and safety, whereby the concept of security has to do with the prevention of intentional threats, and the con-cept of safety deals with the preven-tion of non-intentional dangers.

2. Human Rights Instruments

The provisions of the European Con-vention for the Protection of Human Rights (ECHR) and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950 (as amended by Protocol No. 11 and the governing practice of the European Court of Human Rights) and the In-ternational Covenant on Civil and Po-litical Rights (of 16 December 1966) should guide the legal considerations of Kosovo’s authorities in the security realm.

7.3.6 In addition legislation will be nec-essary to provide more detailed require-ments in the security architecture. Exam-ples include:

1. A Service Act for the Kosovo De-

fence Force that:

Regulates personnel promotion, KDF education policies, and length of service obligationsEstablishes a code of justice and an oath of allegiance250

Allows for the exercise of an individu-al serviceman’s civil rights Ensures that the defence forces are politically neutral (servicemen may vote or be members of a party, but have significant restrictions placed on their political activities)251

Prohibits political parties and political movements from the KDFProhibits active duty servicemen from holding Assembly positionsPlaces strong restrictions on the role of the KDF in internal security tasks provides for the exercise of limited internal security tasks, such as cere-monial duties, transportation of state officials, and defines their authority to guard KDF installations and property inside Kosovo

250 The current KPC Disciplinary Code (introduced in December 2005) should form the basis for a new KDF code of justice, but it would have to be reviewed to ensure that it fully complies with the EU Convention on Human Rights. For example, the current code lacks certain guarantees to provide legal representation to KPC members charged with its violations. Interview with KPCC legal advisor; 31 July 2006. The Assembly should also consider the whether to establish a court martial system as part of a code of defence force justice, rather than deferring KDF offences to the civil courts.

251 The European Union Parliamentary Assembly issued Recommendation 1742 (2006) declaring that members of the armed forces are “citizens in uniform who must enjoy the same fundamental liberties, including those set out in the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Social Charter, and the same protection of their rights and dignity as any other citizen, within the limits imposed by the specific exigencies of military duties”. Specifically, the recommendation is made in paragraph 9.3 to remove existing restrictions on the electoral rights of members of the armed forces. ICG Report No. 174, “An Army for Kosovo?” page 18, reminds that the KPC is still learning to be apolitical. Given these circumstances, significant restrictions should be imposed on political activities within the KDF.


149Provides clear and simple legislation banning paramilitary formations Establishes clear limits to the domes-tic police authority of the KDF during crisis periods, and defines the severe-ly limited authority that can be exer-cised in peacetime Ensures international humanitarian law is incorporated in military train-ing programmes and regulationsDescribes the legal and administra-tive procedures to protect the rights of service personnel, to include pro-viding for adequate pay, benefits, and pensions

This act, or a separate one, may also de-scribe procedures for the creation of a KDF and the demobilisation of the KPC, and provide procedures for vetting recruit-ment from the general public and the KPC into the KDF (under NATO supervision) as well as how to honourably resettle those KPC members not selected (to include pensions and transitional skill training) to serve in the KDF.

2. A law addressing the proper use of a reserve (should a reserve force be deemed necessary and formed) should be considered.

3. Preparation of a Security Services Act in support of security institutions and domestic police activities.

4. Establishment of a law on classifying certain sensitive information, in a manner consistent with the require-ments of regional security organisa-tions such as NATO. The Classified Information Act should follow NATO and EU standards regulating the handling of classified information. A Classified Information Act should har-monize relevant laws with the EU and NATO acquis. NATO in particular has precise regulations that must be ap-plied in legal order and in practice by all the members when handling clas-sified information. Assembly mem-bers must have access to classified information as appropriate.

5. The Assembly should review legal provisions for citizen access to official documents. Currently provisions are contained in an Administrative Direc-tion regarding public access to official documents, but consideration to pre-pare a Freedom of Information Act to provide procedures for citizens of Ko-sovo and set guidelines for identifica-tion and management of documents considered sensitive is required.

6. Preparation of a Defence Procurement Act providing a detailed procedure for ensuring allocated defence fund-ing is properly spent.

7. Legislation should be written to fa-cilitate Kosovo security officials con-sulting security experts from outside of the Government that can assist in subject areas where there is a lack of official expertise and experience.

Section 7.4: Recommendations

7.4.1 Ministry of Defence and

Kosovo Defence Force

A KDF should, in the event of Kosovo gaining independence, be formed under the initial guidance of the OKPCC and COMKFOR. Once the KDF has reached an operational strength commensurate to its role and budget affordability, the KPC should be dis-banded with honour. The KDF would continue to provide the civil emer-gency response and ceremonial roles presently provided by the KPC.

Recruitment to the KDF should be from the general population and re-flect the ethnic mix of that popula-tion. In addition, members of the KPC can apply to join the KDF. Recruitment should be overseen by the interna-tional community.252

The KPCC Office and KIKPC should merge. This new office would be the prototype of the eventual Kosovo

252 Kosovar leaders present at the final ISSR Steering Committee meeting expressed the view that the KPC should be the primary source of recruitment for the KDF, subject to a rigorous vetting process. They suggested that remaining positions could then be filled by recruitment from the general public. Furthermore, Commander KPC noted that an internal regulation on selecton criteria for new KPC members is under development.


150 Ministry of Defence. In due course, the post of KPCC should pass to an international civil servant with De-fence Ministry experience. The KFOR role should be extended to provide military training and capacity devel-opment during this transition phase.

7.4.2 Security Services

Kosovo needs a Security Service to provide support to internal informa-tion and security needs in the terri-tory.

Given the sensitivities surrounding the concept of a security service in Kosovo, as well as the existence of Al-banian parallel institutions and the at-mosphere of insecurity they create, a programme of public outreach could serve to reduce misunderstandings and clarify that the proposal is for a Security Service rather than an Intelli-gence Service. ISSR’s public outreach has been successful in expanding the public debate on security issues gen-erally, and open discussion on the topic of a security service would lay the groundwork for the eventual im-portant decisions on structure, man-date, oversight and legislation.

Any newly established institution will require training and capacity building for its staff. Although foreign agen-cies will likely be willing to provide some operational training on a bilat-eral basis, it will also be important to ensure that officers receive training in

management questions such as: in-ternal and external authorisation for operations; record-keeping; financial management; security and human rights legislation; vetting and recruit-ment criteria; and personnel manage-ment.

It is important for the members of the service to undergo screening and vetting processes in order to ensure officers can work effectively with bi-lateral and multilateral partners. It is essential that a security vetting sys-tem is established that meets NATO standards.

Any information gathering and analy-sis institution should have a presence and clear coordination mechanisms within the Situation Centre and KSC Secretariat once they are established.

Some members of parallel structures may be permitted to join the new security institution after a clear and transparent vetting process that in-corporates competence criteria.

The OSCE has some activities under-way or planned to increase aware-ness of security issues. Given the importance of expanding awareness regarding these issues to ensure transparency in their creation, it is recommended that the OSCE and In-ternational partners expand and ac-celerate plans for increasing security awareness, in particular the role of a security service in a democracy.


151

CHAPTER VIII

ISSR Security Sector

Development Proposals

ISSR Security Sector Development Proposals

154


8.1.1 Stage 8 of the ISSR process in-volves development of Security Sector Implementation plans and costings. Given the unclear status of Kosovo and the unique division of security sector responsibilities under UNSCR 1244, the ISSR Secretariat determined that many of the issues to be addressed in Stage 8 of the programme could not be considered while the future of Kosovo’s security sector was unclear. In addition, the ISSR Secretariat found that, because of the lack of a clear definition of who would be responsible for the security sector post-UNSCR 1244 or, for that matter, the status of Kosovo post 2006, it was im-possible to make definitive recommenda-tions for security sector development or to accurately cost them. Therefore, the ISSR proposes that a decision is taken by the current ISSR Steering Committee that as part of the follow-on ISSR project to begin in 2007, a comprehensive Security Sector Development Programme is constructed in consultation with the Government of Kosovo.

8.1.2 The ISSR process has identified a range of threats, public perceptions of the security sector, and gaps in the current se-curity architecture of Kosovo. On this basis, the ISSR team identified four groupings of projects:

1. Projects dealing with changes of ex-isting legislation or adapting existing institutional structures. This stream of projects does not imply major cost implications and may be imple-mented following existing PISG and Kosovo Assembly procedures;

2. A stream of projects dealing with the establishment of new Ministries and structures, such as the Minis-try of Defence and Kosovo Security Council, which may benefit from the experience UNMIK and PISG have ac-cumulated particularly regarding the foundation of the Ministry of Internal

Affairs and the Ministry of Justice. The establishment process of such insti-tutions should follow the experience in place, and the costing might be deducted from the above new minis-tries;

3. A group of projects dealing with the establishment of new institutions mostly related to the framing of the new security architecture post-sta-tus, such as the Security Service and Kosovo Defence Force. In ISSR’s view, the development of these institutions would benefit from the bilateral do-nor assistance to the future Govern-ment of Kosovo. ISSR recommends that expertise should be brought in to work with the Government on the design of a development process, le-gal framework, and the implied cost-ing;

4. A number of other proposals mainly evolving around capacity building of existing and future institutions. It is proposed that the fourth group of projects is addressed through donor funding by the ISSR Implementa-tion team in the post ISSR phase of the project. The main themes and cost estimates for the fourth group of project examples follow in Section 8.2.

8.1.3 In order to assist the Government of Kosovo with prioritisation and imple-mentation of proposed projects is recom-mended that an implementation body be formed with a Steering Committee di-recting its activities, chaired by the Prime Minister and including all the key security related Government of Kosovo Ministers. It is essential that the new Steering Com-mittee is led by the Kosovo Government, as local ownership of the implementation process is vital. This Committee could also include as observers representatives from the international community as well as the principal donors to a trust fund set up to coordinate and support projects in the

CHAPTER VIII

Issr Security Sector Development Proposals

There is still much to be done before

the countries of the region can realise their ambition of integration into the EU and NATO. Local owner-ship is key in this respect, as the necessary decisions towards this end can only be taken by the countries themselves.

Source: NATO Press

Release (2003)089- EU and

NATO agree concerted ap-

proach for the Western Balkans.

Brussels: NATO, 29 July 2003

Security for me means that po-

lice functions well, that there is no corruption and that there are more work-ing places. If these three conditions are in place, we would have a much better Kosovo.

Kosovo Albanian woman,

Mitrovice/a


155security sector. The Steering Committee will identify the key priorities and the se-quencing of the ISSR implementation plan. The steering committee will also have the authority to approve new projects not in-cluded in this plan if donors approve and it serves to support the implementation of the ISSR report.

8.1.4 The proposed project ideas could be implemented by a range of different agencies but all activities are uniformly part of the ISSR security sector develop-ment plan and thus linked directly to iden-tify security threats in Kosovo and priorities outlined in the ISSR report. In some cases ISSR has recommended activities that may coordinate well with ongoing donor-funded projects or ongoing international organization activities. In addition to the

projects outlined here, a matrix listing all of ISSR key recommendations, current donor support, and recommended future donor activities can be found at Annex IX. It is important to note that these proposed projects should not be seen as stand alone projects but rather a coordinated series of activities linked to other security sector initiatives which together will assist the development of the security sector in Ko-

sovo and in turn assist the evolution of a security strategy.

8.1.5 All projects outlined in the im-plementation plan match the OECD DAC criteria for Official Development Assist-ance (ODA) unless stated.253 The princi-pal OECD ODA categories included in this chapter refer to Management of Security Expenditure, enhancing civil society’s role in the security system, and security system reform to improve democratic governance and civilian control. The principal areas which are excluded from ODA and would therefore be excluded from this process are that of direct military assistance, and military training, such as the KPC Redun-dancy/Pension Trust Fund mentioned in section 8.3 of this chapter.254

Section 8.2: Capacity Building

Projects By Theme

8.2.1 Oversight

The construction of a democratically con-trolled and monitored security sector is essential. In order to build the foundation for this type of oversight, it is necessary to provide capacity building for formal and

UNSCResolution

StatusDay

TransitionPeriod

ICO and Kosovo structures take UNMIK Mandate

Local Structures takefull security mandate

KFORDownsizes

ICOMandate Review

KFOR andICO disband

Start the process of dialog with key actors

Drafting of laws on dataprotection,police, national security etc (ongoing)

Establishment ofKosovo Security Council(shadow)

NewConstitution

BudgetaryReviews

Launch the New ISSR Steering Committee

Publish SSDP with full costing

Trust fund provides assistance to the development ofSSDP

Figure 39: Development of SSDP Against Political Events

253 See the OECD Policy Directive “Conflict Prevention and Peace Building- What Counts as ODA” Paris: OECD , 3 March 2005.254 “Statistical Reporting Directives Addendum to DCD/DAC (2000)” Paris: OECD:10 April 2005


156

informal oversight actors to strengthen them to be able to implement the prin-cipal of democratic civilian control of the security sector. This will also allow for the development of strategic security thinking in Kosovo over the next few years and al-low for a greater protection of the sector against politicisation.

Training for Kosovo Assembly

Committees and Municipal Safety

Councils

The current Assembly Security Committee, formerly the Committee for Preparedness and Emergency, (as well as other new As-sembly subcommittees recommended by ISSR) will be required to widen existing as well as create new mandates to cover se-curity issues. As such, capacity will need to be increased in terms of both understand-ing of the role of parliamentarians in over-seeing the security sector, developing a ca-pacity to respond to government security policy, and awareness of the different roles of the security agencies and their needs. A key element will be fiscal oversight train-ing. Given changes in the overall security architecture, Municipal Safety Councils will also require training to familiarize

them with new structures and processes. The activities would include the support of specialist courses exploring the role of parliamentary committees in carrying out oversight activities. Ongoing training for Kosovo’s Municipal Safety Councils could be enhanced to include training regarding Kosovo’s new security architecture, new legal frameworks for institutions, and in-formation flow issues.

Media Relations Capacity training

for Government Press Officers

Public Affairs spokespersons in security-relevant ministries are required to provide the public and media with information on a day to day basis. Planning and coordi-nation of statements and facts is currently done by individual ministries or some-times directly with the Office of the Prime Minister. Currently, PISG ministries have limited professional capacity in terms of media management and crisis response as many of these functions are currently led by the international community, particu-larly in the security sector. A number of donors are already providing media train-ing in Kosovo, but directing some effort towards training for spokespersons, cri-

EU action on SSR should be based on the following principles…

nationally/regionally owned participatory reform processes designed to strengthen good governance, democratic norms, the rule of law and the re-spect and promotion of human rights, in line with internationally agreed norms;addressing the core requirements of a well functioning security system, includ-ing the development of a nationally owned concept of security, well-defined policies and good governance of security institutions;addressing diverse security challenges facing States and their populations, based on a gender-sensitive multi-sector approach to the provision of secu-rity and access to justice, and targeting reform needs in different key sectors. This includes separating tasks between different services and institutions and taking into account the ole of civil society and other non-state structures of governance;accountability and transparency standards should be the same that apply across the public sector, in particular improved governance through greater civilian and parliamentary oversight of security processes;political dialogue with each partner country, addressing human rights, develop-ment and security concerns, and be carried out in synergy with other instruments.

Source: Press Release: 2736th Council Meeting General Affaires and External Relations. Luxemburg: 12 June 2006 (9946/06). Brussels: Council of the European Union


157sis response, and on the job support and advisement from short-term consulting experts regarding management of public affairs, strategy, and day to day manage-ment would be helpful to building capac-ity in this area.

Enhancing Capacity of Non-Gov-

ernmental Actors in the Security

Sector

The development of an informed and professional non-governmental oversight sector in Kosovo will enhance policy de-bate in the sector. With one or two notable exceptions there are relatively few journal-ists, academics, or NGOs which have a sig-nificant expertise in security policy. Devel-opment of technical expertise in foreign policy, international relations, and security policy is required in order to ensure that Kosovo’s civil society can effectively en-gage in security sector policy discussions. In addition, development of this non-gov-ernmental sector will provide independ-ent chains of accountability for the entire security sector and also creates a potential recruitment pool from which the security sector can draw both independent advice and personnel. For this to happen it is vi-tal that members of the civil society gain some expertise in the field and are encour-aged to work with government officials in the sector wherever possible. Examples of targeted activities in this area include:

Enhancement and encouragement of political science studies at University of Prishtinë/Priština and other Kosovo institutions to teach security studies modules in undergraduate and grad-uate training programmes. Development of standard university curricula related to international re-lations, trade, and conflict resolution based on best practice from Europe-an and North American institutions.Professional exchange of scholars with international policy NGOs in Eu-rope and North America. Short courses for journalists regard-ing security issues taught by inter-national experts in coordination with

university professors from the Balkan region hosted by the University of Prishtinë/Priština.

Public Education on the Role of a

Security Service

To address public unease regarding the construction of a security service for Kos-ovo the international community and the Government of Kosovo should expand and accelerate plans for increasing secu-rity awareness among the general public to include the role of a security service in a democracy. Activities might include: seminars and study visits for parliamentar-ians, officials, NGOs and the media; expert briefings to journalists; and a public infor-mation campaign.

Rough Estimated Cost of the Above Clus-ter of Activities: $1,500,000255

8.2.2 Legislation

The ISSR, with input from international or-ganizations such as the OSCE, has identi-fied a number of laws in the area of secu-rity which either do not currently exist or require updating. Without these essential elements of Kosovo’s legal framework, the security sector in Kosovo will not function properly. Dependent on the outcome of Final Status negotiations, the shape of Ko-sovo’s new security sector may take differ-ent forms. However, legal frames for new institutions in the sector, as well as new competencies to be taken up by Kosovo’s government will be required regardless of the outcome of Status – and a prioritiza-tion of the following list should be consid-ered as the shape of Kosovo’s security sec-tor becomes more clear.

Kosovo Security ActKosovo Police Service ActKosovo Security Service ActKosovo Service Act for the Kosovo Defence Force (and potentially separate acts on defence procurement and use of re-serve forces)Kosovo Defence Force/Kosovo Pro-tection Corps Disciplinary Code

255 These rough cost estimates are based on UNDP program cost models, but it should be noted that a full scoping or needs assessment needs to be completed to derive firm costs for projects.


158 Law on Data/Information ProtectionLaw on Data/Information Classifica-tionFreedom of Information Act/Citizen Access to Public DocumentsLaw on Parliamentary Oversight Law on Small Arms and Light Weap-onsLaw on Private Security Companies

Rough Estimated Cost of the Above Cluster of Activities: Cost is difficult to estimate as some of the laws above can be considered through existing donor programmes and PISG structures. Support from interna-tional experts in the crafting of above laws would constitute the bulk of any addition-al cost. $500,000256

8.2.3 Government Coordination and

Policy Formulation

To assist in the building of capacity of policy officials in the different PISG insti-tutions within the Kosovo Security Sector, including the nascent Situation Centre and Communities Security Council, to en-courage coordinated governmental ap-proaches and strategic thinking to secu-rity policy. A series of training workshops should be coordinated with the current courses being organised through such institutions as King’s College, London, Cranfield University, The Marshall Centre for Security Studies and the Geneva Cen-tre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). Further, assistance needs to be provided through the provision of consultants who can work alongside new security institutions especially with regard to helping develop coordination mechanisms between ministries and with the Situation Centre in the Office of the Prime Minister, financial spending con-trols, sustainable security development strategies, and developing an overall se-curity framework.

Rough Estimated Cost of the Above Cluster of Activities: $500,000257

8.2.4 Regional Cooperation and

Coordination

Regional Coordination and

Cooperation

To facilitate the entry of Kosovo into region-al and international security arrangements through the promotion of bilateral rela-tions between security sector members in Kosovo and their peers in other countries, particularly in the area of common region-al threats. A series of regional workshops on regional threats such as organised crime, human smuggling, or drug traffick-ing could be created building on existing efforts and directed at existing institutions such as the KPS and MoIA. Furthermore, issues such as regional disaster response and cooperation might also be considered for regional formats. Dependent on the outcome of Final Status negotiations the efforts could be expanded to incorporate Kosovo’s new security institutions. Kosovo might also play host to ongoing regional events sponsored by international organi-zations such as the Stability Pact or SECI.

Rough Estimated Cost of the Above Cluster of Activities: $500,000258

Section 8.3: Modalities of

implementation

8.3.1 There are two functional issues which the ISSR team determined should be con-sidered as part of the modalities related to establishing the security sector in Kosovo, establishment of an ISSR implementation body and consideration of a KPC Retire-ment and Redundancy Trust Fund. Both are considered in this section.

256 These rough cost estimates are based on UNDP program cost models, but it should be noted that a full scoping or needs assessment is reqired to derrive firm costs for projects.

257 Ibid.

258 These rough cost estimates are based on UNDP program cost models, but it should be noted that a full scoping or needs assessment needs to be completed to derrive firm costs for projects.


159ISSR Implementation Body

8.3.2 Following the determination of final status the Government of Kosovo will face a number of choices regarding the estab-lishment and funding of Kosovo’s security sector. In addition, donor support both on bi-lateral and multi-lateral levels will likely be offered to support the development of the new sector. If required an internation-al coordination body could provide sup-port for implementation of projects in the sector and also provide a mechanism for management of multiple projects funded by multiple donors.259

8.3.3 The process of setting up a new se-curity architecture is complex. In support of Kosovo’s government and its nascent in-stitutions a temporary coordinating body in the form of an Implementation Secre-tariat could be established as a focal point designed to drive the process forward as well as liaise with the significant number of different donors who will engage in SSR related activities. The unit should have expertise within it both in terms of the situation within Kosovo but also of man-aging and implementing development programmes. The unit will administer the creation of a new Trust Fund designed to directly fund the implementation of the ISSR findings.

Organisation

8.3.4 The proposed organisational structure of the new coordinating body would be a Steering Committee, which will provide top level direction to the process, and an Imple-menting Secretariat. Steering Committee decisions will be followed on by the Secre-tariat. Where specific funding is required to proceed with particular work streams, the Secretariat may request a disbursement from the Trust Fund. The Trust Fund would be able to disburse funding either directly to the Secretariat or to outside implement-ers selected to execute select activities.

8.3.5 The Trust Fund would be adminis-tered by the Implementation Secretariat and the Implementation Steering Commit-tee would approve the allocation of grants. Given the high levels of donor funding that are likely and the multiple-donor nature of projects, it is recommended that the Trust Fund sit with an international administra-tive entity known and trusted by donors, such as UNDP Kosovo. This is in keeping with international best practice as UNDP has previous experience managing SSR trust funds.260

Implementation Steering Committee.The Steering Committee should be a Kosovo-led institution responsible for taking key decisions and guidance on the implementation.

Implementation Secretariat. The Im-plementation Secretariat would assist the Steering Committee in its work, monitor the day to day progress of programs.

Trust Fund. The Implementation Trust Fund will be established to act as a depository for donor funding. The Trust Fund should be controlled by an appropriate international administra-tion body and disbursements will be determined by the Implementation Steering Committee.

8.3.6 In keeping with best management practices the Secretariat should produce quarterly and annual reports recording its key business in addition to donor specific activity reports as required. The Secretariat would also have a public information func-tions including disseminating information about its activities on a regular basis to a wider public audience. The Secretariat would also manage a website with pub-lic information regarding its activities, re-ports, and information for donors on pro-gramme activities.

259 UNDP is a logical administrative structure to manage a multi-donor, multi-project fund as described. UNDP already has experience of administering similar SSR trust funds, most notably in Indonesia, and served as the administrative structure for Kosovo’s ISSR.

260 OECD “Policy Brief –Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice” Paris: OECD, 2004, p5


160 8.3.7 The implementation process should continue to provide options for manag-ing change. In addition, the Implemen-tation Secretariat should be prepared to constantly monitor developments in the security sector and ongoing projects in or-der to provide advice and coordination for those agencies undertaking security-sec-tor projects on where gaps exist and where additional activities or funding may be re-quired. A key cornerstone of the process should be to build on and take forward the lessons of the ISSR and take them forward into a post-status Kosovo.

KPC Retirement and Redundancy

Trust Fund

8.3.8 In order to support the recommen-dation of the ISSR to reduce the size and then disband the existing KPC as a new De-fence Force is being created, it is necessary to consider a redundancy and retirement package for decommissioned members of the KPC. It is essential that retiring/re-dundant KPC members are offered either a retirement or a redundancy package in order to ensure that this sensitive issue is addressed properly and transition to new structures is achieved. To assist in the proc-ess of professionalizing and restructuring the KPC, the creation of a trust fund to fi-nance a compulsorily retirement scheme is required.

Organisations and Activities Required

for Delivery

8.3.9 Trust Fund: This trust fund will be established to allow donor countries to finance the restructuring of the KPC. The intention of the trust fund will be to as-sist the COMKFOR and the KPCC in the restructuring of the KPC through allowing for a pension scheme/redundancy scheme for members of the KPC. The trust fund should sit inside an organisation with the

adequate systems to properly track such spending. Delivery will probably be pro-vided by a variety of organisations which could be drawn from either the commer-cial sector or civil society (or both). This project will be overseen by COMKFOR and the KPCC in consultation with COMKPC.

8.3.10 A vital part of the process of trans-forming the KPC to the KDF will involve a reduction in the number of employees in the new KDF compared to those currently employed by the KPC. In a situation where many people made redundant will have limited re-employment options it is vital that there is some form of pension and redundancy scheme. Suggested activities under the project might include:

1. Identification of personnel for retirement/redundancy

2. Creation of a pension scheme3. Creation of a redundancy package

including careers counselling and retraining

Cost of a Redundancy Package

8.3.11 The cost of a redundancy and re-structuring package for the personnel of the KPC is a matter for consideration by the Government of Kosovo following the de-termination of final status. That said, such a large, complex, and long-term undertak-ing will undoubtedly fall outside the cur-rent revenue capacity of Kosovo’s budget. As a result, donor support will be required and the issue should be considered by Contact Group nations and other potential donors as an essential part of ensuring the security of Kosovo and its regional rela-tionships. Rough estimates completed by the ISSR team indicated that dependent upon how long the pension is envisaged to last, € 1,404,000 to € 2,340,000 could be the annual outlay.261

Security is in-c r e a s i n g l y

viewed as an all-encom-passing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the governance of their countries, enjoy the pro-tection of fundamental rights, have access to re-sources and the basic ne-cessities of life, and inhab-it an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being. The security of people and the security of states are mutually reinforcing. A wide range of state insti-tutions and other entities may be responsible for en-suring some aspect of se-curity. This understanding of security is consistent with the broad notion of human security promot-ed by the United Nations Development Program-meme (UNDP) and used by development actors.

Source The DAC Guidelines:

helping Prevent Violent Conflict

Paris: OECD-DAC, 2001, p 38.

261 Estimate is based on the current average KPC salary of €260 per month for approximately 900-1500 people.


161

CHAPTER IX

Conclusions and

Recommendations

Conclusions and Recommendations

164

9.1 The purpose of Kosovo’s Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) was to review the security environment in Kosovo, iden-tify long and short term threats and define a new security architecture in the lead up to finalisation of final status negotiations led by the United Nations Special Envoy in Vienna. The ISSR was an eight-stage process that also identified the short- and long-term development needs of the se-curity sector and prepared the outline of a Security Sector Development Programme to meet those needs.

9.2 Security Sector Review processes have been undertaken by a number of countries recovering from conflict or at critical stages of their development. How-ever, given the fact that Kosovo is an in-ternational protectorate with developing local institutions, it was the first to under-take a security sector review under such circumstances and in advance of determi-nation of its final status. As a result, at the time of the review many of the functions and requirements related to traditional security concerns were managed by the international community, under the aus-pices of UNMIK or KFOR. Despite this chal-lenge, the review undertook a broad scope – looking at issues across the spectrum of security from human security to more traditional military concerns. The review also sought to look at the broad scope of threats facing Kosovo – both internal and external – and attempted to put Kosovo in a regional context when assessing its secu-rity needs.

Main findings

9.3 The recommendations and find-ings of the ISSR can be grouped into a number of broad themes that cross a number of existing and proposed institu-tions including:

Capacity Development of InstitutionsPolicy DevelopmentLegislative DevelopmentOversight

Building Trust Between Citizens and Governing InstitutionsRegional Cooperation

Each of these thematic areas is exam-ined in greater detail below.

9.4 Capacity Development of Insti-

tutions. Kosovo is in the early stages of its post-conflict development. Although Kosovo’s period of conflict was relatively short, its longer term struggle during the period of the break-up of the Former Yu-goslavia resulted in a slow degradation of its governing institutions, infrastructure, and public services such as schools and health centres. Since the end of hostilities in 1999, Kosovo has made a great deal of progress towards building new institu-tions and governing structures. However, challenges for Kosovo’s developing institu-tions remain, including the fact that insti-tutions were not created using a uniform approach. For example, the police and civ-il service were developed under an Anglo-based model and the judicial system was built on a Napoleonic model. Furthermore, an atmosphere of political competition and self-interest among Kosovo’s leader-ship has slowed or inhibited development in some areas like professionalisation of the civil service and efforts to combat cor-ruption. Poor performance by some of Kosovo’s key institutions, particularly the judiciary, have also resulted in a growing lack of public trust in institutions and lead-ers. In addition, coordination mechanisms between institutions are weak. Finally, un-even development of institutions, particu-larly between institutions such as KPC and KPS versus the Ministry of Justice of Minis-try of Internal Affairs, has the potential to put Kosovo’s future democratic develop-ment and thus security at risk.

9.5 Policy Development. There are a number of areas in the security sector where new policies will need to be de-veloped and maintained. To date, policy development among existing PISG institu-tions is at a nascent stage. Furthermore,

The lack of secu-rity for the state

and for its citizens is a major obstacle to politi-cal, social, and economic development. To escape from a downward spiral where insecurity, crimi-nalisation, and under-development are mutu-ally reinforcing, social, economic,governance, and security dimensions of the domestic environment must be addressed simultaneously.

Source: Regional Conference of

the Special Co-ordinator of the

Stability Pact for South Eastern

Europe, Working table III Security

and Defence Issues- Security Sec-

tor Reform. Bucharest, 25 & 26

October 2001

CHAPTER IX

Conclusions


165there is a tendency among government leaders to defer decision to the interna-tional community or to lay blame for poor-ly thought out policies on the internation-al community. Following determination of final status, Kosovo’s leadership will have full responsibility for policy decisions and implementation. Although support from the donor community, in the form of ad-visors and international experts, will likely continue – the ultimate responsibility will be shouldered by the Government of Ko-sovo. The transition to full responsibility will undoubtedly be a difficult one in the early stages, and Kosovo’s leaders will need to find their own way towards developing answers to Kosovo-specific problems. The difficulties of this transition period may also occur in the context of social unrest or severe economic decline, further challeng-ing Kosovo’s leadership.

9.6 Legislative Development. Ko-sovo’s unique status as an international protectorate has caused confusion and fragmentation in its legal framework and legislative process. There are currently three sources of law in Kosovo – laws from the Former Yugoslav system, UNMIK Regu-lations, and laws passed by the Assembly of Kosovo. This network of legal provi-sions needs to be reviewed, modernized, and made uniform based on the require-ments of Kosovo’s post-status constitution and the needs of Kosovo society. Further-more, an effective system of judicial review needs to be established in Kosovo follow-ing full transfer of authorities from UNMIK to the Government of Kosovo. In the secu-rity sector a number of new laws and regu-lations will be required that are related to new security institutions. In crafting these new legal provisions, Kosovo’s legisla-tors need to consider issues such as civil-ian control over military forces, defence budget oversight, and the role of the As-sembly in security policy, and deployment of armed forces.

9.7 Oversight. Development of gov-ernment oversight mechanisms in Kosovo has been weak. Although UNMIK Regula-tion 2001/9 established a constitutional framework for Kosovo, which included some oversight provisions, key areas of oversight such as legislative and budget-

ary oversight are underdeveloped. This is partially a result of fragmentation of insti-tutional responsibilities and reservation of powers by UNMIK. In addition, vague provisions included in the constitutional framework regarding oversight issues left institutions like Kosovo’s Assembly with unclear mandates in this area. Regardless of the reasons, the mechanisms that exist need to be improved and new mechanisms – specific to the security sector – need to be developed. Important new areas of se-curity oversight include an Assembly Com-mittee on Security, creation of information vetting and management systems, and budgetary oversight mechanisms related to allocation and appropriation of funds in the area of defence budgeting.

9.8 Building Trust Between Citizens

and Governing Institutions. Citizens’ per-ceptions of corruption and mismanage-ment by international and Kosovo officials has negatively impacted their trust in gov-erning institutions. Disappointment with international peace and development efforts are universal across Kosovo’s com-munities. As indicated in Chapter Three of this report, studies have shown that levels of corruption in Kosovo are below regional norms and Kosovo’s citizens have a low tolerance for corruption. However, the perception by the majority of Kosovo’s citizens that unfair conditions created by corruption impact their ability to improve their daily life is problematic for develop-ment of institutions that are responsive to the needs of the populace. In general, anti-corruption efforts have not been tak-en seriously by PISG institutions. Further-more, Kosovo’s Assembly has not taken a leading role in investigating causes of corruption through committee structures or taken on specific cases. Finally, pub-lic consultations conducted by ISSR with Kosovo’s citizens found serious concerns regarding the closed list electoral system and the accountability of elected officials. In line with other thematic areas examined here, such as oversight and capacity build-ing of institutions, building trust between Kosovo’s people, elected officials, and their institutions is a key element to ensuring democratic development of those institu-tions and ensuring a transparent security sector for all of Kosovo’s communities.


166 9.9 Regional Cooperation. Should the future status of Kosovo be some form of independence, Kosovo will be required to build relationships with its immediate neighbours as well as the wider European Community. Existing regional security organisations such as the Stability Pact, Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative (SECI), South East European Co-operation Process (SEECP), and Partnership for Peace (PfP) are a few of the mechanisms that can be used to help Kosovo build relationships that will be essential to its external secu-rity. In addition, fostering strong regional relationships will help Kosovo to become an active and effective partner in com-bating common regional threats such as organised crime and terrorism. Finally, es-tablishing positive regional relationships will be essential to rebuilding Kosovo’s economy – a key element of insecurity in the territory and essential for its long term security.

9.10 Recommendations specific to Ko-sovo’s institutions can be found in Chap-ters 4 and 5 of this report. In addition, a summary of recommendations can be found in matrix form at Annex IX. ISSR’s key recommendations related to Kosovo’s future security architecture can be found in the executive summary and in Chapter 7 of this report and include:

The need for Kosovo’s government to take a holistic approach to threat analysis and addressing the scope of threats facing the people of Kosovo.

Dependent on the outcome of Status negotiations, the need for the Kosovo Assembly to consider a number of laws in the security sector – but pri-marily to address the need for a Ko-sovo Security Act that would provide the legal framework for Kosovo’s new security institutions and oversight mechanisms.To lay the groundwork for a Kosovo Security Council (KSC) within the Of-fice of the Prime Minister through the existing Communities Security Coun-cil (CSC) and to begin immediate work towards setting up a functioning situ-ation centre to begin the process of gathering and coordinating informa-tion and analysis of information re-lated to security in Kosovo.Dependent on the outcome of Sta-tus negotiations, for the international community and Kosovo authorities to consider the scope and framework for a Security Service for Kosovo.Following the cessation of UNSCR 1244, for the international communi-ty and Kosovo authorities to consider the scope and framework for a demo-cratic, and civilian controlled Minis-try of Defence and Kosovo Defence Force.

The costing for the recommended Kosovo Security Architecture will follow in an Ad-dendum to this Report, along with the Security Sector Development Plan, which will be produced by a follow on ISSR team during 2007. In the meantime full costing may be found at www.issrkosovo.org


167

annexes

Annexes

169ANNEXES

Annex I Sources Consulted

Reports and working papers

Abdela, L. (2000). Kosovo - Missed Opportunities, Lessons for The Future. A Report prepared for the OSCE Mission in Kosovo.Adams T. (2003). U.S. Assistance Programs in Europe: An Assessment. Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State.Ball, N., Bouta, T. and van de Goor, L. (2003). Enhancing Democratic Governance of the Security Sector: An Institutional Assessment Framework. The Hague: The Neth-erlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.Blumi, I. (2003). Political Islam among Albanians: Are the Taliban coming to the Balkans? (Paper # 2. July 2003). Pristina: Kosova Institute for Policy Research and Development.Born, H. (Ed.), Fluri, P. (Ed.) and Lunn, S. (Ed.). (2003). Oversight and Guidance: The Relevance of Parliamentary Oversight for the Security Sector Reform. Brussels: DCAF, Nato Parliamentary Assembly. Bradley, J. & Knaus, G. (2004). Towards a Kosovo Development Plan: The state of the Kosovo economy and possible ways forward. (ESPIG Policy Paper No.1). Pris-tina: ESPIG. Busek, E. (2005). Keynote Speech. Presented at the University Association for Contemporary European Studies 35th Annual Conference, Zagreb, Croatia. D/SSDAT/20/1/1/1. (2005). Scoping visit report by the security sector development advisory team (SSDAT) to Kosovo: 11-22 April 2005. Damian, L., Luckham, R. and Von Tangen Page, M. (2002). A Goal Oriented Ap-proach to Governance and Security Sector Reform. London: International Alert.DCAF (2002). Commonwealth of Independent States Model Law on the Parlia-mentary Oversight of the State Military Organization. DCAF Document–No. 1. De Benitez, S., Fawcett, C., Fujimora, C., Miller, S., Sommers, M., Yousef, T. (2003). Youth Explosion in Developing World Cities. Ruble, B.(Eds.), Tulchin J. (Eds.),Varat, D.(Eds.), Hanley, L.(Eds.).Washington: Woodrow Wilson Centre for Scholars. Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis. (2006). Kosovo SHIK, Directly Linked with Albanian SHIK Intelligence Organization, Prepares for “Big Push” for Kosovo Independence.Department for International Development (2000). Kosovo Emergency Human-itarian Assistance Programme. Report on Activities: 26 March 1999 to 31 March 2000. London: Conflict & Humanitarian Affairs Department. Department for In-ternational Development.DFID.(2001). Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform: London: DFIDDonini, A., Minear, L., Smillie, I., van Baarda, T., Welch, A.C. (2005). Mapping the Security Environment: Understanding the Perceptions of Local Communities, Peace Support Operations and Assistance Agencies. A Report commissioned by the UK NGO-Military Contact Group. Medford MA: Feinstein International Famine Cent-er; Tufts University.Draft Law on Democratic and Civilian Control of the Serbian and Montenegrin Armed Forces. Belgrade 25 July 2005. Dugolli, I. and Peci, L. (2006). Intelligence Agencies of Kosovo: Dismantling, Osmo-sis or Integration? Pristina: KIPRED. Eide, K. (2004). Report to the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Na-tions Interim Mission in Kosovo. Pursuant to the Report on the United Nations

Annexes

170 Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (S/2004/348). New York: United Na-tionsEUROPOL. (2004). The threat from organized crime. Luxembourg.Evans, G., Sahnoun, M. et. al. (2001). The Responsibility to Protect. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Ottawa: Inter-national Development Research Centre. Germann, N. (2002). Evaluation of Security Sector Reform and Criteria of Success: Practical Needs and Methodological Problems. Working Paper – No. 85. DCAF. Godet, F. (2002). The Pyramid of Norms in the Security Sector. Conference Paper. DCAF. Goreski, V. and Handziski, B. (2001). Democratic Civil Control of the Armed Forces in the Republic of Macedonia. Geneva. Heinmann-Guder, A. and Wolf-Christian P. (2001). Wag the Dog- The Mobilisation and Demobilisation of the KLA. Bonn: BICC. Hendrickson, D. (1999). A Review of Security-Sector Reform, Working Paper - No. 1. Centre for Defence Studies, London: Kings College. Human Rights Watch (2006). Not on the Agenda. The Continuing Failure to Ad-dress Accountability in Kosovo Post-March 2004. (Volume 18 No. 4(d)). Washing-ton, DC: Human Rights Watch.International Alert: Women Waging Peace. (2004). Inclusive Security, sustainable peace: A Toolkit for Advocacy and Action. Washington, D.C. International Crisis Group (2001). Kosovo: a Strategy for Economic Development. (Europe Report N°123). Brussels: International Crisis Group. International Crisis Group (2002). Finding the Balance: The Scales of Justice in Ko-sovo, (Europe Report N – 134), Brussels: ICG.International Crisis Group (2004). Collapse in Kosovo. (Europe Report No – 155).International Crisis Group (2005). Bridging Kosovo’s Mitrovica Divide. (Europe Re-port N – 165). Brussels: ICG. International Crisis Group (2005). Kosovo after Haradinaj. (Europe Report N – 163). Brussels: ICG. International Crisis Group. (1999). Who is killing whom in Kosovo. (Balkan Report No – 78). International Crisis Group.International Crisis Group. (2004). Collapse in Kosovo. (Europe Report No -155). ICG. International Crisis Group. (2006). An Army for Kosovo? ICG (Europe Report No – 174). ICG. International Crisis Group. (2006). Kosovo: The Challenge of Transition (Report N – 170). Pristina: ICG. Joseph, E.P. (2005). Bystanders to a Massacre. Washington DC: The Washington Post. P.B04. KIPRED. 2006. ISSR Stage 1 and 2: Executive Summary. Pristina: KIPRED. KIPRED. 2006. Policy Brief Series: Paper #2. Intelligence Agencies of Kosovo: Dis-mantling, Osmosis, or Integration? Prishtina: KIPRED. Leigh, I. (2002). National Legal Dimension of the Democratic Control of the Secu-rity Sector: Values and Standards in Developed Democracies. Conference Paper. DCAF. Leigh, I. (2005). Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Forces Per-sonnel: The European Court of Human Rights. (Working Paper No – 164). DCAF. Matus, J. (2001). Civil – Military Relations and Decision – Making on Defense. Ge-neva. Michalopoulos, C. (2003). Kosovo’s international trade: trade policy, institutions and market access issues. Report to the UK Department for International Devel-opment. London.

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171Ministry of Defence (2004). The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations. Joint Warfare Publication 3-50. Second Edition. Shrivenham: The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre.Ministry of Defence. (1997). British Defence Doctrine. Joint Warfare Publication 0-01. London: Directorate of Joint Warfare.N, Ball. and Hendrickson D. (2006). Trends in Security sector reform (SSR): Policy, Practice and Research. Workshop on “New Directions in Security Sector Reform” Peace. Conflict and Development Program Initiative. International Develop-ment Research Centre (IDRC). Canada, 3-4 November 2005. National Audit Office. (2000). Emergency Aid: The Kosovo Crisis. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General. HC 495 Session 1999-2000. London: The Sta-tionery Office.National Security Law. (2000). No 473/476. Nikitin, A. (2002). Civil and Parliamentary Control over the Military: Purposes and Principles of the Cis Model Law. Working Paper Series – No. 59. DCAF. OECD. (2004). Policy Brief –Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice. Paris: OECD. OECD. (2005). OECD Policy Directive - Conflict Prevention and Peace Building- What Counts as ODA. Paris: OECD OECD. (2005). Security System Reform and Governance. Paris: OECD. OECD. (2005). Statistical Reporting Directives Addendum to DCD/DAC (2000). Par-is: OECD. OECD-DAC. (2001). DAC Guidelines: helping Prevent Violent Conflict. Paris: OECD. OSCE, UNEP, UNDP. (2003). Environment and Security: Transforming risks into co-operation. OSCE. (1994). Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security.OSCE. (2006). Report of the Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Ambassador Werner Wnendt, to the Permanent Council. Vienna. Pantev, P. (2002). Legal Issues of Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in the Process of the Security Reform: The Case of Post-Communist Countries in South-Eastern Europe. Working Paper – No. 57. DCAF. Parliamentary Assembly. (2006). Human Rights of members of the Armed Forces.Recommendation 1742. Patten, C. (2001). EU Strategy in the Balkans. Speech to the International Crisis Group, Brussels. Patten, C. (2002). Organised Crime. Speech to the UK Conference on Organised Crime. London.Petrson, E. (2005). Kosovo Protection Corps In Search of a Future. Groningen: Cen-tre for European Studies. Pettifer, J. (2003). Kosovo Protection Corps in Transition. London: Conflict Studies Research Center. Philip, P. (2004). Reducing Environment & Security Risks from Mining in South East-ern Europe. UNEP. SEESAC. (2006). The Sarajevo Process Client Procurement Guidelines for Private Se-curity Companies (PSC). (Activity Report AR/077). Belgrade: SEESAC. SEESAC. (2006). The Sarajevo Process Code of Conduct for Private Security Compa-nies. (Activity Report AR/076). Belgrade: SEESAC.Solana, J. (2000). The Development of the CFSP and the role of the High Representa-tive. Speech to the Institute of European Affairs, Dublin, March, 30, 2000.Spector, B., Winbourne, S., and Beck, L. (2003). Corruption in Kosovo: Observations and Implications for USAID. Washington: MSI. Statistical Office of Kosovo. (2004). Series 2: Agriculture and Environment Statis-tics: Agricultural Household Survey 2004. Pristina: SOK.

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172 Statistical Office of Kosovo. (2005). Series 1: General Statistics: Kosovo in figures 2005. Pristina: SOK The European Union’s National Action programme for Kosovo. (2006). Study on Elimination of Gender Inequalities and Support to Disadvantaged Areas in relation to Enterprise Development in Kosovo. EU. The Urban Institute. (2003). Kosovo Returns Assessment. (UI Project 06901-010). UNDP. (2002). Human Development Report – Kosovo 2002. Pristina: UNDP. UNDP. Combating Corruption in Kosovo: A Citizen’s Perception Survey in Support of the Kosovo Anti-Corruption Strategy. UNDP. DCAF. Recommendations for Improving Democratic Oversight and Guid-ance of the Security Sector.UNHCR. (2006). 2005 Global Refugee Trends. Geneva: UNHCR. United Nations Development Fund for Women. (2005). Securing the Peace. New York: UNIFEM. United Nations. (1999). UNSCR 1244 (1999). S/RES/1244 (1999). New York: United v Nations. United Nations. (2005). Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo Security Council S/2005/88. New York: United Nations. UNMIK European Union Pillar. (2006). UNMIK’s Impact on the Kosovo Economy: Spending Effects 1999-2006 and Potential Consequences of Downsizing. UNMIK Office of Gender Affairs. (2003). Women and Men in Kosovo. Pristina. UNMIK, IOM, KFOR, (2003). The Kosovo Protection Corps Plan 2004. Pristina: UN-MIK. UNMIK. (2004). Kosovo Media Highlights. Division of Public Information Media Monitoring. US State Department. (1999). Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo: An Accounting. Second Report. Washington DC: US State Department.Von Tangen Page, M. and Hamill, O. (2006). Security sector reform and its role in challenging of radicalism. DIIS Working Paper. Von Tangen, Page, M. and Ryne, S. et al (2005). SALW and Private Security Compa-nies in South Eastern Europe. Belgrade: SEESAC. Woehrel, S. (2005). Islamic Terrorism and the Balkans. CRS Report for Congress. Woods, N. (2005). The Shifting Politics of Foreign Aid. A Working paper commis-sioned by DFID. Oxford: Global Economic Governance Programme, University College.World Bank (2001) Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montene-gro): Economic and Social Reforms for Peace and Reconciliation. Vol.1.Chap.3. Washington DC: World Bank.World Bank (2005). Poverty Assessment Report, Kosovo. Prishtina: World Bank. World Bank. (2006). International Development Association Interim Strategy Note for Kosovo for the Period FY06-FY07.

Books

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173dependence. In Kohnstamm, M & Hager, W. (eds.). A Nation Writ Large? Foreign policy Problems before the European Community. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Pp.1-21.Fukuyama, F. (2004). State Building: Governance and World Order In the 21st Century. Cornell University Press. Ithaca: Cornell University. Hester, A. and Earle, R. (Ed.). (1991). Revolutions for Freedom: The Mass Media inEastern and Central Europe. The J.M.Cox Center for International Mass Communi-cation Training and Research. Athens: University of Georgia. Huntington, S. (1991).The Third Wave. University of Oklahoma Press. Juncos, A. (2005). The EU’s post-conflict intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (re)integrating the Balkans and/or (re)inventing the EU? Loughborough: Lough-borough University.Keane, J. (1991).The Media and Democracy. London: Polity Press. Lerner, D. (1963). Toward a Communication Theory of Modernisation. In L. W. Pye (eds.). Communications and Political Development. Princeton University Press. Lichtenberg, J. (1990). Democracy and the Mass Media. Sparks, C. (Eds.), Manaev, O. (Eds.). Media in Transition : From Totalitarianism to Democracy .MimeoMalcolm, N. (1998) Kosovo: A Short History. London: MacMillan.Nimmo, D. and Mansfield, M. (Ed.). (1992). “Government and the News Media: Comparative Dimensions”. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press. O’Donnel, G. and Schmitter, P. (1986). Transitions from Authoritarian Rule - Pros-pects for Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Olsson, C. (1987). Freedom of Communication Under Law. The European Institute for the Media.Paletz, D., Jakubowicz, K. and Novosel, P. (Ed.). (1995). Glasnost and After: Media and Change in Central and Eastern Europe. New York: Cresskill Hampton Press. Ramsbotham, O. (2000). Reflections on UN Post-Settlement Peacebuilding. In Woodhouse, T (Ed.).Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution. (pp.169-189). London: Frank Cass Publishers. Vankovska, B. (Ed.). (2001). Legal Framing of the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Security Sector: Norms and Reality/ies. Beograd: DCAF, Centre for Civil-Military Relations. Von Tangen, M. and Damian, L. (Ed.). (2002). Security Sector Reform and the Chal-lenges and Opportunities of the Privatisation of Security. London: International Alert. Wieberg, H. and Scherrer, Ch. (1999). Ethnicity and Intra-State Conflict: Types, causes and peace strategies. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Websites

Albright, M. (2005). Address to Kosovo Central Assembly. Retrieved August 24, 2005 from http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/1867 ksv albright 070505.htmlArticle 19 - The International Center Against Censorshi. http://www.article19.org/Association of Professional Journalists of Kosovo. Retrieved August 08, 2006 from http://www.apjk.org/English.htmBBC http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/3084482.stmEuropean Union (2004). The EU's relations with the State of Serbia & Montenegro: Fact Sheet. Retrieved August 29, 2005 from http://europa.eu.int/comm/external relations/see/fry/kosovo/index.htmEvans R. (2002). Donor Perspective on Security Sector Reform as a Governance Is-sue. Paper prepared for The 5th International Security Forum in Zurich. Retrieved August 28, 2006 from http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/SSAJ32.pdf

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174 Freedom House Index, http://www.freedomhouse.orgHaraszti, M. The State of Media Freedom in Kosovo: Observations and Recommen-dations. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Retrieved August 08, 2006 from http://www.osce.org/documents/rfm/2006/07/19767 en.pdfhttp://www.ngorc.nethttp://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/dfasa011606.htm

http://wwwa.house.gov/international relations/108/shel0625.htmIndependent Media Commission. http://www.imc-ko.org/article.php?id arti-cle=82.Index Kosova. www.indexkosova.comIndonesia UNDP SSR project home page www.partnership.or.idInitiative for Policy Dialogue. Retrieved August 07, 2006 from http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/programs/program.cfm?prid=25&ptid=2Islami, N. (2002, July). Mayor Lift Lid on Kosovo Corruption. Retrieved July 25, 2006 from http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/launder/regions/2002/0419mayor.htmKosovo Government http://www.ks-gov.netKosovo Ministry of Finance and Economy http://www.mfe-ks.orgLancaster, C. (2003). Poverty, Terrorism, and National Security. Retrieved from www.wilsoncentre.org n/d. Louise, S. (2003). Statement to the House Committee on International Relations.Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights. Re-trieved July 28, 2006 from NATO/KFOR http://www.nato.int/kfor/Nikolai, B. Kosovo’s mineral wealth. Retrieved July 22, 2006 from www.unmikon-line.org/pub/focuskos/sept05/focuskeco5.htmOffice of the Coordinator and Eurasia Overview. (2006). Country Reports on Ter-rorism: Europe and Eurasia Overview. Retrieved August 08, 2006 from the U.S De-partment of State Web site: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64342.htmOffice of the High Representative and EU Special Representative. (1995). The General Framework for Peace in Bosnia – Herzegovina. Retrieved September 2, 2005 from http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp.Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe http://www.osce.orghttp://www.ngorc.netOSCE Representative on Freedom of Media. http://www.osce.org/fom/Partos, G. (2003). New concerns over Albanian Guerrillas. Retrieved August 08, 2006 from the BBC News Web site: www.bbc.co.ukSouth East Europe Cooperative Initiative www.secicenter.org and www.secinet.infoSpecial Co-ordinator for the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. (2004). Sta-bility Pact for South Eastern Europe. Retrieved September 1, 2005 from http://www.stabilitypact.org/constituent/990610-cologne.aspStatistical Office of Kosovo. www.ks-gov.netThe Centre for Peace in the Balkans. (2000). Research Analysis. Balkan – Albania – Kosovo – Heroin – Jihad. Retrieved July 28, 2006 from http://www.balkanpeace.org/our/our03.shtmlUNDP. Youth Post-Conflict Participation Project. www.kosovo.undp.orgUNDP Democratic Governance Programme. http://www.undp.org/govern-ance/United Nations CIVPOL. (2004). Factsheet & Statistics. Retrieved August, 24, 2005 from http://www.civpol.org/portal/html.

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175United Nations Development Programme. (2003). UNDP Factsheet No.1: Un-employment. Retrieved August 24, 2005 from http//:www.kosovo.undp.org/Factsheets/factsheets/unemployment_may2003.pdfUnited States Institute of Peace. (2002). Special Report No.97: Lawless Rule versus Rule of Law in the Balkans. Retrieved July 28, 2006 from http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr97.htmlUnited States Office in Pristina. (2003). Human Rights Report 2002. Retrieved Au-gust 16, 2005 from http://pristina.usmission.gov/hrkos2.htmUS Department of State. (2004). USAID: Europe and Eurasia. Retrieved August 24, 2005 from http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/countries/.html.USAID. (2001). USAID Budget: Kosovo. Retrieved August 24, 2005 from http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/countries/.htmlWikidepia. (2005). Martti Ahtisaari. Retrieved September 9, 2005 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martti_AhtisaariWood, N. (2000). Kosovo assassination. Special Report: Kosovo. Retrieved August 21, 2006 from http://www.guardian.co.uk/Kosovo?Story/0,402191,00.html.World Bank. (2000). World Bank grant aims to re-energize Kosovo’s rural economy and agricultural production. Retrieved from http://www.unsystem.org/scn/ar-chives/rnis29/ch15.htm, n/d. World Bank. (2006). Kosovo Brief 2006. Retrieved January 08, 2006 from http://web.worldbank.orgWorld Bank Institute (governance issues). http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/gov-ernance/www.womenwarpeace.org

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Abramowitz, M. and Schneider, M.(2006). Balkans Choice. The Wall Street Journal. Champagne, H. (January, 2005). Peacebuilding: Toward a Global Ethic of Respon-sibility? Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development. Issue 6.Cincotta, R. (2005). State of the World 2005 Global Security Brief #2: Youth Bulge, Underemployment Raise Risks of Civil Conflict.Economist. (2005). Change and Decay: Happiness in Eastern Europe is a Compli-cated Business. The Economist. Vol. 376. No. 8441. P. 68. Economist. (2005). Rendering unto Ceasar. The Economist. Vol 376. No. 8443. P.44.Hapern. (1994). Media Dependence and Political Perceptions in An AuthoritarianHuman Rights Watch. (1992). Hate Speech and Freedom of Expression. Free Ex-pression Project. Vol 4. No 3. Human Rights Watch. (2004). Failure to Protect: Anti-minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004. Vol. 16, No. 6(D). Matić, T. (2003). Kosovo: Crimes against Serbs Investigated. Institute for Peace and War Reporting. (BCR No 468, 13-Nov-03). Paris, R. (2002). International peacebuilding and the ‘mission civilisatrice”. Reviewof International Studies. Vol. 28, (2002). 637–656.Snyder, J. and Ballentine, K. (1995). Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas. In-ternational Security, 21: 2/4 system. Journal of Communication.

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176 ANNEX II

List of Acrynoms

ANA Albanian National Army AUS Advisory Unit on Security BPK Banking and Payments Authority of Kosovo CBP Community Based Policing CCK Coordination Centre for Kosovo CFA Central Fiscal Authority DCSA Department of Civil Service Administration DEM Department of Emergency Management DFID Department for International Development DJA Department of Judicial Administration DOC Directorate of Organised Crime DOJ Department of Justice DPED Department of Police Education and Development EFC Economic and Fiscal Council IEPU International Executive Police Unit IMC Independent Media Commission IOB Independent Oversight Board IREX International Research and Exchanges BoardJIC Joint Intelligence Committee KCB Kosovo Consolidated Budget KCPSED Kosovo Centre for Public Safety, Education and Development KIKPC Inspectorate for the KPC KJC Kosovo Judicial Council KJPC Kosovo Judicial and Prosecutorial Council KPCC KPC Coordinator KPST Kosovo Pension Savings Trust LPSC Local Public Safety Councils MCSC Municipal Community Safety Councils MFE Ministry Finance and Economy MH Ministry of Health MIA Ministry of Internal Affairs MJ Ministry of Justice MPS Ministry of Public Services MSC Municipal Security Committees MTI Ministry of Trade and IndustryKSC Kosovo Security Council ODA Official Development Assistance OKPCC Office of the KPC Coordinator OLA Office of the Legal Adviser OPM Office of the Prime Minister OPS Office of Public Safety PfP Partnership for Peace PHC Primary Health Care PSC Private Security Companies PSD Sector Development

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177PTB Provisional Business Registry SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons SECI Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative SEESAC South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of SALWSITCEN Kosovo Government Situation Centre SME Small and Medium Size Enterprises in Kosovo SOP Standard Operating Procedure SPAC Senior Public Appointments Committee SSPIU Section and Security Providers Inspection Unit WAC Weapons Authorisation Card WHO World Health Organization WRC Weapons Registration Card AAK Alliance for the Future of KosovoASI Assembly Support InitiativeCCK Coordination Centre for KosovoCDHRF Council for Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms CFA Central Fiscal AuthorityCFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CSC Community Safety Councils OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD/DAC Development Assistance Committee DCAF Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed ForcesDJA Department of Judicial Administration EFC Economic Fiscal CouncilESPIG Kosovo’s Economic Strategy and Project Identification Group EU European UnionFDI Foreign Direct InvestmentICG International Crisis GroupICM International Civilian Mission IHSOP Institute for Strategic Research of Public OpinionIOB Independent Oversight BoardIOM International Organization for Migration ISSR Internal Security Sector ReviewKAN Kosovo Action Network KCPSED Kosovo Centre of Public Safety Education and DevelopmentKCB Kosovo Consolidated BudgetKCS Kosovo Correctional Service KDF Kosovo Defense Force KEK Kosovo Energy Corporation KFOR NATO Kosovo ForceKIC Kosovo Islamic Council KIKPC KFOR Inspectorate for the KPCKIPRED Kosovo Institute for Policy Research and DevelopmentKJC Kosovo Judicial CouncilKPC Kosovo Protection Corps KPS Kosovo Police ServiceKSIP Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan LDK Democratic League of Kosovo

Annexes

178 NGO Non Governmental OrganizationKSC Kosovo Security Council KSCSEC Kosovo Security Council Secretariat OCTAIS Organized Crime and Terrorist Acts Investigation OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development PBR Provisional Business RegistryPDK Democratic Party of Kosovo PfP Partnership for Peace PISG Provisional Institutions of Self-GovernmentPMD Penal Management Division PTK Post and Telecom Enterprise of Kosovo RTK Radio Television of Kosovo SHIK Kosovo Information ServiceSOK Statistical Office of Kosovo SPAC Senior Public Appointments Committee SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-GeneralSSDAT Security Sector Development Advisory Team SSR Security Sector Reform TMC Temporary Media Commissioner UNDP United Nations Development Program UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural OrganizationUNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo CIVPOL Civilian Police USAID United States Agency for International Development VBA Serbia's Military Security Agency

Annexes

179ANNEX III

List of Members of The ISSR Steering Committee

Members

Søren Jessen Petersen (until June 06)Joachim Rücker (from Sept 06)SRSG (Chair)

Torbjörn Sohlström

Personal Representative of the EU HighRepresentative (Deputy Chair)

Jean Dussourd (until May 06)DSRSG Pillar IStephen Curtis (replacing Pillar I)Police Commissioner Albert Moskowitz (replacing Pillar I)Director UNMIK Department of Justice

Werner Wnendt

DSRSG Pillar III (OSCE)

Joachim Ruecker (until 1 Sept 06)Paul Acada (acting as of 1 Sept 06)DSRSG Pillar IV

General Giuseppe Valotto (until 31 Aug 06)General Roland Kather (from 1 Sept 06) COMKFOR

Dr Ibrahim Rugova (until Jan 06)Dr Fatmir Sejdiu (from Feb 06)President of Kosovo

Bajram Kosumi (until March 06)Agim Ceku (from March 06) Prime Minister of Kosovo

Nexhat Daci (until March 06)Kole Berisha (from March 06)President of the Assembly

Haki Shatri

Minister of Finance and Economy

Fatmir Rexhepi

Minister of Internal Affairs

Jonuz Salihaj

Minister of Justice

Hashim Thaci

Leader of Democratic Party of Kosovo

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180 Veton Surroi

Leader of ORA

Oliver Ivanovic

Leader of the Serbian List for Kosovo

Zulfi Merxha

Representative of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities in Kosovo

Father Sava Janjic

Serbian Orthodox Church

Mahir Yagcilar

KDTA Representative

Dzezair Murati

Vakat Representative

Rustem Ibisi

Representative of the Gorani Community

Advisers

COMKPC

UNDP Resident Representative

UNMIK AUS

OSCE Democratisation Committee

DCAF

SSDAT

KPS

President’s Security Advisor

PM’s Security Advisor

PM’s Gender Advisor

Director OPS KIPRED

Annexes

181ANNEX IV

ISSR Bus Questionnaire

QUESTION MARK 1-5What do you feel is the greatest threat to you?

Select 3 and give vote 1-5

1. Crime

2. Ethnic violence

3. Poverty

4. Environment

5. Organised crime

6. Terrorism

7. Corruption

8. Diseases

9. Unemployment

10. Traffic safety

11. Electricity provision

What do you think of the performance of the following institutions

Select 3 and give your vote 1-5

1. KPS

2. KPC

3. UNMIK

4. Assembly

5. Municipal Assembly

6. Judiciary

List your priorities for government action

Select 2 and give your vote 1-5

1. Health

2. Economy

3. Jobs

4. Education

5. Policing

6. Defence

7. Environment

8. Other (please specify)

'What should be the priorities be for theGovernment' - Economy and Jobs.

Evaluation criteria: 1 not at all 5 very

This Generic questionnaire was altered and added to depend on the individual and department/service interviewed.

1. What are the main functions of your institution?

2. Are there any other functions currently exercised by reserved areas? If yes, by which/whom?

3. Is the current structure consistent with the functions of your institution? If not, what would be the necessary improvements?

4. What are the oversight mechanisms related to your institution?

5. To whom/which institution is your Ministry/institution accountable? How?

6. How does your institution link with other institutions on cross cutting issues? Examples?

7. Are all the functions/areas of your institution covered by appropriate legislation? If not, which are the areas not yet covered?

8. Are there any SOPs in place? Since when?

9. Is there any appeal procedure in place? If yes, since when? What are the cases you have been dealing with?

10. How many disciplinary cases did your institution deal with over the last two years? What were the issues involved?

11. How long have the Permanent Secretary and the Department Directors been in place? If there were any changes, when did this take place and why?

12. What are the current contractual arrangements for the senior civil servants (Permanent Secretary and the Department Directors)?

13. What are, in your view some of the deficiencies of the system in the area of responsibility of your institution? Legal, structural or conceptual?

14. Do you see any security related issue in the functioning of your institution? If yes how?

ANNEX V

ISSR Structured Interview for

the PISG Governance/ Security

Dimension

Annexes

182

UNMIK Regulation No.1999/1. On the au-thority of Interim Administration in Kosovo.

UNMIK Regulation No.1999/8. On the Es-tablishment of the KPC.

UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/4. On Hate Speech.

UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/33. On Licens-ing of Security Services Providers in Kos-ovo and the Regulation of their Employee.

UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/37. On Print Media.

UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/38. On the Es-tablishment of the Ombudsperson Institu-tion in Kosovo.

OSCE Permanent Council Decision No. 305, 1 July 1999. On the OSCE contribution to the implementation of UNSC Res. 1244.

UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/12. On The Prohibition of Terrorism and Related Of-fences.

UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/19. On the Ex-ecutive Branch of the PISG (later on amend-ed by UNMIK Regulation No. 2002/5).

UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/36. On Kos-ovo Civil Service.

Assembly of Kosovo Law No. 2002/3. Law on Higher Education in Kosovo as promul-gated by UNMIK Regulation No. 2003/14.

UNMIK Administrative Direction No. 2003/2. On the Management of the Kos-ovo Civil Service.

UNMIK Regulation No. 2003/39. On the promulgation of the Assembly Law 2003/22 on Kosovo Sanitary Inspectorate.

UNMIK Administrative Direction No. 2004/16 of 30 June 2004 (OPS).

UNMIK Regulation No. 2004/31. On the promulgation of the Kosovo Assembly Health Law 2004/4.

UNMIK Regulation No. 2004/47. On the promulgation of the Kosovo Assembly Law 2004/38 on Rights and Responsibili-ties of Kosovo residents in the Health Care System.

UNMIK Regulation No. 2004/55. On the promulgation of the Assembly of Kosovo Law 2004/37Law on Primary and Second-ary Education in Kosovo (Assembly of Ko-sovo Law 2002/2) as promulgated by UN-MIK Regulation No. 2002/19.

UNMIK Regulation No. 2005/1. On the promulgation of the Kosovo Assembly Law No.2004/50. On Private Practices in the Health Sector.

UNMIK Regulation No. 2005/15. Amending UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/19. On the Ex-ecutive Branch of the PISG.

UNMIK Regulation No. 2005/54. On the Framework and Guiding Principles of the Kosovo Police Service.

UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/6. On the Om-budsperson Institution in Kosovo.

UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/25. On a Reg-ulatory Framework for the Justice System.

UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/26. Amend-ing UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/19 on the Executive Branch of the Provisional Institu-tions of Self-Government in Kosovo.

ANNEX VI

Unmik Regulatons and Assembly of Kosovo Laws Referred

to in the Text

Annexes

183ANNEX VII

List of Institutions and People that ISSR Consulted in Regard of the

Institutional Analyis

Office of the Prime MinisterAgim Ceku

Prime Minister Rame Arifaj PM Adviser on Security

Prime Ministers Legal OfficeShefik KurtishiDirector of PMLO

Assembly of KosovoHydajet Hyseni Chairman of the Committee on LegislationNaser Osmani Chairman of the Committee on Economy Fatmire Kollcaku Chairman of the Committee on Health Enver Hoxhaj Chairman of the Committee on Education

Ministry of Justice Azem Hajdari Acting Permanent Secretary of the Ministry Kujtim KerveshiPrincipal Adviser to the MinisterBardhyl HasanpapajPolitical Adviser to the MinisterProf Rexhep GashiCorrections Adviser to the Minister

Ministry of Interior Blerim KuciDeputy MinisterArber Gorani

Principal Adviser to the MinisterNuredin Ibishi

Police Adviser to the Minister

Ministry of Finance and EconomySefedin Sefaj

Permanent Secretary of the MinistryGani Asllani

Adviser to the MinisterAgim Krasniqi

Director of the Budget of KosovoHasan Jusufaj

Deputy/Director of the Budget of Kosovo

Annexes

184 Salih Bytyqi

Chief of Division for Budgetary Policies

Ministry of Trade and Industry Skender AhmetiPermanent Secretary

Ministry of Mines and Minerals Ekrem Belegu Permanent Secretary

Ministry of Labor and Welfare Service Eshref ShabaniActing Permanent Secretary

Ministry of Health Pleurat SejdiuPermanent Secretary Fadil BekaDirector of Clinical University Center of Pristina

Ministry of Education, Science and TechnologyFehmi IsmajliActing Permanent Secretary

Kosovo Police Service KPSCol. Reshat MaliqiHead of Border PoliceCol. Atifete JahjagaHead of Training DepartmentCol. Shefqet BeqajRegional Commander / Prishtina RegionCol. Rrahman SylejmanHead of Crime DepartmentCol. Destan ThaqiRegional Commander / Ferizaj RegionCol. Ahmet HasiRegional Commander / Prizren RegionCol. Shaban ShalaRegional Commander / Peja RegionLt.Col. Shpend MaxhuniRegional Commander / Gjilani RegionLt.Col. Nehat ThaqiD/Regional Commander / Mitrovica Region Shefqet BeqajCommander Pristina Region Steve BennetDirector, Police School, VushtrriXhevat MexhuaniCommissioner, Kosovo Correctional Service

Kosovo Protection Corps Gen. Sylejman SelimiCOMKPC

Annexes

185Col. Skender ZhitiaChief of Staff, ZONE 5Col. Xhavit GashiChief of Cabinet, COMKPC Office

Department of Judicial AdministrationSahit Shala Head of Project Management, Monitoring and Reporting Division Vahid LimaniHead of Personnel – DJA

Supreme Court of KosovoRexhep HaxhimusaPresident of the Court

Kosovo Judicial Institute Rrustem QehajaAdviser in KJI

Ombudsperson of KosovoHilmi JashariActing Head

KEKFaik NahiExpert on Energy

International Officials Robert Wilton

Prime Minister’s Executive Advisor Michael Mann

Advisor to the Minister for Trade and IndustryJan SchuermannEU & International Police Liaison Officer, UNMIK

Andre HeinrichsEU Police Advisor Office

Nick BoothSenior Adviser to the DSRSG for Police and Justice, UNMIK

William Irvine

Head, Penal Management Division, UNMIKGeoff Chester

Operations, Penal Management Division UNMIKAlexander RobertsonD/Commander, Border & Boundary Police UNMIK

Aleksander YeliseyevCommander, Border & Boundary Police, UNMIK

Robert MorrisonD/Commissioner (Crime) KPS, UNMIK

Kai VittrupCommissioner, KPS, UNMIK

Annexes

186 Jared Rigg

D/Head AUS, UNMIK Henri Winkler

Head of Operations and Training Office KPC Coordinator

Lt Col Andrew EdingtonSO 1 Development Office KPC Coordinator

Lt Col Iain Macdonald SO 1 Development Office KPC Coordinator Major Gen Chris Steirn

KPC Coordinator

Jeffrey TudorHead, DFID Kosovo

Emeline SaunierGovernance Advisor Western Balkans Team DFID

Philip EvisonConsultant Justice and Internal Affairs DFID

Arianita Beqa Consultant Justice and Internal Affairs DFID Lt Col Phil Cox

Defence Advisor British Office Ben Crampton,

Political Advisor, Council of European UnionCol Jim Playford

Defense Attaché US Office

Sossi Tatikian

Senior Political Officer OSCEKim Vetting

Programme Officer for Democratisation OSCEDr Monica LlamazaresDepartment of Police Education and Development OSCE

Dr Tamara DuffeyDepartment of Police Education and Development OSCE

List of Media Interviewees Sarah MaliqiKosovo Office Director of Youth Initiative on Human Rights

Lorik PustinaSecurity sector journalist at Lajm newspaper

Fatmire TerdevciSenior journalist at Koha Ditore newspaper

Syzana BytyciEditor of economy pages at Koha Ditore newspaperMuharrem Nitaj

Head of the Radio BBC Albanian section in Kosovo

Safet MuhovicKosovo head correspondent of Belgrade-based TV Pink and Kosovo correspondent of Bosnian news agency ONASA

Altin AhmetiEconomy journalist at Lajm newspaper

Annexes

187Lt. Veton ElshaniSpokesperson and head of KPS Information Office

Col. Shemsi SylaSpokesperson and head of KPC Information Office

Fatime Lumi MFE Press Officer

Civil Society OrganisationsLulzim Peci Executive Director KIPRED

Lecilia Stromlad Kvina till Kvina

Pernilla Johansson Field Coordinator Kvina till Kvina

Dr Istvan Gyarmati Senior Political Officer DCAF

Antje Fritz Kosovo Project Coordinator DCAF

Gregor ZoreHead of Operations DCAF

Alex Anderson Kosovo Project Coordinator ICG

Simon Rynn Balkans Project Coordinator Saferworld

Juliana Sokolova Programme Officer Saferworld

Astrit Istrefi Programme Manager FIQ

Ilir Dugolli Head Special research projects KIPRED

Haki AbaziDirector Community Watch Project East West Management Institute

Pristina University Ibrahim Gashi Spokesperson – Lecturer Ilir KelmendiPDD, Lipjan Prison, Kosovo Correctional Service

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188

Threat Threat Level Short term threat Long term threats

Economic InstabilityUnemployment

High • Increased social upheaval against governing authorities

• General criminality

• Social Upheaval• Increase in Organised Criminality• Vulnerability to international terrorist

infiltration

Rule of Law High • Undermined public faith in the justice system encourages vigilantism

• Lack of trust in the system discourages individuals from brining complaints or cases forward.

• Lack of faith in prosecution undermines enforcement regimes

• Collapse of governing authority• Collapse of police authority and enforcement• Collapse in rule of law creates atmosphere of

failed state and allows growth of organised crime, trafficking in persons and weapons, and terrorism

Corruption High • Public trust in governing institutions is low.• Public confidence in economy and economic

opportunities is low.• Increased criminality and growth of organised

crime activity

• Criminalized state institutions• Breakdown of rule of law and increased

atmosphere of failed state.

Political Instability and Ethnic Violence

Medium • Demonstrations, rioting, political instability• Inter-ethnic violence• Growth of paramilitary structures

• Collapse of government/failed state• Cross-border violence in reaction to inter-

ethnic violence

Organized Crime Medium • Discourages international investment.• Increased criminality.• Corruptions of government institutions

• Criminalization of the state• Risk for international investment means level of

investment near zero• Increased corruption and political instability• Weak rule of law allows criminality to flourish

and create atmosphere where other threats such as terrorism can grow

EpidemicsNatural Disasters

Medium/Low • Significant mortality rates in disaster zone• Rioting in response to perception of

incompetent response by authorities

• Significant mortality rates in disaster zone• Poor government response leads to collapse of

public trust in institutions• Social violence and political unrest

Drugs Low • Criminal networks continue drug activities relatively unhindered as Kosovo’s Police are in transition and international security authorities are limited in capacity to deal with the issue.

• Rule of law is challenged. Corruption grows

• Increased criminality • Social upheaval • Terrorist or political extremist presence

strengthens

Terrorism Low • Threat of attack against international and local institutional targets in Kosovo.

• Weak border controls facilitates a gateway for terrorists into Western Europe via human smuggling routes

• Poor economic conditions provides opening for influence of terrorists in population.

• Weak border enforcement, inexperienced police, and disintegrating rule of law break down ability of officials to combat external terrorist threats.

• Internal insurgent groups receive support required to incite political violence and destabilize government

External aggression

Low • Riots or acts of political violence encouraged by Serb and Albanian extremists

• Cross-border insurgency• Invasion

ANNEX VIII

Public Percepritons of Security Threats Based on ISSR Stage One & Two

Annexes

189

ISSR Recommendation/Finding Current Donor Activity in Sector Required Assistance

Sector: SALW Legal Provisions

• SALW transfer provisions brought to EU Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers.

• EUSAC initiative (EU funds via SEESAC), UNDP Kosovo

• Assistance to bring Kosovo legal and institutional framework in line with best EU practice

• Amend legal sanctions regarding illegal SALW possession to bring them into proportion with the crime and make them appropriate for Kosovo

• KOSAC initiative (USD 700,000), UNDP Kosovo

• Hunting weapons properly regulated and seasons defined

Sector: Information Management

• Economic data gathering and dissemination at local, Kosovo-wide, and regional levels should be professionalised and part of a larger Kosovo trade and economic development strategy

• Benchmarking for Public Service Delivery (BPSD) Initiative, USD 420,000, UNDP Kosovo

• Training for Kosovo institutions and technical assistance to generate in a timely manner puiblicly accessible data on budget figures, court decisions, crime statistics, firearm incidents and drug-related crimes

• Kosovo’s budgets require more professional public information regarding breakdown of budget figures and supporting data in order to make the data more transparent

• Courts should make decisions publicly available in a timely manner and have trained public information officers to provide background information regarding cases

• Trial schedules should be publicly available information

• Crime statistics should be made publicly available

• Data regarding firearm incidents, injuries, and deaths are uniformly gathered and properly processed by various public agencies including health, police, and MOIA

• Data regarding drug-related crimes and health issues should be tracked by KPS and health institutions and be available publicly

ANNEX IX

ISSR Recommendations Matrix262

262 Note: Current Donor Activity illustrated in this matrix is not meant to be a comprehensive representation

Annexes

190

Sector: Capacity Building Kosovo’s Civil Service

• The SPAC institution should be reviewed in order to support the creation of a professional class of technocrats

• DFID support to set up the legal and institutional framework for Kosovo Civil Service (project completed in 2004)

• Technical assistance is needed on the functioning of oversight mechanisms in the Civil Service. Furthermore, expertise is required (based on EU best practice) on establishing mechanisms to ensure professional continuity in the Civil Service

• The Assembly of Kosovo should consider forming a public administration committee which would assume an oversight role related to the Ministry of Public Services and IOB

• Pay and grade review completed by HELM Corporation in 2004. Proposed system not implemented

• Performance review and pay and grade systems should be designed to encourage merit-based advancement

• Kosovo’s civil service needs to be oriented towards building a professional group of technocrats who can remain in place as politically appointed civil servants change

• DFID technical assistance to PISG to build policymaking and administrative capacity

Sector: Budgeting and Accountability

• Accountability mechanisms are required in order to curtail abuse of public funds by public officials. These mechanisms should be part of the budgeting and allocation procedures and might include regular reporting of expenditures, requirement for officials to publicly release financial data, and the requirement to appear before the Assembly to give testimony regarding public programmes

• USAID’s support through advisers at MFE training and coaching Kosovar counterparts in management and oversight responsibilities (part of USD 5,000,000 for FY 2006, and part of USD 5,200,000 for FY 2007)

• Assistance to focus on strengthening the accountabiltiy mechanisms

• Kosovo’s Auditor General Office requires review and recommendations should be made for more effective function of the institution

• DFID technical assistance to PISG to improve the quality of public expenditure management.DFID also supports the development of economic planning capability in both the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Finance

• Monitoring of accountability mechanisms (EU)

• An institutional link between the Auditor-General and the Office of the Public Prosecutor of Kosovo needs to be established

• EAR assisted the Ministry of Economy and Finance to develop the first Public Investment Programme, which includes over 1.500 public investment projects

• Given the high level of UNMIK involvement in budgeting and allocation mechanisms, capacity building in this area will be required post-status

• OSCE’s training of civil administrators at various levels, in co-operation, inter alia, with the Council of Europe

Sector: Oversight

The Assembly of Kosovo

• Assembly to provide oversight of the executive branch’s implementation of laws and expenditure of public funds

• USAID’s support to Assembly on transparent law-making and oversight of the executive branch and public funds expenditures

• Technical assistance in drafting the Kosovo Security Act and expertise in setting up relevant committees at the Assembly level. Training will be requird for the Assembly members to discharge their oversight responsibilities in the security area

• Any new legislation related to the security sector (such as a National Security Act) must include provisions for oversight by the Assembly

• OSCE support to the current Assembly Committee on Safety and Preparedness

• Staff training and support study tours for Assembly Committee on Security

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191

• The Assembly should establish a Committee on Security with mandate over budget, policy, and legislative issues related to security

• UNDP programme on democratic gover-nance

Ombudsperson Institution

• In order to ensure that the institution retains its independence, budgeting and appointment provisions should be adopted to ensure political influence is minimal

• OSCE’s contribution to the monitoring, protection and promotion of human rights, including, inter alia, the establishment of an Ombudsman institution, in co-operation, with the UNHCR

• Legal advice/support for review of oversight mechanisms and negotiations of stakes agreemnts with international organisations

• Mechanisms to address abuse of power by international officials (including UNMIK and KFOR, etc) should be considered post-status

• Swedish SIDA support projects for human rights and democracy

Informal Oversight Actors

• Editorial Boards of the media should assign dedicated journalists to cover the security sector and training for specialised journalists should be provided

• USAID’s support on developing independent media to become more professional in their reporting and better positioned to be self-supporting (USD 1,300,000 for FY 2006, and USD 1,600,000 for FY 2007)

• Assistance to media to develop expertise in reporting on security related issues

• DFID assistance to media• NGOs participation in advocating for

policy change, especially in the security area, should be encouraged

• USAID several years’ assistance to civil society including training, expert consultancies, and grants for NGOs (USD 1,600,000 for FY 2006, and USD 900,000 for FY 2007)

• Assistance to NGOs who have created a profile on security issues so that they advocate for policy changes and play their oversight role

• Political parties to effectively represent their constituencies and administer their organisations in transparent and democratic fashion

• USAID’s support for credible election processes (USD 1,500,000 for FY 2006 and USD 950,000 for FY 2007). Also USAID’s program to strengthen democratic political parties (USD 1,100,000 for FY 2006, and USD 850,000 for FY 2007)

• Assistance to political parties to update their programmes to address post-status challenges and concerns of their constituencies

• OSCE’s contribution to democratisation and governance, including the development of a civil society, non governmental organisations, political parties and local media

Sector: Education

• Educational institutions across Kosovo need to be unified and parallel institutions joined with Kosovo-wide institutions

• UNICEF’s involvement in the sector, with special focus on children from communities

• Best practice expertise on the way similar issues have been addressed in other countries in the region and wider

• Accreditation of Kosovo’s higher education and technical schools in line with EU standards should be undertaken. The proliferation of unchecked private education facilities poses a threat to Kosovo’s higher education system

• USAID’s support to increase capacity of higher education to contribute to development (over USD 2,500,000 for FY 2006, and over USD 2,300,000 for FY 2007)

• Expertise is needed in ensuring proper accreditation on private institutions. EU educational accreditation advice should be provided to the Ministry of Education as they develop Kosovo standards

• Kosovo’s education system should be oriented towards basic levels of education and professional development of the population.

• Projects encouraging the literacy and professional development of marginalised and vulnerable communities

• Educational policy at all levels should be directed towards the challenges of Kosovo’s marginalized and vulnerable communities – particularly in the area of literacy and scholarship for professional development

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192

Sector: Health

• Health institutions across Kosovo should be unified and parallel institutions should be brought into the Kosovo-wide structures

• WHO support to Kosovo institutions in the health sector

• Immediate expertise in developing a health-coordination mechanism to include all health institutions in Kosovo, and also with a regional component, to address emergency situations

• Information gathering and sharing between institutions should be more transparent – particularly in order to combat threats such as epidemics

• DFID support to improve policymaking, planning and service delivery in the social sector and health sector

• A health-coordination mechanism should be developed as part of emergency planning capacity development. Such a mechanism should include ALL health institutions in Kosovo – regardless of the community they serve – and also might include a regional component

• Swedish SIDA support projects for healthcare

Sector: Economy, Energy, Trade, and

Industrial Development

• Capacity development of Kosovo’s MTI is required in the area of short and long term planning, as well as formation of Kosovo-specific and regional trade policies

• USAID assistance to help develop secondary legislation in key areas of energy regulation. Additional USAID’s assistance in support of KEK (USD 2,500,000 for FY 2006, and over USD 1,700,000 for FY 2007)

• Longer-term economic strategy development

• Development of a long-term strategy for the energy sector

• EAR assisted the energy utility KEK to benefit from its participation in the Energy Community for South East Europe and improve its revenue collection

• Bi-lateral and regional support for trade development and FDI

• USAID support to improve economic policy and institutional climate for productive investment (USD 4,800,000 for FY 2006 and USD 5,200,000 for FY 2007)

• Strategy development regarding attraction of FDI is required

• EAR collaborating with the EBRD in providing expert management advice to enterprises for business expansion and development

Sector: Judiciary

• Comprehensive reform of the judicial system as authorized by UNMIK Regulation 2006/25 should be undertaken carefully. Reform should be approached in a holistic way in order to best understand how to address problems. Specific issues for consideration might include:

• USAID’s support to the Kosovo Chamber of Advocates (KCA) by establishing Continuing Legal Education (CLE) and a pilot clinic programme withing Pristina University Law School;

• Technical assistance to conduct a comprehensive reform of the judicial system

• Constitutional guarantees of separation of powers

• EAR assistance to PISG in developing technical competencies to manage reforms mandated by the SAA process and the European Partnership

• Technical support for constitutional development and role of judicial review

• Unification of legislative processes • USAID assistance on court archiving, audio recording, and on notary services;

• Expertise to set-up a mechanism to fight corruption and malpractice in the judicial system

• Alignment of Kosovo legislation with the EU acquis communautaire

• USAID legal assistance on legislation covering courts and prosecution;

• Specific projects in support of training and definition of roles in regard to the role of the “judicial police” and prosecutors

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193

• Administrative review of court management systems

• USAID assistance in support of the Ministry of Justice and the Kosovo Judicial Council (over USD 5,800,000 for FY 2006, and over USD 6,000,000 for FY 2007)

• Expertise based on EU best practice on fighting crime generally and addressing organised crime threats

• Review of court structures and jurisdictions

• EAR support: some 31.000 people from all of Kosovo’s communities have received legal aid in civil and administrative matters as a result of an EC-funded programme

• Kosovo’s new institutions in charge of administering the evolving justice system should be strengthened

• OSCE’s training of judicial personnel

• The judicial system needs its own mechanism to fight corruption and malpractice. In addition, simple oversight mechanisms, such as a uniform, mandated computer system for case management should be implemented

• Parallel court systems need to be brought into a Kosovo-wide judicial system post-status. In the meantime PISG should ensure free access to justice for all the communities

• Given the changes in investigative responsibilities under amendments to UNMIK Regulation 2003/23, proper capacity building, training, and definition of roles needs to be undertaken in regard to the role of the “judicial police” and prosecutors

• Institutional linkages between the courts and police should be reviewed in light of best practices from EU countries in terms of fighting crime generally and addressing organized crime threats

Sector: Emergency Preparedness

• Communication links between technical and political actors related to Emergency preparedness planning and response need to be developed. Institutions affected include: Department of Emergency Management, OPS, KPC, KPS, and municipal level bodies

• British Liaison Office has invested in the development of the Kosovo Situation Centre (£300,000)

• Coordination, support, advice and training for new security institutions

• The Situation Centre in the office of the prime minister should be stood up and functioning

• Strengthening Capacities for Emergency Management (SCEM) initiative (USD 900,000), UNDP

• Situation Centre capacity building to include information analysis, reporting, and roles and responsibilities

• Training for public affairs staff in ministries regarding crisis management should be undertaken

• Strengthening Capacities of the Ministry of Justive (EAR and DFID)

• Incorporation of staff in relevant ministries in crisis management media training

• Capacity building for information management and daily reporting needs to be delivered to those staffing the Situation Centre

• Training of OPS staff (especially those staffing the Situation Centre) on information management and daily reporting

• Ministry of Justive should be strengthened to discharge its executive mandate

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194

Sector: Security Actors

Kosovo Police Service (KPS)

• The UNMIK regulation “Framework and Directing Guidelines of the Kosovo Police Service’ does not fulfil the needs and legal requirements that the KPS need. There is an urgent need to draft a new KPS law, by which through the legal process it can be better regulated

• OSCE human resources capacity-building, including the training of a new Kosovo police service within a Kosovo Police School which it established and operates

• Monitoring of development of police (EU mission)

• Continued capacity building of the police is required – particularly in the area of management. Senior officers who have been rapidly promoted should be encouraged to remain in positions longer in order to test their skills and contribute to the overall capacity building of their commands

• UNDP’s project on the Internal Security Sector Review

• Capacity development and training in areas like criminal investigation, financial crimes monitoring, and fighting organised crime, and counter-terrorism

• International police mandates post-status should be reviewed to include monitoring and capacity building elements

• DFID and EAR are currently supporting the Ministry of Internal Affairs to perform the mandated tasks

• Data protection mechanisms are required to ensure post-status Kosovo Police have ability to exchange information and work directly with regional counterpart to combat organised crime and other regional threats

• Training and recruitment of the KPS are two of the most important aspects of its future effectiveness. The centralisation of training should be reviewed and should be more relative to the specific local requirements of the regions

• Enhancement of ongoing regional coordination, cooperation and training activities

• The Ministry of Internal Affairs should be strengthened to discharge its policy-making and executive mandate

Kosovo Protection Corps and

Kosovo Defence Force (New Institution)

• Downsizing of the KPC will be necessary in order to promote professionalism and ensure correct rank structures. It will be crucial to provide an adequate redundancy and resettlement package given Kosovo budget restraints

• IOM and other donor support to KPC • KFOR/NATO assessment of equipment needs for KDF through PfP or other programmes

• There is a need to conduct an equipment review in order to ensure that the KPC is capable of providing its civil emergency response services to a uniform standard across Kosovo


• Creation of donor coordination mechanism for support to KDF

• A KDF should, in the event of Kosovo gaining independence, be formed under the initial guidance of the OKPCC and COMKFOR. Once the KDF has reached an operational strength commensurate to its role and budget affordability, the KPC should be disbanded with honour. The KDF would continue to provide the civil emergency response and ceremonial roles presently provided by the KPC

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195

• Recruitment to the KDF should be from the general population and reflect the ethnic mix of that population. In addition, members of the KPC can apply to join the KDF. Recruitment should be overseen by the international community

Ministry of Defence (MOD)

(New Institution)

• Institutional development in terms of policy making, oversight, and military-civilian interface will be required for the new ministry

• Coordination mechanism for donor assistance

• Bilateral donor assistance for capacity buildig of new ministry to include training, provision of expert advice, policy development, roles and development

Security Service (New Institution)

• Capacity building and training technical aspects as well as in management questions such as internal and external authorisation for operations; record-keeping; financial management; security and human rights legislation; vetting and recruitment criteria; and personnel management


• Coordination mechanism for donor assistance and identifying needs

• Development of competence criteria for selection of members of the new security service should be developed in line with best practice from EU and NATO states

• Bilateral donor assistance for new institution to include training, international expert advisory, policy development, and technical skills such as information gathering and analysis

• Given the importance of expanding awareness regarding these issues to ensure transparency in their creation, it is recommended that the OSCE, in conjunction with UNMIK AUS, expands and accelerates its plans for increasing security awareness, in particular the role of a security service in a democracy, to ensure that the debate does not become dominated by misunderstandings about the proposed new service

• Training for all staff on legal framework governing activities

National Security Council

National Security Council Secretariat

(New Institution)

• Training for institutional development and capacity building in areas such as policy making, civil-military relations, legal provisions related to security, roles and responsibilities, crisis management, and information management

• Establsh donor coordination mechanism.

• Training regarding information processing, analysis, and reporting for Situation Centre and KSC Secretariat

• Identify/assess needs

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196

Private Security Companies

• Monitoring of transition of PSC oversight from UNMIK to Kosovo authorities to ensure that criminal elements remain outside the PSC sphere


• Bi-lateral assistance to new department/division in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as required

• Establishment of a new department within the MOIA with responsibility for oversight of PSCs

• Review of regulations to end separations between international and Kosovo PSCs

• Review of regulations to allow for harmonization of issues such as the ability of PSCs to offer close protection services

Security-Specific Legislation

• Kosovo’s Assembly should prepare a Service Act for the Kosovo Defence Force which provides for the specific mandate of the force and outlines oversight authorities. This act, or a separate one, may also describe procedures for the creation of a KDF and the demobilisation of the KPC, and provide procedures for vetting recruitment from the general public and the KPC into the KDF (under NATO supervision)


• Incorporation of security specific needs into ongoing donor programmes

• A law should be passed addressing the proper use of a reserve (should a reserve force be deemed necessary and formed). There is a need for improved legislation outlining the duty obligations and service requirements of a reserve defence force

• Assessment of needs and identification of additional funds/programmes as required

• The Assembly should prepare a Foreign Intelligence Act. Such legislation should distinguish between intelligence for defence and external security purposes from intelligence gathered to support domestic police activities

• The Assembly should establish a law on classifying certain sensitive information, in a manner consistent with the requirements of regional security organisations such as NATO

• The Assembly should prepare a Defence Procurement Act providing a detailed procedure for ensuring allocated defence funding is properly spent

• Legislation should be written to facilitate Kosovo officials consulting security experts from outside of the Government that can assist in subject areas where there is a lack of official expertise and experience

• Legal provisions for public access to information, through a Freedom of Information Act, are required

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197

Security related issues

Returns and reintegration

• Improve the capacity and accountability of local government to support return and reintegration

• USAID’s Municipal Integration and Support Initiative (MISI) (USD 1,300,000 for FY 2006, and USD 771,000 for FY 2007)

• Continue ongoing programmes.

• EAR assisted the return of some 220 Serb and Roma families though multi-sector projects involving housing construction and rehabilitation of social infrastructure

• Provide encouragement, support and advice to the Government of Kosovo as they develop their own efforts..

• UNDP programme on returns and jobs for minorities

• Support for Municipal Community Safety Councils to continue in coopeartion with PISG

• DPED, through the Community Safety Action Teams Programme, already supports 16 Municipal Community Safety Councils

Trafficking

• Capacity of PISG to combat traffciking should be strengthened

• USAID’s assistance to strengthen the ability of PISG to combat trafficking and to assist local victims of trafficking (over USD 600,000 for FY 2006, and USD 200,000 for FY 2007)

• Provide encouragement, support and advice to the Government of Kosovo as they develop their own efforts

• IOM anti-trafficking programmes in cooperation with UNMIK Police

Mitigate conflict and support peace

• Create linkages accross ethnic divide against isloation and psychology of fear

• USAID’s support of activities to bring youth of all ethnic groups together and create economic linkages across the ethnic divide (USD 2,200,000 for FY 2006, and USD 1,100,000 for FY 2007)

• Support and encourage Government of Kosovo’s efforts to assume role in this area

• UNDP’s programme on crisis prevention and recovery and its programme to support local development

Elections

• Free and fair, and democratic elections in line with best practice

• OSCE organisation and supervision of elections

• Provide support and advice to the Government of Kosovo to improve the electoral law and conduct free and fair elections

• DFID support to voter education and election monitoring

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198

The following is the list of discussion topics and questions raised with participants in the municipal level consultations organised by the OSCE.

Area of Discussion Questions Raised

Political Security

• Do you feel that your interests are represented by the PISG?

• Which of your interests do you feel are better addressed by the PISG and which by UNMIK?

• What should the PISG do to represent your interests better?

• Do you trust the justice and security institutions?

• Do these institutions sufficiently protect your rights?

• Do you think the institutions can guarantee your security if you witness and report a crime?

• Which organization or institution in Kosovo is capable of dealing effectively with the following (KFOR, UNMIK Police, KPS, etc)

o Fighting organized crime and corruption?o Ensuring freedom of movement?o Providing general/personal security?o Public order?o Providing border security?o Prevention of inter-ethnic violence?o Protection of property?

• Who do you think is the most effective at fighting crime at present?

ANNEX X

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

ISSR Consultative Meetings Questions

Annexes

199


Social Security • What consequences will the disproportion of population and economic growth have for you? Would it affect your employment opportunities, and cause an increase in crime, illegal immigration and social distribution? In which ways?

• Do you feel threatened by unemployment and why?

• Do you think that the social aid of the Government is sufficient to reduce the poverty and is it enough for your basic needs?

• Do you influence your life by participating in elections?

• Have elected officials ever contacted your community?

• Does the government (local or national) offer sufficient space for participation in public life?

Economic Security • What effects will the future economic developments have on your life?

• Do you feel that the place where you live offers enough security for developing current economic activities?

• Do you feel that the place where you live offers sufficient implementation of the rule of law?

• Do you find that the quality of electricity effective when thinking about starting a new business?

Environmental Security • Do you feel that the water distribution in the area where you live is threatened?

Annexes

200


Ethnic Community Security

• How has the demographic picture evolved in the place where you live compared to before the conflict and how has it affected your life?

• Do you feel insecure due to the demographic picture change in the community where you live? Why?

• Do you feel that the identity and community development for your community is threatened or hindered? Why?

• How secure is the accessibility to education premises for you or your children?

• How accessible are cultural monuments for you?

• How free and safe are you to exercise your community cultural life?

• Do you feel that you have equal opportunity in employment in public institutions?

• Do you feel safe in your village/area and outside of it?

• More specifically, how would you describe the relative security or insecurity of your community at present?

• What problems, if any do you encounter when travelling in all areas of Kosovo?

• Do you feel threatened by members of other communities? Why?

• Do you think that the Government has done enough to observe and protect your human rights?

Security Institutions • What kind of role would KPC have in the future and how would you and your community benefit from it?

• Is KPC trusted in your area and by your community? If not what can be done to gain that trust?

Annexes

201


Security Threats Analysis

International Threats• What is the level of political extremism in

your area/village and at the national level? Does it cause you to feel insecure and why?

• Do you think that there is any threat of terrorism in your area or national level and where is the source of it? What is the potential for it to widen?

• Are elected representatives sufficiently accountable to the people?

• Do you know whom to address in the government (local and national) if you need to raise your concerns?

Trans-Regional Threats• How threatened are you and your

community by organised crime?• Do you feel threatened from the security

forces in your country or neighbouring countries?

International Threats• Is there religious fundamentalism in

the area where you live and do you feel threatened by it?

Vulnerabilities• Do you feel that there is potential risk of an

epidemic breakout in Kosovo and does it cause you to feel threatened?

• Do you feel that the government can sufficiently counter any potential epidemic threat in your area?

Breakdown of Participation

Regional ethnic distribution of participants

# participants Albanian Serb Turk Bosniak RAE

Mitrovicë/Mitrovica 144 53% 42% 1% 0% 4%

Prishtinë/Prishtina 185 79% 12% 0% 0% 9%

Gjilan/Gnjilane 165 63% 19% 1% 2% 9%

Peja/Peć 155 72% 11% 0% 6% 8%

Prizren 134 64% 3% 19% 7% 5%

Total 783 67% 17% 4% 3% 7%

Table 18: Regional and Ethnic Distribution of Participants in First Phase of ISSR Municipal ConsultationsSource: OSCE Kosovo Democratisation Department

ISBN 9951 - 498 - 01 - 9

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