OPERATION BADR’S BAD SURPRISE: ARAB DECEPTION IN THE YOM KIPPUR

WAR

AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

School of Security and Global Studies

INTL413 Denial and Deception

Professor William Drohan

Jim Garrett

30 May 2015

Introduction

Denial and deception (D&D) ensured Egypt achieved strategic surprise during the 1973 Yom

Kippur War. Israel’s intelligence services and civilian government leadership expressed

significant cognitive vulnerabilities. Egypt crafted a D&D plan that exploited those weaknesses

to allow Arab nations to stage forces without drawing an Israeli reaction.

Israeli Issues

Intelligence activities require professionals are able to reason, open-minded, detached,

imaginative, skeptic, intellectually honest, accurate, patient, diligent, and persevering (Clauser

2008, 28-35). History shows that Israeli intelligence was plagued by professional problems that

fed into the national security policymakers’ misconceptions. The primary job of intelligence is

to bring “truth to power” (Andregg 2007, 56). Any intelligence professional with a sense of

career self-preservation considers that they may be marginalized and their voice excluded from

future national security issues when policymakers make their preference known before

intelligence is provided. Great courage is required to overcome this fear of reprisal and to

deliver hard and unwanted truth.

Israel was as much a victim of self deception as it was of Egyptian denial. Their

misconception was so pronounced that it was called “the Concept.” The Israeli national security

policy makers believed Egypt could only attack if two conditions were met. First, Egypt would

not attack unless they were allied with Syria. Second, Egypt would not attack unless air

superiority over Israeli’s Air Force could be assured (Wirtz 2007, 33).

The Israeli Defense Force’s (IDF) previous success during the Six Days War and the Ten

Hours War undermined their appreciation of the military abilities of Arab adversaries. The IDF

assessed Arab soldiers were “primitive, undisciplined, and incapable of handling sophisticated

equipment or conducting coordinated operations” (Betts 1982, 70). This helped the Arabs

achieve performance surprise. The Arabs turned out to be “second rate rather than third rate

soldiers” (Betts 1982, 71).

Targeting Foreign Leadership

The Egyptians were the only true keepers of the flame of knowledge throughout the entire

planning period of the Yom Kippur War. They deceived friend and foe alike. They denied their

non-committed allies information until the last possible moments.

Israeli President Golda Meir maintained a cabinet that wielded the true power of the Israeli

Knesset (a parliamentary government) (Hughes-Wilson 2001, 232-233). In order to maintain a

position in this inner circle historians claim that one had to give themselves over to group think.

Otherwise, they risked being ostracized. In truth this inner council and especially President

Golda Meir were the only true targets of deception.

The Israeli Director of Military Intelligence Eliyahu Zeira was an ardent supporter of The

Concept, which led to a very biased presentation of evidence to the General Staff (Richardson

1991, 1). Zeira denied the evidence until the invasion. On October 4th, Brigadier General Joel

ben Porat, Head of Intelligence Collection pleaded with Zeira to heed the collected indicators.

Zeira replied, “You just stick to collecting intelligence and let those with the responsibility do the

assessing” (Hughes-Wilson 2001, 259).

The only Israeli of true significance the Egyptians failed to estimate correctly or perhaps

consider was the Chief of Staff General Elazar. On October 6th, when President Meir and her

cabinet agreed only to a partial mobilization based on the collected intelligence, General Elazar

ordered a full mobilization of the IDF.

Egypt deceived Syria as well. Establishing a foothold 10 kilometers from the Suez Canal to

regain their lost territory and suing for peace was Egypt’s goal (Sheffy 2008) Syria’s goal was

the utter destruction of Israel. Knowing that Syria would disagree to a limited war Egypt

deceived them to believing that Egypt too desired complete victory.

The Arab leaders denied information to their international allies as possible. The Arab

presidents informed Moscow of their plans at the beginning of October and informed the Soviet

ambassador in Damascus of the day and hour of attack on October 4th (Oren 2013). King

Hussein of Jordan, who promised to rattle sabers along the Jordanian-Israeli border to tie up

Israeli forces was considered unreliable and therefore only informed of the attack out of political

necessity on October 5th (Hughes-Wilson 2001, 252).

Know Thy Enemy

The Arabs studied their enemies well. They were well aware of their enemy’s cognitive

failures in assessing Arab capabilities. They built their military attack strategy as well as their

denial and deception plans to exploit Israel’s inaccurate political, military, and cultural

assessments.

Due to the small landmass of Israel military attacks can quickly force Israeli forces to deploy

in defense of their cities. Therefore, one of Israel’s four core defense concepts is deterrence by

pre-emptive strike “to avoid playing on Arab terms” (Ben-Horin and Posen 1981, 15).

Understanding Israel’s inclination for pre-emptive attacks the military staff of Egyptian General

Ismail, the commander of Operation Badr, identified their first requirement was to “strike first by

surprise to pre-empt the Israelis” (Hughes-Wilson 2001, 230).

The IDF relies heavily on reservists and therefore it requires strategic warning, executive

decision making, and mobilization time (Chorev 1996, 4). The Israelis assumed they would have

48 hours forewarning of any planned military action which would give them enough time to

mobilize their reserves (Chorev 1996, 4-5). Mass electronic communication would be disabled

throughout the country during the Jewish holiday. Therefore, Israel’s ability to call forth

reserves was decreased.

The Arabs proved they could coordinate operations to a limited extent. President Sadat of

Egypt and President Assad of Syria began planning a joint venture to attack the Israelis in the

final months of 1972 (Hughes-Wilson 2001, 228). The secrecy surrounding this agreement kept

the Israelis from realizing one of the two conditions of The Concept had been met. Without this

knowledge Israel continued to ignore other indicators of offensive Arab activity.

Israel Overconfidence in its Air Force

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) is considerably destructive to the nation’s enemies. Egypt and

Syria were scarred by Israel’s strategy of punishment. The punishment doctrine of the Israelis is

not to simply destroy enemy military formations but to attack enemy cities and force the enemy

to re-deploy defensively. One of Israeli intelligence’s false assumptions was that Arab nations

would not strike unless they could attack all Israeli airfields in order to prevent Israel from

conducting its punishment and combat air support missions. Israeli intelligence assessed that

Egypt would be unable to simultaneously attack Israeli airfields until 1975 (Richardson 1991).

Therefore, Israeli intelligence was unconcerned about an attack in 1973. A person may pay little

attention to an enemy’s sincere or stated intentions if they doubt that enemy’s capabilities

(Chorev 1996, 9).

The Egyptians, aware of the airfield problem came up with a new solution. They determined

that denying Israel air superiority sufficed rather than achieve air superiority (Betts 1982, 71).

Their solution also fed into the deception. The Egyptians imported large numbers of Soviet

surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Israeli military intelligence judged the SAMs to be part of an

Egyptian air defense shield to repel attacks based upon their assumption that any attack required

attack aviation. They did not factor in that these SAMs could and would be used to create an air

defense shield that protected their invading ground forces from IAF aircraft attempting to

provide defending Israeli ground forces combat air support.

Israel’s superiority complex was reinforced on September 13th when the IAF engaged and

shot down 12 Syrian fighter jets while losing only one of their own (Geller n.d.). On September

17th, General Zeira firmly told the General Staff that the Arabs were unable to go to war due to

Israeli’s air superiority (Chorev 1996).

The War Cries go Silent

At the political level Sadat declared 1971 to be the “Year of the Decision” (Geller n.d.). The

Year of Decision and 1972 passed without incident. By 1973 the saber rattling was

commonplace. The Egyptian leader’s rhetoric in 1973 was more subdued than previous years.

President Sadat took a more appeasing tone with Israel beginning in June and weeks before the

war began ordered diplomats to follow suit. Sadat spoke in July 1973 that the United Nations

would be the answer for the tension between Egypt and Israel (Bar-Joseph 2005, 29). On

September 26th during a speech he said, “I have not broached the subject of fighting because

there has not been enough talk” (Hughes-Wilson 2001, 244). The lack of an aggressive rhetoric

reinforced Israeli perceptions that the mobilizations were defensive rather offensive or that they

were part of an annual military exercise known as Tahrir.

Desensitization

Egypt understood that the Israelis needed to come to view Egyptian mobilization along the

Canal as normal. The Egyptians mobilized and demobilized reserves 22 times in 1973 before

Operation Badr began (Bar-Joseph 2005, 27). The forces were moved repeatedly to the Suez

Canal, tank ramps were constructed, and openings were created in the defensive earthworks for

Egyptian soldiers to launch their crossings (Gerwehr and Glenn 2000, 21-22). In May 1973 the

IDF mobilized at a cost of $20 million only for the Egyptians to demobilize. Afterward, the trap

was set. Intelligence personnel became caught up in a problem not of their concern. They began

to consider what economic impacts that another false-start mobilization would have on their

nation rather than reporting the indicators and allowing the politicians to determine the economic

versus physical risk.

The mobilizations and increase of military engineering was disguised as part of Tahrir 41 in

1973. Some Israeli commanders saw the buildup as a natural evolution of military exercises,

ever increasing in coordination as smaller units were considered trained in their tasks. Not all

Israelis were fooled into dismissing the Arab mobilizations. In the first week of October Israeli

military officers along the Bar Lev Line were reporting that hostile action was probably

imminent. A young intelligence order of battle officer, Lieutenant Benjamin Simon-Tov

submitted two papers to his superior, Lieutenant Colonel David Gedediah, that assessed that an

Egyptian attack was imminent, the second being as late as October 3rd (Richardson 1991, 2).

Unfortunately both reports were suppressed by the lieutenant colonel. Six months after the war

Gedediah would be dismissed and Simon-Tov promoted when the reports came out in the war’s

aftermath, although too late for Israel (Hughes-Wilson 2001, 247).

Indicators Missed or Misinterpreted

The name of the Operation “Badr” is telling in itself. Badr was a historical Muslim victory

on October 6, 626 that solidified Muhammed’s place as a political and religious leader in Arabia

(Hughes-Wilson 2001). However, Israeli intelligence assumed that Muslims would not start a

war during the holy month of Ramadan and therefore may have discounted this indicator

(Chorev 1996, 7).

The September mobilization surpassed Egypt’s previous mobilizations. Israeli and US

Intelligence both noted that maneuvers were being coordinated at the division level for the first

time. Reconnaissance photographs depicted unprecedented simultaneous troop deployments

along the Suez Canal and Golan Heights (Wirtz 2007, 33). Reserves were ordered to report to

their units. Elite commando units were deployed. All five Egyptian army divisions and 194

artillery batteries were staged along the canal when October 6th arrived (Richardson 1991, 4).

Steady state activities were disrupted far beyond what a Tahrir exercise warranted. The

military communication network was upgraded and expanded. All military communication

between Cairo and the field transitioned from radio to landlines (Richardson 1991, 4). A

National Security Agency listening post in Bavaria, Germany intercepted Soviet communications

that Warsaw Pact armament was being consolidated and airlifted to Egypt (Bamford 2002, 153).

The Schoenau Terrorist Attack

On September 28th, two Palestinian terrorists kidnapped five Jews and an Austrian customs

official hostage at the Schoenau Castle in Vienna, Austria. The Austrians gave into their

demands to close down the Schoenau transition point, the primary conduit for Soviet Jews to

immigrate to Israel. The closure diverted the attention of the Israeli government that was intent

on bringing Jews to their ancestral land. Golda Meir turned her attention to this new issue, even

traveling to Austria to petition for the transition point’s reopening.

In a statement to a German newspaper the terrorists stated their operation was part of

preparations for the imminent Yom Kippur War. While there has been no official admittance of

this by the Egyptian or Syrian government it is known that the terrorists belonged to the As

Sa’iqa “thunder” terror organization which was managed by the Syrian security forces (Israeli

Defense 2011). The boasting of such an attack, no matter how successful, would likely result in

an unnecessary and uncomfortable tension between Austria and the Arab sponsors and therefore

no admittance is likely to be forthcoming from a political level.

Not only did the Schoenau attack distract the government it provided the Syrians an excuse

for their mobilization. On October 3rd, Prime Minister Meir and her cabinet assessed that Syrian

mobilization along the Golan Heights was defensive posturing (Hughes-Wilson 2001, 250).

They determined the Syrians worried that Israel would retaliate for the attack. On October 5th,

Zeira maintained the party line that Syrians were deploying their forces defensively when the

Minister of Defense and Chief Inspector of the Armored Forces clamored for mobilization due to

reports that Syrian mobilization along the Golan Heights had reached unprecedented levels

(Hughes-Wilson 2001, 247).

Cyclic Intelligence

The State Department’s Intelligence and Research Bureau, supported by the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA), wrote an assessment in June-July 1973 that predicted a war in the

Middle East by Autumn (Hughes-Wilson 2001, 239). In September State Department analysts

informed Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that they believed conflict would begin on

September 30th (Hughes-Wilson 2001, 245). Kissinger, convinced his own personal intelligence

was greater than his department’s professional intelligence dismissed their analysis. Despite the

Intelligence Community’s warnings Kissinger agreed with Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban

that the probability of an Arab attack was low (Hughes-Wilson 2001, 238). The Director of the

CIA continuously attempted to meet with the Secretary throughout the final week to change his

mind.

The United States and Israel were victims of self-deception by cyclical intelligence. The

national Israeli intelligence reported that the Arab threat was low despite the excessive number

of indicators of attack. Therefore, the US Intelligence Community, despite their earlier

assessments began to downgrade their predictions of imminent war in the Middle East. Israeli

intelligence, believing that the United States was downgrading its threat predictions based on

independently collected and analyzed data rather than Israeli predictions further downgraded the

Arab threat (Hughes-Wilson 2001, 251).

Close Hold Planning

The Egyptian and Syrian armies centrally planned Operation Badr. Prior to October 1st only

President Sadat and Minister of War Ismail Ali of Egypt were aware of the date and time of

attack. On October 1st the Syrian Defense Minister was startled by the news that his forces

which he had been mobilized along the Golan Heights were to launch an attack in five days

(Hughes-Wilson 2001, 243). Interrogation of Egyptian prisoners during and after the war

determined that most of them were unaware of the impending war until October 6th when officers

ordered them to uncrate their rafts and put them in the canal.

The Arab Presidents even deceived and denied information to their own diplomats. The

Egyptian government told their diplomats that Egyptian mobilization was in solidarity with

Syria, believing that Israel would strike both countries if conflict occurred between Syria and

Israel (Bar-Joseph 2005, 28). The Arab nations did not want to indicate imminent action by

recalling their diplomats before the war. Ambassadors and even the foreign minister of Egypt

were abroad and unaware of the military plans when the war began.

Tactical Unpreparedness

The Egyptians played into the Israeli’s bias towards their tactical capabilities. On April 22nd

a senior Egyptian general openly announced at a general staff meeting that Egypt and Syria

needed to overcome significant “political and military issues that inhibited joint operations”

before the two nation’s militaries could cooperate effectively (Hughes-Wilson 2001, 238). The

D&D activity staff utilized the media to feed the Israelis false open source information. They

emphasized the negative effects the expulsion of Soviet military advisers had on Egyptian

military readiness (Asher 2009, 92). The Egyptian Navy reported that its forces were re-training

mine laying operations because they were performing unsatisfactorily when in actuality the Navy

was laying mines to blockade Israel.

Logistical Capabilities

The Arabs exploited Israel’s belief that Egypt and Syria lacked resources to launch an attack.

The Egyptian Navy allowed false information that two submarines were scheduled for

maintenance in Pakistan to convince the Israelis their Navy was ill prepared for conflict (Jordan

1997). In fact those submarines put to sea to blockade the Israeli coast. A supposedly classified

report leaked to the media indicated that only “40% of the [Egyptian] army’s weaponry and 60%

of aircraft were operable” (Bar-Joseph 2005, 29).

False Scheduling

Schedules were not to indicate any disruption of normal activities in Egypt. One group of

planners finalized the details of a war in late September. Throughout Egypt multiple military

and political planners, unaware of Badr, planned for tasks that would never be carried out.

The Egyptian Army’s internal deception including allowing its transportation officers to

schedule trains for the return of the Alexandria garrison from the front. (Bar-Joseph 2005, 28).

The Egyptian high command informed their forces that Tahrir 41 would end October 7th and that

routine activity would continue on October 9th, including military courses (Bar-Joseph 2005, 28).

In fact training courses and leave schedules were cancelled (Richardson 1991, 4). A Defense

Ministry public release announced registration openings for soldiers to pilgrimage to Mecca at

the end of October was announced just days before hostilities began (Bar-Joseph 2005, 28).

President Sadat told a foreign representative “he intended to participate in the UN General

Assembly in October (Bar-Joseph 2005, 28). A meeting was scheduled between the Romanian

and Egyptian War Ministers on October 8th (Bar-Joseph 2005). Syria news media announced

that President Assad would travel to eastern Syria on October 10th for a nine-day visit. Egyptian

foreign affairs officials traveling abroad were not recalled to the country prior to the war’s

initiation. Many, “including the Foreign Minister were abroad when the war started” (Bar-

Joseph 2005). This lack of a recall reduced the probability of Israeli or pro-Israeli national

intelligence communication intercepts. Also, the recall may have alerted Israeli intelligence that

a significant event was about to occur if foreign relations were being disrupted.

Supporting the Deception with Resources

The phrase “actions speak louder than words” holds true in deceptions. Egypt supported

their misinformation with some resources to back up their claims. This allocation of resources

provided a threadbare number of indicators for opponents of Israeli mobilization to point to in

their arguments.

Egyptian media reported that all of the reserves mobilized on September 17th were

demobilized. Twenty thousand non-essential reserves were demobilized as part of the ruse.

(Bar-Joseph 2005, 28). Shortly after the public announcement a deferral of demobilization was

announced. However, the United States and Israel were unconcerned because it was the third

postponement of demobilization in 1973 (Hughes-Wilson 2001, 244).

The Egyptians dispatched troops to the Suez Canal to walk around without uniforms,

weapons or armor, string out fishing lines, and swim in the canal (Geller n.d.). Some Israeli

commanders along the Bar-Lev line saw the display as concrete proof that the forces were just

there for an exercise. On October 6th Israeli soldiers recounted that the sunbathers disappeared

before artillery barrages began hammering the Bar Lev line (Hughes-Wilson 2001, 253).

Conclusion

The Arab coalition achieved strategic surprise in the Yom Kippur War through excellent

employment of D&D activities. Their understanding of the Israeli leadership’s cognitive biases

allowed them to tailor a deception plan that exploited that mental vulnerability. Their employed

deception as well as denial against their own forces to ensure operations security. The Israel

leadership adherence to The Concept blinded them to the enemy’s concept for victory. The

politicization of intelligence greatly hampered the ability to bring truth to power. Israeli

leadership was in a state of self-denial and they parroted the deceptions of their enemies happily

to avoid a harsh truth until it could not be further ignored.

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