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Journal of Rural Studies 28 (2012) 631e639

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Journal of Rural Studies

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Organic coasts? Regulatory challenges of certifying integrated shrimpemangroveproduction systems in Vietnam

Tran Thi Thu Ha a,b,*, Simon R. Bush a, Arthur P.J. Mol a, Han van Dijk c

a Environmental Policy Group, Wageningen University, Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN Wageningen, The NetherlandsbDepartment of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business Management, Vietnam Forestry University, Xuan Mai town, Ha Noi City, VietnamcRural Development Sociology Group, Wageningen University, Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN Wageningen, The Netherlands

Keywords:CertificationOrganic shrimpNaturlandShrimp farmingVietnam

* Corresponding author. Department of EconomicBusiness Management, Vietnam Forestry University,Vietnam. Tel.: þ84 936 258 279.

E-mail addresses: ha.tranthithu@wur.nl, hafuv2simon.bush@wur.nl (S.R. Bush), arthur.mol@wur.nlwur.nl (H. van Dijk).

0743-0167/$ e see front matter � 2012 Elsevier Ltd.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2012.07.001

a b s t r a c t

The Vietnamese government aims to expand the scale of Naturland certified organic production inintegrated shrimpemangrove farming systems across the coast of Ca Mau province by 2015. In doing sothe division between public and private regulation has become blurred. We analyze the government’sgoal by examining the regulatory challenges of using organic certification as a means of linking farm-level management to the sustainability of coastal (mangrove) landscapes. The results show the impor-tance of farmer perceptions of sustainable farm and landscape management, fair benefit sharingmechanisms in the certified value chain, and legitimate private sector-led auditing. We conclude that inorder to overcome conflicts of interest and legitimate representation in organic certification, the socialand economic conditions of production require regulatory intervention from provincial and local levelgovernment. To achieve benefits beyond the scale of the farm, the role of shrimp producers should beredefined as partners in rather than targets of regulation.

� 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

The aquaculture of tropical shrimp in coastal areas has been animportant source of export income to Southeast Asian countries, aswell as a source of economic risk and environmental impact (e.g.Barbier and Cox, 2004; Huitric et al., 2002; Primavera, 2006;Vandergeest et al., 1999). Asian shrimp producers are now firmlyembedded in a global agri-food system of production andconsumption, within which networks of state and non-state actorsat multiple spatial and political scales have increasing control overthe management of local resources (Bush and Oosterveer, 2007;Islam, 2008; Vandergeest, 2007; Vandergeest and Unno, 2012). Thegreat diversity of production systems across Southeast Asia, hasmeant that regulating shrimp is not only dependent on prevailingproduction conditions but also on the organization of domesticindustries (Hall, 2004). In Vietnam, shrimp aquaculture is domi-nated by small-holders due to physical and economic constraints ofintensifying production. In an attempt to improve the internationalimage of Vietnamese shrimp production the government has

s, Faculty of Economics andXuan Mai Town, Ha Noi City,

001@yahoo.com (T.T.T. Ha),(A.P.J. Mol), han.vandijk@

All rights reserved.

sought to promote organic production in shrimpemangroveaquaculture systems as a means of conserving the coastal land-scape and reducing the production risk of farmers.1

Small-holder aquaculture farmers in transitional economiessuch as Vietnam are increasingly drawn into global organicnetworks by virtue of their low input farming practices, making it(at least in principle) easy for them to meet standardized require-ments (Nigh, 1997). Third party certification is seen as a tool forimproving their market position while also achieving environ-mental and social policy objectives. But it has also come underincreasing scrutiny, especially when applied to small holders indeveloping countries (Hatanaka, 2010b; Konefal and Hatanaka,2011). Questions remain over auditing and traceability ininformation-poor economies (Bush and Oosterveer, 2007; Mol,2009), the illogics of global standards in the context of locallydefined practices (Muttersbaugh et al., 2005), and the modes andstructures of hybrid state-market environmental regulatorynetworks (Vandergeest, 2007).

After 10 years of successful implementation in Nam Can district,the Vietnamese government wants to upscale Naturland certified

1 Organic production in Vietnam lags behind many other Southeast Asiancountries, but is one of the fastest growing agricultural sectors in the country,driven by exports and domestic retailers marketing safe foods to a growing urbanmiddle class (see Scott et al., 2009; Hoi et al., 2009).

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organic production to all integrated shrimpemangrove farmingsystems along the southern coast of the Ca Mau peninsula by 2015.Such aspirations for developing an ‘organic coast’ reflects the highproduction risks associated with intensification (Joffre and Bosma,2009; Kautsky et al., 1997) and the growing international demandfor improved environmental practices in aquaculture production(Bush et al., 2010; Vandergeest, 2007). The realization of an ’organiccoast’ also demonstrates a clear shift in the governance of aqua-culture in Vietnam over the last decade, by incorporating marketoriented voluntary standards as a means of incentivizing farmers toupgrade their production practices, as well as their position inglobal value chains (Ha and Bush, 2010). As a result, the Vietnamesegovernment has begun to redefine its role from a central purveyorof regulation, to a partner in what Vandergeest (2007) has labeleda global environmental regulatory network (ERN).

This paper investigates how scaling up organic certification, asan new form of ERN, can balance the goals of ecologically, sociallyand economically sound shrimp aquaculture in Vietnam. Morespecifically we explore the regulatory challenges of using organiccertification as a means of linking farm-level management to thesustainability of coastal (mangrove) landscapes. The research isdriven by two key questions. First, what are the regulatory chal-lenges of up-scaling organic certification to coastal landscapes?And second, what are the (potential) roles and levels of involve-ment of different government institutions in organic certification asan ostensibly privatized form of environmental governance?

Research was conducted from 2007 to 2011 in Tam Giang andTan An communes of Ca Mau province; an area dominated byintegrated shrimpemangrove farming system (Fig. 1). A total of 130semi-structured interviews were conducted with farmers, collec-tors, traders, government officials, processing companies and anexternal auditor. Follow up interviews were conducted in Europewith the Naturland Association for Organic Agriculture. Most of theinterviewees were visited more than once to monitor changes intheir perception and practices between years and seasons. In

Fig. 1. Map of Ca Mau provi

addition, a year-long monthly survey of 20 households providedinformation on shrimp production. Focus group discussions wereconducted with both certified and non-certified shrimp farmers tovalidate research findings. Supplementary data was gathered fromproject websites and reports produced by certification and auditingbodies.

We now turn to an explanation of certification as a new form ofenvironmental regulatory network and identify key ‘clusters ofconflicts’ in the practice of certification compliance and regulation.Section three then introduces integrated shrimpemangrovefarming systems in Ca Mau province. Section four and five elabo-rate on the organic shrimp ERN, analyze the challenges of regu-lating organic production and trade in Ca Mau, and discuss howgovernmental organizations are involved in the certificationprocess. Finally we reflect on the Vietnamese government’s aspi-rations for developing an ‘organic coast’ and how organic certifi-cation can contribute to obtain such a goal.

2. Certification as environmental regulatory network (ERN)

The growing prominence of market-based governance, such asthird-party certification, has redefined responsibilities for regu-lating a range of environmental and social problems in global agri-food production. How standards are defined and enforced, as wellas what combinations of actors are involved in both steps, has led towidespread discussion over the roles and power of state and privatesector actors. State-centric models argue that governments arecenters of policy making authority and have a steering role insocietal decision making. Alternatively, market models emphasizea sidelining of the state (Rhodes, 1994), and a shift of authority toprivate actors and economic processes. Cashore (2002), siding withthe latter, frame certification as a ‘Non-State Market Driven’(NSMD) environmental governance arrangement, emphasizing thediminished role of governments in create or enforce adherence to‘rules’, and their role as one of many participating interest groups.

nce and the study sites.

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Moreover, NSMD arrangements gain authority through the market,in which price signals and access shape the behavior of producers.

The rise of NSMD certification schemes in global agri-foodnetworks is a contested but widely perceived positive move toovercome the limitations of state-based regulation of environ-mental and social performance of primary production (Cashore,2002). Within specific niche or alternative agri-food networks,such as fair trade and organic, NSMD certification is criticized forfulfilling an increasingly unrealistic number of expectations; fromsafe and healthy food to the promotion of environmentallysustainable production practices, and the empowerment of small-holder producers (e.g. Hatanaka, 2010b; Konefal and Hatanaka,2011). Supplanting state regulation with private certification maytherefore be a too simplified view of ‘market driven’ governance(Auld et al., 2008; Rönnbäck, 2003). The literature on standards andcertification clearly outlines a continued role for governments increating basic guarantees in certification arrangements, especiallyfor small-holder producers in transitional economies (e.g.Giovannucci and Ponte, 2005; Klooster, 2005; Auld et al., 2008). AsEden and Bear (2010) argue, NSMD certification has as yet onlybeen able to supplement rather than supplant government regu-lation, and should be thus understood as a “precarious balancing ofdifferent interests and forms of authority” (Eden and Bear, 2010: p.103).

Based on research on shrimp aquaculture in Thailand,Vandergeest (2007) conceptualizes certification as an environ-mental regulatory network (ERN) in which wider groups of actors(including state institutions, certification bodies, environmentalgroups, development agencies, international organizations, tradeagreements, consumers, retailers, traders and farmers) participatein a relational form of governance that includes, but also expandson, linear notions of value chain regulation. Actors in these certi-fication ERNs are driven by multiple motives and competingagendas, including reducing environmental harm, promotingeconomic growth, facilitating trade, and ensuring food safety andquality.

Seeing certification as an ERN allows us to identify multiplelinkages between actors and understand how their relationsinfluence practices related to primary production and trade.Questions of state involvement in certification ERNs remainextremely pertinent. The formulation, implementation and regu-lation of (environmental and food quality) standards is influencedby multiple actors and networks. In Vietnam, a country in an on-going transition from a centrally planned to market economy(Beresford, 1990; Kerkvliet, 1995), the government is exploringways to balance sovereign control over farmers with the growinginfluence of intergovernmental organizations andmarket actors, allof which have a different perspective of how to regulate sustainableshrimp production (Ha and Bush, 2010). This is clearly evident inthe decision by the Vietnamese government to upscale organicshrimp production in Ca Mau by 2015, and opens up questionsabout the ways in which the Vietnamese state interacts with and isinvolved in global certification ERNs.

Based on the literature, we identify three ‘clusters of conflicts’within certification ERNs that are relevant to organic shrimpproduction and regulation in Vietnam. Governing these conflictsdirectly influences the willingness and capacity of local producersto comply with organic standards. The first cluster emerges aroundthe diverging epistemologies of ‘organic’ farming between actors incertification ERNs. In her work on organic shrimp producers inIndonesia, Hatanaka (2010a, 2010b) illustrates the consequences ofdiverging understandings of ‘sustainable’ and ‘organic’, eitherbecause it is lost in translation or because there is no consultationwith farmers in standard formulation. Hatanaka (2010b) notes anuneven division of responsibility, where producers are expected to

comply regardless of the level of technology availability, technicalexpertise or economic capacity. While organic certificationnetworks are successful in forging a partnership in ‘productoutcome’, Hatanaka argues they are not as successful in developing‘partnerships in process’; a point that is reiterated in various otherstudies (e.g. Giovannucci and Ponte, 2005; Islam, 2008; Neilson andPritchard, 2007; Vandergeest, 2007; Ponte, 2012). Such a ‘product’focus also raises concerns over the scale of responsibility. Themarket paradigm has placed the burden of proof of on farmers,which limits the scale at which the impact of improved productionpractices can be seen (Muttersbaugh, 2005). Questions thenemerge over whether such farm-level organic certification can behelpful for the Vietnamese government to govern coastallandscapes.

The second cluster focuses on trading practices in what Bushand Oosterveer (2007) label the ‘black box’ of global value chains:the segment linking producers and processors. In contrast topractices at the farm level and on factory floor, this value chainsegment is poorly understood, with poor assumptions often madeabout the existence of direct and traceable linkages betweenproducers and exporters. In reality, Farmers are embedded ina complex patron-client trade networks (Ruddle, 2011; Anh et al.,2011). These relations facilitate services to producers that areoften not otherwise available, including informal credit, technicalexpertise and social welfare. Over the long term these services areoften more highly valued than farm-gate price maximization.However, in organic certification, which depends in large part onprice signals to incentivize changes in production practices(Johannsen et al., 2005; Muttersbaugh, 2006; Reardon et al., 2009),such social relations can also be constraining. Understanding valuechain relations therefore helps to determine whether and howprice premiums are negotiated and transferred to farmers, as wellas the extent to which equitable benefit sharing can be fostered bythe private sector and/or the state.

The third cluster focuses on third party auditing practices.Audits are responsible for verifying that standards are imple-mented, certificates are issued to products, and credibility andlegitimacy is assured through periodic site visits. The credibility ofthe audit system is maintained by the differentiation of regulatoryand technical responsibilities, and by independently verifyingcompliance against pre-determined indicators (Hatanaka, 2010a).To lower costs auditing is divided into periodic external audits, andcontinual monitoring through internal control systems (ICS). In anICS producers are required to document activities that are verifiedon a regular basis by an internal party. Despite being outwardlyobjective in their design, there is growing critical awareness of thesubjectivity of such auditing practices. As outlined by Power (1997),auditing is widely perceived as a coordinated series of technicalsteps, but is in reality a socially embedded set of practices andperspectives. Understanding the role that social relations play inthe audit process opens up questions of legitimacy and credibilitywhich are so fundamental to private forms of governance. Whatrole governmental organizations can play to ‘mitigate’ concerns oflegitimacy and credibility in certification auditing is thereforea centrally important question.

3. The evolution of integrated shrimpemangrove farmingsystems

Ca Mau is the leading province of Vietnam in terms of both areaand output of shrimp cultivation. In 2009, 265,153 ha of shrimpwere being cultured - equivalent to 48% of the total shrimp farmingarea in Vietnam - producing 99,600 tonnes or 25% of the country’stotal production (Vietnam Aquaculture Department, 2009; Ca MauAgriculture and Rural Development Department, 2010). At the

Fig. 2. The proportion of different shrimp farming systems in terms of area in Ca Mau.

Table 1Economic analysis of different systems of shrimp farming in Ca Mau province.

Integratedshrimpemangrove(N ¼ 10)

Improved extensivemonocultureshrimp (N ¼ 7)

Intensiveshrimp(N ¼ 3)

Shrimp productivity(kg/ha)

228 218 4366

Income fromshrimpa

18,280 22,669 498,300

Income fromfish & craba

4864 2001 0

Total incomea 23,143 24,670 498,300Total costa 5886 3631 251,584Net incomea 17,257 21,039 246,716Benefit Cost Ratio

(BCR per ha)2.92 5.79 0.96

a Unit: VND 1000 per ha. (1 USD ¼ 20,000 VND). Source: Household recordingwithin from October 2008 to October 2009, this study.

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same time CaMau is home to half of the remainingmangrove forestin the Mekong Delta and a third of what is left in Vietnam (MARD,2008). The government is therefore under pressure to balancewider aspirations of an export-led economy with the conservationof the remaining mangrove forests. Against these competingagendas integrated shrimpemangrove systems have emerged as anopportunity to maintain production while ensuring a minimumarea of forest cover.

Integrated shrimp-mangrove systems can be considereda traditional form of extensive aquaculture that has been practicedalong the Ca Mau peninsula since the early 1980s (De Graaf andXuan, 1998). Extensive systems are characterized by the naturalrecruitment of larvae through tidal exchange, the absence of arti-ficial feeding during the entire grow-out period and low levels ofproduction of around 250 kg per hectare per year. In the 1990s thegovernment supported the intensification of shrimp farming bysubsidizingmangrove clearance, as well as investing in state ownedhatcheries and feed mills (Buu and Phuong, 2000). By 2000production was only increased to 450 kg per hectare per year (DeGraaf and Xuan, 1998), still well below other Southeast Asiancountries, but mangrove cover had declined by to 48%. Todayshrimp aquaculture in CaMau is more diversified than in the 1990s,but remains dominated by improved extensive systems, whichinclude shrimp-mangrove integrated systems, characterized by lowdensity artificially stocking (1e3 fingerlings per square meter) andno supplementary feeding (see Fig. 2).

Although making up only 15% of the total pond area in theprovince, integrated shrimpemangrove systems have remainedattractive to farmers and policy makers alike given their low cost,lower virulence of diseases such as white spot syndrome (Dieu,2010), and the need to protect mangrove forests (MARD, 2008).Shrimpmangrove integrated systems have therefore become one ofthe only clear examples of how the government might fulfill itswider goals of developing environmentally responsible shrimpproduction (Ha and Bush, 2010). How environmental improve-ments should be achieved remains unclear, but is closely linked tothe reduction of disease incidence, maintaining farmers’ liveli-hoods, and securing the ecosystem services that mangrove forestsprovide in low lying fluvial coastal areas.2 It is also exactly these

2 Mangroves have been shown to play an important role in coastline protection,mitigation of wave and storm impacts, local climate stabilization and as a source forwood, fuel and feeding and nursing areas for many aquatic species (Primavera,1998; Lebel et al., 2002). The Vietnamese government has recognized these asvaluable environmental services given their importance in the fluvial environmentof the Mekong Delta and the Ca Mau peninsula (Viet Nam Environment ProtectionAgency, 2005).

production aspects that have made the shrimp-mangrove systemamenable (in theory) to organic certification.

As shown in Table 1, only a small difference in productivitybetween the integrated and non-forested improved extensivesystems is evident, indicating relatively a low economic barrier tomaintaining mangrove cover. But perhaps making integratedshrimpemangrove systems more attractive to farmers, policymakers and organic certifiers alike is also their inherent stabilitycompared to the non-forested improved extensive system. More-over, the results show that households in the integrated systemhave extra income from fish and crab (nearly 28% of total income),while farmers in the non-forested system only obtain 9% additionalincome (see Fig. 3). From an organic production perspective, this isappealing as it illustrates themore bio-diverse nature of productionof shrimp-mangrove farming. The improved extensive systems alsohave lower investment costs than the intensive systems, anda higher economic efficiency. Integrated shrimp-mangrove systemsare therefore comparatively a lower risk form of farming for themajority of farmers in Ca Mau.

The prevalence of shrimp-mangrove farming in Nam Can andNgoc Hien, two of the most forested coastal areas in the country,have made them the focal point of the organic coast policy. AsNaturland organic certification has been drawn into the aspirationsof the Vietnamese state, it has become an important arbiter ofcoastal landscape management by regulating small-holderproducers inhabiting these forested areas to maintain mangrovecover. The remainder of the paper examines how and to whatextent the organic certification ERN combines private and publicactors in to achieve an up-scaling of organic production along thecoast of Ca Mau.

Fig. 3. Proportion of income from shrimp and other fish of different farming systems.

Table 2Naturland organic shrimp production in Tam Giang, 2002 to 2009.

Year Numberof householdscertified

Volume of organic product bycertified households (tons)

Percentages ofcertified householdssold the product tothe project

Black tigershrimp

Othershrimp

2002 143 10 4 40e502003 336 47 12 50e602004 694 365 125 50e602005 850 450 170 50e602006 854 467 190 60e702007 850 480 225 60e702008 817 490 214 70e802009 784 485 202 70e80

Source: Ca Mau Frozen Seafood Processing Import Export Corporation, 2010.

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4. Regulating organic shrimp production and trade throughcertification

4.1. Organic environmental regulatory network

The development of an export-led economy has played a majorrole in the environmental governance of agri-food production,including shrimp aquaculture. The transition from a centrallyplanned to a market economy has not only opened up Vietnameseproducers to international trade, but resulted in the introduction ofthird party certifications such as Naturland, in which diverse actorswith a range of interests, norms, knowledge and values movegovernance beyond the monopoly of government institutions.

The organic certification of integrated mangrove-shrimp produc-tion systems draws together different state regulation to protectmangrove forests and promote responsible aquaculture production,with private Naturland organic standards. The initial impetus fororganic certificationwas given by the VietnamAssociation of SeafoodExporters and Producers (VASEP), which, according to its director,was looking to demonstrate that shrimp farming was not necessarilydamaging to the environment. VASEP then brought together the CaMau Department of Fisheries, and sought funding from the SwissImport Promotion Program (SIPPO). Tam Giang was selected asa project site because it had integrated farming in a production forestarea managed by the State-owned 184 Forestry Fisheries Enterprise(which later became 184 Forestry Company). Once implementedthe organic certification network expanded to include an externalauditor, the Institute for Market Ecology (IMO), and the Ca MauFrozen Seafood Processing Import Export Corporation (CAMIMEX) toexport the shrimp to Co-op supermarkets in Switzerland.3

The initial proposal for upscaling came from the 184 ForestryCompany in response to the challenge of administering a rapidlygrowing number of farms. As the number of farms grew to about1200 the company suggested certifying the entire area under theirmanagement. The basis for this suggestion was to reduce theburden of farmers in meeting auditing requirements for certifica-tion and the observation that as long as the overall pond mangroveratio was 50:50, the area could still be considered ‘organic’.However, the proposal was rejected by IMO because they wereconcerned about free-riding by individual farmers if auditing wasat the group level. The result is that although the government’sgoal, as expressed through the forestry company is to maintainlandscape coverage of mangrove, the responsibility for manage-ment remains at the individual household level.

The consistent growth of certified farms in Tam Giang since2002 (Table 2) led the government to expand organic certificationto Tan An commune in Ngoc Hien district in 2009. There 335 farms,on 2100 ha, were enrolled in the program in partnership with theNam Can Sea-products Import Export Join Stock Company (SEA-NAMICO), funded by SIPPO and certified by IMO. The site repre-sented a newmodel for the government because instead of a State-owned forestry company, the production forest as part of a widerarea of mangrove was managed by the KienVang Protection ForestManagement Board. The role of the management board is similar tothat of 184 Forestry Company in Tam Giang commune: it isresponsible with the processing company to organize and imple-ment certification schemes in the field. Buoyed by the success todate, the Ngoc Hien district People’s Committee plans to enlargethe organic certification site to all 19,500 ha of integratedshrimpemangrove systems by 2015. Like in Tam Giang, landscapemanagement will remain at the farm level.

3 Located in Ca Mau city, CAMIMEX was initially a state-owned company that wastransformed into a joint-stock corporation in 2008.

The organic ERN is considered a success by the government,primarily because of the steady increase of the number of certifiedfarms andproduction since 2002. Somegovernment officials also seethe success of organic certification as strengthening both landscapeand farm level sustainabilitygoals. Despite questionsover the level ofresponsibility for management, the state-owned Forestry Companyenterprises and Protection Management Board are deemed to beeffectively maintaining 50% forest cover, meeting the requirementsof landscape level forestry management. Farmers, at least on paper,are seen as being rewarded for following farm level productionpractices through a price premium. Furthermore, the widergovernment goal of ensuring socio-economic development of forestusers has beenpromoted through themarket orientation inherent toorganic certification. As a combinationof state, private and farm levelinterests, the organic ERN has therefore received widespreadsupport by the provincial and district government, as it appears tomeet environmental, social and economic development aspirations.

4.2. Farmer practices and compliance to the standards

The success to date of promoting organic certification in TamGiang and Ngoc Hien can be largely linked to the lack of episte-mological conflicts between farming practices and the organicstandards. Because of their pre-existing compliance shrimp-mangrove integrated farmers have been coopted into the organicproduction system by virtue of their low input farming techniques(cf. Nigh, 1997). Their production system is also compliant to theregulations of the government; they use a low density of artificialfingerlings and there is no supplemental feed or chemical use. Asoutlined above, farmers have maintained these extensive systemsnot only because of a desire to comply to government regulation,but also because they recognize the unstable productivity ofimproved extensive production in the absence of mangroves.4 Asone farmer expressed, “all shrimp farming practices and shrimpproducts in integrated shrimp-forest areas here are organic, so whydo we need certification for it?”. This raises the question about thelegitimacy of the existing system by the Naturland standardsbecause the integratedmangroveeshrimp production systems herecould be considered ‘organic’, or at least having organic farmingcharacteristics, before Naturland certification arrived.

The level of mangrove forest cover, however, does reveal anepistemological conflict. According to the Naturland standards, the“former mangrove area in property of the farm shall be reforestedto at least 50% during a period of maximum 5 years” (Naturland,

4 The only way in which farmers currently fall short of full compliance to theNaturland standards is their failure to stock organic certified seed because there isno certified organic hatchery in the region, despite plans by the government andCAMIMEX.

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2010: 23). The standard is generally in line with the regulation setout in Decision 24/2002/QÐ-UB on the forest e shrimp pond ratiowith the exception of farms with a total area less than 3 ha (Fig. 4).As forest cover has become the most important (and most visual)indicator for certification it has become a point of controversy.According to a report from IMO’s staff, 19 households were notcertified after auditing in 2009 because they did not comply withthe Naturland standards despite meeting the government’srequirement for 40% forest coverage. Interviews revealed thatfarmers with plots less than 1e2 ha were less likely to complybecause they have chosen to maximize their pond area as incomefrom shrimp is larger and more consistent than income fromforestry (Ha et al., forthcoming a). The 10% ‘deficit’ between theNaturland standards and the government regulations thereforeappears to disadvantage small-holders in the Naturland program.

Data from CAMIMEX shows that most of the certified farmsmeet Naturland’s requirement for >50% forest coverage and thata number of farms have up to 70% coverage. The apparent success ofmaintaining forest by these farmers can be explained by theimplementation of government policy and management activitiesof the forest company, as well as the farmer’s attitude towardsprotecting forests (Ha et al., forthcoming a). Farmers, however,argued that the assessment of certification should not be based onindividual farms, but rather, in line with the claims of the forestrycompany, collectively. If a number of farms in the village have lessthan 50% forest coverage they should be ’compensated’ by thosefarms with 60% and even 70% forests coverage, so that both can becertified. Non-compliance of small-holders to the Naturland stan-dard on forest cover therefore appears to be both a question ofdifferent perceptions about what constitutes a ‘forested’ area aswell as (in)flexibility of standards that have predefined units andscales of measurement. Farmers complain that Naturland standardsare not realistic because they assess individual farms, while the real‘organic’ effect of forest cover is realized at a larger scale.

4.3. Value chain practices e premium payment and benefit sharing

A key conflict that appears to undermine the certification ERN isthe difference in the farm gate price and premium paymentsapplied in Tam Giang and Tan An communes. In Tam Giang, thefarm gate price of certified shrimp is VND 8000 per kilogram(zUS$ 0.4) lower than the market price for non-certified shrimp.This is an explicit policy applied to organic shrimp by CAMIMEX inorder to discourage mixing non-certified with certified product.The standard price of shrimp is based on 20 pieces per kilogram. Ifthere are fewer pieces per kilogram, meaning a larger size ofshrimp, the price increases by VND 10,000 (US$ 0.50) per kilogram.After export a guaranteed 20% of the value of the shrimp flows back

Fig. 4. Ratio of forest to pond area as set out by the provincial government.

to the production site and is distributed into four parts: (i) 5% forCAMIMEX; (ii) 6% for the farmer; (iii) 2% for to collector; and (iv) 7%to a fund to insure against downward fluctuations in market price.However, the payment to the farmers normally takes at least two tothree months depending on the time of export, and the 6% farmershare has been reduced over time from 15% at the start of theproject. In addition, farmers complain that the 7% insurance isnever used in periods of downward prices and instead is accrued toCAMIMEX, making their share double of what farmers receive.

In Tan An, the farm gate price of organic shrimp is VND 10,000per kilogram (zUS$ 0.5) lower than the price for non-certifiedshrimp, but this is compensated by a flat price given to shrimpranging from 20 to 40 pieces per kilogram. Theoretically, thisbenefits farmers, but in practice the size of shrimp in Tan An rangesfrom 10 to 20 pieces per kilogram. If farmers sell their shrimp tocollectors working outside the organic value chain they can get upto VND 10,000 per kilogrammore for the product. Certified farmersare also promised a 20% premium above the market price. Butunlike Tam Giang, the premium is divided into 5% for the devel-opment fundmanaged by SEANAMICO and 15% for the farmers. Themain concern of the farmers is that theymust wait for up to three tofour months before being paid the premium because of the longdelays in exporting shrimp to Europe and the slow paymentschedule of downstream actors in the chain.

As these two cases illustrate, the payment of equitable (andcontracted) price premiums is the biggest concern of certifiedfarmers. In both communes, farmers receive the same (or a littlemore) from certified organic shrimp compared to non-certifiedproducts. Reflecting experiences in other aquaculture systems inVietnam (Khiem et al., 2010), farmers are disadvantaged bypayment delays e a stark contrast with payment terms for non-certified shrimp. As a result many certified farmers are increas-ingly reluctant to sell their product to organic shrimp collectors.The risk for Naturland and the government is that farmers arewithdrawing their enrollment in the program. In 2009, 145 newfarms were certified, but in 2010, 155 certified farms were notaudited because they had not sold shrimp as organic to the pro-cessing company. The farmers are increasingly questioning theeconomic benefit of being certified, but many remain associatedwith the system in the hope of improvements in the system.

4.4. Auditing practices e internal control system (ICS)

The selection of organic shrimp collectors by CAMIMEX playsa key role in the functioning of the certification scheme. Thirtycollectors were enrolled in TamGiang commune, with an average ofthree collectors per hamlet, each servicing 25 to 30 organic farms.These collectors were already active before the organic projectstarted in 2001 and, while maintaining the same clients, are nowregulated within the ICS of the CAMIMEX. During harvest periods(about 14 days per month) collectors are personally responsible forcollecting shrimp and handling payments. They first categorizeshrimp into different sizes, then weigh and fill in the formsprovided by CAMIMEX. Collectors directly pay farmers based on thegrade and size of shrimp, which is also set by the processingcompany. The shrimp are then re-checked at the CAMIMEXcollection station by a company officer. Within 24 h after harvestingthe shrimp must enter the processing company according to foodsafety standards.

An Internal Control System (ICS) was set up in 2008 by CAMI-MEX, the 184 State Forestry Company, farmer representatives andcollectors. The organization is under the direct control andmanagement of CAMIMEX and operates following the regulationsdetailed by the International Federation of Organic AgricultureMovements (IFOAM). The main function of the ICS is to monitor

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farming and traceability through the trade chain in accordancewith the Naturland standards. Because the ICS is recognized as aninternal mode of auditing, IMO (as an external auditor) uses thedata generated as the basis of their annual auditing. To improvetheir own efficiency they only randomly visit audited farms tocheck whether ICS information and documents are correct.

Although the ICS operates smoothly and contributes to theauditing process, there are doubts about the effectiveness andefficiency of the system, especially with respect to the collector’sactivities. The problem is that collectors not only collect organicshrimp from certified farms but also buy other aquatic products(black tiger shrimp, other shrimp and fish) from both certified andnon-certified farms in order to increase their income. Farmers arealso in favor of this practice as it provides a ready market for theirother aquatic products and it is an important way for collectors tomaintain relations with farmers in their social network. Thefarmers, however, reported that some collectors, if not many, mixnon-certified with certified products in order to maximize their 2%bonus based on the value of the farm gate price and the volume ofcertified shrimp transported to the collecting station.

Managing collectors is seen as the most difficult task for ICS.Those directly involved in the ICS recognize that they should notonly rely on farmers for auditing information, but are restricted bythe costs that further monitoring would entail. By the same tokenthese ‘middlemen’ play an important role in the supply chain due tothe fragmented character of shrimp production. The local govern-ment is noticeably absent in making any attempt to improve thequality of the ICS. As government staff pointed out, the governmenthas made a decision not to intervene in deteriorating networkrelations. The net results is that although auditing and supply chainmanagement are important functions of the Naturland system, thecurrent make-up of the ICS appears to be hindering the sustain-ability of the certification scheme. The results also indicate that theICS system risks not being objective because all the actors have aninterest in increasing the volume of organic shrimp.

5. Regulatory challenges of ‘organic coasts’: a discussion

Our analysis demonstrates that Vandergeest’s understanding oforganic certification as an environmental regulation network opensup a more nuanced view on the role of state and private actors withtheir different norms, values and practices. Governments, inter-governmental organizations, NGOs and industry play differentroles in the certification ERN. Although Naturland has come a longway in facilitating interaction between these diverse actors,concerns remain about the ongoing incentives for farmers to beinvolved in the system should it continue to be scaled up throughgovernment policy. We now return to the three ’clusters ofconflicts’ to explore the regulatory challenges faced by thegovernment’s goal of certifying an organic coastal landscape by2015.

The shrimp-mangrove integrated system benefits from existing‘organic’ practices of producers in Nam Can and Ngoc Hien. Theonly point of contention is the protection and re-forestation ofmangroves. The 10% ‘deficit’ between the Naturland standards andthe government regulations on the allowable proportion of farmarea under mangrove forest for farms less than 3 ha disqualifiesmany small-holders from Naturland certification. The proposalmade by farmers to also consider forest cover over ‘clusters’ offarms demonstrates an alternative understanding of the relation-ship between farm and landscape management that would allowtheir participation in the program. The different definitions offorest cover are therefore not only administrative but also representan epistemological divide over what constitutes landscapeconnectivity that holds direct implications for the participation of

small-holders. This is in line with Hatanaka’s (2010b) observationson the tensions between farmer practices and externally definedand regulated standards.

The farmer’s proposal for group certification as a means ofcertifying larger ecological units holds some credence, and wouldrespond to the concerns that mangrove forests are best managed atthe landscape rather than farm level. There is growing evidencethat a cluster based approach can save on certification costs, as wellas enable improved internal monitoring systems, upgrading ofcommunal infrastructure, improved economies of scale inproduction and improved bargaining capacity in the value chain(Kassam et al., 2011; Umesh et al., 2010). Such an approach wouldalso respond in some degree to Vandergeest’s (2007) call for morecohesion of certification processes with community-based naturalresource management institutions. However, as found in otherstudies on Vietnamese aquaculture (Khiem et al., 2010; Anh et al.,2011; Ha et al., forthcoming b), successful cooperation requirescloser support from government agencies in providing technicalinput and closer regulatory oversight.

With respect to conflicts around trade practices in the organicERN, our analysis shows that the role of market incentives is vital infostering farmer participation and compliance with any privatesector-led governance arrangement. If farmers do not get bettermarket access or a premium for their products, they are unlikely tochange their practices to pursue certification (e.g. Hatanaka, 2010b;Muttersbaugh et al., 2005; Raynolds, 2009; Reardon et al., 2009).The certified farmers in Ca Mau are not satisfied with the benefitsharingmechanism applied in the Naturland program as there is nosignificant difference in farm gate price between certified and non-certified shrimp. The government’s orientation towards organicshrimp farming in Ca Mau is therefore oriented towards environ-mentally sustainability, but unless greater regulation ensues, willcontinue to neglect social and economic dimensions of production.

Small-holder shrimp farmers in Vietnam, by virtue of theirremote location, low production levels andweak organization, haveextremely low bargaining power relative to other actors along thechain (Bush and Oosterveer, 2007). In the Naturland organic chainthis low bargaining power might be enhanced by the involvementof the local government via the 184 Forestry Company and theforest management board. In practice, however, forestry SOEs andmanagement boards are primarily interested in guaranteeingtimber production rather than shrimp production. This reflects aninstitutional decoupling of shrimp and forest production althoughthey are directly dependent on each other (Ha et al., forthcoming a).The result is that the interests and concerns of the shrimpproducers have been marginalized. As outlined by Belton et al.(2009), this reflects a wider bias in aquaculture certificationtowards environmental sustainability, neglecting equitable accessof participants to a sustainable livelihood. The future success of theexisting Naturland system and the aspirations of the government toupgrade the system to a wider area therefore appear to be stronglydependent on the ability of farmers to capture the full share of theircontracted 20% premium.

The third and final set of conflicts in the ERN relate to reportingand enforcement. The current make-up of the Naturland ICS in CaMau also appears to hinder the sustainability of the certificationscheme. Reflecting the observations of Vandergeest (2007) inThailand and Hatanaka (2010b) in Indonesia, farmers find them-selves the objects of, rather than partners in, monitoring with little(if any) input to the form and function of reporting. The only meansof objection and resistance they have is to not sell their shrimp tothe processing company e by far the most influential and powerfulactor in the system. The ICS system also risks not being objectivebecause all the actors have an interest in increasing the volume oforganic shrimp. This opens up a central contradiction of private-

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sector-led third party certification such as Naturland. Althoughcharacterized by its claims of objectivity (Hatanaka and Busch,2008), a distinction has to be made between organizational andoperational independence. As actors in the Naturland chain pursuetheir own benefits, operational independence is being slowlyeroded. Supporting Rönnbäck’s (2003) review of Naturland shrimpin Indonesia, the risk of misinformation and cheating is consider-able when external auditing is based on information provided bystakeholders whose benefits depend on the exploitation of small-holders.

Faced with these regulatory challenges of organic certificationthe question of where, when and how the state can be brought backinto networked forms of environmental governance remains highlyrelevant. The government, however, is not an homogenous entity.Different government departments at multiple levels have differentgoals, abilities and interests in supporting organic certification.Determining which institution can best intervene depends onaddressing conflicts of interest and questions of legitimate repre-sentation within the ERN and their influence over steering towardsan ‘organic coast’.

Following Anh et al. (2011), Muttersbaugh (2005) andVandergeest (2007), we suggest that local government atcommunal and village level is best positioned to support farmers inthe translation of standards and price bargaining. As we argueelsewhere (Ha et al., forthcoming b), improved farmer organizationthrough clusters can also be supported by local government orexisting state sponsored farmer associations, but success is morelikely if they are led and ‘owned’ by producers. If these clusters aresupported by technical government services they can be moreeffective in steering and monitoring the shrimp supply chain(Khiem et al., 2010), which in turn can balance the existing regu-latory difficulties experienced by the Naturland ICS. We also seea clear role for the provincial government to not only scale up thenumber of farmers enrolled in the system, but also to promoteorganic products both internationally and domestically, and toprovide stronger enforcement over existing benefit sharingcontracts between producers and processing companies. However,government involvement is not an absolute solution for ensuringconflicts of interest are avoided and legitimate representation putin place. Instead multiple actors in the ERN need to develop theircapacity for negotiating their terms of incorporation and the finaloutcomes of organic certification.

6. Conclusions

The decision of the government to upscale organic certificationin Ca Mau province by 2015 raises a series of challenges about therole of the state in NSMD forms of environmental governance.Organic certification in Vietnam is not a fully privatized form ofgovernance, as the state remains a key actor. Our analysis has shownhow the government has blurred the lines of the state/private divideby using organic certification to govern the sustainability of coastallandscapes, where shrimp aquaculture and mangrove forests havehistorically conflicted. However, we conclude that although privategovernance holds the potential to supplement state-led regulation,it does not supplant the role of government. In that sense,we concurthat Vandergeest’s concept of environmental regulatory networksbetter reflects the dynamics of implementing organic certificationthan the concept of Non-State Market Driven governance. But inorder for organic certification to achieve sustainable and equitableshrimp aquaculture in mangrove forests a series of regulatorychallenges need to be addressed.

Organic certification in shrimp-forest integrated farmingsystems in Ca May holds the potential to link farm-level manage-ment to landscapes sustainability, especially because these systems

already hold organic qualities. However, ensuring that farm levelregulation can have an impact on the landscape level goes beyondquestions of ecological scalability. Expansion of organic certifica-tion is also dependent on the improvement of social and economicconditions of production. Realizing ‘organic coasts’ therefore beginswith the involvement of farmers as partners rather than targets ofregulation when determining (1) how to best scale up forestprotection, (2) the extent to which economic benefits are sharedbetween actors in the certified value chain, and (3) the level oflegitimacy given to private sector-led auditing systems. Theseconflicts within and beyond the farm level need to be resolvedbefore producers will equitably, and therefore willingly, invest inthe government’s goal of organically certified coasts.

These regulatory challenges faced by implementing Naturlandcertification might be overcome through a more precisely definedinvolvement of the state. Based on our analysis of local scale valuechain, auditing and farmer practices we conclude that more directinvolvement of provincial and district government would improvethe representation of producers in organic ERNs. More specifically,state interventions should include greater legislative enforcementover contract arrangements along the value chain and support forimproved farmer organization that can support a scaling up ofenvironmental regulation and certification from the farm to thelandscape level. Following the suggestion of both the localgovernment and farmers this might be achieved through producer-led clusters across ecologically linked landscape units. Doing sowould partly redefine the role of producers as partners rather thantargets of regulation, assist in achieving benefits beyond the farm,and move the government further towards their aspirations of anorganic coast.

Acknowledgments

Research for this paper was conducted under the RESCOPARprogram and funded by the Interdisciplinary Research Fund (INREF)at Wageningen University. The authors would like to thank thereviewers for their tough but highly constructive comments.

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