PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

This article was downloaded by: [Smith, Craig A.]On: 29 September 2009Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 915420995]Publisher Psychology PressInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Cognition & EmotionPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713682755

Putting appraisal in context: Toward a relational model of appraisal and emotionCraig A. Smith a; Leslie D. Kirby a

a Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA

Online Publication Date: 01 November 2009

To cite this Article Smith, Craig A. and Kirby, Leslie D.(2009)'Putting appraisal in context: Toward a relational model of appraisal andemotion',Cognition & Emotion,23:7,1352 — 1372

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/02699930902860386

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699930902860386

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial orsystematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply ordistribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contentswill be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug dosesshould be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directlyor indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Putting appraisal in context: Toward a relational model

of appraisal and emotion

Craig A. Smith and Leslie D. Kirby

Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA

According to appraisal theory, emotions result from an individual’s meaninganalysis of the implications of his/her circumstances for personal well-being, andindividual differences in emotion arise when individuals appraise similar situationsdifferently. Relational models of appraisal attempt to describe the situational anddispositional antecedents of appraisals, and should allow one to predict suchindividual differences. In this article, we review three examples of our efforts towarddeveloping relational appraisal models. In two, we start with a particular appraisalcomponent, motivational relevance and problem-focused coping potential (Smith &Lazarus, 1990), respectively, and describe and test the relational model proposed forthat component. In the third, as a precursor to developing a true relational model,we examine another appraisal component, emotion-focused coping potential, froma more dispositional perspective. We conclude by considering both the potentialvalue of relational appraisal models, and future directions in the development ofthese models.

Keywords: Appraisal theory; Relational models; Coping potential; Motivational

relevance.

What brings forth an emotion? Under stressful conditions, what determines

whether a person will react with anger or fear or sadness or guilt, or,

perhaps, a sense of challenge/determination? Why is it that different

individuals will often react to seemingly identical circumstances with very

different emotions, and that the same individual will often react to very

similar circumstances very differently at different times? For example, in

response to the same grade of ‘‘B’’ on a particular exam, why is it that one

student will respond with profound relief and joy, another with despair, a

third with shame, a fourth with anger, and a fifth with casual indifference?

Why, too, does a student who responded to a low grade on an initial exam

Correspondence should be addressed to: Craig A. Smith, Vanderbilt University, Peabody

College #552, 230 Appleton Place, Nashville, TN 37203�5721, USA. E-mail:

craig.a.smith@vanderbilt.edu

COGNITION AND EMOTION

2009, 23 (7), 1352�1372

# 2009 Psychology Press, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business

www.psypress.com/cogemotion DOI: 10.1080/02699930902860386

Downloaded By: [Smith, Craig A.] At: 12:16 29 September 2009

with a sense of challenge, combined with resolve to buckle down and

master the material, respond with anguish when receiving a similar grade

on the next exam?

Questions such as these have motivated the development of a theoretical

perspective on emotion known as appraisal theory (Roseman & Smith, 2001).

As often noted (e.g., Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Roseman & Smith, 2001;

Smith, 1989), the concept of appraisal was introduced to emotion theory

specifically to enable the explanation of the readily observable individual

differences that characterise emotional reactions. Not only do different

individuals often respond to similar circumstances with different emotions,

but also the same individual will often respond to the same circumstances

quite differently over time. That both these types of variability can be readily

documented causes grave difficulties for attempting to explain emotion

through classic psychological approaches. Situationally oriented stimulus�response theories would have great difficulty explaining the vast differences

in emotional reactions across persons under the same conditions, whereas

dispositionally oriented trait-based theories would have similar difficulty

explaining the cross-time variability that is often observed within persons. In

fact, historically, the readily observed variability in emotional reactions across

individuals, circumstances, and time have often led scholars to characterise

emotion as chaotic, disorganised and disorganising (e.g., Angier, 1927;

Darrow, 1935; See also, Roseman & Smith, 2001; Smith 1989).

At a general theoretical level, appraisal theory, however, has the potential

to systematically explain this variability in emotional reactions, and to reveal

considerable organisation, structure, and even logic, in the functioning of

emotion (Roseman & Smith, 2001; Smith, 1991; Smith & Lazarus, 1990).

The two central propositions underlying appraisal theory are: (1) emotion is

evoked as a function of an individualised meaning analysis, or ‘‘appraisal’’,

in which the person evaluates the adaptational implications of his or her

circumstances for personal well-being; and (2) different emotions result from

different evaluations, such that if we know how a person is appraising his or

her circumstances we can predict which emotion(s) will result, and vice-versa

(Smith, 1989; Smith & Lazarus, 1990).

On this view, individual differences in emotion reflect individual

differences in appraisal. Two individuals will react to the same circum-

stances with different emotions if they appraise the personal significance of

those circumstances differently. Similarly, the same individual will experi-

ence different emotions to the same circumstances over time if his or her

appraisals of those circumstances change. Importantly, appraisal theory

provides the conceptual machinery needed to systematise, understand, and

predict such individual differences in appraisal and emotion.

RELATIONAL MODEL OF APPRAISAL 1353

Downloaded By: [Smith, Craig A.] At: 12:16 29 September 2009

A central tenet of appraisal theory is that emotion-eliciting appraisals are

inherently relational.1 That is, appraisals are not a simple function of either

the person’s dispositional characteristics, or the stimulus characteristics of

the person’s circumstances. Instead, the appraisals reflect an evaluation of

what the stimulus circumstances imply for the person’s well-being in relation

to that person’s specific configuration of needs, goals, resources, abilities, etc.

(Roseman & Smith, 2001; Smith & Lazarus, 1990; Smith & Pope, 1992).

Theoretically, if we know enough about the relevant characteristics of

particular individuals on the one hand, and of the circumstances they are

confronting on the other, we should be able to predict, at an individual level,

how those persons will appraise, and hence respond emotionally to, their

circumstances. Moreover, to the extent to which different individuals bring

different configurations of needs, goals, and abilities to the situation, we

would expect them to appraise a common set of circumstances rather

differently, and thus react with different emotions. In addition, if these

personal characteristics change for an individual over time, so too should his

or her appraisals. Thus, drawing on one of our initial examples, the student’s

reactions to the poor grade on the second exam became more negative

because his/her standards and expectations for the grade had changed in the

interim as a result of all the effort that had been extended to master the

material.

Of course, to be truly useful as an explanatory mechanism, the abstract

and general theoretical principles outlined above need to be developed into

concrete models that can support specific predictions. In fact, we see a need

for at least two distinct types of appraisal model. First, there is a need for

structural models of appraisal that specify the structural relations between

appraisal and emotional response. These models ask about the issues that

are evaluated in appraisal (i.e., the questions that are asked2 in emotion-

antecedent appraisal), and how the outcomes of these appraisals (i.e., the

answers to these questions), map onto emotional experience. For instance,

what are the appraisals that lead one to experience anger, or sadness, or

fear?

1 It should be noted that the usage of the term ‘‘relational’’ here and with respect to the

relational models of appraisal that we advance in this article follows that of Lazarus (e.g., 1991b;

Smith & Lazarus, 1990). Lazarus (1991b, p. 819) maintained that ‘‘emotions are always about

person�environment relationships’’, and that they involve not just the circumstances confronting

the individual but also how those circumstances relate to the individual’s personal

characteristics, including his or her needs, goals, and abilities. This use of ‘‘relational’’ does

not imply that interpersonal relationships are necessarily involved in the emotion-eliciting

conditions, although they certainly can be (see Smith, David, & Kirby, 2006).2 These questions may be asked consciously, or outside of focal awareness (see Smith &

Kirby, 2000).

1354 SMITH AND KIRBY

Downloaded By: [Smith, Craig A.] At: 12:16 29 September 2009

Second, as the key appraisal variables responsible for differentiating

emotional experience are identified and described, a second class of model,

relational models of appraisal, also needs to be developed. These models are

concerned with the antecedents of the emotion-eliciting appraisals, and

specify both the situational and personal characteristics that are combined

in a particular appraisal, as well as how they are combined to produce

particular outcomes for that appraisal. For instance, what kinds of

information about an individual (personal beliefs, goals, abilities, etc.) feed

into making particular appraisals? What information about the circum-

stances (presence of others, task demands, time-pressure, etc.) is also drawn

upon? And, most importantly, how do these various personal and

situational elements interact in determining the outcome of the appraisal

process?3

Whereas developing structural models allows one to predict how

individuals will be reacting emotionally once we know how they are

appraising their circumstances, the development of relational models to

describe the antecedents of these appraisals will allow us to predict how they

will appraise their circumstances in the first place. Thus, with such models

we should be able to begin to predict actual individual differences in

appraisal, and, assuming the structural models are correct, in emotional

response.

Over approximately the last 30 years, appraisal theory has become an

increasingly prominent approach to the study of human emotion, especially

for the study of the antecedents of emotion (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Lazarus,

1991a; Roseman, 1979; Scherer, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Smith &

Lazarus, 1990), and considerable progress has been made in the development

and testing of specific appraisal models. Perhaps reflecting a natural

progression, given that the key appraisal variables need to be identified

before the antecedents of these variables can be examined, the bulk of the

research conducted to date has focused on the testing of several different

structural models (Lazarus, 1991a; Roseman, 2001; Scherer, 1984, 2001;

3 As we have noted elsewhere, there is also a third class of models, known as process models

of appraisal, that are very important to the development of appraisal theory. These models

attempt to describe the cognitive processes underlying appraisal, and typically describe appraisal

as being able to occur at both a more conscious, volitional level, and at a more automatic level

that typically occurs outside of awareness (e.g., Lazarus, 1991a; Leventhal & Scherer, 1987;

Scherer, 2001; Smith & Kirby, 2000; Van Reekum & Scherer, 1997). These models are very

important for reconciling the central premise of appraisal theory*that emotions are evoked in

response to a meaning analysis*with observations that emotions are often elicited unbidden,

suddenly, and outside the seeming awareness or control of the person who experiences them.

Consideration of these models is beyond the scope of this article. For a more thorough treatment

of them, the reader is referred to Smith and Kirby (2000).

RELATIONAL MODEL OF APPRAISAL 1355

Downloaded By: [Smith, Craig A.] At: 12:16 29 September 2009

Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Smith & Lazarus, 1990). To date, considerable

evidence has accrued that supports these specific models and strongly

supports the general proposition that the experience of particular emotions

are systematically related to specific appraisals (e.g., Frijda, Kuipers, & ter

Schure, 1989; Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, & De Boek, 2003; Roseman,

1991; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Scherer, 1997; Smith & Ellsworth,

1985; Smith & Lazarus, 1993; Tong et al., 2007). Work on these structural

models continues, and key issues associated with these models are currently

being vigorously scrutinised and debated. For instance, considerable debate

and empirical effort have been directed at examining the degree to which

appraisals are actually causal antecedents of emotion as hypothesised (Frijda

& Zeelenberg, 2001; Parkinson, 1997; Roseman & Evdokas, 2004; Smith &

Kirby, 2009); as well as the degree to which specific patterns of appraisal

(e.g., other-blame) hypothesised to elicit specific emotions (e.g., anger)

represent universal antecedents of that emotion versus are more limited in

their applicability (Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004; Kuppens et al., 2003;

Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, De Boek, & Ceulemans, 2007; Roseman,

2004; Smith & Kirby, 2004).

It should be noted that some of this latter work represents an approach to

understanding individual differences in emotion through appraisal that is

different than that to be developed in this article. Specifically, both Kuppens

et al. (2003, 2007) for anger, and Silvia, Henson, and Templin (2009 this

issue) for interest, have suggested that there may be multiple distinct

appraisal patterns associated with the experience of certain emotions, and

that individuals may differ in the specific patterns that elicit those emotions

for them. For instance Silvia et al. (2009 this issue) have documented that for

some individuals the perceived novelty and/or complexity of a stimulus is

important for evoking interest, whereas for others it is the perceived

likelihood of being able to comprehend the stimulus. Similarly, Kuppens et

al. (2007) have documented that appraisals of blame are important for

evoking anger in some individuals, but not for others. This approach is

different from the present one, in which we have assumed that the specific

links between particular appraisals and the experience of particular

emotions, as specified in the structural models, are general across all

individuals.

Although there have been some efforts in this direction (e.g., Kuppens &

Van Mechelen, 2007), relational models of appraisal have received much less

theoretical and empirical attention than have the structural models. This

class of appraisal models is the focus of this article. Specifically, we focus on

three appraisal components taken from the structural appraisal model we

helped develop and continue to work with (for a more complete description

of this model see Smith, 1991; Smith & Kirby, 2001; Smith & Lazarus, 1990),

1356 SMITH AND KIRBY

Downloaded By: [Smith, Craig A.] At: 12:16 29 September 2009

and for each, we review our efforts, to date, toward developing a relational

appraisal model.4

The three components are:

1. Motivational Relevance, which is an evaluation of how important the

situation is to the person. This appraisal is hypothesised to determinethe intensity of the resulting emotional reaction, with emotions

becoming stronger as appraised importance increases.

2. Problem-Focused Coping Potential (PFCP), an assessment of the

individual’s ability to act on the situation to increase or maintain its

desirability. Under conditions appraised as ‘‘stressful’’ (motivationally

relevant, and not as desired;5 Smith & Lazarus, 1990), this appraisal is

hypothesised to differentiate between feelings of challenge/determina-

tion (high appraisals of PFCP) and sadness/resignation (low appraisalsof PFCP).

3. Emotion-Focused Coping Potential (EFPC), an evaluation of one’s

ability to psychologically adjust to the situation should it turn out not

as desired. Under stressful conditions this appraisal is hypothesised to

differentiate between feelings of relative calm or tranquillity (appraisals

of high EFCP) and fear/anxiety (appraisals of low EFCP).

Although appraisals of problem- and emotion-focused coping potential are

related, in that they both reflect evaluations of one’s ability to cope with

potentially or actually stressful circumstances, they are nonetheless distinct.

PFCP reflects the evaluation of one’s ability to act directly on the situation

to make or keep it consistent with one’s goals. This form of coping is very

similar to primary control coping as described by Compas, Connor-Smith,

Saltzman, Thomsen, and Wadsworth (2001) and Rothbaum, Weisz, and

Synder (1982). In contrast, EFCP reflects the evaluation of one’s ability to

act on oneself to maintain or increase such consistency through strategies

4 There are a couple of things we should note about these efforts. First, to keep things

tractable, we have initially focused on explaining between-person variability in appraisal and

emotion, and have not yet attempted to explain within-person variation in appraisal and

emotion over time. Thus, in the work we report we focus on relatively stable dispositions as

potential person-based antecedents of appraisal. In addition, we would not make much of the

particular appraisal components we have chosen to focus on in this work thus far. These are

simply the appraisal components for which we have made progress in developing and testing

relational models. In the long term, we intend to develop and test relational models for each of

the components within our structural model, and we believe that such models can and should be

developed for additional appraisals emphasised in alternative appraisal models proposed by

others.5 The appraised desirability or undesirability of the circumstances is captured by an

additional appraisal component of the Smith and Lazarus (1990) structural appraisal model,

motivational congruence, that will not be considered in detail in this article.

RELATIONAL MODEL OF APPRAISAL 1357

Downloaded By: [Smith, Craig A.] At: 12:16 29 September 2009

that include, but are not limited to, such things as modifying one’s goals,

reappraising one’s circumstances in a more positive manner, or denying the

existence of threatening or harmful aspects of one’s situation (e.g., Lazarus

& Folkman, 1984). This type of coping is very similar to secondary control

coping, as described by Compas et al. (2001) and Rothbaum et al. (1982).

Both types of coping, and hence appraisals of both types of coping potential,

are clearly relevant under stressful circumstances in which some aspect of the

situation is appraised as not as desired, however, both types of coping and

appraisal can be relevant under desirable conditions in anticipation of non-

desired changes to one’s situation, either in an attempt to prevent such

changes (problem-focused coping) or to facilitate adjustment to them should

they prove unavoidable (emotion-focused coping).

EXAMPLE 1: THE RELATIONAL ANTECEDENTS OFAPPRAISED MOTIVATIONAL RELEVANCE

Colloquially, the question evaluated by the component of motivational

relevance is: ‘‘How important to me is what is happening (or might happen)

in this situation?’’ As discussed by Smith and Pope (1992), this question is

inherently relational. To answer it one needs to refer both to one’s own goals

and the implications of the situation for those goals. A situation could have

implications for many things but would not be appraised as motivationally

relevant if the person did not care about those things. Conversely, a person

could be passionately committed to a particular issue but would appraise

little motivational relevance if the circumstances were seen as unrelated to

that issue. Thus, it is hypothesised that motivational relevance will be

appraised as high, resulting in relatively intense emotions, to the extent to

which an individual cares about a particular goal or issue and his or her

circumstances are perceived as having implications for that goal or issue.

Motivational relevance should be appraised as relatively low to the extent to

which either condition does not apply.

This hypothesis has been tested in a series of three studies in which we

measured the individuals’ goals at a broad, general, superordinate level (as

opposed to more narrow, subordinate, task-specific goals; cf. Carver &

Scheier, 1982) by assessing the strength of their motivational orientations

toward achievement concerns (i.e., accomplishment, success, mastery; e.g.,

McClelland, 1985), affiliative concerns (i.e., the desire to establish and/or

maintain relationships with other; e.g., McClelland, 1985), or both, and then

experimentally manipulated the degree to which situations they encountered

were potentially relevant to one or the other of these types of concerns. The

general prediction was that an individual’s appraisal of motivational

relevance in a given situation would be positively correlated with the

1358 SMITH AND KIRBY

Downloaded By: [Smith, Craig A.] At: 12:16 29 September 2009

person’s degree of commitment to a particular domain if the situation was

perceived as being relevant to that domain, but that dispositional commit-

ment in the domain and appraised motivational relevance would be

unrelated if the situation was not perceived as being relevant to the domain.

In the first two studies (Smith & Pope, 1992), individuals were asked to

report on the appraisals and emotions associated with a particular

experience selected for its high degree of relevance to either achievementor affiliative concerns. In the first study participants recalled relevant past

experiences from their own lives, and in the second they were asked to

imagine themselves in hypothetical experimenter-supplied vignettes. In both

studies participants were asked to recall or imagine themselves in situations

that were presumed to be of either positive or negative valence (e.g., doing

well vs. poorly on an important exam) and to be high in either achievement

relevance (e.g., exam performance, as above) or affiliative relevance (e.g.,

having a fight with one’s significant other, or learning that someone you wereinterested in dating was also interested in you). The relevance of the recalled

or imagined situation to either affiliative or achievement concerns was not

explicitly mentioned in the study materials, but rather, in the second study

(but not the first), the affiliative and achievement relevance of the situation,

as perceived by the participant, was assessed via self-report as a manipula-

tion check.

Based on the ‘‘matching principle’’ described above, it was predicted that

the strength of one’s affiliative orientation would be positively correlatedwith appraisals of motivational relevance of the affiliative, but not of the

achievement-related, situations, whereas the strength of one’s achievement

orientation would be positively correlated with appraisals of motivational

relevance of the achievement-related, but not of the affiliative, situations.

For both studies, these predictions were supported within the achievement

domain, but not within the affiliative domain. Specifically, achievement

orientation was positively associated with appraised motivational relevance

in the achievement-related situations, and was not associated with appraisedmotivational relevance in the affiliative ones. Affiliative orientation was not

correlated with appraised motivational relevance within either domain.

Smith and Pope (1992) speculated that the lack of predicted associations for

affiliative orientation may have been due to restricted variance in the

appraisals of motivational relevance in these studies: virtually all affiliative

situations, both remembered and imagined, were appraised as highly

relevant, and this restricted variance may have been severe enough to

preclude observing the predicted relations.In addition, in the second study, and across all situations, the partici-

pants’ evaluations of the relevance of the vignettes to affiliative and

achievement-related concerns were found to be positively associated with

the strength of one’s orientation within a particular domain. That is, more

RELATIONAL MODEL OF APPRAISAL 1359

Downloaded By: [Smith, Craig A.] At: 12:16 29 September 2009

affiliative individuals viewed the circumstances described in the vignettes as

being more affiliation relevant than did other individuals, whereas more

achievement-oriented individuals viewed those same circumstances as being

more achievement relevant. Thus, it appeared that individuals with strong

needs within a domain might have been especially sensitive to the potential

implications of their circumstances to those needs. Although this finding had

not been predicted, it is reminiscent of work conducted within the New Lookapproach to perception (e.g., Bruner, 1957), and, in line with the assump-

tions of appraisal theory, it illustrates that it is not the objective

circumstances, but rather how those circumstances are perceived and

evaluated, that determines one’s emotional state (see, e.g., Roseman &

Smith, 2001).

The third study (Griner & Smith, 2000) was designed to replicate and

extend these findings within the affiliative domain, but to do so in the

context of a real-life encounter in which appraisals of motivational relevancewere not expected to be artificially restricted. Specifically, individuals

selected to be either high or low in affiliative orientation were engaged in

a task in which they attempted to teach another individual how to use a

complicated computer graphics package. The major predictions for the study

concerned the period in which the participants were waiting for the teaching

task to begin. Specifically, it was predicted that during this period, relative to

less affiliative individuals, more affiliative participants would appraise the

motivational relevance of the situation as higher and report stronger feelingsof interest and weaker feelings of boredom. In addition, in accord with the

earlier study’s findings regarding sensitivity to motivation-relevant contex-

tual information, highly affiliative participants also were expected to

perceive the teaching task as more relevant to affiliative concerns. These

predictions are summarised in the upper panel of Figure 1.

The observed results are presented in the bottom panel of Figure 1, and,

as can be seen, the predictions were supported. That is, while waiting for the

task to begin, relative to less affiliative persons, highly affiliative individualsappraised the motivational relevance of the task as higher, and reported

stronger feelings of interest and weaker feelings of boredom. Further, the

elevated levels of motivational relevance were partially attributable to the

fact that affiliative participants also perceived the task as being more

relevant to affiliative concerns than did other participants.

Taken together, these three studies provide considerable support for our

relational model of the antecedents of appraised motivational relevance,

and, in doing so, help illustrate the importance of adopting a relationalapproach to understanding appraisal and emotion. In all three studies,

knowledge of either the potential relevance of the circumstances to affiliative

and/or achievement concerns, or of the person’s degree of commitment to

those concerns, was not adequate to optimally predict the person’s

1360 SMITH AND KIRBY

Downloaded By: [Smith, Craig A.] At: 12:16 29 September 2009

appraisals of motivational relevance. Instead, to best predict how motiva-

tionally relevant a given set of circumstances was likely to be appraised (and

thus how strongly one was likely to react to those circumstances emotion-

ally) both types of information needed to be considered and combined.

EXAMPLE 2: THE RELATIONAL ANTECEDENTS OFAPPRAISED PROBLEM-FOCUSED COPING POTENTIAL (PFCP)

Colloquially, the question represented by the appraisal component of PFCP

is: ‘‘Can I successfully do something that will make (or keep) this situation

(more) the way I want it to be?’’ This evaluation is closely related to

Bandura’s (1986) conceptualisation of a self-efficacy judgement. However,

whereas a self-efficacy judgement represents a very specific evaluation of

one’s ability to perform a specific behaviour or set of behaviours, PFCP

represents a somewhat more general evaluation of one’s ability to do

something, which is not necessarily specified, to improve (or maintain) the

desirability of the situation. As discussed by Smith and Pope (1992), who

based their analysis, in part, on the seminal work of Heider (1958),

appraisals of this component would seem to require consideration not

only of the perceived difficulty of the ‘‘task’’ at hand (i.e., whatever might

need to be done to make one’s circumstances more desirable) but also of how

this difficulty relates to one’s perceived abilities. Specifically, to the extent to

Figure 1. A priori model of the predicted influences of affiliative orientation on construals of the

perceived affiliative relevance of the situation, appraisals of motivational relevance, and the associated

emotions of interest and boredom (top panel), and the path analysis of the observed relations among

these variables corresponding to this a priori model (bottom panel). Notes: CFI is the Comparative Fit

Index. x2(5)�12.54*; CFI�0.91; *pB.05; **pB.01; ***pB.001.

RELATIONAL MODEL OF APPRAISAL 1361

Downloaded By: [Smith, Craig A.] At: 12:16 29 September 2009

which the task demands are perceived as exceeding one’s abilities, appraised

PFCP should be low, but to the extent to which they are perceived as being

within one’s abilities, appraised PFCP should be high.

This hypothesis has been examined in two studies examining partici-

pants’ appraisals and emotions during a mathematical problem-solving

task (Smith & Kirby, 2009; Smith & Pope, 1992). In both studies,

participants selected to be high or low in mathematical ability, as assessedboth by their self-rated confidence in their abilities and by the mathema-

tical portion of the Scholastic Aptitude Test (MSAT), attempted to solve a

series of math word problems in which difficulty was experimentally

manipulated (and the success of this manipulation was verified using both

behavioural measures, including the probability of correctly solving the

problem and the time spent on the problem, and self-reports of the

perceived difficulty of the problems). In the first study (Smith & Pope,

1992), participants were selected to be high or low in terms of bothobjectively assessed ability and subjective confidence, whereas in the second

study (Smith & Kirby, 2009), participants were selected to factorially vary

these two ability-related factors. For both studies it was predicted that in

response to an easy problem all participants would evaluate their abilities

as exceeding the task demands, and therefore that appraisals of PFCP

would be uniformly high and would not vary systematically as a function

of either ability factor. In contrast, in response to a very difficult problem,

we predicted that participants would generally appraise the task asexceeding their abilities, but that this would be especially true for

individuals with low abilities and/or low confidence in those abilities.

Thus, we predicted that in response to a difficult problem appraisals of

PFCP would increase as a positive function of the ability factors, and that

in the second study these appraisals would increase as a function of both

mathematical ability and self-perceived confidence.

The relevant results for the more complex design of the second study

are depicted in Figure 2 and 3. Figure 2 depicts the results for PFCP, andFigure 3 depicts the results for challenge/determination and resignation,

which are two emotions associated with this appraisal (Smith, 1991; Smith

& Lazarus, 1990). With one exception in the second study, the predictions

for PFCP were supported in both studies: In response to the easy

problem, appraised PFCP was generally high and did not vary system-

atically as a function of the ability factors. In response to the difficult

problem, appraised PFCP was generally lower, but, with the one exception

to be described below, was appraised as higher by individuals with higherlevels of confidence and/or higher MSAT scores. The one exception, in the

second study, was for the very highest ability participants (i.e., those whose

MSAT scores in the top tertile of the distribution and who reported being

confident of their abilities). As can be seen in Figure 2, in response to the

1362 SMITH AND KIRBY

Downloaded By: [Smith, Craig A.] At: 12:16 29 September 2009

difficult problem, the effects of both confidence and ability appeared to be

additive, with increasing confidence and ability generally leading to higher

levels of appraised PFCP. However, the highest ability participants, who

were expected to be least affected by the difficulty manipulation, reported

substantially lower levels of appraised PFCP than would have been

predicted from a simple consideration of their ability levels. As can be

seen in Figure 3, these effects were mirrored in theory-consistent ways for

both challenge/determination and resignation. In response to the difficult

problem, reported levels of challenge/determination increased, and levels

of resignation decreased with increasing confidence and/or ability*except

that the highest ability participants reported considerably lower levels of

challenge/determination and higher levels of resignation than would have

been predicted as a function of their confidence and ability levels.

This one anomalous finding begs for explanation. We (Smith & Kirby,

in press) have speculated that it might reflect the fact that the highest

ability participants experienced a self-imposed pressure to perform well at

the problem-solving task, which led them to feel especially threatened

when confronted with a problem that proved very difficult to solve.

However, this explanation is highly speculative, and clearly needs to be

further tested. In the meantime, we believe that this finding further

strengthens the case for the importance of developing relational models of

appraisal. Although the finding suggests that the specific relational model

we were testing for the antecedents of PFCP was somewhat too simple, it

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1 2 3 4

Pro

blem

-Foc

used

Cop

ing

Pot

entia

l

Low SATMed SATHigh SAT

Low Confidence High Confidence High ConfidenceLow Confidence

Easy Condition Difficult Condition

Figure 2. Interactive effects of confidence, MSAT, and task difficulty on appraisals of problem-

focused coping potential (PFCP).

RELATIONAL MODEL OF APPRAISAL 1363

Downloaded By: [Smith, Craig A.] At: 12:16 29 September 2009

highlights the relational nature of appraisal. No model based on a

consideration of just the participant’s confidence and abilities, or of just

the difficulty of the problems, could have predicted the rather complicated

way in which ability considerations interacted with problem-difficulty in

producing appraisals of PFCP as observed in this study.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1 2 3 4

Hop

e/C

halle

nge

Low SAT

Med SAT

High SAT

Low Confidence High Confidence High ConfidenceLow Confidence

Easy Condition Difficult Condition

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1 2 3 4

Res

igna

tion

Low SAT

Med SAT

High SAT

Low Confidence High Confidence High ConfidenceLow Confidence

Easy Condition Difficult Condition

Figure 3. Interactive effects of confidence, MSAT, and task difficulty on hope/challenge (top panel)

and resignation (bottom panel).

1364 SMITH AND KIRBY

Downloaded By: [Smith, Craig A.] At: 12:16 29 September 2009

EXAMPLE 3: APPRAISED EMOTION-FOCUSED COPINGPOTENTIAL (EFCP) AS AN APPRAISAL STYLE

Colloquially, the question asked by the appraisal component of EFCP is:

‘‘Will I be able to handle, or adjust to, this situation, even if things do not

work out the way I want them to?’’ In working toward developing a

relational model for this appraisal component, we have adopted a different

approach than we have illustrated for the previous two appraisal compo-

nents. Rather than starting with a proposed relational model directly, we

have started by examining this appraisal component as a dispositional

individual-difference variable, that is, as an appraisal style (Smith, Kirby, &

David, 2008). We have examined both whether individuals differ across

situations in their characteristic appraisals of EFCP, and the dispositional

correlates of this appraisal style.

Our primary reason for doing this was that we hoped that such an

analysis would yield clues as to the likely relational antecedents of this

appraisal component. At the outset, the specific relational model we should

pursue for this component was less obvious to us than was the case for either

motivational relevance or PFCP. Although we had some expectation that the

availability of coping resources, such as a high self-esteem or a supportive

social network, might support appraisals of high EFCP, whereas a history of

emotionally traumatic experiences would tend to undermine such appraisals,

we thought that examining the correlates of this appraisal would be very

informative for developing a specific relational model.

In addition, it seemed likely to us that this appraisal component might be

somewhat more strongly dispositionally based than other components, such

as PFCP. Whereas problem-focused coping clearly involves acting on one’s

circumstances to improve them, and thus necessarily involves relating one’s

abilities to external task demands as discussed above, the nature of emotion-

focused coping seems fundamentally different. This form of coping involves

adjusting oneself, so that one can accept, function in, and adapt to

undesirable circumstances, whether these adjustments be through changing

one’s goals, reinterpreting the meaning and implications of the situation,

seeking comfort and support from others, or through other means. Although

we do not want to be misinterpreted as implying that the circumstances to be

adapted to do not matter, it does seem that the process of emotion-focused

coping is more strongly internally focused than is the case for problem-

focused coping, and thus that appraisals of EFCP might also be more

internally based than is the case with PFCP. That is, we believed that

appraisals of EFCP might be more focused on an assessment of one’s

abilities and internal resources for adjusting to the situation than on the

particulars of the situation to which one was adjusting. Accordingly, we

RELATIONAL MODEL OF APPRAISAL 1365

Downloaded By: [Smith, Craig A.] At: 12:16 29 September 2009

reasoned that EFCP was an ideal appraisal to examine from a dispositional

perspective.

To examine EFCP and its correlates at a dispositional level, we were able

to draw on an extensive data set that was assembled for the validation of the

Appraisal Style Inventory (ASI; Smith et al., 2008), a broad measure that

attempts to assess appraisal styles for each of the appraisal components,

including EFCP, presented in the structural appraisal model of Smith and

Lazarus (1990). On this measure, which is modelled after the original

Attributional Style Questionnaire (Peterson et al., 1982), respondents rate

their appraisals in terms of each of the appraisal components in response to

brief descriptions of 12 situations, half of which are designed to be pleasant

(e.g., having a pleasant date with one’s significant other), and half of which

unpleasant (e.g., doing poorly on an important exam). The data we

examined included responses from more than 1500 undergraduates.

The first issue we addressed was to assess the degree to which EFCP could

be characterised as an appraisal style. That is, across the 12 situations

represented in the ASI, were there stable individuals differences in the

appraisals of emotion-focused coping potential? The answer to this question

was a clear ‘‘yes’’, as across all 12 situations, the observed alpha was .87,

which indicates that the individual differences in this appraisal were quite

similar across the different situations (Smith et al., 2008).

Given evidence of a reliable appraisal style for EFCP, we compared our

measure of this style to the emotional and behavioural coping subscales of

the Constructive Thinking Inventory (Epstein & Meier, 1989). Of the two

subscales, emotional coping should be more strongly correlated to disposi-

tional EFCP than behavioural coping, as Epstein’s construct of emotional

coping is conceptually very similar to the construct of emotion-focused

coping, whereas his construct of behavioural coping is more similar to that

of problem-focused coping. As can be seen in the top portion of Figure 4,

this was found to be the case, with our measure of EFCP demonstrating a

stronger relation to the measure of emotional coping than it did to the

measure of behavioural coping, thereby supporting the construct validity of

our scale.6

In light of the theoretically predicted, and empirically demonstrated, links

between situation-specific appraisals of EFCP and the experience of fear and

anxiety, we anticipated that at the dispositional level EFCP would be

negatively correlated with trait anxiety (Trait version of the State-Trait

Anxiety Scale; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). This was observed

to be the case, as can be seen in the middle portion of Figure 4. In addition,

6 Due to the large Ns involved in these analyses, all correlations reported in this section of

the article and in Figure 4 are statistically significant at well beyond the pB.01 level, and thus

statistical significance will not be explicitly reported here.

1366 SMITH AND KIRBY

Downloaded By: [Smith, Craig A.] At: 12:16 29 September 2009

as also can be seen in this portion of the Figure, dispositional appraisals of

EFCP were correlated with an array of additional adaptational outcomes. It

correlated negatively with a number of indicators of stress and distress,

including, depressive symptoms (CES-D; Radloff, 1977), perceived stress

(Perceived Stress Scale; Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983), and

negative affectivity (trait version of the PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen,

1988). It also correlated positively with more positive indicators of

adaptation, including positive affectivity (Watson et al., 1988) and life

satisfaction (Satisfaction with Life Scale; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, &

Griffin, 1985).

We also examined the relations of dispositional appraisals of EFCP to

constructs such as self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965), and quality of emotional

support (Smith & Wallston, 1992), which are commonly conceptualised as

Figure 4. Strength of correlation of dispositional emotion-focused coping potential (EFCP) with

subscales of the Constructive Thinking Inventory (CTI, top section), adaptational outcomes (middle

section), and coping resources (bottom section). Notes: CT-emote�Emotional Coping subscale of the

CTI; CT-Behave�Behavioural Coping subscale of the CTI; Anxiety�trait version of the State-Trait

Anxiety Inventory; CESD�Center for Epidemiological Studies � Depression Scale; PSS�Perceived

Stress Scale; NA�Negative Affectivity from the trait version of the Positive and Negative Affect

Schedule (PANAS); PA�Positive Affectivity from the trait version of the PANAS; Life-Sat�Satisfaction with Life Scale; Self-Esteem�Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; Emot Supp�Quality of

Emotional Support Scale; and Optimism�Life Orientation Test (LOT).

RELATIONAL MODEL OF APPRAISAL 1367

Downloaded By: [Smith, Craig A.] At: 12:16 29 September 2009

coping resources (Smith & Wallston, 1992), and found that dispositional

EFCP was consistently positively correlated with such resources, including

self-esteem, quality of emotional support, and dispositional optimism (Life

Orientation Test; Scheier & Carver, 1985), as can be seen in the bottom

portion of the figure.

Although in our own work, we are still considering these patterns of

relations, and are still exploring what they might imply for a relational model

of EFCP, we believe that these initial findings already indicate the

importance of dispositional EFCP as a construct for understanding

individual differences in emotion. As expected theoretically, dispositional

EFCP is clearly correlated with trait anxiety. Moreover, the pattern of

correlations we have observed between this construct and the other variables

we examined, including a variety of adaptational outcomes and coping

resources, suggests to us that having an appraisal style of high EFCP might

well, in itself, represent an important psychological resource. It needs to be

highlighted that the data we have presented here is strictly correlational, and

thus it is premature to draw any conclusions regarding directions of causality

among these variables. Nonetheless, intriguing hypotheses suggest them-

selves. First, it is entirely possible that the disposition to appraise one’s

emotion-focused coping potential as high serves as a buffer in the face of

stress, such that a person with such tendencies is likely to react with less

anxiety and other negative emotions. Our findings suggest that it is well

worth pursuing such hypotheses.

In addition, we believe that the findings we observed, may, in fact, provide

some clues as to the dispositional underpinnings of this appraisal style. To

work toward a relational model of this appraisal component, we need to

identify the dispositional characteristics that support the belief, captured by

this appraisal style, that one will, one way or the other, make it through

difficult circumstances and be OK. In this regard, the correlations we

reported with the ‘‘coping resources’’, and especially both self-esteem and

adequacy of emotional support, are suggestive. Again, although strong

conclusions are clearly premature, it might well turn out to be that having a

high sense of self-esteem, and having reason to believe that emotional

support is available if one needs it, might directly support the tendency to

evaluate one’s level of EFCP as high. We believe that these hypotheses

represent promising leads in our quest for a relational model for EFCP.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

We believe that the three examples we have presented highlight the potential

for further developments in appraisal theory to provide a strong accounting

for individual differences in emotion. Most notably, the first two examples

1368 SMITH AND KIRBY

Downloaded By: [Smith, Craig A.] At: 12:16 29 September 2009

indicate the value of developing relational models of appraisal that detail the

ways in which situational features and dispositional properties are combined

in appraisal to determine appraisal outcomes along particular appraisal

components. The work we have presented, however, just scratches the

surface. We are under no illusion that the work we have presented represents

the final work on the antecedents of either motivational relevance or PFCP,

and even preliminary models of the antecedents of the other appraisalcomponents in our structural model (Smith & Lazarus, 1990) await

specification.

In addition, the initial findings we have reported for EFCP as an

appraisal style highlights the value of complementing the development of

relational models with work examining individual differences in appraisal

through more dispositional approaches. We believe that it is well worthwhile

to further investigate the possibility of meaningful individual differences in

the other appraisal components. There are at least two potential payoffs thatwe can see in pursuing such a path. First, as is the case with dispositional

emotion-focused coping potential and trait anxiety, and assuming that the

structural appraisal models linking particular appraisals to the experience of

particular emotions are valid, stable individual differences in the other

appraisal components ought to be associated with stable individual

differences in the emotions theoretically associated with those appraisal

components, and thus our ability to explain such individual differences will

be directly increased.Second, the study of dispositional differences in particular appraisal

components, especially if combined with the development of relational

models for those appraisals, promises to elucidate our understanding of the

origins of emotional individual differences in ways that might facilitate

intervening with individuals who display problematic patterns of emotion.

That is, by knowing both that the tendency to experience a particular

emotion or set of emotions is accompanied by a tendency to appraise one’s

circumstances in particular ways, and by knowing both the situational anddispositional factors that combine to determine such appraisals, one has a

variety of potentially powerful tools available for helping to change the

potentially problematic emotional patterns. Knowledge of the beliefs,

motives, and goals that support a particular appraisal offers considerable

guidance for exploring whether a troubled individual has problematic beliefs

that might be targeted through an appropriate intervention. Similarly,

knowing which situational factors contribute to the appraisal gives guidance

for exploring whether there are troublesome aspects of the person’scircumstances that profitably might be targeted for alteration.

As we hope this discussion begins to illustrate, relational models of

appraisal are crucial in furthering our knowledge of emotional antecedents.

By both identifying the relevant person and situation characteristics that

RELATIONAL MODEL OF APPRAISAL 1369

Downloaded By: [Smith, Craig A.] At: 12:16 29 September 2009

contribute to particular appraisals, as well as how they are combined to

produce those appraisals, relational appraisal models offer more specific and

precise predictions of what emotion a person is likely to experience in a given

set of circumstances. In essence, these types of models are necessary to place

the appraisals, and subsequent emotions, in context. There is considerable

value to knowing that if individuals are appraising their circumstances in a

particular way they will likely be experiencing these particular emotions, andvice-versa, as the structural models indicate. However, there is much

additional value to knowing the dispositional and situational factors that

contribute to those appraisals. With this information not only can we better

predict individual differences in emotional reactions, but also we have the

potential to more deeply understand why a particular individual is reacting

to their circumstances in a particular way.

REFERENCES

Angier, R. P. (1927). The conflict theory of emotion. American Journal of Psychology, 39,

390�401.

Arnold, M. B. (1960). Emotion and personality (2 vols.). New York: Columbia University Press.

Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A social-cognitive theory.

Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Berkowitz, L., & Harmon-Jones, E. (2004). Toward an understanding of the determinants of

anger. Emotion, 4, 107�130.

Bruner, J. S. (1957). On perceptual readiness. Psychological Review, 64, 123�152.

Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1982). Control theory: A useful conceptual framework for

personality-social, clinical, and health psychology. Psychological Bulletin, 92, 111�135.

Cohen, S., Kamarck, T., & Mermelstein, R. (1983). A global measure of perceived stress. Journal

of Health and Social Behavior, 24, 385�396.

Compas, B. E., Connor-Smith, J. K., Salzman, H., Thomsen, A. H., & Wadsworth, M. E.

(2001). Coping with stress during childhood and adolescence: Problems, progress, and

potential in theory and research. Psychological Bulletin, 127, 87�127.

Darrow, C. W. (1935). Emotion as relative functional decortication: The role of conflict.

Psychological Review, 42, 566�578.

Diener, E., Emmons, R. A., Larsen, R. J., & Griffin, S. (1985). The satisfaction with life scale.

Journal of Personality Assessment, 49, 71�75.

Epstein, S., & Meier, P. (1989). Constructive thinking: A broad coping variable with specific

components. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 332�350.

Frijda, N. H., Kuipers, P., & ter Schure, E. (1989). Relations among emotion, appraisal, and

emotional action readiness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 212�228.

Frijda, N. H., & Zeelenberg, M. (2001). Appraisal: What is the dependent? In K. R. Scherer,

A. Schorr, & T. Johnstone (Eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: Theory, methods, research

(pp. 141�155). New York: Oxford University Press.

Griner, L. A., & Smith, C. A. (2000). Contributions of motivational orientation to appraisal and

emotion. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 727�740.

Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley.

Kuppens, P., & Van Mechelen, I. (2007). Interactional appraisal models for the anger appraisals

of threatened self-esteem, other-blame, and frustration. Cognition and Emotion, 21, 56�77.

1370 SMITH AND KIRBY

Downloaded By: [Smith, Craig A.] At: 12:16 29 September 2009

Kuppens, P., Van Mechelen, I., Smits, D. J. M., & De Boek, P. (2003). The appraisal basis of

anger: Specificity, necessity, and sufficiency of components. Emotion, 3, 254�269.

Kuppens, P., Van Mechelen, I., Smits, D. J. M., De Boek, P., & Ceulemans, E. (2007). Individual

differences in patterns of appraisal and anger experiences. Cognition and Emotion, 21,

689�713.

Lazarus, R. S. (1991a). Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press.

Lazarus, R. S. (1991b). Progress on a cognitive-motivational-relational theory of emotion.

American Psychologist, 46, 819�834.

Lazarus, R. S., & Folkman, S. (1984). Stress, appraisal, and coping. New York: Springer.

Leventhal, H., & Scherer, K. R. (1987). The relationship of emotion to cognition: A functional

approach to a semantic controversy. Cognition and Emotion, 1, 3�28.

McClelland, D. C. (1985). Human motivation. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Parkinson, B. (1997). Untangling the appraisal�emotion connection. Personality and Social

Psychology Review, 1, 72�79.

Peterson, C., Semmel, A., von Baeyer, C., Abramson, L. Y., Metalsky, G. I., & Seligman, M. E.

P. (1982). The Attributional Style Questionnaire. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 6,

287�300.

Radloff, L. S. (1977). The CES-D scale: A self-report depression scale for research in the general

population. Applied Psychological Measurement, 1, 385�401.

Roseman, I. J. (1979, September). Cognitive aspects of emotion and emotional behavior. In

S. Fiske (Chair), Social cognition and affect. Symposium conducted at the 87th Annual

Convention of the American Psychological Association, New York, USA.

Roseman, I. J. (1991). Appraisal determinants of discrete emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 5,

161�200.

Roseman, I. J. (2001). A model of appraisal in the emotion system: Integrating theory, research,

and applications. In K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, & T. Johnstone (Eds.), Appraisal processes in

emotion: Theory, methods, research (pp. 68�91). New York: Oxford University Press.

Roseman, I. J. (2004). Appraisals, rather than unpleasantness or muscle movements, are the

primary determinants of specific emotions. Emotion, 4, 145�150.

Roseman, I. J., & Evdokas, A. (2004). Appraisals cause experienced emotions: Experimental

evidence. Cognition and Emotion, 18, 1�28.

Roseman, I. J., & Smith, C. A. (2001). Appraisal theory: Overview, assumptions, varieties,

controversies. In K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, & T. Johnstone (Eds.), Appraisal processes in

emotion: Theory, methods, research (pp. 3�19). New York: Oxford University Press.

Roseman, I. J., Spindel, M. S., & Jose, P. E. (1990). Appraisals of emotion-eliciting events:

Testing a theory of discrete emotions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59,

899�915.

Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press.

Rothbaum, F., Weisz, J. R., & Snyder, S. S. (1982). Changing the world and changing the self: A

two-process model of perceived control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42,

5�37.

Scheier, M. F., & Carver, C. S. (1985). Optimism, coping, and health: Assessment and

implications of generalized outcome expectancies. Health Psychology, 4, 219�247.

Scherer, K. R. (1984). On the nature and function of emotion: A component process approach.

In K. R. Scherer & P. Ekman (Eds.), Approaches to emotion (pp. 293�317). Hillsdale, NJ:

Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Scherer, K. R. (1997). Profiles of emotion�antecedent appraisal: Testing theoretical predictions

across cultures. Cognition and Emotion, 11, 113�150.

RELATIONAL MODEL OF APPRAISAL 1371

Downloaded By: [Smith, Craig A.] At: 12:16 29 September 2009

Scherer, K. R. (2001). Appraisal considered as a process of multilevel sequential checking. In

K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, & T. Johnstone (Eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: Theory,

methods, research (pp. 92�120). New York: Oxford University Press.

Silvia, P. J., Henson, R. A., & Templin, J. L. (2009). Are the sources of interest the same for

everyone? Using multilevel mixture models to explore individual differences in appraisal

structures. Cognition and Emotion, 23(7), 1389�1406.

Smith, C. A. (1989). Dimensions of appraisal and physiological response in emotion. Journal of

Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 339�353.

Smith, C. A. (1991). The self, appraisal, and coping. In C. R. Snyder & D. R. Forsyth (Eds.),

Handbook of social and clinical psychology: The health perspective (pp. 116�137). New York:

Pergamon Press.

Smith, C. A., David, B., & Kirby, L. D. (2006). Emotion-eliciting appraisals of social situations.

In J. P. Forgas (Ed.), Affect in social thinking and behavior (pp. 85�101). New York:

Psychology Press.

Smith, C. A., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1985). Patterns of cognitive appraisal in emotion. Journal of

Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 813�838.

Smith, C. A., & Kirby, L. D. (2000). Consequences require antecedents: Toward a process model

of emotion elicitation. In J. Forgas (Ed.), Feeling and thinking: The role of affect in social

cognition (pp. 83�106). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, C. A., & Kirby, L. D. (2001). Toward delivering on the promise of appraisal theory. In

K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, & T. Johnstone (Eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: Theory,

methods, research (pp. 121�138). New York: Oxford University Press.

Smith, C. A., & Kirby, L. D. (2004). Appraisal as a pervasive determinant of anger. Emotion, 4,

133�138.

Smith, C. A., & Kirby, L. D. (2009). Relational antecedents of appraised problem-focused

coping potential and its associated emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 23(3), 481�503.

Smith, C. A., Kirby, L. D., & David, B. (2008). The appraisal style inventory: An individual

difference measure of appraisal. Unpublished manuscript. Vanderbilt University, Nashville,

TN.

Smith, C. A., & Lazarus, R. S. (1990). Emotion and adaptation. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.),

Handbook of personality: Theory and research (pp. 609�637). New York: Guilford Press.

Smith, C. A., & Lazarus, R. S. (1993). Appraisal components, core relational themes, and the

emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 7, 233�269.

Smith, C. A., & Pope, L. K. (1992). Appraisal and emotion: The interactional contributions of

dispositional and situational factors. In M. S. Clark (Ed.), Review of personality and social

psychology. Vol. 14: Emotion and social behavior (pp. 32�62). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Smith, C. A., & Wallston, K. A. (1992). Adaptation in patients with chronic rheumatoid

arthritis: Application of a general model. Health Psychology, 11, 151�162.

Spielberger, C., Gorsuch, R., & Lushene, R. (1970). Manual for the State-Trait Anxiety

Inventory. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.

Tong, E. M. W., Bishop, G. D., Enklemann, H. C., Why, Y. P., Diong, S. M., Khader, M. A.,

et al. (2007). Emotion and appraisal: A study using ecological momentary assessment.

Cognition and Emotion, 21, 1361�1381.

Van Reekum, C. M., & Scherer, K. R. (1997). Levels of processing for emotion�antecedent

appraisal. In G. Matthews (Ed.), Cognitive science perspectives on personality and emotion

(pp. 259�300). Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.

Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures

of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social

Psychology, 54, 1063�1070.

1372 SMITH AND KIRBY

Downloaded By: [Smith, Craig A.] At: 12:16 29 September 2009