TAKING A STAND -. | Perpustakaan Komnas Perempuan

TAKING A STANDFour Decadesof Violence Against Womenin the Journey of the Indonesian Nation

Komisi Nasional Anti Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan, 2011

ISBN: Translation ©2011 Komnas Perempuan

Team of AuthorsKamala ChandrakiranaAyu RatihAndy Yentriyani

Photograph Research TeamT. J. ErlijnaShanti Ayu Prawitasari

Translation and Editing TeamRosita ArielKaren Campbell-NelsonRika IffatiWenny MustikasariDjoehana OkaAndy Yentriyani

DesignAhmett Salina

Cover PhotographRemains of Rumoh Geudong (Aceh; Galuh Wandita)The cover photograph shows the remains of Rumoh Geudong, the place where a number of women experienced sexual torture, including rape. The house was burnt down by the masses after the Military Operation Zone (DOM) status in Aceh was lifted in August 1998. The remains of Rumoh Geudong is evidence that traces of the nation’s history will gradually vanish if no one wants to remember and take care of them.

©2009 Komnas PerempuanThis book was originally written in Indonesian. This English translation includes additional information to clarify some Indonesian terms and events. Komnas Perempuan holds the copyright for this document. However, any or all parts of this document may be reproduced or utilized, with acknowledgement of the source, for educational purposes and policy advocacy to promote the rights of women victims of violence. This report was printed with support from AUSAID.

Komnas PerempuanJl. Latuharhary No. 4B, Jakarta 10310 IndonesiaTel. +62 21 3903963Fax. +62 21 [email protected]://www.komnasperempuan.or.id

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

AcknowledgmentsList of Abbreviations and AcronymsPreface

I IntroductionFrom Knowledge to Taking A StandViolence against Women: What and WhyMethodology and Organization of the Book

II Retracing Women's Journey in the National MovementThe First Step: Iboe Bangsa (Mother of the Nation)From Iboe Bangsa to Women of the Republic

Jugun IanfuIslamic Law and PolygamyRepublican Women in Socialist ClothesNationalist Politics vs. Women’s Politics

Indonesian Womanhood Shaken

III Reconsidering the Position of Women in DevelopmentExploitation of Women’s Labor

Rural WomenWomen LaborersWomen Migrant Workers

Regulating Women’s Bodies and SpaceRegulating Women’s Bodies: The Family Planning ProgramRegulating Women’s Space

The Seeds of Conflict: Regulating Identity and Nature

Uniformity of IdentityRegulating Natural ResourcesUndermining the Role of Women

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3469

1314333442465053

61686870727575

8189

899498

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IV. Exposing Violence against Women in Conflict SituationsThe May 1998 Tragedy East TimorAcehPapua Ruteng, East Nusa TenggaraMaluku Poso, Central SulawesiJemaah AhmadiyahThe 1965 Incident

May 1998 Tragedy, Ten Years After

V. Learning from History and Future Directions Learning from History

Rethinking Violence against Women and its VictimsA Misleading SeparationHer Story: The History of Women in Politics

Future DirectionsTruth and AcknowledgmentSense of Justice and the Judicial SystemReparation and EmpowermentFrom Iboe Bangsa to Women Citizens

AppendicesAppendix 1: Steps towards Truth, Reparation, and Justice to Address

the Root Causes and Impact of Four Decades of Violence against Women in Indonesia

Appendix 2: Reading List

105108115122132138139143147154159

167168168171176178179181182184

190

193

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Tables : 1. Increase in Native Students during the Dutch Colonial Era2. Number of Victims Based on Type of Sexual Violence and

Source of Information3. Portrait of Violence against Women in 23 West Timor

Refugee Locations4. Violence against Acehnese Women by Time Period and

Type of Case5. Violence against Women During Poso Conflict, 1998–2005

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118

127

147

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We of Komisi Nasional Anti Kekerasan Perempuan (Komnas Perempuan—National Commission on Violence Against Women) would like to express our heartfelt gratitude to women victims of violence in various conflict situations who opened themselves to share their sufferings and struggles. They are all survivors. We are appreciative of the trust they have given to Komnas Perempuan and respect their authority and tenacity in relating their stories. We are aware that each effort to recall extremely painful experiences reopens their wounds. Without their participation and cooperation in revealing to us their experiences, the Indonesian nation would not have a full and genuine understanding of its own course of history. Komnas Perempuan also extends deep appreciation to the documentation teams, colleagues, and partners who recorded the experiences of women victims of violence, joined in seeking ways to resolve the conflicts, and hence opened the road toward recovery for women victims of violence, for their perseverance and solidarity.

We also would like to thank everyone who worked hard to produce this book. First of all, our thanks to all the writers: Agung Ayu Ratih, a historian and humanitarian worker who has given a solid historical foundation for this book and the analyses on four decades of violence against women; Andy Yentriyani, a defender of women’s human rights who has developed her career at Komnas Perempuan as a companion to women victims of violence, especially through documenting their experiences they have entrusted to Komnas Perempuan; Kamala Chandrakirana, one of the Komnas Perempuan founders who pioneered the organization’s monitoring of all forms of violence against women in the past and present; and colleagues from the International Center for Transitional Justice who supported the work of the writing team. Second, our gratitude is extended to the illustration team for this book: Theodora J. Erlijna, a young researcher who selected illustrations and coordinated the process of collecting photographs and other visual materials;

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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Shanti Ayu Prawitasari, an apprentice in Komnas Perempuan who supported the search for photographs; and to John McGlynn, from the Lontar Foundation, and Poriaman Sitanggang who provided access to their photo collections. Many others contributed documents and photographs from personal or organizational collections, including the Post-CAVR Technical Secretariat in Timor-Leste. Their dedication has been invaluable and ensured the completion of this book.

Komnas Perempuan visualized, wrote, and launched this book with the support of a number of national and international experts who contributed their wisdom and thoughts to make this book meaningful to struggles for gender justice everywhere. Those experts are Azriana (Aceh), Cecilia Ng (Malaysia), Ery Seda (Jakarta), Farida Haryani (Aceh), Fatimah Syam (Aceh), Hilmar Farid (Jakarta), Khairani Arifin (Aceh), Kumudini Samuel (Srilanka), Mary Jane Real (Filipina), Rumadi (Jakarta), Samsidar (Aceh), Saparinah Sadli

(Jakarta), Sunila Abeysekera (Srilanka), Syafiq Hasyim (Jakarta), and Yuniyanti Chuzaifah (Jakarta). Komnas Perempuan consultations with victim communities were supported by Ikatan Keluarga Orang Hilang Indonesia (IKOHI–Indonesian Association of Families of Victims of Enforced Disappearances), Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan (KontraS–the Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence), Forum Komunikasi Korban Mei 1998 (Communication Forum for May 1998 Victims), Lembaga Penelitian Korban Peristiwa 1965 (LPKP–Research Institute on Victims of 1965) in Jakarta and Bali, and Paguyuban Keluarga Korban Tragedi Mei 1998, Trisakti, Semanggi 1 dan 2 (Families of Victims of the May 1998, Trisakti, and Semanggi 1 and 2 Tragedies). Friends at Komnas Perempuan, from Commissioners to staff members and many others too numerous to list, helped support the writing team in completion of this book. To you all we are most grateful.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABRIAD ANRI

BKCS-KB

BKKBN

BPPIP

BTICAVR

DAWNDI/TII

DOMDPRFAOG30SGapi GBHNGDPGerwani GerwisGolkarGWS

IPPFISSIITB

Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia; Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia Angkatan Darat; Indonesian ArmyArsip Nasional Republik Indonesia; National Archives of the Republic of IndonesiaBadan Kesejahteraan Catatan Sipil Keluarga Berencana; Marriage Registration and Family Planning AgencyBadan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional; National Family Planning BoardBadan Perlindungan Perempuan Indonesia dalam Perkawinan; Indonesian Agency for the Protection of Women in MarriageBarisan Tani Indonesia; Indonesian Farmers’ FrontComissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor Leste; Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East TimorDevelopment Alternatives with Women for a New EraDarul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia; Indonesian Islamic Army (an Islamic insurgency group during the 1950s–1960s)Daerah Operasi Militer; Military Operation ZoneDewan Perwakilan Rakyat; Parliament Food and Agriculture OrganizationGerakan 30 September; 30th of September MovementGabungan Politik Indonesia; Indonesian Political FederationGaris-garis Besar Haluan Negara; State Policy GuidelinesGross Domestic ProductGerakan Wanita Indonesia; Indonesian Women’s MovementGerakan Wanita Istri Sedar; Aware Wives MovementGolongan Karya (the ruling political party during Soeharto’s rule)Gerakan Wanita Sosialis, became Gerakan Wanita Sejahtera (1964); Socialist Women’s Movement, became Movement for Women’s Welfare (in 1964)International Planned Parenthood FederationInstitut Sejarah Sosial Indonesia; Indonesian Social History InstituteInstitut Teknologi Bandung; Bandung Institute of Technology

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KBKITLV

KKKKP

KNIP

Komnas HAM

Komnas Perempuan (KP)KowaniKPP HAM

KrismonKWILaswi LitsusLKBN

MCKMDGMPR

MRPMUINekolim

NICA

NKK/BKK

Keluarga Berencana; Family PlanningKoninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde; Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Carribean StudiesKontrak Karya; Work ContractKomisi Kebenaran dan Persahabatan; Commission on Truth and Friendship Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat; Indonesian National Central CommitteeKomisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia; National Commission on Human RightsKomisi Nasional Anti Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan; National Commission on Violence Against Women Kongres Wanita Indonesia; Indonesian Women's CongressKomisi Penyelidikan Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia; Investigative Commission on Human Rights Violations Krisis moneter; Monetary crisisKongres Wanita Indonesia; Indonesian Women’s Congress Lasykar Wanita Indonesia; Indonesian Women’s TroopPenelitian khusus; Special researchLembaga Keluarga Berencana Nasional; National Institute for Family PlanningMandi-Cuci-Kakus; Bathing, Washing, and Toilet facilitiesMillennium Development GoalsMajelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat; People's Consultative AssemblyMajelis Rakyat Papua; Papuan People's CouncilMajelis Ulama Indonesia; Indonesian Ulama Council Neokolonialisme dan imperialisme; Neocolonialism and imperialismNederlandsch Indië Civil Administratie; Netherlands-Indies Civil AdministrationNormalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan; Normalization of Campus Life/Coordinating Body for Student Affairs

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NKRI NU OPMOtsusPancasilaPekka

PermiPersitPerwanasPerwaniPerwari

Peta PetrusPIKAT

PilkadaPKBI

PKI PKKPNI PPI PPII

P3HPTR

PRDPRRI/Permesta

PRTPSI PUP

Negara Kesatuan Repulik Indonesia; Unitary Republic of IndonesiaNahdlatul Ulama (one of Indonesia’s largest Muslim organizations)Organisasi Papua Merdeka; Free Papua MovementOtonomi khusus; Special autonomyFive Principles (Indonesian state ideology)Pemberdayaan Perempuan Kepala Keluarga; Empowerment of Women Heads of Households Persatoean Moeslim Indonesia; Indonesian Muslim AssociationPersatuan Isteri Tentara (Angkatan Darat); Association of Army WivesPersatuan Wanita Nasional; National Women’s AssociationPersatuan Wanita Indonesia; Indonesian Women’s Association Persatuan Wanita Republik Indonesia; Women’s Association of the Republic of Indonesia Pembela Tanah Air; Defenders of the Fatherland Penembak misterius; Mysterious snipersPercintaan Ibu Kepada Anak Temurunnya; Mother’s Love for Her Children Pemilihan kepala daerah; elections for governor and head of districtPerkumpulan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia; Indonesian Planned Parenthood AssociationPartai Komunis Indonesia; Indonesian Communist PartyPembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga; Guidance for Family WelfarePartai Nasionalis Indonesia; Indonesian Nationalist PartyPemuda Puteri Indonesia; Indonesian Female Youth Persatoean Perempoean Indonesia; Indonesian Women’s AssociationPerikatan Perhimpoenan Istri Indonesia; Federation of Indonesian Wives Association Panitia Penyelidik Peraturan Hukum Perkawinan, Talak, dan Rujuk; Review Team on Law Regulating Marriage, Divorce and Reunification Partai Rakyat Demokratik; Democratic People's PartyPemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia/Perjuangan Rakyat Semesta; Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia/People’s Universal Struggle Pekerja Rumah Tangga; Domestic workerPartai Sosialis Indonesia; Indonesian Socialist Party Panca Usaha Pertanian; Five Agricultural Programs

xi

RepelitaRPuK

RUUSARA

SISKBSOBTBOTGPF

TKTBTKW TNI TrituraTRuK UNAMETUNFPA UNTAETUNTEA USUUUUPAVOC Wani WH

WHO

Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun; Five Year Development PlanRelawan Perempuan untuk Kemanusiaan; Women Volunteers for Humanity (Aceh) Rancangan Undang-Undang; BillSuku, Agama, Ras, dan Antar golongan; Ethnic Group, Religion, Race, and Inter-groupSyariat Islam; Sharia LawSurat Keputusan Bersama; Joint DecreeStaat van Oorlog en Beleg; State of War and SiegeTenaga Bantuan Operasi; Military Operations AssistantTim Gabungan Mencari Fakta Kerusuhan Mei 1998; Joint Fact-finding Team on May 1998 Riots Tim Kemanusiaan Timor Barat; West Timor Humanitarian TeamTenaga Kerja Wanita; Female Migrant WorkerTentara Nasional Indonesia; Indonesian National Armed ForcesTri Tuntutan Rakyat; People's Three DemandsTim Relawan untuk Kemanusiaan; Volunteer Team for HumanityUnited Nations Mission in East TimorUnited Nations Fund for Population ActivitiesUnited Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor United Nations Temporary Executive AuthorityUnited StatesUndang-Undang; LawUndang-Undang Pokok Agraria; Basic Agrarian Law (No. 5, 1960)Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie; Dutch East Indies CompanyWanita Negara Indonesia; Women of the Indonesian NationWilayatul Hisbah (Sharia police under authority of local executive in Aceh)World Health Organization

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This book was written as a conclusion to Komnas Perempuan’s first ten years of existence and work. It is no coincidence that these ten years concur with the ten years of Indonesia’s efforts at reform. This institution was founded upon the ruins of Chinese women’s damaged lives, women who became targets of violence during the 1998 May Riots. Thus what Komnas Perempuan has learned during the course of its work has also been a lesson about the journey and struggle of the Indonesian nation. Insights regarding future directions offered in the last part of this book are part of how we imagine Indonesia.

We have tried our best to make this book appeal to many parties. Hopefully the gamut of lessons presented here can reach the hearts and minds of the readers. It is indeed the task and the responsibility of Komnas Perempuan to disclose and disseminate information regarding all forms of violence against women in Indonesia, and propose ways to address, prevent, and eliminate it.

We sincerely hope that among the readers, wherever they are, are those who will continue the struggle for justice and humanity for all.

Jakarta, November 20, 2009

Kamala ChandrakiranaKomnas Perempuan, Chairperson

PREFACE

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The rapes in the May 1998 Riots encouraged women of various backgrounds to take a stance and demanded that the state take responsibility (Jakarta, 1998; M. Sandra)

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INTRODUCTIONI

The past could be recorded as a battle between the winner and the loser, between right and wrong. This is a historical judgment and, of course, history tends to be written by the winner.

What is often forgotten and left unrecorded is how history brings about tragedies and victims. Who are its victims? All of us, without exception! And this is a moral judgment! Because this means that

we have to rebuild human beings from the ruins of humanity itself.

Nani Nurrachman, in a letter to Komnas PerempuanDecember 15, 2006

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Indonesian history is filled with bloodshed from the time of its birth until the present. Each and every drop of blood from our bodies—whether shed in the name of Indonesian independence at the end of World War II, or for maintaining the unity of the Indonesian Republic in the New Order era, or for the desire of gaining political supremacy of a certain religion in the reform era—bears witness to how deeply the use of violence is rooted in the political strife, power struggle, and journey of the nation in this land of Indonesia. Violence in the name of “Indonesia” is often wrapped in nationalist romanticism so impressive in its intensity that it is hard for us to examine carefully the meaning and impact of violence on our life as a nation.

Now, after almost 65 years of independence, we can no longer avoid asking who have become victims of violence on the journey to building the nation-state of Indonesia. However, it is not too late—it is never too late!—for us to look into the victims’ eyes (or those of their descendants) and find ways to heal the pain, to restore their sense of justice, to reestablish national dignity, and to ensure that the future of our children and grandchildren will be free of the cyclical snare of violence that has seeped into every order of national,

social, and family life today. Quoting Nani Nurrachman’s words to Komnas Perempuan in December 2006 during the discussion “Weaving Togetherness,” “. . . all of us, without exception” are victims of tragedies that have ruined our own humanity.

From Knowledge to Taking a Stand

For the last ten years, Komnas Perempuan has documented various forms of violence against women that occurred during the most significant incidents of mass violence in the journey of Indonesia as a nation-state. This documentation was done in the line of duty as stated in Presidential Regulation No. 65/2005 regarding the National Commission on Violence Against Women, namely:

Monitoring, … documenting all forms of violence against women as well as gender-based violations of human rights, …, and taking steps that support accountability and solutions. Article 4, Point c

Since 2005, Komnas Perempuan has published nine reports on violence against women: in the context of armed conflict in Aceh, the communal

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TAKING A STAND

The first poster on the state’s violence against women, published by Kalyanamitra. The Indonesian delegation brought this poster to the women world congress in Beijing in 1995.(Semsar Siahaan/Kalyanamitra)

conflict in Poso, the 1965 tragedy, the May 1998 riots, the assault on the Ahmadiyah Community, conflict over natural resources in Manggarai, East Nusa Tenggara and in Buyat, North Sulawesi, the conflicts related to local policies that discriminate against women, and the prolonged conflict in

Papua (which is now in the process of a settlement). These reports were based on the documentation of women victims’ experiences and written according to a human rights framework.

Now, more than ten years after Indonesia began its reform era, following the collapse of Suharto’s New Order regime in 1998, it is time to establish the connection between one incident of violence and another in order to gain a comprehensive understanding about the root causes of the problem. This exercise is not only to deepen our understanding of violence against women, but also, and more importantly, to guide us in developing appropriate measures to ensure that such brutality will not happen again in the future.

What kind of stand do we expect to adopt? First of all, a stand that is guided by universal humanitarian values. The struggle in Indonesia to eliminate all forms of violence against women is part of a worldwide struggle to promote human rights. As mentioned in the preamble to the Indonesian Constitution of 1945, Indonesia is committed “to contribute to the establishment of a world order based on freedom, abiding peace and social justice.” These universal aspirations demand that we fulfill human rights consistently in every aspect of life

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without exception, both in public and private domains..

Second, the stand expected from the knowledge developed in this book is a stand that situates violence against women as an integral part of the arduous journey of “becoming Indonesia”. This means that special efforts be made to overcome the neglect of women’s experiences in the nation’s historical records, and that a special point be made that violence against women is a violation of the national values and consensus as emphasized in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.

Third, the stand expected to emerge from the knowledge gained from this book is a stand that liberates all women—in their diversity—from all forms of injustice. This demands a critical and comprehensive analysis of violence against women in relation to various patterns of discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity, religion, class, and political views. Such a stand is relevant for all woman citizens who face the contemporary challenges of the 21st century, including the way women engage in politics and become leaders of the nation and of their fellow women.

Violence Against Women: What and Why

According to the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, “violence against women” means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual, or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion, or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether in public or in private life. Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the following

• physical,sexual,andpsychologicalviolence taking place in the family, including beating, sexual abuse of girls in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-marital violence, and violence related to exploitation;

• physical,sexual,andpsychologicalviolence occurring within the general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions, and elsewhere, trafficking of women, and forced prostitution;

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TAKING A STAND

• physical,sexual,andpsychologicalviolence perpetrated or condoned by the state, wherever it occurs.

The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), through General Recommendation No. 19, asserts that the definition of violence against women includes gender-based violence, that is, violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman, or that affects women disproportionately.

In Indonesia, violence against women is rooted in the history of women since Indonesia was first imagined. Throughout this book, we consider the root causes of women’s current experiences of violence in relation to ideas about women and womanhood that were alive in discussions among women during the nationalist movement at the beginning of the 20th century. How were the roles and positions of women envisioned in a nation that was about to become “Indonesia”? How did the ideas of women freedom fighters interrelate and compete with ideals about women and womanhood that existed in the society? Once the Republic of Indonesia was established, we observed how the women’s movement discussed and argued with the state to assert the rights of women as human beings and as citizens.

TThe crisscross of so many thoughts on womanhood and nationality at a certain point in history triggered a bitter conviction: to establish the welfare and glory of a nation-state, forced uniformity must be imposed on the thought and behavior of every citizen under one chain of command. Women became one of the main targets because their bodies have the power to spawn new life, and their movements and care traditionally determine the continuity of life itself.

The chairperson of Komnas Perempuan submitting the first official state report on the violation of human rights as experienced by the women victims of the 1965 Incident to President Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono at Istana Merdeka, February 20, 2008.(Jakarta, 2008; KP)

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Unfortunately, in the discourse of Indonesia’s national history, stories about violence against women rarely surface. Among the many records of the women’s movement, it is hard to find any mention about incidents that gave rise to women victims. Even when it is mentioned, like in the latest textbook on the National History of Indonesia (2008) that includes stories about women forced to become sex slaves (jugun ianfu) during the Japanese occupation era (1942–1945), violence against women is considered an exception in history. There is a tendency to view violence against women, especially that is sexual in nature, like rape, as a mere accident or collateral damage of a bigger incident, like war, and not worth being discussed openly.

Neglect of the experience of women victims of violence in the nation’s historical records obstructs us from fully understanding the background and consequences of the many tragedies that have shaken our sense of humanity. When the mass rapes of the 13–14 May 1998 tragedy were disclosed, followed by the open testimonies of women victims of the military operation in Aceh, we were taken aback. We wondered whether these stories were true, whether the Indonesian nation could be so barbaric. Wasn’t the foundation of this republic based on

noble values? Didn’t we have Pancasila [the five basic principles of the Republic of Indonesia] and the 1945 Constitution to guide us in maintaining our unity as a nation? When we were forced to be faced again and again with the stories of women victims from Papua, East Timor, or the 1965 incident, without an adequate explanation about who should be responsible, we began to accept that violence against women is an unavoidable disaster, part of women’s unlucky fate. Without an adequate explanation, tragedy after tragedy will emerge without control, without structure, without history, and we can only pray that we will not be the next victims.

This book serves as a means to look at history, while acquainting ourselves with today’s problems. As such, we might also examine the legitimacy of the reference points that have guided the life of our nation and state from one historical period to the next, in light of the experiences of women victims of violence today. The hope is that ultimately we will all agree that the way this nation-state treats women as human beings and citizens is an indicator of its existence as a nation.

Violence against women as a result of an imbalanced relationship between men and women and interwoven with other power interests in the life of the state and the nation. Tugu Pak Tani.(Jakarta, 2009; KP)

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Methodology and Organization of the Book

Where do we begin? Komnas Perempuan is convinced that efforts to understand violence against women should begin from the experiences and hopes of the victims. The preparatory process of this book began with the victims. From August 2008 until September 2009, Komnas Perempuan held a series of dialogues with victims to find out what their hopes were and what challenges they faced, as well as to build a common understanding about recovery and reparation efforts with a gender perspective. In order that the preparation process of this book end with something really meaningful for the victims and the nation, Komnas Perempuan also conducted a series of consultations with the government to procure complete information on recovery programs for victims; with national and international experts to establish a precise and sharp analytical framework to link all efforts at the national level with those at the international level; and, also with human rights defender organizations, artists, and cultural workers to discuss the type of event for the launching of this book.

The explanation presented in this book begins with a time when dreams of an independent and sovereign Indonesia were first imagined and then fought for. In Chapter II, we will hear how women shared the dream of freedom and sovereignty for the nation, but then had to face contradictions in the national struggle and leadership. In the end, women freedom fighters had to make concessions for the sake of national unity, and many internal debates were left unresolved.

Counseling the victims’ families was the starting point of arriving at a mutual understanding of the problem and of formulating future steps, a.o. the Walisongo community, Situwu Lemba. (Poso, 2009; KP)

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In Chapter III, we will see the New Order regime from the women’s perspective. In this period, many women experienced marginalization, standardization of their roles, and uniformity of identity, as well as systemic exploitation and negligence through state policies. All this happened within the New Order paradigm regarding progress, economic growth, and security, along with the regime’s efforts to control, and sometimes to subjugate, citizens and their diversity. In this period, we examine how women experienced multiple layers of discrimination, how the seeds of conflict began to be sown, and how a culture of violence culture propagated rapidly.

At the request of victims and their advocates, Chapter IV is the story of Komnas Perempuan’s experiences in addressing violence against women that occurred during various conflict situations in Indonesia. In this chapter we witness the silence—and the silencing—of women victims, and the complexities of the impunity trap in cases of violence against women.

Chapter V is a reflection based on lessons Komnas Perempuan has learned from ten years of interacting with women victims and addressing various forms of violence against women. In this chapter we also find some preliminary thoughts on

future directions as Komnas Perempuan’s contribution to the struggle ahead that is even longer.

Through the documentation done together with the victims and their counselors, and through the effort to disseminate knowledge and understanding of the cases, Komnas Perempuan has functioned as a truth-seeking and recovery mechanism about violence against women occurring in the course of this nation’s history. With this book, we break the silence that still exists, despite the openness of the reform era, regarding all forms of violence against women.

The silence of victims about violence they have experienced is rooted in an unfriendly political climate and social sanctions related to narrow religious and moral norms. Our confused views of sexual violence also corner the victims. Rape, for example, is more often considered a moral violation—as stated in our criminal code—than a violation of human rights. As long as discriminatory actions against women in daily life have not been eliminated, it will be impossible to avoid violence against women.

Discrimination based on the different roles and positions of men and women—that is always intertwined

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TAKING A STAND

with other mutually reinforcing types of discriminations—is the root of violence against women. The impossibility of discussing these things openly and sincerely in and with the community of victims, along with the impossibility of victims to obtain justice and recovery through both legal and social-cultural mechanisms are nothing other than a trap of impunity that represses women victims of violence.

Through the truth revealed in this book, Komnas Perempuan hopes to open the way to eliminating all forms of violence against women, including its causes which are strongly rooted in the history and cultures of the Indonesian nation. The effort to eliminate all forms of violence against women includes steps of accountability taken by the state and perpetrators, recovery of victims’ rights, and guarantees that the violence will not recur. This is in line with the nation’s aspiration to provide justice and welfare for all as stated in the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, and in keeping with the humanitarian values and human rights embraced by the world’s civilizations.

Women in the role of Mother of the Nation working in the public domain as an extension of her domestic role.(1947; KITLV).

Retracing Women’s Journey In The National Movement 13

TAKING A STAND

RETRACING WOMEN’S JOURNEY IN THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT

We have no intention whatsoever to make our students become half European, nor do we intend to make them Javanese Dutch. Our intention in providing emancipating education is mainly

to make the Javanese people true Javanese of spirit who love and cherish their country and their people, and are happy to observe the virtues and beauty of their nation and motherland as well

as . . . its shortcomings!

Kartini’s letter to Mrs. Abendanon, June 10, 1902

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II

14

The First Step: Iboe Bangsa (Mother of the Nation)

When Kartini wrote about the repression she experienced as a Javanese woman at the end of the 19th century, she had come to realize that liberation for women was not possible without a complete change in the mindset of Javanese society. For Kartini, to campaign for women’s equality was part of the task of civilizing a nation, something that was not the sole purview of women. Although she was not yet thinking about Indonesia, she understood the existence of unhappy “native people” subjugated under a feudal and colonial power. From her reflections and discussions with friends, it is clear Kartini believed that the freedom to make personal choices, to decide one’s own fate, is an indication of women’s progress and that of the nation.

It is undeniable that in the end Kartini did not succeed in liberating herself from the constraints of tradition, nor was she able to realize her dreams to pursue the highest possible education. Pressures from her beloved family, especially from her father, and restrictions from the colonial government thwarted Kartini’s plan to study in the Netherlands. She had

to marry a man whom her father chose and died young when giving birth to her first son in 1904. However, Kartini’s ideas about the importance of freedom of thought and the necessity to help all people regardless of gender or class to improve the nation’s quality of life became the main reference for women involved in the nationalist movement at the beginning of the 20th century. If struggles against the Dutch colonial power of the previous century led by women such as Tjoet Nja’ Dhien in Aceh (1837–1904), Nji Ageng Serang in Java (1825–1830), or Martha Christina Tiahahu in Maluku (1817) showed that women have the ability to enter a man’s world, Kartini’s letters called for a prerequisite: the struggle for human liberation must take into consideration women’s experiences, even in the most private sphere, namely the institution of marriage.

The birth of Kartini’s ideas marked the beginning of modern ideas about the relationship between women’s advancement and the civilization of a nation as well as about women’s role in the national movement. Her rarely published letters show that Kartini was not only speaking about the importance of education for the advancement of women; she was also pointing out how educated women should use


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One of the traditions the women criticized is polygamy. Photo Djero Trena and I Djampiring, two of the numerous wives of the king of Buleleng (Bali,1865; KITLV).

their intelligence to think and act for the advancement of their nation. She carefully examined the colonial structure of oppression supported by aristocrats, discussed the moral depravity of local officials, and observed the influence of both on the deterioration of the people’s wellbeing. She witnessed how feudal tradition, including concubinage, had been maintained solely for the comfort of aristocrats. She inveighed against “aristocratic thinkers” who mastered European scholarship, but made no effort to improve the people’s welfare.

That the best must be solely owned and considered a personal right of the

aristocrats originates in the twisted idea that aristocrats are nobler human beings, creatures of the highest stratum of society,

and therefore have the right to claim ownership of everything that is best!

R. A. Kartini: Nota, Jepara, January 1903

Adeldom verplicht—noblesse oblige—is a Dutch expression Kartini frequently quoted. Kartini believed that the higher one’s aristocratic status, the greater his/her responsibility to look after the people. As leaders, it is not sufficient for aristocrats to have “intelligence of the mind”, they must also have “intelligence of the heart”. In the task of civilizing society, women must not be left behind

because educated and conscientious women will prove to be worthy partners for men. When women become mothers, they have great influence on the moral education of their children.

Women are the pillars of civilization! Not because women are considered capable of the task, but because I myself strongly believe that from women great influence might emerge . . . that women have most contributed to the advancement of human morality. It is from women that humans receive their first education—on a woman’s lap, a child gradually learns to feel, think, and speak; I came to realize more and more that the effect of the first education is not insignificant to human life in the future. And how can native mothers possibly educate their children if they themselves are uneducated?

Kartini’s letter to Mrs. Abendanon, 21 January 1901

In general, issues of progress and civilization were of interest to the educated native peoples—men and women alike—who had the rare chance to access the scientific tools of modern knowledge at the end of the 19th century. They were concerned about the deterioration of the people’s quality of life due to colonial policies whose sole intent was depletion of natural resources

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and indigenous labor for the glory of the Dutch Kingdom. Meanwhile, local rulers who were supposed to ease the burden of the people became an extension of the colonial government, taking advantages for themselves. The educated class was aware that throughout the 19th century there were various forms of resistance towards the colonial power, whether farmers’ uprisings led by Muslim religious leaders in rural Java, or the longest guerilla war in history in Aceh. However, one by one, these resistances were broken by Dutch military strength. There had to be new ways to overcome the damages wrought by the colonial system, and simultaneously question the inhuman aspects of it.

TThrough western education, the educated natives were introduced to the idea that to fight colonialism they must use tools of the powerful such as science, educational institutions, organizations, general meetings, and printing and publishing. With implementation of its Ethical Policy at the beginning of the 20th century, the colonial power, which had always assumed that the natives were unintelligent, lazy and uncivilized, offered them opportunities for education with the hope they would willingly accept western civilization and thus become part of the Dutch Kingdom. The natives immediately took advantage

of these opportunities and used them for their interests. If the colonial power thought it sufficient to measure the natives’ progress by their mastery of technical skills that would benefit the Dutch East Indies industrialization process, natives, on the other hand, considered progress to be the growth of a passion to think freely, to dismiss obedience to traditional rulers, and to be engaged in cooperative efforts to fight ignorance, discrimination, and other forms of injustice. Progress meant being ready to give birth to new traditions, to become new people.

Ideas of progress imagined by the educated natives generally influenced their views on women. They maintained that a woman’s main role is to give birth and raise children, but their concerns about the need for a new generation of greater moral and intellectual quality made them reconsider the importance of education for women who would become mothers. Educated women themselves thought that the colonial system and feudal traditions had, in general, degraded women’s lives. Among the elite, women were merely a decoration in the home, ignorant about the wider world, and victims of polygamy. At the lower level of society, poverty drove women to accept underage forced marriage that


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repeatedly led them to unjust divorce, prostitution, or concubinage. Therefore, educated women thought that only education, both that which provided a set of skills as well as general knowledge, would improve women’s lives. With skills, women could live their own lives and be economically independent from men. With knowledge of homemaking—maternal and child health care, nutrition, sanitation—women would be able to take better care of their families.

Education (in technical skills) that frees women from financial dependency on their families, will also free them from unwanted forced marriage. Educated women realize they are not objects, but fellow human beings of men with rights to life and will realize the true meaning of marriage. They will understand that marriage is not an escape, but rather a step in life that must be weighed seriously, to bring joy to husbands whom they have chosen, and to be good mothers to their children.

R. A. Sosrohadikusumo in Dewi Sartika, p. 38

It was a spirit such as this that encouraged educated women in various places to open schools for women. Shortly before Kartini died, Dewi Sartika founded the first women’s school,

Education is believed to improve the life of women. Students of Korido, the first school for girls in Papua, class of 1952-1955 (Sarah Netta Boerdam).

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Sekolah Istri (School for Wives), on 16 January 1904. Within eight years the school, that changed its name to Sekolah Kautamaan Istri (School for the Excellence of Wives), had developed into nine schools with a focus on girls from the farming and working classes. In Kotogadang (west Sumatra), Roehana Koeddoes founded the Amai Setia Vocational School in 1911, while in Manado (northern Sulawesi), Maria Walanda-Maramis founded Percintaan Ibu Kepada Anak Temurunnya school (PIKAT—Mother’s Love for Her Children) in 1917. The first Dutch lawyer to stress the importance of broader educational opportunities for native peoples, C. Th. Van Deventer, and his wife, founded the Kartini School in Semarang (central Java) in 1913.

Women affiliated with Islamic organizations, such as Muhammadiyah, were also influenced by the growth of the reform spirit in the Dutch East Indies. They thought the Islamic teachings spread at that time were very backward and disrespectful of women. Thus, women needed to be equipped with religious and organizational knowledge to increase their dignity as human beings. With the guidance of the Muhammadiyah leader, Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan, the Aisyiyah organization was established in Yogyakarta in 1917 and

operated a school for girls with a modern curriculum that concentrated on religious education. In Padang Panjang, West Sumatera, Rahma El Joenoesia, a woman who lived among Islamic educational reformers, was also thinking about the importance of modern education for

Increase in Native Students during the Dutch Colonial Era

women based on Islamic teachings. In 1922 she founded a religious boarding school for girls called Sekolah Dinijah Poetri.

These private schools were built and operated with the support of the

Source: Frances Gouda (1995). Dutch Culture Overseas: Colonial Practice in the Netherlands Indies 1900-1942, p. 79.

Table 1.

STATE ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS

YEAR GIRLS BOYS

1915 3.490 18.970

1925 10.195 28.722

1929 - 1930 11.917 29.984

1934 - 1935 15.492 31.231

1939 - 1940 19.605 34.307

TOTAL 60.699 143.214

PRIVATE ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS

YEAR GIRLS BOYS

1915 1.049 1.195

1925 6.250 14.529

1929 - 1930 6.941 14.055

1934 - 1935 8.355 14.077

1939 - 1940 10.838 15.915

TOTAL 33.441 59.771


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founders’ husbands or relatives, support of native officials at the local level, or with donations from Dutch citizens sympathetic to reform efforts in the Dutch East Indies. Subjects taught in each school varied, but usually were related to literacy and basic household training: sweeping and mopping, arranging furniture, dusting, washing dishes and cooking utensils, sewing and mending clothes, caring for babies and the sick, and doing handiwork such as sewing, needlepoint, and knitting. In school the girls also studied proper social customs and manners such as how to address and behave towards people of higher status and position.

It is interesting to note that until the 1930s, native women, including Kartini, never directly criticized the nyai tradition as one of the main practices of the colonial system, but indirectly kept their distance from the nyai and the culture that developed from this tradition. Nyai were native concubines of Dutch men. There was a tendency to view the nyai system as disguised prostitution that grew from the poverty and moral depravity of lower class women without questioning the role of the colonial government in supporting this system for economic interests.

Since the time that crowds of Dutch men arrived in Java with the Vereenigde

Oostindische Compagnie (VOC—Dutch East Indies Company) in the 17th century, the company had refused to be burdened with the wellbeing of its employees. Taking native women as concubines to care for the mental and physical wellbeing of these colonial government employees was considered the best choice. The nyai also opened the way for Dutch men to acquaint themselves with local traditions and customs, and thus made it easier for them to implement government policies that demanded obedience from the natives. The problem was that this institution of relations with Dutch men was never recognized as legal marriage and a concubine’s owner could end the relation at any moment without due responsibility. Furthermore, native mothers did not have rights to claim their children born from these relationships.

Although considered illegitimate, the “mixed marriage” between Dutch men and native women gave birth to a new class, the Indo-Europeans or Eurasians, which gave rise to a new complexity in the colonial social order. Besides this, the Puritan Calvinists were bothered by the custom of polygamy and concubinage among Javanese aristocrats. In the midst of government efforts to organize a modern state administration and to promote European norms of efficiency and clarity about

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Photograph in an exhibition in the Netherlands. The Dutch East-Indies women were depicted as exotic and obedient.(Jawa, 1901/1903; KITLV).

division of responsibilities, the existence of polygamous families was not at all helpful, if not creating new social problems.

For the colonial government, the two best ways to straighten up the maze of relationships in the colony among people of different race, class, and gender was to empower women through education and encourage monogamous marriage to build nuclear families through regulations on child marriage, divorce, polygamy, concubinage, and the nyai system. Dutch women who began arriving in the middle of the 19th century brought with them conservative views on the important role of women as household managers and supporters of their husbands’ careers. For native women, especially those of the upper class, a monogamous marriage along with a well-ordered household was a sign of modernity: a readiness to leave the old civilization that had positioned women as mere objects of men’s pleasure.

During the first three decades of the 20th century, discussions among educated women focused on the attempt to formulate the meaning of progress and civilization for women. It seems they were looking for a middle way to be involved in a changing world, between encouraging women to leave


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Chinese woman in a sedan chair. In the colonial structure, the Chinese, Arabs, Indians and other people of foreign descent were considered lower in status than the whites, but higher than the natives. The society has not much knowledge about the involvement of the Chinese community, the women in particular, in the Indonesian national movement Indonesia ((Jakarta, 1870; KITLV)

the constraints of tradition and facing opposition from those not yet able to accept changes of the time, whether they be feudal groups wishing women to remain in their traditional position, or Dutch authorities who were always on guard so that native movements would not develop in directions that opposed the interests of the colonial power. These educated women were looking for moral and political justifications to work in the public domain without being seen as

denying their nature as women, and so that their work would be acknowledged as contributing to national progress.

The support of men actively involved in the national movement became important, especially to confront resistance coming from conservative groups among the native people who could not see the need for women to gather, exchange thoughts, express opinions, and engage in social work.

Women also needed men’s help to familiarize themselves with and utilize modern social tools such as organizations, publishing, and public assemblies. Boedi Oetomo encouraged the birth of the first women’s organization, Poetri Mardika, in Jakarta (1912). The first women’s newspaper, Poetri Hindia, published by journalist R. M. Tirto Adhisoerjo in Bandung (1909), was still under the management of and staffed by men. Three years later,


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Ari jadi awewe kudu segala bisa, ambeh bisa hirup!

A woman needs a lot of skills in order to survive!

Dewi Sartika, p.38

Soenting Melajoe, published by Roehana Koeddoes in Bukit Tinggi, West Sumatra was managed completely by women. In less than 15 years, other organizations sprang up in many cities. Their activities were more or less the same: providing education and social welfare services for women, providing scholarships to talented girls, distributing information about education, and publishing weeklies to disseminate ideas about women’s progress and civilization.

At that time women’s organizations were still dominated by elite native women. The suggestions and appeal they made through their publications were also directed to upper class women who could afford regular subscriptions and had more free time to read and think. The idea of noblesse oblige, so apparent in Kartini’s writings and also present in Dewi Sartika’s efforts to sow the seed of “honorable aristocrats,” continued to influence women’s discourse until the end of the 1930s. Meanwhile, elite women in Minangkabau and Minahasa, such as Roehana Koeddoes and Maria Walanda-Maramis, were attempting social reform by reinterpreting local history and religious teachings. This did not mean they were unconcerned about lower-class women. On the contrary, they positioned themselves as educators

giving voice to the needs of the common women so that “women of our nation” would not fall prey to poverty and moral depravity.

The wish to reach women from different classes was not easy to realize. Organizing schools and other social services needed financial support and teachers, whereas the financial and human resources of these organizations were limited. The Dutch East Indies government never gave substantial support to private educational institutions nor did they extend educational opportunities to women from the farming and labor classes. The colonial civilizing mission had to face the economic interests of European businessmen. On sugar, tea, and coffee plantations, for example, 25–45% of the laborers were women, while in the agricultural areas in Java, 30% of the laborers were women. Progressive colonial authorities suggested banning the night shift for women workers so they would have more time to take care of their households and children. The conservatives who prioritized economic interests argued that this suggestion imposed European views on women’s domestic role, whereas natives’ views regarding work were, in essence, totally different.

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Women’s ideas on progress and civilization—whether from reinterpreting tradition or religion—received recognition and more open opposition in general meetings where ‘Indonesian-ness’ and womanhood were discussed. These meetings, which took a congress format, were held and attended mostly by the educated, and were closely monitored by the colonial government. Nationalists gave women’s issues particular attention at the First Youth Congress in 1926. Congress participants, comprising delegates of youth organizations from various ethnic groups, attempted to link women’s struggle for emancipation to “national awakening” in general. A medical student from Minangkabau (Sumatera), Bahder Djohan, called for women to be given liberty to “cultivate the noblest, the most humane of traits, which is motherhood”. He rejected polygamy as disrupting women’s composure in carrying out their duties for the development of the state and nation.

It can be said there was no significant resistance to the view that woman’s main domain was the household, and that the health and prosperity of the family was considered a central pillar in building a strong nation. In the First Indonesian Women’s Congress (Jakarta, 1928) and the Second (Yogyakarta, 1935), the speakers repeatedly emphasized these


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points, and associated the soundness of the household with a happy marriage. Social problems, such as the trafficking of women, prostitution, concubinage, or forced marriage, were discussed in the framework of building healthy and strong marriages and households for the progress and civilization of the nation. One of the speakers at the First Indonesian Women’s Congress who concisely and coherently developed this view was Sitti Soendari, a journalist for the women’s bi-weekly magazine, Wanita Sworo:

If the Indonesian people intend to become a nation that gains the respect of the world, each of us should build a loving home, and not a home based on jealousy, ignorance, or other evils. Polygamy, underage marriage, forced marriage, divorce as well as marital separation for unspecified periods of time, are quite difficult to defend these days if we want to present marriage at its best. In summary, the more solid our families, the more solid the nation of Indonesia and the more prosperous its people will be.

Kongres Perempuan Pertama: Tinjauan Ulang, p. 61

IIt is worth noting that in both congresses mentioned above, Bahder Djohan and Sitti Soendari mentioned polygamy as a women’s problem in the institution of marriage and the family.

The women of the Dutch East Indies were cheap labor for the colonial plantations and factories. (1915; Prentenkabinet Leiden/KITLV)

This issue has been a constant source of dispute throughout the history of the women’s movement: Is polygamy actually a source of the problem or part of the solution for women? This debate involved not only women, but also men, particularly those in the nationalist movement. It is interesting to note that in the beginning, resistance to polygamy emerged from social reform and anti-feudalism movements inspired by a similar spirit in Europe. Early opponents of polygamy, such as Kartini and Roehana Koeddoes, and later women activists, did not specifically question Islamic teaching that permits polygamy, but rather denounced aristocratic and upper-class habits to take many women as legal wives or concubines. These practices trapped women in situations of insecurity, especially when they were economically dependent. Even proponents of polygamy criticized polygamous practices and concubinage among aristocrats. However, they believed that Islamic law could overcome the breakdown of marriage that harmed women, including unconditional polygamy.

The anti-polygamy position began to be associated with an attack on Islamic teachings when Islamic-based organizations rejected the strong belief held by secular nationalist and non-

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Islamic groups that a monogamous marriage is the main prerequisite for family and national welfare. As explained at length by Ratna Sari, a board member of Persatoean Moeslim Indonesia (Permi—Indonesian Muslim Association), at the Second Women’s Congress, polygamy might in fact safeguard the beneficial relationship among husbands, wives, and society if practiced in accordance with Islamic law. The limitation regarding the number of wives, the obligatory permission granted by the other wives, and the obligation to treat all wives the same, guarantees that a polygamous marriage is not always detrimental to women. Ratna Sari described how a monogamous marriage could easily create various bad conditions, such as illegal marriages that were synonymous with adultery, an increase in prostitution, the hypocrisy of spouses in a forced monogamous relationship, or the neglect of war victim widows. What needs to be resisted is not polygamy itself, but the practice of polygamy for the sake of satisfying sexual desires without due regard to the principle of justice for women.

The debate regarding polygamy developed beyond the realm of congresses and became more intense. When the demand to revise the marriage law that contained the elimination of

polygamy was welcomed by the colonial government in 1937, the debate shifted to the issue of Western influence on the nationalist movement. The government formulated a bill commonly known as the Ordinance of Registered Marriage and distributed it to many organizations before sending it to the Dutch East Indies Parliament. The ordinance appealed to citizens to register their marriages, thereby accepting monogamy, and allowing a woman in a registered marriage to appeal for divorce if the husband intended to marry another woman. The colonial government recognized the need to issue this ordinance in order to protect Dutch women who married native men from polygamy, and to respond to pressure from secular women’s organizations to eradicate polygamy.

Islamic organizations immediately opposed the proposal and said it was a government attempt to change Islam. Among women, the strongest opposition came from Rasuna Said, a Permi official, who viewed this project as an intervention of the colonial government into Islamic tradition. Two nationalist parties, Parindra and Pasundan, also opposed the project because they believed the government was deliberately creating chaos to disintegrate the nationalist movement.


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Child marriages and forced marriages were practices the women movements opposed to since the Indonesian Women Congress I. Photo Patih Pemalang, Raden Toemenggoeng Reksa Negara, and spouse (Banyumas, 1863; KITLV).

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In this debate, the nyai issue came to the surface and the question arose as to why the colonial government had not produced a law that could protect native women in illegal marriages with Dutch men. Rasuna Said demanded that the government devise a clear regulation about interracial relationships or eradicate the nyai tradition. Encountering such strong opposition, the government finally canceled the bill.

At almost the same time, the Second Indonesian Women’s Congress sought to consolidate the different views on polygamy among its members by setting up the Marriage Law Research Commission under the leadership of a legal expert, Maria Ulfah Santoso. Maria Ulfah presented the research findings, supported by strong facts about women’s problems in marriage, at the Third Women’s Congress. She concluded that eventually the Indonesian people would agree that polygamy had to be eliminated. She felt that the opinion stating polygamy was good because it solved the problem of women outnumbering men was an insult to women. “We do not want to be married on the basis of pity . . . It is better to work hard than to be married out of pity.” The research became a significant reference for the discussion about marriage in the following years

as well as the basis for the Congress Chair’s decision to establish a body called the Badan Perlindungan Perempuan Indonesia dalam Perkawinan, (BPPIP—Indonesian Body to Protect Women in Marriage). Its task was to examine the position of women in Islamic law, traditional law, and European law, and also to set up marriage consultation bureaus in various places.

From the debate on polygamy we can learn that the institutionalization of marriage and women’s position in it became a problem of national politics. Each side in the debate had its own views on the best reference to use in defining one of the main social institutions for upholding the Indonesian nation-state: the family. Women’s organizations were also aware of the political aspects of their struggle. But the complexities they encountered when confronted with traditional customs and religion caused them to choose safer ways to advocate for women’s needs and rights. When the First Indonesian Women’s Congress agreed to establish Persatoean Perempoean Indonesia (PPI—the Indonesian Women’s Association) in 1928, which changed its name to Perikatan Perhimpoenan Istri Indonesia (PPII—the Federation of Indonesian Wives Associations) the following year, this federation decided


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not to take a decisive position on polygamy. Condemnation from the Islamic groups that nationalists tended to “insult Islam” and “tear Indonesian people apart by talking about polygamy” seems to have influenced the decision of women’s congresses conducted before independence to refrain from discussing religion and politics.

On one hand, this choice can be seen as an attempt by organization leaders to prioritize women’s unity in support of the nationalist movement over concerns more specific to women. On the other hand, the safer path taken by the women’s movement opened the door for the male-dominated nationalist movement to determine the direction the women’s struggle would take in the following years. Furthermore, it was as if the women’s movement seemed to be separate from the struggle of women in social movements who were questioning the repression of women outside the marriage institution. This was unfortunate since an encounter between women activists in the women’s movement and those in social movements could have deepened and sharpened the general formulation about the role and position of women in the nationalist movement. Should women indeed put public issues before domestic ones?

Probably the only women’s organization that dared to breach the boundaries of women’s political involvement was Istri Sedar (Aware Wives), established in 1930 under the leadership of Soewarni Pringgodigdo. Istri Sedar publicly opposed polygamy and decided not to join PPII because of its views on polygamy. Soewarni said, “It is within the rights of Indonesian women to have justice and freedom, and polygamy is a genuine repudiation of that justice and freedom.” When Soekarno said that the women’s movement had to support national independence before demanding women’s rights, Soewarni expressed the opposite: women’s equality is a prerequisite to achieving national independence. In her speech “On Indonesian Women’s Labor” at the Second Indonesian Women’s Congress, Soewarni also criticized the view that women should be confined to domestic labor. Using statistics, she demonstrated that the number of women working on farms and plantations, and in commerce were greater than those involved in domestic work. She also suggested that domestic work must be considered as productive and, therefore, should be paid. Congress participants returned to the issue of the inherent nature of women. Women should not do hard work and degrade themselves by becoming plantation laborers,

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There were also women journalists involved in leftist movements; for example, Siti Larang Sosrokardono, a journalist for Sarekat Islam’s newspaper in Surabaya, Oetoesan Hindia, and leader of the Motor Vehicle Labor Union as well as the Hotel and Restaurant Labor Union, and Sitti Soendari, a journalist and skillful propagandist for the Train and Tram Labor Union. When the colonial government suppressed the attempted rebellion of the radical nationalist movement, including the Indonesian Communist Party, at the end of 1926, several women activists were arrested and exiled to Boven Digul, a heavily forested and swampy area in South Papua. Hundreds of the approximate 1300 detained exiles died of starvation and disease. One woman who survived this ordeal, Raden Soekaesih, had a chance to go to the Netherlands where she gave her testimony before Dutch society about the brutality of the colonial government in dealing with the nationalist movement.

Another problem untouched in the women’s congresses was related to Indonesian domestic workers whom the Dutch brought back to their country beginning in the 18th century. Some of these workers commuted between the Dutch East Indies and the Netherlands as zeebaboe (sea servants), babysitters

The Baboe Laoet was a child fosterer/babysitter specially employed at oceangoing vessels. There was no protection for them in terms of wages, job safety, and other job securities. (Batavia, 1880; KITLV)

street sweepers, or coolies. Finally, the Chairperson of the Congress terminated the debate due to differences of principle.

Also neither women’s congresses nor the PPII gave attention to women who actively participated in and led organizations regarded as having communist views, although it was

estimated that thousands of women were involved in such organizations. Several names mentioned in social history records regarding the radicalism of nationalist movements in the 20th century were Mrs.Vogel, an Indo-Dutch woman who headed the Surakarta branch of Sarekat Hindia, and Woro Sumarsih, the leader of the Sarekat Rakyat women’s branch in Surakarta.


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on ships. There were hundreds of them, and many of them experienced injustice in terms of wages, work safety, and other benefits. In 1939 they founded an organization named Kaoem Iboe Indonesia (Indonesian Mothers) under the leadership of Sandijem and Mak Ginem. They offered their houses to be used as rest stops and gathering places for Indonesian people in the Netherlands.

If we study the thoughts and experiences of women involved in the nationalist movement, we realize they had a wealth of inspirational sources to draw from in formulating their womanhood. Traditions of leadership and women-led resistance in previous centuries, the courage of the nyai and women workers in breaking through cultural boundaries to confront a foreign world, the intelligence of educated women to use private space as a basis for resistance, as well as the involvement of women in social movements to demand a basic change in the social order, all these are important pillars that should serve as a reference in the formulation of womanhood and nationalism. It is interesting to note that when the women’s movement overlapped with the nationalist movement, Iboe Bangsa (Mother of the Nation) was the dominant idea, with the household as the headquarters of her struggle, as determined at the Second

Indonesian Women’s Congress (1935):

What is the obligation of a woman as Iboe Bangsa? First and foremost it is to nurture the noble character of her nation . . . We do not ask Indonesian mothers to be Iboe Bangsa simply by sitting and contemplating every day and night on abstract issues without exerting any

The Indonesian Women Congress III unanimously decided to urge the Dutch colonial government to issue more democratic marriage laws, and demanded active and passive suffrage in the Volksraad (Bandung, 1938; ANRI).

effort whatsoever . . . As Iboe Bangsa . . . we should pay attention to all matters of the nation. Wherever fathers of the nation go, we should follow, so that our views equal theirs. We do not ask Indonesian mothers to be involved in all of the fathers’ work so that our household is left unattended! No, even by attending to household chores, mothers can follow

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the path of the fathers by providing motherly influence, as long as there is a will and diligence to do so.

Mrs. Sri Mangoensarkoro, Chairperson of the Second Indonesian

Women’s Congress,“Women’s Role as Iboe Bangsa”

Being Iboe Bangsa was a crucial strategy for the women’s movement. The political stance in the epithet Iboe Bangsa reflected a view of womanhood and nationalism closely related to a woman’s biological ability to be a mother and her social role as a housewife. The nation needed women’s expertise to take care of its “domestic” affairs. This can be understood as a strategy of the women’s movement to procure a place in the nationalist movement without triggering a lot of opposition from men. At the same time, the Iboe Bangsa formula could be used as a political statement vis-à-vis the colonial government to assert that Indonesian women were determined and capable of giving birth to a new nation that would not be easy for other nations to treat arbitrarily. On the other hand, this formula reinforced the different roles of men and women in society. Women were still seen as domestic creatures. This difference restricted and undermined women’s involvement in the public domain.

Morality and the Nation-State

Comrades, very few men can resist the power of those sinful women. Therefore, men in general better keep away from those wicked women, rather than attempting to test their own strength. We are certain that men would lose

Mrs. Sri Mangoensarkoro Second Indonesian Women’s Congress, 1935

IIn the last five years, we have seen the emergence of many policies at both national and provincial levels that are based on arguments about morality,

such as the policy on clothing, prostitution, khalwat (close proximity of men and women not related by blood or marriage), and pornography. In the history of Indonesia, the issue of morality is nothing new. It has been discussed since the beginning of the nationalist movement and has covered, among others, the issues of the nyai tradition, prostitution, concubinage, and trafficking of women.

Morality is one of the key issues in the process of becoming a nation-state. Morality is considered the grand pillar of the nation, closely linked with its sacredness. Women are made the symbol of that sacredness; they are judged on the basis of their virginity and their marital status. In the context of colonialism or war, a woman’s sexual relationship with a male colonist or enemy could be considered as damaging the sacredness of her community. This is especially true if the sexual relationship produces offspring, who no longer have the “pure blood” of the community from which the women originated.

This is why, in the history of Indonesia, nyais were disadvantaged. From the standpoint of the native, they were considered traitors who had given birth to children of mixed race who had no cultural connection to their mother’s community. A nyai’s shrewd use of her position in order to cope with her social and economic problems was often seen merely as a loose woman wanting to live freely and comfortably. That is why the nyai practice tended to be viewed as disguised prostitution. The same attitude of natives toward the nyai has emerged in the conflict situations of Aceh, Papua, and East Timor. Local people ostracize women who had sexual relations with Indonesian soldiers and the children born from those relationships, including as a result of rape. These children are often derisively called “barrack children,” “straight-haired children,” and “Javanese children”. Families and communities may just expel these women and their children.

Considered the key to a nation’s grandeur, the issue of morality is always present in discussions about a nation-state. The morality issue easily attracts support, and thus is an effective campaigning tool for the political elite in their struggle for power. The women’s movement, striving for the protection and enforcement of women’s rights, will always be in the middle of that struggle.


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Women were allowed to be involved in political activities as long as they did not forget their duty to give birth to a new generation and attend to household chores.

From Iboe Bangsa to Women of the Republic

Aside from the restrictive definition of the role and position of women in the nationalist movement toward the end of Dutch colonialism, women’s activities in the political area intensified. They still promote the motherhood role of women and openly expressed support for independence. At the Third Indonesian Women’s Congress in Bandung (1938), it was decided that the birthday of the Women’s Congress, 22 December, would become Mother’s Day with the slogan “Free to Do Good,” stressing the importance of a woman’s duty as Mother of the Family, the Society and the Nation. At the next congress (1941) in Semarang, women decided to join an umbrella organization, Gabungan Politik Indonesia (Gapi—the Indonesian Political Federation). In the meantime, women activists involved in political parties were arrested: Rasuna Said, a cadre of Permi and a prominent orator, was arrested in Semarang in 1932; Surastri Karma Trimurti, a cadre of Partindo and

The media coverage on Hajjah Rangkayo Rasuna Said’s appeal for women to be independent thinkers in the political realm. This appeal was presented at the Perwari Congress V (1953; Harian Rakyat).

a journalist for several newspapers, was arrested in 1936 and imprisoned from 1939 to 1943 for distributing anti-Dutch pamphlets and for harshly criticizing colonialism in her writings.

The Japanese occupation (1942–45) was a dark period that is least discussed in

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Komoriah supposedly the leader of the Jugun Ianfu is holding on a doll which accompanied her during the time the Japanese army confined her. (Kupang, 2 Oktober 1945; Australian War Memorial/K. B. Davis).

Twenty-six Javanese Jugun Ianfus in a number of Japanese brothels in Kupang were set free by the Australian army. To disguise their identity as Jugun Ianfu, the Japanese army required them to wear a Red Cross armband (Kupang, 2 Oktober 1945; Australian War Memorial K. B. Davis)

Jugun Ianfu

Jugun ianfu is the Japanese term for comfort women who were recruited to serve the Japanese armed forces during the Second World War. The Japanese government

allowed the establishment of ianjo (brothel or post to facilitate ianfus) to tend to the needs of the Japanese soldiers. According to Japanese government internal documents, the creation of ianfu posts was meant to avoid anti-Japanese sentiment, to prevent the deterioration of the troop’s strength because of venereal disease, and also to prevent spy activities.

Women in the ianfu posts lived in a situation of sexual slavery. Although private parties functioned

as managers of ianfu posts, it was the military that really controlled the post. It was the military who gave permission to build ianfu posts and who established the regulations, including hours of operation, fees, the prohibition to consume alcohol in the ianfu post, the obligation to wear condoms to avoid venereal diseases, and medical check-ups for the ianfu women. Most women had to serve soldiers from morning until late at night; some even served ten men in one day. They could not escape because the posts were controlled by the military.

It is estimated that more than a thousand women in Indonesia were made ianfus and they were distributed among more than 40 ianfu posts, mainly in Java, Sulawesi and Kalimantan. In Indonesia, village officials were used to recruit ianfu. Some women were promised a scholarship to foreign

countries or given guarantees that their families would not be tortured or plundered by the armed forces. Others were lured by the promise of jobs as dancers or art performance group members. Yet others were kidnapped from their homes.

Besides Indonesia, these women victims of sexual slavery also originated from Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, and the Netherlands. It is noted that ianfu posts had already been established


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The Australian army handing the women over to the NICA (Kupang, 3 Oktober, 1945; Australian War Memorial/K. B. Davis).

The Japanese army who had imprisoned the women unloading their ex-victims belongings from the Australian army boats. (Kupang, Oktober 3, 1945; Australian War Memorial/K. B. Davis).

in Shanghai in 1932. The number of ianfu posts grew rapidly in the Second World War in areas colonized by Japan such as China, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Burma, Hongkong, Macau, and Indochina. The exact figure is not known, but it is estimated that more than 400,000 women were scattered among more than 400 ianfu posts.

When Japan lost the Second World War, the ianfus were abandoned. Many ianfus could not go back to their homes because they did not have any money to go home, did not know the way, or were felt too ashamed to go home. Of those who did return home, many were in terrible health, some even suffered from permanent physical impairment or damage to their reproductive organs so that they were unable to get pregnant and give birth. Some of the women could not marry. Some who married never had the courage to tell their spouses about the brutality they had endured.

The strong pressure on the Japanese government to take responsibility for the ianfu victims started to show results in the early 1990s. In 1996 the Japanese government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, wrote a letter openly apologizing to the women victims.

Subsequent Prime Ministers of Japan—Keizo Obuchi, Yoshiro Mori and Junichiro Koizumi—also signed the apology.

On 21 May 1997, Prime Minister Hashimoto sent a letter of apology to the Indonesian people through President Soeharto. In response to this letter, the President instructed the Minister of Social Welfare not to blow up the jugun ianfu issue. Social Department documents mention that from the very beginning Indonesia did not demand any compensation or indemnity, but rather hoped the

Japanese government would take proper steps to resolve the problem. Under the direction of President Soeharto, the Indonesian government made a deal with the Japanese government to use the available compensation budgeted for the jugun ianfu to fund the operation of Tresna Werdha, a residence for senior citizens. This facility housed not only jugun ianfu victims, but also other senior citizens.

This Indonesian policy reaped criticism from the jugun ianfu victim community because it kept the issue of jugun ianfu from being shared knowledge in Indonesian society. The use of available funds missed the target, when in fact so many women victims were still living in poverty. It is thought that the government’s position was motivated by an interest to maintain Japanese investments, as Japan is one of the main investors in Indonesian development. It is also thought that the Indonesian government was worried that a more open stand could lead to a reemergence of anti-Japanese sentiment as seen in the Malari Incident of 1974.

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the history of the women’s movement. After defeating the Dutch colonial force, Japanese military authorities began to mobilize Indonesians to support their preparations to confront the Allied Forces in World War II. Social and political organizations founded during the Dutch era, including women’s organizations, were banned. The Japanese government replaced them with various mass organizations and youth militia that were assigned different functions: as bodies to spread propaganda about the ideals of a prosperous Great Asia under the leadership of Dai Nippon, as reserve troops to defend the country, as bodies to amass people’s riches and crops for war logistics, or to build up the military and war infrastructure.

IIn a short time, the Japanese government succeeded in herding young men 14–25 years old into paramilitary youth corps, while men aged 25-35 years old were used to reinforce the police force and the civil defense corps. Around 25,000 young men were recruited into the military force as reinforcement troops called Heiho and were given military training just like Japanese soldiers. More than 60,000 other young men were recruited for Pembela Tanah Air (Peta—Defenders of the Fatherland) and were prepared to launch guerilla warfare if the Allied forces happened to attack

Indonesia. Several youth organizations were also given military training, such as Barisan Pelopor (Exemplary Guard) and Hizbullah that was affiliated with Masjumi, an Islamic organization founded by the Japanese government in 1943 to control the Muslim population. Unmarried young women aged 15–20 were also recruited for military training and to join Barisan Srikandi. In addition, the Japanese government established a special organization for women, Fujinkai, which mainly comprised the wives of government officials and following a leadership structure that paralleled their husband’s hierarchy of power. The main task of Fujinkai members was to encourage and consolidate women workers to support the Japanese troops. The women were recruited to collect logistics from the citizens and set up social activities in the villages, while at the same time spread propaganda about the government’s kindness; in some places they were asked to nurse and to entertain Japanese soldiers with art performances.

The nationalist fighters were divided in their opinion about the Japanese invasion. On one hand, this vast and organized mass recruitment enabled nationalist leaders to reach the common people and utilize the Japanese-formed organizations to promote the


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In the midst of the revolution for independence, women movements who had experienced a standstill during the Japanese occupation and had just resurfaced, consolidated themselves. They agreed to support the freedom struggle. A session in the Aisyiyah congress (ANRI).

independence of Indonesia. On the other hand, the control the Japanese military government had over the life of the entire Indonesian population, along with their brutality toward those fighting them, triggered a fear about a fascist force in Indonesia. The nationalist movement then agreed to appoint Soekarno-Hatta to cooperate with the

movement, but others, such as S. K. Trimurti, joined both. S. K. Trimurti was a member of Fujinkai, but also aided activities of the underground nationalist movement.

The short period of Japanese occupation unexpectedly strengthened and spread the sense of nationalism down to the

Japanese government, hoping that their involvement would lessen Japanese brutality toward the Indonesian people. Several other figures, such as Amir Sjarifoeddin, Sutan Sjahrir, and Tan Malaka established underground anti-fascist movements. Some of the women fighters who refused to be members of Fujinkai joined the underground

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lowest layers of society, especially through the obligation to use the Indonesian language, Bahasa Indonesia, and the prohibition to have relations with anything Dutch. Another impact of the Japanese occupation was the shift in the nationalist movement from unarmed civilian politics that focused on managing mass organizations to a warrior tradition that demanded the involvement of armed forces. When the Japanese occupation ended, the number of youth involved in various militia groups had reached two million. In just an instant, Indonesians went through a process of militarization and masculinization because so many people became part of a military institution dominated by men and that glorified values of combat. Although only a few militia members were armed, all of them were trained, disciplined, and indoctrinated in a bellicose spirit and given dreams that one day they would become real soldiers, fighting with guns.The bitterness of the Japanese period seemed to be remedied by the Proclamation of Independence on 17 August 1945. President Soekarno specifically asked Soewarni Pringgodigdo, the leader of Istri Sedar, to lead the women’s movement to defend and maintain the independence of Indonesia. In Jakarta, Wanita Negara Indonesia (Wani—Women of the Indonesian

Nation) was formed, and outside Jakarta, Persatuan Wanita Indonesia (Perwani—Indonesian Women’s Association). In Bandung, Mrs. Arudji Kartawinata founded Lasykar Wanita Indonesia (Laswi—Indonesian Women Fighters) in October 1945. Most Laswi members were former members of Barisan Srikandi, established by the Japanese Government, and Pemuda Putri Indonesia (PPI—Indonesian Female Youth). The women fighters were quickly infected by the burning passion of the defenders of independence for the nation-state that had just been born and was already threatened by a return of Dutch colonialism. They voluntarily participated in many activities, especially in regions called the “rear line,” that were considered less important than the struggle of heroes on the frontline. Women from various backgrounds and generations organized communal kitchens; sewed uniforms, flags, and symbols of the republic; provided shelter, food, and clothing for the displaced; distributed food and medicine for the guerilla fighters; nursed the injured; delivered messages from one front to another; and smuggled guns. The best female couriers were food stall and market vendors because they were able to talk to many people without arousing suspicion. Female couriers also found unique ways to conceal messages, such as inside their


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plaited hair or sanitary napkins. Although small in number, several female troops were also established in some areas of Java, Sumatra, and Sulawesi.

Women’s activities did not stop with work on the battlefield. Women’s organizations in existence since the colonial era resumed their activities and new ones emerged between 1945 and 1949. At the first women’s congress held after the proclamation of independence (in December 1945), Wani and Perwani merged to become Persatuan Wanita Republik Indonesia (Perwari—Women’s Association of the Republic of Indonesia) with Sri Mangunsarkoro as the chairperson. In the same year, SK Trimurti and several other activists founded Barisan Buruh Wanita (Women Workers’ Front), which was the merger of several women’s labor organizations and affiliated with Partai Buruh Indonesia (the Indonesian Workers’ Party). Sri Mangunsarkoro founded Partai Wanita Rakyat, the first women’s party in Indonesian history. The wives of soldiers and policemen also founded women’s organizations that provided aid to the widows of servicemen. A number of women worked as staff members in Republic of Indonesia representative offices in neighboring countries. In 1948, a delegation of women attended the All India Women’s Conference in Madras to

promote the independence of Indonesia.The emergency situation created by the need to maintain sovereignty of the republic seemed to open up space for acceleration of the women’s movement. Unlike the previous era, women did not hesitate to participate in public activities and openly assert their political stance: supporting Indonesian independence. Although most of the activities were limited to nursing, work that has always been considered women’s main responsibility, expansion of the workspace from the household to public places, such as the battlefield, had brought new insights about the relationship between womanhood and nationalism. Acknowledgment from the nationalist movement in general that women’s thoughts and strength were also necessary to build this young nation convinced women activists that their involvement in turn would help realize equality and recognition of women’s rights as citizens.

While battles against Dutch aggression supported by the Allied Forces were taking place, women’s organizations divided their attention and energy between supporting national struggles and formulating women’s basic demands in relation to establishment of the new nation-state. Almost every year from 1945 to 1952, women’s organizations

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held national women’s congresses in various cities in Java to find the most appropriate shape for an umbrella organization to represent Indonesian women’s aspirations that at the same time to offer practical guidelines for the government. As a result, in 1946 women’s organizations established Badan Kongres Wanita Indonesia (Kowani—Indonesian Women’s Congress) with full authority to make decisions on behalf of all organizations affiliated with it. After the transfer of sovereignty from the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Republic of Indonesia in 1949, Kowani changed its name to Kongres Wanita Indonesia (KWI—Indonesian Women’s Congress) and only functioned as an inter-organizational coordinating body without any authority to make decisions or action plans for its members. Since its inception, the political stance of Kowani was to fully support the establishment of the republic and adopt decisions of national leaders, who were mostly men, on the form of government and basic principles of the state, such as the 1945 Constitution and the state ideology of Pancasila. Resolutions related to women revolved around at least four main issues: the guarantee of equal rights for women as citizens, a just labor policy for women, a marriage policy which protects women from polygamy and arbitrary divorce, as well as a social welfare system for

women and children, especially in the areas of health and education.

Throughout the revolution period, the women’s movement succeeded in promoting inter-organizational unity and overcoming basic differences regarding women’s position in the institution of marriage by prioritizing the interests of Indonesian sovereignty. Even though political powers, particularly in the form of parties with different ideologies, had started to influence certain women’s organizations, women’s congresses were still capable of establishing a consensus to produce meaningful suggestions for women as citizens and for people’s social welfare in general. The wisdom and charisma of congress leaders, such as Maria Ulfah Santoso, Sujatin Kartowiyono, Sri Mangunsarkoro, and S. K. Trimurti, were very important in the effort to reach minimal agreements among organizations that were increasingly indicating their own political orientations.

It is true that to a certain extent, the government weighed input from the women’s movement. The Constitution guarantees women’s rights as citizens to vote and be elected, as well as to work in any profession. In 1946, Maria Ulfah Soebadio was appointed as the |Minister of Social Welfare—the first Asian woman

The women troops are exercising. The women involved themselves in the struggle for independence, including taking up arms. (Antara).

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to be a cabinet minister—and S. K. Trimurti was appointed the Minister of Labor in 1947. But women faced a new struggle: Would the rights stated in the constitution only remain on paper or would they be implemented in the field? Would women enjoy the equality

would they need to affiliate with one of the political parties? If they affiliated with a political party they might get greater support, but they would have to compromise with party leaders, most of whom were men who might not be interested in promoting women’s concerns. The women’s movement found the answer to these questions when it put forward its demands to improve the position of women in marriage and for guarantees of social welfare for women and children. The answer they received shook not only their unity, but also the concept of mother of the nation as the source of moral strength in their steps of progress.

Islamic Law and Polygamy

Soon after independence, the Minister of Religious Affairs issued an instruction banning forced marriages and underage marriages. Marriage laws also showed progress when Regulation No.22/1946 obliged couples to register marriages and divorces in Java and Madura. However, there was no marriage regulation that fundamentally protected women’s rights. Meanwhile, by the beginning of the 1950s the average number of divorces had reached more than 50% and polygamy was the second most cited reason for divorce after the husband’s

"I'm Leaving" by Iriantine Karnaya (Photos Documentation of Cemara 6 Gallery Café)

that was promised to them along with citizenship? What kind of political channels could they use to realize true equality? Men dominated the new government, the temporary parliament and the political parties. Would women need to organize their own strength or


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inability to provide for his family. The turmoil of the Japanese occupation and the revolution for independence were also influential in the inability of Indonesian society to preserve marriage. Moreover, there was a tendency among men who were given positions in the new government to have younger wives who were considered more attractive and suitable for their positions. Women of the revolutionary era were comrades who had lost their appeal after the nation-state that had been desired took shape.

Aware of the vulnerability of women before the law, the women’s movement, in collaboration with women members of Parliament, urged the government to draft marriage laws. In 1950 the Indonesian government formed Panitia Penyelidik Peraturan Hukum Perkawinan, Talak, dan Rujuk (P3HPTR—the Review Team on the Law Regulating Marriage, Divorce and Reunification) comprising male religious scholars and women experts in law, such as Nani Suwondo, Maria Ulfah Santoso, Sujatin Kartowiyono, Kwari Sosrosumarto (representing Catholic women) and Mahmudal Mawardi (representing Islamic women’s organizations). This team planned to draft a general regulation that would apply to all Indonesian citizens, with specific regulations to

be applied to some religious groups. After a long debate, especially between Islamic women’s organizations and other organizations, the basic regulations covered in this bill include the prohibition of forced marriage and the permission of polygamy only in certain conditions or if allowed by religion.

While this team was working on the laws, the Indonesian government issued Presidential Regulation No. 19, 1952 regulating pensions for civil servant widows. This regulation acknowledged polygamy by stating that civil servants with two to four wives would receive a double pension to be shared equally among the wives. To finance this retirement fund, premium payments of all civil servants were increased, and civil servants with more than one wife had to pay more. Islamic organizations such as Masjumi, Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement), and Muslimat NU (the women’s wing of NU) welcomed this regulation whereas women’s organizations led by Perwari quickly expressed strong objections. With the exception of Muslim women’s organizations, nearly all member organizations of KWI were involved in demonstrations opposing this regulation. KWI, as the umbrella organization, did not join the demonstrations due

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Hartini as his second wife in 1955. Since the beginning of independence, Soekarno had been regarded as one who balanced and united various political groups competing for ultimate power. Under Soekarno’s leadership, these various powers were asked to unite to face the threat of attack by neo-colonialist and neo-imperialist powers: advanced industrial countries such as the US, West European countries, and Japan

Women demonstration with Perwari as the driving force demanded the revocation of Tap. No. 19/1952 which permitted polygamy, and the drafting of more democratic marriage laws (Jakarta, Desember 1953; ANRI)

to differences among its members. However, this massive protest by the women’s movement obviously failed to budge the government. The Parliament that met in 1954 determined that it was unnecessary to withdraw this regulation.

While the women’s movement was struggling to produce a law that would protect a woman as a wife and mother, President Soekarno decided to marry

which would use all means to further the accumulation and circulation of capital. Women’s organizations vacillated between defending national sovereignty and fighting for women’s rights. On one hand, they believed that Soekarno, a leader of the nationalist movement and head of state, had betrayed women’s struggle. They feared that Soekarno’s decision to remarry would be considered to legitimate polygamy. On the other hand, attacking Soekarno would invite harsh criticism from various sides. Raising the issue of polygamy could be seen as disturbing the balance of national political powers. This accusation was not much different from the one directed at anti-polygamy organizations during the colonial era, such as Istri Sedar that was accused of causing a rift in the nationalist movement with the issue of polygamy.

Eleven women’s organizations published a joint statement opposing Soekarno’s second marriage and rejecting Hartini as a First Lady. They also requested that Hartini not accompany Soekarno on official affairs or diplomatic visits, urged the state not to pay for her household expenses, and disapproved of Hartini living in official quarters paid by the state. But, in the end, Perwari was the only organization that publicly boycotted Hartini’s presence, and also Soekarno’s, with the risk of losing


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their members and facilities provided by the government. Muslim women’s organizations did not sign the statement, but they visited Fatmawati, Soekarno’s first wife, to show their sympathy and advised her not to leave the state palace. Other organizations were pressured by the husbands of their members not to oppose Soekarno. Even Gerakan Wanita Indonesia (Gerwani—Indonesian Women’s Movement), an organization firmly against polygamy in previous years, chose not to criticize Soekarno, again in the interests of the national political front.

Although shocked by Soekarno’s betrayal, the women’s movement did not cease in their demands for a better marriage law. The team drafting the marriage law reported the results of their work at the end of 1952, but it took seven years for the Minister of Religion to submit this draft to Parliament. One reason for the delay was because Muslim women’s organizations requested a separate marriage regulation based on Islamic law. The bill submitted to Parliament was called the Marriage Bill for Muslims. In 1958, a year before this draft was submitted to and discussed by Parliament, Soemari, a member of Parliament from Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (PNI—the Indonesian Nationalist Party), proposed another Marriage Bill that clearly stated that

marriages should be monogamous. Soemari’s supporters said that Indonesia, as an independent and modern nation, should have one national law that guaranteed equality for all women, because women had also contributed to the struggle for independence.

Soemari’s proposal invited strong opposition from both men and women Parliamentarians who were members of Islamic parties. The men said that the practice of marriage under a secular law was illegal because it was in opposition to Islamic teachings. Furthermore, as a country with a Muslim majority, it was proper to apply Islamic law to the entire country. Some stressed the virtues of polygamy, saying that polygamy could alleviate post-war conditions with a lot of widows and orphans, and could prevent men, who basically have a greater sexual drive than women, from committing adultery. As for the women members of Parliament, they generally agreed with the men that religious laws legitimate marriage. While also aware that it was not easy for women to accept polygamy, they did not think it necessary to ban polygamy entirely, but rather to limit it to certain conditions such as cases of a wife’s infertility or mental disorder. Opposition also came from Protestant and Catholic groups that complained about the articles on divorce and the

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possibility that wives could appeal for divorce.

Both legislation drafts, submitted by Soemari and the Team on Regulation of Marriage, Divorce and Reunification, were openly discussed and debated for several weeks in 1959, but due to strong resistance, Parliament decided to postpone passage of the bill. For no clear reason discussion of the marriage law disappeared from Parliament’s agenda. The political crisis caused by regional rebellions such as Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII—Darul Islam/Indonesian Islamic Army) and Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia/Perjuangan Rakyat Semesta (PRRI/Permesta—Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia/People’s Universal Struggle) that used an Islamic identity apparently caused Parliament to think this law would only trigger a wider crisis in Indonesian society.

Republican Women in Socialist Clothes

Soekarno once said, “A struggle without women is like an eagle’s wing nailed to earth.” On many occasions, before and after he became president, Soekarno seemed to present himself as an advocate of the women’s movement.

When he took refuge in Yogyakarta (1946–49), Soekarno held a bi-weekly “course for women” because he believed that, “Women’s problems are society’s problem!” He rewrote material he presented in those courses and published it in a 329-page book titled Sarinah. He said that Sarinah was the name of his nursemaid who had taught him a great deal about love and the “small people”.

In Sarinah, Soekarno described various views about women in the world and in traditional communities across Indonesia; he also presented the historical journey of the women’s movement in Europe and the US. He showed that the experiences of women from different classes give birth to different demands for justice and equality. He concluded that such differences determine the phases of the struggle. He noted that the Indonesian women’s movement was still in phase one, “not more than a kind of onder-onsje activity or a ‘leisure’ activity. It is an aristocratic onder-onsje that is alienated from the masses, and lacks any social and political ideology!” (p. 146). According to Soekarno, the many organizations established by Indonesian women were merely focused on household issues and the perfection of a woman’s role as a wife and mother. Whereas in the West, the women’s movement had reached phase two which demands the equality


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Soekarno and Fatmawati walking side by side with a number of women activists. In Sarinah Soekarno appealed to the women to be a part of class struggle wave questioning the capitalism oppression structure as the root of oppression towards women. (ANRI).

of women’s rights and status with men because of the restrictions men had imposed on women’s work. This demand emerged simultaneously with the industrialization process in Europe and the US that needed women’s labor

However, according to Soekarno, the demand for equal rights was a call from feminists who represented the interests of upper- and middle-class women who were not allowed to leave the house to work. In contrast, women from the lower classes were forced to work because it was impossible for them to depend solely on their parents’ or husbands’ earnings. They were not satisfied with this feminist demand because it did not question the general structure of capitalism that had created inequality for both women and men. In phase three the women’s movement declares that women and men must cooperate to build a brand new world without oppression. In this very advanced phase, the women’s movement becomes part of, “A wave of class struggle, that does not differentiate among human beings, a wave is moving toward Liberty—Liberty for men and women. Liberty of the classes and Liberty of the sexes!” (Sarinah, p. 157)

Soekarno realized that domestic work was one of the major factors restricting women’s participation in the public

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domain. Therefore, he proposed what he called “a synthesis of public work, love, and motherhood” by shifting the responsibility of domestic work from nuclear families to society. The women’s movement should create collectives and cooperatives to organize education, child care, food processing, and health care. Thus, women would not have to choose between being good mothers and wives at home or dedicating themselves to social and political work in society.

IIn closing, Soekarno invited Indonesian women to work alongside men, not against them, to complete the National Revolution based on the ideals of socialism: a prosperous and socially just society without one person oppressing another. He asserted that socialism had become the soul of the nationalist movement since colonial times and was not the monopoly of just one or two political parties.

It can be said that the women’s organization that was directly influenced by Soekarno’s ideas about the relationship between the women’s movement and socialism was Gerwani. Gerwani was an organization initially called Gerakan Wanita Istri Sedar (Gerwis—Aware Wives Movement). This organization was founded in 1950 and ideologically in line with Istri Sedar.

At the Gerwis congress in 1954, the organization’s leaders decided to reach more women from the lower classes and changed the organization’s name to Gerawi. The phrase Istri Sedar was considered as putting too much emphasis on a woman’s role as a wife who is aware (sadar or sedar) of her status. Gerwis members were actually quite numerous, approximately 80,000. But through activities designed to gather and involve the masses, in a short time the membership of Gerwani reached hundreds of thousands of women. In 1961 Gerwani announced that it had around one million members and 180 branches in many areas in Indonesia.

Gerwani activities expanded into various fields with an emphasis on education for women. Gerwani successfully recruited young educated women to be involved in its network in order to educate people and combat illiteracy starting in 1955. Besides that, Gerwani established at least 1400 kindergartens named TK Melati in various locations like market places, plantations, and villages in Java, Bali, Kalimantan and Sumatra, sometimes built alongside childcare facilities. For housewives, Gerwani organized a number of trainings in technical skills, including bridal make-up, bookkeeping, and accounting. Political education was also provided for organization cadres


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that included discussions about women’s rights in the workplace and marriage, as well as the history of the women’s movement in Indonesia. Sarinah became one of the references used in the political trainings held by Gerwani. In the economic field, Gerwani set up cooperatives, and small savings and loan units.

In addition to its mass education activities, Gerwani was also involved in political activities to disseminate government policies such as the Agrarian Reform Act, and in nationalist projects such as the liberation of West Irian and the Malaysian Confrontation. Together with other women’s organizations, Gerwani was involved in efforts to improve the Marriage Law, to fight for improved wages and working conditions for women laborers, and to protest the rise in prices. Gerwani also specifically discussed cases of sexual crimes and rapes in West Java and Bali, and supported women who successfully gained a position in the government down to the village level. As 1965 approached, Gerwani helped the Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI—Indonesian Farmers’ Front) in its unilateral actions of land occupation in order to accelerate the implementation of the Agrarian Act. To reach middle class women and build a network among its members, Gerwani

The Gerwani, like most women movements, provided education for women and children. A session in a Illiteracy Combat course organized by the Gerwani Gambir Branch, Halimun Section (Oey Hay Djoen family).

published two magazines, Api Kartini and Berita Gerwani.

The militancy of the Gerwani cadres down to the lowest level of society helped to broaden the concept of Iboe Bangsa and made it more radical as Soekarno had wished. Organizationally, Gerwarni never questioned the gender-based division of labor in society; Gerwani activists still saw women’s main role to be as educators and caregivers of

their families and the nation. Gerwani’s innovation was that its literacy and health care activities, that were en masse, collective, and cut across classes, led to a political awareness of motherhood that was not restricted to individual responsibility for one’s family. Women mostly living in rural areas and obtaining survival support from the solidarity of families and relatives were not unfamiliar with this concept. Traditionally, the spirit of gotong royong, cooperation, lived in

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their soul. The new ideas introduced by Gerwani activities were the connection between mass collectiveness and nationalism: that involvement in collective work is a part of the rights and obligations of all women as citizens to build and develop their nation. Lower class women are able to advance and empower themselves without the help of other people considered more advanced and civilized..

Nationalist Politics vs. Women’s Politicss

When Soekarno ordered the dissolution of Parliament and declared the beginning of Guided Democracy in 1959, women’s organizations in general welcomed the decision. In their opinion, Parliament had failed to reach an agreement to draw up a new constitution based on the temporary constitution of 1950. Therefore, returning to the earlier agreement contained in Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution was considered the best solution. For the women’s movement, which experienced the political parties’ tug of war in the 1955 election as well as in the debate on the marriage bill in Parliament, party politics were more disruptive than helpful in realizing national unity. They also seemed to have lost hope in the Parliament because in spite of the great number

of women voters, only 19 women out of 271 candidates (7%) were elected to represent them in the Parliament. Political parties were keen to get women’s votes, but did not attempt to promote women’s demands. Virtually all parties had established women wings in order to amass votes for the parties. The many regional rebellions against the central government and attempts by foreign powers to sabotage the unity of the republic at the end of the 1950s compelled the women’s movement to be more cautious regarding the political situation at that time. Apart from the disappointment that some in the women’s movement felt toward Soekarno’s polygamy, it seems they still hoped that Soekarno would be able to keep the balance among the competing political powers so the women could focus on their main concerns.

The hope of the women’s movement for a kind of stability obviously was never realized. Rivalry among parties and groups escalated in the 1950s until the middle of the 1960s, and threatened the independence of the women’s movement. Although KWI still attempted inter-organizational cooperation, suspicion that each organization had its own hidden agenda created on-going tensions. The rapid growth of Gerwani membership and the boldness


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of its activists to be involved in political activities, such as agrarian reform and the division of land, that had been avoided by other women’s organizations, to some extent influenced the effort of the women’s movement to develop an independent women’s political force. On one hand, Gerwani’s extensive reach and its swiftness were advantageous for the women’s movement to spread new ideas on women’s rights as citizens, such as ideas on marriage and labor. On the other hand, Gerwani’s close relations with Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI—the Indonesian Communist Party) made Gerwani prioritize the interests of the party, which were claimed to be a “national interest” of greater importance than women’s specific interests. For example, following the Gerwis tradition, Gerwani was among the women’s organizations that had been in the vanguard opposing polygamy. But when Soekarno married Hartini, Gerwani chose not to criticize Soekarno. Although Gerwani still had a very strict policy on polygamy—it did not accept women who were willing to be in a polygamous marriage as members and condemned leaders and members of the PKI or other mass organizations who practiced polygamy—its involvement in campaigning for marriage laws decreased after receiving pressure from the PKI. Gerwani believed that an open

In the 1960s most women organizations prefered to prioritize national political interests, including the integration of Irian Barat into Indonesia rather than pursuing their demands for equality.(Antara)

anti-polygamy stance could endanger the interests of the National Front that President Soekarno was in the process of establishing.

Other organizations in KWI, especially older ones such as Aisjijah, were also disturbed by what they saw as Gerwani’s

strategy to push KWI to the left. For example, Gerwani collaborated with other women’s organizations that also linked women’s emancipation with socialism, to form a “Mass Movement” coalition inside KWI so that this federation would pay more attention to the problems afflicting lower class

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women. Several organizations in KWI believed that women’s work should remain in the social domain, and not venture into political issues. Therefore, when Gerwani raised the issue of land reform some saw it as a communist attempt to infiltrate the women’s movement. Although at the lower level cooperation among women’s organizations continued, at the national level the tension among organization leaders increased. As a result, it became very difficult to produce a specific political agenda for women. Discussion of main issues such as polygamy, divorce, underage marriage, trafficking of women and children, and socio-economic issues that demanded state intervention, waned because the women’s movement was preoccupied with efforts to alleviate internal tensions and to adjust to national political developments that were increasingly precarious.

Along with the increasing need to prepare for the military operation to “liberate” West Irian and to confront Malaysia, government and military intervention in the women’s movement also became stronger. In 1962, the KWI became a member of the National Front and allowed its members to participate as volunteers in military training. Military officials referred to the politics of defense for the country’s security that focused

on Pertahanan Rakyat Semesta (Defense of All People) to encourage mothers to participate in defending the sovereignty of the motherland. It was argued that this participation was a critical part of women’s emancipation. Brigadier General Soerjosoempeno, Military Area Commander VII, in his opening speech in one of the training centers for female volunteers, said:

The role of women is very decisive because they can move in all areas . . . Therefore, if war should break out and the enemy occupies towns, women must take an active role in setting up and tending home fronts, and must readily engage in psy-war activities, counter espionage, and sabotage, with the general purpose of paralyzing the enemy through non-combat methods. Women should also know how to use weapons and also how to ruin them so the enemy cannot use them. Women should also know field strategies and combat tactics as well . . .

“Women’s Role is Decisive in Defense of All People”

Suara Merdeka, 15 January 1965, p. 2

Intervention of military leaders in the organizations of the wives of policemen and armed forces had been taking place since the government declared Staat van


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Oorlog en Beleg (SOB—State of War and Siege) in 1957. The first organization that became the target of intervention was Persatuan Isteri Tentara (Persit—Association of Army Wives). Initially, Persit was an autonomous organization whose struggle agenda was different from that of their husbands who were in the army. They fought for a raise in the pension of military widows whose husbands had died, either naturally or in the battlefield, fought for women’s right to vote, and were involved in drafting the marriage bill. Using the state of emergency as an excuse, the Army commander urged Persit to merge with the Army and follow military doctrines. This was rejected by the Central Executive Board of Persit, but somehow through many tactics, the Army succeeded in withdrawing Persit from KWI’s membership, freezing the Central Executive Board, and pushing forward an extraordinary congress which decided that the wive’s organization should merge with the husband’s service unit. Consequently, Persit changed its name to Kartika Chandra Kirana. The wives of air force, naval, and police officers experienced a similar fusion and their organizations became respectively, Pia Ardhya Garini, Jalasenastri, and Bhayangkari; in 1964, the four organizations were united under Badan Kerja Sama Dharma Pertiwi.

Indonesian Womanhood ShakenWhat the women’s movement achieved through independence probably exceeded Kartini’s expectations 50 years earlier. Women acquired a respectable status as citizens encouraged to be involved in the process of building the new nation-state. They no longer saw themselves merely as mothers of the nation doing domestic work for the sake of the nation’s welfare and greatness. They started to take on more complex roles in the process of building the foundation for the new nation-state called the Republic of Indonesia. Indonesian women experienced progress in obtaining access to education and social work. To some extent, their equality with men was slowly being accepted as a daily reality. Patriarchal culture was challenged as women became active outside the home with various social, cultural, and political activities.

Time and again the women’s movement had tried to maintain equilibrium between forces within itself and the nationalist movement in general. Efforts to define womanhood in line with Indonesian identity were never separated from the dominant interpretation of indigenous values and religious doctrines.

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The Indonesian women’s movement had always tried to distinguish itself from the feminist movement that was thought to be influenced by western culture, although pioneers of the women’s emancipation movement were western-educated and their demands were, in fact, not that different from the women’s movement commonly known as the first and second wave of feminism in the US and Europe. Political dynamics within the nationalist movement at the end of the 1920s emphasized the differences between the West and the East, especially culturally, influenced the women’s movement. Indonesian women could advance in all fields as long as they did not forget “eastern norms”.

The women’s movement, born at the same time as the nationalist movement, did not get the chance to continue its discussion on how to overcome internal differences and develop a more solid women’s force. A political action called Gerakan 30 September (G30S—30th of September Movement) took place in Jakarta in 1965 and the immediate response from the Indonesian Army, supported by anti-communist groups, greatly affected the history of women activists in this country. In this incident, several army officials were killed and buried at Lubang Buaya. The Indonesian Army blamed the PKI for these murders.

It was specifically mentioned that Gerwani participated in the brutal torture of the Army generals while dancing in provocative clothing before they were executed. Although the result of the autopsy showed that there was no evidence of torture, the accusation of Gerwani’s involvement in the torture continued to circulate. Stories about Gerwani were deliberately spread among the Indonesian people to create an image that Gerwani was a group of amoral women. Never before in history had a women’s organization and its members been assaulted so brutally, destroyed physically and symbolically by the state apparatus they once gave birth to and raised.

Immediately after PKI and Gerwani were accused of being involved in the Army officers’ murder at Lubang Buaya, the Indonesian Women’s Congress, which had changed its name to Kowani in 1964, terminated the membership of Gerwani on 29 October 1965. Subsequently, in 1966 Kowani discharged Hurustiati Subandrio, M.D., chairperson of Kowani, after her husband, Vice Prime Minister Subandrio, M.D., was arrested with the allegation that he supported the PKI.

Mayor General Soeharto, as Commander of the Order and Security Recovery


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Black Propaganda against the Gerwani has turned the good name of this national-leftist women organization into a stigma of women immorality and the nation’s traitor. The ‘Gerwani’ stigma still prevails up to now. (news about the involvement of Gerwani in Berita Yudha, Kompas and Duta Masyarakat)

Operation, led a military operation to eradicate communists and sympathizers of the leftist movement. He created a “national consensus” with several mass organizations, including women’s organizations, to ensure their loyalty and support of his leadership. Kowani, as the umbrella organization for women’s organizations throughout Indonesia, held an Extraordinary Congress from 30 May to 1 June 1966 in Jakarta that was attended by representatives of 35 member organizations. On this occasion, Soeharto delivered a speech, “The Function and Position of Kowani,” covering such themes as “women’s position in the history of society,” “women’s position in the history of Indonesia,” and “women’s roles in the goal and efforts of the Indonesian revolution”. Soeharto then demanded that “Indonesian women” take responsibility for implementing a major slogan of the reform movement at that time, namely Tri Tuntutan Rakyat (Tritera—the People’s Three Demands): the dissolution of PKI and its mass organizations, the lowering of prices and the reshuffling of the Soekarno cabinet.

The Congress produced a resolution declaring support for the new government with the slogan “a pure and consistent return to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution” and urged the

government to immediately organize a general election and cleanse state institutions of G30S supporters. In June 1966, Kowani was allocated a seat in the new Parliament and appointed Mrs. S. R. Lasmindar from Persit/Kartika Chandra Kirana as a member of Parliament of the New Order era, also known as the Mutual Cooperation Parliament. On 7 March 1967, the Extraordinary Meeting of the Interim People’s Consultative Assembly, which included all members of the Mutual Cooperation Parliament, appointed Soeharto as an interim President of the Republic of Indonesia. From that moment on, Kowani no longer commemorated International Women’s Day on 8 March or International Children’s Day on 1 June on the grounds that communist countries had taken the initiative to commemorate those two days.

Kowani’s next step was to invite Aisyiah back to Kowani, after it left Kowani at the Seventh Kowani Congress in Solo in 1964. For awhile, Gerakan Wanita Sosialis (GWS—the Socialist Women’s Movement)—a women’s organization affiliated with Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI—the Indonesian Socialist Party)—never received a meeting invitation from Kowani. After the chairperson of GWS, Siti Wahyunah Sjahrir, sent a letter to the National Executive Body of Kowani

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explaining that GWS was not involved in G30S, they started to receive invitations from Kowani. Later on, GWS changed the word “Sosialis” (“Socialist”) in its name to “Sejahtera” (“Welfare”), whereas Wanita Marhaen, a women’s organization affiliated with PNI, changed its name to Persatuan Wanita Nasional (Perwanas—National Women’s Association).

The deadly blow Gerwani received, followed by the taming of the women’s movement, became a turning point in the way women interacted with the state. Twenty years after the proclamation of independence, a male-dominated institution, opposing women’s empowerment and built by stunting the democracy needed to discuss women’s issues openly—became a state. For 32 years—the period of Soeharto’s leadership—this situation was a fertile land for discrimination that resulted in violence against women in every aspect of their lives.


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19th century

First wave of women activists (women commanders of armed groups that fought the Dutch), such as Tjoet Nyak Dien and Christina Martha Tiahahu

Women’s Journey in the National Movement

Dutch colonial government’s Ethical Politics

1910

1900-1930an Era of Iboe Bangsa or Mother of the Nation (founders and teachers of schools for Indonesian women)

1920

1904 Dewi Sartika establishes Sekolah Istri (School for Wives)

1908 Boedi Oetomo (intellectuals’ organization; beginning of independence movement)

1909 R. M. Tirto Adhisoerjo establishes Poetri Hindia newspaper (Bandung)

1911 Roehana Koeddoes establishes a vocational school, Sekolah Kerajinan Amai Setia (Kotogadang, west Sumatera)

1912 Poetri Mardika (Jakarta)

1912 Muhammadiyah (one of Indonesia’s two largest Muslim organizations)

1913 Sekolah Kartini

1917 Perempuan Muhamaddiyah (Muhamaddiyah Women) establishes Aisjijah (Yogyakarta); Maria Maramis establishes PIKAT School (Manado)

1900

1922 Rahma El Joenoesia establishes Sekolah Dinijah Poetri (Padang Panjang, west Sumatera)

1926 Women activists exiled to the Boven Digul camp in South Papua

1926 First Youth Congress; NU established

1928 First Indonesian Women’s Congress, PPI (Indonesian Women’s Association)

1928 Youth Pledge

Early 20th century


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1952 A number of women’s groups protest Government Regulation No. 19/1952 on pension for widows of government employees (allows polygamy

Bill on Islamic Marriage proposed to Parliament

1954 Gerwis is established (later changes its name to Gerwani)

1955 Soekarno takes Hartini as his second wife; women’s groups have divided opinions on polygamy

1955 General elections

1957 Central Executive Board of Persit is suspended for not merging with the army or following military doctrine and; Persit changes name to Kartika Chandra Kirana

1958 Soemari of PNI proposes bill on monogamous marriage

1962 KWI becomes a member of the national front that requires its members to join military training and become volunteers

1962-1966 Malaysian Confrontation

1964 Gerwani and BTI accelerate implementation of Agrarian Reform Act by engaging in land occupation actions

Badan Kerja Sama Dharma Pertiwi established as merger of four women’s organizations in the military

KWI returns to its former name, Kowani

1965 G30S Incident followed by arrests of Gerwani members; Kowani annuls Gerwani’s membership

1966 Kowani discharges its Chairperson, Hurustiati Subandrio, M.D.

1930 1940 1950 1960

1930 Istri Sedar

1932 Rasuna Said arrested and detained (Semarang)

1935 Second Indonesian Women’s Congress (Yogyakarta)

1936 Surastri Karma Trimurti arrested, detained from 1939–1943

1938 Third Indonesian Women’s Congress (Bandung; 22 Dec. declared as Mother’s Day)

1939 Kaoem Iboe Indonesia, women domestic workers’ organization in the

1941 Fourth Indonesian Women’s Congress (Semarang; decision to merge with Gapi)

1942-1945Women’s organizations established during the Japanese occupation cater to the special needs of the war: Barisan Srikandi, Fujinkai, Wani, Laswi; more than 400 women forced to become jugun ianfu

1942-1945 Japanese occupation

1945 August 17: Proclamation of Independence

1945-1949Women’s People Party (Partai Wanita Rakyat); new women’s organizations: Perwari, Barisan Buruh Wanita; women’s organizations in the military: Persit (Army), Pia Ardhya Garini (Air Force), Jalasenastri (Navy), Bhayangkari (Police)

1945-1950 War to maintain independence

1946 Kowani Maria Ulfah Santoso of Muslimat NU

appointed as Minister of Social Welfare (first Asian woman to become a minister)

Law 22/1946 on Marriage and Divorce

Registration (Java and Madura)

1947 S. K. Trimurti appointed as Minister of Labor

1948 RI delegation attends All Women’s Indian Conference (Madras, India)

1950 P3HPTR; Fatayat NU

1950-1957 Liberal democracy

1957-1965 Guided Democracy

1959 Parliament terminates discussion of Marriage Bill as proposed by P3HPTR and Soemari due to social controversy

1959 Presidential Decree, a return to the 1945 Constitution

1961 – 1969 Campaign for West Irian liberation

Extraordinary Kowani Congress (Jakarta) decides to support Soeharto’s leadership

Mrs. S. R. Lasmindar from Persit/Kartika Chandra Kirana appointed to represent Kowani as a member of Parliament

1905-1945 Growth of nationalist organizations

1967 Parliament formally appoints Soeharto as President of Indonesia

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The New Order was built upon the sweat and body of women. Women laborers in Bekasi (Bekasi, 8 Oktober 1992; TEMPO/Rully Kesuma)

Reconsidering The Position Of Women In Development 61

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RECONSIDERING THE POSITION OF WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT

IIIFreeport said, “This land belongs to the state, and we have bought it from the state.” So I asked,”Well, since when did the state create the soil, water, fish, and karaka [a type of shellfish], and then give it to

me so they can take it back as they please?”

Yosepha Alomang, Amungme tribe woman activist,upon receiving the Goldman Environmental Prize, 2001

— { —

When Major General Soeharto took over the national leadership in 1966, he and his troops realized that their survival depended heavily on their ability to create a better economic condition than in the Soekarno era. From the very beginning, the Soeharto legacy, known later as the New Order, offered

a framework of national development that was oriented towards economic growth and rapid industrialization with the state as its primary agent of social transformation. The New Order regime believed that the Soekarno government had been preoccupied with national politics and international affairs, and thus

ignored Indonesian people’s welfare and prosperity. As Soeharto said in one of his earlier speeches, “What we need now are heroes of development

The Soeharto government inherited from the Soekarno government a foreign debt of US$2.4 million and a 20–30%

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The New Order government thought it impossible to save Indonesia from bankruptcy without international loans. Soeharto granting Rockefeller a visit (Jakarta, 16 Maret 1967; Djoni Litahalim)

per month inflation rate. Indonesia was declared one of the world’s poorest countries with a per capita income of US$190, food shortages, and a limited and damaged infrastructure without significant economic growth. The New Order government decided that foreign

aid would be needed to save the country from bankruptcy. They argued that, as a new independent country, Indonesia obviously had no adequate capital, expertise, or appropriate technology to process the wealth of its natural and human resources. Indonesia could not


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possibly continue its self-reliant economic policy that Soekarno once propagandized and meant to hold on to, without international support, especially from the advanced industrial countries, which at that time happened to be the Western Block, i.e., the US and Western European countries.

In some aspects, the national development framework Soeharto offered was not something entirely new in Indonesia’s history, neither was it uniquely Indonesian. The idea that progress or modernization is possible only through economic growth and the speed of industrialization was held by national movement elites and had been an influential ideology in the world since the early 20th century. What was new in the New Order was, first, the decision to adjust and integrate the steps of Indonesia’s development program with the Western Block’s foreign policies, especially with those of the US. In this way, the New Order ended a period rich in rhetoric, and anti-neocolonialism and anti-Western imperialism policies. As a result, in 1967, the first law issued under Soeharto’s leadership was the Foreign Investment Law. This law created space for foreign investment and company ownership so that the process of industrialization in various economic sectors continued smoothly. Initially, the

foreign investors were interested only in extractive industries with ample benefits; but soon they also entered other industries, especially textiles, chemicals, and manufacturing. In turn, the change in foreign policy earned the New Order government not only financial, but also political support from the Western Block, for example, support for Indonesia’s position on Papua and East Timor.

Second, Soeharto’s regime stressed the importance of the military as the country’s main leader in realizing its aspirations. During the New Order era, national stability and development were viewed as two sides of a coin. A safe and stable condition, without any social unrest and political turmoil, was an absolute prerequisite for the success of economic growth. Soeharto believed that the effectiveness of Indonesia’s Armed Forces (ABRI), as the state’s security instrument, had already been tested during the war for independence up to the time it saved Indonesia from the G30S coup allegedly organized by the PKI. Thus, the Armed Forces was needed once more to safeguard the national interest named development. The New Order soon adopted the the Armed Forces Dual Function doctrine as stated in the 1966 Doctrine of National Security and Defense as well as the Doctrine of the Armed Forces Struggle.

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The process of restructuring Indonesian economic and political systems by the New Order regime was inseparable from international

political changes after the Second World War. Conflicts of economic and political interests exercised by superpower countries, the US and USSR, known as the Cold War, influenced the history of formerly colonized countries, including Indonesia. As the largest and most populous country in Southeast Asia, endowed with extreme wealth in natural resources, Indonesia played an important role in determining the balance of power in the global arena. Indeed, after the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference, Indonesia and other ex-colonized countries declared themselves as part of the Non-Aligned Movement, which meant they were aligned neither to the Eastern Block (USSR) nor to the Western Block (the US). However, the rapid growth of Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI—the Communist Party of Indonesia) following Indonesia’s 1955 general election disturbed the Western Block. By the end of the 1950s, the US was particularly worried by a growing closeness between the government of Indonesia and the Soviet Union as evidenced by the large amount of economic and military aid from the Soviet Union, such as loans, military weapons, and combat equipment

to help Indonesia deal with separatist movements outside Java. The majority of foreign debt inherited by the Soeharto government from the Soekarno government came from the Soviet Union.

In 1957, Soekarno’s policy to nationalize hundreds of foreign companies—mining, plantations, petroleum, and manufacturing—including those owned by the Dutch, added to the anxiety of the Western Block. The policy became especially alarming when Soekarno allowed the military, particularly the Army, to take over the management of state enterprises, albeit later it turned out that the military could not manage them properly. Meanwhile, the government issued the State of Emergency Law in 1957 (later changed to Governmental Regulation to Replace Law No. 23/Prp/1959) to reduce the likelihood of insurgency by armed paramilitary irregulars, as had frequently occurred since the country proclaimed its independence. As a result, within a very short time the military became a dominant political and economic power. Soekarno bestowed a great deal of power to the military in order to maintain a sound balance of political forces in the country. For the Western Block, this showed not only the increasing stability of Soekarno’s power, but also that Indonesia’s national development

strategy was inconsistent with the modernization ideas of the Western Block. They perceived that the industrialization process in Indonesia was becoming more and more oriented toward the Eastern Block that emphasized an industrialization process that focused on the management of potential resources within the country, restrictions on foreign aid and capital, and the state’s leadership in the entire process of development.

Soeharto’s success as the Commander for the Restoration of Security and Order in crushing Gerakan 30 September (G30S—30th of September Movement) and removing the PKI as well as other communist powers served as an important reference for the Western Block to support his leadership. During the stabilization period of his rule, Soeharto quickly changed the direction of national development and showed the international community that Indonesia was ready to join the Western Block in the free market economy. The first legislation of his period dealt with the country’s openness toward foreign capital investment. Through this legislation, foreign investors as well as international institutions had ample opportunity to influence the development process in Indonesia. The next important

Modernization and the Military


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ABRI’s Dual Function was disseminated through the ABRI Masuk Desa (The Army Village Community Service) program. (Aceh, 1991, Tempo/Sarluhut Napitupulu).

assurance was military leadership in maintaining national stability and security of development projects, which were partly financed by foreign funds.

Soeharto, however, realized that he could not entirely turn over the development of strategic plans and regulation of the national economic system to the military. The military’s poor reputation in terms of managing state companies discouraged countries in the Western Block to give support to his government. Therefore,

Soeharto involved scholars who, since the mid 1950s and with funding from various US philanthropic foundations had been educated in renowned institutions of higher education in the US, to develop a concept for an appropriate development strategy for Indonesia. These intellectuals, later known as technocrats, played a significant role in devising Indonesia’s long-term economic strategy based on a conceptual framework of development from countries in the Western Block.

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The Armed Forces was not merely a professional army, an instrument of defense and security, but also a social force that determined the direction and politics of the state. It was involved in the cultivation, building, development, improvement and protection of all aspects of life—ideological, political, economic, financial, spiritual, and socio-cultural.

With the military as the leaders, even economic matters were described in military terms. One of the well-known phrases at the beginning of the New Order explaining the main components of economic development was “the leader, the man, and the gun”. To spell out this phrase: “the leader” is the general in a military organization, who is not only a true idealist, but also pragmatic and realistic; “the man” refers to the academics, intellectuals, and economic experts responsible for creating a blueprint for economic development; “the gun” refers to the capital and raw materials to be used for development.

The New Order government also believed that the involvement of too many elements of society in determining state policy would disadvantage the nation’s development process and lead to people feeling demoralized. The people, who in their view were “not sufficiently

rational,” should not be swayed to and fro, wasting time in political parties, but should instead develop their own villages. They saw political activities as a form of luxury that the Indonesian people were not ready to enjoy. For this reason, the New Order regime issued a policy that all political activity should be restricted to national and provincial levels, that discouraged people’s political participation, and that prohibited the presence of political parties in rural areas. This was known as the policy of floating masses. Two years after the Golongan Karya (Golkar—the ruling party during Soeharto’s rule) won the 1971 general election due to full support from the Armed Forces and the bureaucrats, nine political parties were merged into two, namely the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia). These two parties were allowed limited mobility in rural areas where the majority of Indonesians live. It can be said that Golkar became the main medium for the people’s political participation since it was regarded as the only party able to transcend political disturbances and ideological differences. In addition to the fusion of political parties, discouraging political participation was also accomplished through a policy of strict monitoring of the media and campus


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life as areas to be free of any political activity.

Besides economic and political problems, the New Order government also inherited the complex task of formulating a national identity that was related to an interest in maintaining the integrity of Negara Kesatuan Repulik Indonesia (NKRI—Unitary Republic of Indonesia). A series of armed rebellions in the late 1950s was a special reminder to the central government that it must at all times consider the nation’s diversity in maintaining a balance of socio-political powers based on primordial identities. For this reason, as well as to facilitate national development projects, the state established its basic directions that were not open to debate, let alone be violated, such as the 1945 Constitution, the state ideology of Pancasila, and the integrity of the territory. Here the Armed Forces again played an important role by ensuring that the spirit of regionalism and belief in certain doctrines would not give rise to any political movement that would compromise national unity and solidarity.

In designing national development strategies, the New Order regime had from the beginning considered the role of women. Throughout the history of the national movement

until the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia, women were actively involved in various domains of national and state development. The New Order government also needed their involvement in the state’s development projects. However, the government had to ensure that their involvement would not jeopardize the existing social order that supported the established development framework. Referring to general ideas about women’s role and position within the nation’s movement and that were current in society, the government formally appointed the household and family as women’s main domains. The government also took advantage of organizational devices previously established by the women’s movement to run its programs. These restrictive measures, which were based on assumptions about the division of roles between women and men, in turn, situated women in a position vulnerable to injustice and violence.

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More than 1.2 million women have left the village as a result of the Green Revolution. (Karawang; Pekka/Ayu)

Exploitation of Women’s Labor

Rural Women

For the New Order, rural women in general played an important role in accelerating industrialization. During the first decade of the New Order government, many of these women left their jobs in agriculture due to agricultural modernization known as the Green Revolution. This was a government policy intended to be a shortcut to alleviate poverty and the lack of food. Indeed, the policy succeeded in boosting rice production by 4.5% annually in the early 1970’s. In a traditional farming system, women planted the seedlings, spread fertilizer, and reaped the rice with a traditional cutting knife (ani-ani). After the harvest, women would also pound the rice to remove the hulls. The introduction of rice hullers caused at least 1.2 million landless women farmers in Java to lose their jobs. Both the expansion of arable land and the urgent need for a quick harvest led to a change in the traditional reaping method where the ani-ani was replaced by the larger sickle. Thus, men who used sickles replaced women who used the ani-ani. Furthermore, in the traditional system, villagers involved in

harvesting activities, especially the poor, would receive in-kind compensation per agreements with landowners and brokers from outside the village. After the modernization policy, women who used to receive additional food in this way were often no longer allowed to participate in the harvest as it would result in less harvest left for the landowners, brokers, and piece workers. This marginalization pushed rural women


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A large poster depicting the success of Indonesia’s self-support in rice, 1984-1989.(Jakarta; John McGlynn)

The Green Revolution

Since the 1950s the Green Revolution has taken place in various parts of the world through agricultural modernization

programs funded by the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation. In Indonesia, implementation of the Green Revolution began in 1968 through the Community Tutoring Program to promote Five Farming Interventions, i.e., the use of superior seed, modern cultivation

methods, irrigation, fertilizer and pesticides. The Green Revolution earned Indonesia a reputation of food self-sufficiency from 1984–1989. In 1986, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) awarded Soeharto for his success in increasing agricultural production. In the early 1990s, however, Indonesia had to again import almost as much rice as it had before its self-sufficiency era, about 1 million tons annually.

What often escapes attention is the fact that this success was built on the

marginalization of rural women from the agricultural sector. Women’s access to the village economy was very limited due to government control of institutions such as the Agency for Village Economic Activities and Village Cooperatives. It became increasingly difficult for women to provide for themselves and their families.

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Export-oriented companies prefer to employ women teenagers because they are easier to manage and willing to be paid less.(Jakarta, 2009; Tempo/Puspa Perwitasari)

from the agricultural to the industrial sector

IIf women remained in villages, they were usually involved in home industries such as bamboo or rattan weaving, or food processing (palm sugar, tofu

and tempeh) that yielded a very small income. Until the mid 1970s, home industries absorbed about 80% of the workforce in the industrial sector, about half of which were women. However, the government did not prioritize the development of home industries so that

only a little government assistance was available to raise capital or to expand the markets for these products.

Women Laborers

Beyond home industries, women’s employment opportunities were in industries that had been around since the colonial era, such as mills or industries that produced weavings, clove cigarettes, tobacco, sugar or new industries that specialized in textiles, chemicals, and metals, as well as electronic assembling companies that required a higher level of skill and education than most women possessed. It was not easy for women to be employed in both types of industry. The older industries usually employed groups of laborers who had worked in the factories from generation to generation. New middle-sized and large industries congested with foreign capital were also congested with laborers resulting from the process that marginalized farmers in rural areas. The New Order gave a great deal of attention to the expansion of new industries that could quickly produce cheap goods for mass consumption in the hope it would create broad employment opportunities. However, this shift in the type of industries could not solve problems created by the rapid pace of


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urbanization. Consequently, women were forced to accept unprofitable schemes of hiring and compensation.

Many young women entered manufacturing industries as temporary workers, i.e., daily laborers, probationary laborers, seasonal workers, and contract laborers. At first, companies preferred to hire skilled and educated laborers, i.e., high school graduates, most of whom were male, to accelerate the production process and generate large profits. In the early 1970s, male laborers were discontented with their working conditions and remuneration that, in turn, ignited protests and violence directed at company management. This situation altered industry policy in the direction of hiring younger, more poorly educated, and low-skilled workers. The majority of these laborers were female teenagers. They were considered easier to handle and were also paid low wages. In fact, women laborers were paid lower wages than their male colleagues because they were not perceived as the main breadwinners. Working in factories was not regarded as women’s primary duty, especially when they were married and had children. Educated male laborers would be assigned a supervisory position, overseeing the women laborers. Companies prioritized single women laborers, or married women without

children. They also fired married women who became pregnant to avoid paying them a welfare allowance, and to prevent an interruption in the production process due to maternity leaves. Women were forced to accept unfair treatment at work because they desperately needed jobs to survive and to help family finances.

Meanwhile, domestic and foreign observers of Indonesia’s economic development celebrated the success of the New Order government in accelerating economic growth. From 1967–1975, Indonesia managed to boost state revenues as much as 10–20% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The biggest share of this revenue was derived from petroleum/crude oil exports, with foreign capital supporting the refinery processes. The development of new technology was considered to have brought a real benefit because the government was at least able to meet people’s basic needs for food and clothing at a low price. Other consumer goods, such as plastic household appliances and electronics were easily obtained at the market. Foreign aid and state revenue from oil exports had made possible the development of basic infrastructure for industrialization: irrigation, electricity, roads, transportation, and communications.

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What was also considered a significant indicator of the success of modernization in Indonesia was the construction of hotels and office buildings in Jakarta and other major cities. Social problems, such as unemployment, malnutrition, and income gaps stemming from excluding people’s participation from the formulation of development policies, were regarded as the government’s limitation in carrying out a more comprehensive industrialization process. Therefore, raising the number of labor-intensive industries was considered a means to increase employment opportunities and enable people to earn a decent income so that their living standards would also be improved.

As oil revenues plunged in the 1980s and international pressure to open the Indonesian economy to even more foreign capital, the government decided to encourage the establishment of export-oriented industries on a mass scale, such as garment, sports shoes, textiles, and electronic goods industries. Women laborers comprised a major asset since it was thought they were easier to control and did not need high wages. Indonesian consulates abroad made special efforts to assure foreign investors they could safely conduct business in Indonesia. This security guarantee was possible because the

state, through its security apparatus, was ready to control laborers by prohibiting them from organizing or from going on strike. The state authority to settle labor disputes also always sided with investors. At the community level, discrimination and violence against women factory workers—unpaid overtime, below-standard wages, denial of women’s right to take leave for menstruation, illness, and pregnancy, and sexual harassment—were considered normal. Violence attracted public attention only when it occurred beyond the walls of the factory and was brutal in character, like the 1993 incident of Marsinah, a woman laborer who was sexually tortured and murdered by local military authorities because she organized a labor union strike.

Women Migrant Workers

Along with the change in industrialization policies, the government also started to encourage the Indonesian workforce to work abroad in order to reduce the country’s unemployment rate. As a result, Indonesian migrant workers became an enormous commercial network involving informal brokers from villages to departure centers in the cities, including immigration and customs officials at the international airports. The smoothness of this enterprise was facilitated by a lack of government regulations, as well

The murder of Marsinah encouraged women laborers to organize themselves and to demand better working conditions. (Semsar Siahaan/poster)


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as violations of existing ones enabling the migrant worker industry to grow significantly in terms of the number of workers sent abroad and profits earned. The state’s Fourth Five Year Development Plan (Repelita) in 1984–89 set a target of 250,000 migrant workers, but in reality the Department of Labor sent more than 450,000 workers. During this period, revenues from migrant workers reached US$552 million. In 1983 the number of women migrant workers was 41.5% of the total number of laborers sent and in 1988, the percentage of women increased to 77.5%. In 2004, 80% of a total 400,000 laborers sent were women, with officially US$1.35 billion in remittances transferred to their homes. It is true that the money did not go directly into the government’s budget, but the workers’ families in Indonesia spent it, which meant that it greased the wheel driving the nation’s economy.

Many of these women had no choice but to work in foreign countries, separated from their children and families for an indefinite period of time. Agriculture, plantations, as well as long-standing companies of the colonial era, such as coffee, sugar, and tobacco, were increasingly neglected as the government favored the development of capital-intensive foreign industries like mining and manufacturing. Meanwhile, as the

manufacturing industries collapsed in the early 1990s due to the shift of foreign investors’ preference to invest in other countries, e.g., China and Vietnam, it seemed the government had no other alternative in finding a comparative advantage for Indonesia in the global economy than to sell cheap labor. The government proudly welcomed women migrant workers at the airport with the slogan “revenue heroines” without even attempting a system to protect these heroines or improve their education.

Since the 1980s, the government has started to encourage women to work abroad, almost without protection. As many as 920 prospective Indonesian migrant workers (BMI) attended a Final Departure Preparation.(Jakarta, 2006; Tempo/Yosep Arkian)

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Most of these women laborers lacked adequate skills and basic education, or worse, were illiterate. This condition resembled that of the industrial laborers in the early 1970s. From their recruitment to their return home, women migrant workers were targeted for extortion. Squeezed by poverty, women migrant workers were easily tricked by brokers whose promises about the kinds of work they would do were lies. These women had to pay a great sum of money to the brokers who were working with the state apparatus at all levels, to arrange for the documents they needed to work overseas. In fact, some of these women were sent without proper documents. Because of this precarious situation, women migrant workers often had to deal with violence in the houses where they worked. Once outside Indonesia, they possessed little, if any, bargaining power. Labor policies, both in Indonesia and most countries receiving Indonesian migrant workers, did not cover domestic workers. The only way they could escape their mistreatment was to run away. Yet, even this was often not viable if a woman’s employer had already confiscated her passport. Women who ran away from their employers began to flood Indonesian embassies in recipient countries. Migrant labor organizations recorded that most of these unfortunate women returned home empty-handed,

some of them injured or disabled, and some even returned in a coffin.Stories about women victims of development, what more if the stories come from rural women, women laborers, women migrant workers and indigenous women, seldom appeared in discussions about Indonesia’s economic progress. Even if they did appear, they are thought of only as “excesses of development,” that could be ignored or addressed with momentary acts of charity, such as donations of basic food items or alms given during religious festivities. Economic growth was the continual, reassuring mantra, with an increased per capita income as the evidence. However, these figures only showed a situation in which each person earned exactly the same amount, but revealed nothing about the distribution of income. A high per capita income could not change the fact that only a few received large incomes, whereas the majority lived from one day to the next without any capital or chance of economic security.

Historically women have used various means to escape the trap of poverty and fight for their survival and that of their families. The inadequate social welfare system run by the state compelled these women to be responsible for the creation and care of their families’ welfare, and


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Women, the drive wheels of the New Order industrialization. (Oktober 1997; Annisa edition VI)

on their own, through various efforts, to guarantee their children’s health and education. To meet these needs, the women were willing to do any kind of job, and if necessary, to go abroad, even without any kind of protection. When the financial crisis hit Indonesia in 1997, Indonesia’s foreign debts went sky high. Once more, women had to bear the consequences of a discriminatory economic policy that did not consider their needs or interests at all. Up to this day, women bear the biggest share of repaying Indonesia’s foreign debt because the state has preferred to rescue the companies with bad debts rather than subsidize basic needs and improve social welfare services for its people.

Regulating Women’s Bodies and Space

Regulating Women’s Bodies: The Family Planning Program

Besides exploiting women laborers, the New Order regime also had a direct interest in women’s bodies as a means to make development successful. This interest was related to the effort to control the population growth rate, which globally was believed a necessity

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to safeguard the welfare of society since uncontrolled population growth could exceed the power of economic growth. In Indonesia, Keluarga Berencana (KB—Family Planning program) was one of three main elements of the modernization project, along with improved food technology and the import of consumer goods. In 1969, KB was the government’s main strategy to address the food crisis and poverty. The document regarding the state’s First Five Year Development Plan stated specifically that the objective of the KB program was to improve the health and welfare of the mother, child, family, and nation, which, in turn, would increase production. Although the program targets were married couples, the targets for contraceptive devices were women because of their inherent reproductive role.

In introducing the KB program, the New Order government had to proceed cautiously for fear that religious groups would take issue with the state’s intervention in private matters. The Perkumpulan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia (PKBI—Family Planning Association of Indonesia) played a crucial role in the initial success of implementing the KB program. This institution contributed most of its clinic equipment to the Ministry of Health and assisted

in the formation of Lembaga Keluarga Berencana Nasional (LKBN—National Family Planning Institute), which the government officially endorsed in 1968. LKBN’s initial activities included dissemination of information about birth control and organizing dialogues with religious leaders to win their support. In 1969, support from international institutions such as the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), the World Bank and the World Health Organization (WHO) prompted the government to increase its target of birth control acceptors from three million to six million within five years. To ensure orderly implementation of the plan and achievement of this target, implementation institutions needed to be established from the national level down to sub-district levels. These institutions were to report directly to the President.

As a result, in 1969 LKBN was merged into Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional (BKKBN—National Family Planning Coordinating Agency) and was no longer under the supervision of the Ministry of Health. The government immediately allocated US$1.3 million for KB programs at the national level. Government expenditure for the implementation of these programs was skyrocketing from year to year; for example, for 1977/1978 alone,


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The New Order government believed that controlling population growth rate was necessary to ensure the people’s welfare. President Soeharto officially opening a condom factory. (1987; Kompas/Bambang SK)

the government allocated US$34.3 million. Foreign donors who provided the initial fund of US$3 million also continued to increase their amount of aid in subsequent years in line with indications of success. In 1976/1977, the biggest aid came from USAID, reaching 44% of the total funds needed for the KB program. Foreign aid would eventually be linked to income-boosting activities, based on loans, for people in rural areas.

The rapid development of KB programs in Indonesia also drew the attention of international contraceptive companies. For example, the famous implant company, Norplant, conducted an experiment in Indonesia before they widely marketed their product. After that, Indonesian women comprised 50% of Norplant consumers worldwide. Later, the use of implants became problematic since most of the KB officials, including physicians and paramedics, were only familiar with the process of implanting devices, but were not trained to perform post-implant services. This was a major problem considering that an intrauterine implant is only effective for five years, and that possible side effects can affect women’s reproductive organs.

The government, however, did not seem to worry about this since the KB program was oriented toward chasing targets regarding the number of acceptors. Nor did it honor an important principle in its implementation of the KB program, namely to provide prospective recipients with adequate information so they could make appropriate choices for themselves. It is apparent from official government documents that the main goal of this program was chasing targets to achieve quotas with no attention at all to issues of women’s reproductive health:

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The objective of this program . . . is to prevent approximately 600,000–700,000 births by achieving 3,000,000 acceptors . . . Every field worker, as well as technical/medical workers, who succeed in getting an acceptor will be given an incentive.

Repelita I, Book I, Chapter XI, pp. 64-65, 67

Two women’s organizations established by the New Order government, Dharma Wanita (wives of male civil servants) and Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (PKK—Guiance for Family Welfare), played an important role in the success of the KB program especially in the rural areas. One of the challenges encountered by this program was that traditionally women knew methods to prevent conception, such as abstinence from sexual intercourse, prolonging the duration of breastfeeding, or drinking certain herbal medicine. Members of Dharma Wanita were instructed to counsel women in rural areas about the KB program; however, they rarely dealt with women’s health issues, especially issues related to reproductive health. In the past, women who were involved in caring for women’s health, dealt with reproductive health problems that arose due to pregnancy at a young age and frequent births. KB counseling, on the contrary, emphasized the importance

of KB as a step towards modernizing the family. The acceptance of modern contraception devices and the willingness to form small families were considered signs of progress. The PKK became the tool to disseminate the state’s idea about one of women’s noble roles in development, namely to be the creator and caretaker of a small family that is healthy and prosperous. The PKK cadres regarded this role, which they adopted voluntarily, as women’s contribution towards the success of development.

Women who were willing to use contraceptives and form groups to invite other women to become acceptors received business loans, distributed through PKK, as an incentive. With initial aid from UNFPA, USAID and the World Bank, the government offered a revolving credit package available only to KB program participants. If a group of women succeeded in mobilizing more women and proved it was able to manage the loan given, BKKBN would give those women an opportunity to obtain an even bigger loan. There were also other forms of compensation, such as scholarships for the children of program participants. These acceptors were hailed as “heroes of development”.

When counseling and loan offers failed to persuade people to accept modern


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ABRI’s support of the “Family Planning (KB) Safari” which aimed at increasing the number of acceptors, through, for example, a free Family Planning Implant program for the community.(Jambi, 2004; BKCSKB Kab. Tanjung Jabung Barat)

contraception, the government employed recruitment methods that involved security officials, namely KB Safari and penggarapan khusus (rapsus—special cultivation). In the early 1980s, KB Safari became the new approach to increase the number of KB acceptors. The Safari covered a wide range of regions, proceeded swiftly and could hook thousands of people in just one day. This activity involved various government institutions and organizations, such as BKKBN, Korpri (Corps of Civil Servants), Dharma Wanita, PKK, the Armed Forces and the police. It was usually conducted on national holidays, for example, Independence Day, Mother’s Day, or Armed Forces Day, and it would receive media coverage as part of the government’s propaganda on KB and national development. The KB Safari also became part of the ABRI Masuk Desa program (the deployment of Armed Forces to work on development projects at the village level). The Army itself had a special unit called KB-KESEHATAN ABRI (the Army’s KB-HEALTH) to handle KB as a military operation. The Armed Forces took on implementation of KB as their responsibility to ensure that Indonesia would become a safe and prosperous society. A Papuan woman recounts her experience:

It was 5 October 1996, Armed Forces Day. I was ordered to go to the Navy Hospital in the city. There were already many women there. There was no socialization about what [the hospital] wanted to do. The women also did not know what [the hospital] wanted to do. Then, in the room the nurse said they wanted to perform an operation. They shaved off our pubic

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hair. Although we knew each other we were all embarrassed. Because we were already in the Navy hospital we were afraid to leave/go home. After we’d been shaved we had to get on the bed, got a shot, and then we didn’t know what happened anymore. When I regained consciousness, I saw many women in the room. Then [I] went home. Five years later I went to the Navy Hospital; they told me there was no device to remove [the KB implant] . . . the device was in Makassar. Until now I still hurt; it’s

hard to bend my legs, it is very painful. Once I hurt, I wanted to know what thing they put inside me. The doctor said it was the contraceptive device that caused the pain, made my menstruation come irregularly, made me dizzy, and caused discharge. Sometimes it itches very much, bothers my activities. I put toothpaste on my vagina, to make it clean and cool.

woman victim’s testimony Papua Documentation Team recording, 2009

Usually, the safari commenced with a meeting of the village chief, physician, BKKBN officials, and security forces to design the activity and determine the team that would mobilize to recruit acceptors. PKK members would then pick up the prospective acceptors, going from house to house, and bring them to the village hall. If a woman who was approached refused to be involved in the program, the security forces would come and force her to participate. In several places, security forces accused those who refused as being communists. For areas not reached by KB Safari, usually remote villages, rapsus was conducted to recruit new acceptors. This operation was also aimed at village women who managed to avoid the Safari hunt. Often, the Armed Forces joined the rapsus team to capture these women. Village government

The image of a New Order woman is one who obeys the husband/military and concentrates on nursing and fostering the next generation. Relief Lubang Buaya (Jakarta, 2009; ISSI)


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officials who were civilians also often took a military attitude in forcing people to participate in the KB program. Success in recruiting acceptors was considered one of the indicators of the district’s success in development. The Department of Home Affairs routinely rewarded regions that showed great achievement in development, and promoted the leader to a higher position.

According to government reports, with this intensive KB program, Indonesia succeeded in decreasing the fertility rate, from 5.5 births per woman in 1970 to 3 births in 1988. In the same period, the use of contraceptive devices rose from 10 to 45%. The infant mortality rate plummeted from an estimated 158 per 1000 live births in 1970 to approximately 57 per 1000 live births in 1994. Soeharto received an international award from the UN in 1989 for success in slowing Indonesia’s population growth. Up to 1994, the Army KB-HEALTH operation included areas of conflict, such as East Timor, as a target that achieved results. Reports from East Timorese and foreign human rights institutions implied that these results were linked to the presence of the military in the context of conflict in East Timor, and that East Timorese women did not feel they were given the right to refuse implementation of the KB program.

Regulating Women’s Space

Probably the clearest sign of change in women’s fate under the reign of the New Order was the way Kartini was commemorated as the pioneer of “women’s emancipation”. Every year, Kartini Day was celebrated in every corner of the country, including in schools, especially with a pageant of traditional clothing, as if the spirit of Kartini could be represented through clothes. In addition, various competitions were held that displayed women’s skills as housewives: from cooking, applying make-up, and creating flower arrangements to making handicrafts. Kartini Day almost had nothing to do with the idea of women’s liberation that she stressed in her letters.

The tradition of women participating in politics, although not old, was enough to raise awareness among women that they had a share in the birth and rearing of the nation. The New Order regime needed to make sure that women, especially those who in the past had been educated to organize and to engage in politics, obtained a place that was felt honorable in the new project of development of the nation and state. At the same time, the government needed to control the family, the smallest unit of society, as the primary

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The Kartini Day celebration often forgot the idea of women liberation and became merely a show of traditional dresses. A Transjakarta. Woman driver (Jakarta, 2007; Tempo/Wahyu Setiawan).

domain to cultivate the new values of progress and civilization in line with the national development project. Thus, the government had a vested interest in reinforcing women’s traditional role as caretaker of the family and manager of the household.

The idea of women’s role and position in the household and society as set by the New Order was not entirely new. It departed from the Iboe Bangsa (Mother of the Nation) ideas present at the beginning of the women’s movement. A woman’s role in the public domain was simply an extension of her role in the domestic domain; her ability to give birth to a new generation demanded that she become part of the nation-building process. When the women’s movement broadened its attention to development of the nation and formation of the republic, the sense of womanhood specified by the idea of Iboe Bangsa

did not distinguish between public and domestic domains. It is true that the boundary between the two mostly presented itself when women were encouraged to temporarily forget their domestic agenda in order to prioritize national political interests. Yet, wherever women went, wherever they were active, they aspired to these ideals. However, the New Order confirmed that the ideal woman should marry and become a mother. Whatever her role in public, she must not abandon her main duty, namely to take care of her household and family.

What was different during the New Order era was that the Iboe Bangsa idea, which had been debated in the early women’s movement in the spirit of freedom of thought, freedom of expression and freedom to organize, was transformed into a state policy that all women were obligated to follow. As such, women were no longer free to form views or visions other than those of the state. This policy apparently came from the assumption that the struggle to achieve women’s equality was finished. Women had obtained their rights as citizens equal to those of men, together with Indonesia’s independence and guaranteed by the Constitution. On paper, there were no differences between the

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In the New Order era the "Mother of the Nation” idea changed and turned into a state policy. That all women should adhere to. A caricature in a newspaper. (Oktober 1997; Annisa Edition VI)

rights of men and women. Another assumption that supported this policy was the conviction that the division of labor between women and men was inevitable. A woman’s inherent nature determined the proper place for her. For example, the 1978 Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara (GBHN—State Policy Guidelines) on the Role of Women in Building and Nurturing the Nation stated that:

a. Comprehensive development mandates the maximum participation of men and women in all fields. Therefore, women have the same rights, obligations, and opportunities as men to fully participate in all development activities. b. Women’s role in development does not diminish her role in attending to the well-being of her family in general and that of the younger generation in particular, within the framework of the advancement of all Indonesians.

Section IV, Sub-section on Religion, Article 11

In the GBHN of the following years, there was no basic change in the state’s elaboration on the role and position of women. In the nation’s development, a woman was a man’s “equal partner” in line with her nature as a wife and

mother. A more focused formulation on the identity of women was articulated in Panca Dharma Wanita (Women’s Five Main Duties) in the 1983 GBHN, namely a woman’s duty as a wife who is a companion to her husband, a manager of the household, a mother and teacher to her children, an additional income provider and a member of society. Referring to this formulation, women’s organizations formed by the government, such as Dharma Wanita, Dharma Pertiwi and PKK, functioned as the main executors of developmental programs down to the rural areas.

These three organizations were organizations for the wives of civil servants and the military. Looking at the structure of these organizations, they followed the hierarchy of the husbands’ positions, and were a perfection of Fujinkai, the women’s organization during the Japanese occupation. It was compulsory for the wives of all civil servants to become a member, and the membership fee was automatically


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drawn from their husbands’ salaries. A wife whose husband was the head of a department would automatically become the head of the women’s organization, without weighing whether or not she had the ability to lead or was interested in the position. If the husband’s term of service was over, so was the wife’s. Such organizations for wives had been a subject of debate by the women’s movement during the early years of independence. For example, Sujatin Kartowijono, who in 1953 was Vice Chairperson of the First Indonesian Women’s Congress (Kowani) and Chairperson of the Women’s Association of the Republic of Indonesia (Perwari), once stated that these wives’ organizations forced women to perform certain activities more out of obedience to their husbands rather than due to their own awareness. According to her, women’s self-sufficiency in managing an organization is important and should be determined collectively by the members in line with the interests and abilities of each woman.

Women’s organizations were established by women themselves and based on their awareness to improve women’s position and destiny through advocacy and struggle, to have freedom in membership, unattached to their husband’s position. These women work

with the spirit of devotion, due to their loyalty to society.

Ny. Sujatin KartowijonoPerkembangan Pergerakan Wanita Indonesia

(Development of the Indonesian Women’s Movement), p. 25

The old organizations left over from the past were Perwari, Aisyiyah, and Wanita Katolik. They continued their previous social activities, such as the education of mothers in household matters and economic empowerment. Perwari, the majority of whose members were wives of civil servants, lost many of its members because they joined Dharma Wanita. Meanwhile, Kowani, as the umbrella organization for all women’s organizations that had been independent from the beginning, was given authority in 1974 to represent women’s organizations in Golkar and received a subsidy from the government to conduct its activities.

The stigma towards Gerakan Wanita Indonesia (Gerwani—Indonesian Women’s Movement) engineered during the period of the New Order’s birth played a significant role in regulating women’s space. Gerwani members were depicted as vile, immoral women with links to the G30S Incident. This image was disseminated through the

A guide how to become an ideal woman in the New Order era. Family Welfare Movement (PKK) poster in Jakarta (Jakarta, 2009; KP)


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film Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI (G30S/Indonesian Communist Party Betrayal), reliefs at the Pancasila Sakti monument erected to commemorate the Incident, and in official history textbooks. These representations justified society’s scorn and hatred of Gerwani. The neighbors accused me of being “a cheap woman,” “a whore,” and other foul words. They didn’t want to talk to me . . . I tried selling food, but no one would buy it.

woman victim Gender-based Crimes Against Humanity: Listening to

the Voice of Women Survivors of 1965.(Komnas Perempuan report), p. 164

The black propaganda about Gerwani implies a relationship between the danger of political participation and unbridled women’s sexuality. By stating that Gerwani is wild and immoral, the New Order authorities were also saying that PKI, and the entire Old Order were also immoral because they had allowed women to become so wild. The entire political system established during Soekarno’s rule was to blame for the abuse of women’s nature. The New Order, on the other hand, would become a force to restore women’s loyalty to their nature. Therefore, all women’s organizations, along with all others, were forced to adopt Pancasila and the

1945 Constitution as forming the sole ideological basis of their organizations; women’s organizations had to perform the roles of womanhood as outlined in the GBHN.

In 1974, as part of standardizing the role of women in the household, the New Order government passed the Marriage Act. This act stipulated the boundaries of women’s space by confirming the role of the husband as the head of the household and the wife as the mother and caretaker of the family. At the same time, this law was also a way the New Order the government fostered women’s support. The Marriage Act could be regarded as a victory for women’s organizations, that for decades had struggled for the state to protect women in the institution of marriage. The law affirmed monogamous marriage and set a minimum age for marriage. This victory could not be separated from military pressure on Islamic parties that strongly opposed the passage of this Act, and Parliament passed the law without taking a vote. To avoid social unrest, the Marriage Act did not cancel jurisdiction of the religious court to adjudicate family matters, like talak (divorce) and inheritance for Indonesian Muslims. It was thought that this policy did not interfere with the objectives of the Marriage Act because the legal argument

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used in the religious court reinforced women’s domestic role.

For the New Order, regulating women’s bodies and their space was an important way to achieve national stability and development. The price women had to pay was to relinquish freedom over their minds and bodies. The state’s reinforcement of women’s role in the household and as second in family decision-making increasingly marginalized women’s position. Such marginalization expanded to the public sphere where it became fertile soil for acts of violence against women. Women who questioned, rejected, what more rebelled against their role as outlined by the state, faced accusations of being Gerwani, ostracism and even violence. This resulted in a situation where women, who for four decades had lived in the midst of conflicts in various regions of Indonesia, were especially vulnerable to particular forms of violence. Even after the fall of the New Order in 1998, this situation has persisted.

Women lost the freedom of their body and thoughts to pay for the national development. Poster depicting Soeharto as Father of Development (Jakarta, 1982; Eka Budianta/Antara)


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Seeds of Conflict: Regulating Identity and Nature

Uniformity of Identity

When its independence was proclaimed on 17 August 1945, Indonesia was envisioned as a political entity comprising individuals with diverse backgrounds who united themselves for the sake of shared ideals; namely, an independent, united, sovereign, just, and prosperous society. The long history of colonialism was the basis for a vision to unite the various societies of Indonesia. In reality, the concept of a modern Indonesian nation-state coexisted with political entities that were far older and more deeply rooted in the daily lives of the people, such as social-political communities based on primordial ties: ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic. Therefore, Indonesia’s proclamation of independence in 1945 was not an end result, but rather the beginning of the process to become a nation-state. This bond among Indonesians was continually being tested and reconfirmed during the nation’s long journey, especially through a process of handling tensions and disturbances that were likely to occur in any nation in the world. This bond would become loose if one of the groups

in this national community, including the government, was seen to deny the shared ideals agreed upon from the start.

It is clear that from the beginning the New Order government faced a challenge to convince people throughout Indonesia that the national development framework it offered would guarantee equal distribution of income. The fact that the majority of the population was Javanese and that the center of power was in Java brought an uneasiness that dwelled in the minds of many, that is, the fragility of the balance of power and sharing of benefits between Java and the regions outside Java. Experience in dealing with regional rebellions during the 1950s by dissidents outside Java compelled the New Order government to develop a national project to foster an awareness of national territory and a belief in the sacredness of NKRI. One of the vehicles for this was to create a single national identity, to be distributed and adopted throughout Indonesia, from nation’s capital city to the most remote villages. This national identity contained many elements of Javanese culture, which eventually created restlessness in regions outside Java.

The New Order government sought to build a power structure on top of a diverse society by stipulating the

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To develop ties of national togetherness, the New Order used the Javanese culture, Javanese being the majority of the Indonesian population. National Resilience Institute (Lemhanas) Regular Course participants with Ibu Tien Soeharto. (Jakarta, 1979; Antara)


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boundaries for a common identity that was then maintained through the force of law and the military. One step towards this was the regulation whereby each citizen was obligated to adhere to one of the state’s five officially recognized religions. This policy made things difficult for groups that adhered to a belief other than these five religions, especially indigenous peoples. Religious groups acknowledged by the government frequently treated these groups as communities “without religion,” as uncivilized people whose ritual practices were considered heretical and therefore in need of conversion. For many of these believers, this policy and the attitude of those who supported it, was felt as a violation of their right to freedom of religion.

IIn 1980, the New Order government insisted that the state ideology, Pancasila, be the sole foundation for the state. Among other reasons, this policy was due to outbursts by Islamic-based movements, such as the Komando Jihad and Jamaah Imron who hijacked the Woyla plane in 1981, that were considered to undermine government authority. Islamic groups strongly protested this policy and showed their resistance, among other ways, by promoting wearing of the veil as a code of identity among Muslims.

The government took harsh measures against this protest. The Department of Education and Culture issued a decree, SK 052/C/Kep/d.82, which regulated the use of school uniforms in public schools. In many cities, female students wearing a veil were expelled from school. Furthermore, security forces launched operations to crush Islamic movements in Tanjung Priok (1984), Talangsari, Lampung (1989), and Padepokan Haur Koneng, Majalengka (1993), all of which were accused of intending to establish an Islamic state. If communism was labeled the extreme left, the Islamic movement was branded the extreme right. The claim of the latent danger posed by these two extremes became a typical device of the state in suppressing citizens’ freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to participate in an organization.

Another Indonesian social category that became the target of discrimination by the state was the Chinese people. Actually, this policy was inherited from the racial segregation conducted by the Dutch colonial government, and from the policy of Soekarno’s government to expropriate strategic Chinese-owned businesses and hand them over to native Indonesians. The New Order government emphasized discrimination against ethnic Chinese by linking the G30S Incident to communist China. As a result, all

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cultural institutions that previously had been established by the Chinese, such as the Sino-schools, publications in Mandarin, Sino-art groups, and anything considered to represent Chinese culture, were banned. Furthermore, the government issued population policies that differentiated between native and non-native (Chinese) citizens, and noted this on their residence cards. To be recognized as citizens, Chinese were required to possess a document

called Surat Bukti Kewarganegaraan Indonesia (SBKRI—Letter to Prove Indonesian Citizenship). Each time they had to deal with the state they were required to pay more for public services. The non-native status also limited the access of Chinese Indonesians to state educational institutions and to careers in civil service and the Armed Forces. On the other hand, the government used the network of Chinese businessmen that had developed in previous eras and encouraged a coalition between Chinese businessmen and government officials to facilitate the country’s economy.

Discrimination that coincided with exploiting the potential of the Chinese created a tension in society. The Chinese were generally perceived as people who were merely interested in economic activities, who were indifferent to social issues and who were usually rich. The Chinese, on the other hand, suspected that native Indonesians only wanted to exploit their business abilities and extort their wealth. The prejudice of both communities was sharpened and tensions increased leading to various incidents in which the Chinese community became the target of riots. This violence was dismissed as minor social disturbances whose perpetrators need not be held legally accountable for their actions.

Various state policies confirmed race-based discrimination against Chinese ethnics, including Evidence of Indonesian Citizenship Certificate (SBKRI) and the change of names. (Documentation by KP)


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Although daily social interaction between the Chinese and the non-Chinese appeared to be peaceful, limitations from both sides on inter-ethnic marriage placed the heavier burden on women. If a Chinese man wished to marry a non-Chinese, his family would not object since the children would bear the name of the Chinese family. But if a Chinese woman married a non-Chinese man, that created a big problem. The situation was the same among non-Chinese. A non-Chinese woman who married a Chinese man was regarded as having degraded her family because her marriage caused them to be seen as second-class citizens. This situation became more complicated when the man and woman were of different religions.

In addition to discriminative policies on behalf of uniformity, the New Order government utilized a divide and conquer tactic by sowing seeds of caution towards socio-cultural differences, something only natural in a pluralistic society such as Indonesia. The New Order government turned common social terms, such as race, religion, and ethnicity into a source of unimaginable threats via the acronym SARA (Suku, Agama, Ras, dan Antar golongan—Ethnic Group, Religion, Race, and Inter-group relations). Any discussion of inter-group

issues was stigmatized as SARA and considered a potential danger to the unity of Indonesia. The government even issued a prohibition on inter-religious marriage as part of its strategy to regulate relations among different groups and, at the same time, to control the identity of its citizens.

On the other hand, to perfect consolidation of its power, the New Order government developed a centralized development policy determined and controlled from Jakarta. For example, provincial governors, most of whom were retired army officers, were appointed by the central government and typically did not come from the region they governed in order to avoid the possibility of a dual allegiance. To a certain extent, this practice added to people’s dissatisfaction since they viewed a provincial leader merely as an instrument used by the central government to control and rule their region

The government policy, often regarded as Java-centric, gave rise to tensions between original residents and newcomers to a region who were involved in contestations over land ownership, access to natural resources, and economic resources. For example,

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the difference in the government’s treatment of transmigrants, who were given land and a house, and original inhabitants who did not receive such facilities; or the difference between traders, most of whom were newcomers who developed their economic power, and local residents who relied on agricultural produce and whose economic strength increasingly slumped. The judicial system, which should have been a means to resolve

conflicts and controversies peacefully, was often ineffective, or did not function independently and fairly, because it had already become simply an instrument to defend the authorities or anyone who could afford to pay for a legal process.

Regulating Natural Resources

If in the strategy to develop the manufacturing industry and migrant labor, the New Order government

For the Papua community, the mountain is a ’mother’ who gives the people.life. The mining activities that destroys nature hurt their identity as a human being. (Freeport mining, Papua; Antara)

effectively exploited the human resources of women to facilitate turning the wheels of development, it surrendered the management of natural resources almost entirely to foreign companies. The government preferred to play the role of a shareholder of the profits and security guard to protect regions of natural resource exploration and exploitation from disturbances by local residents of the area. The constitution and laws regulating forest and mining


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management gave the state authority to manage natural resources “for the good of national economic development and the people’s prosperity”. This set of laws made space for a broader interpretation that the state had not only the right to manage natural resources, but also the right to own them. The laws and policies were created in such a way as to allow Soeharto’s government to divide the regions of Indonesia into plots of oil and natural gas exploration, mining, and forest logging for foreign companies.

The policies of the New Order government in the management and exploitation of Indonesia's natural wealth of course increased state revenues significantly. The percentage of the GDP from the mining sector soared rapidly from 3.7% in 1965 to 12% in 1977. However, such dredging of the earth apparently did not improve the public’s general propsperity in areas rich in natural resources, such as what happened in Aceh and Papua. Besides that, the process of opening up an area for mining was usually preceded by the removal of large numbers of local residents without giving them adequate compensation. Terror, intimidation, arrests, rape, and murder were common methods used by state security forces—sometimes working in cooperation with a company’s security guards—to

expedite the process of acquisition. The state justified the violence by arguing that those regions were the rightful property of the state and that local protestors were simply troublemakers. The state also obscured the identity of state officials and security forces that commited the violence by using the generic term oknum (person or individual) when referring to them.

The forced displacement of local residents, including traditional miners, from territories rich in natural resources compelled them to seek other work that frequently was not in line with their abilities and that could barely provide for their daily needs. The destruction of sources of livelihood, especially clean water, due to mining activities exacerbated this condition. Women were the first to face the impact of the water crisis, in terms of both quantity and quality. While mining industries consumed enormous quantities of water, the water available for families’ daily needs was greatly diminished. Women had to seek other sources of water further away from where they lived just in order to wash and cook. The mining industry also produced waste that polluted the rivers, sago forest swamps, agricultural land and the sea where women usually gathered shellfish and shrimp. For example, a number

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of women in Buyat, a coastal village in North Sulawesi, became ill because they were exposed to polluted water. They suffered from reproductive health problems such as pregnancy disorders and miscarriages, and from severe skin diseases. They did not have enough money for adequate medical treatment.

It was getting increasingly late at night. Two little brothers . . . burst into tears because they hadn’t eaten anything since noon. Their parents, Jemmy Bawole (35 years old) and Ahyani (30 years old), were confused. There was no rice or fish to cook. The neighbors were equally poor. They did not have money to shop in the stalls. Finally, the mother ran to another person’s garden. She found a banana tree with unripened fruit and picked several bananas. When she got home, she boiled the hard bananas and coaxed her children to eat. For a while they stopped crying, but kept on grimacing. Well of course, how delicious is a boiled unripened banana!

Kampung Nelayan tanpa Aroma Ikan (“Fishing Village Without the Aroma of Fish”)

Report from Buyat Bay (1) Republika, 4 August 2004

People’s discontent with natural resource management in Aceh and Papua gave birth to resistance movements that

declared a desire for independence, away from the Republic of Indonesia. The state responded to these movements, which at first did not have a lot of strength, with large-scale military operations to annihilate the rebellions, targeting unarmed citizens, including women. Initially, violence by the security forces caused fear, but gradually it engendered public hatred towards the leaders of the New Order regime, and encouraged people to support the resistance movements, both openly and in secret. The greater the state’s effort to eradicate public resistance with violence, the deeper became people’s feelings of being treated unfairly. People’s increased support for the resistance meant that military operations in Aceh and Papua were never fully successful.

These military operations were designed not only to safeguard the state’s vital objects and secure the circulation of foreign capital, but also to reassert the importance of the Republic of Indonesia’s integrity that was the constant buzz as part of national identity. Herein lies the clash between a national identity resting solely on regional awareness and indigenous identity tightly linked to nature. For example, for the Amungme women in West Papua, nature in its entirety is the body of a mother. In West Timor, people consider the mountains

When no satisfactory solution was arrived at, feelings of being unjustly treated accumulated in the community. A demand for a referendum in Aceh. (Aceh, 1999; Kemal Jufri)


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as bones, the land as flesh, water as blood, and the forest as hair. Therefore, for indigenous people, the mindless destruction of nature wounds their identity as human beings.

Blind adherence to the principle of territorial integrity and the need to display the military's power in safeguarding the honor and glory of the republic were reconfirmed when the New Order government decided to launch a military operation in East Timor in 1975. Under the pretext of the threat of communist infiltration that would harm the integrity and stability of NKRI, the military declared it would conquer this small country that had just recently become independent after centuries of Portuguese colonialism, in only three weeks. This decision, supported by countries in the Western Block who were influenced by the political framework of the Cold War, brought about an effect that dragged on and on. Because the East Timorese resisted vehemently, the Indonesian government had to double the strength of its military operation and became involved in armed conflict for more than 20 years to maintain its occupation of the territory. This war caused a great number of casualties among both the Indonesian army and the Timorese people.

Had the New Order government effectively used a persuasive approach, it would not have been difficult for the residents in the conflict areas to feel they were a dignified part of this nation. This was especially true considering that most residents in Aceh, Papua and East Timor lived in poverty and had limited access to basic services necessary to ensure their welfare. The resistance movements in these three regions were initially small-scale and did not pose a serious threat to the territorial security of the country, especially when compared to the movements in the late 1950s that received financial support and equipment from other countries. However, since no satisfactory resolution was reached, the sense of being treated unfairly continued to grow. To Indonesians outside these three regions, the movements were described as being dangerous with the ability to foment chaos throughout Indonesia. The government used this threatening image to justify its placement of troops on a large scale with a minimum of supervision, which, in turn, gave rise to the troops’ arbitrary treatment of civil society.

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Undermining the Role of Women

The New Order promised a rebirth for Indonesia following economic bankruptcy and moral degradation, with the Armed Forces in the vanguard (as stabilizer and dynamo) and the bureaucracy as the manager of development activities. Throughout the country, civilian bureaucracy ran parallel to a military structure that functioned down to the village level. This system was a means for the people themselves

The attention the government gave to economic growth ignored the women’s contribution to the success of the primary development programs. Health service through the Mawar Integrated Service Station (Posyandu Mawar)(Sukabumi, 1986)

to monitor each others’ movements down to the household level through a neighborhood system called Rukun Warga and Rukun Tetangga. This system, in turn, stood on a concept of the household where the role of the husband was the head of the family, and the wife was to be a companion to her husband. At a glance this concept looked perfect and guaranteed the orderliness and neatness of the “floating mass” as it moved in the direction of a modern Indonesia. Women were in the midst of the “floating mass”, voluntarily donating their labor to the household, giving it


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cheaply in home industries, domestic work, and manufacturing, while dramatically increasing state revenues as domestic workers in foreign countries. Women were also the main volunteer force in expediting modernization projects such as Family Planning and rural development programs during the early years of the New Order government.

Although the state formulated women’s main role and position in development to be in the household, at the same time it overlooked women’s great contribution to development through their household labor. Household labor was considered the duty of women, while home industries were seen as a mere pastime. Such negligence was apparent from, among other things, the extremely long time the state needed to protect women against domestic violence. Violence in the household was often justified with the excuse that wives were too demanding, disobedient to their husbands, or incompetent in taking care of the household. Faced with violence, it became difficult for women to fully realize their potential. Many women were unable to get out of abusive relationships simply because they were economically dependent on their husbands. This dependence was, indirectly, also the consequence of the

state ideology that reinforced women’s domestic role in order to sustain the development paradigm.

Government attention that was centered on economic growth in sectors dense with foreign capital also ignored the contribution of women to the smoothness and success of major development programs. The state-formulated position and role of women in national development as household managers, men’s companions, and additional sources of income, presented women as no more than a screw in the giant machine of development. For the State, women were not a main force whose opinions on state and nation development strategies deserved to be considered. With such a view, it is understandable how the New Order’s industrialization strategy marginalized rural women and encouraged them to enter cheap labor markets, both domestic and abroad. Consequently, women faced violence and injustice in various aspects of their lives, not only due to government policies that specifically aimed to restrict women’s movements and thoughts, but also because of other general policies.

The New Order government argued that the restriction and regulation of people’s movements would guarantee

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the quick and efficient realization of welfare and prosperity for the people. However, when the people no longer believed in the government’s promises and attempted to find ways to express their opinions, the New Order government had already limited the main channels that would allow for a peaceful settlement of disputes. Institutions that should serve as a space for the exchange of opinions on major community problems were not available.

Government offices and the Parliament, when not occupied with supervising security and public order together with the security forces, prioritized on-going stability of the government. Similarly, legal and judicial institutions that were supposed to regulate the traffice of diverse opinions and aspirations as well as establish the nation’s basic references about truth and justice, failed to perform their duties. They took a greater role in safeguarding the validity of the Soeharto

The state’s standardization of gender roles attributed to women the mere role of a screw in the giant machine of development and made women specifically vulnerable to violence. Women porters.(Jakarta, 2006 ;Tempo/Bismo Agung)

government, its development policies, and its working mechanism so filled with corrupt practices that even the people no longer trusted it.

It was also not easy for the people to arrange safe and comfortable space to discuss ideas about nationality and governance. A great deal of legislation was created to monitor and restrict citizens’ basic rights in expressing their opinions, to assemble, and to participate


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in organizations that were guaranteed by the Constitution. Courageous groups that chose to exercise their rights as citizens were accused of sowing hatred, showing contempt for the leader of the state, or engaging in seditious acts to overthrow the government. Arrests and imprisonment of people who were outspoken and made demands regarding injustice persisted throughout the New Order era. Communities that fought for their survival and began to consider breaking away from the Republic of Indonesia were immediately confronted by operations to crush such rebellions. Violence, whether in the form of discourses that threatened and spread fear, or in the form of physical action, marked the political style during the reign of Soeharto. At the most critical points, violence gave birth to violence and everyone—women and men—were caught in a cycle that only presented violence as the way out. When this cycle of violence burst into prolonged open conflict, women, who from the beginning had already experienced layers of discrimination in various areas of life, were not only trapped by their dependence on men for survival, but also had to face specific vulnerabilities because of their womanhood.vulnerabilities typically associated with her womanhood.

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The New Order’s Course in Regulating Bodies, Space, and Identity of Women and Society

General:Law Number 11/PNPS/1963 on Eradication of Subversive Criminal Acts

Law Number 62 of 1958 on Republic of Indonesia Citizenship

Government Regulation 10/59: Ethnic Chinese forbidden to engage in retail business in areas below the district level

Before 1965 1965- 1968 1969-1973 1974-1978

General:

30 Sept. 1965: G30S Incident

1965: Law Number 1/PNPS/1965 on Blasphemy

11 March 1966: Presidential Order (Supersemar), an order from Soekarno to Suharto to lead the restoration of peace following the 1965 Incident

1966: order that Chinese must change their names through cabinet presidium policy Number 127/U/Kep/12/1966

March 1967: Soeharto becomes president

Law Number 1/1967 on foreign investment; Law Number 11/1967 on mining

1967: Work Contract with Freeport (gold mining in Papua)

1967: Prohibition of Chinese culture, including use of Chinese script, through Presidential Instruction Number 14/1967

Women:

1965: Gerwani removed from Kowani membership

1966: Kowani Extraordinary Congress (Jakarta) decides to support Soeharto’s leadership

1968: LKBN

General:

1969: Papua Referendum

1970: first male laborers’ strike

1971: Golkar wins general election

1971: contract with Mobil Oil in Aceh

1972: transmigration policy (Law Number 3/1972)

1973: merging of political parties

Women:

1969: KB becomes part of Repelita; BKKBN

1972: instruction issued to change name of PKK from Pendidikan to Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (from Education to Guidance for Family Welfare)

General:

1974: Malari Incident driven by sentiment against Japanese investment

1975: Invasion into East Timor

Women:

1974: Dharma Wanita; Dharma Pertiwi

1974: Kowani represents women’s organizations in the Golkar party

1974: Law Number 1/1974 affirming monogomous marriage and setting minimum age

1978: The Role of Women in Building and Nurturing the Nation as elaborated in the GBHN


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1979 – 1983 1984 – 1988 1989 - 1993 1994 – 1998

General:

1982: Press Law/Act Number 21 limits press freedom

Women:

1981: Clinical test conducted for Norplant implant; Family Planning Safari promoted

1982: Decree 052/C/Kep/d.82 regulates the use of school uniforms

1983: first formal Republic of Indonesia exports women migrant workers

1983: Five Principles (Panca) of Dharma Wanita in the GBHN

General:

1984: media censorship sanctions issued through Minister of Information Regulation Number 01/Per/Menpen/1984

1984: Tanjung Priok Incident

1986: President Soeharto receives FAO award for Indonesia’s self-sufficiency in rice

Women:

1984: ratification of CEDAW

1987: marketing of Norplant products approved

General:1989-1999: Special military zone

status (DOM) in Aceh

1989: Talangsari Incident, Lampung

1990: depolitization of campus life through Minister of Education and Culture Decree Number 0457/0/1990

1991: work contract with Freeport renewed

1993: National Committee of Human Rights established

1993: Haur Koneng Complex, Majalengka Incident

Women:1989: Pres. Soeharto receives UN

population award

Mei 1993: Marsinah, a woman labor activist, is murdered

General:1996–2004: Gold mining in Buyat,

Northern Sulawesi

1996: Presidential Decree No. 56/1996 reinforces Letter of Evidence of Indonesian Citizenship (SBKRI) applied only to Chinese communities

1997: monetary crisis; New Order loses popularity

21 May 1998: Soeharto resigns

Women:13–15 May 1998: May Tragedy

1998: Komnas Perempuan

"False Target" by Astari Rasjid (Photos Documentation of Cemara 6 Gallery Café)

Exposing Violence Against Women In Conflict Situations 105

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EXPOSING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS

IVBy the middle of 1997, the prestige of the New Order had begun to wane. The Indonesian economy, the symbol of the New Order’s success, began to suffer from the impact of the global economic crisis. The country could not pay its foreign loans that the government had relied on to finance New Order development projects. Furthermore, Indonesia’s development policy had made it very dependent on imports of both food and raw materials needed for industry. Thus, the government decided to allow its exchange rate to be determined by the world financial market. As a consequence, the price of basic commodities skyrocketed, some as much as tenfold. This situation triggered people’s protests

and demonstrations against the New Order throughout Indonesia. Those conducting demonstrations were mostly students, women, workers, and farmers. Suara Ibu Peduli (Voice of Concerned Mothers), who urged the government to provide milk and basic food products at affordable prices, was one of the first groups to protest.

From the beginning of 1998, demonstrations occurred almost every day in major cities across Indonesia. The demonstrators demanded that President Soeharto, who had led the New Order regime for more than 32 years, step down. In Jakarta, students began to have sit-ins at the Parliament building, and security forces were on full alert. Several

times anti-riot troops and security forces arrested a number of people thought to be leaders of the demonstrations; some of them never returned. Officials also used clubs, tear gas, and fired rubber bullets into the air and to the ground to disperse protesters

On 12 May 1998, security forces fired into student demonstrators at the Trisakti University campus in Jakarta in an attempt to keep them from taking the demonstration off campus. This time the troops used live ammunition. Four students were killed in the shootings.

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Distribution of Violence against Women in Conflict Situations*

Mei 1998

(Jakarta, Solo, Surabaya, Medan)

Sexual Violence

• sexual harassment: 9• sexual abuse: 10• rape: 52• rape with abuse: 14

Jemaah Ahmadiyah (2005 – 2006)

(Cianjur, Bogor, West Lombok, Central Lombok)

Sexual Violence

• Rape threat: 3• Sexual harassment: 1• Sexual assault: 3

Non-sexual Violence

• Death threat: 1 • Confiscation of right to work: 1 • Reject marriage registration: 1

Ruteng, East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) (2004)

Ruteng, Manggarai, Flores

Non-sexual Violence

• Arbitrary detention: 4

JAKARTA6

MEDAN, SUMATERA UTARA2

PADANG, SUMATERA BARAT 3

LAMPUNG 5

PALEMBANG4

BOGOR7CIANJUR 8 SOLO9

YOGYAKARTA 10

SURABAYA11

MADIUN12

ACEH1

1965

(Jakarta, Bali, Padang, Lampung, Palembang, Yogya, Solo, Madiun, Kalimantan Timur)

Sexual Violence

• Rape: 74• Pregnancy due to rape: 9• Forced abortion: 1• Sexual slavery: 21• Sexual violence (other than rape and sexual slavery): 60

Non-sexual Violence

• Domestic violence after victim was released from detention: 3

• Forced labor: 56• Lack of food in detention: 56• Killing: 29• Arbitrary arrest & detention: 457• Kidnapped: 222• Forced disappearance: 35• Torture: 133• Post-detention compulsory reporting to security forces: 36

Aceh (1998 – 2007)

Aceh

Sexual Violence

• Sexual exploitation: 8• Sexual abuse: 3• Sexual torture: 12• Sexually-related cruel & • Inhumane treatment: 7• Rape: 31 (including 3 cases of gang rape

and 4 cases of repeated rape)

Non-sexual Violence

• Beating: 1• Torture: 31• Cruel & inhumane treatment: 9


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* Data is based on Komnas Perempuan’s documentation, except for the May 1998 case (from the May 1998 Joint Fact-finding Team report), the East Timor case (from CAVR’s report; data on sexual violence from statement-taking process that does not include 175 interviews by the CAVR research team on women; non-sexual violence data is not disaggregated for sex), Papua case (Papua Documentation Team), and non-sexual violence in Maluku (from the National Commission for Human Rights; not sex-disaggregated data).

Poso, Central Sulawesi (1998-2005)

Poso, Central Sulawesi

Sexual Violence

• Sexual exploitation: 44• Forced abortions: 5• Forced to strip: ± 200• Attempted rape: 1• Rape: 11

Non-sexual Violence

• Intimidation: 1 • Domestic violence: 6• Killing: 1 • Killing with mutilation: 3• Attempted killing: 2

East Timor (1974-1999)

Timor-Leste

Sexual Violence

• Sexual harassment & other forms of sexual violence: 231 • Rape:393 • Sexual slavery: 229

Non-sexual Violence

• Killing: 5,120• Enforced disappearance: 835• Arbitrary arrest/detention: 25,347• Torture: 11,123

Papua (1967-2009)

Papua

Sexual Violence

• Sexual exploitation: 8• Sexual slavery: 4• Forced contraception: 5• Forced abortions: 1• Attempted rape: 2• Rape: 57

Non-sexual Violence

• Death threat: 7• Forced labor: 2 • Arson, destruction of property, looting: 14 • Restricted movement: 2• Killing: 3• Arbitrary detention: 20• Beating: 17• Forced disappearance: 1 • Torture : 9

KALIMANTAN TIMUR15

LOMBOK13 RUTENG14

POSO, SULAWESI TENGAH16

TIMOR LESTE17

PAPUA18

Maluku (1999 – 2002)

Maluku, Ambon

Sexual Violence

• Forced circumcision : 1• rape : 1

Non-sexual Violence

• Killing: 3.080• Injured : 4.204• IDPs: 281.365

MALUKU 19

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The May 1998 Tragedy

The next day, 13 May 1998, the Trisakti campus was full of students and civilians who gathered for the funeral procession of the students who had been shot dead the day before. The presence of security forces angered the masses. The situation became uncontrollable when some people started attacking the officers and damaging security facilities around the campus. Amidst this situation, a group of men moved toward a shopping mall near the campus, shouting at the masses to burn buildings and loot stores. Flames and smoke began to fill the air of Jakarta.

At about the same time, other groups began moving toward various commercial centers in Jakarta. They looted, destroyed, and burned every building and vehicle they came across. Their targets were buildings owned by ethnic Chinese and areas largely inhabited by them. To avoid being targeted by the masses, many houses and shop doors were tightly shut and marked with the words “native’s”, “Haji’s”, or “Muslim”.

The unrest spread quickly throughout Jakarta and lasted for two days with no action by security forces. The situation was bedlam. During the days prior to the riots, troops had been on full alert in


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Inscriptions "Native Property", "Moslem" or "Hajj’s Property", like those in the riots at Rengasdeklok in 1997, were also spontaneously made by the community in the May 1998 riots. The society was aware that the violence was aimed at a certain group, the Chinese community. (Rengasdengklok, 1997; Kompas/Edy Hasbi)

Jakarta. However, at the time of the riots, almost no security officers were seen. If any were present, they seemed to allow the riots to continue. They even allowed the masses to damage and burn some police stations. Riots, with the same pattern, spread to other major cities in Indonesia such as Surabaya, Solo, Palembang, and Lampung.

Information gathered by Tim Relawan untuk Kemanusiaan (TRuK—Volunteer Team for Humanity) revealed that not just buildings and vehicles were damaged and burned during the riots. Hundreds of people were killed in the buildings that were burned; a large number of them were deliberately trapped when the doors to the buildings were locked so that people could not escape. In the midst of the riots, there were also mass rapes, i.e., a large number of gang rapes that occurred over a wide area, and sexual assaults against women.

[The victims] were girls, two cousins aged 12 and 15 years old . . . During the riots, the shop where they lived was smashed by a group of men. One of the girls was raped in turns. Some of the offenders carried a wooden board to prevent more people from witnessing and participating in the gang rape. The victim fell unconscious, but she remembered that the offenders called her “little amoy” [a term for Chinese women] . . . The victim is always afraid when she sees a piece of bamboo; the doctor who examined her suspected that she was abused with sharp objects. The other victim witnessed the rape scene from her hiding place under the table; she endures guilt for not helping at that moment; she was just quiet, not moving from her hiding place.

victim’s counselor, also a teacherTime to Settel the Sense of Security : A Step Toward the

Fulfillment of Right for Women Victim of Sexual Violence in May 1998 Riot

(Komnas Perempuan report), p. 21

In response to the violence and rape against women in the May 1998 riots, women and other concerned groups urged the state to take responsibility for the incident. A number of women leaders met with President Habibie to convince him that rapes indeed took place during the May 1998 riots. They

110

May 14, 1998

Location of Initial Riots May 14, 1998

Until 12.00

May 14, 1998

Until 14.00May 14, 1998

Location of All Riots

MAPS SHOWING SPREAD OF MAY 1998 RIOTS IN JAKARTA

(Prof. Dr. Dadan Umar Daihani)


TAKING A STAND

also sought to ensure that the victims would be redressed and that similar incidents would not be repeated. As a result of this meeting, the President issued an official statement of regret for the May 1998 rapes, and supported formation of both the TGPF Mei 1998 (May 1998 Joint Fact-finding Team) whose investigation was to include the

Twenty-two women leading figures in the name of the Anti Violence against Women Community demanded that President Habibie take responsibility for the May 20, 1998 Tragedy. (Jakarta, 15Juli, 1998; Carla Bianpone)

rape according to the Indonesian penal code, but also by using other objects that damaged the victims’ reproductive organs. At least 85 cases of rape and sexual assault were verified, and from these cases it can be concluded that rape and sexual assault were perpetrated:

. . . by a number of actors in different locations at about the same or at approximately the same time. These abuses could have occurred spontaneously, situation permitting, or could have been engineered by a certain group for a particular purpose. The victims were Indonesian with diverse backgrounds, most of them ethnic Chinese.

Temuan Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta Peristiwa Kerusuhan Mei 1998

(Findings of the May 1998 Joint Fact-finding Team)Komnas Perempuan Key Document Series, p. 28

Besides confirming that rape occurred during the May 1998 riots, TGPF Mei 1998 also asserted there were indications that security forces were involved in the planning and implementation of the riots. The army was also cited as negligent for failing to prevent the riots.

mass rapes, and Komnas Perempuan (the National Commission on Violence against Women).

The TGPF Mei 1998 findings confirmed that gang rapes occurred during the May 1998 riots, where the rapes were not limited to forced penetration of the penis into the vagina, as is the definition of

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THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIAAssalamu’alaikum Warahmatullahi Wabarakatuh

DECLARATIONOF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

Having heard reports from women leaders of Anti-Violence against Women Society, and being presented with authentic and real evidence regarding violence against women in any form whatsoever in Indonesia in general, and especially that occurred in mid-May 1998, I hereby express my deepest regret for these acts of violence that are not at all in accordance with the cultural values of the nation of Indonesia.

Therefore, I declare that the government shall proactively provide protection and security to all members of society to prevent the recurrence of such inhumane events in the history of the Indonesian nation.

I expect cooperation from all levels of society to increase vigilance and to report immediately to government authorities whenever they see a tendency toward violence against women in any form, anywhere.

Therefore, on behalf of the government and the entire nation of Indonesia, I hereby condemn the various actions of violence committed during riots that occurred

simultaneously in various locations, including violence against women.

Wassalamu’alaikum Warahmatullahi Wabarakatuh

Jakarta, 15 July 1998Signed

B. J. Habibie


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Source: TGPF Mei 1998 Report

Number of Victims Based on Type of Sexual Violence and Source of Information

Source of InformationRape

Rape with Abuse

Sexual AbuseSexual

Harassment

Directly from the victim 3 - 3 1

Doctor Examination 9 3 1 -

Parents and Families 3 10 3 -

Witness 10 - - 8

Counselor 27 1 3 -

Total 52 14 10 9

Table 2.

In the midst of efforts to expose the rapes that occurred during the May 1998 riots, people were shocked by the murder of Ita Marthadinata, a 17-year-old Chinese woman. Together with her mother and family, she was actively giving assistance to TRuK. Before she was killed, the victim and her family had received several death threats as well as anonymous letters. For the community of victims of the May 1998 riots and their counselors, Ita’s death was a culmination of the terror intended to silence their efforts to disclose the May 1998 tragedy. Prior to Ita’s murder, several victims’ counselors had also received threats, for example, that their houses would

be burned and their family members harmed if they kept talking about rape victims. In the Chinese community, many opted for silence and decided to leave Indonesia because of the circulation of notes, signed “native”, threatening there would be more killings of Chinese. The police denied there were indications of terror related to Ita’s murder, stating that the case was a purely criminal act. Responding to the situation, Ita’s family requested that her death not be connected to the riots of May 1998.

Controversy about the May 1998 rapes continued even after TGPF Mei 1998 submitted its report. Those who

questioned the truth of the rapes kept arguing that no man could possibly commit rape in the middle of riots. They demanded that the victims testify in public as evidence that the rapes occurred. Because no one came forward, they accused the victims’ counselors of deceiving the public with the intent to discredit the good name of the Indonesia nation.

In the midst of the controversy, Komnas Perempuan facilitated a meeting between the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women and several women victims of violence in East Timor, Aceh, and Papua, as well as women victims of the May 1998 tragedy. The UN Special Rapporteur visited Indonesia from 20 November to 4 December 1998 at the invitation of the Indonesian government, which at that time was under the leadership of B. J. Habibie. In her report, the Special Rapporteur concluded that prior to May 1998, the rape of women had been used as an instrument of torture and terror by Indonesian security forces in the aforementioned regions. Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur stated that a culture of denial regarding violence against women still prevailed in the government and society.

Type of Sexual Violence

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The Indonesian government denied the Special Rapporteur’s report that was brought before the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva in 1999. Until now, the Indonesian government has used various excuses not to follow-up on the TGPF report’s recommendation for a thorough investigation of the May 1998 incident. One excuse is that no rape victims are willing to testify in public.

Rape as an Instrument of War

World history of wars records how combat troops were lured by the promise they could have any woman from the enemy’s side. Women were considered spoils of war, part of the property that belonged to the winner. Therefore, almost no efforts were made to stop rape or sexual slavery. Furthermore, fellow troop members encouraged each other to participate in rape.

Rape has occurred persistently in all armed conflicts in Indonesia. This suggests that rape is not an unintentional individual act but rather an effective war strategy. Rape often becomes part of the attack, a method of punishment and torture, and a means to terrorize society. Rape by the enemy demonstrates not only the inability of men to protect their “property”, but also destroys society’s symbol of sanctity. Furthermore, a child born as a result of rape no longer carries the “pure blood” of the victim’s community. Rape also plays an important role in the conquest of individual women. Since rape is an assault on women’s integrity, it becomes a powerful means of punishment that destroys the self-confidence of victims, as some women combatants have experienced. From victims’ narratives, we also understand that rape is not limited to the act of forced penetration of the penis into the vagina as defined by the Indonesian penal code.

It is not only enemies, but even community and family members who rape women in situations of conflict. Repeated and widespread cases of rape have showed to society that rape is a way that men exert power. As a result, men who lose in a conflict conduct rape in order to reclaim control and power. In such cases, the targets of rape are women members of the men’s own community. Their wives are the most vulnerable to this violence.

To preserve the truth in public memory, Komnas Perempuan released both the TGPF Mei 1998 and the UN Special Rapporteur reports.

Although marked by denial, disclosure of the mass rapes during the May 1998 riots became a milestone for a new history of Indonesia. Society, which for so long was stunted by the state, took

immediate steps as individuals or as groups, to help the victims of riots and to become counselors for rape victims. This marked the reemergence of democratic space following the collapse of the New Order regime. Disclosure about the May 1998 tragedy became key to the process of revealing the truth in several other conflict situations in Indonesia. Hence, violence against women, which the New


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The disclosure of the rapes incident in May 1998 opened the way to the disclosure of other cases of violence against women in various conflict situations in Indonesia. (Jakarta, 1998; M. Sandra)

Order had concealed, became one of the main issues of Indonesia’s reform agenda. This motivated many women to organize themselves to provide support for the recovery of women victims of violence in many contexts. This response was crucial to the revitalization of women’s groups as an influential social force in Indonesia

East Timor

Immediately after the disclosure of the May 1998 rapes, Komnas Perempuan received reports of rape and sexual torture against women in East Timor (now Timor-Leste). The violence occurred amidst other violence against civilians. The Indonesian public was not aware of this because as a Military Operation Zone, any information on East Timor was directly controlled by the New Order regime. Most Indonesians believed that East Timorese desired the inclusion of East Timor as Indonesia’s 27th province in mid-1976.

At the time Indonesian independence was proclaimed, East Timor, which shares an island with East Nusa Tenggara Province, was not part of Indonesia since it was still a Portuguese colony. That is why the inclusion of East Timor was always hailed as the success of the Armed Forces to bring home “little brother” to the lap of the Motherland. Only a few Indonesians outside the territory knew that Indonesian troops invaded East Timor and killed many civilians. Over the next 24 years, the East Timorese lived with fear and violence. Indonesian troops committed violence against civilians with the pretext of eliminating Fretilin, an East Timorese political party that wished to liberate East

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The violence against women in East Timor occurred amidst other violences agains civilians. (Timor-Leste, 1999; CAVR)

between the military and guerrilla groups because members of her family took part in the resistance movement. She stated that in 1981 she was repeatedly raped on several different occasions . . . D (38 years old) from Viqueque was arrested and raped on several occasions from 1975–1991. She was forced to service a number of officers on duty near her village. She has five children, and people suspect that all of them are the result of her rapes by troops . . . from the Regional Command unit and the Nanggala Special Forces Unit.

Laporan Pelapor Khusus PBB tentang Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan

Misi ke Indonesia dan Timor Timur(UN Special Rapporteur’s Report on Violence against

Women Mission to Indonesia and East Timor)

Komnas Perempuan Key Document Series, p. 84

Violence against civilians did not end with the change of leadership in Indonesia in May 1998. Violence rose sharply after President Habibie allowed a referendum to be held to determine the future of East Timor: would it continue to join with Indonesia or become an independent country? Pro-integration militia began to systematically intimidate people, including abuse and killings, to ensure they would choose to remain integrated with Indonesia. UNAMET

Timor. Residential areas suspected as the origin or hiding place of Fretilin were attacked. Civilians were taken hostage and their crops destroyed, causing local people to suffer from food shortages. Some, accused of being members of Fretilin, were arrested, killed, and

disappeared. Those who were detained suffered torture, including sexual torture and rape.

In the 1980s, M (36 years old) from Viqueque was captured, interrogated, and raped every time there was a clash


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A sketch map from Ossa-Huna village describing the bombing of the village and the forest where people were hiding. (Bacau, Timor-Leste, 2002; CAVR)

(United Nations Mission in East Timor), assigned to guard the referendum so it would be peaceful and independent, said that as of the middle of July 1999, a month prior to the vote, approximately 40,000 to 60,000 people fled as a result of the violence.

In early September 1999, the result of the referendum was announced. More than three fourths of East Timorese voted for independence. Militia responded to the announcement by razing Dili, the capital of East Timor, and several other cities to the ground. They also committed large-scale murder of civilians, and approximately 1,500 people were killed or disappeared. In the middle of this situation, women were raped. Militia then forced a number of residents to leave East Timor and move to West Timor (part of East Nusa Tenggara Province). Monitoring of refugee camps conducted by Tim Kemanusiaan Timor Barat (TKTB—the West Timor Humanitarian Team) recorded cases of confinement and rape in addition to other types of violence against women. Results of this monitoring were submitted to Komnas Perempuan who in turn facilitated a public dialogue in Jakarta regarding the findings.

In response to referendum-related violence in East Timor, the National

Commission on Human Rights formed the Komisi Penyelidikan Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia (KPP HAM—Commission to Investigate Human Rights Violations), with Komnas Perempuan as one of the members. KPP HAM reported that rape and sexual slavery against women were an integral part of grave human rights violations that occurred in East Timor in relation to the

referendum. After Parliament's decision in 2002 to conduct an ad hoc human rights court for East Timor, the Attorney General’s prosecution used the results of the KPP HAM investigation. In general, the trials were marked by tension due to identifying the role of the Indonesian state and command responsibility for the violence. The proceedings were also marked by protests from groups

118

who demanded the release of all defendants because they were perceived as protectors of Indonesia’s territorial integrity. The court sentenced a militia leader to imprisonment, but failed to determine command accountability although there was a strong indication that the militia group was linked to Indonesian security forces. The judges did not give attention to rape and sexual slavery despite the fact that these crimes were mentioned in the prosecutor’s indictment

After the referendum, an independent institution, the Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor Leste (CAVR—Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation), was formed in East Timor to uncover the truth about human rights violations from 1974–1999. Findings from the commission would be used as a basis to formulate recommendations for reform measures and initiatives to prevent the recurrence of human rights violations, to respond to victims’ needs, and to encourage reconciliation in Timor-Leste society. Komnas Perempuan was invited to attend CAVR’s public hearing on “Women and Conflict” in April 2003. Komnas Perempuan was asked to submit her position on the issue, but first and foremost, her participation was to support women victims in the struggle

Portrait of Violence against Women in 23 West Timor Refugee LocationsInvestigation Findings of TKTB, 2000

Violence in personal

relationships

Rapes and Harassment

Beatings and Killings

Forced Marriages and Broken Promises

other

Table 3.

53%

22%

12%

3%

10%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Proxy Victims:Women as Targets of Violence

Women of the enemy’s community became random targets of violence as well as

substitutes for the real target, namely male members of the enemy’s group. In cases such as East Timor, usually the wives, daughters, and sisters of Fretilin members became targets of rape and torture by the Indonesian authorities. The goal was to obtain information on the whereabouts of Fretilin members, to hold the women hostage in order to pressure male members of their families to surrender, or as a punishment when Fretilin members escaped. Violence against women was also used to discourage others from supporting the enemy. A similar pattern was found in the experiences of women victims of violence in Aceh and Papua.


TAKING A STAND

Sexual Slavery

The UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery in 1998, Ms. Gay J. McDougall, in her report entitled “Contemporary

Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices During Armed Conflict” has identified slavery as “the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised, including sexual access through rape or other forms of sexual violence.” Sexual slavery also covers situations in which adult women and girls are forced to “marry”, provide domestic services, or other forms of forced labor involving forced sexual activity, including rape, by their captors.

During the Japanese occupation, jugun ianfu experienced a condition similar to sexual slavery. In East Timor there were also cases of sexual slavery where women victims were held captive and forced to

provide sexual services for one or more soldiers. They were ordered to do domestic labor like washing, cooking, and cleaning the places where they were held. When a troop’s period of duty in a location was finished, it sometimes handed over women to the new troop taking its place.

The village head [of Fahinehan] notified Airborne Infantry Battalion 100 that EG2 [my brother] was a high-ranking commander in the forest and so should be killed or, if not, the TNI [the military] would need to take or marry his sister. Then they took my sister, EG. They took her to the army post and took turns raping her. They kept doing this until 1980 when they [Airborne 100] completed their term of duty and were replaced by Battalion 643. They also took me to their post to become a TBO . . . With my own eyes I saw my sister get raped. It wasn’t until they left Fahinehan that she was released [and allowed] to go home.

victim’s brother

Pemerkosaan, Perbudakan Seksual, dan Bentuk-bentuk

Lain Kekerasan Seksual (Rape, Sexual Slavery, and

Other Forms of Sexual Violence)

Komnas Perempuan Key Document Series 8, p. 112

for their rights, and at the same time to optimally prepare Komnas Perempuan for her active engagement in the fact finding and reconciliation processes that were to take place in Indonesia.

During this hearing, several women testified about their experiences of violence, including sexual violence they experienced as a result of the conflict. According to CAVR’s final report, 853 of the approximate 8,000 statements collected were cases of sexual violence. Nearly half of the cases of sexual violence were rape, more than a quarter were sexual harassment and other acts of sexual violence, and the rest were cases of sexual slavery. The majority of perpetrators (93.3%) were Indonesian security forces and their auxiliaries, while the rest were members of Fretilin and other political parties in East Timor at that time. These cases of sexual violence occurred amidst killings, forced disappearances, forced displacement and starvation, detention, torture, abuse, and various other forms of human rights violations against civilians.

To reduce the likelihood of becoming targets of sexual violence, some young women disguised themselves by dressing like men. There were also women whose parents arranged for them to immediately marry local men. Other

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To expose the truth and to sow the seeds of reconciliation in the community, a woman victim reveals in a CAVR public hearing the violence she experienced. (Timor-Leste, April 29, 2003; Komnas Perempuan)

women became the mistress of one soldier rather than being continually harassed by many soldiers. There were even families and community leaders who “sacrificed” certain women to the military so that other women would be left unharmed.

As a follow-up to the CAVR’s findings, in March 2005 the Indonesian and Timor-Leste governments agreed to form Komisi Kebenaran dan Persahabatan (KKP—Commission of Truth and Friendship) to “learn from the causes

of violence in the past in order to build a strong foundation for reconciliation, friendship, peace, and prosperity [of Indonesia and Timor-Leste].” For three years, KKP worked with a focus to determine the “conclusive” truth about events leading up to and immediately following the referendum in East Timor in 1999. In order to support these efforts to reveal the truth, Komnas Perempuan submitted to the KKP her notes on the various forms of violence against women that had taken place in conflict situations in Indonesia, including in East Timor, as

well as the root causes and the impact of the violence.

KPP also found that the Indonesian government and its security forces were primarily responsible for the violence that occurred during this period. The Commission findings strengthened the understanding that violence against women was an integral part of broader human rights violations that occurred in East Timor in the context of the 1999 referendum. KKP’s findings and recommendations were submitted to


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After the referendum in East Timor was won by the pro-independence party, the militia forced the people to evacuate to West Timor. (Timor Leste, 1999; Kompas/Edy Hasbi)

122

the governments of Indonesia and Timor-Leste in July 2008, yet to date the recommendations still have not been implemented.

AcehAt almost the same time as the initial disclosure of rape and sexual torture against women in East Timor, Komnas Perempuan was presented with cases of violence against women that had occurred in the context of the Military Operation Zone in Aceh. The government imposed this status on Aceh in 1989 as a pretext for eliminating Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM—the Free Aceh Movement) that wished to separate itself from Indonesia. The Indonesian government never explained to the public that this movement arose from the people’s protests concerning the management of natural resources, particularly oil exploitation by Exxon Mobil that was considered to have impoverished the people of Aceh. Instead the government linked the protests to the David Beureu’eh movement of the 1950s that wanted to proclaim Aceh an independent Islamic state. With the military zone status, Aceh became a closed region to the Indonesian public and the government stationed a large number of security forces there. As in East Timor, the rape of local women

often occurred during military sweeping operations from village to village.

After returning home from a visit to her child in Malaysia, the victim was arrested by Special Forces and brought to “Rumoh Geudong”. The victim was tortured, stripped, and given electric shocks to her breasts and vagina for 15 days. [A few months later] the victim was arrested again with the charge of hiding weapons. Her house was ransacked, but no weapons were found. She was again taken to the “Rumoh Geudong” where she was tortured, then transferred to Rancung, and [two months later] was released. At the time of release, the victim was asked for IDR 500,000 and was threatened, if she didn’t give them the money, she would be arrested again.

testimony of 45-year-old victim as quoted inPeta Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan

(Map of Violence Against Women) (Komnas Perempuan report), p. 234

Demands to uphold human rights during the reform era pushed the Indonesian government to lift the military zone status in Aceh in August 1998. This policy was followed by various peace talks between the Indonesian government and GAM, including the


TAKING A STAND

The remains of Rumoh Geudong, the place where women accused of supporting the GAM experienced sexual torture, including rape.(Aceh; Galuh Wandita)

Humanitarian Pause in June 2000 and the Termination of Hostilities Agreement in December 2002. These two agreements were considered unsuccessful because clashes between the military and GAM continued. Therefore, the Indonesian government imposed a military emergency status in May 2003. Two years later, the security status of this region was lightened to become a Civil

Emergency Zone. This status was lifted in 2005 following the tsunami in Aceh, a disaster that prompted the Indonesian government and GAM to enter a new stage in peace negotiations.

During the conflict, Komnas Perempuan received a number of reports from various women’s organizations in Aceh revealing that the change in status

124

did not affect the level of violence there. Murder, arbitrary detention, torture, rape, and other forms of abuse continued. Destruction and burning of buildings as well as looting often accompanied exchanges of fire. The perpetrators were not only Indonesian forces but also members of GAM, although the latter were far fewer in number. As if to copy the tactics of the Indonesian forces, GAM’s abuse of women targeted those who were related, by blood or marriage, to members of the Indonesian army or police, and those accused as being spies. Women human rights defenders who assisted women, regardless of their background, were caught between the two conflicting parties.

Many women had to bear multiple burdens during the conflict. They became the backbone of their families when their husbands or other male members of their families could not work, either because they had been arrested or because they had fled into the forest. With limited knowledge, skills, and capital, their income was just barely enough to make ends meet. Some relied on the produce from their fields or became laborers. When working in their fields, women might be wounded or even killed if caught in crossfire. Women were also

prone to sexual abuse during searches that authorities conducted to ensure they were not carrying aid, including food, to GAM members.

Both Indonesian authorities and GAM forced women, along with others, to leave their homes. Indonesian authorities forcibly displaced villagers to cut off their contact with GAM, or took them hostage so that GAM members from that village would surrender. Those displaced were forced to live on soccer fields, alongside marshes, or close to security posts. Men were not allowed to work in their fields, let alone travel. Under close supervision, women were allowed to go in small groups to collect food from their fields. Once the produce was cooked, the women had to share it with the officers on duty. Several women were selected to clean the places that had been turned into military checkpoints. As in East Timor, parents chose to have their daughters marry as soon as possible because they were worried their daughters might become victims of rape. Other parents ordered their daughters to wear baggy dresses, usually worn by older women, so men would think they were already married.

Residents forcibly displaced by GAM were made a living shield to facilitate


TAKING A STAND

Inong Balee is the women milita of GAM. In the pre-Indonesia history of Aceh Inong Balee was a women army under the command of Admiral Malahayati. (Aceh; Tempo)

Women Combatants:Women as Targets of Violence

Women combatants were the women who joined in carrying arms in conflict situations. Their reasons for becoming combatants were varied; one of which was the loss of people they loved. In East Timor, the women combatants joined Falintil, the armed wing of Fretilin. In Aceh, they joined GAM’s Inong Balee. In the local language Inong Balee means widow. If caught, these women combatants were often tortured.

Rape was used as a weapon to torture women so that they would give information about their troops’ whereabouts. Rape was also an effective tool for punishing women combatants. To bear arms was considered part of man’s nature. To become a woman combatant was considered a betrayal to woman’s nature characterized as loving and gentle, because she is the one who gives birth and nurtures life. Punishment was intended to return women combatants to their “nature”, i.e., staying at home to care for their children, husbands, and parents, and without questioning, accept decisions that have been made for them.

GAM’s move to a new location. During displacement it was the GAM fighters who controlled the flow of communication to and from the displacement site. Displaced women not only had to care for their families, but also had to feed these armed forces. Women had almost no opportunity to participate in decision-making. If it was not the armed forces who made decisions, it was the men who gathered

in the meunasah or mosque. The choice of a meeting place prevented women from attending meetings; in the meunasah, men and women are seated separately, and women who are menstruating are not allowed to enter.

In general, due to their gendered role, women were caught between two fighting parties. For example, a woman’s life could be in danger just because she

126

prepared meals. She was accused of being a GAM sympathizer because she prepared meals for her husband who was suspected of being a GAM member, when in fact preparing meals for one’s

husband is considered a wife’s obligation. A similar problem occurred when a woman was ordered to prepare meals for Indonesian troops. She could not refuse because then she would be accused of

T he term “women human rights defenders” refers to women who struggle to fulfill the human rights of all. In daily activities, they more

often call themselves humanitarian workers, women activists, victim counselors, community organizers, social workers, human rights activists, service providers, and volunteers.

Women human rights defenders are also prone to criminalization or accused of perpetrating crimes. In Papua, a woman defender of indigenous rights who protested the presence of a mining company was accused of violating the law. Another example is the case of a woman counselor of five young women who were victims of rape in Aceh in 2001. Together with the Komnas HAM regional representative in Aceh, the victims and their counselor reported to Komnas HAM

in Jakarta that the perpetrators were members of the Mobile Brigade. To protect the victims, the counselor secured them in a safe place. During the investigation, the police came and took the victims, saying that they were the ones authorized to provide protection. A few days later, the victims went to Komnas HAM in Jakarta and changed their testimony, stating they were actually raped by GAM. The police, then, charged the victims’ counselor with kidnapping and defamation of a state institution.

Besides being victims of intimidation, stigmatization, and criminalization, women human rights defenders have also been victims of murder, torture, persecution, arrests, arbitrary detention, and destruction of property and the means of their livelihood. Men human rights defenders also experienced these forms of violence. However, due to their activities related to the struggle for women's rights and because they are women, women human

rights defenders experience particular forms of violence including rape, sexual torture, sexual terror, sexual harassment, sexual stigmatization with labels such as “Gerwani” or “prostitute”, the erosion of credibility in relation to their marital status, stunting of their capacity, as well as ostracism and rejection on the basis of morality, religion, customs, culture, and family reputation. In these specific experiences, the perpetrators are not only members of conflicting parties, but also members of the women’s communities and their families. The layers of violence that women human rights defenders must face reduce the space in which they can move, and some have even withdrawn from the movement for the sake of their survival.

Women Human Rights DefendersWomen as Target of Violence

being an insurgent. However, if she did prepare the meals, GAM would accuse her of being a traitor.


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Violence against Acehnese Women by Time Period and Type of Case

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

Table 4.

non-sexual sexual

After the tsunami, based on input from women’s groups in Aceh, Komnas Perempuan established a special rapporteur mechanism for Aceh to more completely reveal violence against women in Aceh, and to encourage policy changes based on her findings. Besides strengthening information regarding violence committed by the parties in conflict, Komnas Perempuan also noted cases of violence against women committed by family and community members. Women were almost always blamed for the violence they experienced. In cases of violence by her husband, the woman victim was accused that she was unable to satisfy him physically, psychologically, and sexually. In rape, the woman victim was accused of having provoked the violence, especially if the perpetrator was a security official who had been dating the victim. Girls who were victims of rape were often forced by their schools and their families to discontinue their education. Victims were also often forced to marry their rapists to cover up family shame, particularly if the violence resulted in a pregnancy. Generally, a perpetrator did not mind marrying the victim since that freed him from legal responsibility. After marriage, the victim would often simply be abandoned and thus have to bear the burden as a single parent.

Another form of violence against women in Aceh that Komnas Perempuan highlighted in her report was the obligation to wear a veil. This act of violence developed after the government of Indonesia issued Law No. 44 in 1999 that authorized implementation of Sharia law in Aceh. Law No. 18 in 2001 that conferred special autonomy status for Aceh, and Law No. 11 in 2006 on the Governance of Aceh further strengthened this authority. The Indonesian government granted this authority as a strategy to win the hearts of the people of Aceh.

The issue of the implementation of Sharia law diverted public attention from the handling of cases of human rights violations and directed it to the formation of symbols that would give Aceh an image as an Islamic region. Compulsory wearing of the veil was one of the most visible examples. To impose this regulation, unidentified groups of men conducted veil raids. They cursed at, pulled the hair of, and sprayed car paint on women who did not wear a veil. Such coercion became more rampant after the government of Aceh issued Regional Regulation (Qanun) No. 11 in 2002 regarding the implementation of Sharia law in the areas of theology (Aqidah), worship (Ibadah), and Islamic teaching (Syiar). According

Across A

ll Periods

5 2

9

5

3

3

11

1

4

6

Military

Operation,

1999

Republic of Indonesia–

GA

M Peace D

ialogue, 2000–M

ay 2003

Military and C

ivilian Em

ergency, May

2003–Aug 2005

Post-MoU

, Aug

2005–11 Jan 2006

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to this regulation, every Muslim who does not “dress in accordance with the guidance of Islamic teaching” would face sanctions of a three-month confinement or a fine of IDR two million. Various groups conducted the veil raids such as the “Taliban” who dressed in robes and turbans, and groups claiming to be members of GAM, the Indonesian military or police, and even of government organizations, including women’s groups such as Dharma Wanita and Dharma Pertiwi. During these raids, any woman not wearing a veil or those wearing a veil but also tight clothing would be humiliated with foul language. Moreover, some of the victims’ clothing was cut with scissors. The raids flourished again after the tsunami hit Aceh at the end of 2004. Many in society thought the disaster was punishment for attitudes and behavior of Acehnese women who did not uphold religious teachings. At this stage, Wilayatul Hisbah—WH, a special unit to enforce Sharia law under the coordination of the Aceh regional government, also conducted the veil raids.

Besides forced use of the veil, local authorities also enforced the prohibition of khalwat that, under Qanun No. 14 in 2003, is defined as “close proximity between two or more mukallaf [people] of the opposite sex who are not related

Kawin Cina Buta (Blind Chinese Marriage)

According to Islamic marriage laws, a couple has two opportunities to reconcile after divorce (talaq) if the husband initiated the divorce. After the third divorce initiated by the husband, that carries the same weight as the first divorce initiative by the wife, the couple is only allowed to reconcile after each of them marries another

person. Muhalil refers to the third party who is married solely for the sake of the couple’s reconciliation and is usually paid by the couple. Islam actually prohibits the practice of muhalil.

Komnas Perempuan found that muhalil are still used in Aceh. In the local language, this practice is called Kawin Cina Buta or “Blind Chinese Marriage”. A woman who refuses a “Blind Chinese Marriage” will be accused of not serving her husband, when in fact carrying out the “Blind Chinese Marriage” practice causes women to suffer. She must be willing to have intercourse with a man who was paid to marry her, and is thus exposed to violence. In such a marriage, the new couple is told not to use contraception. Consequently, these women can be infected with venereal disease or become pregnant. There is also no certainty that her former husband will be willing to reconcile or treat her well since she has had sexual relationships with another man.

It’s so hard and embarrassing to endure Blind Chinese marriage . . . I feel like I am being ‘used’ and I know it also hurts my [first] husband . . . It is already enough that I have endured one . . . that really hurt me, and made me sad, embarrassed, and shameful.

woman victim

Experiences of Acehnese Women : Seeking & Accessing Justice from One Era to the Next(Komnas Perempuan report), p. 47


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The conflict caused many young women become the economical backbone of the family, and at a very young age even became the head of the family. (Aceh; KP)

to each other either by blood or by marriage.” Every Muslim in Aceh who committed khalwat may be punished with three to nine floggings, or a fine of IDR 2.5 to 10 million. This khalwat regulation means that all relationships between men and women in whatever situation are subject to surveillance. Because the regulation emphasizes aspects of morality, young women and widows become the main targets of spying. They are subject to arrest based on this accusation even without any clear proof.

Since clothing and khalwat regulations emphasize aspects of morality, it is almost impossible to defend women accused of violating these rules. At the end of 2005, four women human rights defenders were arrested for allegedly violating the dress code while in the hallway of a hotel where they were having an activity. In detention they were sexually harassed with insults by Pamong Praja (civil service personnel). They reported this unpleasant treatment to the police. However, their report was dismissed because it was considered

weak. In another case in which a woman was accused of commiting khalwat, she was sexually harassed from the time of her arrest until her trial. Although the court released her, the community still ostracized her, and she was even expelled from her village. For women punished by flogging, the community continues to stigmatize them as immoral. It is not only these women who are ostracized, but also their children and other family members.

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Based on findings and analyses, Komnas Perempuan concluded that the regulations on clothing and khalwat institutionalize discrimination against women, and that flogging is a form of inhumane punishment. Thus, the implementation of Sharia law can lead to human rights violations and is a serious challenge for the local government and society who want to promote the enforcement of human rights in post-

The forced regulation on women’s codes of dress to develop an Aceh identity has been enforced since 1999 when the central government offered the right to put Syariat Islam into effect as a way to solve the conflict in Aceh.(Aceh; KP)

conflict Aceh. Komnas Perempuan’s Special Rapporteur publicly presented this conclusion to Acehnese and national authorities in early 2007. It was a risky political move given that at that moment there was almost no space in Aceh to criticize the implementation of Sharia law. Those who were critical would be accused of opposing Islam and denying the desire of the Acehnese. In fact, a woman who criticized the WH

was reported to the police with the accusation of slander. The steps taken by Komnas Perempuan, that received a positive response from the executive leaders and the people of Aceh, started to open space for dialogue, both in the government and community, to review these policies.

The implementation of Sharia law presents a complicated challenge to


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Flogging is one form of punishment that violates one’s constitutional right to be free from torture; it is a punishment that downgrades human dignity. (Central Aceh, August 19 2005; Antara)

women’s groups in Aceh. During the conflict, these groups sat together in the first Dupakat Inong Aceh (all-Aceh Women’s Congress) in 2000 and agreed to develop joint measures to achieve peace. However, when the second Dupakat Inong Aceh was held

in 2007 the situation was different. The women’s groups were divided on the issue of violence against women related to the regulations on clothing and khalwat. Concerns about morality and Acehnese women’s identity were the reasons some women supported these

regulations. Leadership of the Acehnese women’s movement was now at stake, particularly after the Qanun jinayat (criminal law) was issued. This regulation not only strengthened social prejudices—particularly towards women—based on a single understanding of morality, but it also reinforced the use of flogging as a form of punishment along with the introduction of stoning as a new form of legal punishment in Aceh.

The Aceh conflict ended with the signing of the Helsinki MoU as a peace pact between the Indonesian government and GAM on 15 August 2005. It is worth noting that these peace talks did not include even one of the women human rights defenders who had constantly been calling for peace. There has been no progress on resolving human rights violations that occurred during the conflict in Aceh. Neither the Human Rights Court nor the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, promised in the MoU, have been established. Reintegration funds provided by the central government were not disbursed smoothly and their distribution gave rise to new social tensions. Some victims still have not received aid. Women victims of rape were not considered a priority for receiving funds. Besides its limited amount, the funds were also given without any program to guide and

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enable the victims to manage their funds properly. Most victims were unable to develop economic independence after the aid they received was used.

Papua During the mission of the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women to Indonesia, Komnas Perempuan facilitated her meetings with women victims of violence from Papua, Aceh, East Timor, and victims of the May 1998 tragedy. For most Indonesians, information about the violence in military zones was quite novel because news about these regions was strictly controlled by the government.

The ambition to include Papua in Indonesia began with Soekarno’s campaign to “reclaim” Irian (the former name of Papua) through both military operations and international diplomacy. In response, in October 1962 the United Nations established UNTEA, the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority. In 1963, UNTEA handed over government power of Irian to Indonesia who was to conduct Pepera, a people’s referendum to determine the future of Irian. The Pepera was conducted in 1969. According to the Indonesian government, the people of Irian unanimously chose to become

part of Indonesia. On the other hand, a review of Papuan history conducted after the fall of the New Order regime argues that the implementation and results of the Pepera were only unilateral claims of Indonesia.

In carrying out a development program in Papua, the Indonesian government cooperated with P. T. Freeport Indonesia to mine copper and gold. This policy led to public discontent, just like in Aceh, because it did not bring prosperity to the local population. This dissatisfaction was not only because the company did not employ local laborers, but also because the mining destroyed mountains, and its waste polluted the soil and rivers in the vicinity. As a consequence, local communities became increasingly poor.

IIn response to this situation, the New Order government accused the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM—the Free Papua Organization), of provoking dissatisfaction in society. As in Aceh, the government sent more troops to protect the mining sites as well as to curb the separatist movement. The placement of large numbers of security forces with almost no supervision created an opportunity for abuse of power. Killings, arrests, detentions, and intimidation of civilians occurred almost daily. Komnas Perempuan notes the case of a man and


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woman who were forced to copulate and then paraded around naked. Women were also arrested, detained, and tortured to obtain confessions that they supported the OPM. Mama Yosefa, a woman fighter for indigenous rights, was once held in a room full of water and human fæces for a month. During that time she was repeatedly tortured, included being forced to balance a heavy iron bar on her head for hours, and being threatened with rape and murder.

When my child was naughty, the villagers here would say, “Hey, you ‘kolong’ kid

[bastard]. This is not your region. It belongs to the indigenous people.” I would

feel very ashamed, stressed . . . insecure and liked to stay home alone . . . We

moved a lot. My family was often angry with me and with my son, and told us to leave the house. “Both of you must leave

this house. Don’t defile this house.”

woman rape victim,Stop Sudah! (Stop Already!)

(Papua Documentation Team report), p. 39

The change in national leadership in May 1998 brought only a slight change to Papua. The Indonesian government, represented by President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), apologized for human rights violations that had occurred, ordered the release of Papuan political

prisoners, changed the name of Irian Jaya to the Province of Papua, and allowed the raising of the Morning Star flag [Papuan] alongside the Red and White flag [Indonesian]. However, raising of the Morning Star flag precipitated different responses. Some of the troops tolerated the two flags, while others carried out operations to take down the flag and arrest individuals who raised it with charges of treason. A number of the political elite at the national level continued to question Gus Dur’s move and considered permission to raise the Morning Star flag a “political accident”.

Under the leadership of President Megawati, the government offered special autonomy to Papua. This authority was realized in Law No. 21 in 2001 on Special Autonomy for the Province of Papua, which was later updated with Law No. 35 in 2008. Included in this law was authority for Papua to have regional symbols in the form of a flag and regional songs, as long as they are “banners of greatness and cultural symbols of the grandeur of Papuans’ identity.” To implement special autonomy, the government formed a Majelis Rakyat Papua (MRP—Papuan People’s Assembly) to protect the rights of the indigenous people of Papua based on respect for their customs and culture, the empowerment of women,

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and religious tolerance. In practice, the Indonesian government’s seriousness in granting special authority to Papua was often questioned. The central government policy of breaking up the Papua Province into a number of smaller provinces supposedly to accelerate development in Papua was seen as evidence of the central government’s intervention in the regional government

that aimed to divide the people of Papua. This policy to split up the region into several provinces was also seen as an excuse to increase the number of security forces since the Indonesian security structure is developed to parallel the government’s administrative structure. This means the addition of administrative units will be followed by an addition of security forces.

Despite these new policies, violence against the population persisted, especially in relation to flag-raising events and protests of mining and plantations. Human rights organizations in Papua noted acts of violence against civilians in various areas such as Biak, Sorong, Manokwari, Wamena, Abepura, Wasior, Jayapura, Puncak Jaya, Nabire, Merauke, and Serui. In the midst of these acts of violence, women were also faced with threats of summary killings, the destruction and seizure of property, and starvation. For example, in the Puncak Jaya case in 2001, security forces from 753 Yonif forced a group of women out of their honai—a traditional Papua house—and accused them of being OPM sympathizers. Arbitrary arrests and detentions on the basis of treason were particularly aimed at women who actively rejected the exploitation of natural resources. This violence culminated in the murder of Theys H.

Papua women also had to face violence committed by the state, the community, and even their family. (Papua, 2009; KP).


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At P.T. Freeport’s invitation Mama Yosepha Alomang along with the Amungme community and Komnas Perempuan, went to see the Freeport mining area for the first time. When she saw the caved out mountain, Mama Yosefa cried: ”Where’s my mother? Why is her belly empty? (Timika, 2001; KP)

Eluai, Chair of the Papuan Presidium Council, in November 2001.

In order to reveal the truth about the violent events against the people in Papua, Komnas Perempuan became a member of the KPP HAM formed by Komnas HAM in relation to the attack of armed forces on a student dormitory in Abepura at the end of 2000. The investigation team found that students who were arrested had been tortured while in detention. Together with male detainees, women experienced physical and psychological torture, including insults based on racial and religious differences. In addition, women detainees were also harassed by foul language that humiliated them as women.

At the end of 2002, Komnas Perempuan was invited to attend a meeting of indigenous women in Papua. At that meeting, a number of women talked about the issue of domestic violence as a result of widespread prostitution and the consumption of alcohol. For Papuan women, prostitution and alcohol were much bigger problems than just caring for the good reputation of the region, the reason the regional government used to conceal these issues. Both problems were closely connected to the military presence in Papua. Most

of the sex workers came from outside of Papua and lived in the locations where military troops were based. Many Papuan men used the money they earned from businesses or exchanged the highly valuable agarwood to obtain sexual services or alcohol. Violence in the form of physical abuse happened especially if the wife refused to give money to her husband, or if the husband returned home drunk. Prostitution was also suspected as the main cause for the spread of HIV/AIDS in Papua, with husbands spreading this disease to their wives at home. It is no secret that

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security forces are behind the availability of sexual services and alcoholic drinks; therefore, the people of Papua suspect the presence of prostitution and alcohol as part of a tactic to weaken the people’s struggle, or even to destroy the Papuan people. Ever since the women’s meeting was held, Komnas Perempuan has received annual reports on violence

against women in Papua by victims’ support organizations there.

Since early 2009, at the request of the MRP, Komnas Perempuan facilitated capacity building of community groups to document violence against women that occurred during the period of conflict in Papua. They found that

Discussion sessions among the community provide space for the women to tell about and understand the violence as well as the multiple burden they had experienced as a result of the conflict. (Papua, 2009; KP)


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the rape of women, as also in Aceh and East Timor, was a widespread in regions considered enclaves of the people’s resistance. Some victims suffered repeated rape, and some even experienced it by different authorities for more than ten years. Although it happened in a context of conflict where women victims had no power to fight back, society tended to blame the victims for what happened to them.

Communities also ostracized not only victims, but also the children resulting from rapes because they were viewed as stains on the community’s purity. Women victims of rape were often ignored by their families because their families considered them damaged goods. This situation led women to enter a cycle of violence, that is, a chain of violence committed by a number of perpetrators in different domains. For example, in 1997 a soldier raped a girl in her house when she was only 14 years old, then forced her to drink traditional medicine to prevent pregnancy. A member of a different troop raped the girl again in 1999. This perpetrator raped her twice in the woods. The victim’s family threw her out of the house when other community members reported the event to them. In 2008, the victim returned to her village when she was two months pregnant. An officer entered her house and raped her.

It was not until I gave birth that I told my husband . . . He was upset because I was raped by a soldier . . . my dignity as a wife disappeared. Finally, he made up his mind, he let go of me [divorced me] . . . then the fourth [rape] was by the Special Forces. On Sunday, 2 January [2009] I planned to go home; I waited, maybe an empty truck going to Tanah Merah would pass by. A member of the forces in Biak on duty at Upyetetko Village in Waropko District went by on a motorcycle. [Because we’re acquainted] he asked me to ride along with him on his motorcycle. Then on a quiet road, he pulled me into the woods and raped me. He said, “If you do not serve me, I will leave you here,” so I was forced to succumb. It happened around 12 noon . . . Now I live with my [second] husband . . . But this life is full of suffering. I was abandoned by my first husband. They [the community] called me a whore. Living with [my husband] now, I’m beaten, I’m kicked, sometimes I cry, but he keeps beating me.

woman victim Papua Documentation Team recording, 2009

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Ruteng, East Nusa TenggaraIn early 2004, the people in the region of Ruteng, Manggarai District, East Nusa Tenggara Province asked Komnas Perempuan to come and monitor the violence against women in the region. A total of four women and three men were arrested and detained at the Ruteng Police Headquarters because they were caught taking cassava in the forest area of Ruteng. One of the women arrested was a 16-year-old girl. The arrest led to public demonstrations the next day. For the community, the detention of women was seen as a kidnapping and regarded as a “war challenge” instigated by the police and the local government. While the demonstration took place, some police officers rebuked the women prisoners for causing of the protests. Seven of the protesters were detained for 20 days. All four women were placed in a narrow room and given only a bucket of water to clean themselves. They also were not accompanied by any legal counsel during the inquiry and were forced to sign documents whose contents they did not understand.

As a response to these protests, the police fired into the masses causing six people to die, injuries to 29 people, and disabling seven people for life. The wife

of a man who was killed fell unconscious because she was so shocked by what had happened. She also suffered from prolonged stress. The women whose husbands died or became permanently disabled had to become the sole breadwinners for their families. One of these women was extremely worried that she would be unable to provide an education for her children. Not one perpetrator of the shootings underwent a legal process to take responsibility for his actions. In order to avoid prosecution, the Chief of Police for the Ruteng Sector was transferred to a new post.

These violent events were the height of tensions between the people and the police in the forest area of Ruteng. These tensions began in 1993 when the national government declared the area a tourism forest. This meant that people were no longer allowed to farm or even use forest products, whereas the livelihood of the community depended on produce from their fields and the forest, such as firewood for cooking. Since the 1920s the people of Colol and Meler Kuwus Villages in the Manggarai District of Flores Island had been cultivating coffee in the forests of Ruteng. Clashes with authorities erupted because the people insisted on using land they had been cultivating for more than 70 years. In 2001, the government


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began clearing the coffee plantations in Manggarai District and replaced them with teak and mahogany trees whose market value was greater. Security forces were put on alert to safeguard the timber estates. Consequently, clashes between local people and state forces became more frequent, as was the case in other places where people’s land was seized, or where people protested the state’s management of natural resources.

Maluku Investigation of the May 1998 case had not yet concluded, and disclosure of cases of violence against women in Aceh, Papua, and East Timor continued, when Komnas Perempuan had to directly face several incidents of violence against women that occurred in the context of inter-communal conflict in Maluku. The conflict ignited in January 1999 when two young men quarreled in the Ambon Mardika market. This fight quickly developed into an inter-religious conflict with the burning of mosques and churches. For Indonesia, the Maluku conflict was startling because this region is known for its gandong tradition, i.e., family ties between two or more villages whose residents are descended from the same ancestors. There is also the tradition of pela that means close

Artists showing their stance towards the issue of violence against women. "Destined" by Sriyani Hudyonoto (Photos Documentation of Cemara 6 Gallery Café)

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ties outside the bonds of kinship. These traditions bind families, even of different religions, into one big family whose members respect each other. These traditions have lasted thousands of years so that Maluku had always been well known as a symbol of religious harmony in Indonesia. Thus, some suspected that the conflict in Ambon was engineered in relation to the post-New Order power struggle, as was the case with earlier ethnic, religious, racial, and inter-group (SARA) conflicts in Sambas, West Kalimantan and Sampit, Central Kalimantan.

There were casualties and wounded on both sides of the conflict, Christians and Muslims. Members of the two communities also had to flee because their villages were constantly under attack and their houses were destroyed or burned. Women and religious organizations contacted Komnas Perempuan because during the attack on one village, women were forcibly circumcised. The victims were evacuated from Ambon in a state of intense shock and suffered from genital infection. The victims and their counselors decided not to publish this incident or report it to the police. This decision was made to protect the women victims as well as their families from possible retaliation by the perpetrators, and also to prevent the

conflict from escalating.

. . . we [women] have to survive. Before the conflict, just being yelled at made us cringe. By the time of the conflict, we had to save ourselves from the flames, shooting, and bomb explosions. If the enemy were drawing near, we would use weapons. If no men were around, we had to advance . . . Even if I died, I would die because I was just trying to save my life.

woman internally displaced person (IDP) Komnas Perempuan recording, 2003

At first, some women believed they were in a “religious war”, what more because the groups engaged in the conflict blatantly wore religious symbols. The rapid escalation of the conflict in Ambon and its surrounding areas compelled many women to get involved in “the war”; they carried weapons, flushed out the enemy, saved themselves and their families, as well as prepared guns and Molotov bombs needed for counter-attacks. Some women supported the “troops” in their community by preparing meals and becoming couriers who went to the front lines. They also became shields to protect men when security forces conducted sweepings to confiscate firearms.


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The use of religious symbols in the Ambon conflict created special tension for women. Fellow community members often intimated women IDPs to join and support the war. For example, in Muslim IDP camps, a group who called themselves the “Jihad Troop” forced women to wear the veil as a sign of women’s support for the community’s struggle. Another example is when an aid organization requested that women IDPs wear veils when posing for a photograph of them receiving aid. A woman IDP

The community evacuates escorted by security personnel. (Ambon, 23 Januari 1999; Dien Kelilauw/Antara)

coordinator said that she ordered her community to refuse the aid because of that request.

As a response to the Maluku conflict, the Indonesian government sent troops to restore and maintain peace. At first, the parties to the conflict greeted the presence of these troops with enthusiasm. However, the spread of prostitution and the increase in cases of extra-marital pregnancies of local young women by security forces gave rise to new unrest in the community. Sex workers from outside Maluku were accused of encouraging local girls to sell their bodies for money or protection. There were also women who dated security personnel and agreed to have sexual intercourse because of a promise of marriage. However, once they became pregnant they were abandoned. It was very hard for these women to track down their partners. Besides that, the security institution did not seriously respond to these cases. The most a commander would do was to marry the couple, provided the man was single. If the woman were later abandoned, no sanction was given to the perpetrator. Even the community’ mocked women who had been abandoned, using acronyms of military terms. For example, Koramil (Sub-district Military Command) became Korban Rayuan Militer or Victim

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of Military Seduction, and Kopassus (Special Forces Command) became Korban Korps Pegang Susu or the Victim of the Breast-petting Corps.

In May 2001, in the middle of the conflict, people were shocked by the rape of a young woman by two men who admitted they were members of the security forces. At that time, the victim and her boyfriend were chatting on the beach when the perpetrators approached them. Her boyfriend was ordered to take off his clothes, was dragged into the sea, and beaten. The victim was raped in turns. While seeking help, the victim met two other men who wanted to rape her. Fortunately, she managed to save herself. With her mother beside her, the victim reported the incident to the police. During the investigation, the case was widely publicized by the local media. However, since the incident took place at night on the beach, public opinion was divided. Some people blamed the victim for the incident.

Besides violence, women victims of the Maluku conflict also had to ensure the survival of their families. The conflict had paralyzed the local economy and many people lost their livelihoods. To meet the economic needs of their families several women became peddlers. Women peddlers who sold goods at the harbor

often experienced sexual harassment. They could not avoid or fight it because they had to use their hands to balance their merchandise that they carried on their heads.

The traditional market was the embryo for an organic peace in Ambon and women’s gender role made them natural agents of peace. To feed their families, women took courage and went to the market where they met women from other communities. Through these encounters, women became acquainted with each other and the suffering endured by each other’s communities. Because of the market women’s potential for sowing peace, unknown individuals often disrupted market activities.

Driven by a shared concern about the situation of women in the Maluku conflict, a group of women formed a cross-community network called the Coalition of Maluku Women. This coalition then requested Komnas Perempuan to facilitate their meeting with a number of national authorities responsible for handling the conflict. Their intention was to convey women’s aspirations for peace efforts that were being developed. The meeting, held in mid-2002, lasted for a week in Jakarta. However, the role of women’s leadership in peace apparently did not receive due


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attention. In the Malino negotiations for a resolution of the Maluku conflict, not one woman was involved.

The conflict in Maluku gradually subsided. Peaceful encounters among members of different religious communities resumed in daily life. Public services were no longer divided on the basis of religion. People were also more cautious in dealing with religious issues that could reignite the conflict. Nonetheless, the conflict left scars. For example, in 2009 a community assistance agency reported that there were still 10,000 displaced people. Widespread corruption of IDP funds deprived these people of their rights. They live on land owned by someone else or the government so that at any time may be evicted. Another impact of the conflict that continues to be felt is the segregation of space. There are almost no inter-religious residential compounds as existed before the conflict.

Poso, Central SulawesiAs in Maluku, the conflict in Poso began with a fight among residents and was suspected to be an extention of the power struggle following Soeharto’s resignation. In December 1998, a young man was slain with a machete

in front of the mosque in Poso, Central Sulawesi. The incident occurred during the fasting month that happened to coincide with Christmas festivities. Soon, the situation in the region grew tense as rumors of a religious war began to grow. Actually, the strain between religious groups started in October 1998 when the issue of religion arose in protests regarding election results for the head of Poso District. Attacks against different religious communities could no longer be contained after a fight broke out among youth at the Poso bus terminal in April 2000. The clash that continued from 15-21 April 2000 resulted in 37 people killed while thousands of others were displaced because their houses were burned. The conflict in Poso was exacerbated with the arrival of external forces in support of each side of the conflict. Those who attacked used sharp objects such as knives and machetes, handmade rifles known as bum-bum, and factory manufactured weapons.

In mid-2005, Komnas Perempuan received a public request, extended through an official visit from the victims’ community and their counselors, and by a joint letter from a woman's organization and a human rights advocacy organization in Central Sulawesi, to facilitate the disclosure of

The market was the place where organic peace in Ambon originated. The women of the disputing parties met there and told each other the situation in their communities. (Ambon, Wednesday, 5 Juni, 2002; Tempo/Hendra Suhara)

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violations of women’s human rights that occurred during the conflict in Poso. Responding to this request, Komnas Perempuan appointed a Special Rapporteur to head its monitoring team.

One focus of the monitoring was the issue of rape against women during a raid on the Walisongo boarding school in Situwu Lembah Village in June 2000. This event was widely reported in various meetings and the media so that it elicited

anger in the Muslim community. Situwu Lembah Village, inhabited mostly by descendants of Javanese migrants, is located at kilometer 9 in Lage Sub-district, Poso District. Investigations by various parties regarding the attack on the village showed that security authorities allowed the incident to occur. As a result, dozens of men were killed. Although Komnas Perempuan did not find strong evidence regarding the rape case, the possibility that rape occurred cannot be dismissed, especially considering that during this attack 200 women were forced to strip. They were gathered in one place by a group of the attackers. One by one they were ordered to enter a room and take off their clothes. The perpetrators were looking for amulets that supposedly are worn by Javanese women in their genitals and breasts. These women did not have the courage to protest because they were threatened that the safety of their families was at risk. Because the perpetrators did not find anything they released the women and children. These women then walked to the nearest military base to seek refuge. Until now, some of them still choose not to return to Situwu Lembah Village because they still suffer from trauma and do not feel safe. Although community leaders signed the first Malino peace agreement in

To go on with their lives, women refugees in the Poso conflict became rubber tappers. A long lasting evacuation could arouse tensions between the locals and the evacuees because of the limited natural resources available. (Poso, 2007; KP)


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December 2001, the violence continued. One example was the attack on Malei-lage Village in December 2002. During this attack, a woman was raped after she witnessed the murder of her husband. The parties who wished to reignite the conflict continued to terrorize people. The terror took the form of, bombings in public areas, such as markets and houses of worship, the shooting of Rev. Susianti Tinulele in July 2004, and the mutilation of three female students who attended the Poso Christian High School in October 2005. Rev. Susianti was conducting a worship service at the time she was shot dead. The three girls became victims of mutilation while on their way to school by unknown persons who blocked their way. A fourth victim managed to escape, but suffered trauma as a result of the incident. Still in relation to arbitrary killing of women was the November 2005 shooting of two girls who were students at the Poso Economic High School. Both victims survived, but suffered permanent physical impairment because each had a bullet lodged in her jaw. Besides creating fear, terror in the form of violence against women was thought to be an effective means to provoke anger in the victims’ community. However, acts of terror proved unsuccessful in triggering revenge that would prolong the conflict.

In IDP areas, which in Poso were divided on the basis of religion, women were not free from violence, especially in the household. This violence was often triggered when a husband was drunk, unfaithful, or tried to extort money from his wife. Public opinion that still perceives domestic violence as the woman’s fault made it difficult for a victim to file a complaint and obtain justice. Women victims of sexual harassment and rape committed by fellow IDPs faced the same problems.

With the presence of security forces, as also seen in the Aceh and Maluku conflicts, young women were faced by a new vulnerability to violence. Since the conflict erupted, security forces were deployed to secure all areas of Poso. They lived close to civilians in order to quickly catch information that was circulating so they could anticipate outbreaks of conflict. Since most of the soldiers were young, they attracted the attention of local young women. Eventually, some of them began to date. A number of soldiers took advantage of their position as a symbol of protection and also promised to marry their girlfriends in order to have sex. Several women who refused to have sex were raped. A number of others agreed while believing in promises of marriage. Some

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. . . his Danton [the perpetrator’s platoon commander] came . . . and met with the traditional chief in our village. Then it was decided [for the perpetrator and the victim] to pay a fine of IDR 5 million. The village secretary wrote a letter, but until now there has been no follow-up . . . [T]he IDR 5 million payment was settled in accordance with customary law, and it had to be paid within 8 days. If it were not paid within that period, the amount would double. I myself paid the fine while he has not. I want to go

who became pregnant were forced by their partners to have abortions. Many others were simply abandoned. Komnas Perempuan refers to cases like these as sexual exploitation.

It was difficult for victims of sexual exploitation to be acknowledged as victims. The romantic relationship between victims and perpetrators was used to question victims’ experiences of rape. If a victim filed a complaint about an abortion she was forced to have, the complaint could backfire and the woman could face charges for a criminal act. People would look at women victims of sexual exploitation with disdain because they thought the women wanted to be seduced by men in uniform. Just as in Maluku, the victims’ own communities created labels like Victims of Military Seduction, Victims of Breast-petting Corps, and Selebriti (Sisa-sisa Brimob/Pasukan Perintis or Remnants of the Mobile Brigade/Pioneer Army). Women victims were also socially ostracized by their communities; for example, they would not be invited to attend house worship nor were their houses used for it. For their children to be baptized, Christian victims who bore children as a result of sexual exploitation had to be willing to be represented by their parents on the baptismal certificate.

The presence of the security officials in the center of the community settlement without sufficient supervision on how they relate to the locals gave them the opportunity to misuse their authority and their status as the symbol of protection. (Poso, 23 Januari 2007; Antara)


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there, but I have nobody to accompany me . . . It has been three years now, so the payment must be multiplied. I called several times but he did not pick up the phone, and I would like to tell him, his son will be going to school and needs money. His telephone number has been changed . . . If I want to marry I cannot because he hasn’t yet paid, so the customary process is not yet finished. My

child was baptized with the names of his grandmother and grandfather; the birth certificate bears my name.

victim of sexual exploitation in Poso Komnas Perempuan recording, 2007

As in Aceh, the perpetrators of violence often took advantage of traditional mechanisms or local customs in order to

Violence against Women During Poso Conflict, 1998–2005

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

58

2 237

violence against women related to internal armed conflict

violence against women related to placement of military and security apparatus

Violence against IDP women

Table 5.

sexualnon-sexual

avoid legal responsibility. Soldiers who committed sexual violence also used such loopholes. The perpetrator would use kawin siri, a type of socially accepted unregistered marriage, as if he intended to keep his promise to marry the victim. Once they were married, the perpetrator would then abandon the woman. There were also perpetrators of rape who chose to pay a customary fine to avoid a legal process. Customary fines usually took the form of a cow or money and were paid to the victim’s family. In one case of domestic violence documented by Komnas Perempuan, a husband who was given a penalty according to customary law for having an affair sold a field that he jointly owned with his wife to pay the fine.

Jemaah AhmadiyahAs the conflict in Ambon and Poso began to subside, Indonesia once again was shocked by the assault on the Jemaah Ahmadiyah group (JA). This attack was a surprise because for nearly 50 years, JA was recognized as a legitimate religious organization whose members could conduct activities without constraint. The attacks on JA began in 2002 in Kuningan, a district in West Java, and in Mataram and East Lombok of West Nusa Tenggara Province. The attacks became stronger after Majelis Ulama Indonesia

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Vulnerability of Young Women:Women as Targets of Violence

Young women and girls were targets of sexual violence in the form of rape, sexual harassment, and sexual exploitation. Sexual exploitation refers to an act where there is abuse of power over someone for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, gaining financial, social, or even political advantage. As found in Poso, Aceh, and

Maluku, security forces committed sexual exploitation, abandoning women after having successfully persuaded them to engage in sexual intercourse. Young women who became victims of violence were ostracized because they were seen as unable to guard themselves against male seduction.

Since extramarital sexual relations are considered to ruin a woman’s purity, young women rape victims were obliged to marry the perpetrators. The objective was to cleanse themselves, their families, and communities of disgrace.

Young women IDPs in Aceh and Maluku complained about peeping while they were alone in the place they stayed or in the public bathhouse. Those managing IDP sites often ignored their reports, accusing the women of failing to adjust to the limitations of the IDP environment. In fact, peeping made the women feel unsafe because it is associated with the threat of rape. Cases of rape committed by strangers or by fellow IDPs have been noted in several places.

Efforts to protect young women from becoming victims of sexual violence during the conflict ironically gave birth to new violence against women. Young women became victims of forced marriage in the name of guarding their purity and to avoid rape. Young women were also targets of a coerced dress code because of the opinion that sexual harassment is due to a woman’s dress that accentuates the shape of her body. A coercive dress code, especially for young women, also intends to shape the community’s image based on a particular religious or cultural identity.

(MUI—Indonesian Ulama Council) published a fatwa (Islamic religious instruction) stating that the Ahmadiyah sect is heretical. This fatwa inspired the release of letters, both from Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah (Muspida—Regional Leadership Councils) and regional heads in various locations such as Bogor, Garut, Sukabumi, Cianjur, South Sumatra, and Padang that prohibited JA activities.

Attacks on JA were conducted by groups of men who wore and carried Islamic symbols with Arabic writing on them. They also used machetes and wooden clubs as weapons. Since the desmise of the New Order regime, religious-based or even ethnic-based groups not reluctant to use violence to enforce their opinions have expanded. Furthermore, these groups wear uniforms similar to military uniforms and patrol in cars like police.

In response to this situation, the Indonesian government, via a Surat Keputusan Bersama (SKB—Joint Decree) by the Minister of Religious Affairs, Attorney General, and Minister of the Interior issued in June 2008, ordered JA to discontinue any activities considered inconsistent with the general interpretation of Islam, but the existence of JA in Indonesia was not prohibited. In addition, the Indonesian government


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ordered other community groups to stop the attacks and other illegal acts towards JA.

We want to be independent, rebuild ourselves, and sell in the market. But people

in the market have been influenced not to buy our products. Our children in school

are not allowed to bathe in public bathing places. They say we’re filthy. Our children go to school escorted by police who drive them in vehicles used to transport prisoners. The police drop them off in front of the school

and later picked them up. They cry and ask why they should be treated like this.

woman victim, Ahmadiyah member Komnas Perempuan recording, 2006

On 27 September 2006, Komnas Perempuan received complaints from JA community representatives regarding attacks on their community in Cianjur that occurred on 19 September 2005 and 14 February 2006, and in West Nusa Tenggara on 19 October 2005 and 17 March 2006. Results of Komnas Perempuan’s monitoring revealed that before the attacks occurred, a number of women were intimidated and asked to immediately leave JA. They received threats that their houses would be destroyed, and were terrorized by people placing human fæces under their windows and bathroom vents. JA

mosques, schools, and members’ houses were defaced, destroyed, burned, and looted. During the attacks, at least two women were threatened with rape and one woman was threatened with murder. After the attacks, the surrounding community ostracized members of JA. There were women who always had to walk because ojek (motorcycle taxi drivers) were unwilling to give them a ride. Villagers no longer did business with members of Ahmadiyah. On various occasions, members of JA were always being mocked as followers of heresy. A woman who was a teacher and a member of JA lost her livelihood when she was expelled from the public school where she taught.

Violence against Ahmadiyah women continued in the IDP camps scattered around the areas where the attacks occurred. Young women were especially prone to sexual violence, including, being forced to marry an unknown individual; forcibly hugged from behind by local residents; being called “cunt” by public order officers on patrol at the IDP camps if a woman ignored them; and being peeped at while using public bathing places. A young woman reported that she experienced an attempted rape while alone and lying down alone in her IDP housing.

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After 50 years of activities, the Jemaah Ahmadiyah was suspended by the government in June 2008, through a Three Minister Decree (SKB Tiga Menteri).

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In addition, children of Ahmadiyah became targets of ostracism and discrimination in schools. No one was willing to befriend them because they were considered the children of heretical families. Ten Ahmadiyah students at the Mataram State Grade School were given a different exam schedule than their classmates. In one day, they were tested on a greater number of subjects than other students. They also received report cards with no grades, but just the phrase, “Report, Children of Ahmadiyah”.

As a result of these attacks and discrimination, some women experienced

prolonged stress, disruption of reproductive functions so that they did not menstruate for months, and some had miscarriages. Because the regulation prohibiting JA activities was not revoked, its members were in constant fear of repeated attacks. Women and families had to endure impoverishment as they lost their houses, possessions, and businesses. They also did not have access to sources of livelihood, such as fields for farming, because they had to flee.

In response to the attack in Cianjur, police were placed on guard at JA houses and buildings to prevent further destruction. A total of 12 people were arrested and the Cianjur District Court sentenced them from four to six months of detention. In the case of the assault in West Nusa Tenggara, the police evacuated the members of JA to avoid loss of life. The police also guarded JA’s assets such as houses, buildings, and fields. However, a number of houses in the area had already been destroyed. In this incident five people involved in the attack were detained. They were later released when nine trucks of people from eight villages came to the police insisting that JA be dissolved. To avoid more attacks, JA members were evacuated to Mataram City. The district government of West Nusa Tenggara provided food to 33 families during their displacement.

A female member of the Jemaah Ahmadiyah complaining to Komnas Perempuan about the sexual violence, intimidation, and discrimination they experienced.. (Jakarta, 2006; KP).


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Considering the likelihood that JA members would be unable to return home, the government of West Lombok District, West Nusa Tenggara Province expressed its willingness to buy all JA assets in one of the villages that had been a target of the attack. Up to now that decision has not been implemented, with the district government only advising JA members not to return home since the government cannot guarantee their safety.

Hatred and violence toward the Ahmadiyah community has continued until now. The height of recent attacks against them occurred in Cikeusik, West Java on 6 February 2011. Three community members died and five were wounded in the attack. Ahmadiyah members in that region were forced to move, and wives of the victims who died became single parents who must alone carry the burden to support their children. Intimidation of Ahmadiyah members increased when several district governments issued regulations that prohibit JA, and the central government has not indicated a willingness to revoke the joint decree by the three ministers that not only violates the right to freedom of religion, but also has the potential to trigger violence against the Ahmadiyah community.

As violence against JA drags on, it becomes increasingly difficult to separate it from attacks on various other minority religious groups. One example is the attack on a HKBP congregation (a Batak ethnic-based Christian denomination) in Bekasi on the outskirts of Jakarta. A woman minister of this church was beaten in an attack that occurred while she was leading worship. Judicial processes to try cases related to attacks on minority religious communities are often marked by intimidation to release

The Moslem Defense Front (Front Pembela Islam) demanding the dissolution of the Jemaah Ahmadiyah. (Jakarta, 27 Agustus 2008; Tempo/Dimas Aryo)

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perpetrators of the violence. This makes it difficult for the judges to safely and justly examine and rule on the cases. This situation relates to power struggles at both national and provincial levels.

The 1965 IncidentWe, the delegation . . . present here, consist of women activists who for years were . . . [imprisoned by the New Order government without a] legal process; [we are] wives, children, and families of ex-political . . . [prisoners who have suffered] as a result of the arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, and killing of our husbands, fathers, brothers, and families. We come today, representing the fate of thousands of women victims of the 1965 Tragedy who don’t have a chance to be here on this opportunity.

letter of complaint from women victims of the 1965 incident Gender-based Crimes Against Humanity : Listening to the Voice of Women Survivors of 1965

(Komnas Perempuan report), Appendix 1, p. 191

Monday, 29 May 2006 was a historic day for Indonesia. After 40 years of silence, on this day, women who were victims of the 1965 Tragedy broke their silence and

told the people of Indonesia what had happened to them through a submission to Komnas Perempuan. They requested Komnas Perempuan to examine their complaints carefully to gain an understanding about why they had been victimized in the 1965 Tragedy. They also asked that economic, social, cultural, and political rights for themselves and their children, as victims and as citizens, be restored.

Before May 1998, the government allowed only one version regarding

The movie "Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI", made in the New Order era was run every year and became compulsory for the people, especially students, to watch

the establishment of the New Order to circulate in society. According to this version of history, the New Order regime developed from the success of the Indonesian Armed Forces in protecting the Indonesian nation from the dangers of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). On the evening of 30 September 1965, the PKI kidnapped, tortured, and murdered six army generals at a place called Lubang Buaya (Crocodile Pit). Members of Gerakan Wanita Indonesia (Gerwani—Indonesian Women’s Movement) allegedly joined in the


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vicious torture while dancing naked. Major General Soeharto managed to dismantle this PKI strategy and was successful in destroying PKI to its very roots. After Parliament appointed him president in 1967, Soeharto spearheaded improvements in the structure of the Indonesian nation-state so that the people could enjoy guarantees of security and prosperity through development programs.

What was eliminated from this story was that the eradication of the PKI “to its very roots” caused the death of 75,000 to 1,000,000 people accused as members of PKI or of its affiliated organizations. The killings were not only conducted by the military, but also by civilians. At that time, hatred towards the PKI could be used to kill political opponents; by simply accusing someone of being a member or a sympathizer of the PKI, that person would be killed. The state imposed the death penalty on PKI leaders. Those who were detained experienced horrifying forms of torture. Outside detention, the wives and daughters of male prisoners became targets of rape and extortion. These things even happened to them if they wanted to visit their relatives who were in detention. The perpetrators might be security forces, or they might also be civilians.

The women activists members of Gerwani and other mass organizations allegedly involved in the September 30, 1965 incident, arrested and assembled in the Kartosuro field. (Central Java, 1965; W. Sutarto/Antara)

My younger brother said, “Brother, when your wife died . . . [she] suffered . . . Every night . . . she was taken to the [village] . . . office, was ordered to sleep there, was ordered to massage them, all sorts of things. If she didn’t go there, then the army would come here . . .” Eventually my wife got thinner and thinner, her stomach became more and more bloated. [She] died in '77 . . . [In] ’79, I came back [from detention]. I was told by the head of my neighborhood, “Your wife cared, she suffered on the inside. When she was dying [she asked], ‘When is my husband . . . coming back?’

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[She] kept hoping. ‘What about my body; I’ve gone so far like this. Will my husband want to take me back or not?’”

ex-detainee of the 1965 incidentGender-based Crimes Against Humanity

Komnas Perempuan report, pp. 130-31 Gender-Based Crimes Gaints Humanity : Listening to the Voice of Women

Survivors of 1965(Komnas Perempuan report), p. 130 – 131

Around 1972-1974, under the pretext of a transmigration program, state officials forcibly displaced the wives and children of male detainees to Buru Island to join their male relatives who had been exiled there earlier. Only minimal facilities were available for them; no teachers and medical personnel were available except the trained women amongst themselves. They also were not allowed to sell or buy the produce from the rice paddies they cultivated. Their children suffered discrimination and violence from local residents. There was nothing they could do, especially when the perpetrators were military personnel and members of army families. If they resisted, their fathers, who were detainees, would be punished. Komnas Perempuan found that three girls became victims of sexual slavery. Military officials routinely visited the victims’ houses and asked for sexual services. The girls could not refuse. To prevent pregnancy, the military forced

the victims to take birth control pills. When the political prisoners on Buru Island were released, the state provided no support whatsoever for the women and their children to return home. As “transmigrants” they had to find their own way home.

In the period immediately following the events of 30 September, a picture of

The Gerwani stigma as an immoral woman, as depicted in the Lubang Buaya relief, is still very much alive until now. (Jakarta, 2009; Komnas Perempuan)


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Gerwani’s involvement was supported by the mass media that depicted Gerwani members as immoral women. This image of Gerwani can still be seen in reliefs at the September 30th monument at Lubang Buaya and in a film about this event that was created by the New Order government. Not once did the history written by the New Order regime mention Gerwani’s contributions to the process of developing the Indonesian nation-state in the post-independence era.

This image of Gerwani was used to justify the torture of women prisoners who were accused of being members of Gerwani. The torture they experienced was not just physical abuse, but they were also forced to watch or listen to the torture inflicted on other inmates. They also experienced sexual abuse, including rape and stripping under the pretense of a search for the Communist hammer and sickle tatoo. Many of them also suffered from hunger. As with male detainees, they were detained without a fair judicial process. Many of the victims were falsely arrested; they were not members of Gerwani and knew nothing about the organization.

At that time [around November of December 1965], I was just about to go to school. But I was arrested with

Gender-based Persecution

Persecution is the denial of basic human rights as a result of discrimination based on, but not imited to, religious, ethnic, racial, cultural, gender, or political identity. Persecution includes the denial of civil-political rights, such as the right to feel safe; to be free from arbitrary detention, torture, and inhumane treatment; the right to express opinions; to adhere to religion and beliefs; and to participate in the government. The denial of basic economic, social, and cultural rights is also part of persecution, such as denial of the right to work and earn a decent living; to education; to health; to involvement in social and cultural activities; and the right to live as a family. This persecution was actively carried out by state agents and thus reinforced discrimination and ostracism.

With regard to the 1965 incident, everyone accused of being linked to the PKI, as well as members of their families, were persecuted. For example, a prisoner’s wife was laid off from her job and their children were expelled from school. Women accused of being members of Gerwani experienced gender-based persecution on the grounds of political views (communism) and gender (because as Gerwani they were considered immoral women). Although they were released from detention, persecution continued through the denial of their rights to work, to education, to engage in politics, to freedom from stigmatization, and to freedom of movement. Throughout their lives, and to date, these women have continued to suffer ostracism and stigmatization.

the others. They said I could go straight home, but I was detained for two years. At that time I was still young [17 years old when I was arrested, just in the second grade of economic high school], I didn’t know anything. So many people were being detained. If anyone wanted to sleep . . . on their side, everyone had to . . . [sleep] on their sides. The only mattress available was cardboard . . . There I learned that PKI

people were kind. . . . It was ’65 when I went in and '67 when I was released. I used to eat rice wrapped in leaves, rice mixed with cracked wheat. My job was to put out the cardboard for everyone to sleep on, and in the morning I had to fold it up again.

woman victim Gender-Based Crimes Againts Humanity : Listening to the

Voice of Women Survivors of 1965(Komnas Perempuan report), p. 80

158

Once released, the prisoners experienced persistent and systematic discrimination of their rights. For example, they had to report regularly to the security agencies. Their identity cards were marked ET for eks-tahanan politik (eks-TAPOL—ex-political prisoners) that caused them to always be treated differently in the public service area. In the community they remained ostracized.

Women victims of the 1965 Affair standing at the gate of the House of Representatives building to request an audience with Commission III. Part of them were arrested when they were still adolescents. (Jakarta, February 2007; Tempo)

The entire family experienced stigmatization and ostracism; they experienced discrimination by the state and in their social life. The New Order developed special techniques to scrutinize members of the state apparatus to ensure they or their family members, however distant, had no affiliation with PKI. These scrutinizing techniques were established as state

policy that applied to all civil servants and soldiers of the armed forces. Because of this policy, all family members of anyone allegedly involved in the 1965 incident had difficulty finding employment, not only at government offices, but also in society in general.

The stigma against Gerwani was specifically designed to prevent


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women from being involved in politics. Gerwani became a term to mock a woman who voiced her views on social issues, especially regarding injustices experienced by women. This stigma has also been used to intimidate women human rights defenders today, to stop their attempts to fulfill women’s human rights, especially for women victims of violence. This threat is particularly felt among women human rights defenders who work on issues of violence that question women’s morality, such as coerced wearing of the veil, violence against women sex workers, violence against homosexual women, and pornography.

Despite the collapse of the New Order and elimination of the ET code on citizenship cards under the leadership of President Abdurrahman Wahid, the space for these victims to share their experiences with the Indonesian people is still very limited. The stigma against the PKI and Gerwani is still very much alive and is often used to silence critical voices in society. This stigma also hampers reconciliation efforts at the community level. Young people promoting reconciliation often face opposition from their families. Many people immediately close the space for dialogue because they still internalize the vicious image of the PKI that was propagated by the

New Order. Many victims, either of their own will or because they are asked by family members, remain silent regarding the violence they experienced because they fear ostracism or even revenge. In Bali, the silencing has become stronger because perpetrators of the killings and detentions are members of the victims’ own families.

Some former women prisoners have died. Many of those still alive are now old, but have not been given a lifetime identity card, a right that should be granted to every citizen over 65 years old. A number of them suffer permanent health problems, including reproductive disorders, because of the severe torture they experienced during detention. Many have difficulty accessing health services because they are poor. Some even live alone because their family members are still too afraid or ashamed to accept them due to the stigma and discrimination strongly attached to Gerwani.

May 1998 Tragedy, Ten Years After

Several times I was urged to ask the victim to testify. Some argued that the testimony is for the long-term benefit of human rights enforcement in Indonesia. But it’s not as simple as that, and so I

160

replied, “If you or your daughter or your sister had been the victim, would you let her testify?”

Victim’s counselorTime to Settle the Sense of Security : A Step Toward

the Fulfillment of Right for Women Victim of Sexual Violence in May 1998 Riot


Ten years after the May 1998 Tragedy, Komnas Perempuan found that the women who experienced sexual violence during the riots remained silent and still did not want to testify in public. Based on information from the victims’ counselors, Komnas Perempuan has identified seven reasons for the women’s silence. The most important factor is the state’s attitude towards the cases of sexual violence during the May 1998 riots. They feel the state prolongs impunity for perpetrators by allowing the controversy about sexual violence during the riots to persist, and by ignoring the recommendations of the May 1998 Joint Fact-finding Team. They also feel that in general the state has never shown it is serious about handling cases of human rights violations as seen by the half-hearted legal process in the case of the murder of Munir, a prominent human rights defender.

The second factor is the law. Both substantially and practically, it remains doubtful that Indonesian law can provide justice for the women victims of sexual violence in the May 1998 riots. Although a witness and victim protection mechanism exists, it has not yet earned the trust of the women victims and their communities. Furthermore, the current criminal law’s definition of rape is limited and its rules of evidence place an unjust burden on the victim.

Historical factors also contribute a great deal to the silence of the victims. Riots targeted at the Chinese community occurred several times, but the government never made any serious effort to disclose the crimes. Not a single riot targeted at the Chinese community has been recorded in the written history of Indonesia. In fact, the New Order regime’s discriminatory policies towards Chinese allowed the crimes to occur. Although these discriminatory policies have by now been revoked, the victims’ community doubts that in the case of the May 1998 riots the state will take a different stance, particularly in relation to violence against women, which has been rarely mentioned in the history of Indonesia.

The continuing silence of victims is also influenced by cultural values or beliefs


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of the women victims and/or of their families regarding women’s position in the family and violence against women. Rape is considered bad luck that should not be discussed and also a disgrace of the woman victim. Rape is also considered karma or punishment for bad acts committed by one’s ancestors. Presenting the experience of rape in public means exposing the family’s disgrace. The social concept of women’s purity also means that the disclosure of rape, particularly of single women, is thought to cause shame for the victim.

Besides that there is also a social factor, namely that in general society did not care, showed no empathy, and even doubted the existence of victims of sexual violence in May 1998. Such attitudes were apparent in the constant demand for victims to appear in public to testify without understanding the reasons that caused victims to remain silent.

The family also plays an important role. Since the victim is a woman, the family feels obliged to protect her by making decisions for her. Because of shock, trauma, and fear of revenge by the perpetrators, some families decided to send victims away and prevent them from talking. The seventh reason relates to the personal situation of women

‘The May 1998 Needle memorial’ (‘Prasati Jarum Mei 1998’)was built to commemorate the May 1998 Tragedy. The needle and the thread symbolize the effort of sewing up the wounds caused by the losses and by the torn trust among the community in the May 1998 riots. (Jakarta, 2009; KP).

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victims following the sexual violence in May 1998. Some victims experienced trauma, some lost their memory, and one even lost her ability to speak Indonesian and could only speak her native language, Chinese. These women do not wish to remember their experiences of May 1998, and have cut off their memory of the past by changing their identities and moving to a new location; some have even left Indonesia.

Komnas Perempuan has found it is not only victims who remain traumatized and silent. The victims’ counselors, who have different backgrounds including as social workers, became counselors simply because they succeeded in winning the trust of the victims. After ten years, we found that counselors still experience trauma as a consequence of the incident experienced by the victims. Some counselors still become depressed when May draws near and become very emotional or tense when they remember the event. Others internalize the incident in a way that affects their family life. Deep disappointment due to persistent denial of the May 1998 Tragedy has led several counselors to withdraw from any social environment that reminds them of the event.

These findings are disturbing. Since the reform movement, women have

Diagram 1.

SILENT VICTIM

CULTURE

• Rape=badluck• Rape=karma • Rape=awoman’s disgrace

• Shock,trauma,shame• Fearofrevengebyperpetrator• Sendthevictimaway• Blamethevictim• Forbidthevictimfromtelling her story

• Silenceaboutattackson Chinese community

• Violenceagainstwomen during conflicts is often forgotten

HISTORY

FAMILY

• Wantstoforget/doesnot want to be reminded• Lossoflinguisticability• Death,suicide• Trauma• Changeofidentity• Wantstocutoff memories of the past• Moves,including leaving Indonesia

PER

SON

AL

SOCIETY

• Indifferencetowardsvictims/no empathy for victims

• Ethnic-basedprejudiceexists

• Demandsthatvictims

THE LA

W

• Definitionofrapeinpenal code does not accommodate the experience of victims

• Doubtfulthatenforcement of law can mete justice

• Noprovenprotectionofwitnesses or victims

THE

STAT

E

• Indicationofinvolvementas perpetrator

• Stillpermitsambivalentopinions regarding the violence

• SexualviolenceofMay ’98 as systematic discrimination is only a suspicion

Seven Factors Causing Victims’ Silence


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succeeded in pressuring the state to issue various public policies that support the fulfillment of human rights for women, for example the Law to Eliminate Domestic Violence, policies at the national and provincial levels regarding holistic services for women victims of violence, the Law to Eliminate Human Trafficking, the policy regarding a quota of 30% women in Parliament, and other policies related to gender mainstreaming. The state has also passed the Law on Witness and Victim Protection, and established an institution to implement it. The number of organizations catering to women’s needs has also grown quickly, although they tend to focus on cases of domestic violence and human trafficking. All this still has been insufficient to instill a feeling of safety for victims of the May 1998 Tragedy. Many other women victims of violence may also feel unsafe. Therefore, as a state and nation of Indonesia, we need to develop clear steps to enable all women victims of violence to obtain their full rights as victims and citizens.

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Victim Type of Violence Objectives Perpetrator

Women members of the “enemy” community

Murder, including mutilation

Intimidation; Provocation“Enemy” group; Unidentified individuals

Bombing

Sexual attack, including threats of rape and sexual harassment

Rape

Punishment; Evidence of subjugation; Intimidation Indonesian security forces in

military operations to crush “rebels”; “Enemy” group, including unidentified masses

Sexual slavery

Stripping and/or parading while nude

Genital mutilation

Women family members of the “enemy”, for example, mother, wife, daughter, and sister Torture, including rape and other

forms of sexual torture

To obtain information; Punishment; Evidence of subjugation; IntimidationWomen fighters, or members of

the “enemy” groupSecurity forces; “Enemy” group

Young and teenage women

Sexual exploitation Sexual servicesBoyfriend, especially Indonesian security forces on duty

Forced prostitutionCommunity members; State agents

Beatings in the name of morality, including enforced dress code

Symbol of community sanctity Community members

Forced marriagePrevent or cover up family disgrace due to extra-marital sexual relations

Father, uncle, or other male family members;Neighbors; Unknown individuals

Rape Exercising powerCommunity members;Unknown individuals

Women’s Vulnerability in Situations of ConflictTable 6.


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Victim Type of Violence Objectives Perpetrator

Women IDPs

Sexual harassment, including peeping

Exercising power

Community members

Rape Unidentified person

Physical, psychological, and sexual abuse

Husband

Exploitation of labor (cooking, washing, cleaning)

Obtain domestic services

Opposition group, including Indonesian security forces in military operations to crush “rebels”

Exploitation by being used as a human shield

Self-protection Community members

Women human rights defenders

Torture, including sexual tortureStop activities defending human rights

Groups in conflict, including Indonesian security forces in military operations to crush “rebels”

Abuse and other forms of intimidation

CriminalizationIndonesian law enforcement officers through application of penal code

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"We might not have the chance to see justice done. We speak up so that the young people know what had happened, and similar incidents will not happen again in the future." Message from the mothers of the 1965 Affair victims. (Jakarta, 2009; KP).

Learning From History And Future Directions 167

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LEARNING FROM HISTORY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS V

The May ’98 incident is a stain on our nation. Therefore, it must be truly exposed. It is history that must be written. Hopefully, if because of this publication, wherever the victims are, they

can see that our nation has also been hurt by what happened to them. Through this publication victims should be strengthened rather than criticize that this nation is indeed ruthless . . . We should view history realistically. This is the truth. We must bring the truth back to life so that

everyone can learn from this and make sure that similar incidents will not happen again.

counselor of victim raped during May 1998 incident who is also a teacher and spiritual leader

Komnas Perempuan recording, November 2007

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Women experienced a multi-layered discrimination because they have to fight in a world controlled by men and have to face an economy system that marginalizes the poor. "Multiple Roles" a statue by Paula Isman (Photos Documentation of Cemara 6 Gallery Café)

Learning from History

After retracing the history of Indonesian women and their experiences during major conflicts that shaped the journey of this nation over the last four decades, what kind of understanding have we reached now about violence against women? What do we define as the contexts in which violence against women occur in Indonesia so that we know how to take a strong and thorough stand to address this issue down to its root causes? What lessons have we learned from Indonesian women’s efforts in addressing discrimination and violence against women since Indonesia was first imagined in the early 20th century up till the days when Indonesia broke down into prolonged conflicts in its various regions a century later?

Rethinking Violence against Women and its Victims

When we observe carefully the experiences of various women throughout Indonesian history, we understand that violence against women was not the exception, but a recurring fact arising from one context to another that forms a pattern. Women victims of violence are not only the victims of

actions perpetrated by certain individuals in certain locations, but they are also the victims of an unjust system of power that entraps everyone, men and women. The social construct of gender roles—where men are the ones who hold power and women are their inferior companions, or even their possessions—has given men a disproportionate burden and has marginalized women in the name of women’s “nature”. This system of power stands at the center of life in the family, the society and the nation; in the world of work and business; and in all dynamics of civil, political and national life. Each of these “worlds” has its distinct dynamic of power relations that is also full of injustice and discrimination, whether based on class, race, religion, belief, or gender, or all of them combined. Thus, a poor woman from a community that holds minority beliefs will be three times more vulnerable to discrimination—she is vulnerable because of her gender identity, because of her poverty, and because of her beliefs. This layered marginalization has made women vulnerable to various forms of violence.

During the New Order era, many women experienced multi-dimensional discrimination. Besides the need to survive in a male-dominated world, women also had to face an economic system that favored the interests of


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The layered discrimination towards women was also a product of a political system in which there was no space for democracy, of militarism, and of a system managing national life that prioritized uniformity of the community’s identity. (KP).

strong capital while marginalizing the poor; a political system that left no space for democracy and was dominated by the military, militarism, and a culture of violence; and a national bureaucracy that prioritized uniformity of identity rather than social pluralism and independence. When dissatisfaction in society that resulted from various injustices met the failure of mechanisms to resolve disputes peacefully—whether through mediation or court settlements—the seeds of conflict were sown.

Women’s experiences during the New Order era show the multiple and complex facets of women’s vulnerability. For example, women’s vulnerability that had an economic dimension takes the form of women’s impoverishment and/or women’s economic dependency on men who are head of the household. This vulnerability makes women more susceptible to violence, whether perpetrated by their husbands in their own homes or by their employers at their places of work.

Women’s experiences during the New Order era also show how widespread militarism in the state and society contributed to the use of violence as a tool to “resolve” disputes while subjugating women from the home to situations of conflict. And when the

seeds of conflict finally broke into armed conflicts, women were often targeted in attacks perpetrated by the conflicting parties. For example, we know from the conflicts in Aceh, Poso, East Timor, Papua and the 1965 Incident, that women civilians, as with men civilians, were victims of various forms of violence such as killing, shooting, arbitrary arrest and detention, bombing, intimidation, forced displacement, and being held hostage. Besides all these atrocities, women also experienced particular forms of violence rarely experienced by men such as rape, sexual torture, sexual slavery and forced prostitution.

In conflict situations women are targets of violence if they are members of groups considered to be the enemy and also because they are women. For example, because women are considered a sign of a community’s sanctity, the men of that community must ensure that the women do not lose their sanctity. If that happens then the whole community loses its sanctity and dignity. In a conflict situation, attacks on enemy communities are often accompanied by attacking the women of that community, usually through rape and other forms of sexual abuse. This results in immediate counterattacks so that the fighting spreads. From women’s perspective, this means that women’s bodies become

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the battlefield of power struggles. Also because of this condition, we often see how news about violence against women is used to provoke a fighting spirit against the enemy.

Women’s experience of violence is closely related to social constructions of gender roles. Women are often used as shields (because women are weak they should not be attacked) or as an intermediary or substitute target in attacks or rescue efforts (because women are the property of husbands or fathers). For example, women are forcibly displaced from their homes when they become human shields, so that the troops fighting each other can move with relative safety from place to place. Or, during a sweeping to confiscate arms and sharp weapons, women are pushed to the front to face security forces because of the conviction that it is impossible women will be thought dangerous. There are also many women caught between conflicting parties and accused of betrayal simply because they prepare food for those considered the enemy.

What kind of women become targets of violence in a situation of armed conflict? Are they only passive women who do not take sides? There are a lot of women who play an active role in conflicts, whether as women combatants

who join in bearing arms or as women human rights defenders involved in humanitarian work. Both are targets of violence because of their activities. Many women combatants are tortured while in detention, where rape or other forms of sexual abuse are used to subjugate them. Women human rights defenders often face situations where they are caught between the conflicting parties because they provide aid to civilian victims of the conflict, are negotiators to release hostages, or are advocates for women victims of violence. Often women human rights defenders are stigmatized as Gerwani to discredit their work in the eyes of society, or to hinder continuation of their activities. Although the activities of women human rights defenders are not related to the Gerwani organization which has been long gone, stigmatization of it continues in order to eliminate women’s activsim and leadership.

In open and large-scale war, what is more often documented is violence during attacks or torture of detainees. However, women also do not escape violence perpetrated by family members or those with whom they have a personal relationship. While greater public attention often focuses on violence perpetrated by conflicting parties, including state security forces, it should be remembered that women in


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conflict areas still must deal with violence perpetrated by members of their own communities. Members of a woman’s own community will sometimes justify the violence against her, claiming it is to protect her (read: forced marriage to the perpetrator); or to affirm and defend community identity (read: forcing her to follow a certain dress code); or even to conform to tradition that, if not followed, will threaten continuation of the community’s existence (read: practice of Kawin Cina Buta or Blind Chinese Marriage).

Society often views women who have been raped as women who are damaged and defiled. Women who have been raped are contrasted with “good” women, those who are imagined as virgins until the day they marry and women who are faithful to their husbands throughout marriage. A woman who fails the ideal of a “good woman” must bear disgrace for staining the good name of her entire family and community, a burden she must carry the rest of her life. In certain cultural traditions, disgrace has to be avoided, not only because it brings shame to the family and community, but also because it disturbs harmony in them, and even brings disaster to them.

Because the burden to guard the sanctity of one’s self, of one’s family, and one’s community is placed fully on women’s shoulders, women victims are often blamed for what has happened to them. They are thought unable to take care of themselves. In such a mental framework, the community’s dignity will be restored when the woman who is the source of the disgrace can regain her status as a “good woman,” and if harmony within the community can be restored. This is why community leaders often force women victims to marry the perpetrators and conduct a traditional ceremony to restore social harmony.

In the face of all these burdens, a woman victim of violence—especially of sexual violence—often chooses to remain silent although it means she must bear the impact of the violence all alone. This is an understandable choice given that the social sanctions she must bear may be greater than the physical pain she must endure.

A Misleading Separation

Our experience in dealing with violence against women in conflict situations invites us to take a closer look at the separation between the private and the public domains. This separation gives

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rise to women’s particular vulnerability towards violence. The public domain is assumed to be men’s responsibility while the private sphere is the responsibility of women. Thus, women who play a public role, which is not seen as an extension of their domestic role, are accused of violating their nature, and should be punished. Independent women are seen to be violating women’s function as men’s companions, and so need to be subjugated. In a situation of conflict, the sexual torture of women accused of being part of the rebel force is indeed an effort to reassert women’s role in the household, not in the political domain. On the other hand, women are also punished as traitors or experience abuse precisely because they play their conventional role in the private domain, that is, providing food to their husbands or family members who happen to be part of the enemy group.

The separation of the private from the public domain also results in unique forms of violence against women in conflict situations. For example, women are forced to be sexual objects for armed men on a long-term basis and at the same time must perform household chores for the perpetrators. The institution of marriage is used—or, more accurately, misused—to deceive society and obfuscate the violence that is, in

fact, sexual slavery.

The separation of the private from the public domain can also give rise to our inability to recognize the relationship between the two domains in the struggle of power that occurs in conflict situations. The documentation regarding domestic violence that occurs during a conflict situation shows that the expression and impact of war does not end in the public sphere. The men who lose the battle use their private sphere at home to regain confidence that they still have power to control after having failed to defend it outside the home. For example, a number of victims of marital rape that happened in refugee camps said their husbands forced them to have intercourse because they were stressed as a consequence of the conflict. The wives could not refuse because they were afraid it would drive their husbands to have affairs, causing the family to split. Because they are private in nature these cases are often brought up during light conversations to amuse people rather than being handled effectively. A number of organizations that provide counseling to the community treat these cases as communication problems among spouses, so that the understanding of the violence and the way it is handled are separated from the dynamics of the armed conflict.


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The separation of the public domain from the private domain which in reality is not in line with the women’s real experiences, developed in women a particular vulnerability towards violence. Women laborers in an oil palm plantation. Korindo, Papua (Papua, 2009; KP).

Separation of the public and private domains is always accompanied by the assumption that domestic violence is less important than that commited in public sphere or by the state. An example is sexual exploitation by security personnel who build intimate relationships with local women, persuade them to have sexual intercourse with a promise of

marriage, and then, almost always, end the relationship without any consideration of the stigma and other burdens the women bear as a result of the relationship. Many consider such a case not a violation of human rights, but rather just a problem of a broken promise between two individuals in a relationship of “mutual consent”. This separation has enabled politicians, who are generally men, to utilize private issues such as marriage, women’s behavior, and pornography, as instruments to negotiate a balance of power among competing social political strengths.

Because the entire continuum of violence against women—from that in the private domain to the public domain—is not integrated in efforts to resolve and prevent conflict, women still tend to experience violence although the conflict has ended. The violence women experience in post-conflict situations is just a change of its form; abuse in detention becomes domestic violence; a substitute target in an attack on the enemy becomes being a hostage to community expressions of sanctity and morality. Since violence against women is rooted in gender-based discrimination, the handling of violence without a system of accountability and an effective prevention mechanism will eventually reinforce the unbalanced power

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relationship between men and women in the community. This situation will reduce, even deny, opportunities for women to be actively involved on an equal basis with men in rebuilding society in the post-conflict period. As a result, all efforts to reorganize the state structure to be more democratic will not touch the injustices experienced by women who constitute half of the population of this country.

The separation of private and public domains is an effective way for perpetrators to escape responsibility. It is also an effective way to keep women in a secondary position. Impunity, understood as a situation in which perpetrators of violations are not held accountable for their actions, happens when society itself justifies certain forms of violence against women. Thus, for women, impunity, which is an effective way to keep women in a secondary position, has a strong foothold in patriarchy.

So, what do we mean by handling the root causes of violence against women? It means we do not stop at demanding accountability of perpetrators and supporting the restoration of victims’ rights. It means we also work to ensure that current patterns of violence do not recur in the future. The way we do this is to address the root causes of violence,

namely all forms of discrimination embedded in various aspects of life.

Therefore, the comprehensive handling of violence against women includes the enforcement of values of justice, equality and humanity in all aspects and dimensions of life. Only when these values apply equally in the private as well as in the public domain is the eradication of all forms of violence possible. The state’s assertion of women’s rights through passage of the Anti-domestic Violence Law, and interpretation of the UN Committee Against Torture that domestic violence is a form of torture, are examples of applying these values equally.

Diversity among Indonesian men and women is a reality. The state is responsible for preserving diversity which is guaranteed in the Constitution as a foundation of the Indonesian nation, and celebrated by all Indonesians as a collective wealth. One crucial way for the state to fulfill this responsibility is to create and protect space that is not exclusively owned by a certain group or groups in society. Without this safe collective space, violence and conflict will continue to haunt us. The more expansive and clear the boundaries of collective space are, the greater the nation’s capacity to manage its diversity. For women, collective space is space where they can be true to their


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conscience, free from community demands to represent community standards of morality through the way women dress, behave or speak. To ensure that no violence is inflicted on women, safe space must be created for women to freely choose an identity that can grow and change over time. This space will also provide women the independence to fight for themselves, their families, and their communities according to their own concerns and interests.

The comprehensive handling of violence against women demands acknowledgement and treatment of women not first as wives or mothers, but as autonomous citizens. Women’s various roles in society and the nation, including the possibility of simultaneous roles as heads of families, wives, and mothers, should also be acknowledged. Women’s citizenship also crosses state borders; they are citizens of the world where struggles for gender justice and women’s rights are also waged. Special measures are needed to support and develop the political, economic, social and cultural roles played by various women in the public domain. These measures are particularly important considering the great efforts made recently to restrict women from freeing themselves from domestic roles. The restrictions also

The hard work of the women groups in their efforts to demand protection against domestic violence gave birth to Law No. 23/2004. (Jakarta, 2004; KP).

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apply to those who choose to firmly place their feet in both worlds at the same time, in the domestic life of the household and the public life of society or the state. Without a guarantee of women’s sovereignty as citizens at national and global levels, women will continue to be punished by those who think they have opposed their “nature”.

Her Story: The History of Women in Politics

We learned in Chapter II that since the moment Indonesia was imagined in the colonial era, women actively joined in developing ideas about nationhood and womanhood. These ideas were unique and authentic because they were developed from women’s experiences of that era and based on the conviction that women were pillars of civilization (see the quote from Kartini’s letter of 21 January 1901 in Chapter II). Based on these ideas, a number of women leaders took new initiatives such as opening special schools for girls. They believed that women who have sufficient knowledge—an intellect as perfect as men’s (Sri Mangoensarkoro, the Chairperson of the Second Congress of Indonesian Women in 1935)—have an obligation for the development of the nation’s character, welfare, and progress.

Once Indonesia was independent and its citizens had extensive freedom for political engagement, women’s organizations began to formulate their struggle agendas based on their analysis of women’s specific needs and interests. However, it was not long before the independence of these organizations was tested when their agendas were seen as conflicting with or not beneficial to national political interests. Chapter II, for example, pointed out how the demand to reject polygamy that was promoted by many women’s organizations was, after long debate, finally dropped at the request of national male leaders. As a result, the women’s movement accepted conditional polygamy, a political compromise. To date, half a century later, polygamy remains a controversial issue and the compromise (conditional polygamy) stated in the Marriage Law continues to be questioned and contested.

Chapter II described the dynamics within the women’s movement in the period leading up to the 1955 election. The women were restless about the tug of war between the political parties, but were unable to disentangle themselves from this situation. Meanwhile, political parties appeared keen to mobilize women’s support, but did not work to


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advance women’s demands. Almost every party formed a women’s branch just to gain votes for itself. This situation is not much different from the complaints of women legislative candidates in the latest post-New Order elections, half a century later.

After engaging in political compromises that, in the end, created confusion about the enforcement of women’s rights, finally in the early 1960s the women’s movement came to a dead end. Let us review the explanation in Chapter II, page 54

Although at the lower level cooperation among women’s organizations continued, at the national level the tension among organization leaders increased. As a result, it became very difficult to produce a specific political agenda for women. Discussion of main issues such as polygamy, divorce, underage marriage, trafficking of women and children, and socio-economic issues that demanded state intervention, waned because the women’s movement was preoccupied with efforts to alleviate internal tensions and to adjust to national political developments that were increasingly precarious.

It is then explained that, in the end, the women’s movement, born together with the nationalist movement, could not

continue the conversation to reconcile internal differences or to develop a great force among women. Thus, the women’s movement lost the power needed to overcome the big problems faced by Indonesian women.

What lessons can we now learn from details of the women’s struggle in the national political arena from the 1950s to 1960s? Currently, as opportunities for women’s political participation are increasing, the women’s movement and women politicians need to be vigilant so they are not trapped in situations that do not benefit women as happened half a century ago.

Compromises that subordinate the primary issues of the women’s movement in the interest of national politics, as happened before, are not conducive to eradicating all forms of violence against women and fulfilling women’s rights in the 21st century. The various bitter realities women experienced in various conflict situations during the last four decades—such as rape as a weapon of war, young women’s vulnerability to sexual exploitation by security forces, sexual slavery, and the silencing of women victims—require focused and thorough analysis, not only by women, but also by the entire state and nation.

Since the very beginning women were involved in formulating the concept of nationalism. Maria Ulfah Santosa attending the KNIP meeting. (Malang, 1947; CAS Oorthuys/nifa, coll. The Netherland’s photo museum/KITLV).

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Current debates about state regulations regarding the way women dress, the social behavior of single women, and women’s sexuality, show that women and the concept of womanhood within nationhood have taken a central position in national politics. The articulation of women’s specific interests, women’s leadership in various domains, and the integration of women’s issues as a central part of nation-state projects are needs that should be met without further delay. How do we ensure that the women’s

movement and the broader gender justice movement learn from the rise and fall of their predecessors so they can adequately answer the call of this century?

Future Directions

There will only be justice when the perpetrators ask my forgiveness and that of other victims for what they did in the past – when they are punished

The independency of women organizations were put to a test when their agenda came face to face with national political interests.. A meeting between women independence contenders and the first lady, Tien Soeharto. (Jakarta, 1975; Antara).

appropriately for what they did to me, in accordance with the law. [When] there is a guarantee that what happened to me will not happen to others, [and] I receive sufficient assistance so that I can attain a better life . . .

victim of sexual torture in Aceh, Seeking & Accessing Justice from One Era to the Next



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To free ourselves from the shackles we have inherited from four decades of violence against women in the journey of the Indonesian nation, the steps we take forward must include the fulfillment of victims’ rights to truth, justice, and recovery, as well as the affirmation of women’s central position in the vision of the nation and in state governance. These steps must also include building public understanding, including that of future generations at the national and global levels, about the failures and successes of the power and management systems that have been developed to uphold the dignity and fundamental rights of each individual without exception. The guarantee of non-recurrence will only be achieved if we have a new vision of the entire order of economic, political, and socio-cultural life. This new vision nurtures the concept of Indonesia as a nation of and for all people; a just economic system for everyone; democratic political engagement; and a concept of defense that prioritizes human security.

The first step should be directed towards victims and efforts to fulfill their rights to truth, justice, and recovery. Affirmation of women’s central position, and understanding of the public and of future generations, helped to guarantee that such events will not happen again.

Truth and AcknowledgmentIn connection with efforts to end impunity, international standards stipulate that human rights include the right to know the truth about past atrocities, their root causes, and their impact. For victims, the right to know the truth does not depend on whether or not their cases have been legally processed. For gender-based atrocities where the victim is a woman, the key to the truth usually lies with just two parties: the victim and the perpetrator. Since men’s voices are more greatly valued than women’s, women victims often choose to remain silent.

In facing this situation, Komnas Perempuan has made efforts to listen to victims’ reasons for remaining silent. In the process of disclosing cases of violence against women, we have found that many of the victims who are silent have in general experienced rape and other forms of sexual violence. There are victims who are still traumatized so that they are unable to talk about what happened to them, and some refuse to speak because it causes them to feel hurt again. Some hesitate because they are afraid that family members, especially husbands and children, would not understand what they have gone through and would leave them.

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Some are worried that if they reveal the violence they have experienced, society would ostracize them and their families. In situations where state agents were perpetrators of the violence, or allegedly involved in the violence, the victims are worried that disclosure of their cases would cause their families to become targets of violence. Such concerns have caused women who suffered violence because of their real or perceived membership in Gerwani to remain silent for 40 years. They are worried that if they revealed the truth about the violence they experienced, their families would be ostracized or even lose their sources of income. With these considerations, a number of women victims have chosen to cut off relations with their own past so they will not be reminded of the violence they experienced. Some wait until their children are adults, their husbands have died, or they feel they have nothing to lose, before they want to talk about their experiences. Some are only willing to speak to those they trust will help get them through their ordeal and keep their stories secret.

I didn’t tell my husband what happened. I’m very scared and humiliated. I’m not brave enough to take the risk and not brave enough to imagine what would happen if my husband found

out. There is a strong possibility that he could not accept that I had been with someone else, even though I was raped . . . Maybe we would divorce. I would be embarrassed if this happened and the community later tried to look for the reason. I also haven’t told my children, as this would cause too many problems in the future. Let me keep this to myself.

woman victim of sexual torture during the Aceh conflict Seeking & Accessing Justice from One Era to the Next


Whether or not they feel safe to speak is the main key for women victims in deciding to give testimony about what happened to them. This condition can be created in personal spaces where people who know each other are present to discuss certain cases of relevance to them. It is also important that a feeling of security for victims to testify be created politically in public spaces through official statements that invite society’s openness and acceptance, as well as reducing the opportunity for perpetrators to obstruct disclosures about their actions. In these two contexts, cultural constraints that judge and punish women victims of sexual violence as the source of disgrace for the family, community, and nation, must immediately be eliminated. The general public must be convinced that


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blaming the victim is a discriminatory act against victims and a disadvantage to the common interest to uphold truth and justice for all.

Women victims’ testimonies that reveal the truth based on their experiences should be followed by an acknowledgement that their experiences are part of a greater truth. For the purpose of nation building, acknowledgment of the truth that has been revealed will only be truly meaningful if followed by steps such as rewriting the nation’s history and disseminating it through teaching materials in schools or at sites that commemorate important moments in the journey of the nation.

Sense of Justice and the Judicial System

According to international guidelines on justice for victims of crime and abuse of power, victims must be treated humanely, and their dignity and self-respect promoted. Special efforts must be made for victims to have access to the judicial system so that their cases can be processed immediately, and it is mandatory that victims be given assistance throughout the judicial process.

For women victims of violence, the judicial system is in general considered distant, foreign, and sometimes frightening. Justice obtained through a legal and judicial process is a faraway dream, especially for women victims of sexual violence in Indonesia. Most women victims of rape in Indonesia cannot obtain justice in the current criminal justice system. Legal provisions, such as the definition of rape and its rules of evidence, are not at all sensitive to women’s vulnerability. They are products of a century ago that other countries have abandoned in order to accomodate society’s evolving sense of justice.

In order for justice to be realized, changes must be made according to victims’ sense of justice. Our legal system must be improved substantially, structurally, and in terms of legal culture so that it is more responsive to women’s unique vulnerabilities in seeking justice. These improvements are a necessity that can no longer be negotiated.

Customary settlement mechanisms and other traditional forms of mediation are often used in various conflict situations. Such settlements usually require the perpetrator to pay a fine or marry the victim. Payment of customary fines by perpetrators simply aims to cleanse the community of disgrace, and marrying off

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the victim is considered a proper measure to protect her from stigma as the source of her family’s and her community’s shame. Perpetrators often accept this kind of settlement because it frees them from legal accountability. On the other hand, such settlements revictimize victims because they are discriminatory, deny women space to articulate their sense of justice, and expose them to other forms of violence, including abandonment after marriage.

Social acceptance, especially for women victims of sexual abuse, is important in efforts to fulfill victims’ sense of justice. Acceptance by their families and social circles is the foundation they need in order to recover and build a new life. This means that reforming society’s understanding of women’s sanctity is just as important as reforming the legal system to ensure access to justice for women victims of violence.

Reparation and Empowerment

International standards for victims of gross human rights violations stipulate that victims are entitled to sufficient, effective, and immediate reparation as part of the effort to obtain justice. Reparation for victims must match the weight of the violation suffered as well as

For the women victims, the community’s acceptance was as important as the judicial process. Women victims of violence encouraging each other in the process towards the public hearing CAVR. (Timor Leste, 2003; CAVR).


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the size of damages ensuing from it. This includes restoring victims to their original condition before they were victimized, for example by returning their freedom to interact with the public, to enjoy their fundamental human rights, their identity, citizenship, employment, a place to stay, and property. Victims should also receive compensation for economic damages, including for unemployment due to physical or mental disabilities caused by the abuse. As part of the rehabilitation process, victims also must have access to medical, psychological, social, and legal services.

International standards further stipulate that victims’ sense of satisfaction is essential to their recovery. Satisfaction includes preventing the continuation of violations; full and true disclosure to the public about the incidents they experienced without endangering the victims, their families, or counselors; an official statement or court verdict that restores the dignity, reputation, and rights of victims; an apology, including acknowledgment of the facts about what actually happened and accountability for the violations committed; sanctions for perpetrators; commemoration of the incidents that occurred and steps taken to honor the victims; and educational curricula at all levels that integrates an

accurate representation of the violations committed.When Komnas Perempuan asked women victims about their hopes for the future, they always mentioned something in line with international standards regarding victims’ rights, namely a guarantee that the violations perpetrated against them will not be repeated. Provision of this guarantee demands reform of the security system and institutions, including effective controls and the enforcement of standard operational procedures that respect human rights; an independent judicial system that transcends political and economic interests; effective protection for humanitarian workers, legal advocates, human rights defenders, and journalists; human rights and political education in all social sectors and the security apparatus; a code of ethics and code of conduct conducive to fulfillment of human rights within public institutions, including law enforcement, media, medical, and business institutions; an effective mechanism to monitor social conflicts and their resolution; and, reform of laws and other policies that may contribute to gross human rights violations.

For women victims of gender-based gross human rights violations, all these measures must be based on and

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congruent with efforts to change social values and institutional roles so they no longer perpetuate inequality between men and women, and no longer perpetuate women’s subjugation by segregating the private from the public domain. Such changes are needed to ensure that all reparation initiatives on behalf of victims do not perpetuate gender inequality and injustice. There are already too many protectionist initiatives that actually restrict mobility and self-determination for victims and women in general. For example, there are situations where community leaders, parents, and/or the government, issue regulations that restrict the way women victims dress, that force victims to marry the perpetrators, and that prohibit women from free social interaction, all in the name of “protecting” women victims.

Reparation steps for women victims must be in line with and not separated from broader efforts to empower women politically, socially, and economically. Ultimately, reparation for women victims of violence will only be realized when their communities, as well as the social and state institutions that influence their lives, also participate in reform of the nation-state so that it guarantees equality, justice, and humanity for all citizens without exception.

From Iboe Bangsa to Women Citizens

How do Indonesian women imagine their roles in achieving the nation’s goals to create a just, prosperous, and peaceful life for all? When Indonesia was just born, women leaders imagined their role as Iboe Bangsa, mother of the nation. Now,

Disclosure of the truth was also a means of supporting and increasing the capacity of the women from the victim’s community. Discussion in one of documentator’s barracks about the findings on the cases of violence against women happening in their own environment. (Aceh, 2005; KP).


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more than half a century later, having experienced a period full of violence that began with the emergence of the New Order regime in 1965 and continued until the day it collapsed in 1998, Indonesian women realize the need to emphasize that a woman’s role is not just as a mother, what more just as a wife. Policies and regulations issued during the New Order era institutionalized women’s uniform role as mothers and wives who accompany their husbands who are head of the household. This institutionalization had led to various restrictions on space and opportunities for women to develop as economic, political, and social-cultural actors in both societal and state domains. Data on the Human Development Index (HDI) in Indonesia and achievement of Millennium Development Goals clearly show that these restrictions are detrimental not only to women but to the entire Indonesian nation.

In reality, Indonesian women of the 21st century hold multiple roles. From experiences of violence that took place across Indonesia over the last four decades, we know that women became targets of violence and attack because of their role as humanitarian workers, as soldiers who participated in combat, as unmarried young women, as well

as being the wives or mothers of the enemy. Many women must also be the main breadwinners for their families and are often single parents. Therefore, they need to work in and outside their homes, day and night, and even go across country borders, mainly to become domestic workers in Asian and Arab countries. Some women also hold leadership positions in state and social institutions where they are able to realize their ideas and take positions regarding justice, democracy, welfare, nationalism, and humanity in all aspects of life. This reality demands that we, as women, as a conscientious public, and as responsive citizens, affirm the plurality of women and the diversity of their roles.

If women’s role as Iboe Bangsa is no longer appropriate for Indonesia in the 21st century, what term can reflect women’s diversity and sovereignty through the ups and downs of the nation-state’s journey? Citizenship is a concept that can liberate us from rigid and inhibiting distinctions between public and private, or state and non-state domains. The concept of citizenship, first and foremost, treats all people as equal members of a community they have joined of their own free will. This community could be as small as a family and neighborhood, or as large as

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or by the state. As a woman citizen of a state as well as the global community, she participates in demanding accountability for all violatations of human rights, wherever and towards whomever they occur. Women citizens actualize universal values of human civilization, support development of a just economic system, create a tradition of democracy from the household to the parliament, and take a stand on all forms of violence, discrimination, and other violations of human rights. To realize this, women citizens, wherever they are, continually develop their capacities, power, and strength to fight for justice and equality for all.

Finally, fellow citizens and the state need to acknowledge women’s equality and their contributions to the whole life of the state and the nation., All the ups and downs of women’s work and experiences need to be recorded in the official history of the nation. Society needs to affirm women’s equality in various ways, such as guaranteeing that women are meaningfully involved in decision-making processes as well as in cultural and customary rituals. The nation and state must ensure that women’s work, experience, and leadership will be continually recognized as an inseparable part of the nation’s and humanity’s

a nation with borders and a universal human civilization. Each member of the community is an autonomous individual with his or her own uniqueness, who also come together to acknowledge and share responsibility for nurturing the sustainability and purpose of this unity. Although the state plays an important role, it is not the only party that holds authority or has meaning. Citizens interact independently and equally with the state and the community through various dynamic social networks that extend across public-private domains, and religious, racial, and ethnic borders. The Constitution gives state guarantees to each of its citizens while the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts the fundamental rights of each human being. Women also have membership in a global sisterhood that is fighting for equality and justice for all.

As a citizen engaged in all aspects of life, what stand should a woman take towards her country and state? Learning from the past, many cases of violence against women were perpetrated in the name of national unity and state interests. As an independent citizen, a woman must continually develop her awareness and take a stand on the injustice around her, including injustice perpetrated in the name of the nation

struggle to create justice, peace, and prosperity for all.

For the women to participate optimally, they do not only need an opportunity to be involved in decision making, but they also need to be freed from the normative role as mother and housewife only. (Jakarta, 2008; Antara).

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HERE WE STAND

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TAKING A STAND

Women citizens is a sovereign figure, has its peculiarities of each, recognize and be responsible for maintaining the sustainability and usefulness of this togetherness (Jakarta, 1998; Antara)

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APPENDIX 1

Steps towards Truth, Reparation, and Justice to Address the Root Causes and Impact of Four Decades of Violence against Women in Indonesia

Komnas Perempuan RecommendationsNovember 2009

No. Issue Steps for 1 Year Steps for 5 Years

1 TRUTHIncrease understanding of the public and victims’ communities about all forms of violence against women that have occurred during four decades of Indonesian history, and about the root causes of the problem.

The government develops curricula about Indonesian history for schools and universities that include the history of women’s struggles and violence against women in accordance with Komnas Perempuan findings.

The government involves actors of women’s history, both individuals and organizations, in the development and maintenance of an education center on the national history of Indonesian women.

The Indonesian government and Parliament issue a gender-sensitive law on truth and reconciliation based on input from communities of victims of human rights violations and human rights defenders, including women, and in line with international standards regarding victims’ rights.

Improve representations of women’s image and roles as portrayed in various important events of Indonesian history.

The government supplements the representation of women’s image and roles in the national museums at Monas (the National Monument) and Lubang Buaya (Crocodile Pit), using new knowledge acquired by Komnas Perempuan.

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2 REPARATIONGive women victims of grave human rights violations sufficient, effective, and immediate compensation, restitution, and rehabilitation in accordance with international standards.

In collaboration with relevant national com-missions such as Komisi Nasional Lansia (National Commission for Sr. Citizens) and Komnas Perempuan, the President takes special measures to give government aid to women victims who are senior citizens and to others needing immediate assistance.

The government establishes and implements gender-sensitive policies on compensation, restitution, and rehabilitation based on knowledge generated by Komnas Perempuan.

Fulfill a sense of satisfaction and relief for women victims in relation to past incidents of social-political violence.

The President issues an official and public statement to restore the self-esteem and dignity of women victims and their families.

The government and society encour-age and strengthen social initiatives to launch a national campaign to “Stop Blaming Victims” initiated by Komnas Perempuan.

The government and society give a public role in national ceremonies such as on Independence Day, National Awakening Day, and Kartini Day, to women victims of violence and to women who have struggled over the years so they can join in developing critical awareness and national resilience.

The government and all relevant sec-tors, together with Komnas Perempuan, and giving an active role to society and to cross-institutional collaboration, develop a comprehensive and effective reparation system for women victims.

Provide a guarantee, in the form of concrete measures, to prevent the recurrence of violence and human rights violations.

The government and the Parliament compre-hensively integrate women’s experiences and a gender perspective in the concept of and ef-forts to reform security and police institutions.

The government develops an effective mechanism to research, improve, or repeal regulations and laws at the national, sectoral, and regional levels to prevent all forms of discrimination and violence against women, including against women from minority groups.

The government, the Parliament, and Komnas HAM develop a legal framework and system for the protection of human rights defenders, including women human rights defenders.

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3 JUSTICEIncrease opportunities for women victims of violence to obtain justice through a legal process.

The government and law enforcement institutions launch a national program to enhance the capacity of law enforcement officers in the public, religious and military judicial systems, as well as in the ad hoc human rights judicial system, to ensure that justice is realized in cases of violence against women.

The government and law enforcement institutions develop a national standard regarding due diligence to address cases of violence against women in accordance with international standards

The government and the Parliament support the strengthening of legal aid with a gender perspective for women victims of violence through ratification of the Bill on Legal Aid (RUU Bantuan Hukum).

The government and the Parliament draft and ratify a national legal framework that provides effective and just protection to victims of sexual crimes, violence, and harassment.

Prevent revictimization of women victims of violence who are seeking justice.

The government and law enforcement institutions provide a legal framework to accommodate the role of victims’ counselors in court proceedings, including through Supreme Court policies.

The government and the Parliament strengthen the role of the Witness and Victim Protection Agency in handling cases of violence against women and handling women witnesses/victims.

Fulfill a sense of justice for women victims of violence.

The President takes measures to revoke state policies that reinforce the stigma of women victims and that create conditions so that victims cannot enjoy their rights as citizens.

The state imposes adequate legal and administrative sanctions on perpetrators of human rights violations, including gender-based crimes.

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Most readings in this list have been used as references and have been helpful sources of information that enriched the process of writing this book. Information about other resources has been added to aid readers who wish to broaden and deepen their understanding of the issues discussed in this book.

GENERAL

Selected Human Rights Instruments

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United Nations General Assembly 1999. Declaration on the right and responsibility of individuals, groups and organs of society to promote and protect universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. UNGA Res 53/144.

________________. 22006. Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparations for victims of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law. UNGA Res 60/147.

________________. 2009. Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development. A/HRC/12/L.27.

Orentlicher, Diane. 2005. Updated set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity. Addendum in the report of the independent expert to update the set of principles to combat impunity. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1. United Nations Economic and Social Council.

Republik Indonesia. 1958. Ikut serta negara Republik Indonesia dalam seluruh konvensi Jenewa tanggal 12 Agustus 1949. Undang-Undang 59 Tahun 1958.

_______________. 1984. Undang-Undang 7 Tahun 1984 tentang pengesahan konvensi mengenai penghapusan segala bentuk diskriminasi terhadap wanita (CEDAW).

APPENDIX 2

READING LIST

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CHAPTER II

History of the Nationalist Movement and History of the Women’s Movement (General)

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Women’s Struggle in the Colonial Era

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Boekoe Peringatan Konggres Perempoean Indonesia II di Djakarta, 20-24 Juli 1935.Djojopuspito, Suwarsih. 2000. Manusia bebas. Jakarta: Penerbit Djembatan.Fitriyanti. 2001. Roehana Koeddoes: Perempuan Sumatra Barat. Jakarta: Yayasan

Jurnal Perempuan.Pane, Armijn. 2008. Habis gelap terbitlah terang. Jakarta: Balai Pustaka.Putra, I Nyoman Darma. 2003. Wanita Bali tempo doeloe: Perspektif masa kini.

Gianyar: Yayasan Bali Jani.Toer, Pramoedya Ananta. 2006. Panggil aku Kartini saja. Jakarta: Lentera Dipantara.Walanda, A.P. Matuli. 1983. Ibu Walanda Maramis: Pejuang wanita Minahasa.

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Wiriaatmadja, Rochiati. 1985. Dewi Sartika. Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan.

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Martyn, Elizabeth. 2005. The women’s movement in post-colonial Indonesia: Gender and nation in a new democracy. New York: RoutledgeCurzon.

Rahayu, Ruth Indiah. 2005. “Militerisme Orde Baru dan ideologi koncowingking: Pengukuhan ideologi perempuan Indonesia secara pemaknaan ksatria Jawa.” Paper presented at Konferensi Warisan Otoritarianisme I, Yogyakarta, 17-19 November 2005.

Soekarno, Dr. Ir. 1951. Sarinah: Kewadjiban wanita dalam perdjoangan Republik Indonesia. Cetakan ke-2. Jakarta: Jajasan Pembangunan Nasional.

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CHAPTER III

History of the New Order, Women in the New Order Era (General)

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Exploitation of Women’s Labor

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Management of Natural Resources

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The May 1998 Tragedy

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Rahmany, Dyah. 2001. Rumah geudong: Tanda luka orang Aceh. Jakarta: Lembaga Studi Pers dan Pembangunan (LSPP).

Yayasan Penguatan Partisipasi, Inisiatif dan Kemitraan Masyarakat Indonesia (Yappika). 2008. Aliansi, media penguatan masyarakat sipil: Mimpi tentang Aceh baru 45 (xiix). Jakarta: Yappika.

__________. Aliansi, media penguatan masyarakat sipil 45 (L). Jakarta: Yappika.

Papua

Departemen Kesehatan Republik Indonesia. 2009. Interaksi: Save Papua, save lost generation. Jakarta: Departemen Kesehatan.

Giay, Benny. 2006. Pembunuhan Theys: Kematian HAM di tanah Papua. Yogyakarta: Galangpress.

Hermawan, J. Budi. 2009. Laporan praktek penyiksaan di Aceh dan Papua selama 1998–2007. Jakarta: Imparsial.

Irian Jaya Crisis Center. 2005. Pemekaran dan otonomi khusus wilayah Papua: Kumpulan perundang-undangan. Jakarta: Irian Jaya Crisis Center.

La Pona. 2002. Menggagas tempat yang aman bagi perempuan: Kasus di Papua. Yogyakarta: Pusat Studi Kependudukan dan Kebijakan UGM.

Majelis Rakyat Papua (MRP). 2007. Media cultural “Sekilas Langkah MRP”. Jayapura: Sekretariat MRP.

Osborne, Robin. 2001. Kibaran Sampari: Gerakan pembebasan OPM dan perang rahasia di Papua Barat. Jakarta: Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat (ELSAM).

Pokja Papua. 2006. Inkonsistensi dan separatisme Jakarta: Mengapa tanah Papua terus bergolak? Jakarta: Pokja Papua.

Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian (SKP) Jayapura. Memoria passionis di Papua: Potret sosial, politik, dan HAM sepanjang 2004. Jayapura: SKP Keuskupan Jayapura.

Soehoed, A.R. 2005. Jilid I: Sejarah pengembangan pertambangan P.T. Freeport Indonesia di propinsi Papua: Membangun tambang dari ujung dunia. Jakarta: Aksara Karunia

204

____________. 2005. Jilid 2: Sejarah pengembangan pertambangan P.T. Freeport Indonesia di propinsi Papua: Mengembangkan tambang kelas dunia di atas bumi. Jakarta: Aksara Karunia.

_____. 2005. Jilid 3: Sejarah pengembangan pertambangan P.T. Freeport Indonesia di propinsi Papua: Tambang dan pengelolaan lingkungannya. Jakarta: Aksara Karunia.

_____. 2005. Jilid 4: Sejarah pengembangan pertambangan P.T. Freeport Indonesia di propinsi Papua: Pertambangan dan pembangunan daerah. Jakarta: Aksara Karunia.

Sugandi, Yulia. 2009. Analisis konflik dan rekomendasi kebijakan mengenai Papua. Jakarta: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES).

Tebay, Neles. 2009. Dialog Jakarta Papua, sebuah perspektif Papua. Jakarta: Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian (SKP) Jayapura.

Tekege, Petrus P.T. 2007. Perempuan Papua: Dulu, sekarang, dan masa depan dalam fenomena pembangunan. Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan.

Tim Sintese. 2006. Sintese kapasitas pembangunan Papua. Jayapura: Tim Sintese.UNDP. n.d. Perikehidupan masyarakat dan keadaan lembaga kemasyarakatan di

Papua, Indonesia: Suatu gambaran dari LSM. UNDP.Wattie, Anna Marie. 2002. Belenggu adat dan kekerasan terhadap perempuan.

Yogyakarta: Pusat Studi Kependudukan dan Kebijakan Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM).

Maluku

Agustiana, Endah Trista and Maria Pakpahan. 2004. Women and peace-building, Central Sulawesi and North Maluku: A thematic assessment. Jakarta: UNDP.

Brown, Graham. 2005. Overcoming violent conflict: Peace and development analysis in Maluku and North Maluku. Jakarta: CPRU-UNDP.

ISAI. 2004. Kajian tematis peran media dalam pembangunan perdamaian dan rekonsiliasi Sulawesi Tengah, Maluku, dan Maluku Utara. Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi (ISAI).

Malik, Ichsan. 2003. Bakubae: Gerakan dari akar rumput untuk penghentian kekerasan di Maluku. Jakarta: Bakubae Maluku.

205

Noveria, Mita, Aswatini Raharto, and Haning Romdiati. 2003. Pengungsi di Maluku Utara dan Sulawesi: Upaya penanganan menuju kehidupan mandiri. Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan.

Pieris, John. 2004. Tragedi Maluku. Jakarta: Yayasan Obor.Salampessy, Zairin dan Thamrin Husain. 2001. Ketika semerbak cengkih tergusur

asap mesiu: Tragedi kemanusiaan Maluku di balik konspirasi militer, kapitalis birokrat, dan kepentingan elit politik. Jakarta: Tapak Ambon.

Poso, Central Sulawesi

Amidhan. 2005. Poso: Kekerasan yang tak kunjung selesai. Jakarta: Komnas HAM.Kontras. 2004. Ketika moncong senjata ikut berniaga: Ringkasan eksekutif

keterlibatan militer dalam bisnis di Bojonegoro, Boven Digul, dan Poso. Jakarta: Kontras.

Lasahido, Tahmidy. 2003. Suara dari Poso. Jakarta: Yayasan Penguatan Partisipasi, Inisiatif dan Kemitraan Masyarakat Indonesia (Yappika).

Suhardi, Ahmad. 2006. Tragedi Poso. Rawabungan, Poso: Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia.

Jemaah Ahmadiyah

Muryadi, Wahyu (ed.). 2005. Ahmadiyah: Keyakinan yang digugat. Jakarta: Pusat Data dan Analisa Tempo.

The 1965 Incident

Cribb, Robert. 2004. Pembantaian PKI di Jawa dan Bali 1965-1966. Jakarta: Matahati.

Fic, Victor M. 2005. Kudeta 1 Oktober 1965, Sebuah studi tentang konspirasi. Jakarta: Yayasan Obor.

Hindley, Donald. 1964. The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963. Berkeley: University of California.

Kaligis, O. C. and Rum Aly, eds. 2007. Simtom politik 1965: PKI dalam perspektif pembalasan dan pengampunan. Jakarta: Kata Hasta Pustaka.

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Nadia, Ita. 2007. Suara perempuan korban tragedi '65. Yogyakarta: Galangpress.Roosa, John. 2008. Dalih pembunuhan massal: Gerakan 30 September dan kudeta

Suharto. Jakarta: Hasta Mitra and Institut Sejarah Sosial Indonesia.Roosa, John, Ayu Ratih, and Hilmar Farid, eds. 2004. Tahun yang tak pernah berakhir:

Memahami pengalaman korban 65, esai-esai sejarah lisan. Jakarta: Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat (Elsam), Institut Sejarah Sosial Indonesia (ISSI), and Tim Relawan untuk Kemanusiaan (TRuK).

Tungal, Hadi Setia. 2000. Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia nomor 29 tahun 1999 tentang pengesahan konvensi internasional tentang penghapusan segala bentuk diskriminasi rasial tahun 1965. Jakarta: Harvarindo.

Zegepral. Pengaduan Korban Kekerasan 1965 kepada Komnas Perempuan, Jakarta 2. VCD. Jakarta: Komnas Perempuan, 2006.

KOMNAS PEREMPUAN DOCUMENTS

General

2002. Peta kekerasan: Pengalaman perempuan Indonesia.2004. Perjalanan perempuan Indonesia menghadapi kekerasan.2007. Human Rights Defenders : Struggling under Pressure2007. Hal-hal penting mengenai pelaksanaan Konvensi CEDAW di Indonesia.

Laporan independen Komnas Perempuan dipersiapkan untuk Laporan Indonesia gabungan periode keempat dan kelima kepada Komite CEDAW.

2009. Memecah kebisuan: Agama mendengar suara perempuan korban kekerasan demi keadilan. Sebuah seri terdiri dari tiga buku: Respon Muhammadiyah, Katolik, Protestan.

Annual Reports

2001. Laporan tiga tahun pertama.2003. Gambaran nasional kekerasan terhadap perempuan 2002: Kumpulan data dari

lembaga pengadaan layanan di berbagai daerah.2004. Dampak kelambanan pengesahan RUU A-KDRT: 303 lembaga membantu

perempuan korban kekerasan tanpa dukungan landasan hukum.2005. Location of Violence Againts Women 2004 : Home, Environment of Life :

Yard and Garden

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2006. KDRT & pembatasan atas nama kesusilaan: Kekerasan terhadap perempuan 2007. In Homes, Refugee Camps and The Judicial System : Violence Againts Women

from Region to Region.2008. Sepuluh tahun reformasi. 2009. Women’s Vulnerability to Economic & Sexual Violence : At Home, Educational

Institution and State Agency.


2000. Perdagangan perempuan, migrasi perempuan, dan kekerasan terhadap perempuan: Penyebab dan akibatnya. Laporan Pelapor Khusus PBB tentang kekerasan terhadap perempuan. Seri dokumen kunci 3. Buruh migran Indonesia: Penyiksaan sistematis di dalam dan luar negeri. Laporan Indonesia kepada Pelapor Khusus PBB untuk HAM, Kuala Lumpur, 2 Juni 2002.

2003. Indonesian Migrant Workers ; Systematic Abuse at Home and Abroad. Report Indonesia to UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights, Kuala Lumpur, June 2, 2002.

2006. Buruh migran tak berdokumen: Sebuah strategi perempuan mempertahankan kehidupan. Studi kasus lima buruh migran perempuan Indonesia yang bekerja di Malaysia.

2006. Unsatisfactory : Reform is Empeded by the Bureaucracy. Notes on the Preliminary Monitoring of Presidential Decree No. 06/2006 Concerning the Policy to Reform the System of the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers.

2006 Developing Understanding through an Inter-Cultural Dialogue on Protecting Indonesian Migrant Workers in the Middle East. Report on the Inter-Regional Dialogue between Human Rights Advocates in Indonesia and the Middle East. Jakarta, July 2 – 7 2006.

2006. Recognise and Protect: Undocumented Migrant Workers and Women Migrant Domestic Workers. Appeal from The Jakarta Process On The Human Rights of Migrants to the UN High – Level Dialogue on Migration and Development. New York, 14-15 September 2006

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On Conflicts

1999. Mission to Indonesia and East Timor. Report from the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its cause and consequences.

.1999. Temuan Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta Peristiwa Kerusuhan Mei 1998. Laporan Tim Relawan untuk Kemanusiaan. Seri dokumen kunci 2.

2003. Laporan investigasi pelanggaran hak asasi manusia di Timor Timur, Maluku, Tanjung Priok, dan Papua 1999-2001. Kumpulan ringkasan eksekutif. Seri dokumen kunci 4.

2006. The May 19998 Tragedy in the Course of the Nation’s Journey : in denial!.2004. Kondisi HAM perempuan di komunitas Buyat, Minahasa Selatan, Sulawesi

Utara. Laporan hasil pemantauan.2004. Kekerasan terhadap perempuan yang dilakukan dan/atau dibiarkan oleh

negara selama berlangsungnya konflik bersenjata (1997–2000). Laporan Pelapor Khusus PBB tentang kekerasan terhadap perempuan. Seri dokumen kunci 5.

2005. Kondisi HAM perempuan petani pasca penangkapan dan peristiwa 10 Maret 2004 di Manggarai, NTT. Laporan hasil pemantauan.

2006. Pemerkosaan, perbudakan seksual, dan bentuk-bentuk lain kekerasan seksual. Laporan Komisi Penerimaan, Kebenaran, dan Rekonsiliasi (CAVR) Timor-Leste. Seri dokumen kunci 8.

2006. As Victims, Also Survivors. Collection on Women IDPS’ Experiences and Voices of Violence and Discrimination in Aceh..A report on decumnetaion findings on the status of women IDPS’ Humna Rights inAceh.

2007. Perempuan pengungsi bertahan dan berjuang dalam keterbatasan: Kondisi pemenuhan HAM perempuan pengungsi Aceh, Nias, Jogjakarta, Porong, NTT, Maluku dan Poso. Laporan Bersama.

2007. Gender-based crimes against humanity: Listening to the voice of women victims of 1965.

2007. Seeking & accessing justice: Acehnese women’s experiences from one era to the next. (aku sesuaikan ini dengan judul asli yang ada di buku ‘aslinya’ Karen. Namun kalau dirasa baik untuk tetap menggunakan ‘through time’, bagaimana menurutmu??

2008. Time to Settle the Sense of Security: A step towards the fulfillment of the rights of women victims of sexual violence in the May 1998 riots. Report on

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the documentation of Komnas Perempuan’s Special Rapporteur on the sexual violence in the May 1998 riots and its impact.

2009. Kondisi tahanan perempuan di Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. Sebuah hasil pemantauan Komnas Perempuan.

2009. Kondisi tahanan perempuan di Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. Sebuah hasil pemantauan Komnas Perempuan.

2009. Perempuan dan anak Ahmadiyah: Korban diskriminasi berlapis. Laporan pemantauan HAM Komnas Perempuan.

2009. In the Name of Regional Autonomy : The Institutionalisation of Discrimination in Indonesia. A monitoring report by Komnas Perempuan on women’s constitutional rights in 16 districts/municipalities in 7 provinces.

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