Robert Van Trombley

THE BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO AND THE PENNSYLVANIA VOLUNTEER

REGIMENTS

Trombley, 1

THE BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO AND THE PENNSYLVANIA VOLUNTEER

REGIMENTS

The battle of Cerro Gordo is among the crowning achievements of General Winnfield

Scott’s military career. Few men could have defeated an army that not only outnumbered them,

but also had the advantage of the high ground and fortifications. Among those that bravely

fought for Scott that day were the first and second Pennsylvania Volunteer Regiments. While

they were only in combat for less than an hour that day, their actions in that short amount of time

showed the world what the of Pennsylvania were made of.

As early as October 2 1846, five months before Scott’s army first set foot on the beach of

Mocambo Bay, two and a half miles southeast of Vera Cruz, the Mexican Government began

issuing orders to fortify key natural and manmade strong points along the Federal Highway, the

only route from Vera Cruz to Mexico City that could accommodate the massive siege train that

would be necessary to take Mexico City. Yet critical shortages of money, resources, manpower,

and skilled engineers resulted in little if any real progress being made prior to Scott’s landing at

Vera Cruz. On his, return to Mexico City from La Angostura, on the twentieth of March, Santa

Anna turned his full attention to fortifying and occupying key points along the Federal Highway

for the purpose of either crushing of slowing down the invading American Army.1

On April 2, three days after the news of the fall of Vera Cruz reached Mexico City, Santa

Anna named General Anaya substitute President and took to the field once more to take personal

control of the defenses along the Federal Highway. On reaching Perote Santa Anna received a

1 Justin H. Smith, The War With Mexico: The Classic History of the Mexican-American War (St Petersburg, FL: Red

FL: Red and Black Publishers, 2011), 2: 39-40; Irving W. Levinson, Wars Within War: Mexican Guerrillas, Domestic Elites, and

the United States of America, 1846-1848 (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 2005), 30.

Trombley, 2

dispatch from General Canalizo informing him that when the news of the defeat of Vera Cruz

reached the nearly 1000 men toiling to fortify the National Bridge 800 dropped what they were

doing and fled. In their hast, they abandoned four large caliber pieces.2

After a brief respite at his great hacienda of El Encero, located eight miles south of

Jalapa, Santa Anna continued south paying close attention to the terrains around Corral Falso,

Cerro Gordo, and Plan de Rio. Santa Anna hoped that one of these locations would prove

suitable enough for him to make a consolidated stand. Many of his commanders including

Lieutenant- Colonel D. Manuel Robles; the engineer whose repairs to the fortifications at Vera

Cruz allowed the Mexicans trapped behind them to hold out for as long as they did; suggested

that Santa Anna make his stand at Corral Falso. Corral Falso was seen as the most defensible

position for there the National Highway passed through a narrow craggy defile that could not be

out flanked. Going against the views of his subordinates Santa Anna decided to make his stand

at Cerro Gordo. He believed it was a superior position to Corral Falso for not only was it just as

unflankable as Corral Falso; a position not shared by all his subordinates; but the plain that laid

in front of it was considered by most to be the farthest inland that one would expect to be at risk

of contracting yellow fever during the yearly yellow fever season. This meant that if he held

Cerro Gordo long enough the Americans would begin to succumb to the effects of yellow fever

and begin dropping like flies. Once the American army was sufficiently decimated by yellow

fever, he could finish them off at his leisure.3

Santa Anna had good reasons to feel that he could make a stand at Cerro Gordo A half a

mile below the hamlet of Cerro Gordo the National Highway descends into a ravine that rapidly

deepens. To the left of the ravine rose a hill named El Telegrafo (named so on account of the

2 Levinson, 33-65.

3 Smith, The War With Mexico, 2: 41-44; Ramon Alcaraz et al., The Other Side or, Notes for the History of the War

between Mexico and the United States, trans. Albert C. Ramsey (New York: J. Wiley, 1850), 199-200.

Trombley, 3

an old single tower located on its peak) which, though low and easily climbable from the

direction of Cerro Gordo, was five to six hundred feet high and extremely steep on the opposite

side. Directly in front of the steep sloping side of El Telegrafo, rose another hill, La Atalaya,

which because of its size obscured most of what could be seen from atop El Telegrafo. To the

right of the ravine the Plateau that Cerro Gordo rested upon continues for more than a mile,

ending finally in three finger ridges. These three finger ridges may be designated From South to

north as 1,2,3 run parallel to the highway and more or less completely command it. These three

finger ridges were connected to a section of the highway to their rear near the head of the ravine

by an old underused road. Santa Anna believed that if he was able to fortify the key heights on

both sides of the ravine Scott would have to either attack his defenses straight on or give up on

his plan to advance on to Mexico city for Santa Anna believed that there was no way Scott could

out flank Cerro Gordo . His right flank was secured by a 500 foot deep canyon whose extremely

steep sides were carved out over the millenniums by the Rio del Plan that flows at its bottom and

his right flank by the rocky and chaparral dominated terrain that lay beyond El Telegrafo and La

Atalaya.4

Once Santa Anna made up his mind that Cerro Gordo was where he was to make his

stand he began at once to reinforce already begun fortifications and create completely new ones.

His first priority was to fortify the three finger ridges with their unquestionable dominance of the

road, for he believed that Scott would not venture to far from the road for he believed that Scott

would not be able to maneuver his artillery over the rough terrain that flanked both sides of the

road. On each finger ridge was built a parapet.5 According to Mexican sources their parapets’

4 Smith, The War With Mexico, 2:41-44; David A. Clary, Eagles and Empire: The United States, Mexico, and the

Struggle for a Continent (New York: Bantam, 2009), 308-309; John Edward Weems, To Conquer a Peace: The War Between

the United States and Mexico (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1974), 361.

5 Smith, The War With Mexico, 2:41-44; Alcaraz, 200-201.

Trombley, 4

“Serve only to mark the lines in which the pieces of artillery were to be placed, and the infantry

formed.”6 The parapet on ridge 1 was entrusted to Colonel Badillo. At his disposal were 250

men of the companies of the National Guard from Jalapa, Coatepec, and Teusitlan and nine

pieces of varying caliber. The command of parapet upon ridge 2 was given to naval captain D.

Buenaventura Araujo. To defend this position he had 400 men of Battalion Libertad, and 300

men and eight pieces of Artillery form the Battalion of Zacapoastla. The defenses upon ridge 3;

commanded by General Pinzon; were manned by elements of the Battalion of Atlixco and the 5th

Infantry which totaled 500 men and seven pieces of artillery. In addition to these three parapets

there were also two more positions erected on the right side of the side of the road. Just to the

rear of the position on ridge 1, lay the Camp of Matamoros commanded by General Pinzon. At

his disposal were 450 men and an 8-pounder from the Battalion of Matamoros and Tepeaca. At

the junction were the National Highway connects with the roads that leads from the three ridges

to their rear, a barricade of more than 900 bayonets were erected across the National Highway.

To defend this barricade General de la Vega was given command of seven large guns, and 900

men of the 6th Infantry.7

By April 17, the defenses on the right side of the road were completed and the

construction of the defenses on the left were starting to get under way. To defend the left side of

the Highway four 4- pounders were dragged up El Telegrafo and placed in a roughly constructed

breast work, which also partially enclosed the signal tower. This position was commanded by

General Vazquez and manned by 100 members of the 3rd Infantry. At the advice of his engineers

Santa Anna reluctantly placed 25 men upon La Atalaya. Those not aside to defensive positions

along the National highway; the 1st , 2nd , 3rd , and 4th Light Battalions totaling 1,700 men, and

6 Alcaraz, 201.

7 Alcaraz, 42-45; Timothy D. Johnson, A Gallant Little Army: The Mexico City Campaign (Lawrence: University Press

of Kansas, 2007), 63- 83.

Trombley, 5

the 4th and 11th of The Line totaling 780 men; were organized into a reserved forces and

encamped in and around Cerro Gordo.8

On the eleventh, General David E. Twiggs’s force crossed the National Bridge, there

they discovered the remains of a few destroyed defenses and a couple of spiked cannons missing

their limbers. By noon Twiggs’s advance, units of dragoons were already over the bridge and

emerging on the other side of the village of Plan del Rio that laid on the far side of the bridge.

As they rode out of Plan del Rio they were engaged by a unit of Mexican lances, who stay

around only long enough to fire a few shots before ridding as hard as they could towards Cerro

Gordo. Farther reconnaissance by the dragoons revealed to Twiggs that the Mexicans were

holding the pass below Cerro Gordo in force.9

The next morning Twiggs lead his force down the National Highway as if he did not

believe that a sizable force lay before him. Twiggs’s densely packed column proved to tempting

a target for the men upon the finger ridges for they open fired upon the column prematurely, thus

alarming Twiggs of the danger he was about to walk-in to. Realizing that had the Mexicans held

their fire until Twiggs’s column was within range the column most likely would have been torn

to shreds; Twiggs had his column fall back to a position further down the highway.10

That night, Twiggs began working on a plan for a frontal assault against the Mexican

ridges for the following morning. This plan alarmed many with in his ranks. They believed it

was suicide to attack the Mexican lines straight on with such a small force. Yet what could they

do but make peace with their gods. Then suddenly as if a miracle had happen, General Robert

Patterson arrived with his volunteer division consisting of two brigades, a field battery and a

8 Smith, The War With Mexico, 2:41-45; Alcaraz, 200-203; Johnson, 55-70.

9 David, 309-311; Smith, The War With Mexico, 2: 44-49; Johnson, 85-90; Weems, 361-362.

10 David, 309-311; Smith, The War With Mexico, 2: 47-49; Arthur D. Howden Smith, Old Fuss and Feathers: The Life

and Exploits of Lt.- General Winfield Scott; The Only American Commander Who Never Lost a Battle; The Only Victorious

General to Lose a Presidential Election; Patron of Lee; Protector of Lincoln; Most Inept Politicians; Strategist Statesman;

Humanitarian (New York: The Greystone Press, 1937), 277.

Trombley, 6

squad of cavalry. Everyone know that Patterson was senior in rank to Twiggs which meant

Patterson could over rule Twiggs decision to attack at dawn. Yet Patterson did not seem eager at

all at the idea of taking command of both divisions. Yet he also cringed at the idea of allowing

Pillow the second most senior officer at hand take over. As a result, he placed the entire force

under Twiggs command claiming that he was too ill to command it himself. Yet he and his

subordinates did demand that Twiggs postpone the attack for one day for their men would not be

ready to fight until that time. This Twiggs did agree to. Yet this postponement did not lift any

ones sprits though for the men knew it was only a reprieve from the inevitable. Yet after what

most have been a sleepless night and a stressful day, they finally did receive their miracle

Patterson changed his mind and took over command of both divisions to postpone the attack

until Scott showed up.11

Scott on receiving letters from Twiggs and Pillow late on April 11 in regard to Twiggs’s

proposed plan set out early the next day to take over the commanded of the attack for himself.

By late afternoon on the fourteenth, Scott had arrived and was discussing the situation with his

subordinates. At one such meeting he was informed that prior to his arrival an army engineer by

the name of Lieutenant Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard had done some reconnaissance to the

left of the Mexican line and as a result was sure that a path could be found to out flank Cerro

Gordo. Wanting more concrete intelligence before deciding on a plan Scott ordered army

engineer Captain Robert E. Lee to recon the area and find a path to the Mexican rear. By the

sixteenth, Lee had returned from his mission and with promising news. He had not only found a

route around Santa Anna’s left flank, but a route that the army could march along without being

seen by Santa Anna’s forces , except maybe in one or two locations. The only problem with the

route was that it would need to be widen in a few locations and that it terminated abruptly in

11 David, 310-311; Smith, The War with Mexico, 2: 48-49; Johnson, 70-81.

Trombley, 7

thick chaparral just shy of reaching the National Highway, as a result if this route was chosen the

army would have to carve out the final leg of the route themselves.12

Satisfied with what he heard Scott ordered that work begin at once on improving the

road so that his canons could use it and that the least leg should begin to be cut. By about 9

o’clock that night after much discussion Scott and his subordinate sketched out a plan of attack

that would commence on the morning of the eighteenth.13 Smith summed up Scott’s plan

brilliantly stating “ its essential point was, in accordance with Scott’s announced aim, to gain the

highway in the Mexican rear first of all ,and then – not until then- attack in the rear and perhaps

also on the front.”14

At around 7 or 8 o’clock, on morning of the seventeenth, Twiggs and his division began

advancing down Lee’s road. Their orders were to precede undetected down Lee’s road, so that

the next morning they would be in a position to quickly seize the National Highway there by

cutting off Santa Anna’s only means of escape. Not long after leaving the comforts of the

National Highway for the rough and unleveled route Lee had discovered, the division reached a

pass that could be observed by the Mexicans. Lee then suggested that they should erect a screen

of brush to obscure their movement. Twiggs believing doings so would take up to much time,

advanced his men thought the pass in plain view of Mexicans. Now aware of the existence of

Americans on his left flank Santa Anna reinforced his position on La Atalaya. By noon, they

were in close proximity to the base of on La Atalaya. It was about at this point that Twill started

to become concerned that they might not be in the right position, as a result he order lieutenant

Gardner of the 7th Infantry to ascend a nearby hill with Company E to determine if the division

12 Smith, The War With Mexico, 2: 49-50; Weems, 364-366; Levinson, 149.

13 David, 311-313; Smith, The War With Mexico, 2: 49-50; Alfred Hoyt Bill, Rehearsal for Conflict: The War with

Mexico, 1846-1848 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), 227.

14 Smith, The War With Mexico, 2: 50.

Trombley, 8

was heading in the right direction. As they ascended, they were attack by a small contingent of

Mexicans. Seeing that company E was in trouble Colonel William S. Harney; acting commander

of Twiggs’s first brigade; deployed the Mounted Rifles and First Artillery to relieve them. Soon

the small band of Mexicans were in full retreat towards La Atalaya with the Americans close on

their heel. On reaching the summit, the Americas drove off the Mexicans stationed there and

proceeded to charged down the other side and up El Telegrafo. On reaching, the summit of El

Telegrafo Colonel Thomas Childs who was leading the charge realized that he had led the charge

up El Telegrafo with only sixty men. As a result, Childs and his gallant band were force to fall

back or risk elimination. In the process of falling back many of Childs’s men were forced to

seek shelter behind a small knoll near the base of El Telegrafo. There they remained until the

shroud of night allowed then to sneak back to La Atalaya.15

Childs and his men were not the only ones moving about after dark. Twiggs had his men

that night drag two 24- pound howitzers and a 24-pound cannon up the steep sloop of La

Atalaya. On the opposite bank of the Rio del Plan Lieutenant Ripley organized an effort to

dragged a 8-inch howitzer up a steep hill so that they could drop enfilading fire upon the

defenses on finger one.16

The next morning the Mexicans upon El Telegrafo awoke to the sound of Artillery shells,

fired from the American battery upon La Atalaya, exploding around them. While accounts

suggest that the fire poured upon El Telegrafo may not have been the most accurate, it did cause

great concert with in the Mexican ranks. While the Mexicans hurriedly reinforce El Telegrafo

with more men, General Twiggs gave the ordered for the attack on the National Highway to

15 Smith, The War With Mexico, 2: 50-52; Richard Bruce Winders, Mr. Polk's Army: The American Military

Experience in the Mexican War, Williams-Ford Texas A&M University Military History Series (1997; repr., College Station,

TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2001),142.

16 Smith, The War With Mexico, 2: 52- 53; Johnson, 77-79; Bill, 228.

Trombley, 9

begin. The task of seizing the highway was given to the 2nd Infantry and 4th Artillery under the

command of Brevet Colonel Bennet Riley. The supporting force in this endeavor was Shield’s

Brigade which consisted of the New York Regiment and the 3rd and 4th Illinois. As this force

moved down the route they began taking inaccurate fire form a 4-pound cannon located on El

Telegrafo minor crest. Highly annoyed Riley deployed four companies of the 2nd infantry as

skirmishers. Then Twiggs order Riley’s entire force to assault the minor ridge, in complete

violation of Scott’s orders. As Riley charged the minor crest, Shield’s force continued along

lee’s route.17

At approximately 7 o’clock, Twiggs ordered the 3rd and 7th infantry supported by the 1st

Artillery to assault El Telegrafo. After a great deal of hard and bloody fighting, the Mexicans

were driven from off the hill. As the Mexicans began to fall back to Cero Gordo, the Americans

without hesitating for a second gave chase. It was about this point that Shield’s and his men

emerged from the chaparral and found themselves the left flank of Santa Ann’s headquarters.

Quickly the Mexicans turned the headquarters three-gun battery towards them, and condensed

firing. Though Shield had no artillery of his own and most of his forces were green volunteers

they did not hesitate for a second to charge the Mexicans. With Twiggs’s force to his front and

Shield’s force on his left Santa Anna had no other option but to flee. Not long after, what

remained of the Mexican Army at Cerro Gordo surrendered.18

At approximately 6 o’clock the men of Pillows force consisting of the 1st and 2nd

Pennsylvania Volunteer Regiments and the 1st and 2nd Tennessee Volunteer Regiments began

to assemble and precede down the National Highway to the merry beat of drums. After

17 Smith, The War With Mexico, 2: 50-53; Smith, Old Fuss and Feathers, 282-283; Allan Peskin, Winfield Scott and the

Profession of Arms (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2003), 165-168.

18 Smith, The War With Mexico, 2: 53-56; Johnson, 66-77.

Trombley, 10

marching four miles down the road Pillow’s force came to a halt at a cluster of abandoned huts.19

It was at this point Patterson rode up in front of the 1st Pennsylvania and uttered the following

words of encouragement:

You are now about to take your line of position, and to charge and storm the enemy’s

batteries and heights, and the honor of Pennsylvania, the good old keystone State, is now

in your, and I know, and can safely say, it could not be in better hands, and, again, I am

sure that you all will do your duty, not only as Pennsylvanians, but as soldier of the

United States Army.20

following this brief rest bit Pillow lead his force off the National Highway and into the

chaparrals for his orders were to use the chaparrals to mask to approach towards the finger ridge

area and take up position in front of ridge 3. Once in position he was to keep his men out of

sight until we heard the U.S. guns on La Atalaya open up. The purpose of this attack was to

confuse Santa Anna to where the main attack would come from and to prevent Santa Anna from

repositioning troops on the finger riders to El Telegrafo. As a result of the narrowness of some

parts of the chaparral’s goat trails the regiments were forces to march in single file; with the 1st

Pennsylvania in the lead flowed by the 2nd Tennessee then the 1st Tennessee and then finally the

2nd Pennsylvania.21

Soon after leaving the comfort of the National Highway and entered the chaparral, Pillow

decided that instead of concentrating all his forces to attack ridge 3, the least defended ridge, he

would attack the Mexican defenses right between ridge 3 and 2. To do this he would have to

divide his forces in half. The 1st Pennsylvania, with the 1st Tennessee in reserve, was to attack

the left flank of ridge 3; while the 2nd Tennessee and Company F of the 2nd Pennsylvania, with

19 Randy W. Hackenburg, Pennsylvania in the War With Mexico.(Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Pub., 1992), 35-36;

Charles H. Heyer, “Letters to Ann, January 11, 1848,” Magazine of History 17, no. 6 (1913): 238.

20 J. Jabcob Oswandel, Notes of the Mexican War, 1846-47-48: Comprising Incidents, Adventures, and Every-day

Proceedings and Letters While With the United States Army in the Mexican War; also Extracts from Ancient Histories of Mexico,

ect; also the Names and Numbers of the Different Rulers of Mexico; also Influence of the Church, Rev. ed. (Philadelphia: 1885),

65.

21 Weems, 391; Levinson, 65; Hackenburg, Pennsylvania in the War With Mexico, 38.

Trombley, 11

the reminders of the 2nd Pennsylvania acting as a reserve, was to attack the right flank of ridge 2,

the most highly defended ridge.22

As a result of the terrain and having to explain this new plan to his subordinates, it was

not until a little after 9 o‘clock that Pillow’s troops approached their positions. The first

regiment to get into position was the 2nd Tennessee for there was nothing to impede them from

moving off the goat path to a position in front of ridge two. As the 2nd Tennessee was forming

ranks the 1st Pennsylvania under Colonel Francis Wynkoop was in the process of counter

marching around a large hill in order to get to position where they could form up.23 Irritated at

how long it was taking for the 1st Pennsylvania to get into position Pillow wailed at the top of his

lungs, “Why the Hell dont Colonel Wynkoop file to the right.” 24 Almost at once, a bugle blared

from behind the Mexican works and within minutes, the Mexicans open up upon the

volunteers.25

Being the closest unit to the Mexican fortification the 2nd Tennessee became the focus of

most of most of the Mexican gunners. As the heavy grape and canister fire intensified their

commander, Colonel William Haskell, in violations of Pillow order to wait for his order to do

anything, ordered his regiment to charge.26 According to Sergeant Thomas Barclay of Company

22 Smith, Old Fuss and Feathers,283-284; Bill, 229; Hackenburg, Pennsylvania in the War With Mexico,38; Allan

Peskin, ed. Volunteers: the Mexican War journal of Private Richard Coulter and Sergeant Thomas Barclay, Company E, Second

Pennsylvania Infantry (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1991), 78.

23 Winders, 142; Peskin, 167; Hackenburg, Pennsylvania in the War With Mexico, 38; William Barton Roberts,

“Colonel William Barton Roberts in the Mexican City Campaign―1847,” Ed. Bert Anson, The Western Pennsylvania History

Magazine 39, no. 4 (1956):247.

24 George Brinton McClellan, The Mexican War Diary of George B. McClellan, ed. William Starr Myers (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1917), 83.

25 Smith, Old Fuss and Feathers,283-284; Hackenburg, Pennsylvania in the War With Mexico,38; Peskin,78, 80-81;

Randy W Hackenburg, “The Columbia Guards: Danville’s Volunteer Infantry, 1817-1861” (Master’s thesis, Bloomsburg State

College, 1975), 59.

26 Winders, 163; Peskin, 168; Hackenburg, Pennsylvania in the War With Mexico, 39; Peskin,78-79,81; George W.

Hartman, A Private's Own Journal: Giving an Account of the Battles in Mexico, Under Gen'l Scott, with Descriptive Scenes and

a Roll of Company E, 2nd Pa. Regiment, With the Age, Height, Occupation and Residence of Officers and Men, Also, a Table of

Heights and Distances from Vera Cruz to the City of Mexico (Greencastle, PA: E. Robinson, 1849), 44.

Trombley, 12

E, 2nd Pennsylvania, “They dashed most gallantly forward and were received by murderous fire

of cannon and musketry.”27

Unable to see what was going on to their right the 1st Pennsylvania held their position

waiting for the order to attack. Three times Wynkoop sent out runners to make contact with

Pillow to inquire from them what his orders were. Was he to continue to hold his position or

should he charge? Yet none of his runner could find out were Pillow was. For as soon as the

shooting started Pillow claimed he was being shot to hell and sought cover at which point he

was grazed by a piece of shrapnel and begins running towards the rear claiming that he needed a

surgeon.28

With Pillow leading a one-man retreat towards the rear Colonel William B. Campbell

took over. He then ordered the Pennsylvania to advance, yet no one moved. Colonel William

Roberts of the 2nd Pennsylvania believed that Campbell was talking to Wynkoop, for Wynkoop’s

regiment was the attacking regiment not his. Wynkoop did not advance for he never heard the

command. As this is going on the 2nd Tennessee began to fall back and in the process knocking

over many of the member of the 2nd Pennsylvania who were still trying to form up. As Cambell

tries one more time to assault the Mexican positions Pillow reappears on seen and took back

command. Not long after this, word reached Pillow that Santa Anna was in full retreat and that,

the Mexicans to his front were surrendering. As a result, no further attack was necessary; all that

was necessary was to relieve the Mexicans in front of them of their arms.29

The Battle of Cerro Gordo not only shows how brilliant of a military strategist Scott was

but also the steadfast resolve and courage of the Pennsylvania Regiments. While they were only

27 Peskin, 78.

28 Smith, Old Fuss and Feathers,283-284; Hackenburg, Pennsylvania in the War With Mexico,39; Peskin, 80; James

Skelly, “Diary of a Pennsylvania Volunteer in the Mexican American War,” ed. James K. Greek, The Western Pennsylvania

History Magazine 12, no.3 (1929): 147-154.

29 Smith, The War With Mexico, 2: 53-59. Levinson, 30; Hackenburg, Pennsylvania in the War With Mexico, 40.

Trombley, 13

in combat for less than an hour, they did not falter of showed dishonor. Few regiments,

especially volunteer regiments would continue to hold their ground after seeing their general

running away in fear at the onset of combat. While the role they played that day was but a minor

one, had they and the Tennessee Regiments faltered and fled back to the National Highway the

Mexicans may have been able to redeploy the artillery and men upon the finger ridges in an

effort to blunt Twiggs’s attack which surely would have caused more American casualties.

Trombley, 14

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Trombley, 15

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