TYPES OF AGRARIAN REFORM AND THEIR CONTRADICTIONS : THE CASE OF CHILE *

bu

CRISTOBAL KAY

Unwrity of Glargow

INTRODUCTION

It is possible to distinguish 3 types of rural development strategies in less developed countries (LDCs) which we could refer to as techno- cratic, reformist and radical (Griffin, 1974). A crucial aspect of the reformist and radical rural development strategies is the implemen- tation of an agrarian reform.' Technocratic development strategies are rarely concerned with agrarian reform; their objective is limited to achieving an increase in agricultural productivity and production through conventional economic policies such as price, credit, taxation, export promotion and public investment policies. The major bene- ficiaries of such policies are the landowning elite and the commercial farmers, as no major change in the land tenure structure of the country concerned is expected to take place.

What do we then mean by agrarian reform? We can say that agrarian reform has taken place in a country only if a substantial transfer of ownership rights over land (and sometimes water) has occurred, generally from large landowners to peasants, tenants or agricultural wage labourers, either in private, cooperative, collective or State ownership. For some governments agrarian reform has been advo- cated as a way to prevent revolutionary changes and for others it has meant the opposite. Agrarian reforms have taken place in socialist and capitalist countries alike, but their objectives and results have differed (Lehmann, ed., 1974; Gutelman, 1974).

The major a i m s of a reformist type of agrarian reform are generally to increase agricultural output, redistribute income and prevent a

* Thanks given to Dr. Michael Redclift for editorial assistance.

204 Cristobal Kq revolutionary political upheaval through smal l gradual changes. Land is mainly redistributed in private property from the large landed oligarchy to the richer and entrepreneurially minded peasantry. Landlords receive some compensation and peasants have to pay for the land.

The major a i m s of a radical type of agrarian reform are generally to massively redistribute not only income but wealth, to further revolu- tionary political changes and to increase production. All large landed estates are expropriated and sometimes the land owned by the richer commercial farmers too, and th is land is redistributed to poor peasants, landless labourers and the rural unemployed in collective or State ownership. Often landlords are not paid compensation and the bene- ficiaries don’t need to pay for the land. In short the main distinction between a reformist agrarian reform

and a radical agrarian reform is that the former aims at strengthening and developing capitalism while the lattter aims at destroying capitalist relations of production and establishing socialism.

The peculiarity of the Chilean case is that 3 successive governments implemented 3 different rural development strategies which, broadly speaking, correspond to the previously outlined types of agrarian reform. A technocratic agrarian reform was attempted by the Con- servative government of President Alessandti in 1918-1964. A reformist agrarian reform was carried out by the Christian Democrat government of President Frei during 1964-1970 and finally an attempt at a radical agrarian reform was made by the Popular Unity govern- ment of President Allende in 1970-1973. As exemplified by the Chilean case, agrarian reform cannot be viewed in isolation, as it is often done by economists, if a proper understanding of it is to be attained, as agrarian reform takes place within a wider social and political setting. The economics and politics of agrarian reform cannot be separated; they have to be analyzed in their relationships if the character of an agrarian reform is to be understood.

The hacienda system (also referred to as the ~‘l~tif.ndio-l.inifundio~ndio-~~~n~~nd~o complex’’ in the literature) has dominated rural society in Latin- *

America for centuries.8 It is an agrarian system which is economically unproductive and socially oppressive. (Barraclough, ed., 1973 ; Feder, 1971; Huizer, 1973; Pearse, 1975). It is therefore perhaps not sur- prising that, particularly after the Cuban revolution, demands for agrarian reforms intensified. (Stavenhagen, ed., 1970, Petras and La Porte, Jr., 1973; Feder, ed.,1g73). Support for an agrarian reform grew in Chile during the late rgjo’s and 1960’s due to the gross

o p e s of Agrarian RefDrm and their Contradictions ZOI

economic inefficiency of large landed estates (latifundios) and also due to the political need by successive governments to capture the in- creasingly important peasant vote after the peasants were en- franchised in the early 1g50’s. (Loveman, 1976). The latifundia monopolised most of the land as evideaced by the following statistics: on the one hand 2% of landed proprietors owned over j 5 % of the farm land and on the other hand 80% of peasant proprietors owned less than 10% of the farm land. As for the inefficient use of land by the lut$mdio, it might be sufficient to point out that over half of the agricultural land was left permanently in natural pastures and over 10% of farm land was left fallow. (CIDA, 1966).

The consequences of the predominance of the hacienda system in Chile was a negative per capita rate of growth of agriculture, growing food imports, high rates of rural unemployment, low wages and low standards of living for the mass of the rural population. For example, between 1945 and 1964 agriculture and livestock production grew at an average annual per capita rate of -0.4%. (The production growth rate was 1.8% but the population growth rate was higher, i.e. 2.2%).

In 1936 agriculture still produced a balance of payment surplus of $12 million dollars but after the 1930’s it turned into a deficit and in 1961 the agricultural balance of payment deficit reached $150 d o n U.S. dollars. This deficit represented approximately 20% of foreign exchange earnings. (Mamalakis, 1976).

An increasing majority of the population became aware that the balance of payment dif€iculties, the high rate of idation and the lack of expansion of the industrial sector were partially due to the stagnation of the agrarian sector. A faction of the industrial bourgeoisie sup- ported a limited agrarian reform because they thought that, with the resulting increase in agricultural production and rise in the peasants’ monetary incomes, on the one hand, industrial workers would reduce their claims for higher wages as food products would become cheaper; and on the other hand, sales of industrial products to the peasantry would increase. Both factors would provide a stimulus to industrial expansion. Because of the above mentioned factors opposition to a limited agrarian reform in Chile was slowly ove rc~me .~ (Kaufman, 1972).

.I R E F O R M I S T T Y P E O F A G R A R I A N R E F O R M

Objectives The Christian Democrat agrarian reform of 1964-70 was the f k t

206 Cristobal KUJI serious attempt at agrarian reform in Chile. Its objectives could be summarized as follows. Firstly, to achieve a substantial increase in agricultural productivity and output by expropriating all inefficiently exploited latijiidios and simultaneously by providing generous eco- nomic incentives to modemizing commercial farmers. Secondly, to increase rural incomes and standards of living by redistributing land to IOO,OOO peasant families (about one sixth of the rural labour force) but above all by greatly increasing minimum rural wages. Thirdly, and less explicitly, to enlarge the base of political support of the Christian Democrat party not only by land distribution but above all by government sponsored unionization of the rural labour force. (Alaluf, et al, 1970).

The ultimate aim of the Christian Democrat agrarian reform was to modernize and strengthen the capitalist mode of production by expropriating only the inefficient landlords and by extending political stability through political incorporation of the peasantry and rural labourers by providing them with the benefits of land ownership and union organization respectively. (Lehmann, 1971).

Imphentation

In briefly highlighting the implementation of the Christian Democratic agrarian reform, we first turn our attention to the redistribution of land. The process of land expropriation was slow, selective and limited. In six years only one quarter of the Zat@ndios were expro- priated, comprising in terms of standard hectares (land of varying quality is converted into one homogeneous unit of land - the standard hectare - which is irrigated land of the best quality) just over 10% of the land, benefitting only 22,000 peasant families instead of the pro- mised IOO,OOO, that is to say about 7% of the tenants and rural wage labourers. (CORA, 1970 b).

As far as agricultural production is concerned, it should also be pointed out that the rate of growth of agricultural and livestock out- put almost trebled between 1965-68 if compared with the average annual rate of growth of the previous two decades. The rate of growth was 4.6% per mum between 1965-68, however due to one of the severest droughts in this century which hit Chile in 1968, the overall rate of growth of the agrarian sector between 1965-1970 was reduced to less than 3% on average. (Barradough, 1971). Never- theless, this average was s t i l l significantly higher than the average rates of growth since the crisis of the 1930’s.

Types of Agrarian Reform and their Contradictions 207

With regard to political incorporation it might suffice at this stage to mention that the membership of rural unions increased dramatically from a couple of thousand to 140,000 in 1970, the majority of which became supporters of the government party. Furthermore, by 1970 almost IOO,OOO smallholders were organized, also under the govern- ment’s sponsorship, into cooperatives, precooperatives, and peasant committees. (Loveman 1976).

Contradictions

In making an assessment of the Christian Democrat’s agrarian reform we want to focus our attention on some contradictions or problems which tend to arise generally from reformist types of agrarian reforms - at least within the Latin American context. How- ever, let us first point out the way in which the Christian Democrat government found a solution to a common problem of agrarian reforms.

Generally agrarian reforms create insecurity among landlords and as a result they reduce their investment and thus production diminishes. The Christian Democrat government avoided this insecurity by reassuring landlords through legislation that, firstly, only estates above 80 standard hectares in size could be expropriated, secondly that all new investments which they carried out would be fully compensated in cash at market value in case of expropriation, and thirdly - this being the more original aspect of the legislation - an assurance that those latifundias which undertook investments, paid decent wages to .their work force and became efficient farms would almost certainly not be expropriated. Furthermore, in those cases in which landlords were expropriated despite having carried out investments they would be allowed to retain a reserve (i.e. a smaller farm) of up to 80 standard hectares in size, besides having the legal right to keep all their machine- ry and livestock. (ICIRA, 1968). Thus one of the most interesting results of the Christian Democrat agrarian reform was the economic response of the landlords who were not only under the threat of expropriation but who were also under financial pressure due to the substantial rise in minimum wages they were forced to award to their labour force. The more commercially minded landlords responded by taking advantage of the government’s economic policies, which gave incentives for modernization by providing a large amount of subsidized credits and facilities for importing farm machinery cheaply but also by increasing prices for agricultural products. The result of these

208 Cristobal Kq government policies was that many latifundias increased their capital stock, decreased farm size by subdivision, expelled redundant labour, and intensified land use thereby achieving higher productivity enabling them to pay the higher minimum wage and hopefully avoid- ing expropriation. (Ringlien, 1971 ; Smith, 1974).

Thus, in an apparent contradiction the agrarian reform goal of substantially increasing production was achieved largely on account of the private farm sector, although the expropriated farms also registered increases in production. However, the Christian Democrat govern- ment was unable to solve other problems which arise out of reformist types of agrarian reforms and indeed it is possible to argue that the following problems are contradictions inherent in a reformist agrarian reform.

There was a con9ict between the government’s policy of increasing rural wages and providing cheap credits for mechanisation on the one hand, and the policy of reducing rural unemployment and organizing rural unions on the other hand. The former policy encouraged land- lords to substitute machinery for labour and the latter policy en- couraged labourers to resist dismissals and demand full employ- ment. And indeed rural labourers through their newly formed unions obliged the government to introduce legislation which protected jobs - landlords only under very particular circumstances could reduce their labour force. Nevertheless, rural unemployment in- creased as this legislation was brought in after large scale dismissals had already occurred (Lehmann, 1974a; Bloom, Jr., 1973).

Another contradiction which emerged was between the government’s promise to give ownership rights to IOO,OOO peasant families and the suc- cess of its policy to encourage the modernization of the lat+do. Many landlords subdivided their estate into smaller farms of less than 80 standard hectares in size so as to avoid expropriation. (Smith, 1974). This process of subdivision meant that fewer and fewer estates became available for expropriation and land redistribution and therefore more and more peasants saw their chances of becoming rural proprietors reduced. Only after this process was well under way and under rural union pressure did the government introduce legislation prohibiting subdivision of large estates, thereby contradicting the modernization which some landlords were carrying out - i.e. selling their surplus land to other entrepreneurially minded rural capitalists so as to cultivate the remainder more intensively. The expropriation process not only slowed down because of subdivisions but also due to the high financial cost of the agrarian reform produced by the generous

Types of Ajyarian Reform and their Contradictions 209

compensation paid to landlords, the high settlement costs and above all the spitalling administrative expenditure of the State bureaucracy (CORA, 197oa).

Finally another problem which the Christian Democrat agrarian reform created was to accelerate the process of social differentiation among the peasantry. Although it reduced inequalities between large landowners and the remainder of farmers and labourers, it increased inequalities among different types of peasants and rural workers. As already mentioned, only 7% of tenants and wage labourers benefitted from the land redistribution This 7% of benficiaries be- came a priviledged group of peasants as on average each of them acquired access to land (either privately or collectively) whose size was ten times as large as that of the average minifundia, the small- holder’s farm.4 The minifundia peasants were completely excluded from the land redistribution and they formed almost half of the total rural labour force - a very large group of peasants was indeed excluded from the agrarian reform I (Bloom, 1973). Also inequalities within the beneficiaries increased. One third of the former latifundia’s labour force were tenants, one quarter were permanent wage labourers and less than half were seasonal wage labourers, mainly migrants. (Kay, 1971). Only the former tenants had full rights in the administration of the transitional cooperative and received individual property rights over a plot of land. The permanent wage labourers had no voting rights in the administrative council of the cooperative and had no individual property rights, they only had rights to the distribution of profits of the cooperative. The seasonal wage labourers had no rights whatsoever, not even of secure employment. In some cases they continued to be hired as seasonal labourers for a low wage, but this time not by the old landlord but by the new beneficiaries. It is estimated that 30% of work done in the reformed sector (the new production units resulting from the expropriations) was done by these seasonal wage labourers. ( L e h m a ~ , 1974a).

We condude this assessment of the Christian Democrat’s agrarian reform by pointing out the growing contradiction between the govern- ment’s policy of increasing agricultural production by chiefly relying on the modernizing landlords and of developing a peasant movement. The increasing pressure exercised by the growing rural trade unions for avoiding the negative social effects of the landlords’ modernization, for speeding up expropriations and for extending the benefits of the land distribution led to the political failure of the Christian Democrat’s agrarian reform as it fell between two stools. On the one hand, for the

210 CriJto bal Kay

landlords, the agrarian reform represented a threat whose final result was unpredictable due to the inmasing militancy of the rural labourers and the inablility of the government to completely control this growing peasant movement. (Gomez, 1972). On the other hand, for the peas- ants, the agrarian reform was advancing too slowly and it was in- sufficient to meet the new expectations which it had aroused, partic- ularly among those rural labourers who had been excluded. (Klein, 1973; Chinchilla, 1973). Landlords demanded a stop to the agrarian reform and the abolition of the restrictions on subdivision and dis- missals. (Kaufman, 1972). Peasants demanded a radicalization of the agrarian reform. Thus in the 1970 presidential elections the Popular Unity was elected into government on a platform of radical changes.

A RADICAL TYPE OF AGRARIAN R E F O R M

Objectives

The main objectives of the Popular Unity’s agrarhn reform of 1970- 73 were as follows. (Chonchol, 1973). Firstly, to eliminate the lati- fundia system, i.e. to expropriate all large estates above 80 standard hectares in size, regardless of their efficiency, and transform them into joint peasant and state cooperatives or collectives and some into State farms where valuable recourses were at stake, like livestock for breeding, timber and vineyards. The idea was to transform the budendo system into a future socialist farm sector and make it the domi- nant form of production inagriculture. Thus, also as few as possible reserves were to be granted to expropriated landlords. Secondly, to reduce some of the inequalities which the Christian Democrat agrarian reform had created by, on the one hand giving access to land to a larger number of rural workers by expropriating all latifundias and, on the other hand, by eliminating the differences between the various categories of farm workers of the expropriated estate, that is to say by giving them all equal rights to a plot of land and equal rights in the administration of the collective and in the profit distribution. Above all efforts were to be made to incorporate the seasonal and casual wage labourers as full members of the collective, thereby hoping to reduce the number of unemployed. Thirdly, to increase agricultural output by a yearly average of 5 % so as to meet the rising demand for food which would arise out of the redistribution of income, not only in the rural sector but above all in the urban sector. Finally, another major objective was to strenghthen the political power of rural workers by

Qpes of Agrarian Reform and their Contradictions 21 I

extending unionization and by creating peasant councils at local, regional and national levels. The ultimate goal was to gain the political support of the peasantry for the “Chilean road to Socialism”.

Implementation

What happened to the implementation of the above mentioned goals? Indeed after 2 years of Popular Unity government the centuries old bacienh system had vanished. Popular Unity expropriated all the remaining large landed estates in such a short period due to, on the one hand, peasant pressure expressed forcefully by the spontaneous seizure of almost z,ooo estates by the farm labourers who demanded the expropriation of the latifundia and, on the other hand, because for a socialist oriented government it made sense to expropriate as quickly as possible so as to avoid a drastic fall in agricultural production which would result from the disinvestment by landlords who knew that sooner or later they would be expropriated. (Kay, 1974 b).

The following table illustrates the drastic change in the land tenure structure.

Approximat8p8rcmtagt &tribdon by fmm rector of land, labour andpro&ction(Jdy, 1972)

Farm Sector Land Labour Value of Value of Proportion (standard (permanat Production Commercial- of total hectares) & seasonal) id production

Production which is commercial-

ized

Small (0-20 standardhectares) 22 60 28 I > (41)

hectares) 42 22 43 16 (91) Reformed 36 18 59 59 (85)

Total I00 I 0 0 I 0 0 I 0 0 (76)

Medium & Large (20-80 standard

Source: S. Barraclough and A. Affonso. “Diagnostic0 de la Reforma Agraria Chilena’, ClccrdaMs& Ia ReaIiddNacwnaI, No. 16, April 1973, p. 81.

Although some of the inequalities of the Christian Democrat agrarian reform were eliminated, the Popular Unity government had difficulties in incorporating all the seasonal wage labourers, but particularly the

2x2 Cristobal Kay rural unemployed, into the reformed sector due to the resistance from the resident labour force who wanted to retain their privileges.

Agricultural and livestock production increased by about 3% per a ~ u m on average during the first two years to the Popular Unity government, but in the third year the effects of the drastic agrarian reform were fully felt and production fell by an estimated 5 % to I 5 % in 1973.5 Due to the massive redistribution of urban and rural in- comes, demand for agricultural products rose sharply, and although production had risen during the first two years it was insufficient to meet the increased demand. As a result agricultural imports rose steadily from 165 million U. S. dollars in 1970 to 650 million U.S. dollars in 1973, i.e. in 1973 over half of Chilean export earnings were required to finance imports of agricultural products. (World Bank,

(Lehmam, '974 4.

1974).

Contrddcttions What are the lessons we can learn from the problems which Popular Unity encountered in implementing its agrarian reform, problems which to a certain extent are common to radical types of agrarian reforms?

Firstly, there is the difficulty of reconciling in the short run the goal of increasing incomes for the mass of the population with the goal of drastically redistributing land, particularly in a country like Chile in which most (71%) of the population is urban. The radical agrarian reform is likely to result in a reduction of production for the market in the period of reorganization, thereby resulting in food shortages, particularly as demand for food is rising due to income redistribution. During the last year of the Popular Unity government part of the increases in food consumption which most of the popula- tion had achieved in the first two years was being eroded due to the large fall in agricultural production in 1973. (Vylder, 1976).

Secondly, there is the problem of reorganizing production on the reformed sector and of providing the right sort of economic incentives on the collectives so as to expand production. Production dropped in the reformed sector because there was a reduction of the sown area in the land held in common, and to a lesser degree because of a fall in productivity. This was largely due to the lack of capital. The collec- tives lacked financial resources to purchase sufficient seeds and fertiliz- ers but above all they lacked machinery and farm implements. The

Types of Agrarian Reform and their Contradictions 213

latter was due to the legal right which enabled landlords to take with them all their farm machinery when being expropriated, thereby decapitalizing the farm. The government through imports of farm machinery gradually replaced the loss in farm equipment, but it could not do it fast enough. (Barradough and Fernandez, 1374).

The preference of agrarian reform beneficiaries for working on their individual plot of land was also largely responsible for the reduction in the cultivated area of the collective’s common land. Individual plots of land had multiplied in the reformed sector as Popular Unity not only gave usufruct rights to the former tenants but also to all the former wage labourers of the latifundia. However, this equality principle reduced the supply of labour for collective work. It is my opinion that the lack of proper incentives was the chief factor which explained the reluctance of the beneficiaries to work as much and as hard as they could have done on the common land. (Kay, 1975 a). This lack of proper incentives largely derived from the fact that the beneficiaries were paid a guaranteed equal weekly wage irrespective of the number of days worked, the skill and effort required for each task and the final total output achieved on the common land. Popular Unity became aware of the negative economic effects of the lack of a differential wage policy on the collectives, but when it tried to introduce one it met some resistance from the bene- ficiaries, particularly those belonging to reformed units which had made losses and accumulated debts with the state agencies. If the collective had made a loss, beneficiaries obviously preferred to continue to receive fixed wages, as these in fact amounted to a state subsidy to them. For political reasons the government did not dare to confront the beneficiaries and demand payment of the collective’s debts with the State. (Lehmann, 1974 b).

Thirdly, a contradiction developed between Popular Unity’s economic policy and its political goal. The economic policy of Popular Unity stimulated the development of capitalism (increasingly of a speculative kind) in the countryside, particularly in the private commercial farm sector. However, the political aim of the govern- ment was to initiate a process of transition to socialism, which in the end would have meant the abolition of capitalism in Chile. Although the government attempted to develop socialist relations of production in the reformed sector, it could not prevent the expansion of the individual’s enterprise at the expense of the collective enterprise. It would seem unrealistic to expect peasants to start building socialist type of productive relationships in the reformed sector given the

214 CristobaZ Kay fact that the capitalist market economy was s t i l l predominant, and the vital question of political power had not yet been resolved in favour of the socialist forces in society. The Popular Unity government could not afford for economic reasons to expropriate the private commercial farmers who owned properties between 20 and 80 standard hectares in size. This farm sector supplied over half of the agricultural goods which reached the market although they owned just over 40% of the country’s farm land (see table). However, the most militant and organized political opposition to the government in the countryside came precisely from t h i s farm sector, even though Popular Unity promised not to expropriate them. This farm sector played an important part in the violent overthrow of the Popular Unity government by a military coup d‘etat in September of 1973. (Kay, 1971 b).

Thus, finally, we come to the crucial problem for Popular Unity which was the question of political power. Most radical agrarian reforms are only implemented aftw the revolutionary forces captured complete power. The novelty of the Chilean case consisted in the attempt by Popular Unity to introduce a radical agrarian reform within the bourgeois democratic framework (the “Chilean road to Socialism”). However, this bourgeois legality turned into a trap for the Popular Unity government. The following analysis of some estate seizures might illustrate t h i s point.

PEASANT CONFLICT A N D ESTATE SEIZURES

The estate seizures we are going to analyse happened during the last weeks of April and the first week of May 1972, near the townof Melipilla just over one hour’s drive from Santiago, the capital city.6 The conflict started when one day suddenly the owner of one of the farms in the area without any warning began to make off with all the machinery and cattle, as he thought that his days as landlord were numbered. To prevent this the peasants decided to seize the farm. However, the landlords were well organised and occupied the farm, expelling the peasants who were promptly carried off to the local prison. At this point the peasant union sprang into action.The union decided to seize the farm again in order to draw public attention to the plight of the imprisoned peasants, so as to force the government to take a stand and expropriate the farm. (See interview with union leader in the next section). So one night over forty peasants seized the estate again. A special detachment of over I j o well-armed police-

Types of Agruriun RGfrm and their Contradictions 215

men arrived from Santiago in the early hours of the morning. The peasants offered no resistance and were sent to prison. The union retaliated and within days the whole region was aflame. Over j o latifundior were seized by peasants in solidarity with the imprisoned. They demanded not only that the imprisoned should be set free but that the government should also expropriate the estates which they had seized. A new militancy and peasant consciousness had suddenly emerged in rural Chile after centuries of cultural and organisational deprivation. A couple of days later a further 60 estates were seized in the remainder of Santiago province.

The provincial rural union organisation put forward a political programme which involved lowering the size limit of estates which could be expropriated, speeding up expropriations in general, pro- hibiting the landlords from withdrawing machinery and livestock from expropriated estates, rejecting the right of landlords to retain a reserve (i.e. a s m a l l farm), fighting against the state agrarian bureau- cracy which was delaying expropriations, taking action against landlords who were armed and training white guards to oveahtow the government, and strengthening the peasant councils. The most radical aspect of t h i s fighting platform was the denunciation of Congress which was blocking the legal road to socialism, and the accusation that the Judiciary was acting in favour of the landlords and against the peasants. It also pointed an accusatory finger at the CIA for organising an “invisible blockade” (i.e. cutting off all foreign aid) against Chile, and for attempting to “destabilize” the country. (Ben-

The peasant mobilization escalated further on the day the imprison- ed peasants were refused bail by the local judge of Melipilla, who was a close friend of the local landlords. A large mass meeting was organ- ized in the main square of Melipilla in front of the law court. The prison where the 45 peasants were being held was just a block further down the main square. Over loo peasants were assembled to protest against the imprisonment of their fellow-peasants and to demand the removal of the judge. Suddenly a group of about IOO peasants broke away from the crowd and stormed the law court. The judge quickly locked himself up in his own oflice together with some of his employ- ees. A couple of hours later police reinforcements arrived from Santiago. At t h i s time some of the police officers were especially armed with machine guns. They looked nervous. A confrontation could have suddenly flared up. However, soon afterwards the peasants handed over the law court peacefully to the police after having made

goas ‘974.

216 Cristobal Kay their point and negotiated with high government officials. The crowd shouted some more slogans but slowly dispersed.

The day before a peasant group of about zoo had seized for 4 hours the head office of CORA, the land reform corporation, in Santiago. They wanted to express their dissatisfaction with the agrarian bureau- cracy for not having yet expropriated the seized estates of Santiago province. According to them CORA was too bureaucratic (what they really meant was legalistic) and slow with the expropriations. They wanted to get on with their farm work but could not do so during the occupation of the farms as they lacked financial resources and did not know whether the farms were going to be expropriated.

Although over 2,000 farm seizures occurred during the Popular Unity government, very few violent incidents resulted from the land occupations. The government was able to defuse the explosive situation by skilfully using the law and by persuading their peasant supporters that the government was listening sympathetically to their rightful demands. But it was anybody’s guess how much longer the government would be able to defuse the escalating conflicts in a peaceful way. As a result of the peasant pressure Popular Unity speeded up the expropriation process as much as it could within the legal limits of the law. Thus, for example, a couple of weeks after the Melipilla conflict (which had escalated to a level never reached before or after) the Minister of Agriculture in a large public meeting attended by the peasants involved, announced the legal expropriation by CORA of zoo estates in Santiago province which included all the occupied farms.

However, the Melipilla case also showed that already by mid 1972 the Allende government was caught in a legal trap. On the one hand the government could not prevent the Judiciary from issuing orders to the police force demanding the eviction of the peasants who had illegally occupied the farms. The government had to face the un- pleasant fact that the peasants who were its supporters were in goal, while the landlords who were its opponents were left free to organize the government’s overthrow. O n the other hand the government could not obtain from Congress a new land reform legislation which would allow it to expropriate the farms under the conditions which the peasants demanded, thus risking to loose its peasant support leading to a further escalation of farm seizures.

opes of Agrarian Reform and their Confradictions 217

A N E W CONSCIOUSNESS

In what follows we present an extract of an interview in the prison of Melipilla with one of the main organizers of the farm seizures. He was a well known peasant union leader. The interview reveals a high degree of class consciousness and foresight of the leader. Such a consciousness did not exist before the land reform period, and was more of a dependent type.’ (Lehmann, 1972; Chinchilla, 1973).

“Why did we reoccupy the farm? Well, we had to support as an organization the peasants who had been dismissed, evicted and im- prisoned by the landlord. We had no alternative, you see only with unity can we achieve something”.

“We support the seizure of Ibfifundios. It is the only way to avoid that the farm gets completely dismantled from its machinery and livestock. The law only expropriates the soil and landlords are legally allowed to take out all machinery and livestock. This is what was happening on the estates in this area, that is why we had to seize them too. We as peasants suffer the conscquences of the dismantling. It is a boicot against production by the landlords. All Chileans suffer from the consequences of this boicot. We cannot work the farm properly without machinery. The land reform is done so a to produce more. We peasants are conscious of that. We demand that CORA should expropriate during this month all the hfijmdios of this region, as otherwise we will fall too much behind our work. Production will suffer if we delay the sowing.

“We knew that the carabineros (police) would arrive. That is why we are here. So that peasants know where we stand and so that it should serve them as an experience. We are happy. Look at all the solidarity seizures and demonstrations, because we saw that up until now the peasants weren’t tackling the problem properly. Although all these things are illegal, what can we do about it? We have to break all these things (in this context meaning the law), because if we want a worker’s government in the future, and we are not able to pass over this legal wall that the momios (popular denomination for reaction- aries) have, well, then we will never be able to do anything, because there is no law yet which favours the workers, because in order to do some things and so that these things should be just, we have to pass above these things (meaning going beyond the limits set by the law).

“The peasants who got land, thanks to the land reform, shouldn’t think that the land is theirs, they shouldn’t feel secure as we are all peasants, and if the reaction wins us one day, it will win us all. The

218 Crisfoba! Kay peasants who got land will also fall. We are all in the same boat. We are trying to make them conscious of this”.

CONCLUSION

The agrarian reform had become necessary in Chile for both political and economic reasons. However, neither the reformist nor the radical type of agrarian reform could overcome the basic contradiction be- tween the politics and economics of agrarian reform. The reformist agrarian reform succeeded in achieving a higher rate of agricultural growth, but it resulted in the loss of government of€ice for its executors. The Christian Democrats were not re-elected into government as the agrarian reform had antagonized the traditional right Wing forces who withdxew their support from the Christian Democratic party. It also resulted in a proportionally higher increase in the rural labourers’ vote to the Popular Unity rather than to the Christian Democrats, due to the limited number of land beneficiaries and the rising rural un- employment. In its turn the radical agrarian reform was initialh successful politically but it failed economidy. It was successful politically in the sense that it greatly increased Popular Unity’s support in the countryside, but this electoral support was unable to prevent a coup d’etat which was staged because of the radical changes introduced not only in the countryside but in the remainder of the economy and society as well. Nevertheless, it is likely that the radical agrarian reform could have become economically successful if the coup had not hindered it, as the phase of the widescale expropriations had been completed and problems of reorganization of production in the reformed sector were being tackled. But the radical agrarian reform of P o p b r Unity was ultimately a political failure which, however, was mainly a failure of the bourgeois democratic system itself.

NOTES

Some authon prefer to use the categories of incrementalist and redistributive agrarian reform (F‘etras and La Porte, Jr., 1973; pp. 37740). Still others speak of distributionist and collcctiviat reforms (Lipton, 1974; Bell, 1974). ’ For a conceptualization of the b u c i d syatcm ace my article. (Kay, 1974). ’ Although the Alessandri government passed an agrarian reform legislation (Law I &ozo) in 1961 ofa technocratic type we are not going to andyse it in this article a8 no significant land redistribution took place. (Loveman, 1976, pp. 223-240). ’ These are rough estimates which I calculated from data provided by the voluminous report of I-. (ICIRA, 1973). An abridged version of thia report was also published. (Barndough and Femnadu, ~974).

Typ~s of Agrarian Reform and their Conh.adctions 2’9 Estimates of agricultural production vary considerably. Normal procedures of data

collection in the rural arm were upset as a result of the drastic change in land tenure and the spread of black marketing. The lower estimate is provided by the former Minister of Agriculture. (Chonchol, 1975). The higher estimate is from a World Bank mission to Chile. (World Bank, 1974). a Research and interviews were undertaken during the period of the land occupations in the Melipilla area by Peter Winn and the author. I benefitted also from discussions with Ian Roxborough who did cxtenaive research on the s&d estates. (Roxborough, forthcoming). 7 James Petras and Hugo Zemeiman ana lyd cases of consciousness of peasants who had seized control of a &b$atdio in 1965 demanding its expropriation. (Petras and Zcmelman, 1972). The taped in-depth inteniews with the peasants offer an interesting comparison with the interviews by Winn and myself, particularly as the 1965 estate seizure happened in the Melipilla area too.

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BARRACLOUGH, SOLON and J. FEnvANnEz (1974). Diagnostico de la Reforma A@ Chilena, (Mexico: Siglo XXI).

BELL, CLIYE (1974). Ideology and Economic Interest in Indian Land Reform, in: Lehman David (cd.), (1974). Agrarian Reform and Agrarian Reformism, (London: Fa& and Fabcr), 190-220.

BENGOA, JOSE (1972), Movilizadon Campesina: Analisis y Puapectivas, Sociedad y Duarollo No. 3, 17-75.

BLOOM, JR., REYNOLD (1973). The Influence of Agrarian Reform on Small Holder Com- munities in Chile’s Central Valley 1963-70. (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation; University of California).

CHINCHILLA, NOMA J. STOLTZ (1973). Strata and Class Consciousness in the Chilean Peasantry, .(Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation; University of Wisconsin).

CHONCHOL, JACQW (1973). The Agrarian Policy of the Popular Unity Government, in: Zammit, AM (ed.). The Chilean Road to Socialism, (Brighton: Sussex University Press), 107-114.

CHONCHOL. JACQUES (1971). Allende’s Land Revolution, New Internationalist No. 27, 13-17.

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S U M M A R Y

The purpose of this a.rtide is to analyze the limitations and contradic- tions of agrarian reforms. Basically two types of agrarian reforms are distinguished: reformist and radical. Both types are analysed by drawing on the Chilean experience. The a i m s and the implementation of each type of agrarian reform are presented before proceeding to their assessment. The contradictions which emerge between the economic, social and political consequences of the two types of agrarian reform are highlighted. Finally the analysis of the peasants’ estates seizures in the Melipilla region during the Allende government shows the high degree of organization and dass consciousness achieved by the peasantry, but above all it reveals the limitations and contradictions of the “Chilean road to Socialism”.

R ~ ~ S U M J ?

Le but de cet article est d’analyser les limites et les contradictions des rtformes agraires. Fondamentalement, deux types de rt5formes agraires sont distinguts : le type rt5formiste et le type radical. C e s deux types sont analysts sur la base de l’exptrience chilienne. L’apprtcia- tion de chaque type de rtforme agraire est prtctdte par une prbenta- tion de ses buts et de sa mise en oeuvre. Les contradictions entre les constquences Cconomiques, sociales et politiques des deux types de rtformes sont mises en evidence. Finalement l’analyse des occupations de proprittts foncikres par les paysans dans le rtgion de Melipilla SOUS

le gouvernement Allende rtvkle le haut degrt d’organisation et de conscience de classe atteint par la dasse paysanne. Mais elle rtvtle surtout les limites de la woie chilienne vers le socialisme),.

222 Cristobal Kay Z U S A M M E N P A S S U N G

Absicht dieses Artikels ist es, die Gremen und Widerspriiche von Agrarrcformen zu analysieren. Grundsatzlich konnen zwci Typen unterschieden werden: der reformistische und der radikalc. Beide Ty- pen werden am Bcispiel der drilenischen Erfahrung untersucht. Die Zele und die Durchfiihrung jedes Typs werden vor der eigentlichen Analyse erlautert.

Die Widerspriiche, welche zwischen den wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und politischen Konsequenzen der zwei Typen von Agramformcn sichtbar werden, werden stark hervorgehoben. Abschli&nd zeigt die Analyse der Beschlagnahmung des bliuerlichen Grundbesitzes in der Melipilla-Region wiihrend der Zeit der Allende-Regierung den hohen Grad der Organisation und dcs Klassenbewul3tseins untet den Baucm, aber vor allem auch offenbart sie die Gremen und Wider- spriiche des “Chilenischen Weges des Sozialismus”.

AFRIKA - STUDIEN

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