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The Battle of El Alamein
By CPT Orlando de Oliveira Marin(BRAZIL)
ECCC 4-10, Team D
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ATSE-DOT-DI
20 september 2010
Battle Analysis
SUBJECT: Battle Analysis of the Battle of El Alamein.
On 23 October of 1942, the 8th British Army, commanded by General Montgomery, and
the Axis Forces (German and Italian), commanded by General Stumme, fought the battle which
helped change the course of the World War II: the Battle of El Alamein. This battle took place
near a small train station in the northern part of Egyptian desert, near the Mediterranean Sea
(See Map 1 and 2). The British Army was trying to prevent the arrival of the axis Forces in
Cairo, which would allow to the Germans access to Middle East oil and the opening of another
front of attack on the Union Soviet by the south. This also would cut the British communication
lines with Africa and Asia.
This analysis will cover 2140 on 23 October to 0915 on 24 October 1942, first phase of
the battle (Operation Lightfoot) and it will focus only on the forces that fought in the 6th
Brigade/2nd
New Zealand Division/XXX Corps sector. Forces fighting in this sector, beyond the
6th
New Zealand Brigade, commanded by Brigadier William Gentry, were the 382nd
Panzer
Grenadier Regiment/164th
Leicht Afrika Division, commanded by Colonel Hirsch, the 61st
Infantry Regiment/102nd
Trento Division, commanded by Colonel Menzio and the 62nd
Infantry
Regiment/102nd
Trento Division in his opposite side (Schneck, William, 2006, p. J-15, I-16, I-36)
(See Map 6 and 7).
The 6th
Brigade played an important role in the battle, since they reached its objective
(Miteiriya Ridge) early on the first day of operations. This enabled the British Army to exploit
this weakness, forcing the withdrawal of Axis Forces 4 days later and preventing the possibility
of Axis Forces getting to Cairo.
The success of the 6th
Brigade was due to the use of concepts already internalized in
Army Field Manuals. Among them, the most important were the use ofartillery fires to
suppress the enemy in support to breaching operations , allowing the triggering of a series
of actions without significant interference from the enemy. On the other hand, the Axis forces,
taken by surprise and shock, and having their communications affected, failed to observe
several other concepts. One of them was the lack of adequate protection of obstacles by
direct fire. However, the forgotten concept that had more weight wasnot to counterattack
when it was possible, since they were on the defensive . This is part of the purpose of the
defense as highlighted in the FM 3-0 Operations: to create conditions for a counteroffensive
that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. (United States, 2008, p. 3-10)
Phases of the Battle
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The Battle of El Alamein can be divided into three distinct phases: Phase 1 From line
of departure to phase lane Red, Phase 2 From Phase Line Red to Phase Line Oxalic, and
Phase 3 Consolidating on Miteiriya Ridge and attempt to exploit success.
Phase 1: From line of departure to phase lane Red
In the previous battles, which were fought primarily with tanks, the type of operation
chosen by the 8th
Army, was the defense, just to trying to stop the advance of its enemy.
However, the 8th
Army every time permitted to the enemy to gain terrain. Nevertheless, in the
last battle, the history started to change and for the first time the Axis Forces advance was
totally stopped near El Alamein. Then the Axis Force established a defense in depth with
employment of two minefields in the first line of defense (The Devils Garden) (See Map 3).
At this point of the war, both sides started the preparations waiting for the best moment
to regain the offensive. While the Axis Force had problems with its logistics support in all
classes of supply, the 8
th
Army was reinforced in personnel and equipment (reaching the ratio of2:1) and had the time to refresh and training its forces. The most important change in the
scenario to the 8th
Army was the transition from a defensive to an offensive posture, since they
planned the Operation Lightfoot (See Map 5).
The assigned 6th
Brigades objective was the Miteiriya Ridge (just 5 to 6 meters high),
which was the only ridge in the sector and it allowed observation over the terrain around it and
over the avenue of approach from east to west at its foot (See Map 8). Lucas (1982) stated that
the seizure of those high points would allow Eighth Army to dominate the ground up to a native
track, the Abd el Rahman track; once across it and the Battle of El Alamein was as good as
won, for behind it lay open desert (32).
To this phase, the 6th Brigade established an intermediate objective: the Phase Line
Red. The 6th
Brigade chose reach this Phase Line with just one Battalion moving forward (24th
Battalion), followed by two companies (C and D) from the 28th
Infantry Battalion to clear possible
position bypassed by the 24th
Battalion. Two battalions were in reserve, the 25th
and 26th
Battalion (See Map 4).
At 2140 on 23 October, the 8th
Army started a fifteen minute artillery barrage (planned
by General Montgomery that assumed the command on august) focused on artillery positions of
the Axis Forces. Ford (2005) described the barrage like the largest artillery barrage yet seen in
the war (12). After a pause of 5 minutes to the divisional field regiments returned to divisional
control, the artillery started fire again for approximately 20 minutes against selected targets.Schneck (2005) asserts these fires would serve to suppress the defenders while XXX Corps
began to breach the first minefield belt (62). In the 6th
Brigade sector, the barrage fired in a
scheme in which it moves forward at each 3 to 5 minutes (See Map 10). These fires were
synchronized with the advance of the 24th
Battalion.
The first enemy elements encountered were from the 382nd
Grenadier Regiment. The
enemy artillery started response fire only at 2250 (Schneck, William, 2005, p. 127). This delay
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was due to the Axis Forces were taken by surprise and shock. In addition, it was because they
had cut his communications between outposts and commanders. Ten minutes later, the
engineers in the 6th
Brigade sector started to open lines through the minefields. The barrage in
the 6th
Brigade sector ceased at 2305, moment in which the 24th
Battalion seized Phase Line
Red. The Route through the first minefield to the 6th
Brigade was completed at 2330. Five
minutes later, the 164th reported to headquarters of the Axis Forces two major axis of attack in
its sector (Schneck, William, 2006, p. K-1). However, at midnight the 382nd
Grenadier Regiment
erroneously reported that the attack had been forced back (Schneck, William, 2005, p. 140). At
0050, the lifting barrage was resumed on the line just beyond the phase line Red, marking the
end of this phase (Schneck, William, 2005, p. 141).
The lesson here is that it is important to have an adequate suppressing fire to support
breaching operations. Suppress decrease the number of casualties usually increased in a
context of attack with breach operations. The concept of Combined Arms capabilities with each
warfighting function is used to increase the combat power. The use of the artillery to suppress
the enemy while friendly forces approach to destroy it is an example of complimentary an
reinforcing capabilities as seen in FM 3-0 (Operations). In the Battle of El Alamein, the
description of artillery preparation given by the FM 1-02 (Operational Terms and Graphics) was
reached in totally, because the artillery fires suppressed the enemys defense, disrupted their
communications, and disorganized them. These preparatory fires (fire support) are written in
the FM 3-90 (Tactics) below the title the basics of the offense. Also in the FM 3-34.2 (Combined
Arms Breaching Operations) the use of friendly artillery to suppress the enemy is highlighted as
important when developing Courses of actions. This lesson had affected all the rest of the
battle.
Phase 2: From Phase Line Red to Phase Line Oxalic
At 0055 on 24 October, the artillery barrage begins again in favor of the 6th
Brigade,
marking the beginning of this phase (Schneck, William, 2006, p. K-1). The 6th
Brigade, to this
phase, made a forward passage of lines with two infantry battalions (25th
Infantry Battalion on
the left and the 26th
Infantry battalion on the right) through the 24th
Battalion and the 28th
Battalion. The 6th
Brigade final objectives (Miteiriya Ridge) were located in the Phase Line
Oxalic.
About 0100 the Royal Engineers from the 10thArmoured Division completed the breach
of the first Axis minefield in the 6th
Brigade sector (Schneck, William, 2005, p. 130). At 0140,
the barrage was halted again for 15 minutes to fire preplanned concentrations on Miteiriya
Ridge (Lucas, James, 1982, p. 168). Twenty minutes later the 25th
Battalion reached the first
slope of Miteiriya Ridge and began to dig, with the belief that was in the second slope (Latimer,
Jon, 2002, p. 189). This was because the 25th
Battalion received fires from the left plus the
confusion in the navigation due to the dust and to the fires. At this moment, the Royal
Engineers from the 10thArmoured Division had begun the breach in the second Axis minefield
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(near the Miteiriya Ridge) in the 6th
Brigade sector (Schneck, William, 2005, p. 130) (See Map
9).
Around 0222 the last artillery fires were fired (Schneck, William, 2006, p. K-1). At 0300,
the 26th
Battalion was dug in on Miteiriya Ridge (Latimer, Jon, 2002, p. 189). At this moment,
the artillery fires from the Axis Forces increased, although General Stumme still had no idea
about the front of the main effort of the 8 th Army attack.
Like stated earlier, what happened in this phase was also affected by the artillery fires
from the 8th
Army. So that the Axis Forces were suppressed, which allowed to the 8th
Army
trigger a series of actions without significant interference from the enemy. They reached their
objective and were able to start to open lanes in the minefields.
Phase 3: Consolidating on Miteiriya Ridge and attempt to exploit success.
The infantry and the sappers from the 6th
Brigade entered the minefield without much
danger as the Axis forces were unable to put more anti-personnel mines, due to lack of
logistical support. Moreover, the few men of the Axis forces present were unable to protect the
minefield with direct fire ( they were in a reverse slope defense and they were suppressed by
artillery fire). So at 0330, the 26th
Battalion consolidated on the Miteiriya Ridge (Phase Line
Oxalic) in the sector of the 382nd
Grenadier Regiment, at 0500 the breaches for the 6th
Brigade
were completed, and about 0600 the breaches for the 10th
Armoured Division were completed
(Schneck, William, 2006, p. K-1). The countermine and combined arms training and use of new
breaching procedures and new equipment (and Pram Scorpion mine detector) were important
to this phase.
As soon the breaches for the 10th
Armoured Division were completed, the leading
squadrons crossed the crest at north of Miteiriya Ridge in the 5th
Brigade/2nd
New Zealand zone,
but they didnt have success in the attempt of exploitation (Schneck, William, 2006, p. K-1).
At this moment, the 61st Regiment held the 25th Battalion and the 26th
Battalion started
to have problems in its sector. Lucas (1982) asserts that at 0615 hours, the Afrika Korps was
ordered to mount a series of assaults against the penetrations by XXX Corps, using elements
from the 15th
Panzer and Littorio Divisions (201). This late response was due to the lack of
communications between outposts and headquarters caused by the artillery barrage cutting the
telephone wires. When there was communication, it was wrong. Moreover, the centralized
command at the highest level denied the artillery support when needed and halted major
counter attacks.
Between 0640 and 0730 the Axis Forces began to react and to assemble for a late
counterattack (they had underestimated the attack). Nevertheless, around 0800, and helped by
the light of day, they were able of to halt the first tanks that reached Miteiriya Ridge, but the
destruction of the first line of defense was almost complete, which jeopardized the subsequent
actions. At 0915, General Montgomery issued his first orders to his corps commanders since
Operation Lightfoot had begun (Schneck, 2005, p. 191).
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The lesson here is that obstacles must be protected by direct fire. The FM 90-7
(Combined Arms Obstacle Integration) states that: obstacle effects occur because of fires and
obstacles, not just obstacles alone. (United States, 2003, p. 2-4). It also states that obstacles
integrated with fires can create a decisive battlefield effect.
Another lesson is that in a defense, early counterattack is important. The FM 3-0
describes defensive operations as combat operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack,
gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability
operations. Also states, Defending commanders use every opportunity to transition to the
offense, even if temporarily. In addition, it highlights that counterattack opportunities rarely
last long (United States, 2008, p. 3-10). The importance of a counterattack is also showed in
the FM 3-90: although on the defense, the commander remains alert for opportunities to attack
the enemy whenever resources permit. (United States, 2001, p. 8-4)
Summary
The use of artillery fires, by the 8th
Army, to suppress the enemy in support to breaching
operations caused the unbalance of the battle in its favor, since it allowed that a series of
actions were triggered without significant interference from the enemy. This proves that
preparatory fires (fire support) are one of the basics of the offense as written in the FM 3-90
(Tactics).
The Axis Forces, suppressed, were unable to protect adequately the obstacles with
direct fire, which goes against the FM 90-7 (Combined Arms Obstacle Integration) that states:
obstacle effects occur because of fires and obstacles, not just obstacles alone (United States,
2003, p. 2-4).
Finally, to the Axis Forces not to counterattack when it was possible was responsible for
its subsequent withdraw. This does not meet with the purpose of the defense as highlighted in
the FM 3-0 Operations: to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to
regain the initiative (United States, 2008, p. 3-10).
The outcome at El Alamein allowed to the 8th Army to exploit the break of the first line
of the Axis Forces defense, forcing its withdrawal 4 days later and preventing the possibility of
Axis Forces getting to Cairo. This was important to the course of the World War II, since the
Axis forces were unable to open another front of attack on the Union Soviet by the south.
Moreover, later it placed to the Battle of El Alamein a space in the history like the most
important battle of tanks already occurred.
ORLANDO DE OLIVEIRA MARIN
CPT, EN
ECCC 4-10 Student
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MAP 6 Operation Lightfoot, X Corps and XXX Corps Plan. Highlighted the 2nd Division zone (with entireline) and the enemy positions (dashed line)SOURCE: Schneck, William. Breaching the Devils Garden The 6th New Zealand Brigade in operation
Lightfoot: The Second Battle of El Alamein. Fort Belvoir: Night Vision and Eletronic Sensors Directorate; 2005 Jan,page 102.
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Works Cited
Ford, Ken. El Alamein 1942: the Turning ofthe Tide. Botley, Oxford, UK: Osprey Pub.; 2005;
ISBN: 1841768677.
Latimer, Jon. Alamein. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard university Press; 2002
Lucas, James. War in the Desert: The Eighth Army at El Alamein. New York: Beaufort Books,
Inc.; 1982.
Phillips, C. E. Lucas. Alamein. Boston, NY: Little, Brown and Company; 1963.
Schneck, William. Breaching the Devils Garden The 6th New Zealand Brigade in operation
Lightfoot: The Second Battle ofEl Alamein, 23 October 1942, Appendices A-M. Fort Belvoir, VA:
Night Vision and Eletronic Sensors Directorate; 2006.
Schneck, William. Breaching the Devils Garden The 6th New Zealand Brigade in operation
Lightfoot: The Second Battle ofEl Alamein. Fort Belvoir: Night Vision and Eletronic Sensors
Directorate; 2005 Jan.
United States. Department ofthe Army. Field Manual 1-02. Operational Terms and Graphics.
Washington: GPO, 2004.
United States. Department ofthe Army. Field Manual 3-0. Operations. Washington: GPO,
2001.
United States. Department ofthe Army. Field Manual 3-34.2. Combined Arms Breaching
Operations. Washington: GPO, 2002.
United States. Department ofthe Army. Field Manual 3-90. Tatics. Washington: GPO, 2001.
United States. Department ofthe Army. Field Manual 90-7. Combined Arms Obstacle
Integration. Washington: GPO, 2003.