Deterrence Deterrence is the effort by one actor to
persuade another actor to refrain from some action by convincing the opponent that the costs will exceed the rewards of the act.
Deterrence, in order to be successful, must meet two conditions: The capabilities to complete the threat must be
present, and The will, or intent, or resolve, must be present.
These two elements make the deterrent credible
Mutually Assured Destruction In the age of MAD, the possession of a
protected first strike capability means that one can always inflict unacceptable harm.
Such a condition becomes self-limiting, a constraint as well as an asset.
You cannot press to the limit for something it is clear that you are not willing to risk unlimited destruction.
Brinkmanship Push the other side to the limit to
see who backs down. Cuban missile crisis 1963 “Till the other side blinks” There is no crisis if both states’
level of resolve is known. It is uncertainty that makes
Brinkmanship feasible.
Strategic doctrine
The doctrine of massive retaliation gave way to flexible response as Soviet military capability made the capability calculus more suspect, and the resolve less credible.
Note that doctrine must evolve to maintain credibility in the face of evolving political and military realities.
Flexible response Flexible response buttresses up
nuclear deterrence by allowing “low-level nuclear exchanges”
Such low-level exchanges carry the risk of further escalation, hence retain credibility where MAD would not.
This returns to Hermann Kahn’s escalation ladder.
Deterrence and Rationality
Discussions of deterrence state that deterrence relies on the assumption of “rational behavior” on the part of the opponent.
The Deterrence sequence
1. Determine apparent threat.2. Assess own interests and capabilities.3. Assess opponents interests and
capabilities.4. Make implicit or explicit threat to
impose costs if event occurs.5. Follow up deterrent threat if required.
Otherwise credibility becomes lower in later deterrent situations.
Some propositions about deterrence Deterrence is not simply a matter of
announcing a commitment and backing it up with threats
It is heavily context dependent. It is difficult to design a deterrent threat that
will deter all options available to the attacker Deterrence often fails in stages rather than
all at once. Deterrence is often at best a time-buying
strategy.
Coercive diplomacy Coercive diplomacy seeks to reverse actions
which have already occurred. A combination of diplomatic action and
military force which occurs to force the other side to back down. Usually more difficult to implement.
Best example of success – Cuban Missile Crisis
Best example of failures – Persian Gulf/Iraq Often a try-and-see strategy…
Stable Deterrent
Not only should a deterrent be credible, it needs to be stable.
A deterrent threat should not provoke the other side to act.
Does SDI make nuclear deterrence unstable?
SDI and Deterrence Stability
If Flexible response is a policy that exists under the umbrella of Mutual assured destruction, does a defensive “shield” destabilize deterrence?
NMD The deployment of NMD is
generally suggested by one of two scenarios A rogue state An accidental launch
Likely rogue states: North Korea, Iran, (Iraq prior to 2003) Syria?, Libya? Aberrant Russian commander?
Accidental launch
Command & control in emerging nuclear arsenals is less secure?
Why should C&C be less capable in a newly emerging nuclear arsenal?
Suppose probability of 1/50 Is risk a series model? A parallel model?
Rogue states
Are rogue states deterable? It all becomes a question of
resolve Does NMD influence resolve? Does the uncertainty of the
effectiveness influence resolve?
Extended Deterrence
When a deterrent threat is extended to cover an ally, we call this extended deterrence.
Extended immediate deterrence is the situation where the ally is threatened by immediate action on the part of the attacker and failure to act will result in an immediate attack on the ally state.
Military/Political Doctrine
Purist - Military should leave politics to politicians. Give advice strictly on military terms
Fusionist – the nature of the modern world dictates that politics and military issues have converged. Military advice must be hedged or
advised by political advice
Arms Races - Definition
Arms races are reaction processes whereby the participants react towards arms acquisitions by partners (opponents) by acquiring more themselves.
The arms race implies an escalating cycle of acquisition/purchasing.
Arms races – Friendly Ones?
Arms races are typically between opponents e.g US-Soviet, Egypt-Israel, India-
Pakistan Occasionally, they are between
friendly rivals Britain-France, US-Britain
Arms Races - Types Quantitative
Increased spending ($) Increases in system components
(ships, missiles, warheads) Qualitative
Changes in system type The New Look Star wars NMD