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http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governancehttp://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance8/7/2019 Kauffman Corruption & Governance Kauffman
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New Frontiers in Governance and Anti-CorruptionThe Power of Data and Collective Action
OSCE Economic Forum 2001
Brussels, January 30-31st
Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance
Governance: 9 Key Issues + 1 Challenge
Focus on Corruption equating poor governance
Government drives Anti-Corruption (A-C) program
Paramount: A-C Agencies / Commissions / Ethics Off.
Judiciary/Legal Enforcement Institutions arethe key
Strict Enforcement of Rules: civil service/bureaucracy
High Pay in public service for combating corruption
Focus: Bureaucratic bribery in developing countries
Focus on problem within Governments
Data on Governance/Corruption not that useful
ChallengeChallenge:: The 9 Key Issues above contain mythsThe 9 Key Issues above contain myths
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3%
4%
4%
4%
7%
8%
18%
4%
48%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Not Worth It
NGOs AloneInt'l Experts
Legislative
Enforcement Agencies
Executive Alone
Civil Society Alone
A-C Agency
Broad Coalition
Percentage of Respondents
Who Should take the lead in a NationalGovernance/Anticorruption Program?
(response of public officials in conference surveys)
A-C: Anti-Corruption
Broad Perspective -- and Unbundling:
Assessing OverallGovernance with Data[based on over 300 variables; 160 countries][based on over 300 variables; 160 countries]
Control of Corruption (or Graft)
Application of the Rule of Law
Quality of Regulatory Framework
Government Effectiveness
Voice, Civil Liberties and Accountability
Political Stability & lack of Violence/CrimeFull definition on governance, and access and details on data: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance
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3
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Zaire
Turkmenistan
Cameroon
Azerbaijan
Uzbekistan
Paraguay
Nigeria
Ukraine
Indonesia
Venezuela
Mauritius
CzechRepublic
CostaRica
Hungary
Malaysia
Belgium
Slovenia
Chile
France
UnitedStates
UnitedKingdom
Singapore
Canada
New
Zealand
Finland
Denmark
Control of Corruption: Aggregate Indicator(From 155 worldwide, transition/selected countries)*
Source: Governance Matters, PRWP 2196 by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido; based on data from 1998.
For details and data, visit http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance There is a margin of error (thin line); extreme care in interpretation is needed.
POORGOOD
Application of Rule of Law Varies by Region
OECD East
Asia
Middle
East
South
Asia
Eastern
Europe
Latin
America
Sub-
Saharan
Africa
Former
Soviet
Union
(based on aggregation of surveys/polls 1997-99*)
HighIndex
of Rule
of Law
Appli-
cation
LowIndex
Note: Regional Averages shown for discussion purposes, and hide large intra-regional variation in each case. Thin verticalline reflects estimated margin of error. Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton(1999). "Aggregating Governance Indicators" and"Governance Matters" PWRP 2195 and 2196. http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance
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The Dividend of Good Governance
Infant Mortality and Corruption
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Weak Average Good
Control of Corruptionx DevelopmentDividend
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
Weak Average Good
Regulatory Burdenx DevelopmentDividend
Per Capita Income and
Regulatory Burden
Literacy and Rule of Law
0
25
50
75
100
Weak Average Good
Rule of LawxDevelopment
Dividend
Per Capita Income and
Voice and Accountability
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
Weak Average Strong
Voice and AccountabilityxDevelopment
Dividend
Note: The bars depict the simple correlation between good governanceand development outcomes. The line depicts thepredicted value when taking into account the causality effects (Development Dividend) from improved governance to betterdevelopment outcomes. For data and methodological details visit http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance.
Finland0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
-2 -1 0 1 2
Voice, Civil Liberties and Accountability
InfantMortality
Voice, Accountability and Civil Liberties Matter for Development
Source: KKZ 1999
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Not Free Partly Free Free
Corrup
tion
Corrup
tion
High
Low
Civil Liberties
Corruption is associated with absence of Civil Liberties
Based on averages of
data from 160 countries.
AGOALB
ARE
ARG
ARM
AUSAUT
AZE
!
BEN
BFABGD
BGR
BHR
BHS
BIH
BLRBOL
BRABRN
BWA
CANCHE
CHL
CHNCIV
CMR
COGCOL
CRI
CUB
CYP
CZE
DEU
DNK
DOMDZA ECU
EGY
ESP
EST
ETH
FIN
FJI
FRA
GAB
GBR
GEO
GHA
GIN
GMBGNB
GRC
GTM
GUY
HKG
HND
HRVHTI
HUN
IDN
IND
IRL
IRN
IRG
ISL
ISR
ITA
JAM
JOR
JPN
KAZKEN
KGZ
KOR
KWT
LBN
LBRLBY
LKA
LSOLTU
LUX
LVA
MAR
MDA MDGMEX
MKD MLI
MLT
MMR
MNG
MOZ
MUS
MWI
MYS
NAM
NER
NGANIC
NLD
NOR
NZL
OMN
PAK
PAN
PER PHL
PNG
POL
PRK
PRT
PRY
QAT
ROMRUSSAU
SDN
SEN
SGP
SLE
SLV
SOM
SURSVK
SVN
SWE
SWZ
SYRTCD
TGO THA
TJK TKM
TTO
TUN
TUR
TWN
TZA
UGA
UKR
URY
USA
UZBVEN
VNM
YEMYUG
ZAF
ZAR
ZMB
ZWE
r = 0.68
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Control of Graft and Freedom of the Press
High
Low
Low High
r = .68
Freedom of the Press (Freedom House)
ControlofGraft[kkz]
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Salient Features of New Governance Diagnostic Tools
Multi-pronged surveys of: households, firms and public
officials [triangulation]
Experiencial questions (vs. opinions/generic)
Speciallydesignedand testedclosedquestions
Conceptual framework: Incentive Structure behindGovernance; focus on development
Rigorous technicalrequirements in implementation
Local Institution Implements, with WB Collaboration Recognizing Multidimensionality of Governance
Focus on Service Delivery: Input for Action and Change
4.2
2.1
1.4
0
1
2
3
4
Low
Income
Middle
Income
High
Income
Lower Income Households Pay Disproportionally
Bribe/Total Income ratio % ( A Latin American Country )
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Albania
Georgia
Latvia
0 20 40 60 80
Customs inspectors
Tax inspectors
Judges
Ordinary police
Investigators/prosecutors
Ministers
Which Public Sector Jobs Are Sold?
Percent of public officials reporting purchase of positions
48
60
41
5241
25
39
3216
25
10
4023
5
3332
14
19
Source: Diagnostics 1998
Public Prosecutor
Electricicy company
Cent. BankM of Fin - Income
National Fin. Corp.
MunicipalityPresidency
M of Fin - Treasury
Attorney General
Congress
Undersec. Of Gov't
Electoral Supreme TribunalCourts
Universities and schools
M of Energy and Mines
M of Fin - BudgetUndersec. Of Social Welfare
Telephone company
National Council of TransitProv. Council
Comptroller
Real Estate Bank
y = -0.05x + 6.05
R2
= 0.50
r=-0.71
1
2
3
4
5
40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Meritocracy in Hiring and Promotion
Public Officials Survey: Meritocracy in the Public Service
Can Help Reduce CorruptionHigh
Low
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Citizen Voice Improves Accessibility of Public
Services to the Poor in Bolivia
Based on Bolivia Public Officials Survey. The sample of institutions includes 44 national,
departmental, and municipal agencies which are a prior anticipated to be accessible to the poor
30
40
50
60
70
Low Moderately Low Moderately High High
Voice / External Accountability
AccessibilitytothePoor
Simple Average Association Controlled Causal Link
Transparency within Government Agencies Increases
Their Poverty Reduction Impact in Bolivia
Based on Bolivia Public Officials Survey. The sample of institutions includes 50 national, departmental,
and municipal agencies which are a prior anticipated to have a major impact on poverty reduction.
30
40
50
60
Low Moderately Low Moderately High High
Internal Transparency
PovertyReductionImpact
Simple Average Association Controlled Causal Link
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Extent of State Capture in TransitionExtent of State Capture in Transition
Country
Parliamentarylegislation(% of firms)
Presidentialdecrees(% of firms)
CentralBank(%of firms)
CriminalCourts(%of firms)
Party finance(% of firms)
Capture index(%of firms)
CaptureClassification
Albania 12 7 8 22 25 16 LowArmenia 10 7 14 5 1 7 LowAzerbaijan 41 48 39 44 35 41 HighBelarus 9 5 25 0 4 8 LowBulgaria 28 26 28 28 42 28 HighCroatia 18 24 30 29 30 27 HighCzech Rep 18 11 12 9 6 11 LowEstonia 14 7 8 8 17 10 LowGeorgia 29 24 32 18 21 24 HighHungary 12 7 8 5 4 7 LowKazakhstan 13 10 19 14 6 12 LowKyrgyzstan 18 16 59 26 27 29 HighLatvia 40 49 8 21 35 30 HighLithuania 15 7 9 11 13 11 LowMoldova 43 30 40 33 42 37 HighPoland 13 10 6 12 10 12 LowRomania 22 20 26 14 27 21 HighRussia 35 32 47 24 24 32 HighSlovakia 20 12 37 29 20 24 HighSlovenia 8 5 4 6 11 7 LowUkraine 44 37 37 21 29 32 HighUzbekistan 5 4 8 5 4 6 Low
Overall 24 21 25 18 20 22
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Hungary Estonia Russia Azerbaijan
Parliamentary
legislation
Decrees Central Bank
Influence
State Capture Prevails in some countries
The Capture Economy vs. the Market Economy
%ofFirmsaffectedbystatecapture
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
Adverse Impact of Purchases of:
Source: Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann 2000 (BEEPS in Transition)
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2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
%f
irms'purchase'legislative
DomesticInvestor
WithFDI
% of firms that 'Purchase' Legislation and Decreesin Transition Economies
Transnational Corporate Responsibility Matters as Well:
Note: For transition economies, average of 20 countries.Source: Hellman, Jones andKaufmann, 2000 (www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance)
% Firms that pay public procurement kickbacks% Firms that pay public procurement kickbacks(of those that trade with the state)(of those that trade with the state)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
%o
ffirms
Domestic
FDI(D
omesticH
Q)
FDI(O
verse
asHQ
)
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Enormous Social/Enormous Social/EconomiEconomi costs of state capture:costs of state capture:Much lower growth in sales and investment in economyMuch lower growth in sales and investment in economy
(and also weaker property rights protection)(and also weaker property rights protection)
0
5
10
15
20
25
Averagerateofgrowth'97-'99
High capture Countries Low capture countries
Sales
Investment
State Capture exists where partial Civil Liberties
and slow Economic Reforms
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
ExtentofState
Capture
High Civil Liberties Partial Civil
Liberties
High Economic Reform
Partial Econ. Reform
Low Ec. Reform
Degree of Civil Liberties in Transition Economies
Economic
Reforms
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Corruption
Public Oversight and Civil Society:Public Oversight and Civil Society:
OmbudsmanOmbudsman in Albania and Boliviain Albania and Bolivia Private Sector CoalitionPrivate Sector Coalition in Boliviain Bolivia DiagnosticDiagnostic Surveys andSurveys and NGONGO
monitoring in Ecuador and othersmonitoring in Ecuador and others
Governance Improvement in Practice:Differentiated Strategies in Five Countries
Financial Controls:Financial Controls:ProcurementProcurement Reform in Bolivia,Reform in Bolivia,
Ecuador and GeorgiaEcuador and Georgia
Institutional and Civil ServiceInstitutional and Civil ServiceReform:Reform:TransparentTransparent PrivatizationPrivatization
in Ecuadorin Ecuador SalarySalary Reform in BoliviaReform in Bolivia Disclosure of AssetsDisclosure of Assets inin
Bolivia and GeorgiaBolivia and Georgia
Legal-Judicial:Legal-Judicial:
Revamp ofRevamp ofSupreme CourtSupreme Court in Boliviain Bolivia Competency test and firingCompetency test and firing of judgesof judgesin Georgia, Albania and Latviain Georgia, Albania and Latvia MediationMediation in Albaniain Albania
Economic Policy:Economic Policy:Deregulation andDeregulation and DelicensingDelicensing in Boliviain Bolivia RevampingRevamping CustomsCustoms in Ecuador and Latviain Ecuador and Latvia Tax AdministrationTax Administration in Latvia and Ecuadorin Latvia and Ecuador Tax/CustomsTax/Customs Code Reform in AlbaniaCode Reform in Albania
Summing Up
Broadening Framework: Governance for Growth
Addressing State Capture and Grand Corruption
Political vs. Economic Independence of key agencies
Voice & Civil Society: Participation/Collective Action
Role of Competitive Private Sector/Business Assciations
Addressing Fundamentals/Systemic Factors [vs. Symptoms]:
imperative of Institutional Reform
New empirical diagnostic tools & dissemination:
The Power of Info.data
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance
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Broader Framework in Quality of Growth: Summing Up
Growth is paramount for poverty alleviation andwelfare improvement...
...But not if short term, K-int. and volatile growth
And there are also other important welfarecomponents: Civil Liberties, Human K, etc.
Governance and Voice components are alsoimportant inputs for quality growth
Rich countries can help quality growth process inemerging economies: governance and aid
We are still learning: power of data
Visit: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance
National Governance: Challenges in Integrating Anti-
Corruption Into Institutional Change
A simple Formula synthesizing Governance/Anticorruption:
IG and AC = KI + LE + CA
Improving Governance andAnti-Corruption =
= Knowledge/Info.Data +
...+ Leadership (incl. Political) + ...
... + CollectiveAction (change)
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http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/
Data Presented for Analysis and informing
Policy Advise, not for Precise Rankings
The data contained in this presentation originates from
various enterprise surveys (as well as outside expert rating
agencies) and are subject to a margin of error. The
purpose is therefore not to present precise comparative
rankings across countries, but instead to illustrate
characteristics of governmental and corporate
performance in order to assist in drawing implications for
action. No ranking of countries is intended in presentingresults from these external sources by either the presenter
of this work, the World Bank or its Board of Directors.
Further details and data, visit: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/