PoliticalPartyOrganisationinEastAsiaTowardsanewframeworkfortheanalysisofpartyformationandchange
by
OLIVERHELLMANN
Athesissubmittedto
TheUniversityofBirmingham
forthedegreeof
DOCTOROFPHILOSOPHY
DepartmentofPoliticalScienceandInternationalStudies
SchoolofGovernmentandSociety
CollegeofSocialSciences
TheUniversityofBirmingham
July2009
University of Birmingham Research Archive
e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder.
–ABSTRACT–
Atpresent,progressivetheory‐buildingintheareaofpoliti‐
calpartyorganisationisbeinghamperedbythecontroversy
overhowmuchfreedomofchoicedecision‐makerswithina
partyenjoyinrelationtotheirenvironment.Thispieceofre‐
searchwill therefore develop an analytical framework that
transcends this debate by acknowledging the causal effects
ofbothstructuresandparty leadership.Basedon the ideas
ofhistorical institutionalism, itwillarguethatpartyorgani‐
sation is the product of strategic decisionsmade in a stra‐
tegicallyselectivecontext.Theframeworkisthenappliedto
political parties in the newer democracies of South Korea,
Taiwan,thePhilippinesandIndonesia.Theselectionofcases
ismotivatedbythefactthatEastAsiahassofarbeenlargely
ignoredbysystematicstudiesofpoliticalpartyorganisation.
Aswill be seen, post‐autocratic environments in the region
stronglyfavourpoliticalpartiesthataremerefaçadesforin‐
formal patron‐client networks. However, we can also find
parties characterised by a higher level of formal organisa‐
tionalstrength,includingpartiesthatsharemanysimilarities
with the classical mass party. These parties thus demon‐
stratethatpoliticalactorsareabletodevelopalternativeor‐
ganisationalresponsestothesamestructuralcontext.
FürMamaundPapa
Ichhabdannmalfertigstudiert.
Acknowledgements
Somewhatsurprisingly,IwouldliketobeginbythankingtheESRCfornotpaying
me amaintenance scholarship, as this proved a greatmotivation to finish the
PhDwithinthreeyears.OthersourcesofmotivationIwouldliketoacknowledge
aretheLittleCreaturesbrewery,theZeitgeistpub,mybicycle,cutelittlekittens
andmyfriends–thankyouforremindingmethatlifeisgood.Moreover,Icould
not have finished the PhDwithin such a short timeframewithout the encour‐
agementandconstantsupportofmysupervisor, IngridvanBiezen. In the long
tradition of Dutchmanagers (such as Johan Cruyff, Leo Beenhakker and Guus
Hiddink),shegavemethedisciplineIneeded,whileatthesametimeproviding
anopen ear formyproblems, and cheeringmeup in timesofmethodological,
theoreticalandempiricalstruggle.Inaddition,Iamverymuchindebtedtomany
peopleforhelpingmewithmyfieldwork.Inparticular,Iwouldliketothankthe
followingpeopleforsettingmeupwithinterviewpartnersandgivingmeuseful
adviceonseeminglymundane,butatthetime,highlyconfusingmatters(suchas
buying a SIM card, hagglingwith taxi drivers orwhere towatch theEuroCup
final):Jin‐MinChunginKorea,ChynSanJuaninthePhilippines,MarcusMietzner
inIndonesiaandDafyddFellatSOAS.Finally,IwouldliketoapologisetoKatie
forleavingherhomealoneforseveralmonths,andthankherforherlovingspirit
andputtingupwithme, especiallyduring the lastmonthsofwritingup.How‐
ever, firstand foremost, this thesis isdedicated tomyparents,who–although
alwaysquestioningthevalueofapoliticalsciencedegree–havehelpedandsup‐
portedmeendlesslyovertheyears.
TABLEOFCONTENTS
Listoftables ...................................................................................................................................................... i
Listoffigures ...................................................................................................................................................ii
Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................................ iii
Noteonromanisation................................................................................................................................ vii
1. THESTRUCTUREAGENCYDIVIDEINTHEPARTYORGANISATION
LITERATURE........................................................................................................................................1
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................1
ThedevelopmentofpoliticalpartiesinWesternEurope.........................................5
Structuralistapproachestopartyorganisation .........................................................17
The“lifecycle”approach...........................................................................................................18
The“periodeffect”approach ..................................................................................................26
The“generationeffect”approach..........................................................................................38
Voluntaristapproachestopartyorganisation............................................................45
2. THEORETICALFRAMEWORK..................................................................................................55
Historicalinstitutionalism.......................................................................................................56
Whatareinstitutions? ................................................................................................................59
Thestructuringeffectofinstitutions ...................................................................................61
Institutionalformationandchange......................................................................................64
Summary ..........................................................................................................................................71
Explainingpartyformationandchange...........................................................................74
Politicalpartiesasconstellationsofpower ......................................................................74
Electoralstrategies ......................................................................................................................76
Strategicallyselectivecontexts ..............................................................................................81
Linkingelectoralstrategiesandorganisationalpreferences ....................................86
Summary ..........................................................................................................................................94
3. METHODOLOGICALIMPLICATIONS ....................................................................................98
Measurement ...................................................................................................................................98
Theenvironmentalcontext......................................................................................................99
Partyorganisation..................................................................................................................... 103
Datacollection ............................................................................................................................. 112
Dataanalysis ................................................................................................................................. 116
Caseselection ............................................................................................................................... 121
4. SOUTHKOREA .............................................................................................................................. 127
Theenvironmentalcontext .................................................................................................. 128
Actorsandtheirstrategies ................................................................................................... 132
Theeraofthe“threeKims”................................................................................................... 133
Thepost‐Kimspartysystem................................................................................................. 139
Partyorganisation ..................................................................................................................... 146
Membership................................................................................................................................. 147
Candidateselection .................................................................................................................. 157
Distributionofresourcesanddecision‐makingpositions....................................... 167
Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 173
5. TAIWAN............................................................................................................................................ 178
Theenvironmentalcontext .................................................................................................. 178
Actorsandtheirstrategies ................................................................................................... 183
Aone‐partydominantsystem(1991‐2000) ................................................................. 184
Atwo‐partysystememerges................................................................................................ 192
Partyorganisation ..................................................................................................................... 197
Membership................................................................................................................................. 198
Candidateselection .................................................................................................................. 207
Distributionofresourcesanddecision‐makingpositions....................................... 217
Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 225
6. THEPHILIPPINES ....................................................................................................................... 229
Theenvironmentalcontext .................................................................................................. 230
Actorsandtheirstrategies ................................................................................................... 234
Elitefamiliesinpost‐MarcosPhilippines........................................................................ 235
Politicalpartiesascoalitionsbetweenfamilies ........................................................... 241
Partyorganisation ..................................................................................................................... 249
Membership................................................................................................................................. 250
Candidateselection .................................................................................................................. 254
Distributionofresourcesanddecision‐makingpositions....................................... 257
Adeviantcase:AKBAYAN! .................................................................................................... 260
Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 262
7. INDONESIA...................................................................................................................................... 265
Theenvironmentalcontext .................................................................................................. 266
Actorsandtheirstrategies ................................................................................................... 271
Conflictbetweenpersonalisticfactions........................................................................... 272
Socialidentitiesasdriversofvotingbehaviour........................................................... 278
Partyorganisation ..................................................................................................................... 284
Membership................................................................................................................................. 285
Candidateselection .................................................................................................................. 289
Distributionofresourcesanddecision‐makingpositions....................................... 293
Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 297
8. CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................. 301
Towardsanewframeworkforpartyorganisationanalysis ............................. 301
Asiancontextsandactors’strategies ............................................................................. 306
PartyorganisationinEastAsia .......................................................................................... 312
Membership................................................................................................................................. 313
Candidateselection .................................................................................................................. 317
Distributionofresourcesanddecision‐makingpositions....................................... 321
Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 324
TheimplicationsforthestudyofpartyorganisationsinWesternEu
rope .................................................................................................................................................... 327
Bibliography............................................................................................................................................... 335
Interviews ................................................................................................................................................... 379
Appendix...................................................................................................................................................... 384
–i–
LISTOFTABLES
Table1: TheorganisationaldevelopmentofpoliticalpartiesinWesternEurope
16
Table2: Structuralistapproachestopartyorganisation 45
Table3: Determinantsofpartyorganisation 54
Table4: Basicelementsofpartyorganisation 110
Table5: DemocracyinEastAsia 123
Table6: Caseselection 125
Table7: Socio‐economicdevelopmentinSouthKorea 129
Table8: SouthKorea–Partysystemindicators 134
Table9: SouthKorea–ResultsforNationalAssemblyelections 137
Table10: Socio‐economicdevelopmentinTaiwan 180
Table11: Taiwan–Partysystemindicators 185
Table12: Taiwan–ResultsforLegislativeYuanelections 187
Table13: Taiwan–Voters’attitudestowardsthenationalidentityissue 188
Table14: Taiwan–Partymembership 199
Table15: Socio‐economicdevelopmentinthePhilippines 233
Table16: Philippines–Partysystemindicators 242
Table17: Philippines–ResultsforHouseofRepresentativeselections 244
Table18: Socio‐economicdevelopmentinIndonesia 269
Table19: Indonesia–Partysystemindicators 273
Table20: Indonesia–Parliamentaryelectionresults 275
–ii–
LISTOFFIGURES
Figure1: Electoralstrategies–Strategicallyselectedoutcomes 86
Figure2: Partyorganisation–Strategicallyselectedoutcomes 91
Figure3: Dimensionsofcandidateselection 108
Figure4: Taiwan–Inclusivenessoftheselectorateintheprocessofcandidateselection
216
–iii–
ABBREVIATIONS
CDA ChristenDemocratischAppèl(ChristianDemocraticAppeal)
CKP CreativeKoreaParty
DJP DemocraticJusticeParty
DLP DemocraticLiberalParty
DP DemocraticParty
DPP DemocraticPeople’sParty[SouthKorea]
DPP DemocraticProgressiveParty[Taiwan]
DPP DewanPimpinanPusat(CentralExecutiveBoard)[Indonesia]
DPR DewanPerwakilanRakyat(People’sRepresentativeCouncil)
DS DemocraticidiSinistra(DemocratsoftheLeft)
FN FrontNational(NationalFront)
FPÖ FreiheitlicheParteiÖsterreichs(AustrianFreedomParty)
GAD GrandAllianceforDemocracy
GNP GrandNationalParty
Golkar PartaiGolonganKarya(PartyofFunctionalGroups)
GPB BritishPound
ICMI IkatanCendekiawanMuslimIndonesia(AssociationofIndonesianMuslimIntellectuals)
IDR IndonesianRupiah
KAMPI KabalikatngMalayangPilipino(PartneroftheFreeFilipino)
–iv–
KBL KilusangBagongLipunan(NewSocietyMovement)
KDLP KoreanDemocraticLabourParty
KMT Kuomintang(NationalistParty)
KRW SouthKoreanWon
LABAN LakasngBayan(PeoplePower)
Lakas‐CMD Lakas‐ChristianMuslimDemocrats
Lakas‐NUCD‐UMDP LakasngEDSA‐NationalUnionofChristianDemocrats‐UnitedMuslimDemocratsofthePhilippines
LAMMP LabanngMakabayangMasangPilipino(StruggleofthePatrioticFilipinoMasses)
LDP LabanngDemokratikongPilipino(StruggleofDemocraticFilipinos)
LFP LibertyForwardParty
LP LiberalParty
M/E Membership‐electorateratio
M/V Membership‐voterratio
MDP MilleniumDemocraticParty
NAMFREL NationalMovementforFreeElections
NCNP NationalCongressforNewPolitics
NDRP NewDemocraticRepublicanParty
NKDP NewKoreaDemocraticParty
NKP NewKoreaParty
NP NacionalistaParty[Philippines]
NP NewParty[Taiwan]
NPC NationalistPeople’sCoalition
–v–
NPRP NewPoliticalReformParty
NPUPP Non‐PartyforaUnifiedPeople’sParty
NTD NewTaiwanDollar
NU NahdatulUlama
PAN PartaiAmanatNasional(NationalMandateParty)
PBB PartaiBulanBintang(CrescentStarParty)
PCI PartitoCommunistaItaliano(ItalianCommunistParty)
PD PartaiDemokrat(DemocraticParty)
PDI PartaiDemokrasiIndonesia(IndonesianDemocraticParty)
PDI‐P PartaiDemokrasiIndonesiaPerjuangan(IndonesianDemocraticParty–Struggle)
PDP PartidoDemokratikoPilipino(PhilippineDemocraticParty)
PFP PeopleFirstParty
PHP PhilippinePeso
PKB PartaiKebangkitanBangsa(NationalAwakeningParty)
PKS PartaiKeadilanSejahtera(ProsperousJusticeParty)
PP People’sParty
PPD PartyforPeaceandDemocracy
PPP PartaiPersatuanPembangunan(UnitedDevelopmentParty)
RDP ReunificationDemocraticParty
TAIP TaiwanIndependenceParty
TSU TaiwanSolidarityUnion
UDP UnitedDemocraticParty
–vi–
ULD UnitedLiberalDemocrats
UNDP UnitedNewDemocraticParty
UNIDO UnitedNationalistDemocraticOrganization
UPP UnitedPeople’sParty
–vii–
NOTEONROMANISATION
Inorder tocreateLatinscript readings forChineseandKoreancharacters this
thesisuses thePinyinand theRevisedRomanisationsystemsrespectively.The
onlyexceptionsarewidelyrecognisednames that followalternativeguidelines
of romanisation (such asKuomintang). Chinese and Korean names within the
textaregivenwiththesurnamefirst.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–1–
‐1‐
THESTRUCTURE‐AGENCYDIVIDEINTHE
PARTYORGANISATIONLITERATURE
Introduction
Theoriesthathelptoexplainpartyorganisationscan,broadlyspeaking,bedivided
into two strands, depending onwhether they stress the importance of contextual
factors, or rather focus on the political actor. Several scholars of political parties
haveinthepastmoreorlessexplicitlymadereferencetothishighlyunsatisfactory
stand‐off between these two seemingly contradictory interpretations of party for‐
mationandadaptation.Probablytheclearestdescriptionofthecurrentsituationof
theory‐buildinginthefieldofpartyorganisationcomesfromvanBiezen,whopoints
out that it is yet not clear “howmuch structure actually matters and howmuch
room it leaves forparties as active agents” (2003a:179). Similarly,Müller (1997)
distinguishesbetweenan“environmentalist”anda“purposive‐action”approachto
OLIVERHELLMANN
–2–
theproblemofhowtoexplaindifferentformsofpartyorganisation.Lessexplicitly,
thisdebateisalsoreflectedintheconceptsofpartyorganisational“change”and“in‐
novation”,withchangedefinedasthe“differencefoundbetweentwopointsintime
inthewayapartyoperates”,whereasinnovationisunderstoodas“thepartofthat
changewhichisintentionallybroughtaboutbysomeagentsinsidetheparty”(Hei‐
darandSaglie2003:223;emphasisadded).Likewise,Harmel(2002)makesadis‐
tinction between the “life‐cycle” approach and “system‐level trends” approach on
theonehandandthe“discretechange”approachontheother.Althoughheargues
thatthethreeprimarilydifferastothetypeorpatternofchangetheyareaimingto
explain,heacknowledgesthattheformerputsmoreemphasisoninternalandenvi‐
ronmentalfactorsrespectively,whilethelatterseestheinterestsofpartyactorsas
theprimesourcefororganisationalchange.
Althoughthisstructure‐agencydivideseriously limitsourunderstandingof the
processesofpartyformationandchange,therelevantliteraturehasnotyetoffered
any ways to transcend the obvious tension between the different theoretical ap‐
proaches to party organisation. Therefore this thesis will develop an analytical
framework,which,basedonthecentralideasofhistoricalinstitutionalism,acknow‐
ledgestheexplanatorypowerofbothstructuresandagency.Inparticular,itwillbe
argued that, althoughstructural contexts favourcertainstrategiesoverothers, ac‐
tors are able to develop divergent strategic responses to the opportunities pre‐
sentedbyaparticularcontext.Inotherwords,althoughpoliticalpartieswithinthe
sameenvironmentwilltendtoexhibitcertainregularitiesintheirorganisation,the
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–3–
outcomeofanygivendecisiononhowtoorganiseapartyisunpredictable,sinceac‐
tors are always able to choose alternative courses of action. As a result, because
therecanbemore thanonestrategy torespondtoaparticularcontext, thedevel‐
opmentofpoliticalpartiesisbestseenasaconstantconflictbetweendifferentparty
internalgroupings,allofferingdifferentorganisationalstrategies.
Theframeworkwillthenbeappliedtostudytheorganisationofpoliticalparties
in thenewerdemocraciesofSouthKorea,Taiwan, thePhilippinesand Indonesia.1
The selection of cases wasmotivated by the fact that – in contrast to other geo‐
graphical regionshit by the “thirdwave”ofdemocratisation2 –politicalparties in
EastAsiahavenotyetbeenthesubjectofanysystematicanalysis.Whilethestudy
will thus contribute to our understanding of party formation and change in East
Asia,wehopethattheanalyticalframeworkitselfwillproveusefulasageneraltool
forpartyscholarswithverydifferentgeographicalareasofexpertise.Mostnotably,
wehopethattheanalyticalframeworkwillmakeacontributiontostudyofWestern
Europeanparties,whichstillformsthebasisformostexistingtheoriesofpartyor‐
ganisation.
Inorder toachievetheseobjectives thestudywillbestructured into twomain
parts.Thefirsthalfwillbedevotedtothedevelopmentoftheanalyticalframework.
1Theterms‘SouthKorea’and‘Korea’willbeusedinterchangeablythroughoutthetext.2Huntington(1991)distinguishesbetweenthreehistoricwavesofdemocratisation,whichwereseparatedbytworeversewavesofauthoritariansetback.The“firstwave”(1828‐1926)haditsoriginintheAmericanandFrenchrevolutionsandslowlyweakenedafterthecomingintopowerofMus‐soliniinItaly.WiththeendoftheSecondWorldWarthe“secondwave”(1943‐62)wasinitiatedbythevictoryofthealliedforces,butitcametoanearlyendwhenmilitarycoupsinLatinAmericabroughtdownanumberofdemocraticallyelectedgovernments.Finally,thethirdandlast“wave”hasbeensetoffbythefallofthePortugueseright‐wingdictatorshipin1974.
OLIVERHELLMANN
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This, first of all, requires reviewing the existing literature on party organisation
along the structure‐agency divide, which will show that the strengths of one ap‐
proacharetheweaknessofanotherapproachandviceversa.Havingestablishedthe
needforamoreintegrativeperspectiveonpartyorganisation,wewillthenusethe
dialectical understanding of the relationship between structures and agency sug‐
gestedbyhistoricalinstitutionalismtointegrateexistingtheoriesofpartyorganisa‐
tionfromdifferentlevelsofanalysisintoasinglemodel.Thiswillbefollowedbya
methodology chapter, in which, most importantly, we put forward a newway to
conceptualisepartyorganisation,sinceexistingtypologiesaretoocloselyconnected
tostructuralisttheoriesofpartyformationandchange.
Theanalytical frameworkdevelopedinthis firstsectionwill thenbeappliedto
politicalpartiesinthenewerdemocraciesofEastAsia.Ineachcountrychapterwe
willoutline themainpropertiesof theparticularcontext,discusshowpoliticalac‐
tors develop different electoral strategies within this context and finally demon‐
stratehowthesestrategiestranslate intopartyorganisation.Aswillbeshown,we
arenotwitnessingtheemergenceofparticulartypeofpartyorganisationacrossall
countriesorwithinsinglepolities–asstructuralist theorieswouldwantus tobe‐
lieve–norareweconfrontedwithaconfusingmultiplicityofdifferenttypesofparty
organisation,astheagent‐centredtheorieswouldexpect.Rather,theorganisationof
political parties in East Asia is the product of strategic decisionsmade by know‐
ledgeableandreflexiveactorswithinacontextthat favourscertainstrategiesover
others.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–5–
ThedevelopmentofpoliticalpartiesinWesternEurope
Existingtheoriesofpartyorganisationcanbegroupedintotwostrands,depending
onwhether theyattributemore importance to structuresor agents.However, the
theorisationonpartyorganisationnotonlysuffersfromadividebetweenstructural
andvoluntaristapproaches,butalsofromageographicalandculturalbias.Most,if
notalmostalltheoriesofpartyorganisationalchangeandadaptationhavebeende‐
veloped in the context of the established democracies inWestern Europe.With a
fewexceptions,thestudyofpoliticalpartiesinnewlydemocratisingpolitiesinother
parts of theworldhasnot generatednew theoretical insights.Rather, analyses of
partyorganisation inthe“thirdwave”ofdemocracytendtoemployexistingparty
models.Hence,beforeoutliningthedifferenttheoriesthathavebeenofferedtoac‐
count for theorganisational formationandadaptationofpoliticalparties, it seems
necessary to briefly summarise the historical development of political parties in
WesternEurope,whichservesastheempiricalunderpinningofthesetheories.
Ofthemanytypologiesofpoliticalparties(seeKrouwel2006),thehistoricalnar‐
rativewillfollowtheclassificationbyKatzandMair(1995),whichhasproventobe
themostinfluential.Onecentralcharacteristicofthisclassificationisthateachparty
typetakesapreviouslyexistingoneasreferencepoint.Hence,thehistoricalnarra‐
tivewouldbe incomplete if itdidnot include the factors that caused thedevelop‐
ment of an existing type into a new type. Obviously, these factorswill reflect the
specificstructuralistapproachassociatedwiththewritingsofKatzandMair,which
OLIVERHELLMANN
–6–
will be critically assessed later in this chapter. At themoment, however, this ap‐
proach serves as a heuristic device to paint a coherent picture of party organisa‐
tionaldevelopmentinWesternEurope.
Thegeneraltrajectoryofpartyorganisationaldevelopmentintheindustrialised
democraciesoftheWesthasfrequentlybeendescribedasindecline.Severalschol‐
ars argue thatpolitical partieshave lostmanyof their core functions tootheror‐
ganisationsofinterestrepresentationandhenceportraypoliticalpartiesinasevere
crisisfromwhichtheywillalmostcertainlyneverrecover.3Themainproblemwith
thisgloomypictureisthatitisbasedontheideaofpartiesasunitaryactors.Ifwe
insteaddistinguishthreedifferentelements–orfaces–ofpartyorganisation,itbe‐
comesclear thatonly the “partyon theground”hasbecome less important,while
the“partyincentraloffice”andparticularlythe“partyinpublicoffice”haveinfact
beenstrengthened(Mair1994;KatzandMair2002;seealsoWebb2002).Thetrend
in party development in Western Europe should therefore not be interpreted as
generaldecline,butmoreaccuratelyasorganisationalchangeandadaptation(Bar‐
toliniandMair2001).Hence,itmakessensetodescribethehistoricaldevelopment
ofWesternparties along the changingpower relationsbetween the three facesof
partyorganisation.Moreover, asouranalytical frameworkwill be centredaround
party internal power relations as the centralmechanism to explainpolitical party
3Argumentspresentedinordertosupportthethesisof“partydecline”differmarkedlyintheirlevelofgeneralisation.Whereassomeauthorsinterprettheweakerroleofpartiesinthepoliticalprocessasauniversaltrend(forexampleSchmitter1999),othersinsistonamorenation‐specificapproach(forexampleReiter1989;SchmittandHolmberg1995).
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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development,thishistoricaldiscussionwillserveasanimportantreferencepointto
integrateourfindingsintotheexistingliteratureonpartyorganisation.
Broadly speaking, thepartyon theground refers to themembershiporganisa‐
tionofaparty.Memberscanbedistinguishedfromthegeneralelectorateastothe
obligationsandprivilegesthattheyhavebeenassignedbytheparty(Heidar2006:
301). The party in central office, on the other hand, ismore difficult to define. In
verysimpletermsitcanbedescribedasthenationalheadquartersofthepartycon‐
sistingof twodifferentgroups: (1) theparty leadershipand(2) thepartybureau‐
cracy(Katz2002:98).Finally,thepartyinpublicofficeisself‐explanatory,encom‐
passingthosepartymemberswhoholdofficeasmembersofparliamentorcabinet
ministers.
Although theyhaveneverbeen clearly stated, anumberofdifferent indicators
canbedrawnfromtheliteraturethatscholarshaveusedtomeasurethepowerrela‐
tionsbetweenthe three facesofpartyorganisation.Certainly, themost frequently
analysedindicatoristhesizeofpartymembership.Infact,theargumentsofthead‐
vocatesofthe“partydecline”thesisaremostlybuiltuponthedecreasingnumberof
membersinWestEuropeanpartiesduringthepastdecades.Anotherindicatorused
todeterminethedistributionofpowerwithinpoliticalpartiesisintra‐partydemoc‐
racy.Theproceduresusedtoelectthepartyleadershipandtonominatecandidates
for public elections are a valuable gauge todrawa general power‐mapof a party
(Katz2001).Finally,thedistributionofresourcesrelevanttoelectoralcompetition
OLIVERHELLMANN
–8–
isalsoemployed touncover theparty‐internalbalanceofpower (Katz1996).The
mostimportantresourcesincludemoney,staff,andaccesstomedia.
Accordingtothese indicators, thedominantorganisational faceofthefirstpar‐
tiestoemergeinproto‐democraticEuropeinthe18thand19thcenturywasalmost
certainly the party in public office. Although it is questionable whether one can
reallytalkofadominant face,since,asamatterof fact,whathasbeentermedthe
“cadre party” (Duverger 1964) or the “party of individual representation” (Neu‐
mann1956)wasnothingmorethanalooseallianceofnotableswiththeaimofget‐
tingtheircandidateselectedintoparliament.Anextra‐parliamentarypartywasvir‐
tuallynon‐existent,andthepartyinpublicofficethustendedtobetheonlygroupin
thepartythathad“theneedortheopportunitytomakecollectivedecisions”(Katz
andMair2002:115‐116).
Thecadrepartywasnotbasedonanenduringlocalmembershiporganisation,
butifthepartyrequiredpeopletohelpinmobilisingvotesitwouldprimarilyrely
on the personal networks of friends and clients of itsmembers.Membershipwas
restrictedtothosewithindependentandpersonalaccesstopoliticallyrelevantre‐
sources.InthewordsofDuverger(1964:64),adherencetothecadre‐partytypeis
acompletelypersonalact,basedupontheaptitudesorthepeculiar
circumstances of a man; it is determined strictly by individual
qualities.Itisanactthatisrestrictedtoafew:itisdependentupon
rigid and exclusive selection. If we define a member as one who
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–9–
signsanundertakingtothepartyandthereafterregularlypayshis
subscription,thencadrepartieshavenomembers.
Theonlyfunctionofthesmallelitistcircleofparty“members”wastonominatecan‐
didatesforelection.In‐betweenelectionstheselocalalliancesofnotableswouldbe
dormant, leaving the party’s representatives in parliament with an absolute free
mandateandineveryrespectresponsibleonlytotheirownconsciences(Neumann
1956:404).Theselectionofcandidateswasahighlyinformalprocess,withthepat‐
ronsusuallynominatingoneofthemselves(Katz2001:283).
Takingallthisinmind,itisnotdifficulttounderstandwhythecadrepartyhad
no need for a strong party in central office. Since the individual members could
themselves provide the resources necessary for electoral success (i.e.money and
votes),theywerenotdependentoncentralresources,andthereforefeltnoneedto
defertoacentralauthority(KatzandMair2002:115).
Thecrucial context for theemergenceof theelitist cadrepartywas therégime
censitairewith its restrictive suffrage requirements linked towealthandproperty
(Daalder2001:42).Asthenumberofpeoplewhocouldmeettheserequirementsin
theearlystagesoftheprocessofindustrialisationwasrelativelysmall,politicalpar‐
tiesonlyhad tomobilisea smallnumberof votes inorder toget their candidates
elected.Thisdidnotrequirehighlysophisticatedelectoralcampaigns,butsufficient
votes could simply be secured throughpersonal contacts held by the partymem‐
OLIVERHELLMANN
–10–
bers.Inotherwords,thepersonalinfluenceofthemembersinpublicofficemadean
extra‐parliamentaryorganisationredundant.
This all changedwhen restrictions onworking‐class organisation, whichwere
increasinglyseentobeincompatiblewithliberal ideas,becamemorerelaxed,thus
allowingsocialgroupslockedoutofthepoliticaldecision‐makingprocesstoorgan‐
isetheirownparties“outside”parliament.Asthesegroupslackedtheresourcesof
therulingeliteparties,theytriedtoattractasmanymembersaspossible,thereby
substituting individual quality with quantity (Duverger 1964: 23). Members not
onlyprovidedasourceofincomeforthepartybyhavingtopayregularmembership
dues,buttheyalsocontributedfreelabourbothduringandbetweenelectioncam‐
paigns.Moreover,sincethe“massparty”–alternatively“partyofsocialintegration”
(Neumann1956)–usuallyrepresentedaparticularandclearlydefinedsocialorre‐
ligious segment of society, thus embodying an ideological visionof a better social
order, members represented a valuable basis for spreading that ideology (Ware
1996:66).
Inreturnfortheircontributions,themasspartygavemembersasayininternal
matters,suchastheelectionofleaders,thenominationofcandidatesforpublicelec‐
tions,andtheformulationofpolicygoals.Decision‐makingwasorganisedinahier‐
archicalsystemofdelegation,withthelowerlevelselectingrepresentativesonthe
nexthigherlevel.Theideabehindthiswasthatthepartyleadershipandthemem‐
bers of the party in public office should act as agents of themasses. At the same
time, the party tried to insulate its members from counter‐ideologies through
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–11–
propaganda,partypress,andparty‐organisedactivitiesinallspheresoflifefromthe
cradle to thegrave(Neumann1956:405).Like theparticipatoryrightsgranted to
members, theseactivities, suchassportclubs, readinggroupsetcetera,also func‐
tionedasincentivesforpeopleoutsidethepartytoenlistasamember.
All this, the administration of the membership registry, the collection of
membership dues, the management of voluntary work, the publication of party
newspapers,andthesupervisionofancillaryorganisationscreatedthenecessityfor
a strongparty central office staffedby full‐timeprofessionals.However, given the
symbioticrelationshipbetweenthepartyonthegroundandthepartyincentralof‐
fice–theformersupplyingthepartywiththeresourcesnecessaryfor itssurvival,
while the latter provides central co‐ordination – it is difficult to determine the
dominant organisational face of the mass party (Katz and Mair 2002: 117). The
party in public office, on the other hand, was clearly subordinate to the extra‐
parliamentaryorganisation.
With progressing industrialisation, which meant that more and more people
wereabletomeettherequirementsoftherégimecensitaire,andtheincreasingelec‐
toralsuccessofsocialistanddenominationalparties,theclassiccadrepartieswere
forcedtomobilisevotesbeyondtheirtraditionalconstituenciesintheuppersocio‐
economicstrataofsociety.Thismadeitnecessarytoemulatethemasspartyasan
organisational type, and to openmembership to thewider electorate.As a conse‐
quence, a stronger central organisation became indispensable, which would co‐
ordinatecampaignactivitiesandadministerthegrowingpartyontheground(von
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Beyme1985:161).Theprototype forapermanentcentralpartyorganisationwas
themuch cited Birmingham Caucus of the British Liberals, established by Joseph
Chamberlainin1877.
However,asKatzandMair(1995:11‐12)argue,itwasunappealingtothelead‐
ersofthecadrepartytocopythemasspartymodelineveryrespect.Firstofall,or‐
ganisationallyencapsulatingclearlydefinedsegmentsofsocietyseemedineffective,
sincethegroupsthatwouldhavebeenlefttothemwerepermanentminorities(for
examplefarmers,industrialists).Secondly,theideathattheextra‐parliamentaryor‐
ganisationoughttobedominantwentagainsttheinterestsofthosealreadyestab‐
lishedingovernment.Andfinally,asthepartiesoftheupperandmiddleclasses,and
asthepartiesingovernment,theywerenotsodependentonthematerialresources
providedbypartymembers.Consequently,
the leadersof thetraditionalpartiestendedtoestablishorga‐
nizationsthat looked likemassparties in form(regularmem‐
bers, branches, aparty congress, apartypress), butwhich in
practiceoftencontinuedtoemphasizetheindependenceofthe
parliamentaryparty.
(KatzandMair1995:12)
Indoingso,theycreatedaneworganisationalform,whichthemasspartieswould
thenfeelpressuredtoimitatefromthe1950son:the“catch‐allparty”(Kirchheimer
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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1964) or “electoral‐professional party”model (Panebianco 1988). Although these
partieswerestillbasedonlargemembershiporganisations,theroleofpartymem‐
bers was downgraded considerably. This showed primarily in three ways (see
Krouwel 2003: 28). First of all, one could observe stagnation in the size of party
memberships.Inaddition, insteadofbeinglimitedtoaspecificsegmentofsociety,
thesocialprofileofpartymembershipbecamemorebalanced.Andlastbutnotleast,
partiesofferedfarfeweropportunitiesformembershipactivity,astheycloseddown
manyoftheancillaryorganisations.
Simultaneously, the party in public office witnessed a significant increase in
power–vis‐à‐visboththepartyonthegroundandthepartyincentraloffice.Hav‐
ing gained a taste of office, the parliamentary leaders of themass party naturally
wantedtogetre‐elected,andhencedevelopedaninterestinbroadeningtheirelec‐
toralappealbeyondtheiroriginalclassgardée(Mair1997:102).However,inorder
tobeabletopursueacatch‐allstrategy,thepartyinpublicofficeneededtofreeit‐
selffromthecontrolofthepartyontheground.Inachievingthis,thepartyinpublic
officeprofitedfromtwodevelopments.Firstly,technologicalinnovationsinsystems
ofmasscommunicationrevolutionisedelectoral campaigning.Partiesput lessem‐
phasisonlabour‐intensivecampaignsstressingindividualcontactwithvotersatthe
locallevel,butcampaignsbecamemorestandardisedatthenationallevel,astelevi‐
sionbroughtpoliticians closer to thepeople (Farrell1996). Secondly, through the
introduction of public subsidies for political parties the party in public office ob‐
taineditsownsourceof income(Katz1996:121).Takentogether, thismeantthat
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thepartyinpublicofficebecamelessdependentontheresourcesprovidedbyparty
members–freelabourandmoney.
Thebalanceofpowerwithinthecatch‐allpartycanbedescribedasaconflictbe‐
tweenthepartyonthegroundandthepartyinpublicofficethatwasplayedoutin
thepartyincentraloffice(KatzandMair2002:122).Broadlyspeaking,theconflict
revolvedaround thequestionofwhether theparty in central office shouldbe the
agentofthepartyonthegroundincontrollingtheparty inpublicoffice,orrather
theagentofthepartyinpublicofficeinorganisinganddirectingtheirsupportersin
thepartyontheground.
Eventually,thepartyinpublicofficewonthestruggleforparty‐internalpower,
because the trendsmentionedabovehavebecomeevenmoreapparent.Moreand
morepeoplenowmakeuseofnewcommunication technologies in theireveryday
lives,andthe levelofstatesubventions forpoliticalpartieshassteadily increased.
Theresultingdominanceofthepartyinpublicofficewithrespecttotheotherfaces
ofpartyorganisationledKatzandMair(1995)todiagnosetheemergenceofanew
partytype,the“cartelparty”,whichisbelievedtobethedominantpartyorganisa‐
tionalformincontemporaryWesternEurope.
Thecartel‐partythesisclaimsthatestablishedpoliticalpartiesseektomonopo‐
lisetheaccesstopoliticalpowerbylimitingtheintensityofinter‐partycompetition
throughinformalagreements.Theycreateanoligopolisticcartelwithinwhichthey
allocatestateresourcestothemselves,givingthemasignificantelectoraladvantage
inrelationtooutsidechallengers.Clearly,thisalsohasalargeimpactonthedistri‐
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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bution of resourceswithin the parties themselves, as it is principally the party in
publicofficethatnegotiatesthetermsofthepartycartel.Notonlydoesthepartyin
publicofficetendtobetheprimebeneficiaryofstatesubventions,but,inaddition,it
heavilyprofits fromthegrowingnumberofpublicly fundedstaff inparliamentary
offices(KatzandMair2002:123).Together,thesecrucialorganisationalresources
ensure the party in public office a more or less undisputed position of privilege
withinthepartyorganisation.
Giventheincreasingself‐sufficiencyofthepartyinpublicoffice,partymembers
havebecomemuchlessimportantforelectoralsuccess.This isreflectedinthede‐
clining levels of partymembership that can be observed throughoutWestern Eu‐
rope(MairandvanBiezen2001).Thepartyeliteinparliamentincreasinglyseems
toperceivepartymembersasadisadvantageratherthananasset,andpoliticalpar‐
ties seemmuch less interested in recruiting newmembers. At the same time, the
remainingmembership has been atomised, meaning thatmembers exercise their
participatory rights as individuals rather than through delegates (Katz and Mair
1995:21).Thisbecomesparticularlyapparentinthemethodsusedtoselectcandi‐
datesforpublicelections,wheremoreandmorepartiesarefollowingtheprinciple
of “onemember, one vote”. The causalmechanism identified behind this trend is
againthedesireofthepartyinpublicofficetomaintainelectoralsuccess.Inorderto
enjoy the necessary autonomy to pursue aggressive electioneering, party leaders
giveeachmemberanindividualvote,therebyleavingnopowertotheintermediary
party structures, which are usually crowded with the most ideologically radical
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members(Katz2001;Scarrow,WebbandFarrell2000).Infact,manypartieshave
opened their processes of candidate selection to the general electorate, thereby
makingadistinctionbetweenmembersandnon‐membersdifficult.
TABLE1: THEORGANISATIONALDEVELOPMENTOFPOLITICALPARTIESINWESTERNEUROPE
Cadreparty Massparty Catchallparty Cartelparty
Timeperiod 18‐19thcentury 1880s‐1960s 1945‐1970s 1970s‐today
Dominantface noclearboundar‐iesbetweenfaces
symbioticrela‐tionshipbetweenpartyonthegroundandpartycentraloffice
conflictbetweenpartyonthegroundandpartypublicofficeplayedoutinthepartycentralof‐fice
clearlypartyinpublicoffice
Membership virtuallynon‐existent;usuallyfriendsandfamilyofthepartyelite
extensiveandsociallyhomoge‐neous
stagnatingandsociallyhetero‐geneous
distinctionbe‐tweenmembersandnon‐membersisblurred
Decisionmaking informalandhighlycentralised
organisedinahierarchicalsys‐temofdemocraticdelegation
therulesregard‐ingpartyinternaldecision‐makingbecomefiercelycontested
highlyinclusive:onemember,onevote
Organisationalresources
personalcontactsandmoneycon‐centratedinthehandsofthepartynotables
partymemberscontributefreelabourandpayregularmember‐shipdues
technologicalrevolutionandstatesubsidiesmakeresourcesprovidedbypartymemberslessimportant
partyinpublicofficevirtuallyself‐sufficient
Source: OwncompilationbasedonKatzandMair(1995;2002)andKatz(1990;1996;2001).
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The organisational development of political parties inWestern Europe is summa‐
risedinTable1.Itwasimportanttooutlinethehistoricaltrajectoryofpartyorgani‐
sationsintheestablisheddemocraciesbecausethegreatmajorityoftheoriestoex‐
plain different types of party organisation have been developed in this particular
empirical context. However, as the next sectionwill show, the history of political
partiesinWesternEuropeismuchmorecomplexthantheabovetablesuggestsand
fullofcasesthatexistingtheoriesfailtoaccountfor.Thisfailureresultsfromthefact
thatexistingtheoriespaytoomuchattentiontoeitherstructuresoragency,without
acknowledgingthedialecticalrelationshipbetweenthetwo.Inshort,thehistorical
developmentofpoliticalpartiesinWesternEuropejustoutlinedwillhelpus,firstof
all,highlighttheweaknessesofexistingapproachestowardspartyorganisationand,
secondly,demonstratehowtheanalyticalframeworkdevelopedherecancontribute
toourunderstandingnotonlyofpoliticalpartyformationandadaptationinnewer
democraciesbutalsopoliticalpartydevelopmentinWesternEurope.
Structuralistapproachestopartyorganisation
Theoriesthatemphasisestructuralfactorsinordertoaccountfordifferentformsof
party organisation have been arranged into three distinctive groups (van Biezen
2005;seealsoBartoliniandMair2001:328‐330).Thesecanbedistinguishedonthe
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basisofhowmuchimportancetheyattributetoexternalorinternalfactorsrespec‐
tively.Whilethe“life‐cycle”approachconceivespartyformationandadaptationas
anendogenousprocessofmaturationthatwillalwaysunfold in thesameway,re‐
gardlessofthecontextaroundtheparty,the“periodeffect”approach–usedabove
tooutlinethehistoricaldevelopmentofWesternEuropeanparties–arguesthatthe
organisationalstructuresimplementedbypartieswill,incontrast,tendtoreflectthe
environmentalcircumstances inwhichthesepartiescompete.Finally, the“genera‐
tioneffect”approachmaintainsthatthetypeofpartyorganisationisverylikelyto
beindicativeofthecontextualfactorsthatformedthesettingfortheparty’sinitial
formation.Inotherwords,theformationofapoliticalpartywillbedeterminedby
externalstructuralfactors,whereasthefurtherdevelopmentwillbeconstrainedby
theinternalpartystructuresoriginallyadopted.
The“life‐cycle”approach
Probablythemostwidelycitedtheorythatcanberelatedtothelife‐cycleapproach
isRobertMichels’well‐known“iron lawofoligarchy”. Studying theGermanSocial
DemocraticPartyintheearly20thcentury,Michelsclaimsthatallpartiesthatattain
acertaindegreeofcomplexitywillundergoacentralisationofpowerinthehandsof
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asmallnumberofleaders.Thisissummarisedinhisfamousdictum:“Whosaysor‐
ganization,saysoligarchy”(Michels1962:365).
The causal mechanism underlying Michels’ argument involves two different
stages.Firstofall,Michelsestablishesthenecessityofleadershipinlargeorganisa‐
tions, arguing that beyond a certain size technical specialisation and a division of
labourbecomeindispensable.Thiswillforcethepartytoreplacedirectdemocracy
byasystemofdelegation,which,inturn,willgiverisetoadistinctionbetweenlead‐
ersandfollowers.Althoughthisfirststepintheargumentationseemsalmostbanal,
itneverthelessformsthecrucialbasisforthesecondstageinMichels’lineofreason‐
ing,whenhecontendsthatthisnewlyemergedleadershipwillnecessarilybecome
oligarchic.
Michelsofferstwodifferentsetsoffactorsthatwillencourageleaderstoactoli‐
garchically.Tobeginwith,exercisingpowerhasanumberofpsychologicaleffects
onthoseinleadershippositions,since,accordingtoMichels,thedesiretodominate
isinherenttohumannature.Itfollowsfromthisthat
[…]everyhumanpowerseekstoenlarge itsprerogatives.Hewho
hasacquiredpowerwillalmostalwaysendeavourtoconsolidateit
and to extend it, tomultiply the rampartswhich defend his posi‐
tion,andtowithdrawhimselffromthecontrolofthemasses.
(ibid.:206)
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Moreover,leaderswillseekoligarchicalcontroloftheparty,becauseofthematerial
benefits attached to their status within the party organisation. These would de‐
creaseinvalueiftheyhadtosharethemwithalargergroupofpeople.
Afterhavingansweredthequestionofwhypartyleaderswouldtrytocentralise
powerwithintheirelitistcircle,Michelsgoesontoexplainhowthisisachieved.The
principalcauseheidentifiesinthisregardisthemeretechnicalindispensabilityof
leadership:
The technical specialisation that inevitably results from all exten‐
sive organisation renders necessarywhat is called expert leader‐
ship. Consequently the power of determination comes to be con‐
sideredoneofthespecificattributesofleadership,andisgradually
withdrawnfromthemassestobeconcentratedinthehandsofthe
leaders alone. Thus the leaders, who were at first no more than
executiveorgansofthecollectivewill,soonemancipatethemselves
fromthemassesandbecomeindependentofitscontrol.
(ibid.:70)
Inotherwords,asthepartyorganisationbecomesmoresophisticated,sowilllead‐
ersbecomemoreexpert inrunning theorganisation.Thiswillmake ithard tore‐
place them,which, in turn,makes leaders feelmoresecureand less responsive to
rank‐and‐fileinfluence:Theleaders’monopolyofexpertiseinmanyareaswillmean
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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thatordinarypartymembershavetodependontheirjudgement,exposingthemto
theleaders’control.Toolsusedbythepartyleadershiptomaintaincontroloverthe
party on the ground include themanipulation of party finances, control over the
partypress,andparticularlythe“tacticofresignation”.
WhileMichels’“ironlawofoligarchy” iswithoutdoubtthemostprominentex‐
ample of the life‐cycle approach, other authors also perceive the development of
partyorganisationsasasinglecommontrajectorythatallpartieswillbeforcedto
follow.OneexampleisthestudyofpartiesinNorwayandDenmarkbyHarmeland
Svåsand(1993),inwhichitisarguedthatthe“entrepreneurialissuesparties”found
in these two countriesdid all go through the same threephasesof organisational
progression.Eachstage, theauthorsargue,requiredparticular typesof leadership
skillstodealwithitsspecialchallenges.Duringthefirstphase,buildingapartyor‐
ganisation is less vital, but the emphasis is ondevelopingamessageanddrawing
attention to the party. This will be more successful to the extent that the leader
drawsattentiontohim‐orherself.Inthesecondphase,ontheotherhand,establish‐
ingroutinisedproceduresanddevelopinganelectoralapparatuswillenjoyhighest
priority.Hence,theleaderfirstandforemostrequiresorganisationalskills.Finally,
duringthethirdphasetheprimaryfocusisonsolidifyingareputationasareliable
partner in government, which calls for a “moderator” and “stabiliser” as party
leader.
WhatthisapproachhasincommonwithMichel’sthesisisthattheybothexplain
differenttypesofpartyorganisationswithdifferentstagesinaparty’slife.Similarto
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living organisms, proponents of the life‐cycle approach argue, political parties go
through a process of maturation, and their organisational structures will reflect
their current developmental stage. In otherwords, just as a human being experi‐
ences different phases of physical development (baby, child, adolescent, adult),
whichareallassociatedwithparticularchangesinthebody,apoliticalpartyisper‐
ceivedtogrowupalongauniversalpaththatcanbedividedintodifferentsegments.
Hence, all parties on the same stage of developmentwill be characterised by the
same typeoforganisation.Thismeans that if twoparties areestablished simulta‐
neouslyinverydifferentcontexts,totallyisolatedfromeachother,theywilldisplay
verysimilarorganisations,simplybecausetheyareboth“new”.Moreover,theyare
thenpredictedtorunthroughthesamephaseofmaturation,eventuallybothreach‐
ingthefinalstageoforganisationalmaturity.Unlikelivingorganisms,however,po‐
liticalpartiesarenotperceivedashavingamaximumlifeexpectancy.
Accordingly,we should expectpolitical parties in youngdemocracies to follow
thesametrajectoryaspartiesinWesternEuropedid,developingfromcadreparties
tomassparties,andsubsequentlyadoptingthecatch‐allpartytype,followedbythe
cartel‐party type. However, while such a scenario can probably be dismissed on
mereempiricalevidence(cf.vanBiezen2005:153),thisshouldnotleadustodisre‐
gard the life‐cycle approach completely. In fact, speculations about more general
trends in thedevelopmentofpartyorganisations, suchasoligarchic tendencies in
internal decision‐making, are much less easy to falsify. It does indeed require a
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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muchmoreabstractargumenttoteardownthedeterministictheoriesdevelopedby
Michelsandhisdisciples.
Certainly themainweaknessof the life‐cycleapproach is its generalneglectof
partyactorsandtheirinterests.Picturingpartyorganisationalformationandadap‐
tationasaprocessofmaturation similar to thoseof any life formdenies the sub‐
stantial differences between the natural and the social world. Unlike the entities
studiedbynaturalscientists,socialactorsdonotalwaysreactinthesamemanner
toaspecificstimulus.Rather,theobjectsofanalysisinsocialsciencearecapableof
learningandactingdifferentlyunderthesameconditions.
ThiscanbeexemplifiedbylookingatthedevelopmentofGreenpartiesinWest‐
ernEurope,whichinstitutedhighlytransparentandinclusivestructuresofdecision‐
making.Infact,itcouldbearguedthat–knowingaboutMichels’ironlawofoligar‐
chy–thesepartiesdeliberatelytriedtocountertheoligarchicaltendenciesfoundin
establishedpoliticalparties(cf.Kitschelt1988).Forinstance,inthecaseoftheGer‐
manGreens(DieGrünen),whichisprobablythebestdocumentedexample,theor‐
ganisationalphilosophyofBasisdemokratiewasclearlyaimedatpreventingthede‐
velopmentofaprofessionalparty leadershipthatwouldthenbecomeincreasingly
indispensableandthusdifficulttocontrol(Poguntke1993:138).Severalruleswere
implemented to put this democratic ideal in practice. To begin with, the original
partycharterprovided forasystemofmidtermrotationofparliamentaryseats to
those lower in the party list. Moreover, it embraced the idea of the “imperative
mandate”, which ruled that deputies who deviated from the policy resolutions
OLIVERHELLMANN
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passedbythepartyassemblycouldberemovedfromoffice.Regardingthepartyin
central office, itwas decided that party posts should not be salaried,while party
leadershiptenureandre‐eligibilitywerelimited.
Inshort,contrarytoMichels’ironlaw,manygrassrootsmembersinGreenpar‐
tiesdeeplydistrust leadership,anddonotfollowthemblindly.Andalthoughmost
Green parties have, since their formation, crafted considerable organisational re‐
forms that abolished several of the sacred “new politics” principles of intra‐party
democracy, there iswidespread consensus among scholars thatGreenparties are
stillfarawayfromconventionalpartiesintermsoftheirorganisation(forexample
Rihoux 2006; Burchell 2001). Put differently, the oligarchical trends in Western
EuropeanGreenpartiesaremuchweakerthanthe life‐cycleapproachwantsusto
believe.Hence,Michels iswrongwhenhesays that “historicalevolutionmocksall
theprophylacticmeasuresthathavebeenadoptedforthepreventionofoligarchy”
(1962:368).Rather,anticipatingtheoligarchicaltendenciesoforganisations,actors
arenotrestrictedtosittingbackandwatchingtheprocessofmaturationunfold,but
theycanindeedconsciouslyworkagainstthesetendencies.
Moreover, the life‐cycleapproachdoesnotonlydenyanyrole toagentswithin
theparty,but italso ignores theenvironmentaroundtheparty.Even ifweaccept
theideathatpartyformationandadaptationcanbeunderstoodasanendogenous
process of maturation, we need to make certain assumptions about the external
conditions (cf.Harmel2002:121). Similar to any livingorganism,politicalparties
needacertaininputfromtheenvironmentinordertomoveontothenextstageof
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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their organisational development. In otherwords, progress in the life‐cycle is not
onlydependentupon internaldynamics, but thesedynamics, in turn, are thepro‐
ductofexternalfactors.Similarly,thespeedofpartyorganisationalchangewillalso
bedeterminedbytheenvironmentsurroundingtheparty.
Having outlined theweaknesses, it is necessary to point out that the life‐cycle
approachalsohas its strengths. In fact,what itdoes, it stresses the importanceof
internalfactorsinordertounderstanddifferentformsofpartyorganisation.Inpar‐
ticular,thepossibleeffectsofpartysizehaveinthepastmotivatedmuchresearch.
Forinstance,Tan(1998),disintegratingMichels’ironlawofoligarchyintomeasur‐
able variables, tests the impact the number of partymembers has on intra‐party
participationandthedistributionofpowerwithinpartyorganisations.Hisfindings
onlypartlysupportMichels’hypotheses.While,ontheonehand,largemembership
decreasesmeaningful participation by partymembers and encourages free‐riding
behaviour,organisational complexity (resulting from largemembership size)does
notnecessarily result ina centralisationofpowerat the topof thehierarchy.The
firstrelationshiphasbeenconfirmedinamorerecentstudybyWeldon(2006).Re‐
garding the second relationship, Lundell (2004) comes to a conflicting conclusion
whenheidentifiesacorrelationbetweenpartysizeandtheprocedureofcandidate
selection forpublicelections:The larger theparty, themorecentralised theselec‐
tionofcandidateswilltendtobe.
Tosumup,similartotheageingoflivingorganisms,thelife‐cycleapproachper‐
ceivespartyorganisationalformationandadaptationasauni‐directionalprocessof
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maturation. Indoingso, it totallydeniesanyexplanatorypowertoagencyandthe
externalenvironmentaroundtheparty.However, the life‐cycleapproachdeserves
tobeacclaimedfordrawingourattentiontothepossibleimpactofinternalfactors
whenexplainingdifferentformsofpartyorganisation.
The“periodeffect”approach
While the life‐cycle approach focuses exclusively on endogenous dynamics to ac‐
count for different formsof party organisation, the “period effect” approach gives
sole attention to the external environment. Particular types of party organisation
aresaidtoderivefromcompetitionwithotherparties,whichallhavetoparticipate
in democratic elections under the same external circumstances. The basic thesis
claimsthatifapartyisgoingtocompetesuccessfullywithotherparties,itneedsto
lookandactlikethem.However,advocatesofthisapproacharestillundecidedon
which levelofanalysismattersmost inexplainingpartyorganisational structures.
One group – nowadaysparticularly associatedwith thewritings ofKatz andMair
(1995) – argues that political parties are converging towards a common type of
partyorganisation,sincetheylikewisehavetorespondtouniversaltrendsthatare
observableinallmoderndemocracies.Others,ontheotherhand,claimthatparties
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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aredivergingastotheirorganisation,thusstressingexplanatoryfactorsonthedo‐
mesticlevel(forexampleDetterbeck2005;Gallagher1988a).
The first argument goesback to themuch citeddebatebetweenDuverger and
Epsteinrevolvingaround thequestionofwhichorganisational structurewouldbe
most likelytodominatedemocraticpoliticsaftertheSecondWorldWar.Duverger
(1964) argued that the mass party, with its large membership and its extensive
networkof localbranches,was superior to the cadreparty, as itprovidedamore
effectiveapparatustosecurelargequantitiesofresourcesneededforelectoralcom‐
petition. Consequently, there would be a “contagion from the left”, meaning that
otherpartieswouldfeelforcedtocopytheorganisationalformofsocialistpartiesin
ordertoattainahigherlevelofcompetitiveness.Incontrast,Epstein(1980)claimed
thatAmerican‐styleparties,whichsharedmanysimilaritieswiththeclassicalcadre
partyinproto‐democraticEurope,weremuchmoresuitedtocopewiththechallen‐
gesofmodern election campaigns. Epsteinmaintained that the largemembership
organisation and the encapsulation of specific social groupswould cost themass
party thenecessary flexibility to react to social changes in the electorate.He thus
suggestedparty leaders cutdownonpartymembers, and insteadmobilise voters
directly throughmassmedia. Only thenwould themass parties be able to retain
theircompetitiveness.Inotherwords,Epsteindidnotexpecta“contagionfromthe
left”tocharacterisethedevelopmentofpartysystemsinWesterndemocracies,but
rathera“contagionfromtheright”.
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Scholars who accept that the cartel party is now the dominant organisational
typeinWesternEurope,wouldarguethatneitherDuvergernorEpsteinwereright
in their predictions. As has already been outlined further above, both the “leftist”
masspartyand the “rightist”cadreparty felt compelled tocraftorganisational re‐
formsthatledtotheemergenceofanewcommonformofpartyorganisation.While
the leadersof thecadrepartyestablishedorganisedmembershipbranchessimilar
tothoseofthemassparty,withoutgivinguptheindependencethattheypreviously
hadenjoyed,theleadersofthemasspartymadeorganisationalchoicesthatwould
limit the influence of the party on the ground,without completely abolishing the
membershiporganisation(KatzandMair2002:120‐121).
Factors that facilitate the rise of the party in public office as the dominant or‐
ganisational faceofaparty,advocatesofthecartel‐partythesisargue,arebroader
historicaldevelopmentsthataffectalldemocraciesinthesameway.Associalidenti‐
tiesareweakeningduetothegeneralimprovementoflivingstandards,theexpan‐
sionofthewelfarestateandbettereducation,votersareincreasinglyconceivedas
free floating. An encapsulation of the electorate through grassroots organisations
hasthereforebecomelargelyinefficient.Rather,themostpromisingelectoralstrat‐
egyistomakeacatch‐allappealtothewiderelectorate.Pursuingsuchastrategyis
now possible because party leaders have become largely independent from con‐
strainingopinionsexpressedbythepartyontheground.Asaresultofthetechno‐
logical progress in the field ofmass communication and the availability of public
fundingforpoliticalparties,partymembersnolongerenjoythesamepowerfulposi‐
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tionwithinthepartyorganisationastheydidduringtheeraofthemassparty.Party
leaderscannowaddressvotersdirectlyviatelevisionortheinternet,withouthav‐
ing to rely on door‐to‐door canvassing or leafleting carried out by unpaid party
members.Inaddition,subsidiespaidbythestatemeanthatmembershipdueshave
becomeamuchlessimportantsourceofincome.
Inordertoexplainwhythecartelpartyneverthelessstillmaintainsamember‐
shiporganisedintolocalbranches,anumberofenduringbenefitshavebeenidenti‐
fied fromtheparty leadership’sperspective.Whilevoluntary labourandmember‐
shipdueshavenot lostall theirvalueasorganisational resources, in recent times
otherfunctionsofpartymembersareperceivedtohavebecomerelativelymoreim‐
portantforelectoralsuccess(seeKatz1990;Scarrow1996:42‐45).Tostartwith,a
largemembershiporganisationgivesvoterstheimpressionthatthepartyispopular
andstrongly rooted in society.Moreover,members themselvesareassumed tobe
mostloyalvotersinelections,andthroughtheireverydaycontactstheymayadvise
otherpeoplehow tovote. Inaddition,membersprovidea channelof communica‐
tion,whichkeeps theparty leadership in touchwithpopularopinion.And finally,
thepartymembershipcanbeusedasarecruitmentpoolforfuturepoliticalleaders.
Toputitbriefly,advocatesofthecartel‐partythesisarguethatdespitethedecreas‐
ingimportanceofvolunteerworkandfinancialcontributionsbymembers,political
partiesstillregardamembershiporganisationasanadvantageintheelectoralcon‐
test.
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In order to attractmembers, contemporary parties – similar to the traditional
massparty–granttheirmembersrightsofdemocraticparticipation.However,un‐
likeleftistpartiesintheearly20thcentury,thecartelpartydoesnotorganiseinter‐
naldecision‐making inahierarchicalsystemofdelegation,butdecisionsaremade
byvoteofthefullmembership.Thishighlyinclusiveorganisationofpartyinternal
democracyassuresthepartyleadershipthenecessaryfreedomofactiontopursue
aggressiveelectoralstrategies,since,duetotheiroftendisaggregatednature,grass‐
roots partymembers arenot very likely tomount a serious challenge against the
positionsadoptedatthetop.
All parties, the cartel‐party thesis goes, will display the organisational trends
just outlined: Party membership will decrease in size – without vanishing com‐
pletely,intra‐partydemocracywillbecomeincreasinglyinclusive,andresourceswill
moreandmorebeprovidedby thestate.Altogether, these trendswillgiverise to
party inpublicofficeas thedominantorganisational faceofanyparty.Concerning
thedevelopmentofpolitical parties in youngdemocracies,we should thenexpect
partiestomakean“evolutionaryleap”(Smith1993)overpreviousstagesoforgani‐
sationaldevelopment,andtoconvergetowardsthecartelpartytype.Infact,thisis
thescenarionumerousstudiessuggest(forexamplePuhle2001;Olson1998).The
argument is that political parties in young democracies competewithin the same
environmentaspartiesincontemporaryWesternEurope:Stablepoliticalidentities
have only developedweakly, state funding for political parties has been available
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instantly,andpartyleaderscancommunicatetheirmessagesdirectlytotheelector‐
atethroughmassmedia.
However,basedoncontradictingempiricalevidencefrombothWesternEurope
andnewdemocracies,theperceptionofpartydevelopmentasamoreorlesssimul‐
taneoustransformationofallpartysystemsduringparticularperiodsinhistoryhas
come under heavy criticism. Rather, a second group within the period‐effect ap‐
proachargues,factorscapableofexplainingdifferenttypesofpartyorganisationare
to be found on a lower level of analysis than universal trends and developments.
Consequently,weshouldnotexpectallpoliticalpartiestoconvergetowardsacom‐
monorganisationaltype.Forinstance,vonBeyme(2000:202)claimsthatthecatch‐
allpartyneveremergedintheAnglo‐SaxonandScandinaviandemocracies.Factors
identifiedbyotherscholarsashavingadeterminingeffectonwhetherpartieswill
adoptthecartelpartymodelincludepoliticalinstitutions(Detterbeck2002),politi‐
cal party funding laws (Young1998) and the ideological polarisation of the party
system(Yishai2001).4
Whilemoststudieswithinthe“periodeffect”refertotheseestablishedmodelsof
political party organisation, there is also a small number of studies that develop
theirowntypologiestoaccountfordifferentformsofpartyorganisationthatcanbe
foundacrossmoderndemocracies.Oneexample isKitschelt’s(1995) investigation
ofpartiesinpost‐communistEasternEurope,whichdistinguishesthe“charismatic”,
the “clientelistic” and the “programmatic party”. Although this typology ismainly
4SeealsoTable3onpage54.
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based on the criterion of how partiesmobilise voters, it alsomakes reference to
partyorganisation.Broadlyspeaking,boththeprogrammaticpartyandtheclientel‐
isticpartymakehighinvestmentsinorganisationalstructures,whereasthecharis‐
maticpartyavoidshighcostsoforganisation‐building.However,whiletheorganisa‐
tionoftheprogrammaticpartyusuallyrestsonabstractrulesandregulations,clien‐
telisticpartiestendtobebuiltonhighlyinformalpersonalnetworksthatensurea
constantflowofresourcestothepartyfollowing.Kitscheltlistsseveralfactorsthat
helptopredictwhichpartytypeislikelytoemergewithinanewdemocracy.These
include the typeof thepre‐democraticauthoritarianregime, theprocessofdemo‐
cratic transition, the institutions implemented at the end of this process, and the
timepassed since the first free and fair elections.Moreover,Kitschelt claims, it is
alsonecessarytoconsidermorehistorical factorssuchaswhetherthecountryex‐
perienced democratic government before autocratic rule and the timing of ind‐
ustrialisation.
A somewhatdifferentmethod thathasbeenused to studydifferences inparty
organisationistofocusonlyoncertainelementsratherthantoapplyabroadtypol‐
ogy.Inparticular,theselectionofcandidatesforpublicofficehasreceivedmuchat‐
tention, probablybecause thedegree of intra‐partydemocracy is seen as a useful
indicatorforhowwellpartiesfulfiltheirfunctionasintermediaryinstitutions.Cor‐
responding to thestudyofpartyorganisationmoregenerally, themostsignificant
variablesthathavebeenidentifiedashavinganimpactontheprocedureofcandi‐
dateselectionarethesocio‐politicalcontext,theinstitutionalsetting,andtheparty
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system.Twobasiccausalmechanismscanbeidentifiedbehindthesevariables.The
firstoneisbasedonthenotionofideas:Politicalpartieswillopencandidateselec‐
tion tobroaderparticipation, ifmasspolitical cultureor theparty’s own ideology
understandsparties as an important institution topromotedemocracywithin the
widersociety– inotherwords, if intra‐partydemocracy isperceivedasanend in
itself (Gallagher1988a;1988b).On theotherhand, thesecondmechanismofcau‐
salityiscentredaroundmoreoutcome‐orientedexpectationstowardspoliticalpar‐
ties. Scholars have isolated numerous factors that will allow a political party to
justifyagreaterdegreeofleadershipcontrolovercandidateselection.Allthesefac‐
torshaveincommonthattheyarepositivelycorrelatedwithhigherlevelsofuncer‐
taintyastopoliticalandelectoraloutcomes,andthusrequirepoliticalpartiestoen‐
terintoagreementsandcoalitions,which,inturn,requireseliteselectionofcandi‐
dates in order to increase party discipline and enforce the necessary inter‐party
understandings.Factorsthathavebeenfoundto increasetheneedforsuchagree‐
ments arepacted transitions (Field2004), strategically complex electoral systems
(Siavelis 2002; Thiébault 1988), parliamentarism (as opposed to presidentialism)
(Gallagher1988a;1988b),andhighlyfragmentedpartysystems(FieldandSiavelis
2006).Conversely, thereare factors thatwill forcepoliticalparties to adoptmore
inclusiveproceduresofcandidateselection.Onesuchfactorisinter‐partycompeti‐
tion:Ifthereisspaceforsuccessfulsplinterparties,partyleaderswillbewillingto
delegatecandidateselectiontolargergroupsinordertoincreasethelikelihoodthat
resourcefulcontenderswillsticktotheparty(Poiré2003).
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In sum, theperiod‐effect approach seesdifferent party organisations as a pro‐
duct of their environment. Parties competing under the same conditions are ex‐
pectedtoadoptthesameorganisationalfeatures.Theunderlyingcausalassumption
isthatunderacertainsetofcontextualcircumstancesthereisalwaysatypeofparty
organisation that will yield the best results. Hence, similar to Darwin’s theory of
evolution,politicalpartiesareperceivedtofindthemselvesinastruggleforsurvival
ofthefittest,adjustingtotheenvironmentinordertobeascompetitiveastheirop‐
ponents.Partiesthatdonotfollowthelogicofcompetitionwillbepunishedbythe
electoralmarket.Althoughtheymightnotsharethesamedestinyasextinctspecies
suchasthedodobirdortheTasmaniantiger,partiesthatrefusetoadapttotheen‐
vironmentwilleventuallybecomepolitically irrelevant.However,advocatesof the
period‐effect approach do not agree onwhich environment should be considered
themostimportant.Whileonegrouparguesthatpoliticalpartiesallovertheworld
areincreasinglycompetingunderthesamecircumstancesofamodernsociety,thus
converging towards the cartel party, another group stresses divergence between
partyorganisations,contendingthatthemost importantexplanatoryvariablescan
befoundonthedomesticlevel.
Disregarding theirdifferences,bothcampswouldprobablydismiss theviewof
partyformationandadaptationasanevolutionaryprocessastooharsh.Infact,they
pointoutthemselvesthattherearealwaysexceptionstothegeneraltrend.Forin‐
stance,whileKatzandMair (1995)admit that thecartelisationprocess isuneven,
withnoteverypartyadoptingtheorganisationalcharacteristicsofthecartelparty,
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Gallagher,studyingcandidateselectionacrossindustrialiseddemocracies,observes
some“residualvariance”thatcontradictswhatcouldtheoreticallybeexpectedfrom
thecontext(1988b:265).However,proponentsoftheperiod‐effectapproachdonot
seemtobeawareofthewidertheoreticalimplicationsoftheseexceptions.Iftheex‐
ternalenvironmentfailstoexplaindifferencesintheorganisationofpoliticalparties
competingwithinthesameenvironment,weneedtolookforpossibleexplanations
atlowerlevelsofanalysis–eitheratthepartylevelorevenattheindividualactor’s
level. Hence, by admitting that there are a number of empirical exceptions to the
theoretical assumptions, the period‐effect approach hints at its own weaknesses,
namelythenegligenceofbothinternalandagentialfactors.
ThedevelopmentoftheItalianpartysystemisanexcellentexampletoillustrate
this, as different partymodels have always existed next to each otherwithin the
sameenvironment(BardiandMorlino1994:244).Upuntilitsimplosionintheearly
1990s,theChristianDemocraticParty(DemocraziaCristiana,DC)wastheonlyma‐
jorpartythatcouldorganisationallybecharacterisedasacatch‐allparty.Theother
twomainpartiesfollowedthemodelofthemassparty:BoththeCommunistParty
(PartitoCommunistaItaliano,PCI)andtoalesserextenttheSocialistParty(Partito
Socialista Italiano,PSI)werestructuredaccording toLeninistprinciplesofworker
andpeasantmobilisation.Themass‐partyideaalsoreflectedintheorganisationof
theneo‐fascistSocialMovementParty(MovimentoSocialeItaliano,MSI),whichhad
abandonedthetraditionalfascistmilitiamodel,butwasbasedonadensenetwork
ofterritorialbranches.Althoughthesepartieswentthroughconsiderableorganisa‐
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tionalchangeintheearly1990s,theyhaveretainedcertaincharacteristicelements
of the mass party (Bardi and Morlino 1994; Pamini 1998). Simultaneously, new
party types emerged, such asBerlusconi’sForza Italia (Go Italy!),whichhasbeen
describedasa“businessfirmparty”(HopkinandPaolucci1999)withonlyrudimen‐
taryorganisationalstructuresandaninsignificantmembership.
ThemultiplicityofdifferentpartyorganisationthathavecoexistedinItalyatany
giventimehintsattheexplanatorypoweroffactorswhicharelargelyignoredbythe
period‐effectapproach.Forinstance,ithasbeensuggestedthat“themaintenanceof
organisationalstructureshasbeeneasier forpartieswithstronger identities, such
asextremeorradicalparties”(Morlino2001:135).Thiscouldbeanindicationthat
thegoalsandideasofactorswithinthepartyplayanimportantroleinaccounting
fordifferenttypesoforganisation.Moreover,thecombinationoftraditionalorgani‐
sational elements of the mass party with modern electoral communication tech‐
niques, as in the PCI‐reestablishment Partito Democractico della Sinistra (Demo‐
craticPartyoftheLeft,PDS)(seeGiannettiandMulé2006:471)–orDemocraticidi
Sinistra(DemocratsoftheLeft,DS)asithasbeencalledsince1998–suggeststhat
partyactorsarenotatthemercyoftheenvironment,buttheyareabletodevelop
divergingcoursesofactiontoreacttonewopportunitiespresentedbythecontext.
Inadditiontoagential factors, ithasalsobeenclaimedthat theorganisationaldif‐
ferencesbetweenItalianpartiescanbeexplainedby internaldynamics.Themany
enduringcharacteristicsofthetypicalmasspartywithintheDS,Pamini(1998:152)
argues, aredue to the strengthof theextra‐parliamentaryparty:Thus far, thede‐
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mandsofthepartyleadershipforagreaterfreedomofactioninordertoformulate
aninter‐classelectoralplatformhavebeensuccessfullyrestrainedbythepowerful
positionofthepartyontheground.
However,whiletheperiod‐effect thussuffers fromaneglectofagentialand in‐
ternal factors, it highlights the importance of the environment around parties in
order tounderstanddifferent formsofpartyorganisation–avariable thathasno
placeinthelife‐cycleapproach.Ashasalreadybeenarguedabove,internaldynam‐
icscannotbeunderstoodwithouttakingintoaccountcontextualfactorsaroundthe
party.Moreover,itisimpossibletoseehowpartyactorsshouldmakeorganisational
decisions without paying any attention to the opportunities and constraints pro‐
videdby their environment. For instance, goingback to the above exampleof the
Italianpartysystem,itwasimpossiblefortheleadersofthetraditionalmassparties
toignorethetechnologicalprogressinmasscommunicationaswellastheshrinking
of thesocialclasses theyclaimedtorepresent. Inotherwords,environmental fac‐
torsalwayshaveanimportantinfluenceonthedecisionsmadebypartymanagers.
Inconclusion,theperiod‐effectapproachunderstandspartyformationandadap‐
tationasaprocessofevolution,withallpartieshavingtoadapttotheenvironment
in the sameway in order tomaintain their competitiveness. Therebyour focus is
drawntoexternalvariablesaroundtheparty.Yet,advocatesoftheperiod‐effectap‐
proachdonotagreeonthequestionofwhichenvironmentshouldbeconsideredthe
mostimportantone.Whileonegrouparguesthatpartiesareincreasinglycompeting
under the same conditions, another group argues that domestic factors constitute
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thecrucialenvironment toexplaindifferent formsofpartyorganisation.Nonethe‐
less, as both approaches ignore internal as well as agential variables they suffer
fromthesameweaknesses.
The“generationeffect”approach
The third structuralist approach topartyorganisation,which is closely associated
withthewritingsofPanebianco(1988),canbelabelled“generationeffect”.Itdiffers
from the two approaches alreadydiscussedby clearly distinguishing between the
phaseof formationandthesubsequentphaseofadaptation,stressingtheexplana‐
torypowerofeitherexternalfactorsorinternaldynamics.Regardingtheformation
ofaparty, theorganisationalconfigurationofaparty isbelievedtobedetermined
bytheenvironmentalcircumstances.Theparticularpowerpatternreflectedinthe
organisationof thepartywill thendrive the furtherdevelopment. Inotherwords,
thecapacityofapartytoadapttoitsenvironmentwillbeheavilyconstrainedbyits
internaldynamics.
AlthoughPanebiancoisprimarilyinterestedinpartyinstitutionalisation,defined
as the process throughwhich an organisation “becomes valuable in and of itself”
(ibid.: 53),we can still infer important theoretical ideas for the studyofpartyor‐
ganisations. Essentially, Panebianco argues that different levels of institutionalisa‐
tionareduetohowapartywasformed,its“geneticmodel”:
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Aparty’sorganizationalcharacteristicsdependmoreupon itshis‐
tory, i.e. on how the organization originated and how it consoli‐
dated, thanuponanyother factor.The characteristicsof aparty’s
originareinfactcapableofexertingaweightonitsorganizational
structureevendecadeslater.Everyorganizationbearsthemarkof
itsformation,ofthecrucialpolitical‐administrativedecisionsmade
byitsfounders,thedecisionswhich“molded”theorganization.
(ibid.:50)
Theorganisationaldecisionstakenbytheparty’sfounders,accordingtoPanebianco,
aretheproductofthefounders’interestsandgoalsaswellastheenvironmentalfac‐
torssurroundingtheformationoftheparty:
During the organization’s formative phase, the leaders, whether
charismatic or not, normally play a crucial role. The spell out the
ideologicalaimsofthefutureparty,selecttheorganization’ssocial
base,its“huntingground”,andshapetheorganizationonthebasis
of theseaimsandthissocialbase– taking intoaccount,ofcourse,
available resources, different socio‐economic and political condi‐
tionsindifferentpartsofthecountry,etc.
(ibid.:53)
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Panebianconamesthreecentralfactorstodescribeaparty’sgeneticmodel.Thefirst
one concerns the party’s construction, which can either occur through territorial
penetrationorterritorialdiffusion.Territorialpenetrationmeansthatapartyestab‐
lishesanetworkoflocalbranchesthroughoutthecountry,whileinthecaseofterri‐
torialdiffusionthepartyisfoundedbyindependentgroupsoflocaleliteswhocome
together at the national level. The second principle determining a party’s genetic
model isthepresenceorabsenceofanexternal“sponsor” institution.Accordingly,
Panebianco distinguishes between externally legitimated parties and internally le
gitimatedparties.Finally,thethirdfactortotakeintoaccountistheroleofcharisma
inaparty’s formation. It isnecessarytoanswerthequestionofwhethertheparty
wasessentiallycreatedby,andasavehiclefor,acharismaticleader.
Eachoftheseelementsofparties’geneticmodelsisrelatedtocertaindegreesof
institutionalisation. Whereas the organisational construction through penetration
tendstoproduceastronginstitution,constructionthroughdiffusionwillratherlead
toaweak institution,becausetheorganisationalresourcesare in thehandsof the
many competing elites, thus forcing the organisation to develop through compro‐
miseandnegotiation.Similarly,thepresenceofanexternalsponsoringorganisation
generallyresultsinaweakinstitutionalisation,astheexternalsponsorshouldhave
no interest in strengthening theparty for thiswould inevitably reduce theparty’s
dependenceuponit.Incontrast,internallylegitimatedpartiesaremuchmorelikely
tobecomestronginstitutions.Finally,inorderforapartytoreachahigherlevelof
institutionalisation, it should not be built on charisma, since a charismatic leader
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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will–similartoanexternalsponsoringorganisation–resiststronginstitutionalisa‐
tionbutkeepthepartyunderhispersonalcontrol.
Inotherwords,thelevelofpartyinstitutionalisationwillverymuchdependon
thedistributionof powerwithin a party.Aparty canbe expected to reach a high
level of institutionalisation, if organisational resources are monopolised at the
“centre” of the partywithin a cohesive coalition of leaders. On the other hand, if
powerisdiffusedamonglocalelites,orifthepartyisdependenteitheronanexter‐
nal sponsoringorganisationoron a charismaticpersonality, institutionalisation is
veryunlikely.
Inprinciple,changetotheorganisationalstructures initiallyestablished ispos‐
sible. Identifyingthecausesforchange,Panebiancoadoptsaseeminglyintegrative
approachwhenhesaysthatchangeis
the result of deliberate choices (madewithin the dominant coali‐
tion) influencedbyboundedrationalityandanonymouspressures
(e.g. resistance to change, environmental changes, technological
changes etc.)which interactwith the choices toproducebothde‐
siredinnovationsandcounter‐intuitiveeffects.
(ibid.:242)
Organisationalchangehappensinthreephases.Firstofall,anorganisationalcrisis
mustbeunleashedbystrongenvironmentalpressure,suchaselectoraldefeat.This
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willunavoidablyharmthereputationofthedominantcoalitionwhichwasunableto
handlethecrisis,andthepartywillthen–inthesecondphase–witnesstheforma‐
tionofnewalliancesandthereplacementof the leadinggroup.Finally,duringthe
thirdphasetherulesofpartyinternalcompetitionarechanged.However,asPane‐
biancopointsout,“noinstitutioncan[…]entirelyescapefromitspast”(ibid.:261).
Inotherwords,thefreedomofchoiceofthenewleadinggroupindesigningorgani‐
sationalinnovationsisseverelylimitedbyexistinginternalstructures.Hence,traces
oftheparty’sgeneticmodelwillalwaysremainvisibleintheparty’sorganisation.
Itisprobablythisemphasisofaparty’sinitialformationandthecontinuingcon‐
strainingpoweroftheorganisationalstructuresinitiallyimplemented,whichisthe
mainweakness of the generation‐effect approach. Although Panebiancomentions
the roleof agency in the constructionofpartyorganisations, hedenies the actors
within thepartymuch freedomtosubstantiallyalter theorganisationalconfigura‐
tion.Moreover,Panebiancountenablyunderestimatestheneedforpoliticalparties
toadapt toachangingenvironment inorder toremainelectorallycompetitive(cf.
Ware1996:104).Rather,inhisunderstanding,theorganisationofpoliticalparties
willalwaysreflectthechoicesmadebythepartyfounderswithintheenvironmental
circumstances that surrounded theparty’s founding, as theorganisation is able to
enduredespitechanges inthesameenvironmentordespitechanges intheactors’
interests.
However,therearemanyempiricalexamplesofpoliticalpartiesthathavebeen
abletoshedhistoricalbaggage,effectivelyerasingthetracesoftheirorganisational
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past. Two interesting cases in this regard are the Austrian Freedom Party (Frei
heitlicheParteiÖsterreichs,FPÖ)andtheFrenchNationalFront(FrontNational,FN).
In contrast to Panebianco’s predictions, although extremely dependent on their
leaders’charisma–JörgHaider(upuntil2000)andJean‐MarieLePenrespectively–
boththeseextremeright‐wingpartieshaveachievedrelativelyhighlevelsofinstitu‐
tionalisation (PedahzurandBrichta2002).Putdifferently, judging fromtheircon‐
temporaryinstitutionalstrength,itwouldbeextremelydifficulttoimaginethatboth
theFPÖandtheFNwereoriginallyfoundedasapersonalvehicleofpowerfortheir
charismatic leaders. Certainly, as charismatic leadership still plays a role in both
parties, the geneticmodel undeniablymatters to explaindifferent party organisa‐
tions.However,theconstrainingeffectofparty’soriginonitsorganisationaldevel‐
opmentisexaggerated.
Yet,thisshouldnotleadustooverlookthestrengthsofPanebianco’swork.Not
onlydoesthe“generation‐effect”approachstresstheimportanceofcontextualfac‐
torstoexplaintheinitialformationofaparty,andtheeffectsofinternalstructures
tounderstandthefurtherorganisationaldevelopment,butbyclearlydistinguishing
betweenthestagesofformationandchangeitteachesusthatwemustnotsimply
analyseasnap‐shotofpartyorganisationatpresent,sincethismightproducewrong
results.Rather,wealsohavetoinvestigateunderwhichcircumstancestheseorgani‐
sationalregulationswereestablishedinthefirstplace.Theproblemisthatsincethe
time of the original founding of the party the environment might have changed,
while thepartyorganisationhasremainedunaltered.Studyingthepartyorganisa‐
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tiononlyatthepresentstage,wewouldthenconcludethatitisaproductofthecon‐
temporarycontext,while, in fact, theorganisationaldecisionswere takenwithina
muchearlierenvironment.Thepartyorganisationretained itsoriginal form,how‐
ever,becauseinternaldynamicsandtheinterestsoftheactorswithinthepartyim‐
pededenvironmentalchangetotranslateintoorganisationalchange.
Tosumup,thegeneration‐effectapproachmaintainsthattheinitialformationof
apartywillbedrivenbyenvironmental factors.Thesubsequentdevelopmentwill
thenbeconstrainedbytheinternalstructures.Similartoalivingorganism,thede‐
velopmentofthepartyorganisationislimitedbytheavailablegeneticpool,meaning
that the internal structures only offer the party actors a very limited number of
choices as to organisational reform. However, by perceiving party organisational
development in such away, the generation‐effect approach overrates the import‐
anceofinternaldynamics,andneglectsagentialandexternalfactorstounderstand
different types of party organisation. Itsmain strength, on the other hand, lies in
makingadistinctionbetweenthestagesof formationandadaptation,which is im‐
portantinordertoidentifythecorrectcausesbehindthedevelopmentofaparticu‐
larpartyorganisation.
ThethreestructuralistapproachesareagainsummarisedinTable2.Whilethey
allhavetheirownspecificstrengths,theyallsharethesameweakness,namelythe
negligenceofagentialfactors.Asthischapterhasthusfarshowshown,partyinter‐
nal actors shouldnot be excluded fromany theoryof party organisation. It is not
conducivetoourunderstandingofpartyformationandchangeifwetreatpolitical
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partiesaslivingorganisms,anddescribetheirorganisationaldevelopmentasmatu‐
rationorevolution,oraslimitedbytheirgeneticpool.Rather,asthemanyempirical
exampleshavedemonstrated,partiesareabletoreactdifferentlytothesamestimu‐
lus,sincetheindividualswhocomprisethepartiesareknowledgeableandreflexive.
TABLE2: STRUCTURALISTAPPROACHESTOPARTYORGANISATION
Lifecycle Periodeffect Generationeffect
Theoreticalclaim maturation:partyor‐ganisationsareper‐ceivedtogrowalongacommonpaththatcanbedividedintodifferentorganisationalstages
evolution:politicalpar‐tiesareperceivedtofindthemselvesinastruggleofthefittest,adjustingtotheenvironmentinordertobeascompeti‐tiveastheiropponents
gene‐pool:establishedastheproductofacer‐tainenvironment,thepartyorganisationsub‐sequentlyonlyoffersalimitednumberofpossi‐bilitiesforchange
Strenghts stressestheimportanceofinternalfactors
stressestheimportanceofexternalfactors
makesadistinctionbe‐tweenthestagesoffor‐mationandchange
Weaknesses neglectsexternalandagentialfactors
neglectsinternalandagentialfactors
overratestheexplana‐torypowerofinternalstructures
Voluntaristapproachestopartyorganisation
In stark contrast to the strictly structuralist approaches just presented, other
authorsstress the independent roleofpoliticalactors in theconstructionofparty
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organisations.Thatistosay,itisnotenvironmentalconditionsandinternaldynam‐
ics that shape the organisational structures of a party, but the deliberate will of
thoseindividualsactingwithintheparty.Broadlyspeaking,itisarguedthatactors
withinthepartycanplaytwopossiblerolesintheprocessofpartychange.Onthe
onehand,theyplayaninterveningrole–decidingonwhichexternalchangeswillbe
transformedintoorganisationalresponses–whileontheotherhandalsobeingable
toshapetheorganisationofthepartymorepro‐activelywithouttheneedforanen‐
vironmental stimulus. Therefore, party change can either be goal‐motivated or
power‐motivated(HarmelandJanda1994).
Goal‐motivatedchangehappensasaresponsetoexternal“shocks”.However,in
contrasttotheperiod‐effectapproach,whichexplainspartyorganisationasapro‐
cessofthebestpossibleadaptationtotheenvironment,intheviewofthevolunta‐
ristapproach,thepartywillonlyconsiderneworganisationalalternativesiftheac‐
torswithinthepartyperceiveaneedfororganisationalchangeinthelightoftheir
interests and strategies (Wilson 1994; see also Appleton andWard 1997). Party
leadersandtheirgoalsarethusseenasthekeyinterveningvariablebetweenenvi‐
ronmental pressures andorganisational adaptation. In order tobe translated into
reformstothepartyorganisation,changesintheparty’senvironmentmustbeper‐
ceivedasashockbythepartyleadership.Whatconstitutessuchashockwilldepend
onthepartyleadership’sprimarygoal(HarmelandJanda1994:269‐271).Borrow‐
ing fromthe literatureoncoalition formation(seeStrom1990;BudgeandKeman
1990; Laver and Schofield 1998) the voluntarist approach to party organisation
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usuallydistinguishes fourdifferentgoals thatcanbeheldby theparty leadership:
(1) votes, (2) office, (3) policy, and (4) intra‐party democracy. Themost obvious
shock for vote‐maximisers would be electoral failure. Office‐maximisers, on the
otherhand, understand suchdevelopments as a shock that aredirectly related to
their participation in government. Themost significant shock to policy advocates,
whoareneitherinterestedinwinningvotesnoringainingaccesstooffice,wouldbe
relatedtotheparty’spolicypositions,whilethoseleaderstryingtomaximiseintra‐
party democracy would see any major alteration to the party membership as a
shock.
Power‐motivatedorganisationalchange, incontrast,happenswithoutanexter‐
nalstimulus.Inotherwords,partyinternalactorsandtheirinterestsarethemselves
theultimatecauseforchange.Thevoluntaristapproachclaimsthatweshouldthus
expectreformstothepartyorganisationiftherehasbeeneitheraleadershipchange
or a change indominant faction.Anew leader is likely to alter theorganisational
structuresheinheritedfromhispredecessorforseveralreasons(Harmel,Tanand
Janda1995:5).Firstofall,differentleadershavedifferentabilitiesandorientations,
andwillthereforeevaluatesituationsdifferently.Secondly,leaderswillusuallywant
toleavetheirmarkupontheorganisation,assuringthemselvesavisibleplaceinthe
party’s history. Thirdly, organisational reforms are an important strategy to con‐
solidatethenewlyachievedpower.Andfourthly, leadershipchangesaregenerally
destabilising events. However, the extent towhich changes of leaderwill actually
resultinpartychangewilldependonanumberofadditionalfactors.Mostimport‐
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antly, theextenttowhichthenewleader’sdesiresandstrategiesforthepartyare
differentfromthoseofthepredecessorwillhaveadecisiveimpactonthescopeof
organisational change.Moreover,weneed to take into consideration thepersonal
abilities of the leader to answer the question of whether he will be able to fully
realisehis ideas (seealsoHarmelandSvåsand1993).Finally, theextent towhich
thepartyiswillingtofollowtheleaderisalsopartoftheequation.Thislatterfactor
consistsof twocomponents:First, advocatesof theactor‐centredapproachargue,
extensiveorganisationalchangeismorelikelyinpartieswheretheleadershipposi‐
tionisequippedwithfar‐reachingpowers.Second,thelikelihoodoforganisational
change is greater if leadership change goes togetherwith a change in the party’s
dominantfaction.
Ithasalsobeensuggestedthatdominantfactionchangeitselfcanbeasourceof
significant party organisational change (Harmel andTan2003).However, aswith
leadershipchange,thestrengthoftherelationshipbetweenchangeindominantfac‐
tionandreformofthepartyorganisationissubjecttoseveralinterveningfactors.To
startwith–andverysimilar towhathasbeensaidabout leadershipchange– the
extent of party change after the emergence of a new dominant faction will very
muchdependontheintensityoffactionalrivalry.Thegreaterthedistancebetween
factionsandtheirorganisationalpreferences,themoreextensivetheorganisational
changewillbe.Second,theabilityofthenewlydominantfactiontofullyenforceits
organisationalpreferencesrestsonwhether thechange in the internalpowerdis‐
tributionhas resulted in thecomplete, rather than justpartial, replacementof the
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dominant coalition. If the former dominant faction still holds on to significant or‐
ganisational resources, substantial party change is rather unlikely. Finally, we
should expectmoreparty change if the dominant faction change coincideswith a
change inparty leadership. If the leadershippositionsof thepartyarenotheldby
membersofthenewlydominantfaction,theleadershipmightresistdramaticparty
change.Inotherwords,“thecombinationofleadershipandfactionalchange[…]cre‐
atesopportunitiesforchangethataregreaterthanwhateithereventwouldaccom‐
plishalone”(Harmel,TanandJanda1995:17;emphasisintheoriginal).
Aslightlydifferentexampleofanactor‐centredapproachisAldrich’s(1995)an‐
alysis of the formation of political parties in the United States of America. Using
game theoreticalmodels,Aldrich showshowparties are institutions able to over‐
comeproblemsofcollectiveactionandsocialchoice.Althoughthemainaimofthe
studyisrathertoexplainwhypartieswereestablishedinthefirstplace,andevenif
rationalchoicecanindeedbeaccusedofbeinglatentlystructuralist(Hay2002:103‐
104),theanalysisisstillfoundedonanindividualisticbasis,therebyhintingatthe
possibilityofpoliticalactorsaffectingtheorganisationalstructuresofpoliticalpar‐
tiesintheirowninterests.
Whilethislatterapproachhasnotgainedmuchprominenceintheliterature,the
theoreticalframeworkdevelopedbyHarmelandJandahasrepeatedlybeenapplied
to explain different cases of party organisational change. However, the empirical
evidence is inconclusive.Müller (1997), studying thedevelopmentof theAustrian
SocialistParty(SozialdemokratischeParteiÖsterreichs,SPÖ),maintainsthatleader‐
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shipchangeandchangeinthedominantfactionarebothvaluablefactorstoexplain
partyorganisationalreforms.Incontrast,Bille(1997)findsthatpastchangesinthe
organisationoftheDanishSocialDemocraticParty(Socialdemokraterne,SD)cannot
be attributed to different interests held by the various leaders that have been in
chargeoftheparty.Similarly,Duncan(2007),whoanalysesthehistoryoftheDutch
ChristianDemocraticAppeal(ChristenDemocratischAppèl,CDA)concludesthatthe
HarmelandJandamodelofpartychangerequiresseveralrefinements.Despitesuf‐
feringadisastrouselectoraldefeatin1994andlosinggovernmentofficeforthefirst
time since 1918 the CDAdid not change extensively because of the nature of the
Dutch party system, its specific history, and secondary goal priorities held by the
party.
Thelaststudyhintsatthepossibilitythatthevoluntaristapproachtopartyor‐
ganisationmightoversimplifytheprocessofpartyformationandadaptationbyonly
lookingatthepartyactors’interest.Ittherebydeniesthefactthatinternalandex‐
ternal structures favour certain organisational strategies over others in order to
achievethegiveninterests.Asthestructuralistapproachesallpointout,structures
matter and it doesnotbecome clearwhywe should ignore their findings andex‐
plaindifferentformsofpartyorganisationonlybytheinterestsofthepartyleader‐
shipandthedominantfaction.
Inordertoachievetheirgoalsparty internalactorsneedtotakeintoconsider‐
ation the opportunities and pressures provided by the environment. Policy‐
maximisers,forinstance,shouldincludemanyelementsofthemassparty,asthese
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willhelpthemtostayincontactwiththesocialgroupstheywishtorepresent,and
tokeepthepartyinpublicofficeunderclosecontrol.However,whichoftheseele‐
mentsarenecessarytogaininfluenceonpolicyoutcomeswillverymuchdependon
thecontext.Whileinthemid‐20thcenturymanypartiescameclosetotheidealtype
ofthemassparty,henceleadingDuvergertopredicta“contagionfromtheleft”,con‐
temporarypolicy‐seekingparties,asintheItalianpartysystem,makeincreasinguse
ofmoderntechnologiesofmasscommunication,andhaveabolishedtheworkplace
branchsystem,sincenowadaysfarfewervotersfit intoclearlydefinedsocialcate‐
gories. Epstein, expecting a “contagion from the right”, argued that theAmerican‐
stylepartywasmuchbettersuitedtomobiliselargenumberofvotes.Thus,ifvote‐
maximiserswanttoachievetheirgoalstheyshouldinsteadorganisetheirpartyac‐
cording to the catch‐all type. The cartel‐party thesis, on the other hand, assumes
thatallpartiesareprimarilyoffice‐seeking,tryingtogetaccesstothecartelinorder
toparticipateinthedistributionofstateresources.Itiseasiertogainaccessintothe
cartel,thebasicargumentgoes,ifthepartyadoptstheorganisationalcharacteristics
ofthepartiesalreadysafelypositionedwithinthecartel.Inotherwords,nomatter
what interestsparty‐internalactorspursue, theirstrategiccalculationswillalways
havetoincludetheexternalenvironmentaroundtheparty.
Moreover, party organisers will have to take into account the structures pro‐
videdbythepartyitself.AlthoughtheHarmelandJandamodelofpartychangein‐
corporatesthepoweroftheleadershippositionasoneinterveningvariable,itfails
to include broader internal dynamics. For instance, maximisers of intra‐party de‐
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mocracywill have to be aware of the dangers ofMichels’ “iron law of oligarchy”,
whichtheywillhavetocounterbycertainorganisationalmeasuresthatwillprevent
the leadership from becoming indispensable. Put differently, knowing about such
organisationaltrendswillforcepartyinternalactorstoreactaccordingly.
Other factors not considered by Harmel and Janda regard power‐motivated
changes.Whilethemodelarguesthatsomepartychangecanbeexplainedwithout
anexternalstimulus,butsimplythroughleadershipanddominantfactionchanges,
itfallsshortofexplainingthesereconfigurationsofparty‐internalpower.However,
acomprehensivetheoryofpartychangeshouldcertainlyincludevariablesthatcan
haveanimpactonthedistributionofpowerwithinapoliticalparty.Inlinewiththe
argumentsmadebyPanebianco,parties arebestunderstoodasvery conservative
organisations that try to safeguard the power relations that existed among the
groupsthatinitiallyestablishedtheparty.Inotherwords,thepowermapofapoliti‐
calpartydoesnotjustchange,butitwilltakeanexternaltrigger–orevenaninter‐
nal trigger (suchas thedeathof a leader)– to significantlydisturb thebalanceof
power.Withoutknowingwhatconstitutessuchatrigger,everytheoryofpartyor‐
ganisationalchangewillremainincomplete.
To sumup, the voluntarist approach topartyorganisation–mostly associated
withthemodeldevelopedbyHarmelandJanda–understandsdifferentpartytypes
as the product of the interests of the party leadership and the dominant faction.
However, it largely ignores the structuring effect of both the environment around
thepartyandtheparty‐internaldynamics.Inaddition,itfailstoexplainchangesin
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leadershipand in thedominant faction,whichshouldbeconsideredasan integral
element of any general theory of party change. Nevertheless, the voluntarist ap‐
proachmustbepraisedforintroducingthepartyactors’interestsandgoalsintothe
analysisofpartyorganisations ‐ factors thatare largelyneglectedby thestructur‐
alistapproaches.Thedifferentcausalfactorsofferedbythestructuralistandvolun‐
taristapproachestopartyorganisationaresummarisedinTable3.
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TABLE3: DETERMINANTSOFPARTYORGANISATION
ExamplesofindicatorsAnalyticalapproach
VariablesFormation Adaptation
Globaltrends internalcreation(Duverger1964)
accesstomassmedia availabilityofpublicfunding partisanidentities(KatzandMair1995)
Socio‐politicalcontext autocraticregime processoftransition(Kitschelt1995)
economicdevelopment(RandallandSvåsand2002)
politicalculture(Detterbeck2002)
Institutions systemofgovernment(CroissantandMerkel2001)
electoralsystem directdemocracy(Detterbeck2002;2005)
territorialorganisation typeofpublicfinancing(Young1998)
partylaws
Partysystem numberofparties ideologicalpolarisation(Yishai2001)
natureofcompetition(Warner1997)
contagion
Structuralist
approaches
Politicalparty historicalantecedent(vanBiezen1998)
geneticprocess externalsponsorinstitution(Panebianco1988)
ideology(Gallagher1988a;1988b)
size(Michels1962)
Socialgroup factions(HarmelandTan2003)
factionalcoalitions(HarmelandJanda1994)
Voluntarist
approaches
Leadership partyleaders factionleaders(HarmelandJanda1994)
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‐2‐THEORETICALFRAMEWORK
Inorder toexplain theoriginandthesubsequentdevelopmentofpolitical institu‐
tions,numerousscholarshave fora long time insistedonan integrativeapproach
towardsthestructure‐agencydebate(forexampleThelenandSteinmo1992).The
studyofpoliticalparties,however,hassofarremainedtotallyunaffectedbythison‐
tological shift in comparative politics.5 As the previous section has shown, to ac‐
count for different forms of party organisation the relevant literature still offers
either structuralistor voluntarist theories.Noattempthasbeenmade to integrate
theseintoageneralexplanation.Thisseriouslyweakensourunderstandingofparty
formation and adaptation, since theweaknesses of the structuralist approach are
thestrengthsofthevoluntaristapproach,andviceversa.Moreover,advocatesofthe
structuralistapproachdonotagreeonwhetheruniversal,domesticorpartyinter‐
nalfactorsshouldbeconsideredthemostimportantones.
5AsHall(2003:387:387)argues,“[C]omparativepoliticshasmovedawayfromontologiesthatas‐sumecausalvariableswithstrong,consistent,andindependenteffectsacrossspaceandtimeto‐wardsonesthatacknowledgemoreextensiveendogeneityandtheubiquityofcomplexinteractioneffects”.Inotherwords,manyscholarsnowrecognisetheunpredictablenatureofhumanbehaviour.Oneareathateffectivelycombinesstructureandagencyis,forinstance,thestudyofdemocratictran‐sitions(seeMahoneyandSnyder1999).
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Consequently,inordertogainabetterinsightintotheprocessofpartyorganisa‐
tionaldevelopmentweshouldsynthesiseexistingexplanatoryvariablesfromdiffer‐
entlevelsofanalysisintoasingletheory.Thissectionwillarguethathistoricalinsti
tutionalismoffersseveralusefulideasastohowtomanagesuchanintegration.The
goals of this chapter are therefore to outline the basic theoretical propositions of
historicalinstitutionalismandusethesetoconstructanintegrativetheoryofparty
organisationalformationandchange.
Historicalinstitutionalism
Untilatleasttheearly1950spoliticalscienceconsistedoflittlemorethanthestudy
of institutions. Scholars mainly engaged in the formal‐legal comparison of whole
systemsofgovernment,tryingtofindnormativeargumentsforthebestinstitutional
order.Thisallchangedthroughthe“behaviouralrevolution”.Ratherthanproducing
descriptive analyses of the political system, the focus of scholarly attention was
shiftedtowardstheinputsfromsociety intothepoliticalsystem.Researchparticu‐
larlycentredonformsofmasspoliticalparticipation,suchasvoting,andtheactions
ofinterestgroupsandpoliticalparties.Asthemainaimbecametodeveloptheories
thatcouldexplainwhyindividualsandorganisationsofinterestaggregationbehave
inthewaytheydo,politicalinstitutionswerereducedtoa“blackbox”inwhichsoci‐
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etalinputsareinvisiblyconvertedintooutputsofthepoliticalsystem.However,the
empiricalobservationthat“processesinternaltopoliticalinstitutions,althoughpos‐
siblytriggeredbyexternalevents,affecttheflowofhistory”(MarchandOlsen1984:
739)hasledtoacomebackofinstitutionsinpoliticalscience.
While behaviouralists argued that institutionswere notmore than the simple
aggregation of individual preferences, the “new institutionalism” claims that the
same individualswillmakedifferentdecisionswithindifferent institutions.Yet, in
contrast to the “old” institutionalism, which employed a descriptive‐inductive
method, new institutionalists are experimenting with deductive approaches that
startfromtheoreticalpropositionsaboutthewayinstitutionswork(Lowndes2002:
95).Onthebasisofthesepropositions,itispossibletodistinguishthreebasictheo‐
reticalvarietieswithinthenewinstitutionalism:(1)sociological(normative) insti‐
tutionalism,(2)rationalchoiceinstitutionalism,and(3)historicalinstitutionalism.
Onageneral level,all threeapproachesagreethat institutionsare“therulesof
thegame” (Rothstein1996:145).Theyvary,however, in the specific criteria they
usetocharacteriseaninstitution.Moreover,thethreestrandsofinstitutionaltheory
donotconcurinhowinstitutionsaffectthechoicesofpoliticalactors,howinstitu‐
tionsarereproduced,andhowtoexplaininstitutionalchange.AccordingtoHalland
Taylor (1996), these differences arise from the assumptions the distinctive ap‐
proachesmakeabouthumanbehaviour.Rational‐choiceinstitutionalismfollowsthe
“calculusapproach”,arguingthatindividualsarerationallycalculatingutilitymaxi‐
misers. Proponentsof sociological institutionalism,on theotherhand, found their
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workonthe“culturalapproach”,whichseesindividualsassatisficers,theirbehav‐
iour constrained by their own interpretation of the world. Historical institution‐
alism, Hall and Taylor argue, finds itself in‐between these two approaches, using
eithertheoneortheother.
Theproblemwith thisdistinctionbetweenthevariousapproaches is that it ig‐
noresthepotentialofthenewinstitutionalismtotranscendthelongunfruitfulde‐
bate between structure and agency. Theoretically, by stressing the role of human
behaviourintheconstructionofinstitutions,thenewinstitutionalismdrawsatten‐
tiontotheinteractionbetweeninstitutionsandindividuals,andacknowledgesthat
both influence each other (Lowndes 2002: 102). However, as Hay and Wincott
(1998)maintain,boththe“calculus”andthe“culturalapproach”arelatentlystruc‐
turalist,notallowingmuchspaceforagency.Weshouldtheninsteaddistinguishbe‐
tween rational‐choice and sociological institutionalism as quasi‐structuralist ap‐
proachesononeside,andhistorical institutionalismontheotherside,whichdoes
not vacillatebetween “calculus” and “cultural” considerations, but – in contrast to
HallandTaylor’sargumentation–isfoundedonverydistinctiveontologicalprem‐
ises.Accordingly,theprospectsforintellectualborrowingbetweenthedifferentap‐
proachesof thenew institutionalismaremuchmore limited thanwidelybelieved.
Onlytheparticulartheoretical foundationsofhistorical institutionalism,numerous
scholarsargue(forexample,HayandWincott1998;Koelble1995),promisetotake
usagooddealfurthertoaresolutionofthestructureandagencydebate.Thisisbe‐
cause,mostsignificantly,historicalinstitutionalistsseetheworldintermsofcircu
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lar causal relationships between actors and structures, rather than unidirectional
linksofcausation,witheither actorscreatingstructuresor structuresdetermining
actors’behaviour.
Whatareinstitutions?
Thedefinitionofaninstitutiongivenbyhistoricalinstitutionalismismuchlessab‐
stractthanthoseprovidedbytheotherapproaches.Whereasrational‐choiceinsti‐
tutionalismholdsahighlyfunctionalistviewofinstitutions,describingthemascol‐
lectionsofdecision‐makingrulesfordetermininghowindividualactionswillbeag‐
gregated into collective decision (Peters 1999: 45), sociological institutionalism
understandsan institutionasasetof“rulesofappropriateness”(MarchandOlsen
1984:741),whichcomesintoexistencethroughtheinterpretationofthedominant
institutional values by the individualmembers. Historical institutionalism, on the
otherhand,usesarather“down‐to‐earth”definitionofinstitutions.Historicalinsti‐
tutionalistsdefineinstitutionsbyexampleratherthanbyanunderlyingmechanism,
oranoverarchingprinciple(Peters1999:66).
Thereasonbehindthelessabstractdefinitionofaninstitutiongivenbyhistorical
institutionalists can be directly linked to their specific ontological foundations. As
hasalreadybeenpointedout,rational‐choiceandsociologicalinstitutionalismmake
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certainassumptionsaboutgeneralregularitiesdrivinghumanbehaviour.Theythen
apply their deductivemodel to the real world in an attempt to confirm their as‐
sumptions. These assumptionsmust necessarily be incorporated into their defini‐
tionofaninstitution,intheirquesttoexplainwhyinstitutionsarecreatedandhow
institutionsaffectpoliticaloutcomes.Historical institutionalists, incontrast, takea
muchmore inductive approach to theanalysisof institutions.Theyusually “begin
withempiricalpuzzlesthatemergefromobservedeventsorcomparisons”(Thelen
1999: 373). Accordingly, an historical institutionalist’s definition of an institution
derivesdirectlyfromempiricalobservations,whichwillthenbeclassifiedtomake
themavailabletopoliticalanalysis.Unlikeinthe“calculus”and“cultural”approach
to institutionalism, the definition of an institution does therefore not contain any
cleartheoreticalexpectationsofhowagentswillbehave.
By generally stressing the “intermediate” character of institutions (Thelen and
Steinmo1992:2)–meaningthat institutionsresidesomewherebetweenthestate
asanentityandindividualbehaviour–historicistswould,withoutdoubt,character‐
ise political parties as institutions. Aswith any institution, parties are purposeful
human constructions that embody the “rules of the game”. When establishing a
party,actorsexplicitlyortacitlyagreeuponasetofrulesofbehaviourthatwillhelp
themtomakedecisionsaimedatfulfillingatleastthemostbasicfunctionofallpo‐
liticalparties,namelytocompeteinpublicelections.
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Thestructuringeffectofinstitutions
Thisdirectlyleadstothequestionofhowinstitutionsingeneral–andpoliticalpar‐
tiesinparticular–structurehumanbehaviour.Startingfromthebasicassumption
that “conflict among rival groups for scarce resources lies at theheart of politics”
(Hall andTaylor 1996: 937), historical institutionalismpoints out the various op‐
tionstotheresolutionofpoliticalconflict.Institutionsareconceivedas“filters”that
selectivelyfavoursomeinterestsoverothers(Immergut1998:20).Incontrasttoa
purepluralistapproach,historicalinstitutionalistsarguethattheinstitutionalstruc‐
tureofapolitywilllimitthenumberofwaysinwhichpoliticalactorscancombine
theirresources(Krasner1984:228). Inshort,an institutionshapesthegoals,pre‐
ferences, and strategies of the political actors competing within its boundaries,
thereby steering the resolution of conflict, and ultimately affecting the outcomes.
Thisstandsinstrongoppositiontothepositiontakenbytheproponentsofrational‐
choice institutionalism,whoargue that thepreferencesof the individualareexog‐
enoustoinstitutions(Rothstein1996:147).
However,historicalinstitutionalismisnotdeterministicinitspropositionsabout
theeffectsofpoliticalinstitutions.Rather,itisrecognisedthatthesameinstitution
mayproducecompletelydifferentoutcomeswithindifferentsocialandculturalset‐
tings. Inotherwords,historical institutionalistsviewcausalityasbeingcontextual
(Immergut 1998: 19). Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 16‐17) identify four distinct
causesforthevariabilityintheimpactofinstitutionsoverspaceandtime:(1)broad
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changesinthesocio‐economicorpoliticalcontexttransformapreviouslylatentin‐
stitution into an increasingly important institution; (2) changes in the socio‐
economiccontextorthepoliticalbalanceofpowerfacilitatetheentryofnewactors
whopursuetheir(new)goalsthroughexistinginstitutions;(3)exogenouschanges
producea shift in thegoalsor strategiespursuedwithinexisting institutions; and
(4) political actors adjust their strategies to accommodate changes in the institu‐
tionsthemselves.Thatistosay,politicalactorsdonotonlychoosetheirstrategies
accordingtotheinstitutionalstructurestheyfindthemselvesin,buttheyalsotake
intoconsiderationthewidersocial,cultural,andeconomiccontext.Moreover,actors
areable to learnabout theeffectsof institutions,andundercertaincircumstances
mayaltertheirstrategiesinordertoproducedifferentoutcomes.Historicalinstitu‐
tionalismthusstressesindeterminacyandmulti‐causality.Inthisview,institutions
areonlyonefactoramongotherswhentryingtoaccountforpoliticaloutcomes(Hall
andTaylor1996:942).However,asinstitutions,thestructuralcontextdoesnotde‐
termine actors’ strategies, but actors candevelopdifferent strategies to dealwith
problemsposedtothembythecontext.PutinthewordsofHayandWincott(1998:
954):
[a]ctorsarestrategic,seekingtorealizecomplex,contingentandof‐
ten changinggoals.Theydo so ina contextwhich favours certain
strategiesoverothersandmustrelyuponperceptionsofthatcon‐
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textwhichareatbestincompleteandwhichmayveryoftenreveal
themselvesinaccurateaftertheevent.
Similarly,whenanalysingtheeffectofpoliticalpartiesonactorswithinthepartywe
shouldalwaystakeintoconsiderationthecontextaroundtheparticularparty.More
thanotherinstitutions,however,politicalpartiesseemtobeabletodominatetheir
environment,aspartiesfillthoseotherinstitutions,onwhichhistoricalinstitution‐
alistsusually focus(forexample, legislatures,bureaucracies),with life.Conversely,
political parties are organised by the same actors, who decide on legislation and
other political outcomes. In other words, actors within parties enjoy a compara‐
tivelylargeamountoffreedomtowardstheirenvironmentastheycontrolavehicle
withwhichtheyareable tochangetheenvironmentaccordingto theirown inter‐
ests. Consider the cartel‐party thesis, for instance: Parties co‐operated to exclude
contendersbyintroducingpublicfundingandchangingotherpartylaws(Katzand
Mair1995).Inasimilarwaypartiescanworktogethertochangeotherrulesofthe
electoralcompetition,suchasthevotingsystem.Moreover,thereisstillmuchcon‐
troversyovertheextenttowhichpartiesreflecttheinterestsofthemasselectorate.
WhileDowns(1957)arguesthatpartiesadapttheirpolicyprogrammestothede‐
mandsofvoters,others(forexampleDunleavy1991)claimthatpartiesareableto
actively shapevoters’preferences. In short,what theseexamples show isnot that
actorswithinpoliticalpartiesaretotallyindependentfromtheenvironmentaround
theparty,butthattheymightbemoreindependentthanactorswithinthoseinstitu‐
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tionsusuallyanalysedbyhistoricalinstitutionalists.Thatistosay,partyinternalac‐
torsarenotonlyabletoadapttheirstrategiestothecontext,astheorisedbyhistori‐
calinstitutionalism,buttheyareinsomecasesalsoabletochangetheenvironment
inordertomakethecontextfittheirstrategies.
Institutionalformationandchange
Whilehistorical institutionalism thusmaintains that institutionshaveaneffect on
the behaviour of individuals actingwithin these institutions, it also acknowledges
the capability of political actors to consciously shape institutions. It thereby dis‐
agreeswiththesociologicalapproach,whichmaintainsthatinstitutionsarelargely
shapedbyculture(MarchandOlsen1984).Yet,a frequentlycitedproblemofhis‐
toricalinstitutionalismisthefactthatitseemsmuchstrongerinexplainingpersis‐
tence than formationandchange(Peters1999:67‐71; ThelenandSteinmo1992:
15). Historicists adhere to the idea of “path dependency”, by which in a general
sense they simplymean that “historymatters”. Essentially, they put forward the
argmentthat
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the policy choices made when an institution is being formed, or
whenapolicyisbeinginitiated,willhaveacontinuingandlargely
determinateinfluenceoverthepolicyfarintothefuture.
(Peters1999:61)
Inotherwords,institutionsareabletopersistintheabsenceoftheforcesrespon‐
sible for their original establishment– aphenomenon that economists captureby
the concept of “increasing returns”. In a process of increasing returns, the proba‐
bility of maintaining a once adopted institutional pattern increases with its con‐
tinuedadoption,becauseovertimethebenefitsofthechosenpatternwillincrease
incomparisonwiththebenefitsofpreviouslyavailableoptions(Pierson2000).6
Perceiving institutionaldevelopmentasaprocessof self‐reinforcingreproduc‐
tion causes a dilemma, however, since any “convincing account of institutional
changemustcontainwithinitselfitsownnegation,andyetsomehowremainconsis‐
tent”(Immergut2005:290).Historicalinstitutionalismtriestoescapethisdilemma
bydistinguishingbetween themechanismof reproduction anda separate logic of
change.Broadlyspeaking,historicistsunderstandthedevelopmentofinstitutionsas
achainof longperiodsofpersistencedividedbymomentsof institutional innova‐
tion. Borrowing from evolutionary biology, Krasner (1984; 1988) introduced the
conceptof“punctuatedequilibrium”intotheanalysisof institutions. Incontrastto 6OneoftencitedexampleistheQWERTYtypewriterkeyboard,whichgainedanadvantageovercompetitors,althoughitisgenerallynotregardedasthemostefficientalternative.However,being“thefastestoutofthegate”wascritical.NowthatpeoplehavebecomeaccustomedtowritingwiththeQWERTYkeyboard,andcomputerproducershaveadjustedtheindustrialstandardaccordingly,thecostsofswitchingtosomepreviouslyavailablealternativeareveryhigh.
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the conventional Darwinian view of evolution as a slow, continuous process of
change,proponentsofpunctuatedequilibriumarguethatchangetakesplacerapidly
in geographically isolated groups. They therefore do not assume that constant
causes explain the evolution of living organisms, but they stress uncertainty and
chance.7Similarly,historicalinstitutionaliststheorisethatthehistoryofinstitutions
is punctuated with moments when structural factors are least determining and
whenactorshave thegreatestdegreeof freedomto shape institutional change. In
otherwords,duringsuch“critical junctures”(CollierandCollier1991)themecha‐
nismofinstitutionalreproductionisdisrupted,givingspacetoagencyandchoice.In
order toexplain critical junctureshistorical institutionalistsusuallypoint toexog‐
enous crises – typically shocks from changes inmacro‐structures. Such crises can
causethebreakdownofexistinginstitutions,whichwillthencreateroomforpoliti‐
calconflictovertheshapeofanewinstitutionalarrangement.
However, bymere empirical observation it is possible to criticise the punctu‐
ated‐equilibriummodelonthegroundthatpunctuationsneitherseemtobeasuffi‐
cientoranecessaryconditionforinstitutionalchange.Firstofall,institutionsregu‐
larlypersistdespite external shocksof far‐reachinghistorical importance, suchas
warsorrevolutions.Moreover,notall institutionalchangehappenswithinpunctu‐
ations,butinstitutionsalsoevolveduringperiodsofsupposedstasis.
7Forexample,StephenJayGould,oneofthedrivingmindsbehindthetheoryofpunctuatedequilib‐rium,arguesthatwingsoriginallyonlyservedforthermoregulation,i.e.tolowerexcessbodytem‐perature.Aswingsgrewinsizeformoreeffectivethermoregulation,theyco‐incidentallyalsodevel‐opedanaerodynamicfunction,allowinganimalswithwingstofly(Gould1987).
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In order to dealwith the firstweakness, Thelen (1999: 397) suggests thatwe
shouldacknowledgethat“differentinstitutionsrestondifferentfoundations,andso
theprocessesthatarelikelytodisruptthemwillalsobedifferent”.Putdifferently,
what constitutes an external shock will depend on the mechanism assumed to
underlietheprocessofinstitutionalreproduction.Ausefulcontributionintothisdi‐
rection has been made by Mahoney (2000a), who identifies four possible causal
mechanismsbehindthephenomenonofpathdependency.Thefirstoneisbasedon
autilitarianexplanation:Actorsrationallychoosetoreproduceinstitutions,because
any potential benefits of transformation are outweighed by the costs. A second
theorymakesuseoffunctionalistideasinordertoexplainthereproductionofinsti‐
tutions.Itisarguedthatpathdependencyhappensaseveryinstitutionisembedded
intoalargesystemwithinwhichitfulfilscertainfunctions.Third,institutionalper‐
sistence has been explained through the distribution of power among actors. The
basicideaofthistheoryisthatanyinstitutioninitiallyempowersacertaingroupat
the expense of other groups. The advantaged group will then use its additional
powertodefendtheoriginallyimplementedinstitutionalorderagainstpressurefor
changefromlesspowerfulgroups.Finally,afourthexplanationforpathdependence
isbuilt around thenotionof legitimacy.According toadvocatesof this theoretical
position,institutionalreproductionoccursbecauseactorsviewaninstitutionasle‐
gitimateandthusvoluntarilyoptforitsreproduction.
Dependingonthespecificmechanismofinstitutionalreproduction,onlyparticu‐
larchangesintheenvironmentaroundtheinstitutionwillbeperceivedasashock
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bytheactorswithintheinstitution.Hence,utilitariantheoristsoftenemphasisehow
increased competitive pressures can lead to institutional transformation, while
functionalistaccountsarguethatinstitutionalchangeusuallyrequiresanexogenous
shockthatputspressureontheoverallsystem,makingagiveninstitution’sfunction
obsolete and demanding its transformation to preserve the system in the envi‐
ronmental setting. Scholarswho adopt a power‐basedmechanism of institutional
reproduction,ontheotherhand,wouldarguethatchangesintheenvironmentcon‐
stitute a shock when they weaken the elites and strengthen subordinate groups
withintheinstitution.Andfinally,legitimationexplanationsofpathdependencyde‐
fineshocksasevents that triggerchanges in thevaluesorsubjectivebeliefsofac‐
tors.
Theproblemwithmostoftheseapproachestoinstitutionalreproductionisthat
theymustnecessarilyresorttoelementsexogenoustothetheoryinordertoexplain
change.Thisisapointfrequentlyraisedbycriticsofhistoricalinstitutionalism,who
arguethathistoricisttheoryshouldbeabletoaccountforchangethroughreference
to the nature of institutions themselves (see for example Harty 2005). Only the
power‐basedexplanationof institutional reproductionseems to fulfil this require‐
ment, as it assumes that institutions reproduce through a continuous conflictual
process,whichitselfwilleventuallyleadtoinstitutionalchange(cf.Mahoney2000a:
523).Inotherwords,bothreproductionandchangecanbeexplainedthroughcon‐
flictbetweenelitesandsub‐ordinategroups.Inlightofthis,thepower‐basedtheory
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ofreproductionpromisestobethemostcoherentapproachtothestudyofinstitu‐
tionalchange.
Thepower‐basedapproachtothestudyofinstitutionsfitsinperfectlywiththe
moregeneralargumentsofhistoricalinstitutionalismregardingtherelationshipbe‐
tweenstructuresandagency.Asdiscussedearlier,agentsactstrategicallyandpos‐
sesstheabilitytodevelopdifferentstrategieswithinthesamecontext.Conversely,
contexts are strategically selective, favouring certain strategies over others. This
means thatover timesuchstrategic selectivitywill throwupsystematically struc‐
turedoutcomes.However,theseoutcomesarebynomeansinevitable,asstrategic
agentscanformulatealternativestrategiestodealwiththeopportunitiesprovided
bythecontext(Hay2002:129‐130).Inotherwords,withinthesameinstitutionwe
cantheoreticallyexpectseparategroupstofollowdifferentstrategies.Thesestrat‐
egieswillthenfeedintocorrespondingpreferencesregardingthenatureofthein‐
stitution,sinceanyinstitution–asstructuresingeneral–willfavourcertainstrat‐
egiesoverothers.
Therefore, similar to the arguments of power‐based accounts of institutional
change,politicalpartiesshouldnotbeseenasunitaryactorswithasinglegoal,but
consistingofcoalitionsofpoliticalactorswhopursuetheirindividualinterestsand
goals. Justaspolitics ingeneralcanbeseenasaprocessofconsensusandconflict
amonginterdependentindividuals,intra‐partypoliticsisalsomarkedbyconsensual
andconflictualrelationshipsamonginterdependentpartysub‐groups(Maor1997:
147).Asalreadyhypothesisedbythevoluntaristapproachtopartyorganisation,the
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conflictbetweenthese intra‐partygroups,so‐calledfactions,canhaveasignificant
influenceonorganisationalchange(HarmelandTan2003).Accordingly,reproduc‐
tionofthepartyorganisationhappensasthedominantfactionwilltrytopreserve
the organisational configuration, from which it gains an unequal share of power
(Panebianco1988).
Whilemakingadistinctionbetweendifferentmechanismsofinstitutionalrepro‐
ductioncanhelpexplainwhynotall large‐scaleexternaleventscauseinstitutional
change,itstillleavesuswiththequestionofwhysomeinstitutionalchangedoesnot
requireanexternalshock.Asasolutiontothisproblemithasbeenrecommended
thatwe give up the zero‐sum view of institutional change versus institutional re‐
production,andinsteadallowformodesofchangethatgobeyondthecasesofinsti‐
tutionalbreakdownorwholesalereplacementasimpliedinthepunctuatedequilib‐
riummodel. Two possible concepts in this regard are institutional “layering” and
institutional “conversion” (Thelen2003).While layeringmeans that newarrange‐
ments are set on top of pre‐existing institutional structures, conversion describes
thesituationwhenexistinginstitutionsareredirectedtonewpurposes.Inshort,ra‐
ther than picturing institutional development in terms of a sharp dichotomy be‐
tweenpunctuationsandstasis,weshouldaimforananalysis“thatseekstoidentify
what aspects of a specific institutional configuration are (or are not) renegotiable
andunderwhatconditions”(ibid.:233;emphasisintheoriginal).
Similarly,inthecaseofpoliticalparties,externalshocksthatleadtoinstitutional
breakdownandwholesale replacement are relatively rare, and certainlymore ex‐
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ceptionalthanhistoricalinstitutionalismsupposes.Thereasonisthatconstitutional
institutionsmustalmostnecessarilybereplacedincaseofabreakdown,whilepar‐
tiescansimplydieandbereplacedbyotherexistingparties.Incontrast,thoseinsti‐
tutions thatare typically regardedas theanalyticalobjectofhistorical institution‐
alismneeda functionallyequivalent replacement for the largerpolitical systemto
fulfilitsfunction.
Hence, when explaining party organisational change we are generally dealing
withchangethatfallsbetweenthetwoextremesofinstitutionalbreakdownandin‐
stitutionalstasis.Againcorrespondingtothetheoreticalviewsof thepower‐based
strand within historical institutionalism, it is argued that such incremental party
changehappenswhencertainindividualsorfactionswithinthepartyexperiencean
increaseintheirrelativepowervis‐à‐visotherindividualsandfactions,thusleading
toaredistributionofpowerwithintheparty.
Summary
Although there is stillmuch controversyoverhow toexplain institutional change,
historicalinstitutionalismprovidesanappealingtheoreticalframeworkwithwhich
totranscendthestructureandagencydebate.Itsmainpropositionscanbeformu‐
latedasfollows:
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(1) Structuresinfluencehumanbehaviourbyfunctioninglikeafilterthatselec‐
tivelyfavourssomestrategiesoverothers.
(2) However, although this means that outcomes within the same structural
contextwillexhibitacharacteristicregularitywhenobservedoveralonger
timeframe,theoutcomeofanyparticularstrategiccalculationisunpredic‐
table, since actors can choose alternative courses of action to respond to
opportunitiespresentedbythecontext.
(3) Asaresult,atanypointintime,weshouldnotbesurprisedtofindactors
offeringdifferentstrategicresponsestothesamecontext.
(4) Institutionalreproductionandchange is thereforebestseenasaconstant
conflictbetweendifferentgroupswithinthatparticularinstitution,holding
divergentviewsastothenormsandregulationsthatconstitutetheinstitu‐
tion.
Insum,whenaccountingforpoliticaloutcomes,historicalinstitutionalismacknow‐
ledgestheexplanatorypowerofinstitutions,externalfactors,andagency.Theseare
exactlythethreegroupsoffactorsthatcanbefoundinthepartyorganisationlitera‐
ture,representedbythe“life‐cycle”,the“periodeffect”,the“generationeffect”,and
the voluntarist approaches respectively. Hence, historical institutionalism again
demonstrates–albeitonamoreabstract level than inthepreviouschapter– that
thestrengthsofoneapproachtowardspartyorganisationaretheweaknessesofthe
another approach and vice versa. Actors cannot simply form and change political
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partiesaccording to theirowngoals,asclaimedby thevoluntarist theoryofparty
organisation,buttheirfreedomofactionis,firstofall,curtailedbypowerrelations
withintheparty.Moreover,theirorganisationalstrategymustbeorientedtowards
theenvironmentalcontextaroundtheparty.However,thisdoesnotmeanthatparty
organisationswillbetheproductofeitherinternalorexternalstructures,asargued
bythe“life‐cycle”and“periodeffect”approachesrespectively–or,infact,drivenby
a successive combination of the two, as hypothesised in Panebianco’s “generation
effect”approach–butactorsareable todevelopdivergingstrategies toovercome
theproblemsposedby structures around them. Inotherwords, historical institu‐
tionalismteachesusthatthedividewithinthepartyorganisationliteratureisweak‐
eningourunderstandingofpartyformationandchange.
Historicalinstitutionalismnotonlyhelpsustocriticiseexistingtheoriesofparty
organisation, but, at the same time, it offers an abstractmodel throughwhich to
constructastrongertheoryofpartyorganisation.Thatistosay,thereisnoneedto
refuseexistingtheoriesofpartyformationandchangealtogether,butweonlyneed
to re‐define the relationsbetweenexisting theorieson thebasisof the theoretical
claimsmadebyhistoricalinstitutionalism.Thisispreciselytheaimofthefollowing
section,namelytoconstructageneralframeworkfortheanalysisofpartyorganisa‐
tionbysynthesisingcausalfactorsfromdifferentlevelsofanalysisfoundtohavean
influenceontheorganisationofpoliticalparties.
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Explainingpartyformationandchange
Politicalpartiesasconstellationsofpower
Politicalparties,aswithanyotherinstitution,areconstellationsofpowerbetween
differentactors.Theseconstellationscanbeexplicitlycodifiedintheformalnorms
andregulationsofthepartyorinformallysupportedbygeneralpractice.Inthisre‐
garditisimportanttonotethatinformalinstitutionsaretobeunderstoodasmore
thanmerebehaviouralregularities.Theyare“sociallysharedrules,usuallyunwrit‐
ten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned
channels”(HelmkeandLevitsky2004:727).Therefore,althoughpartystructuresin
the“thirdwave”ofdemocratisationareinmanycasesnon‐bureaucraticandinfor‐
mal,suchinformalityshouldnotbeconflatedwithweaknessorlackoforganisation
(Levitsky 2001). Numerous partiesmaintain solid informal organisations that are
bothextensiveandenduring. Inotherwords, ignoring the informalpoliticswithin
manypoliticalpartiesinyoungdemocracieswouldreducetheanalyticaldepth,re‐
sulting in an inadequate understanding of how these parties actually operate
(Erdmann2004: 75). Existingmodels of party organisation, unfortunately, largely
failtoincorporateinformaldynamicsintotheiranalyticalframeworks.
Only if actors decide to translate the power relationships between them into
formalruleswillpoliticalpartiesdevelopthethreefacesofpartyorganisationthat
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havebeenacceptedbymanyasthemostpowerfulconcepttodescribethedevelop‐
mentofpoliticalpartiesinWesternEurope.However,thenumberofpossiblepower
constellationsbetweenthethreeelementsislimited.Infact,asthehistoricaldevel‐
opment of European parties has taught us – both empirically and theoretically –
therecanonlybetwodifferentmodelstoformallydistributepowerwithinaparty:
Either theparty inpublicoffice is thedominant faceorpower lieswith theparty
centraloffice. In‐betweenthese twoconstellations therecanbe transitionalstages
ofpowerdistribution.Moreover,thepartyontheground–thethirdorganisational
face–canbestrongerorweaker,therebyweakeningthepositionoftherespective
dominantpartyelement.However,thepartyonthegroundcanneverbethedomi‐
nantpartyelementitself,becauseit facesacollectiveactionproblem.Thepartyin
centralofficewillalwaysbestronger,asitisanecessaryvehicletoorganisecollec‐
tiveactionamongtheindividualmembersoftheparty.
Inotherwords,politicalpartiesareneverunitaryactorsbutrathercollectionsof
individualsandsub‐partyfactionswithoftendiverginginterestsandstrategies.The
powerrelationsbetweentheseactorscanbeeitherformalisedintheparty’sofficial
decision‐making rules or established informally through mutual understanding.
Thisisinlinewithoneofthecentraltenetsofhistoricalinstitutionalism:thatactors
candevelopdifferentstrategieswithinthesamecontext.Therelevantstrategiesto
considerwhen trying to account for party organisations are strategies relating to
the electoral market. This follows from Sartori’s influential definition of political
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parties,whichidentifiestheparticipationinelectionsforpublicofficeasthedefin‐
ingpropertyofpartiesvis‐à‐visothervoluntaryorganisations:
Apartyisanypoliticalgroupidentifiedbyanofficiallabelthatpre‐
sentsatelections,andiscapableofplacingthroughelections(free
ornonfree),candidatesforpublicoffice.
(Sartori:1976:63)
Thisistosay,actorsdonotformapoliticalpartyforthesakeofestablishinganor‐
ganisation,butthepartyisprimarilyavehicletoparticipateinpublicelections.Asa
result,theorganisationofthepartyisnotbasedonaseparateorganisationalstrat‐
egy,butitwillalwaysbecloselylinkedtotheactors’electoralstrategy.
Electoralstrategies
Broadlyspeaking, therearetwodifferentstrategiespoliticianscanusetomobilise
votersandlinktheirrespectivepartytotheelectorate:(1)programmaticprinciples
or(2)clientelisticexchangecircuits(Kitschelt2000).8Bothoftheselinkagemecha‐
nismsare, broadly speaking, basedonexchange relationsbetweenpoliticians and
8Kitscheltalsolistscharismaasathirdelectoralstrategy.However,wewilltreatcharismaasasecondarystrategyandthereforediscussitlateron.
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voters,whotradematerial incentives forpoliticalsupport.However, theydiffer in
termsoftheproceduretheseexchangerelationsadopt,asclientelismdescribesdi
rect exchange relations, compared to indirect exchange relations. This property is
capturedbytheclassicaldefinitionofclientelismofferedbyLemarchandandLegg
(1972:151‐152):
Politicalclientelism[…]maybeviewedasamoreorlesspersonal‐
ized,affective,andreciprocalrelationshipbetweenactors,orsetsof
actors, commanding unequal resources and involving mutually
beneficialtransactionsthathavepoliticalramificationsbeyondthe
immediatesphereofdyadicrelationships.
Whileithasrightfullybeenpointedoutthatthepatroninaclientelisticrelationship
can also be the party organisation, rather than any individual within it (Hopkin
2006:409), the importantquestion toask inorder toestablishwhether there isa
direct exchange relation between the party/politician and the voters is:Whowill
benefit from thedistributionofmaterial incentives?Whereas in clientelismvoters
willonlybe included in thedistributionofmaterial incentives if theycomplywith
rules of the exchange gameby providing political support, programmatic benefits
haveapublic‐goodqualityandvoterscannotbeexcludedfrombenefitingfromthem
(Stokes2007).Thatistosay,clientelisticlinkagestargetbenefitseithertoindividu‐
alsor small groups,whoareexpected to supportpoliticianswith controlover re‐
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sources.Assuch,theresourcesdistributedthroughclientelisticexchangenetworks
can be either of an individualistic nature – includingmaterial goods (money and
othergifts),employment(bothprivateandpublic)andservices(suchashelpwith
theauthorities,protectionetcetera)–orofacollectivenature(forinstance,public
infrastructureprojectsortheprovisionofcommunityfacilities).9
However,inreality,itisoftenverydifficulttoclearlydistinguishbetweenthese
latterbenefitsandprogrammaticbenefits. Inmanycases theclassofbeneficiaries
targeted by a given programmatic strategy can be very narrowly defined (for in‐
stance, steelworkers,warveterans, theunemployed)and resourcesare therefore
madeavailabletoverysmallgroupsonly.Conversely,ifclientelisticbenefitsareal‐
locatedtolargergroups(forinstance,definedbygeographyorconstituency),politi‐
cians cannot exclude non‐supporters living in those areas from enjoying the re‐
sourcesprovided.Hence, inorder tomakeabetterdistinctionpossibleweshould
askasecondquestion:Arethereanyfacilitiesforthepoliticiantoeffectivelymoni‐
tor or enforce the direct exchange linkages (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007)?
Whereas in clientelistic relationships such monitoring mechanisms are available,
they are absent from programmatic linkages between politicians and voters. In
otherwords, inclientelism,onlyvoterswhoactuallyvote for thepoliticianare in‐
9Theallocationofpublicemploymentinreturnforelectoralsupportwillbedefinedaspatronage.Manyotherauthorsusepatronageandclientelisminterchangeably,butthisanalysiswillkeepthemstrictlyseparate.Moreover,inordertoclarifyafurthertermoftenusedindiscussionsofclientelism,thedistributionofporkbarrelwillbedefinedhereasthelawfulclientelisticallocationofgovernmentspendingtothepolitician’selectoraldistrict–asopposedtovotebuyingwhichisalmostalwaysil‐legal.Patronage,ontheotherhand,hastobelocatedsomewhereinthegreyareabetweenillegalityandlegality.
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cluded in thedistributionof resourcesand thepoliticianhasaccess tomonitoring
systemsthroughwhichtocontrolwhethertheydidsoornot.
The enforcement of the clientelistic exchange agreement can be achieved
through various differentmeasures (see Schaffer and Schedler 2007). First of all,
political parties and politicians may choose to manage the exchange of material
benefitsandvotesthroughestablishedsocialnetworksandpersonalrelationships.
Accordingly,candidatesoftenrecruitpeoplewithahighsocialstatusintheirrespec‐
tivelocalcommunitiesasintermediariesbetweenthemselvesandthevoters,asthis
is likely to imposeonvotersastrongmoralobligationtovoteas instructed.How‐
ever, inaddition,partieswillalsoneedtomonitorthevotebycircumventingelec‐
toralsecrecy,astheimpositionofsanctionswillhavetobebasedontheknowledge
about non‐compliance. In order to monitor how individuals vote, politicians can
makeuseofvariousstrategies.Forinstance,voterscanbegivencarbonpapertore‐
cordhowtheyvoted,or,inmoremodernsocieties,voterstakeaphotooftheircom‐
pletedballotwiththeirmobilephonetosendasapicturemessagetothevotebro‐
ker.Anotherwayistogivethevoterafakedorstolenfilled‐inballotpaperbefore
enteringthepollingstation.Thevotercaststhefilled‐inballotandgivestheofficial
ballotpaperheorshereceivedinthepollingstationtothevotebrokerwaitingout‐
side. Alternatively, politicians can offer larger groups of voters incentives for ab‐
staining fromvotingaltogether.Finally,politicianscanalsomonitor theaggregate
turnoutofvillagesorneighbourhoods.Thisstrategyisespeciallyrelevantinplaces
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wherecandidatesandtheiragentsdistributematerialincentiveswidelywithinlar‐
gergeographicalunits.
Again,thesemonitoringsystemsensure–oraretobeunderstoodasanattempt
toensure–thatthegoodsthepoliticianpromisedinreturnforvotingsupportwill
onlybedistributedtoactualsupporters.Programmaticelectoralstrategies, incon‐
trast, lack similarmonitoring systems,whichmeans that there is amuch greater
likelihoodthatevennon‐supporterswillbenefitfromtheallocationofresourcesaf‐
ter theelection.However,we candistinguishprogrammatic strategies in termsof
how clearly they define the target group for the redistribution of goods.While a
catch‐all strategy seeks to aggregate thewidest possible variety of social interest,
narrowprogrammaticstrategiesaimataclearlyspecifiedelectoralclienteleconsist‐
ing of individuals who define themselves as belonging to a distinct social group.
Hence,inthelattercase–similartoclientelisticstrategies–voterswillbemobilised
through “club goods” – benefits for subsets of citizens that impose costs on other
subsets(KitscheltandWilkinson2007:11).
Inadditiontoclientelistimandthetwoprogrammaticstrategiesjustoutlinedwe
canidentifytwofurtherelectoralstrategies:charismaandcoercion.Charisma,inthe
classicalWeberian sense, refers to “supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifi‐
callyexceptionalpowersandauthorities” (Weber1964:358),meaning thatpoliti‐
cianscanmobilisevotessimplythroughtheirpersonalskillsandpowersofpersua‐
sion.Electoralstrategiesarecoercivewhenpoliticiansmakeuseofviolenceandin‐
timidation in order to achieve electoral success. Both these strategies, however,
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should only be considered secondary strategies,which are used in a combination
with either a clientelistic or aprogrammatic electoral strategy (Hicken2007: 54).
Whereascharismaclearlyhasnaturallimits,suggestingthatonlyaverysmallnum‐
berofpoliticianscanrelyoncharismaalone,theuseofviolenceisverycostinten‐
siveandcarriesgreatpersonalrisk.Bothstrategiescantheoreticallycombinedwith
eitherclientelismorprogrammaticappeals.
Strategicallyselectivecontexts
Having identified thebasic electoral strategiespolitical actors canuse tomobilise
voters,we shouldnow turnour attention towards the structural environment.As
historicalinstitutionalismteachesus,thecontextaroundactorsisitselfstrategically
selective,meaningthatitwillfavourcertainstrategiesoverothers.Inotherwords,
when choosing between potential courses of action, actors will have to take into
consideration the environment inwhich their strategy is to be realised. As social
agents areknowledgeable andable to enhance theirunderstandingof the context
around them–and the constraints andopportunities this context imposes– their
intentionalconductwillproducesystemicallystructuredoutcomes.Inotherwords,
wewillnotseeaconfusingarrayofstrategies,butthecontextwillselectforacer‐
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tainoutcome,thereby–incombinationwiththelearningeffectonagents–causing
certainregularitiestoemergeovertime.
However–andthisisaveryimportantpoint–althoughtheoutcomeisstrategi‐
callyselectedfor,itisbynomeansinevitable.Firstofall,inordertorealisetheop‐
portunities inherent in a particular environmental context, access to strategic re‐
sourcesiscrucial.Thatistosay,althoughcontextualfactorsfacilitatethestrategies
ofactorswithaccesstotheseparticularresourcesovertheexpenseofthosewithout
access,thelattercandevelopalternativestrategies–requiringdifferentsetsofre‐
sources–todealwiththeproblemsposedtothembythecontext.Secondly,inorder
toactstrategicallyactorsmustinterpretthecontext.Asinterpretationsoftheenvi‐
ronmentcanvarybetweenactors,actors’strategicresponseswillaccordinglydiffer.
Inshort,wecanmakecertainpredictionsaboutthemostlikelyoutcome,butactors
arealwaysabletodevelopstrategiesthatwilldeviatefromthisstrategicallyselec‐
tedoutcome–eitherbecausetheycontroldifferentsetsofresourcesorholddiffer‐
entsetsofideasthroughwhichtointerpretthecontext.Moreprecisely,weshould
notbesurprisedtofindclientelistic,catch‐allandnarrowlyfocusedelectoralstrat‐
egieswithinthesamestructuralenvironment.
Keepingthesebasictheoreticalpropositionsinmind,thefirstthingtonoteabout
newerdemocraciesasacontextfortheformationandadaptationofpoliticalparties
is that they are strategically selective towards clientelism and catch‐all program‐
matic appeals. The reasons lie in the sequence of democratisation in the “third
wave”,whichhasbeenverydifferentfromearlierwavesofdemocratisation.Firstof
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all, unlike inEurope,processesofnationalunificationand industrialdevelopment
did not precede politicalmobilisation, nor have these processes necessarily been
realisedsince(Randall2001).Consequently,electoralstrategiesaimingtomobilise
clearlydefinedsocialgroupsarelikelytobeunsuccessful,associalgroupidentities
willnottranslateintovotingbehaviour.Secondly,whilethe“firstwave”ofdemocra‐
tisation is best described as a gradual process, the democratic transitions in the
“thirdwave”havebeenrelativelysudden,notleavingpoliticalpartiesenoughtime
to formulateclearprogrammaticplatformsanddevelopcloseties tospecificvoter
clienteles.
While the context in newer democracies thus militates against narrow pro‐
grammaticstrategies,weneedtolookatstructuralfactorsatthepolityleveltode‐
cidewhetherthespecificenvironmentfavourseitherclientelisticorcatch‐allstrat‐
egies. Contextual environments that are strategically selective towards clientelism
are those characterised by a high level of poverty.10 Themost convincing explan‐
ationas towhy thepoorareaneffective target for clientelisticpractices refers to
incomeinequalityasthecausalmechanism(RobinsonandVerdier2002):Acontext
of low socio‐economic development favours clientelistic over programmatic strat‐
egies, it isargued,becausevotersare likely toaccept low‐valuerewards inreturn
fortheirelectoralsupport,whiletheupperclass,payingforboththeserewardsand 10Otherfactorsthatarefrequentlymentionedashavingapositiveeffectontheeffectivenessofclien‐telisticelectoralstrategiesaretheinstitutionalcontext–inparticulartheelectoralsystem(forexam‐plePersson,TabelliniandTrebbi2003;KunicovaandRose‐Ackerman2005)–andmasspoliticalcul‐ture(forexamplePutnam1993).However,theempiricalevidenceisfarfromconvincingandtherel‐evantliteratureisunderstandablydividedoverthesetwofactors.Rather,itisarguedherethatal‐thoughboththeinstitutionalcontextandmasspoliticalculturecancontributetoapersonalisationofpolitics,thisshouldnotautomaticallybeequatedwithclientelism.
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themaintenanceofthemonitoringsystem,willonlyhavetoinvestasmallshareof
theirownresources.Economicdevelopment,ontheotherhand,willmakeclientel‐
istictransfersmoreexpensive,astheywillhavetobepaidbyagrowinguppermid‐
dleclass,increasinglytargetedatalowermiddleclass.Thatistosay,paymentsbe‐
comemoreandmoreexpensivetopoliticians.Asaresult,thebeststrategyforpo‐
liticalpartiesistowithholdtherewardfromthevoter.Knowingthattheparty,even
ifitwins,islikelynottorewardvoters,votersarealwaysbetteroffdefecting.
However,thisdoesnotmeanthatinacontextofhighereconomicdevelopment
programmaticcatch‐all strategies targetedspecificallyat thegrowingmiddleclass
becomethestrategicallyselectedoutcome.Infact, ifclientelismisestablishedasa
repeated game, it can be strategically selected for even in higher developed soci‐
eties.Viewedfromagametheoreticalperspective,clientelismwillnotworkunder
conditions of higher economic development as a one‐shot game.But if the dyadic
relationshipbetweenthepoliticianandthevoter isembedded inasocialnetwork
thiswillhelpsolve theprisoner’sdilemma(Stokes2007).Hence, theoretically,es‐
tablishing a clientelisticnetwork in a relativelydeveloped society is verydifficult,
because–asexplainedinthepreviousparagraph–theinitialgameisverylikelyto
result inoneofthetwosidesdefecting. Instead, theclientelisticexchangemustbe
reproducedovertime,assuringbothsidesthattherespectiveothersidewillcomply
withtheagreement.
Morespecifically, innewerdemocracies, theenvironmental contextwill favour
clientelismasastrategyofvotermobilisation,iftheformerautocraticregimeused
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clientelisticmeanstogainsupport fromthepopulation.11However, itwillalsode‐
pendon the typeofdemocratic transitionas towhether theclientelisticnetworks
willbeabletosurvivetheendofnon‐democraticrule(cf.Kitschelt1995).Inother
words,whendescribingthecontextaroundpartiesinnewdemocraciesweneedto
ask two questions: (1)Who held power under the autocratic regime and (2) did
theseactorsuseclientelismtolegitimise(or“buy”legitimisationfor)theirpower?If
theanswertothesecondquestionis“yes”,wethenneedtoaskwhethertheseac‐
torswereable tomaintain theirpositionsofpower throughthedemocratic trans‐
formationofthepoliticalsystem,orwhetherthetransitionwastriggeredandcon‐
trolled by the pro‐democratic opposition from below, leading to a total “replace‐
ment” (Huntington1991)of theregime. Ifelementsof theautocratic regimewere
abletomaintaintheirpositionsofpower,weshouldexpectthemtousetheiraccess
tostateresourcestobothsustainthemonitoringnetworkandprovidematerialin‐
centivesforvoters.
The relevant contextual environment to make predictions about the electoral
strategies to emerge in new democracies is summarised in Figure 1. However, it
mustagainbenotedthatthesepredictionswillalwaysbeimperfect.Asthisanalyti‐
calframeworktriestointegratebothstructureandagency,wecanonlypredictout‐
comesthatarestrategicallyselectedfor.Thatistosay,theseoutcomesarenotinevi‐
11Whethertheautocraticregimehadbeenabletoestablisheffectiveclientelisticnetworkswillhavedependedonanumberofotherfactorscommonlyidentifiedintheliteratureascausesforclientelism–mostimportantly,thedegreeofstatecontrolovertheeconomy(Wilkinson2007)andthedegreeofbureaucraticprofessionalisation(Shefter1994).Formattersofsimplificationthesefactorswillbeexcludedfromouranalyticalframeworkorotherwisethehistoricalchainofcausalitywouldbecomeuncontrollable.
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table,butactorscanalwaysdevelopalternativeelectoralstrategiesthatgoagainst
thestrategically selectedoutcome. Inparticular,weshouldnot ruleout thepossi‐
bilityofactorsdevelopingnarrowprogrammaticappealstargetedatclearlydefined
socialgroups–astrategicoptionthatwewouldtheoreticallynotexpectinnewde‐
mocraciesofthe“thirdwave”.
Linkingelectoralstrategiesandorganisationalpreferences
Actors are theoretically not only able to develop alternative strategieswithin the
same environmental context, but actorswith different strategies can also co‐exist
FIGURE1:ELECTORALSTRATEGIES–STRATEGICALLYSELECTEDOUTCOMES
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withinthesamepoliticalparty.Asaresultofthis,partiesshouldnotberegardedas
unitary actors but rather as collections of individuals and sub‐party factionswith
oftendiverginginterestsandstrategies.Acknowledgingthisnotionofpoliticalpar‐
tiesascoalitionsoffactions–andlargelyreflectingourearlierdistinctionbetween
clientelistic and programmatic electoral strategies – Sartori (1976: 76‐77) distin‐
guishes“factionsofprinciple”and“factionsof interest”.Whilefactionsofprinciple
primarilyservetoarticulatedifferentpolicy ideas, themain functionof factionsof
interest,ontheotherhand,istoallocatepostsandresourcesamongtheirmembers.
Put differently, factions of principle develop programmatic appeals, whereas fac‐
tionsof interestareclientelisticnetworksconnectingpoliticians tovoters through
theallocationofresources.
Basedon theirparticular electoral strategies, these factionsholddifferentpre‐
ferencesastotheorganisationoftheparty:Whereasfactionsofprinciplewillpush
foratransformationofinter‐factionalpowerrelationsintoasetofformalrules,fac‐
tions of interest will resist a formalisation of decision‐making procedures. Politi‐
ciansfollowingaclientelisticstrategyofvotermobilisationshouldtheoreticallynot
be interested in the formal party organisation as the central arena for decision‐
making, because clientelism is built around particularistic relationships. Under
these circumstances, collectivedecision‐makingmechanismsbecomeunnecessary,
butconflictwillratherberesolvedthroughtheallocationofresources:
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Because[clientelism]reliesonmaterialincentivesandself‐interest,
itunderminestheveryessenceoftheorganizationusingit:thepo‐
liticalparty[…]Withself‐interestasthelinkbetweenvoterandthe
party,andbetweenpoliticianandtheparty,sacrificesforthecollec‐
tive goodof theparty areunlikely to occur […] [Clientelism]pre‐
ventscollectivedecision‐makingbythevotersandbytheparty.
(Warner1997:535)
Consequently, the formalpartyorganisationwill bewithout a realpurpose, but it
willonlyactasaformalcloakaroundtheclientelisticnetworks.Thereisnoneedto
investintheformalorganisation,asallfunctionsusuallyattributedtopoliticalpar‐
ties,suchastherecruitmentofcandidatesorthemobilisationofsupporters,canbe
performedbytheclientelisticmachine.Fortheformalpartyorganisationthismeans
thatthedifferentelements–thepartyontheground,thepartycentralofficeandthe
party in public office – are indistinguishable, simply because, asDuverger (1964)
explainedinregardtotheclassicalcadreparty,admissiontothepartywilldepend
ontheindividual’scapacitytocontributepoliticallyrelevantresourcesthatcanthen
beusedtomaintainandextendtheclientelisticnetworks.Asaresulttherewillbea
largepersonaloverlapbetweenthethreefaces,makingitimpossibletodrawclear
boundariesbetweenthem.
Politiciansfollowingaprogrammaticstrategy,ontheotherhand,willnecessarily
haveto invest in thepoliticalpartyasanarena forcollectivedecision‐makingand
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conflict resolution among diverse interests. This imperative follows from the fact
that
thepartymustspeakwithamoreor lesssinglecollectivevoicein
order to create ameasureof confidence amongvoters that itwill
pursuethepolicyobjectivesafterelectionsithasannouncedbefore
anelection.
(KitscheltandWilkinson2007:9)
However, how parties will organise collective decision‐making will depend on
whether their programmatic strategy targets clearly definable social groups or
whetheritisratheracatch‐allstrategy.Ifpoliticiansaimtomobiliseadistinctelec‐
toralclientele,theywillassignahighvaluetoconstituencyrepresentationandde‐
velopapolicyplatformthatclearlyreflectstheinterestsofthisconstituency.Conse‐
quently, ideological consistencyand conformity are importantkeys to achieve the
party’sgoal,whichiswhypoliticiansfollowinganarrowprogrammaticstrategyof
votermobilisationshouldbeinterestedinstrengtheningthepartycentralofficein
order to increase discipline among the representatives in public office. If, on the
otherhand,politiciansaimtoappeal tothewiderelectorate, theyshouldbe inter‐
ested in a powerful parliamentaryparty, because theparties’ electedofficialswill
needconsiderablefreedomofactiontoprovethemselvesasmanagersofthepublic
good. Hence, as in the case of electoral strategies targeting well‐defined social
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groups,thereisstillaneedforformalmechanismsofcollectivedecision‐makingin
ordertoarticulatepolicyobjectives,butthesepolicyobjectiveswillbeformulatedin
verygeneralterms,makingitnecessarytotakemoreconcretepoliticaldecisionin
parliamentonaneverydaybasis.
However, whether to strengthen the party central office or the parliamentary
partyisnotonlytheproductofactors’ interests,butactorswillagainhavetotake
intoconsiderationthestructuralcontext.Asthemoregeneralliteratureonorgani‐
sations points out, the environment surrounding an organisation should be de‐
scribedaccordingtoitsdegreeofuncertainty.12Thebasictheoryclaimsthatorgani‐
sationsnaturallyresistunpredictability,andwillthusadaptaccordinglyinorderto
render the outcomes of their actions more certain (see Burns and Stalker 1961;
LawrenceandLorsch1967).Correspondingly, it ishypothesisedherethattheout‐
comestrategicallyselectedforbyacontextofhighuncertaintyisacentralisationof
powerwithinthepartyorganisationandthusamorepowerfulpartycentraloffice.
Inotherwords,underconditionsofhighenvironmentaluncertainty,actorsfollow‐
ingacatch‐allstrategywillbeundergreatpressuretostrengthenthepartycentral
officeinordertoincreasepartydiscipline–althoughthisoutcomeisbynomeans
inevitable.
In newdemocracies, environmental uncertainty for political parties is particu‐
larlyhigh,giventhatvoterloyaltiesareoftenonlyweaklydeveloped,whichreflects
12Thisisatleasttheassumptionofcontingencytheory,whichisconsideredthedominantapproachtoorganisationdesign.Foranapplicationoftheconceptofuncertaintytothestudyofpartyorgani‐sationseePanebianco(1988:204).
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in high levels of party system fragmentation and electoral volatility (Mainwaring
1998).Moreover,loyaltiesalsotendtobeunderdevelopedwithinparties,leadingto
frequentinter‐partyconflicts(vanBiezen2003b:216).Theseconflictsareparticu‐
larly damaging when they affect the stability of government coalitions, thereby
jeopardising theparty’s capacity to influencepublicpolicyoutcomes. In short, the
context for politicians following a catch‐all electoral strategy should be described
along the following indicators for environmental uncertainty: party system frag‐
mentation,electoralvolatilityandgovernmentdurability.
FIGURE2:PARTYORGANISATION–STRATEGICALLYSELECTEDOUTCOMES
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Whereas a programmatic electoral strategy thus requires a party organisation to
provideformaliseddecision‐makingprocedures,thetwosecondaryelectoralstrat‐
egiesoutlinedabove–similartoclientelism–donotneedlargeinvestmentsintothe
political party as an abstract institution. In the case of charisma, decision‐making
authority will flow naturally from the leader’s personality (cf. Panebianco 1988),
whileparties following a coercive electoral strategywill onlyhave to invest in an
informalmilitant group.Hence, just as clientelism, charisma and coercionwill re‐
ducethefunctionofthepartyorganisationtothatofaformallegalcloak,meaning
thatthethreeelementsofpartyorganisationwillbeindistinguishable.Whencom‐
binedwithprogrammaticstrategies,weshouldstillexpectpartiestodevelopformal
procedures for decision‐making, but, depending on howmuch the party relies on
eithercharismaorcoercionasanelectoralstrategy,thesesecondarystrategiescan
createinformalchannelsofauthoritythatwillcircumventtheformalregulations.
However, thecentral causalmechanisms toexplaindifferent typesofpartyor‐
ganisationarestillclientelisticincentivesandprogrammaticappeals.Usingtheseas
thelinkbetweenthestructuralcontextandorganisationalpreferences,wecannow
identifythestrategicallyselectedoutcomesintermsofpartyorganisation(seeFig‐
ure2).Aswasdiscussedearlier, thecontextofyoungdemocraciesclearly favours
either clientelistic or catch‐all electoral strategies andwe should therefore expect
eitherpartieswithoutformalorganisational facesorpartieswiththepartycentral
officeasthedominantelementasthestrategicallyselectedoutcome.However,ac‐
tors following a catch‐all strategywill have to take into consideration the level of
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environmentaluncertainty:Ifenvironmentaluncertaintyishightheywillbeunder
greatpressuretostrengthenthepartycentralofficeratherthantheparliamentary
party.
Basedon the idea that actors candevelopdifferent strategieswithin the same
party,weshouldthenseethereproductionandchangeofpartiesasaconstantcon‐
flictbetweeninternalactors,eachpushingfortheorganisationalstructuresthatwill
best allow the implementation of their respective electoral strategy. Accordingly,
factionsof interestwillresista formalisationofdecision‐makingnorms,while fac‐
tions of principle will be interested in strengthening the role of the party as the
principalarenafordecision‐making.Dependingonwhetherthelatterfollowacatch‐
alloranarrowlyfocusedelectoralstrategy,theywillworktowardsamorepowerful
parliamentarypartyorastrongerpartycentralofficerespectively.Inotherwords,
thedevelopmentofpoliticalpartiesisnotalinearprocess,asmaintainedbystruc‐
turalistapproachestopartyorganisation,butitisanopen‐endedprocessdrivenby
conflictingelectoralstrategieswithinthesamecontext.However,unlikevoluntarist
approachessuggest,thecontextstrategicallyselectsforacertainoutcome,thereby
strengtheningcertainactorsoverothers.
Asthepower‐basedstrandwithinhistorical institutionalismmaintains,thedis‐
tributionofpowerbetweenactorswithinthesamepartyisthusthemechanismto
explainboththereproductionofthepartyorganisationandorganisationalchanges.
Partyorganisations reproduceover timeas conflicting interests createadeadlock
situation,withneither sidebeingable toadvance their interestsany further.Con‐
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versely, changes to party organisation will become possible if the distribution of
powerwithinthepartyisaltered.Thiscanhappenundereitheroftwoconditions:
(1) therelevantenvironmentaround thepartychanges tosuchanextent that the
strategicallyselectedoutcomebecomesadifferentone;or(2)a factionchoosesto
changeitsstrategyinattempttodealmoreeffectivelywiththeproblemsposedby
thegivencontext.Inotherwords, inthefirstcasethecontextchangeswhilestrat‐
egiesstaythesame,whereasinthesecondcaseactorsoffernewstrategiesforun‐
changedenvironmentalconditions.
Summary
Fromthetheoreticalframeworkjustoutlineditshouldhavebecomeclearthatpre‐
dictingthedevelopmentofpoliticalpartiesinnewdemocraciesperseisimpossible.
Thatistosay,itisveryunlikelythatpartiesinnewdemocracieswillfollowexactly
thesamepathoforganisationaldevelopmentastheircounterparts inWesternEu‐
rope,norshouldweexpectthemtotakean“evolutionaryleap”towardsmorecon‐
temporary models of party organisation found in the established democracies in
Westernindustrialisedcountries.Furthermore,itishighlyimprobablethatallpar‐
tiesinnewdemocracieswillconvergetowardsacommontypeofpartyorganisation
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thatwillclearlydistinguishthemfrompartiesformedinearlierwavesofdemocrati‐
sation.
Making predictions about the development of political party organisations in
newly democratic societies becomes impossible, as our analytical framework ac‐
knowledges the importance of human agency. Accordingly, allwe can predict are
strategically selected outcomes, as contextual environments favour certain out‐
comesoverothers.Theseoutcomes,however,arebynomeansinevitableasactors
areabletodevelopalternativestrategieswithinthesamecontext.Weshouldthere‐
fore allow for the possibility that different strategies may compete against each
otherbothwithinthesamepolityandthesamepoliticalparty.Thedevelopmentof
politicalpartiesisthusbestdescribedasaconstantconflictbetweendifferentparty
internalactorsfollowingdifferentstrategiesandinterests.
Giventhatthedefiningfunctionofpoliticalpartiesistocompeteinpublicelec‐
tions, actors’ electoral strategies become the key to understand different types of
partyorganisation.Broadly speaking,we candistinguishbetweenclientelistic and
programmaticstrategiesforvotermobilisation,withthelatterfurtherdifferentiated
astowhethertheplatformisnarrowlydefinedoraimedataggregatingawiderange
ofsocialviews.While theenvironmentalcontext innewdemocraciesof the “third
wave”strategicallyselectsforclientelisticandcatch‐allstrategies,itdependsonthe
particular context inwhichactorsmake their strategic calculationsas towhichof
thesetwowillbethemostlikelyoutcome.Generally,acontextcharacterisedbylow
levelsofincomeinequalityand/orademocratictransitionlargelycontrolledbyan
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autocraticregimethatmadewideuseofclientelisticincentivestolegitimiseitsnon‐
democratic rule will strategically select for clientelism as the dominant electoral
strategy.
Electoral strategies are then closely linked to preferences for certain types of
partyorganisation:Whileactorsfollowingaclientelisticstrategyforvotermobilisa‐
tionwillresistaformalisationofdecision‐making,actorscampaigningonprogram‐
maticappealswillbe interested in strengthening the formalpartyorganisationas
the central arena for decision‐making.More precisely, those campaigning on nar‐
rowlyfocusedprogrammaticappealswillpushforacentralisationofpowerinthe
partycentraloffice,whereasactorswithacatch‐all strategywill try tostrengthen
the party in public office vis‐à‐vis the other elements of party organisation.How‐
ever,innewdemocraciesenvironmentaluncertaintyforpoliticalpartiestendsbeto
relativelyhigh,makingitdifficulttorealisethislatteroption.
Asactorswithinthesamepartycanfollowdifferentelectoralstrategiesandthus
holddifferentpreferencesastotheorganisationoftheparty,theorganisationalde‐
velopment of political parties is best described as an on‐going conflict between
partyinternalgroupingswithaninterestineitherreproducingortransformingthe
party organisation. This conflict will lead to party change if changes in the envi‐
ronmentstrengthengroupsrejectingthecurrentnormsandregulations,orifactors
decidetochangetheirstrategies.However,inordertorealisetheopportunitiescre‐
ated by environmental changes actorsmust both control the necessary resources
andinterpretthesechangesasopportunitiesinthefirstplace.Moreover,changing
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strategieswillnotalwaysleadtoarelativeincreaseinpower,ascontextsarestra‐
tegicallyselective,favouringcertainstrategiesoverothers.
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–3–
METHODOLOGICALIMPLICATIONS
In a logical sequence, the theoretical assumptions that constitute our analytical
framework shape our research methodology. Thus, this chapter will discuss the
methodologicalimplicationsofconceptualisingthedevelopmentofpoliticalparties
as a constant conflict between strategic actors in a strategically selective context.
Thisinvolvesoperationalisingthevariablesthatconstituteourtheoryofpartyfor‐
mationandchange,decidingonappropriatemethodsofdatacollectionandanalysis,
andselectingthecases.
Measurement
Theprecedingchapter identified severalvariables thatneed tobe taken into con‐
siderationwhenexplainingpartyformationandchange.Thesevariablesmustnow
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beoperationalisedinordertomakethemempiricallymeasurable.Asageneralrule
fortheprocessofoperationalisation,thechosenindicatorsmustadequatelycapture
thefullcontentoftheconcepttheresearcherseekstoanalyse(AdcockandCollier
2001).
Theenvironmentalcontext
To remind ourselves, in order to make a prediction about electoral strategies –
whicharethekeytounderstandingdifferenttypesofpartyorganisation–theenvi‐
ronment around political parties in new democracies should be described along
threevariables: (1) theautocraticregime, (2) theprocessofdemocratic transition
and(3)thelevelofsocio‐economicdevelopment.Thesevariablesdonothaveade‐
terministicinfluenceonhumanbehaviour,buttheywillhelpustopredictoutcomes
thatarestrategicallyselectedforbytheyenvironment.Since“thirdwave”democra‐
ciesasacontextmitigateagainstnarrowprogrammaticelectoralstrategies,theonly
twooutcomeswe should expect are either clientelistic practices or catch‐all cam‐
paigns. Clientelismwill always be the strategically selected outcomeunder condi‐
tions of low socio‐economic development, which provide the perfect breeding
groundforvote‐buyingand/orpatronage.Mostimportantly,inlessdevelopedsoci‐
eties,clientelismdoesnotneedtobeestablishedasarepetitivegame,butitcanbe
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setupfromzero.Inordertomeasurethelevelofsocio‐economicdevelopmentthe
following indicatorswillbeused: (1)GDPpercapita, (2) theGinicoefficient13, (3)
thedegreeofurbanisationand(4)theliteracyrate.Whereasthefirsttwoindicators
arerelatedthequestionofhowmuchoftheirresourcespoliticianswillneedtoin‐
vestintheestablishmentofaclientelisticnetwork,thelattertwoindicatorshavean
influence on how well the system to monitor voters’ compliance will work: It is
mucheasier tomaintain effectivemonitoring systems in rural areas,whilepoorly
educatedvotersmightnotknowabout theunlawfulnessofvote‐buyingandother
clientelisticmethods.
However,ifclientelismisestablishedasarepetitivegame,clientelisticelectoral
strategiescanalsobethestrategicallyselectedoutcomeinmoremodernsocieties.
Innewdemocraciesthiswill,firstofall,dependonwhethertheoutgoingautocratic
regimeusedclientelistimtolegitimiseitspower.Unfortunately,theliteraturedoes
notofferanytypologyofnon‐democraticregimesthatwouldcapturethedifferences
weareinterestedin.14Itisthereforenecessarytobuildourowntypology,basedon
twoseparatedimensions.Firstofall,weneedtoaskhowtheregimelegitimisedits
rule:Was thecurtailmentofpoliticalpluralism justifiedonlybyuniversalisticmo‐
tives–suchastheneedfordevelopmentandmodernisation,religiousbeliefs,politi‐
cal ideologies, an externalmilitary threat or nationalism – or did the regime also
13TheGinicoefficientisameasureofinequalityofthedistributionofincome.Itisdefinedasaratiowithvaluesbetween0and1:0correspondstoperfectincomeequality,while1correspondstoper‐fectincomeinequality.14ProbablythemostinfluentialtypologyofautocraticregimesistheconceptualisationbyLinz(2000),whichisorganisedaroundthreecoredimensions:(1)thedegreeofpluralism,(2)thedegreeofmobilisation,and(3)thedegreeofideology.
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maintainclientelisticexchangerelationswiththepopulationthroughwhichto“buy”
politicalsupport?Secondly, inorder toestablishwhether theelementscontrolling
theseclientelisticrelationshipswereabletore‐establishthemselvesaspoliticalac‐
tors in thenewdemocracy it isnecessary toask:Whoruled?Possibleanswers to
thisquestionareasingleleader,apoliticalparty,themilitaryorthebureaucracy.
However,inorderfortheclientelisticnetworkstosurvivethetransformationof
thepoliticalsystem,thedemocratictransitionmustatleastbepartlycontrolledby
theregimeelites:Iftheregimeiscompletelyremovedfrompower,thismeansthat
the clientelistic networkswill decay, as they are disconnected from the supply of
public resources. Following Huntington (1991), we can distinguish threeways in
which an autocratic regime can be developed into a democracy: (1) “transforma‐
tion”, (2) “replacement” and (3) “transplacement”. In a transformation the regime
takestheleadininstitutionalisingdemocracy,whileinareplacementtheregimeis
overthrown,allowingoppositiongroupstocontroltheprocessoftransition.Trans‐
placement,ontheotherhand,describesthesituationwhenneithertheregimenor
thepro‐democratic oppositionhave thenecessarypower to control the transition
processindependentlyofeachother.Democratisationwillhencelargelyresultfrom
jointaction.Inotherwords,elementsoftheauthoritarianregimewillbeablekeep
positionsofpower ina transformationandareplacement,whereasareplacement
providestheworstconditionsfortheregimetomaintainitsclientelisticnetworks.
We should therefore expect the context to favour catch‐all electoral strategies
over clientelism under conditions of high socio‐economic development, provided
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thattheexitingautocraticregimedidnotuseclientelisticappealsto“buy”legitima‐
tionforitsnon‐democraticuseofpower–orifitdid,thatthedemocratictransition
wastriggeredfrombelowandcompletelyremovedtheautocraticelitesfrompower.
Asexplainedinthepreviouschapter,actorsfollowingacatch‐allstrategytomobi‐
lisevotersshouldbeinterestedinstrengtheningthepartyinpublicoffice.However,
if environmental uncertainty is high, these actorswill be under great pressure to
centralisepowerinthepartycentralofficeinordertoincreasepartydiscipline.En‐
vironmental uncertainty for political parties can bemeasured along the following
dimensions: party system fragmentation, electoral volatility and government lon‐
gevity. Party system fragmentation can be expressed as the “effective number of
parties”throughtheindexdevelopedbyLaaksoandTaagepera(1979),whichtakes
accountofboththenumberofpartiesinthesystemandtheirshareofvotes/seats.A
widelyusedmethod to capture electoral volatility is thePedersen index,which is
equaltothenextpercentageofvoterswhochangedtheirvotesbetweentwosubse‐
quentelections(Pedersen1979).Finally,governmentstabilityismeasuredinyears,
usingthefollowingcriteriatodeterminetheendofacabinet:(1)newelections,(2)
change in party composition or (3) change in primeministership/presidency (Li‐
jphart 1999: 132). Environmental uncertainty is higher, the higher party system
fragmentationandelectoralvolatility,andthelowergovernmentdurability.
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Partyorganisation
Several typologies of party organisation have been offered (see Krouwel 2006).
Theseare,however,notwithoutmajorweaknesses.Firstofall,mostpartymodels
were developed in the context of politics inWestern Europe (cf. Wolinetz 2002:
137).Thismakesthemdifficulttoapplytothenumerouspartiesthathaveonlyre‐
cently emerged through the third wave of democratisation in other parts of the
world. Due to this “travelling problem” (Sartori 1970), the real‐world differences
between political parties in young democracies and their counterparts in estab‐
lisheddemocraciesintheWestareoftenobscured.Moreover,existingtypologiesof
partyorganisationsufferfroma“transformationbias”(vanBiezen2003a:178),as
mostoftheexistingpartytypesactuallyreflectmodelsofpartychangeratherthan
modelsofpartyorganisationperse.However,ageneraltheoryofpartyorganisation
mustnecessarilybebasedonpartymodelsthatcanaccommodatetheoreticalclaims
onbothpartyadaptationandformation.
Broadlyspeaking,therearetwosolutionstotheseproblems.Oneistodevelopa
newtypologythatcancapturethebroadempiricalvariationamongpoliticalparties
indifferentpartsoftheworld(seeGuntherandDiamond2003),theotheristodis‐
integrateexistingpartymodels into their singleelements (seevanBiezen2003b).
Thelatteroptionhasundeniableadvantages,sinceitmuchmoreeffectivelyaddsto
existingknowledgeconcerningtheorganisationofpoliticalparties.Introducingyet
anothertypologyofpoliticalpartieswouldmakeitdifficulttocompareourresults
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with those that have already been generated by the existing literature. However,
simplydisintegratingexistingtypesisnotenough,butthesingleindicatorsthatwe
obtainmustbeclusteredaccordingtoameaningfulmatrixthatdefinestheinterplay
betweenthesedefiningcharacteristics(Sartori1984:46‐50;1993).
Inordertointegratethenewmodelintotheongoingdebatessurroundingparty
organisation,thepowerrelationsbetweenthe“partyontheground”,the“partyin
centraloffice”andthe“partyinpublicoffice”promisetooffersuchameaningfulor‐
ganisingmatrix.Theserelationsareextremelyvaluable,sincetheyhaveasignificant
effect on the linkagesbetween civil society, political parties, and the state.Hence,
theparticularfunctioningofademocracywillalwaysdependontheinternalpower
relations of theparties competingwithin its boundaries (cf.Katz andMair 1995).
Accordingtothedemocraticideal,politicalpartiesshouldfunctionas“gatekeepers”
(Easton1965) of the political systemby aggregating social interests into possible
policyoptions.Partiesfulfilthisroleasabridgebetweencivilsocietyandthestate
when,asintheeraofthemassparty,thereisasymbioticrelationshipbetweenthe
partyonthegroundandthepartyincentraloffice.Ifthepartyinternalpowerpen‐
dulumswingstoofartowardsthepartyontheground,thepartywillnotbeableto
realise demands from civil society against the interests of the state bureaucracy.
Conversely, if it swings too far towards the party in public office, the party will
transformintoanagentofthestate,removedfromcivilsociety.Ifnocleardistinc‐
tioncanbemadebetweenthethreefaces(similartotheclassicalcadreparty),civil
society,thepartysystem,andthestatewillalsobeindistinct.
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Whendisaggregatingexistingmodelsofpartyorganisationweobtainanumber
offormalindicatorsthatservetoevaluatethepowerdistributionbetweentheparty
ontheground,thepartyincentraloffice,andthepartyinpublicoffice.Inorderto
assesstherelativestrengthofthepartyonthegroundscholarsusuallyrelyonthe
size of the party membership. The simplest measure by which to assess party
membership strength is simply to compare the absolute number ofmembers be‐
tweendifferentpartiesovertime.However,althoughsucharawmembershipcount
isvaluable information for the individualparty, itdoesnotallowus tocontrol for
such intervening variables as the size of the electorate.Hence, itmust be supple‐
mentedwithmoresophisticatedmethodstoevaluatethestrengthof themember‐
shiporganisation.Onemethodistoexpresstheabsolutenumbersasapercentageof
theparty’sownelectorate.Yet,theweaknessofthistechniqueisthatitwronglyas‐
sumeseachparty tohavea fixedelectorate (Katzetal.1992:331).Therefore, the
betterindicatorforpartymembershipstrengthistheratioofaparty’smembership
totheoverallnationalelectorate.
Theproblemwithstandardisedmembershipfiguresingeneral,however,isthat
thefiguresvaryaccordingtotheparty’sperformanceinattractingmembers,which
again isdependentonanumberof factorsbeyondthecontrolof theparty leader‐
ship.Thus, ifwewant to includesomespace foragency inour theoryofpartyor‐
ganisation,wealsoneedtotakeintoaccounttheheightofbarriersseparatingparty
members fromnon‐members, becauseonly these can – at least in theory – inten‐
tionallybeshapedby theactorswithin theparty.Generally, the levelof inclusive‐
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nessofapartycanbedeterminedbytheextentofdutiesandprivilegesattachedto
partymembership,andby theeaseordifficultyofenrolment (Scarrow1996:30).
On amore specific levelwe can ask the following questions to operationalise the
easeofaccesstopartymembership:
(1) Isenrolmentopenorrestricted(Duverger1964:72)?Doesthepartyrequire
thatindividualsmeetcertainconditions,suchasage,ethnicityornationality?
(2) Howformalisthemembershipprocedure?Forinstance,joiningsocialistpar‐
tiesintheearly20thcenturyrequiredthewould‐bemembertofollowaleng‐
thyapplicationprocedurethat,amongotherformalities,involvedsigningthe
party’sstatutes,andsecuringsponsorshipfromexistingmembers.Moreover,
oneoftenhadtogothroughaprobationaryperiodinordertobegrantedfull
memberrights.
(3) Domembersneedtopayregulardues?Andifso,howmuchdotheyhaveto
pay?Inordertoallowforcross‐countrycomparisonthelevelofmembership
duesshouldbeputinrelationtotheaverageper‐capitaincome.
Howhigh theparty sets thebarriersofpartymembership tellsus a lot about the
typeofmemberstheparty is lookingtoattract.Broadlyspeaking,wecansaythat
the lower the barriers the less engagement in party‐internal politics is excepted
frommembers.Inthisregard,Scarrow(1994:51)distinguishesfivedifferentforms
of activities for party members (ranked in increasing order according to the in‐
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tensityofengagement):(1)statistic,(2)donor,(3)ideas,(4)volunteer,and(5)can‐
didate. It isreasonabletoclaimthatthepartyonthegroundwillweakest, ifparty
membersareonlyperceivedasstatistic.Itwillbemorepowerful,ifpartymembers
are recruitedas importantprovidersofmoney, ideas, and free labour.Finally, the
partyonthegroundwillbestrongestif,inaddition,itisalsoperceivedasapoolof
potentialcandidatesforpublicelections.
Measuring thestrengthofpartyon theground–basedonacombinationof its
numerical strength and its inclusiveness – provides very little value, ifwe do not
alsoconsidertherelativepowerofthetwootherorganisationalfaces.Asecondand
morecomprehensiveindicatorofthedistributionofpowerwithinapoliticalpartyis
theprocedureused toselectcandidates forpublicelections.Whereasmanyof the
functionsoriginallymonopolisedbypoliticalpartiesarenowalsoexercisedbyother
institutions,competingforgovernmentaloffices–andthenecessaryrecruitmentof
political leadership–remainstheexclusiverealmofparties.Hence,giventherela‐
tive importanceofelectoralcompetitionasamotivationtoestablishandsustaina
party, the selectionof candidates inevitablybecomesoneof the central objects of
party internal power struggles (Gallagher 1988a). In other words, the process of
candidateselectionisnotonlyanindicatorofthedistributionofpowerwithinapo‐
liticalparty,butitalsoinfluencesthedistributionofpower.
Existingmodels of party organisation usually putmost emphasis on the inclu‐
sivenessoftheproceduresofcandidateselection,askingwhoisentitledtovote in
thedecision‐makingprocess(seeKatz2001).Hence,ifwewanttocompareparties
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inyoungdemocracies to theircounterparts inWesternEurope,weshould include
thesameindicatorinouranalyticalframework.Accordingtotheoperationalisation
ofcandidateselectiondevelopedbyRahatandHazan(2001),theselectorate,i.e.the
bodythatnominatesthecandidatesforelection,canbeclassifiedonacontinuum.At
themostinclusiveextreme,everycitizenhastherighttoparticipate.Atthemostex‐
clusiveextreme,ontheotherhand,theselectionofcandidateswillonlybedecided
by a single party leader. Themain categories in‐between these two extremes are
summarisedinFigure3.
However, this indicator alone isnot enough tomeasure thedistributionof power
withinapoliticalparty,as theparty leadershipmayuseotherregulations tohave
significant influenceon theoutcome.Thisparticularlyapplies tonorms ruling the
Allcitizens PartymembersPartymembers+
additionalrequirements
inclusive exclusive
1)Candidacy
ElectorateParty
membersSelected
partyagencyNon‐selectedpartyagency
Selectedpartyleader
Non‐selectedpartyleader
inclusive exclusive
2)Selectorate
Source:RahatandHazan2001
FIGURE3:DIMENSIONSOFCANDIDATESELECTION
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access tocandidacy:Who is allowed topresenthis orher candidacy in the candi‐
date‐selectionprocess?Again, this dimension canbe classified in a continuum:At
theinclusiveend,everyvotercanstandaspartycandidate;attheexclusiveend,po‐
tentialcandidateswillhavetofulfilaseriesofrestrictiveconditions(seeFigure3).15
Iftheprocedureofcandidateselectionunderanalysiscanbeplacedatthehighly
inclusiveend,theresearchercancertainly identifytheparty inpublicofficeasthe
dominantorganisationalface.Thisisbecausemembershiprecordsadministeredby
thepartyincentralofficewillnotplayanimportantroleinmobilisingsupport,and
becausethepartyonthegroundwillbeatomised.However,itbecomesdifficultto
measurethedistributionofpowerwhenpartyagenciesareinvolvedinnominating
thecandidatesorelectingthepartyleader(whothenmonopolisesnomination).Of‐
ten,suchagenciesarecomposedofrepresentatives fromthedifferent faces–par‐
ticularlyfromthepartyincentralofficeandthepartyinpublicoffice,makingitdif‐
ficulttoisolateadominantface.Consequently,weshouldsupplementcandidatese‐
lection,whichonlypaintsaverygeneralpower‐mapofaparty,withmoreaccurate
indicatorstodeterminetheinternalbalanceofpower.
BasedontheworkbyvanBiezen(2000;2003b)onpoliticalpartiesintheyoung
democraciesofSouthernandEast‐CentralEurope,wecanidentifyanumberofas‐
pects in theofficialpartyrules thatwillhelp todescribe therelationshipbetween 15TheframeworkbyRahatandHazanincludestwofurtherindicators.Oneisthedegreeoftheterri‐torial(orfunctional)decentralisationofcandidateselection.However,thisconcepthashardlyanyinfluenceontheinternalbalanceofpowerbetweenthethreefacesofpartyorganisation,andwillthusnotbeincludedhere.ThesameappliestothefourthindicatordevelopedbyRahatandHazan–thequestionofwhethereachcandidateisdeterminedexclusivelybyvotesorwhetheranagreed‐uponlistisratifiedbytheselectorate.Thisdimensionhasprobablyagreaterimpactontheproblemofwhogetsnominated,hencecandidaterecruitment(seeNorris1996).
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theparty incentralofficeandtheparty inpublicoffice.Firstly,weshouldexplore
how much independence the party in public office enjoys from the extra‐
parliamentary organs. The party statutes can be expected to include a number of
provisionsthatrulethepositionof theparty inpublicoffice,suchasthenormsof
behaviour of the party’s parliamentary representatives, the establishment of the
parliamentaryfraction’sinternalrules,theselectionofitsleader(ship)ortheformu‐
lationofpublicpolicy.Secondly,wemusttakeintoconsiderationthedegreeofper‐
sonneloverlapbetweentheorgansoftheextra‐parliamentaryofficeandtheparty
inpublicoffice, lookingatboth theoffice rules that regulateexofficio representa‐
tion,andtheactualextentofpersonneloverlap.Thirdly,itishelpfultoaskwhode‐
cidesabouttheallocationoffinancialresourceswithintheparty.Andfinally,thedis‐
tributionofparty‐fundedstaffcanalsobeavaluableindicatortomeasurethepower
relationsbetweenthepartyincentralofficeandthepartyinpublicoffice.
TABLE4: BASICELEMENTSOFPARTYORGANISATION
Indicators
Membership absolutesize membership‐electorateratio inclusiveness
Candidateselection opennessofcandidacy inclusivenessofselectorate
Controloverparliamentaryparty
officialsubordination personaloverlap financialdecision‐making allocationofstaff
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Tosumup, thepowerrelationsbetween the three facesofpartyorganisationcan
effectivelybemeasuredbydescribingpartiesalongthreedimensions:(1)member‐
ship, (2) candidate selectionand (3) tiesbetweenextra‐parliamentaryandparlia‐
mentaryorgans.Thesethreecentralelementsofpartyorganisationandtheirbasic
propertiesareagainsummarisedinTable4.
Feeding these indicators back into our organisingmatrixwill then allowus to
measurethedistributionofpowerbetweenthethreefacesofpartyorganisation.As
areminder,therearethreepossiblepowerconstellations:(1)Thethreefacesarebe
indistinguishable,(2)thepartyincentralofficeisthedominantfaceor(3)theparty
inpublicoffice is thedominant face.Thethreecentralelementsofpartyorganisa‐
tionare indistinguishable ifpartymembership ishighlyexclusive– that is,admis‐
siontomembershipisdependentonwhetherthepersoninquestioncancontribute
resources thatmake him a strong candidate in public elections – the selection of
candidateshighlycentralised,andthepartybureaucracyalmostnon‐existent,while
the leadershipoftheparliamentarypartyoftenperfectlyoverlapswiththe leader‐
ship of the party as awhole.On the other hand, the party in public officewill be
dominantorganisational face ifbothpartymembershipandtheselectionofcandi‐
datesarehighlyinclusive,withthelatteroftenorganisedasopenprimaries,andthe
parliamentarypartycontrollingmostoftheparty’sresourcesanddecision‐making.
Finally, the party central office will be the dominant face, if admission to party
membership is located somewhere between highly inclusive and highly exclusive,
candidateselectiondecidedbymembershipvotewithinthepartyandcontrolover
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resources and decision‐making exercised by the party bureaucracy and the party
leadership.
Datacollection
As the previous section demonstrated, different types of datawill be required to
empiricallytestourtheoryofpartyformationandadaptation.Weneedtofillvari‐
ous levelsof analysiswithempirical information, ranging from theenvironmental
context,theformalorganisationofpoliticalpartiesandthepowerrelationsbetween
partyinternalgroupstoactors’electoralstrategies.Dependingonthenatureofthe
data,socialscientistsmakeuseofawidevarietyofdatacollectiontechniques.Inour
case, documentary analysis and elite interviews are certainly the most adequate
methods. Concerning the sequencing of these two stages it should be noted that
wheninterviewingelites,oneshouldnotonlyhavedetailedknowledgeoftheinter‐
viewee,butalsoofthefactssurroundingtheeventortheactivitystudied.Therefore,
interviewsshouldtakeplacetowardstheendofthedatacollectionprocess(Lilleker
2003:212)andweshallbeginwithadocumentaryanalysis.
Usually,threedifferenttypesofdocumentsaredistinguished:(1)primarysour‐
ces,(2)secondarysourcesand(3)tertiarysources(Burnhametal.2004:165).Pri‐
mary sources are “those thatwerewritten (or otherwise came intobeing) by the
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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peopledirectlyinvolvedandatatimecontemporaryornearcontemporarywiththe
period being investigated” (Finnegan 1996: 141). Primary sources that should be
usedintheanalysisofpartyorganisationsarepartystatutesandotherpartydocu‐
ments,suchasfinancereports,membershipstatisticsorproceedingsofpartymeet‐
ings.Secondarysources,ontheotherhand,consistofotherevidenceproducedsoon
aftertheevent,andusuallymadeavailabletoalargerpublic.Whenstudyingparty
organisations,printedmassmedia–oneexampleofsecondarysources–servesasa
good source to learn more about the inner‐workings of parties, and the socio‐
political context around them. The same applies to tertiary sources, which differ
fromsecondarysourcesinhavingbeencreatedmuchlateraftertheevent,suchas
booksandacademicjournalarticles.Thesealsohelptheresearchertogetabetter
understandingofthepartiesunderanalysis,andtostructuretherespectivecontext.
The problemwith documentary sources in general is that they are of varying
quality.While it ismoredifficult todeterminethereliabilityofsecondaryandter‐
tiarysources,Scott(1990:6)suggestsfoureasilymanageablecriteriatoassessthe
qualityofprimarydocuments:
(1) Authenticity:Istheevidencegenuineandofunquestionableorigin?
(2) Credibility:Istheevidencefreefromerroranddistortion?
(3) Representativeness: Is theevidencetypicalof itskind,and, ifnot, is theex‐
tentofitsuntypicalityknown?
(4) Meaning:Istheevidenceclearandcomprehensible?
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Officialpartydocumentsarelikelytobeauthenticandmeaningful.Issuesofrepre‐
sentativenessandcredibilitywillprobablyexercisetheresearchersomewhatmore.
Representativenesscouldbeaproblemiftheresearcherisdeniedaccesstocertain
documents, or when some documents have been destroyed. While this could be
simplystatedintheanalysis,itismoredifficulttoestablishcredibility.Oneexample
arepartymembershipfigures.Politicalpartieshaveatendencytoexaggeratetheir
membershiplevels,andthereisverylittletheanalystcandoaboutthisbuttoaccept
thefiguresmadeavailablebytheparties(MairandvanBiezen2001:7‐8).
Havinganalysedthemostrelevantdocuments,wecanthenproceedtointerview
elites.Interviewsfulfilseveralpurposes.Notonlycantheybeusedtofillgapsinthe
data,butmostimportantlytheyhelpustounderstandhowpartiesworkinreality–
behindtheformalproceduresandnorms–aswellasgivingusanideaoftheper‐
ceptionsandstrategiesheldbytherelevantpartyactorswhendesigningtheorgani‐
sation.Commonly,threedifferenttypesof interviewsareidentified:(1)structured
interviews,(2)semi‐structuredinterviews,and(3)unstructuredinterviews(Punch
1998:175).While instructured interviewsthe interviewerreadsoutveryspecific
questionsexactly inthesameorderastheyareprintedontheinterviewschedule,
very often offering the interviewee a fixed range of answers, unstructured inter‐
views tend tobevery similar in character toa conversation,with the interviewer
tryingtocoveracertainrangeofbroadertopics.Inasemi‐structuredinterview,on
theotherhand,theresearcherhasalistofquestions,buttheintervieweehasagreat
dealofleewayinhowtoreply.
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Aswewanttocomparebetweenpartiesandelitesinordertoexplainwhypar‐
tiesorganiseindifferentways,unstructuredinterviewsarenotagoodchoice,since
a comparison always requires a certain level of standardisation across cases
(Bryman2001: 315).However,we should not structure the interviews toomuch,
because elites “appreciate being treated as individuals” (Zuckerman 1972: 174).
Moreover, aswe are unlikely to have nearly perfect knowledge after the stage of
documentary analysis, questions should ratherbeopen‐ended, allowing the inter‐
viewees to bring in their full expertise aswell as their perceptions of the events
underanalysis(AberbachandRockman2002:674).However,ultimately,thedegree
ofstandardisationappliedtotheinterviewwilldependonwhoweareinterviewing.
Generallyspeaking,conventionalsamplingtechniquescanusuallynotbeusedin
eliteinterviewing,sincerespondentsarenotofequalweight(Burnhametal.2004:
207).Rather, intervieweesshouldbechosenon thebasisof their relevance to the
researchquestionandtothetheoreticalframework.Thus,inourcase,wewillinter‐
viewpoliticalpartyelitesinordertocollecttheinformationabouttheformalparty
organisation,andacademicexpertsaswellasotherelites(suchasNGOleaders)to
getan insight into the informalpowerdynamicswithin theparties studied.More‐
over,thelatterinterviewswillhelpusunderstandthemeaningandrelevanceofour
theoreticalconceptsinthedifferentcountries,asthesecanconsiderablydifferfrom
ourWesternEuropeanunderstanding.Consequently,wewillusestructured inter‐
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viewswithpoliticalpartyelites16inordertoensurefullcomparabilitybetweenthe
politicalpartiesandsemi‐structuredinterviewswithpartyexternalelites.
Similartodocuments,eliteinterviewscansufferfromproblemsofcredibility.In
somecasestheintervieweescanhavedifferentperceptionsofwhatthefactsareor
theymayalsoattempttorewritehistoryintheirownfavour.Inordertodealwith
thisproblemDavies(2001)–writingabouteliteinterviewinginsecurityandintelli‐
gence studies – suggests applying themethod of “triangulation”. Thismeans that
data the researcherhas collected from interviews is cross‐referenced, firstly,with
data obtained from primary documents and, secondly, with published secondary
andtertiarysourcematerial.Whereinterviewsconflictwithwrittenrecords,thelat‐
tershouldbetakenasthefinalauthority.Ifinterviewscomeintoconflictwithother
interviews,theuncertaintymustbereportedinthetext.
Dataanalysis
Oncethedatahasbeencollected,itcanbeusedtobuildgeneraltheories.Following
Lijphart(1971;1975),wecandistinguishthreesocialscientificmethodsthatcanbe
usedforhypothesis‐testing:(1)thestatisticalmethod,(2)thecomparativemethod
and (3) the case‐study method. The first two methods are based on John Stuart
Mill’s “methods of experimental inquiry”, which are “modes of singling out from 16 See Appendix for questionnaire.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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amongthecircumstanceswhichprecedeorfollowaphenomenonthosewithwhich
itisreallyconnectedbyaninvariablelaw”(Mill1875).Inotherwords,bychanging
thecircumstancesinwhicharelationshipamongvariablesisobserved,rivalobser‐
vationscanberuledoutandhypothesestested. Inpoliticalscience,themostcom‐
mon units of analysis are countries. Countries are compared to control for those
socio‐political variables that are not part of the hypothesised causal relationship,
allowingtheresearchertoexaminetheeffectoftheindependentvariableonthede‐
pendent variablewithmore confidence.As such,both the statistical and the com‐
parativemethodcanbeseenasaninferiorsubstitutefortheexperimentalmethod,
which involves thecontrolledmanipulationof theobjectofanalysisunder labora‐
toryconditions,butwhichduetopracticalandethicalimpedimentsisnotavailable
inthesocialsciences.
The crucial difference between the statistical method and the comparative
method is the number of cases compared (Lijphart 1971: 684). The statistical
method,which isMill’s“methodofconcomitantvariations”,comparesmanycases.
Thisisalsoreferredtoas“variable‐oriented”research(Ragin1987),sincecasesare
notcompareddirectlytoeachother,butonlybroadpatternsofcovariationareas‐
sessed,makingitpossibletoinferavariable’saverage,neteffectinallcontexts.The
comparativemethod,ontheotherhand,comparesasmallnumberofcases.Itisdi‐
videdprimarilyintotwotypesofsystemdesign:the“mostsimilarsystemsdesign”
(MSSD) and the “most different systems design” (MDSD) (Przeworski and Teune
1970).WhileMSSD,whichisbasedonMill’s“methodofdifference”,comparescases
OLIVERHELLMANN
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thatareashomogeneousaspossibleexceptthevariablesunderanalysis,MDSD,or
Mill’s“methodofagreement”,servestoanalysecasesthat,ideally,donotshareany
featuresbutthevariablesthatarepartofthetheorytobetested.Thesetwodesigns
ofcomparisonarethusreferredtoas“case‐oriented”(Ragin1987),becausethere‐
searcher focuses on the similarities and differences among cases, rather than the
analyticalrelationshipbetweenvariables.
Large‐N comparisons generally suffer from two seriousweaknesses (cf. Land‐
man2000:25;MackieandMarsh1995:185).Firstofall,collectingdataforthelarge
numberofcasesnecessaryforasignificantstatisticalanalysiscanbedifficult,time‐
consuming and expensive. As the above paragraphs on data collection explained,
data on party organisations and their relevant environments is usually not easily
availablebutmustbegatheredthroughlaboriousprocessesofdocumentaryanaly‐
sisandeliteinterviewing.Assuch,analysingalargenumberofcasesseemsalmost
impossible. Second,byapplying concepts toabroader rangeof cases, global com‐
parisons often suffer from “conceptual stretching” (Sartori 1970), as themeaning
associatedwiththeoriginalconceptfailstofittherealityofthenewcases.Rather,in
cross‐cultural research,we should constantlykeepour conceptsopen for revision
byengagingin“acontinuousdialecticaltackingbetweenthemostlocaloflocalde‐
tailandthemostglobalofglobalstructure”(Geertz1983:69).Doingsoisnearim‐
possibleifconceptsusedinthetheoryofpartyorganisationdevelopedabove(such
aspartymembershiporclientelism)arenumericallycodedforstatisticalanalysis.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–119–
The problems associated with the statistical method suggest that we should
compareasmallernumberofcasesinstead.Regardingthequestionofwhattocom‐
pare, theanswer lies in the theoreticalassumptionsofour theoretical framework:
Since–byacknowledgingtheimportanceofagency–wedonotruleoutthepossi‐
bilityofdifferent typesofpartyorganisationemergingwithin thesamecontextat
thesametime,politicalpartiesshouldbechosenastheunitofanalysis,notcount‐
ries.However,thisisnotonlyalogicalconsequenceofourdialecticalunderstanding
of the relationship between structure and agency, but the comparison of sub‐
national units is in fact a useful tool to control for variation (Snyder2001).Thus,
MSSDbecomestheautomaticallyselectedresearchdesigntostudypoliticalparties
withinthesamepoliticalsystem,becauseallpartiescompetewithinthesameenvi‐
ronment. It followsfromthisthat–withallcontextualvariablesbeingequal–dif‐
ferenttypesofpartyorganisationcan,withgreatconfidence,beexplainedbyactors’
diverging electoral strategies and the distribution of power between these actors
withinthedifferentpoliticalparties.
Inordertoisolateenvironmentalfactorsthathaveaneffectonactors’choiceof
electoralstrategieswewillthenhavetocomparebetweencountries,therebyinject‐
ingcontextualvarianceintotheresearchdesign.However,applyingeitherMSSDor
MDSDinastrictsensedoesnotseempossibleinthissecondstep.Thisisbecauseit
wouldbe impossible toestablishunithomogeneity,which isabasicassumptionto
makecausal inferences (Kingetal.1994:91‐94).Putdifferently,while in the first
stepweassumedthatpoliticalpartiesareheterogeneouswithinthesamecontext,
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wewouldnowhavetoassumethat theyarehomogeneous.Asaresult,weshould
applythecomparativemethodinalessrigorousway,onlyusingitasaroughguide‐
linefortheconductofourinquiry.17Infact,asRaginpointsout,weneedtodistin‐
guish between formal characteristics of case‐oriented methods, as formulated by
Millandothers,andtheirapplication.Thatistosay,case‐orientedmethodsshould
notbeusedinarigidormechanicalmanner,but,instead,theyshouldonlybeused
tocarryonadialoguewiththeempiricalevidence,helpingustopinpoint“patterns
ofconstantassociation”(Ragin1987:42).
Forthatreason,toisolateenvironmentalfactorsthatconstrainpoliticalactorsin
developingelectoralstrategies,wewillapplyourframeworktodifferentcountries.
Wewillthereby–throughthecomparisonofthesecountries–establishpatternsof
constant association. Admittedly, our causal inferenceswill beweaker than those
producedbyarigorousapplicationofthecomparativemethod.However,byrepli‐
cating our findings over several countries our evidence will, first of all, be more
compellingthanifweusedthesinglecasestudymethod.Moreover,causalitycanbe
increased throughmethodsofwithincaseanalysis, suchaspatternmatching,pro‐
cess tracing and causal narrative (Mahoney2000b;Mahoney2003). In particular,
processtracingoffersastrongalternativetomakingcausalinferenceswhenitisnot
possibletodosothroughthemethodofcontrolledcomparison(GeorgeandBennett
2004:214).Broadlyspeaking, theprocess‐tracingmethodattempts to identify the
17Thiswouldalsohelpusavoidmoregeneralweaknessesofthecomparativemethod,suchasthedegreesoffreedomproblem,thecombinedcausesproblemandthedifferentcausesproblem.ForacritiqueoftheMSSDandtheMDSDseeRagin(1987),Lieberson(1992)andFaure(1994).
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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causal chain between an independent variable and the outcomeof the dependent
variable.Hence,ratherthanexaminingmultiple instancesofX1→Y(as in large‐N
statisticaldesigns),theresearchersexaminesasingleinstanceofX1→X2→X3→X4
→Y(Gerring2007:173).Inotherwords,itisthequalityoftheobservation,notthe
quantityofobservations,thatisrelevantinevaluatingthetruthclaimsofaprocess‐
tracingstudy.Iftheresearchercanconnectempiricalevidencetoaconvincinghis‐
toricalsequencethatlinkscauseandeffect,heisinagoodpositiontoassertthatthe
relationshipunderanalysisiscausal.
Caseselection
There iswidespread consensus among scholarsofdemocratic transitions thatpo‐
liticalpartiesplayasignificantroleintheconsolidationofdemocracy(forexample
Morlino1998;Pridham1990;Sandbrook1996).Unsurprisingly, then,asignificant
numberofcomparativestudieshavebeenproducedinrecentyearsthatstudythe
developmentofparties in thedifferent regions thatwerehitby the thirdwaveof
democratisationduringthepastthreedecades.Therearenumerousworksanalys‐
ingpoliticalpartiesinEasternEurope(forexampleKopecký1995;Kostelecký2002;
Lewis 2000), Southern Europe (for example Bosco and Morlino 2006; Diaman‐
dourosandGunther2001;IgnaziandYsmal1998),LatinAmerica(forexampleDix
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1992;Levistky2003;MainwaringandScully1995),andweevenfindcomparisons
ofpartiesacross regions (forexamplevanBiezen2003b).Astoundingly,however,
East Asia, which got caught by the thirdwave in themid‐1980s, has so far been
widelyignoredbypoliticalpartyresearch.18Asamatteroffact,mostoftheveryfew
analysesofEastAsianpartieshavenotbeenwrittenbydistinguishedexperts,but
rather by scholars specialising on single countries. The resulting reports tend to
overlookthemoretheoreticalandmethodologicaldebateswithinthegenerallitera‐
tureonpoliticalparties,insteadfocussingondescriptionandfailingtoapplygener‐
allyacceptedtypologiesorexistingtheories.Whenauthorsmovebeyondapurede‐
scription,explanationstendtoremainlargelycase‐specificwithaverylowlevelof
abstraction.Moreover, scholars do not engage in cross‐national comparisons, but
ratherlockthemselvesintheircountryofspecialisation.
Admittedly, different from the regions that have so far been in the analytical
focusofpoliticalpartyresearch,EastAsiaonlydescribesgeographicalborders,nota
commonculturalandhistoricalheritage. In fact, it is consistentlypointedout that
“Asia”isnomorethanaEuropeaninvention.Nevertheless,thisheterogeneityacross
EastAsiansocietieshasnotpreventedpoliticalscientistsfromtreatingEastAsiaas
asingleregionincomparativestudiesofdemocratisationanddemocraticconsolida‐
tion(seeforexampleCheng2003;Croissant2004;HsiehandNewman2002;Laot‐
hamatas1997).Inotherwords,thereisnoreasontodismissacomparisonofEast 18Thisgeographicaltermoftencausesconfusion.NortheastAsiaisusuallydefinedascomprisingofthefollowingcountries:thePeople’sRepublicofChina,thetwoKoreas,Japan,andTaiwan.SoutheastAsiaencompassesIndochina(Vietnam,Laos,Cambodia,Thailand,Myanmar,Malaysia,andSinga‐pore)aswellasIndonesia,thePhilippines,andEastTimor.TogetherthesetworegionsaretermedEastAsia.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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Asianpoliticalpartiesasnotfeasible.Rather,asystematicanalysisofpoliticalpar‐
tiesinthenewdemocraciesofEastAsiaislongoverdue.
TABLE5: DEMOCRACYINEASTASIA
CountryPoliticalrights
Civilliberties
Averagescore
StatusElectoral
democracy?
Cambodia 6 5 5.5 Notfree noChina 7 6 6.5 Notfree noEastTimor 3 4 3.5 Partlyfree yesIndonesia 2 3 2.5 Free yesJapan 1 2 1.5 Free yesLaos 7 6 6.5 Notfree noMalaysia 4 4 4.0 Partlyfree noMyanmar(Burma) 7 7 7.0 Notfree noNorthKorea 7 7 7.0 Notfree noPhilippines 3 3 3.5 Partlyfree yesSingapore 5 4 4.5 Partlyfree noSouthKorea 1 2 1.5 Free yesTaiwan 2 1 1.5 Free yesThailand 7 4 5.0 Partlyfree noVietnam 7 5 6.0 Notfree no
Notes:Politicalrightsandcivillibertiesratingsrangefrom1to7,with1representingthehighestand7thelowestleveloffreedom.Eachpairofpoliticalrightsandcivillibertiesratingsisaveragedtodetermineanoverallstatusof“free,”“partlyfree,”or“notfree.”Thosewhoseratingsaverage1.0to2.5areconsidered“free”,3.0to5.0“partlyfree”,and5.5to7.0“notfree”.Toqualifyasan“electoraldemocracy”astatemustsatisfythefollowing:(1)amultipartypoliticalsystem,(2)universaladultsuffrage,(3)regularlycontestedelectionsconductedinconditionsofballotsecrecyandintheabsenceofmassivefraud,and(4)publicaccessofmajorpoliticalpartiestotheelectoratethroughthemediaandopenpoliticalcampaigning.Source: FreedomHouse(2007)
TheMarcosregimeonthePhilippineswasthefirsttobewashedawaybythe“third
wave”ofdemocratisationinFebruary1986.Subsequently,democracywasalsoin‐
stalledinTaiwan(1986‐1992),SouthKorea(1987/88),Thailand(1992),Cambodia
(1993),Indonesia(1999)andmostrecentlyEastTimor(2002).However,thedemo‐
cratic system installed inCambodiaby theUnitedNationsonly lasted for a single
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nationalelection,whileThailand,too,revertedtomoreauthoritarianformsofgov‐
ernmentafteramilitarycoup inSeptember2006.Hence, in its2007report,Free‐
domHouse only lists six EastAsian countries as “electoral democracies”: Taiwan,
SouthKorea,Indonesia,thePhilippines,EastTimorandJapan(seeTable5).Thelat‐
ter two,however,willbeexcluded fromthisanalysis: Japanbecause ithasbeena
democracysincetheendoftheSecondWorldWarandisthereforenotcomparable
with“thirdwave”democracies,aspoliticalpartiesformedunderverydifferentcir‐
cumstances;EastTimorbecause ithasonlybeenan independentstatesince2002
andheldlegislativeelectionsonlyonce,inJune2007,meaningthatpartieshavenot
hadenoughtimeyettodevelopanorganisationalapparatus.Wewillthusstudypo‐
litical parties in South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia – in a time
framerangingfromthefirstfreeandfairelectionstoDecember2008.19
Forourcaseswewillonlychoosepoliticalpartiesthathavecompetedinthetwo
latestelectionsandhaveobtainedat least threepercentof thevotes in the latest
election.Choosingpartiesaccordingtotheirelectoralsuccessandtheiragedoesnot
constitute a selection bias – as selecting cases on the dependent variable is con‐
sideredhighlyproblematic(Geddes1990)–butitisratheranattempttokeepthe
numberofcasesmanageableandselectcaseswherepartyorganisationalchangeis
actuallypossible.Toexcludeirrelevantcaseswheretheoutcomehasnorealpossi‐
bilityofoccurringisanotherkeyguidelineforselectingcases(MahoneyandGoertz 19Inthe2008FreedomHousereport,thePhilippines’politicalrightsratingdeclinedfrom3to4asaresultofserious,high‐levelcorruptionallegations;thepardonofformerpresidentJosephEstrada;andaspikeinpoliticalkillingsintherun‐uptolegislativeelections.Thecountryisthereforecur‐rentlynotlistedasan“electoraldemocracy”anymore.However,thereisnoneedtoretrospectivelyexcludethePhilippinesfromouranalysis,asthisisonlyarecentdevelopment.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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2004) andwe should thus not include parties in the analysis that are simply too
youngtohaveexperiencedorganisationalchange.Applyingthesetwocriterialeaves
uswith17casessummarisedinTable6.
TABLE6: CASESELECTION
Country Politicalparties
SouthKorea GrandNationalParty(GNP,Hannaradang) UnitedDemocraticParty(UDP,TonghamMinjudang) KoreanDemocraticLabourParty(KDLP,MinjuNodongdang)
Taiwan NationalistParty(KMT,Kuomintang) DemocraticProgressiveParty(DPP,Minjindang)
Philippines LiberalParty(LP,PartidoLiberalngPilipinas) NacionalistaParty(NP)a StruggleofDemocraticFilipinos(LDP,LabanngDemokratikongPilipino) NationalistPeople’sCoalition(NPC) PartneroftheFreeFilipino(KAMPI,KabalikatngMalayangPilipino)a FilipinoLakas‐ChristianMuslimDemocrats(Lakas‐CMD)
Indonesia PartyofFunctionalGroups(Golkar,PartaiGolonganKarya) IndonesianDemocraticParty–Struggle(PDI‐P,PartaiDemokrasiIndonesiaPerjuangan)
NationalAwakeningParty(PKB,PartaiKebangkitanBangsa) UnitedDevelopmentParty(PPP,PartaiPersatuanPembangunan) ProsperousJusticeParty(PKS,PartaiKeadilanSejahtera)b NationalMandateParty(PAN,PartaiAmanatNasional)
Notes:aForthe2004elections,theNacionalistaPartyandKAMPIjoinedpresidentArroyo’sK‐4coalitionandthereforenoseparateelectionresultswerereportedforthesetwoparties.However,asbothpartiescom‐petedtheelectionstheystillfulfilourcriteriaforcaseselection.bThePKSparticipatedinthefirstfreeelectionsin1999underthenameJusticeParty,butthenhadtochangeitsnamepurelyforlegalreasons.
Overthenextfourchapterswewillapplyourtheoreticalframeworktoeachofthe
four countries listed above, in order to discuss the environmental context, actors’
strategic choices within this context and how electoral strategies translate into
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party organisation. Following these chapters, we will then compare our findings
acrossthecountriesinfinalchaptertoidentifypatternsofconstantassociation.
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–4–
SOUTHKOREA
Thepost‐authoritarianparty system in SouthKorea is dominatedbyhighly elitist
parties,which – similar to the classical cadre party – are characterised by almost
perfect overlapbetween theparty on the ground, the party central office and the
party inpublicoffice,making it verydifficult todistinguish the three faces.At the
sametime,theminorKoreanDemocraticLabourParty(KDLP,MinjuNodongdang)
features a strong party central office. However, although this constellation seems
verysimilartopartysystemsin19thcenturyEurope,itisveryunlikelythatKorean
partieswill followthesamepathofdevelopmentastheircounterparts inWestern
Europe.Rather,aswillbeshown,partyorganisationinSouthKoreaistheproductof
actors’strategicdecisionswithinastrategicallyselectivecontext.
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Theenvironmentalcontext
SouthKoreawasdrawnintoauthoritariangovernmentalcontrolintheearly1950s
whentheKoreanWarprovidedthepretexttodemolishthedemocraticsystemthat
theAmericanshadinstalledafterliberatingthepeninsulafrom35yearsofJapanese
colonialismin1945.However,regimecohesionwasnotverystrong,aselitefactions
frequentlyputschedagainsteachother,andshortdemocraticinterludesalternated
with longer periods of autocratic rule. The central pillars of the regimewere the
military,thebureaucracyand–asajuniorpartner–largebusinessconglomerates
(jaebol). Operatingwithin the legalistic frame of a pseudo‐democracy, the regime
tolerated opposition parties, but competition for political offices was subtly cur‐
tailed so the elites’ claim to powerwould not be threatened. The elites sought to
gainlegitimacyfortheirauthoritarianrulebyemphasisingthemilitarythreatposed
byNorthKoreaand–closelyrelated–theneedforeconomicdevelopment.
Inparticular, itshigheconomicefficiencyprovedtobeapowerfulsourceof le‐
gitimacy(seeTable7). Notonlydidtheeconomicstrategyofexport‐orientedind‐
ustrialisation lead to a general improvement of living standards, but profitswere
directlychannelledto individualcitizensthroughclientelisticnetworksconnecting
theregimewiththeelectorate.Theregimemobilisedthefinancialresourcesneces‐
saytonurturetheclientelisticexchangeofparticularisticmaterialgiftsagainstpo‐
liticalsupportthrough“quasi‐taxes”,whichlargebusinesses–particularlythejaebol
–wererequiredtopayforpreferentialtreatmentintheallocationofstatesubsidies,
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public loans, import licenses et cetera (Kang 2002). Payments were organised –
eitherbeforeelectionsasclassicalvote‐buyingorin‐betweenelectionsasirregular
gifts(forexampleforweddingsorfunerals)–throughtheextensivepartyapparatus
oftheregime’sDJP(DemocraticJusticeParty,Minjeongdang).
TABLE7: SOCIO‐ECONOMICDEVELOPMENTINSOUTHKOREA
GDPpercapita(USDollars)
GiniCoefficientDegreeof
urbanisation(inpercent)
Literacy(inpercent)
SouthKorea 4,467(1988)22,029(2005)
0.400(1988)0.316(2007)
74.4(1990)80.8(2005)
95.5(1990)99.0(2006)
Germany 29,461(2006) 0.283(2007) 75.2(2005) 99.0(2006)
UnitedKingdom 33,238(2005) 0.360(2007) 89.7(2005) 99.0(2005)
Source: UnitedNationsESCAP(undated);UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(undated);Hong(1996)
Interestingly,notonlytheregimemobilisedvotersthroughclientelismbuttheop‐
position, too, employed clientelistic linkage mechanisms to gain votes. However,
giventheirrelativelackofresources,oppositioncandidatescouldnotengageasac‐
tively in the distribution of clientelistic rewards as the regime party’s legislators
(Park1988:1057).20Asaresult,oppositionpoliticianswouldinadditioncampaign
onthedemandforpoliticaldemocratisation,whichiswhytheoppositiontendedto
enjoystrongsupportamongmoreaffluent,bettereducatedurbanvoters,whilethe
regimegainedthemajorityofvotesinruralareas–aphenomenonthatcametobe
20Theoppositiongeneratedtheresourcesnecessaryforaclientelisticstrategyofvotermobilisationthroughtheprivatewealthofitscandidates,privatedonationsandbysecuringpublicinfrastructureprojectsfortheirconstituencies.
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knownasyochonyado(villagesforthegovernment,citiesfortheopposition)(Kim
H.N.1989:487).Confirming the central assumptionofmodernisation theory, eco‐
nomic development had given rise to a new urban middle‐class, which was no
longerwillingtoacceptarestrictionofitsparticipatoryrights.21
Thepro‐democratic oppositionperformedbetter in cities, as the regime’spro‐
grammeforeconomicmodernisationwasprimarilybasedoncheaplabourandre‐
pressive employment laws, causing the income gap between the urban working
classandtherestofthepopulationtowidenaccordingly.In1980,whentheKorean
economy plunged into a deep recession, forcing the government to implement a
rigid adjustment and stabilisation programme, theworking class again felt them‐
selvestobethebigloserduetotheseneweconomicpolicies,and–withthesupport
of students and intellectuals – took its protest to streets (Croissant 1998: 176).22
Finally,itisimportanttomentionthatbytheearly1980s,theregime’sscenarioofa
permanentmilitarythreatfromNorthKoreahadlostmuchofitscredibility(Potter
1997:235).
Confronted with this apparent loss of legitimacy, the regime decided to hold
“nearly” freeand fairelections foranewNationalAssembly in1985, inwhich the
newly formed opposition party NewKorea Democratic Party (NKDP, SinhanMin
judang)undertheleadershipofKimDae‐jungandKimYoung‐samwonasurprising
29.3%ofthevotes.TheNKDPsubsequentlybaseditsstrategyontwoelements:ob‐ 21ForadetaileddescriptionoftheambiguousandcomplexroleofthemiddleclassintheSouthKoreandemocratisationprocessseeKoo(1991).22Themostviolentprotestwastheso‐called“5.18Uprising”insouth‐westernGwangjuwhen,afteramassrallyon15May1980,demonstratorstookcontrolofthecity.Theregimeansweredafewdayslaterwiththedeploymentofelitetroops,leavinghundredsdeadandthousandsinjured.
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structive opposition in parliament and – in alliancewith other pro‐reformmove‐
ments –mass public demonstrations (Cheng andKim 1994: 136). Eventually, the
increasing political pressure forced the regime to invite the opposition tomutual
talks on constitutional reforms. When these negotiations failed after only a few
months,theoppositioncampmobilisedlargepartsoftheurbanpopulation.Thisleft
the regimewith the choice ofwhether to return tomore violent repression or to
continue along the path of liberalisation. However, political pressure from the
United States, which in the late 1980s abandoned its policy of supporting anti‐
communistregimesevenagainstthewilloftheircitizens,plusSeoul’shostingofthe
1988OlympicGames–whichmovedSouthKoreaintothespotlightofinternational
attention–benefitedthesoft‐linerswithintheregime.Hence,inJune1987,there‐
gimeacceptedmostoftheopposition’sdemands,andresumedthenegotiationsover
constitutionalreform.
Thus,thetransformationofSouthKorea’smilitary‐bureaucraticautocracyintoa
politicalsystemwithfreeandfairelectionstookplacethroughaprocessofbargain‐
ingbetweentheregimeandthedemocraticopposition.Bythemid‐1980sbothsides
werelockedinanuneasystalematethatcouldonlybebrokenthroughanegotiated
compromise(Saxer2002:54‐61).Asaresultofthis,bothactorswereabletocon‐
tinue their clientelistic strategiesofvotermobilisation, aswillbedescribed in the
nextsection.
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Actorsandtheirstrategies
The1990shavebeendescribedbyobserversofKoreanpoliticsasthe“threeKims”
era, as electionsweredominatedby threepoliticianswith the same family name:
KimYoung‐sam,KimDae‐jung andKim Jong‐pil. The two largest parties inKorea
today are the final product of strategic games played by these highly charismatic
politicians:While theGrandNationalParty(GNP,Hannaradang) isstrongly linked
toearlierpartiesundertheleadershipofKimYoung‐sam(DLPandNKP),theUnited
DemocraticParty(UDP,TonghamMinjudang)isthelastlinkinalongchainofpar‐
ties that harboured politicians loyal to Kim Dae‐jung (PPD, DP, NCNP, MDP, Uri
Party,UNDP).KimJong‐pil’sparty,theULD,ontheotherhand,lostnearlyallsignifi‐
canceinthe2004NationalAssemblyelection,whenitonlywonfourparliamentary
seatsandevenKimJong‐pilhimself failedtosecureamandate.Asaresultof this,
threeof thenewly‐elected lawmakers left theparty to formthePeopleFirstParty
(PFP,GungminJungsimdang),whiletheonlyremainingassemblymandecidedtojoin
theGNPin2006.23Theonlyotherrelevantpartythatwasnotfoundedshortlybe‐
fore the 2008National Assembly election is the KoreanDemocratic Labour Party
(KDLP)–establishedin2000.
23In2008,thePFPwasthenabsorbedbythenewlyfoundedLibertyForwardPartyledbyLeeHoi‐chang,who,afterleavingtheGNP,hadrunasanindependentcandidateinthe2007presidentialelec‐tions,finishingthird.
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Theeraofthe“threeKims”
The strongest party to emerge out of the 1988 elections was the former regime
party,theDJP(DemocraticJusticeParty,Minjeongdang),whichwasnotsurprising,
giventhatthepro‐democracymovementhadsplitintwo.Alreadyduringtheconsti‐
tution talks,KimDae‐jungandKimYoung‐samsplit away from theNKDP to form
the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP, Tongil Minjudang). Only a few months
later,KimDae‐jung established theParty forPeace andDemocracy (PPD,Pyeong
mindang)inordertocompeteinthe1987presidentialelections.Yetanotheroppo‐
sitionpartywas foundedbyKimJong‐pil,whohadservedasprimeminister from
1971to1975–theNDRP(NewDemocraticRepublicanParty,Sinminjudang).
When, ina surprisingmove in1990,KimYoung‐sammergedhisRDPwith the
former regime party DJP to form the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP,Minjadang),
thisheraldedtheeraofthe“threeKims”.Atthesametime,themergerbetweenthe
two parties meant the end of the democracy‐authoritarianism cleavage. Instead,
coming fromdifferent regions, the threeKimsmercilessly overplayed the existing
rivalries between their home regions, thereby turning regional identities into the
most important factor to explain voting behaviour throughout the 1990s (Sonn
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2003).24Initially,thevoteinthesouth‐easternregionofYongnamwasdividedbe‐
tweenKimYoung‐samandRohTae‐woo,theleaderoftherulingDJP,whohadhis
familyrootsinthesameregion.However,whenbothpoliticiansmergedtheirpar‐
tiesin1990tobecometheDLP,theycreatedamonopolyofregionalrepresentation
by the “threeKims” throughwhicheachof theKimswasguaranteed the fullelec‐
toralsupportfromtheirrespectivehomeregion.Thisreflectsintheeffectivenumber
of political parties, which throughout the 1990s hovered around the three‐party
mark(seeTable8).
TABLE8: SOUTHKOREA–PARTYSYSTEMINDICATORS
ENEPa ENPPb Volatility
1988 3.87 3.34 ‐1992 2.96 2.37 95.151996 3.51 2.83 77.252000 2.81 2.30 80.802004 3.17 2.32 51.352008 4.36 2.92 55.60Average 3.45 2.68 72.03
Notes:aEffectivenumberofelectoralpartiesinelectionstotheNationalAssembly.After2004,whenasecondvotewasintroducedtoelectapartyontheclosedpartylist,thenumberiscalculatedontheshareofvotespartiesreceivedinthesingle‐memberconstituencies.bEffectivenumberofparliamentarypartiesintheNationalAssembly.Source: Author’sowncalculationsbasedonTable9.
24WhileKimYoung‐samisfromYongnam,locatedinthesoutheastoftheKoreanpeninsula,Kim
Dae‐junghashisfamilyrootsinthesouth‐westernregionofHonam.KimJong‐pil,finally,mobilisedmostofhisvotersintheChungchongregiontothenorthofHonam.AlthoughthesethreeregionsdoonlyrepresentapartoftheKoreanelectorate,anunknownnumberofvoterslivinginotherpartsofthecountry in their thirdor fourthgeneration tended tovoteaccording theregional rootsof theirregionalfamilybackground.
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Theconflictbetweenthesouth‐westernandsouth‐easternpartoftheKoreanpenin‐
sulaclearlyhas its roots in theunequal socio‐economicdevelopmentbetween the
regions(KimW.B.2003).25However,afterthedemocratictransition,theeconomic
aspectoftheregionalconflictlostmuchofitssignificance.Instead,regionalismbe‐
camemainlydrivenbytheregionaloriginofcandidates,asrecentresearchshows
that post‐authoritarian governments allocated state resources evenly to their re‐
spectivehomeregionandtheopposition’sregion(HoriuchiandLee2008).
WhilethecharismaofthethreeKimswasthusonestrategypartiesreliedonto
mobilise voters, clientelism was the other. Although Kim Dae‐jung would not be
electedintogovernmentuntil1997,hestillattractedasubstantialamountofcorpo‐
rate–mostlyundeclared–donations(ThorntonandKorvick2003:282).Asinthe
governingparty, thismoneywasthenchannelledtocandidatestobuildandmain‐
tainclientelisticlinkagestovoters.Typicalactivitiestostrengthentheloyaltywithin
theseclientelisticnetworksrangedfromofferingcondolencesatfunerals,tomaking
giftsatweddings,toplacingsupportersinjobs,to
intercedingwiththepoliceorcourts for favorabletreatmentand inthe
caseoflegislatorswhoarelawyers,pleadingbeforethecourtonbehalfof
constituents; helping to obtain business licenses, permits, or registra‐ 25SoutheasternYongnam,homeregionofformermilitarydictatorsParkChung‐hee(1961‐1979)andChunDoo‐hwan(1980‐1988),wasthepreferredtargetforlargeindustrialandinfrastructuralpro‐jectsduringtheperiodofstate‐ledeconomicmodernisationinthe1960sand1970s.SouthwesternHonam,ontheotherhand,remainedlargelyexcludedfromtheKoreaneconomicmiracle,keepingitslargelyagriculturallybasedeconomy.Moreover,duringtheauthoritarianregimetheeconomicandpoliticalelitewasmainlyrecruitedfromYongnam,whileHonam–comparedtoitspopulationsize–sufferedfromseriousunderrepresentation.
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tions through administrative agencies; helping to get promotions and
transfersinpublicorprivateagencies;providingassistanceinobtaining
bankloansorinsecuringrelieffundsandawiderangeofcompensations
foraccidents,planningandzoningprojects,shoddyworkbyconstruction
companies, industrial pollution, and so on; making financial donations
and contributions, such as those to assist constituents with living ex‐
penses,children'sschoolexpenses,andlocalfestivals;andhelpingtore‐
solveconstituents'taxdisputeswiththerevenueoffice.
(Park1988:1059)
Asaresultoftheircharismaandtheircontrolovereffectiveclientelisticnetworks,
the three Kims – Kim Young‐sam, Kim Dae‐jung and Kim Jong‐pil –more or less
sharedthetotalnationalvotebetweenthemthroughoutthe1990sandweretheall
dominating players in the post‐autocratic party system. Beforewithdrawing from
thepolitical stage, the threeKimsaltogether established tenpolitical parties:Kim
Young‐samthree,KimDae‐jungfourandKimJong‐pilthree.Theysawtheirparties
merelyasfunctionalvehiclestogainaccesstopower,creating,dissolving,merging
andrenamingthemasitsuitedtheirpersonalinterests(KimB.‐K.2000:60;Heoand
Stockton2005:685).This strategicgame the threeKimsplayedwith theirparties
translatedintoextremelyhighelectoralvolatilityfiguresinthe1990s(seeTable8).
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TABLE9: SOUTHKOREA–RESULTSFORNATIONALASSEMBLYELECTIONS
1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008Party
Va Sb V S V S V S V S V S
DJP 34.0 41.8 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐RDP 23.8 19.7 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐PPD 19.3 23.4 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐NDRP 15.6 11.7 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐DP(1) 1.3 0.3 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐DLP ‐ ‐ 38.5 49.8 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐DP(2) ‐ ‐ 29.2 32.4 11.2 5.0 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐UPP ‐ ‐ 17.4 10.4 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐NPRP ‐ ‐ 1.8 0.3 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐PP ‐ ‐ 1.5 0.0 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐NKP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 34.5 46.5 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐NCNP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 25.3 26.4 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ULD ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 16.2 16.7 9.8 6.2 2.8 1.6 ‐ ‐NPUPP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.9 0.0 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐GNP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 39.0 48.7 35.8 41.1 37.4 51.2MDP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 35.9 42.1 7.1 2.1 ‐ ‐DPP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 3.7 0.7 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐Uri ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 38.3 53.1 ‐ ‐KDLP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 13.0 0.8 5.6 1.7UDP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 25.1 27.1ProPark ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 13.1 4.7LFP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 6.8 6.0CKP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 3.8 1.0Other 6.1 3.0 11.6 7.0 11.8 5.4 11.7 2.2 3.0 1.2 8.2 8.3
Notes:aShareofvotes(inpercent)bShareofseats(inpercent)Source: Croissant(2001);PsephosElectionArchive(undated)
BelowtheKims,factionleaderscompetedforthepartypresident‘sfavour,without
everacquiringenoughpowertoseriouslychallengetheKims.Factionsdidnotde‐
velophighlevelsofinstitutionalisation,andalldecisionsweremadebythefaction
leader. Factional coherence among the clearly identifiable members was mainly
basedonpatron‐clientelismratherthansharedideologicalinterests(Yun1994).In
otherwords,partieswere largeclientelisticnetworkswith theparty leaderas the
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highestpatron,who–duetothefactthehecouldbesureoftheexclusiveelectoral
supportfromhisrespectivehomeregion–couldtakeallsignificantorganisational
decisionswithouttheinterferenceofotheractorswithintheparty.
Theenvironmentalcontext inKoreaduringthe1990sfavouredtheclientelistic
strategies of the three Kims for several reasons. First of all, as to be expected in
“third wave” democracies, the conditions for the electoral mobilisation of social
classesbasedon ideologywerebad,meaning thatpoliticianscampaigningonpro‐
grammaticappealsdidnotposeaseriouselectoralchallenge.Mostimportantly,the
virulentanti‐communismoftheoutgoingautocraticregimehadpreventedsocialist
orsocial‐democraticparties fromforming(KangW.T.1998),while thebanon the
formationofindependenttradeunions–whichstayedinplaceuntil2002–meant
thatworkerswerenotorganisedoutsidethestatecorporatiststructures.Thismade
itverydifficulttomobilisethesegroups.Instead,thethreeKimswereabletoturn
the regional conflict between the south‐eastern and south‐westernparts ofKorea
intothemostimportantelectoralcleavage.Secondly,boththeoldregimeelitesand
the pro‐democratic opposition successfully transferred the clientelistic networks
theyhadbeenusingintheregime’spseudo‐electionsintothenewdemocraticarena.
Althoughtheprocessofexport‐ledindustrialisationhadresultedinadramaticim‐
provement of living standards for the general population, patron‐client relation‐
ships had become embeddedwithin social life and thus continued to play an im‐
portantroleinthevoters’electoraldecision.Andthirdly,independentfromtheen‐
vironmentalcontext,thethreeKimsradiatednaturalcharisma,therebyactingasa
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magnetforvotesanddonations.
Thepost‐Kimspartysystem
Poweronlybecamemoreevenly spreadamongotherpoliticianswithin themajor
politicalpartiesoncetheKimsleftthepoliticalarena.WhenKimYoung‐sam’sterm
as president came to an end in 1997, his influencewithinhis ownparty declined
steeply,ashewouldnolongerbeabletodistributestateresourcesandpatronageto
his supporters in return for loyalty. Instead, influential factions grouped around
otherpresidentialhopefuls,withLeeHoi‐chang,whohadservedasprimeminister
underKimYoung‐sam,eventuallyemergingastheprimusinterparesandtheparty’s
presidentialcandidatein1997.26
Similarly, as Kim Dae‐jung’s presidency was reaching the constitutional five‐
yearlimit,hebeganlosingauthoritywithintheMDP.Finally,afterheresignedfrom
thepartychairmanship in2001(to focushisenergiesonhis lastmonthsaspresi‐
dent), a number of corruption scandals and a disastrous defeat in the 2001 by‐
election, a number of young reform‐minded politicians emerged as a new force
within theMDP. Themost significant figureswere Chun Jung‐bae, Shin Ki‐nam –
26Theauthorowesmuchoftheinformationaboutthedevelopmentofinter‐factionalconflictwithinKoreanpartiescontainedinthisandthefollowingparagraphstopersonalcommunicationwithJin‐MinChung(16Apriland23April2008)andWookKim(17April2008).
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bothhumanrights lawyers–andChungDong‐young, a formerTV‐anchorman.All
threepoliticianshadbeennominatedbyKimDae‐jungascandidates for the1996
National Assembly election to give the party a younger image. The faction led by
these politicians (commonly known in Korea as Chun‐Shin‐Chung) rallied behind
RohMoo‐hyunwhowasnominatedastheMDP’scandidateforthe2002presiden‐
tialelectionandthendefeatedLeeHoi‐changoftheGNPbyasmallmargin.
After thisdefeat,reform‐mindedpoliticiansalsogainedmorepowerwithinthe
GNP–albeittoamuchlesserextentthanintheMDP–eventuallyforcingLeeHoi‐
changtostepdownaspartypresident.ChoeByung‐yul,againaratherconservative
politician, was elected as his successor in 2003. However, the progressive camp
more or less restored the balance of power only a few days later when reform‐
oriented Hong Sa‐duk became the party’s floor leader in the National Assembly.
Amidcontinuingdemandsforpartyreform,Choe’spresidencyonlylastedforafew
months. InMarch2004,hewasreplacedbyParkGeun‐hye.Being thedaughterof
ex‐dictatorParkChung‐hee,Parkenjoyedstrongsupportamongconservativeforces
within the GNP, while her corruption‐free image also pleased more progressive
thinkers.Shewasthereforeapartypresidentacceptabletobothsides.
Meanwhile,intheMDP,themovementaroundChun‐Shin‐Chungwasverydisap‐
pointedbythemerelymarginalsupportthepartyshowedfornewlyelectedpresi‐
dentRohMoo‐hyunandthus,inSeptember2003,splitawayfromtheMDPtoform
theYeollinUridang(generallyabbreviatedtoUriParty,“ourparty”). Inadditionto
42 of the MDP’s 103 lawmakers, this newly established party also attracted five
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legislatorsoftheGNP.Moreover,itabsorbedtheReformPartyundertheleadership
ofYuSi‐minthathademergedoutofRohSaMo–themasssocialmovementuniting
supportersofRohMoo‐hyuninthe2002election.TheYuSi‐mingroupsoonestab‐
lisheditselfasthedominantfactionintheUriParty:Asthemostferventsupporters
ofRohtheyprofitedenormouslyfromRoh’shighpopularityratingsduringtheearly
stagesofhispresidency–morethananyothergroupingwithintheUriParty.
In the GNP, factions again began to form around presidential hopefuls. While
ParkGeun‐hye–withherelectionasthepartychairmanin2004–hadestablished
herselfasoneofthem,LeeMyung‐bak,themayorofSeoul,slowlyascendedasher
maincompetitor.Thetwopoliticiansrepresentverydifferentgroupingswithinthe
GNP:Parkhasthesupportoftheolderguardofpoliticianswithconstituenciesinthe
GNP’s traditional stronghold in the southeast of theKoreanpeninsula; Lee enjoys
thebackingofmoreprogressiveassemblymenfromSeoulandtheprovincesaround
Seoul. LeeMyung‐bak seems to havewon the power struggle for now, as hewas
nominated as the GNP’s presidential candidate for the 2007. However, as several
Parksupporters,whohadlefttheGNPshortlyaftertofoundthePro‐ParkAlliance,
wereabletowinparliamentaryseatsinthe2008NationalAssemblyelections,Park
is seen bymany as the actualwinner of the latest elections,whichwill definitely
strengthenherpositionwithintheGNP.
TheUriPartyalsowitnessedamajorreshuffleofinternalpowerbeforethe2007
presidentialelections.AfterpresidentRoh’spopularitydroppeddramatically–lead‐
ingtoaseriesofhumiliatingdefeatsfortheUriPartyinthe2005by‐elections–the
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Yu Si‐min faction’s power within the party decreased simultaneously. Finally, as
politicianswantedtodistancethemselvesfromRohasfaraspossibleinordernotto
jeopardisetheirchancesinthe2007and2008elections,80outof152lawmakersof
the Uri Party left the party to establish the UNDP in August 2007. Factions soon
groupedaroundthosepoliticianswithgoodchancesofwinningtheparty’snomina‐
tionasthepresidentialcandidate:theaforementionedChungDong‐young,SonHak‐
gyu (the former governor of Gyeonggi‐dowho had joined the UNDPwith a small
group of progressive politicians from the GNP) and Lee Hae‐chan (former prime
minister under RohMoo‐hyun). Chungwon the party’s nomination, butwas then
defeatedinalandslidebyLeeMyung‐bak.Beforethe2008NationalAssemblyelec‐
tion, theUNDPwasmergedwith theDP– thesuccessorof theMDP– to formthe
UDP,withSonHak‐gyuelectedasitschairman.
Inshort,afterdepartureofthethreeKims,conflictarosewithinbothofthepar‐
tiesbetweenoldpartyelitesandyoungerpoliticians.As theseyoungerpoliticians
werenotembeddedintotheexistingclientelisticstructurestheyhadtodevelopdif‐
ferentstrategiesinordertobeelectedintooffice.Theydidsobyreintroducingeco‐
nomicincentivesintotheregionalcleavageandextendingregionalismtootherparts
oftheKoreanpeninsula.Infact,accordingtoHyeokYongKwon,oneoftheleading
experts on electoral behaviour in Korea, economic voting and the distribution of
pork have become the most important factors to explain voting in national elec‐
tions.27OneexampleforthisrecenttrendisLeeMyung‐bak’spromiseinthe2007
27PersonalcommunicationwithHyeokYongKwon,7April2008.
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presidential election to use public funds to turn Seoul’s greenbelt into amassive
housingprogramme, therebyproviding investment opportunities for voters in his
homeconstituency.28Putinmoreabstractterms,becausetheseyoungerpoliticians
lackprivateresourcestoestablishpatron‐clientrelationships,theyareusingpublic
goodstomobilisevoters.Theydosonotinalegalgreyzonebutthroughthelawful
distributionofporkbarrelprogrammes.Thisrepresentsanotabledeparture from
earlierclientelisticstrategiesandthusconfirmsoneofthecentraltenetsofourana‐
lyticalframework,thatsocialactorsareabletodevelopalternativestrategieswithin
thesamecontext.
However,whilethesestrategiesdonotdiffercategoricallyfromthestrategically
selectedoutcome,astheyarestillclientelisticinnature,realdisparitiesbecomeob‐
vious when looking into the Korean Democratic Labour Party (KDLP), which is
populatedwith actors campaigning onprogrammatic electoral appeals. TheKDLP
emergedoutof thepro‐democraticstudentmovement,whichhadalwaysbeendi‐
vided into twomain streams: theNationalLiberationand thePoliticalDemocracy
factions.TheNationalLiberation’smainpoliticalaimwasthereunificationofKorea
and – strongly influencedbyNorthKorea’s Juche ideology – the realisationof au‐
tonomy of the Korean nation fromUS imperialism,while the Political Democracy
factionwerefollowersoftraditionalMarxist‐Leninist ideasandthusputmoreem‐
phasisontheliberationoftheworker,asopposedtotheliberationofthenation.Ac‐
cordingly, both streams also differed in their strategies: Whereas the National
28TheauthorisverymuchindebtedtoEun‐JeungLeeforpointingoutthisexample(personalcom‐munication,15April2008).
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Liberationstressedparticipationintheregularpoliticalprocessandsoughttobuild
a“unitedfront”ofallKoreansthatwouldalsoincludethemiddleclass,thePolitical
Democracygrouptookaclass‐basedapproachthatonlyaimedatimprovingthepo‐
sitionoftheworkingclassthroughorganisingstrikesanddemonstrations.However,
withthefoundingoftheKoreanConfederationofTradeUnions(KCTU)in1995,the
PoliticalDemocracymovement slowly adopted amore participatory strategy, and
soonjoinedtheNationalLiberation’seffortstoestablishanindependentprogress‐
ive party that could successfully competewith the existing parties created by the
threeKims.
Finally,cooperationbetweenthetwogroupsendedinthefoundingoftheKDLP
inJanuary2000.WhiletheKDLPdefinesitsconstituencyasincludingfarmers,small
businessentrepreneurs, theurbanpoor,women, thedisabled,youth,studentsand
concernedintellectuals,itisprimarilyapartythatseekstorepresentKorea’swork‐
ing class (Gray 2008: 119). The party’s electoral breakthrough came in the 2002
localelections,inwhichitreceived8.3%ofthevotes.Then,in2004,tenKDLPcan‐
didates were elected into the National Assembly, making the KDLP the country’s
thirdlargestparty.However,analysesofthe2004electionsshowthatthepartywas
notverysuccessful ingaining thesupportof its coreconstituency,butmostvotes
seems to have been “protest votes”, which suggests that mobilising the Korean
workingclassisstillaverydifficulttask(LeeandLim2006:328).Infact,theKDLP
wasunabletorepeatitssuccessinthe2008elections,whenitonlywonfivelegisla‐
tiveseats.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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AstheNationalLiberationhadbeenthedrivingforcebehindthefoundingofthe
KDLP itwas initially thedominant factionwithin theparty.However, thecontinu‐
ationofKimDae‐jung’ssunshinepolicythroughRohMoo‐hyun–finallyleadingto
aneight‐pointpeaceagreementbetweenSouthandNorthKoreainOctober2007–
madeitdifficultfortheNationalLiberationtojustifytheKDLP’scontinuingstrong
focusontherelationswiththecommunistregimeinthenorth.Hence,thePolitical
Democracyfactionwasstrengthened,andforthefirsttimeintheparty’shistoryfac‐
tionalfissuresbecamevisibletothepublic,whentheparty’snominationprocessfor
the2007presidentialelectionturnedintoaracebetweenKwonYoung‐ghilfromthe
NationalLiberation factionandShimSang‐jeong fromthePoliticalDemocracy fac‐
tion.WhenKwonwonthenomination,severalmembersofthePoliticalDemocracy
faction,includingShim,lefttheKDLPtofoundtheNewProgressiveParty(NPP).
Tosumup,thepost‐autocraticcontextinSouthKoreaclearlyfavoursclientelistic
over programmatic electoral strategies. Both old regime elites and the pro‐
democratic opposition were able tomaintain their clientelistic networks through
thedemocratic transition, and– although the socio‐economic conditions thatpro‐
videdthebreedinggroundforthesenetworkshavelargelydisappeared–thedistri‐
bution of clientelistic rewards still plays an important role when accounting for
votingbehaviourinKorea.Inrecentyears,youngerpoliticianshaveemergedwithin
themajorparties,challengingtheoldguardsandtheirclientelisticnetworks.Lack‐
ing the resources to maintain similar networks, these younger politicians have
introducedeconomicincentivesintotheregionalcleavagethroughtheallocationof
OLIVERHELLMANN
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publicgoodstotheirownconstituencies.However,whilethis iscertainlyaninter‐
estingcasetostudystrategiccalculations,themoststrikingevidenceforactorsbe‐
ingabletodevelopalternativestrategieswithinthesamecontextistobefoundin
theKDLP,wherefactionsarecampaigningonnarrowlyfocusedprogrammaticplat‐
forms–somethingweshouldtheoreticallynotexpectinyoungdemocraciesofthe
“thirdwave”.
Partyorganisation
Basedon thedifferentelectoralstrategiespoliticalactorspursue inSouthKorea–
clientelistic andprogrammatic –we should expect a similar diversity of party or‐
ganisations. In fact, as will be seen in the following sections, the parties of Kim
Young‐samandKimDae‐jungservedmerelyasformalcloakstocovertheirexten‐
sivepatron‐clientnetworks,makingitverydifficulttodistinguishbetweenthethree
faces of party organisation. This is still true for the twomajor parties today, but
younger politicians have successfully pushed for a formal regulation of candidate
selection,makingtheprocesslessdependentonmoneyandotherresources.Incon‐
trast,intheKDLP,wherepoliticiansfollowprogrammaticstrategiesforvotermobi‐
lisation, the three faces of party organisation are clearly distinguishable,with the
partycentralofficeenjoyingthemostpowerfulposition.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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Membership
Politicalparties inSouthKoreaportraythemselvesas largemembershiporganisa‐
tionsbasedondensenetworksoflocalbranchesthatcoverthewholecountry.For
instance, in his analysis of party institutionalisation in neo‐democratic Korea,
Köllner (2003:7) cites a longerpassage fromaGNPbrochure, inwhich theparty
triestoconveytheimpressionthatitsmembersareintegratedintoacomplexorga‐
nizational hierarchy,which gives everymember the possibility of participating in
theinternaldecision‐makingoftheparty:
TheGrandNationalParty(HannaraParty)consistsof theCentralParty
(PartyHq),16City&ProvincialChaptersand253districtpartieseachof
whichhasasecretariat.[…]Thecity&provincialconventionconsistsof
150to300representatives.Itperformssuchfunctionsaselectingrepre‐
sentatives for theNationalconvention,operating thecommitteesof the
CentralCommittee,choosingthechairmenofcity&provincialchapters,
deliberatingonmattersrecommendedbythedistrictparty,andsubmit‐
ting recommendations of every kind to Central Party. […] The district
conventionconsistsof100to150representatives.Itperformssuchfunc‐
tionsaschoosingthechairmenofdistrictchapters,electingrepresenta‐
tives for the National Convention, and submitting recommendations of
everykindtoCentralParty.
OLIVERHELLMANN
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However, inreality, the localbranchesofpoliticalparties inKoreaareusually just
the personal politicalmachine of the assemblyman or candidate in the respective
constituency. The formal local party chapter only serves as a cloak for the politi‐
cian’spersonalnetworkof supporters at thegrassroots level.Thesenetworksare
thetruesourceofpoliticalidentityforpartymembers.Peopledonotjointhelocal
partyorganisationbecause they share theparty’s ideologicalpositionsorbecause
they feel theybelong toadistinctivesocialgrouping. Instead, “thedistrictparty is
based[…]onpersonalandparticularisticbondsbetweenapoliticalbossandfollow‐
ers”(Park1988:1051).Hence,partymembersareusuallyrecruitedamongfriends
and relatives of the local political boss, or they join because they are otherwise
sociallyconnectedtotheboss,suchasthroughschooltiesorregionalprovenance.
Moreover,partymembershipnetworksareheldtogetherbytheboss’provisionof
particularisticbenefitsandfavoursinreturnforelectoralsupport.
Thestatusofthelocalpartybranchasanautonomousmembershiporganisation
fromthepartycentralatthenationallevelisfurtherreinforcedbythefactthatthe
membership register is kept by the district chapter chairprivately, not by the re‐
gionalbranchofficially.29Thepoliticalbossthushasexclusiveaccesstoallmember‐
shipdata,whichmeansthatanyeffectivecommunicationbetweenthepartyhead‐
quarters and the individualmemberwill be dependent on the boss’ cooperation.
Thepowerfulpositionoftheassemblymanorcandidatewasfurtherstrengthenedin
2004,whenanamendmenttothePartyLawActabolishedtherequirementforpar‐
29PersonalcommunicationwithYong‐HoKim,12April2008.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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ties to be based on a dense network of local party chapters.30 Although themain
purposeofthisamendmentwastolowertheexpensesforpoliticalpartiesinorder
toreducetheneedtoacceptillegaldonations,localbosseshavefoundwaystomain‐
tain the institutionalisationof their personal networkswithoutparty funding. For
instance,workthatwaspreviouslydonebyfull‐timepartystaff, isnowoftendele‐
gatedtofriendsandfamilyortoemployeesintheboss’ownprivatecompany.31In
otherwords, thepersonalnetworksofsupportersofassemblymenandcandidates
arenowestablishedastheparties’grassrootsorganisation,aspoliticalpartiesonly
haveofficialrepresentationattheprovinciallevel.
Outsidetheformalpartyorganisationeverylegislatormaintainsotherinformal
vote‐gatheringmachinesthatdonotfunctionundertheofficialbanneroftheparty.
These so‐called sajojik can take different forms. Some common examples include
friendshipsocieties,clangroups,alumnigroups,hikingclubs,andotherrecreation
groups.Usually, the assemblymandoesnotdirectly influence theoperationof the
informalgroupsaffiliatedwithhimorher,andwillonlyactastheirsponsorandad‐
visor.Inthecaseoflong‐servingparliamentarians,thesajojikarecharacterizedbya
certaindegreeof stability,but theyhaveneverachieved the same levelof institu‐
tionalisationasthepersonalvote‐gatheringmachinesfoundinneighbouringJapan
30Upuntil2004Articles25and26ofthePartyLawActrequiredpoliticalpartiestohavedistrictof‐ficesinatleastone‐tenthoftheelectoraldistrictsandfiveofthesevenmainmetropolitanareas.Dis‐trictbrancheshadtoconsistofatleast30members.31OneexamplegivenbyHeikeHermanns(personalcommunicationwiththeauthor,16April2008)isthecaseofaGNPcandidateinthe2008NationalAssemblyelection,whoturnedherEnglishlan‐guageschoolintothevirtuallocalpartybranch,withmembersofstaffhavingtohelpoutwiththeorganisationofthecampaignandotheradministrativework.Insuchcasesmoneyisusuallypaidunderthetable,oremployeesarecompensatedwithagiftorafreemeal.
OLIVERHELLMANN
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(koenkai) (Köllner 2003: 8).32 Regarding membership, it must be noted that al‐
thoughtherecanbehighpersonaloverlapbetweentheformalpartybranchandthe
sajojik,membersofthelatterdonotautomaticallybecomeformalpartymembers.
A slightly different type of support organisation to the sajojik emerged in the
run‐uptothe2002presidentialelection,whenfollowersofRohMoo‐hyunusedthe
internet to forma fanclub,knownasRohSaMo (literally,gatheringof thepeople
wholoveRoh).Thisvirtualsupportgroupattractedalotofattention,mostlyfrom
youngervoters,who–disillusionedwiththeoldstyleofpolitics–cametogetheron
thewebtodebatepolicyissuesandmobilisevotesforRoh–ahumanrightslawyer
andformanyarealalternativetotheoldguardofpoliticians.Asthisonlinenetwork
ofsupportersprovedtobeanimportantpoolofvotersbehindRoh’selectoralsuc‐
cess(WalkerandKang2004:843),similarwebsitesmushroomedbeforethe2004
NationalAssembly.Thistime,however,fanwebsiteswerecreatedontheinitiative
ofthecandidates–notbythesupportersthemselves–whotriedtoattractvisitors
withonlinegames,personalblogs,videosandothercontents.Sincethen,however,
thevirtualnetworksofsupportershavedramaticallydeclinedinimportance,since
the new Election Law revised in 2004 stipulates that internet portals should not
post any content,which supports or opposes a political party or a candidate 180
daysbeforetheelection(Article93). In fact, in the2007presidentialelectionsthe
internethardlyplayedanyroleatall(WooandLee2008).
32ForadetailedanalysisoftheJapanesekoenkaiseeBouissou(1999).
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–151–
Althoughthereisthusaformalconceptofpartymembershipthatdistinguishes
partymembers fromordinarycitizens, it seemsabitmisleading to speakofparty
membership, as voters join parties through their personal loyalty to the local as‐
semblymanorcandidate.Moreover,thecriteriathatdefinepartymembersarevery
limited.PartiesusuallyrefertothePoliticalPartyAct,whichstatesthatanyperson
olderthan19years(20yearsupuntil2005)mayjoinaparty–withtheexceptionof
publicofficials,whichincludedmostteachers,and,upuntil2000,labour‐unionfunc‐
tionaries. In addition, membership fees are relatively low and generally not en‐
forced.Forexample,therulesofKimYoung‐sam’sNKP(1995‐1997)prescribedthat
partymembers should pay at least 1,000KRW (about 0.50GBP) (KimY.H. 1998:
145). The successor party of the NKP, the GNP, charges 2,000 KRW per month,
whichmembersare, again,notobliged topay33,while theUDPdoesnot specify a
fixedsum,butmemberscanmakeavoluntarycontribution34.Inotherwords,join‐
ingeitherofthesepartiesonlyrequiresfillinginamembershipform.Whatismore,
cases have been reported when people were even signed up as party members
withouttheirownknowledge.35Thiscommonlyhappenswhentheheadofavolun‐
tarysocialorganisationhasstrongpersonalconnectionstoalocalbossandsimply
transfersthemembersofhisorherorganisationintothepartymembershipregis‐
ter.
33PersonalcommunicationwiththeGNP,17April2008.34PersonalcommunicationwiththeUDP,24April2008.35PersonalcommunicationwithEun‐JeungLee,15April2008.
OLIVERHELLMANN
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TheonlymajorpoliticalpartyinSouthKoreathatattacheshigherrequirements
topartymembership is theKDLP.36 Inordertobegranted fullpartymembership,
individuals must pay a monthly fee that ranges from 5,000 KRW (2.50 GBP) for
thosewithout a regular income (i.e. students, housewives, senior or disabled citi‐
zens)to10,000KRW(5GBP)foreverybodyelse.Moreover,inadditiontosigninga
declaration, saying that they will adhere to the party statutes, aspiringmembers
needtoattendanintroductorylecturetofamiliarisethemwiththeparty’spolicies
anddecision‐makingstructures.IncontrasttotheothermajorpartiesinKorea,the
KDLP keeps amembership register at the party central office, with two full‐time
membersofstaff responsiblesolely for themaintenanceof theregister.TheKDLP
alsodistinguishesitselffromitscompetitorsinthatitsmembersareorganisedinto
150genuinepartybranchesacrossthecountry,eachwithlocalorganisationatthe
neighbourhoodorworkplacelevel.UnlikeinotherKoreanparties,thelocalchapters
areorganisedbythepartyasanorganisation,notbyalocalbossashisorherper‐
sonalmachine.
In2004, thenewly foundedUriParty experimentedwith the introductionof a
membershipmodelsimilartotheoneofKDLP,tryingtoenforceregularduesamong
itsmembers.Initially,themonthlymembershipfeewassetto8,000KRW(4GBP),
butover thenextmonths itwascontinuously reduced to6,000and then to2,000
KRW,beforefinallydroppingtheobligationofaregularfinancialcontributioncom‐
pletely.ThestatutesofUriPartyhadoriginallyalsostipulatedthatpartymembers
36TheinformationinthisparagraphwasobtainedthroughpersonalcommunicationwiththeKDLP,15April2008.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–153–
shouldattendat leastonepartymeetingamonth,butaswiththemembershipfee
thisrequirementwassoonabandoned.37Clearly,thesemeasurestomaketheparty
membership less inclusive reflect the strategic calculationsof thedominantYuSi‐
mingroupwithintheUriParty,whichcontainedlargenumbersofferventRohMoo‐
hyunsupporters.
TheKDLPalsodiffersfromthetwoolderpartiesregardingmembershipactivity.
InboththeUDPandtheGNP–andintheirrespectiveparentparties–membersare
usually dormant andwill only become active shortly before elections, when they
helpwiththeelectoralcampaign.OnecommonsightinthestreetsofmajorKorean
citiesduringthe2008electoralcampaign,forinstance,wasgroupsofsupportersof
thelocalcandidate–alldressedintheparty’scolours–performingchoreographed
dancestotheparty’sofficialpopsong.38Notsurprisinglythen,partymembersofthe
GNPandUDPreceivenosignificant training fromtheparty.TheNKP,KimYoung‐
sam’sparty,usedtomaintainaCentralTrainingCentreatthecentral leveltopro‐
videpoliticaleducationforpartyofficialsandactivists,but,asYong‐hoKim(1998:
148) points out, the effectiveness of these training programmeswas highly ques‐
tionable.
In theKDLP, in contrast,members are active throughout the year. The party’s
localchaptersusuallyholdtwomeetingsperweek:onepoliticalmeeting, inwhich
currenteventsandpartyrelatedmattersarediscussed,and–inthestyleofsocialist
37PersonalcommunicationwithYong‐hoKim,12April2008.38Usually,thecampaignsongsarelightupbeatpoptunes–sometimesbasedonthemelodyoffa‐mouscharthits–whichintheirlyricswillconstantlyrepeattheparty’snameandparty’snumberonthevotingballotaswellasthekeywordsoftheparty’spledges.
OLIVERHELLMANN
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partiesinearly20thcenturyEurope–onesocialmeeting,wherememberscometo‐
getherforactivitiessuchashikingtours.Moreover,althoughthereisnoinstitution‐
alisedtrainingprogrammeforpartymembersassuch,localchapterscanrequestad
hoctrainingsessionsfromthepartycentral,which,accordingtotheparty’sownre‐
port,happensveryfrequently.39
Afterthiscross‐partyanalysisofpartymembershipithasbecomeclearthatthe
traditionalpartiesontheonesideandtheKDLPontheothersideareaimingtore‐
cruitverydifferenttypesofmembers.Whatismore,inthecaseoftheGNPandthe
UDP–andthepartiesofKimYoung‐samandKimDae‐jungrespectively–itisprob‐
ablyevenbetternottospeakofpartymembership,asindividualsprimarilyjointhe
personal network of the local assemblyman or candidate. In fact, neither of these
twopartiesmakesanycentrallycoordinatedeffort torecruitnewmembers.How‐
ever, at the same time, both parties do not hold off presenting largemembership
figures.Whileinthemid‐1990sKimYoung‐sam’sNKPclaimedtohaveaboutthree
millionmembers (KimY.H.1998:146), in2008 its successor, theGNP, stillmain‐
tains to have a membership of 1,070,000.40 Similarly, the UDP purports to have
roughlyonemillionmembers.41Thisroughlytranslatestoamembership/electorate
ratioof2.6%foreachofthemajorparties.However,itiswidelyknownthatKorean
parties vastly inflate theirmembership figureswhen prompted by political scien‐
39ThisparagraphisbasedoninformationprovidedbytheKDLPthroughpersonalcommunicationwiththeauthoron15April2008.40PersonalcommunicationwiththeGNP,17April2008.41PersonalcommunicationwiththeUDP,24April2008.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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tists in order to create the impression that they have strong support in society
(Köllner2002:11).
In the Korean context, in contrast, political parties do not even seem to value
membersasstatistic,sincetheirclientelisticstrategiesdonotrequirepartiestogive
theillusionthattheyarestronglyrootedinsociety.Forthecandidates,ontheother
hand,membersarealoyalpoolofvoters.Whiletheyalsoprovidefreelabourduring
election campaigns, this contribution is far from vital for electoral success.More‐
over, votes can also bemobilised outside the formal party structure through the
numerous sajojik affiliated with each candidate. In other words, members within
bothtraditionalpartieshavevirtuallynopower,asthereisverylittletodistinguish
them from regular voters. Correspondingly, members do not enjoy significantly
moreparticipatoryrightsintheparties’internaldecision‐makingprocessesthanthe
averagecitizen,aswillbeshowninthenextchapter.
Ontheotherhand,intheKDLP,thepartyonthegroundenjoyssomeconsider‐
ablepower.Firstofall,thefactthatmemberspayregularlyfeesmakesthemavalu‐
ablefinancialassettotheparty.AccordingtotheKDLP’sowndeclaration,in2007,
about50per centof theparty’s total incomecame frommembershippayments.42
This again stands in stark contrast to thebudget structureof the twomore tradi‐
tional parties, which in 2003 obtained only 16 per cent (GNP) and 12 per cent
(MDP)oftheirtotalincomefrommembershipdues(NationalElectionCommission
undated).However,itmustbenotedinmanycases,theseduesarepaidbythepo‐
42PersonalcommunicationwiththeKDLP,15April2008.
OLIVERHELLMANN
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liticalbossofthemember’slocalbranch,notbythemember.Secondly,thefactthat
theKDLPholds regularmeetingsat the local level andorganisespolitical training
sessionsforitsmembers,showsthatthepartyperceivesitsmembershipasapoolof
candidates for public election. This – in addition to their financial contribution –
givesKDLPmembersyetanothersourceofpowerwithintheparty.
As a result, themembership figurespublishedby theKDLP, as opposed to the
blown‐up figuresof theothermajorparties, actuallyhold significance.Asof2008
thepartyclaimedtohaveabout80,000members,ofwhichroughly50,000paytheir
duesregularly.43However,onlythelattergroupareregardedasfullmemberswho
aregivenvotingrightsintheparty’sdecision‐makingprocesses,whichthusclearly
distinguishes themfromtheordinaryvoteroutsidetheparty(seenextsection for
more details). The figure seems reliable, and is supported by the literature (Gray
2008: 119). In terms of membership strength the 50,000 members translate to
0.13%ofthetotalelectorate–or5.1%oftheparty’selectoratein2008.Particularly
theM/EratioisrelativelylowwhencomparedtotheaverageM/Eintheestablished
democraciesofWesternEurope(seeMairandvanBiezen2001:9),butintheSouth
Koreancontextofalarminglyhighlevelsofpoliticalapathythismustbeinterpreted
in a different light, particularly if we remind ourselves that the KDLP is the only
partythatchargesmembershipfees.44
43PersonalcommunicationwiththeKDLP,15April2008.44OneindicatorforpoliticalapathyinSouthKoreaisthedeclininglevelofvoterturnout.Inthe2008NationalAssemblyelectionsturnouthitarecord‐low46percent,down14.6percentagepointsfromthe2004electionsand11.2%fromtheelectionsin2000.ForananalysisofrecentpublicopinionsurveysonKoreans’viewsondemocracyandpoliticsseeShin,ParkandJang(2005).
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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Tosumup,traditionally,thepartyonthegroundinKoreanpartiesishardlyre‐
cognisable. Members are merely passive subjects in the personal network of the
localassemblymanorcandidate,andtheyhardlydifferfromtheaveragevoterout‐
sidetheparty,sincemembershipobligationsandrightsarenegligible.Theonlyex‐
ceptiontothisgeneralpatternistheKDLP–foundedin2000–whichtosomeex‐
tent tries to emulate the grassroots organisation of the classical socialist party in
early20thcenturyEurope.BecauseintheKDLPpartymembershipisattachedtoa
numberofdemandingcriteria,members–intheirroleasfinancialsupportersand
potentialcandidates–carrysomesignificantweight.
Candidateselection
Whilethemembershipstructureofpoliticalparties–exceptforthenewlyfounded
KDLP–hasremainedthesamesincetheendoftheauthoritarianregime,therehas
beensomesignificantchangeinthewaystherelevantpartiesselecttheircandidates
forpublicelectionsatthenationallevel.Fundamentally,thedevelopmentofcandi‐
dateselectionprocedurescanbedividedintoa“threeKims”phaseandapost‐“three
Kims” phase. Although Article 31 of the old Party Law Act demanded that “the
nominationofpublicpostcandidatesbypartiesmustbemadeinademocraticman‐
ner”,theselectionofcandidateshasonlyrecentlybecomemoreinclusive.Formore
OLIVERHELLMANN
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thanadecadeafter the first and freeelections in1987decision‐making in all rel‐
evantpartiesofSouthKoreahadbeenhighlycentralised.Allcontroloverthenomi‐
nationofelectoralcandidatesrestedwiththepartyleader(KimY.H.1998:151),and
it isprobablynotanexaggerationtosay that “theyranthepartiesas if theywere
feudallords”(Im2004:189).
Athoroughdescriptionofcandidateselectionduringthe“threeKims”eracanbe
found inK.S.Kim’s(1997)casestudyof the1996NationalAssemblyelection.The
usualpractice inKoreanpartiesthenwastoselectadistrictpartychair,who–al‐
most automatically – became the party’s candidate of that district in the coming
election.Inordertonominatethelocalpartychairs,bothKimYoung‐sam’sNKPand
KimDae‐jung’sNCNPestablishedakindofscreeningcommittee.Thesecommittees,
composedofhigh‐rankingpartyofficials,reviewedbothincumbentsandnewlyap‐
plyingcandidates,andsubmittedtheirrecommendationstothepartypresident.The
president thenmade the final decision on whom to nominate. In the case of the
NCNP,partyleaderKimDae‐jungannouncedthathewouldnotalterthescreening
committee’sselectionofdistrictchairs,but itwasamatterofcommonknowledge
thathisintentionswerecarriedoutbycloseaidesinthecommittee.
In other words, the selection of candidates was perfectly monopolised by the
partyleader.Infact,nominationforaNationalAssemblymandatecouldbebought
fromtheparty leader inreturn foradonation(Chon2000:72).Besidescorporate
donations,thispracticewasthemoststablefinancialresourceforpartiesduringthe
“threeKims”era–particularlyforoppositionparties,astheselackedthepowerto
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–159–
influencegovernmentpolicies.Thepricevariedaccording to theprospectsof suc‐
cess.Thehigheronewantedtoberankedonthepartylist–usedinadditiontosin‐
gle‐member plurality in Korea’s parallel electoral system – themore onewas ex‐
pectedtodonatetotheparty.
Using the process of candidate selection as an indicator for the distribution of
powerwithinpoliticalpartiesduringthe“threeKims”era,wecanfollowThornton
andKorvick(2003:292)andofferthefollowingsummary:
Thishighlycentralized leadershipstylehascontributedto low levelsof
internal party democracy. Party members are dependent on the party
leaderforpoliticaladvancement,andoppositionorcriticismoftheparty
leadershipistantamounttopoliticalsuicide.Loyaltytothepartyleader
isoftenrewardedwith“safe”electoraldistricts.
The processes of candidate selection in Korean parties have only become more
democraticsince the late1990s.The firstparty toorganise itsnominationsystem
according to more abstract regulations was the NKP. When Kim Young‐sam an‐
nouncedhisretirementfrompoliticsaftertheendofhispresidentialtermin1997,
thepartyhadtoappointanewcandidatefortheupcomingelections.Thenewlyim‐
plementedrulesgovernedthatthepresidentialcandidatewastobeelectedbythe
delegates in theNKP’snational convention.Moreover, the ratio of ex‐officioposts
versuselecteddelegatesintheconventionwasshiftedfrom40:60to15:85.Inorder
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to register a bid for candidacy, the recommendationof at least 50delegates from
threeregionswasrequired(LeeH.C.2002).Overall,theseregulationsmarkedahis‐
toricalmilestone,asitwasthefirsttimesincethebeginningofthedemocratictran‐
sitioninSouthKoreathatapresidentialcandidatewasselectedthroughcompetition
amongmultipleaspirants.Ontheotherhand,theselectionofcandidatesforparlia‐
mentaryelectionsremainedhighlycentralisedinaspecialcommitteeofpartylead‐
ers. Candidateswere evaluated by criteria such as public visibility, loyalty to the
party, connectionswith the top leader, and likelihoodof victory (ParkC.W. 2000;
seealsoKöllnerandFrank1999:96).
TheselectionofcandidatesbecamemuchmoreinclusivewhenKimDae‐jungleft
thepoliticalarenafouryearslater.Tonominateacandidateforthe2002presiden‐
tialelections,histhenparty,theMDP,implementedasystemthatcombinedaclosed
andanopenprimary.Votingfortheopenprimarytookplaceinseveralcities,and
voteswerethenaveragedwiththeresultsofavoteamongpartymembers.Shortly
after,theGNP,thesuccessorpartyoftheNKP,adoptedthesamesystemtoselectits
presidentialcandidate.
However, in order to fully understand themeaning of these seemingly demo‐
craticreforms, it isnecessarytotakeintoconsiderationthemembershipstructure
ofKoreanparties.Aswasexplainedintheprevioussection,partymembersarepri‐
marilypassivesubjectsatthe lowerendsofa localboss’patron‐clientnetwork. In
return for particularistic services, members promise the boss electoral support.
Whilewehavesofaronlydiscussedhowtheseclientelisticpracticesaffectelections
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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outsidetheparty,itiscommonpracticethatthebosswillalsodemandhisorhercli‐
ents’votesinsidetheparty.Hence,inthecaseofaclosedprimary,forinstance,the
bosswill instructhisorhermemberstovoteforthecandidateendorsedbyhisor
herfaction,or–ifheorshestandsforelection–forhim‐orherself(LeeH.C.2002).
Similarly, votes inanopenprimary caneffectivelybemobilised through theboss’
sajojik.Inotherwords,openinguptheselectionofthepresidentialcandidatetothe
widerpartymembershipandgeneralelectorate,didnotstrengthenthepartyonthe
ground,butitsimplydistributedthepowerthathadoriginallybeenmonopolisedin
thehandsofthepartyleaderamongalargergroupofpoliticalbosses.
In the KDLP, in contrast,members enjoy genuine voting rights, which are not
underminedbyinformaldependenciesonlocalbosses.Moreover,itsproceduresof
candidateselectionagainunderlinethevaluethatthepartyattachestomembers,as
tonominatethepresidentialcandidateforthe2002electiontheKDLPheldaclosed
primary,withoutextendingvotingrightstothecommoncitizen.Hence,membersof
theKDLPnot only differ fromnon‐members in their obligations, but also in their
rights. The party on the ground in the KDLP is thereforemuch stronger than the
grassrootsmembers in the traditional parties,who only carry out voting instruc‐
tionsgivenbytheirrespectivepatron.
Thesameappliesforthe2004NationalAssemblyelections,forwhichthethree
traditionalparties–theGNP,theUriParty,andthedwindlingMDP–organisedthe
selectionofcandidates inverysimilarwaysto2002,and,again,basednomination
on the combined resultof a closedandanopenprimary,wherebybothoutcomes
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wereweightedequally.However,tobeabletoparticipateintheprimary,candidates
needed the endorsement of their party’s “independent” screening commission.
Thesecommissionswereappointedbythepartyleadership,andconsistedofparty
officialsandpopularpersonalitiesofKoreansociety(suchasclerics,professorsor
writers).Moreover,thepartyleadershipreserveditselftherighttomakeso‐called
“strategic”selections.Thatistosay,theleadershipcouldnominatecandidateswith‐
outtheneedofaprimary,iftheyfeltthatthiswasnecessarytosecureelectoralvic‐
tory.And, in fact, the leadersofthethreepartiesmadeextensiveuseofthatright:
TheGNPonlyheld15primariesforatotalof228nominations(6.6%),theUriParty
86inatotalof229districts(37.6%),andtheMDP73outof217(33.6%)(Kimand
Kim2005).Inotherwords,theselectionofcandidateswas–toaveryhighdegree–
stillcontrolledbythepartyleadership.
The only exceptionwas again the KDLP, which held a closed primary in each
constituency tonominate thecandidates for theSMPrace inKorea’sparallelelec‐
toralsystem.Thecompositionofthepartylistwasdecidedbytheparty’sexecutive
committee, but it then needed to be approved by the vote of the whole party
membership.Moreover,indrawingupthepartylist,theleadershipisboundbyspe‐
cificrulesintheparty’sconstitution,suchastherequirementthatthefirstcandidate
onthelistmustbeadisabledperson.45
For the 2007presidential election the two traditional partieswent away from
the50‐50formulaandadoptedmuchmorecomplicatedrules.Particularlythesys‐
45PersonalcommunicationwiththeKDLP,15April2008.
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teminstitutionalisedbytheGNPseemedapatchworkofdifferentmethodsandse‐
lectorates.Whiletheoverallselectoratesizewas231,652(representing0.5%ofthe
totalelectorate),voteswerenotcountedequally.20percentofthevotescamefrom
“representativepartymembers”.Thisgroupconsistedof4,811memberswhowere
holding apublic office eitheron thenational, provincial or local level, and41,386
regularpartymemberswhowereappointedbytheseofficeholders.Another30per
centofthevotecamefrom“otherpartymembers”(69,496),whosevotewasagain
splitbetweenmemberswhohadpaidaregularmembershipfeeof2,000KRWforat
least 18 months, and all other members. Moreover, the party conducted phone
interviewswithrandomlyselectedvotersoutsidetheparty,whichaccountedfor30
percentofthetotalvote.Asthis“citizencommittee”wassupposedtoembodythe
averageKoreanelectorate,thiswasdoneuntilenoughrepresentativevotesfromall
agegroupsandbothgendershadbeencollected.Finally, inordertofillthelast20
percentoftheselectorate,thepartycommissionedthreeindependentsocial‐survey
organisationstoask5,490randomlychosencitizensfortheircandidatepreferences.
46
TheUNDP–successoroftheUriParty–alsochangeditsproceduretoselectits
presidential candidate, albeit less drastically than the GNP. A two‐round process
wasadopted,inwhichthefirstroundservedtofindthefivetop‐runnersthatwould
thenbeallowedtoparticipateinthesecondround.Theselectorateinthefirstround
consistedof randomly selectedvoters throughanopinionpoll (50per centof the
46PersonalcommunicationwiththeGNP,17April2008.
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totalvote)and10,000randomlyselectedpartymembers(another50percent).In
thesecondroundanopenprimarywasheld,thatcounted90percenttowardsthe
finalresult.Inordertoparticipateintheprimary,voterscouldvoteinoneofeight
multi‐provincialprimariesortheycouldalsocasttheirvotebysendingatextmes‐
sage from theirmobilephone.47The remaining10per centof the final vote came
fromapublicopinionpollconductedacrossthecountry.48
TheKDLP,again,didnot invitecommoncitizenstoparticipatein itsprocessto
nominate the presidential candidate for 2007, but, similarly to the UNDP, a two‐
roundsystemwasadopted.Thenewrulesstipulatedthatasecondroundofvoting
wouldbeheldifinthefirstroundnocandidatewonanabsolutemajorityofvotes,
whileonlyallowingthetwotoprunnerstoparticipateinthesecondround.Inboth
roundsthesizeoftheselectoratewas50,117,equallingthenumbermembersregu‐
larlypayingthemembershipfee.Memberscouldexercisetheirvoteeitherinoneof
227votingstationsacrossthecountry,oronlineontheparty’swebsite.49
While theKDLPkept itsclosedprimarysystemtonominatecandidates for the
2008NationalAssemblyelection,thetraditionalpartiesagainrevisedtheirproced‐
ures by abolishing the possibility of holding primaries at the district level. The
nominationof candidates thusbecame the exclusivedomainof the “independent”
screeningcommittees.InboththeGNPandtheUDP–thesuccessoroftheUNDP–
thiscommitteewasnominatedbytherespectiveparty’sexecutivecommittee.Inthe 47Beforebeingabletoparticipateinthemobile‐phonevotevotershadtoregisterontheparty’sweb‐site.Personaldetailsneededforregistrationwerekepttoaminimum:name,residentregistrationnumber,addressandphonenumber.48PersonalcommunicationwiththeUDP,24April2008.49PersonalcommunicationwiththeKDLP,15April2008.
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caseoftheGNP,thecommitteehadelevenmembers–sixfromoutsidethepartyand
fivepartymembers.Amongthesixoutsiderswereuniversityprofessors,leadersof
NGOs and a former public prosecutor,while of the five insiders twowere assem‐
blymenandthreepartypoliticianswithoutpublicoffice.50Similarly,theUDPnomi‐
natedsixmembersfromoutsidetheparty–twouniversityprofessors,a lawyer,a
medicaldoctor,amuseumdirectorandapoet–andfourassemblymenfromwithin
theparty.51
It thus seems that with the introduction of the screening committees the two
traditionalpartieshaverevertedtotheun‐democraticstyleofthe“threeKims”era.
However,thereformsmustbeseeninthelightofinter‐factionalconflictwithinthe
parties.Astheoldguardswithinthepartystillcontrolledthevastmajorityofparty
members,anyeffortstodemocratisetheprocedurehadtoopenthedecision‐making
process tonon‐membersoutside theparty.However,evenoutside theparty long‐
establishedpoliticianshaveacompetitiveadvantage,sincetheypotentiallycontrol
largesharesof theelectorate throughtheirsajojik. Inotherwords,youngerpoliti‐
cians needed to find other ways to ensure a fair competition, which is why they
pushed for the introductionof independent screening committees. These commit‐
teesrefused tonominatecandidateswhohadbeen foundguiltyof corruptionand
50PersonalcommunicationwiththeGNP,17April2008.51PersonalcommunicationwiththeUDP,24April2008.
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otherillegalactivities.52Thisparticularlyaffectedtheoldguards,who–inorderto
fueltheirclientelisticnetworkswithresources–aremuchmorelikelytoengagein
corrupt activities than younger politicians. The committees seemed to have been
quiteindependentintheirdecisionsanditnowseemsmoredifficult, ifnotimpos‐
sible,tobuyanominationfromoneoftwomajorparties.53
Tosumup,thissectionsupportstheconclusionformulatedaftertheearlierdis‐
cussionofthemembershipstructureofKoreanparties:Thepartyonthegroundin
thetwotraditionalpartiesisvirtuallypowerless.Whileduringthe“threeKims”era
candidateselectionwasdecidedonlybythepartyleader,theformallymoredemo‐
craticproceduresinstitutionalisedthereafterdidnotsucceedincuttingthroughthe
informal patron‐client networks that connect the party leaders to the grassroots
membership.Asaresult,youngerpoliticianshavepushedveryhardtomovecandi‐
dateselectionoutsidethepoliticalparty–eitherbyconductingpublicopinionpolls
orgiving thedecision‐makingpower to independent screeningcommittees. In the
KDLP, on theotherhand, candidate selection is organised according to effectively
democratic rules. However, different to itsmembership structure, the KDLP does
notfollowtheclassicalmass‐partymodel,whichisusuallyassociatedwithahierar‐
52Forinstance,prominentfiguresthatwereeliminatedbytheUDP’sscreeningcommitteeincludedformerpresidentialchiefofstaffParkJi‐won,KimHong‐up–KimDae‐jung'ssecondson–andLeeYong‐hee,afour‐termlawmaker.Parkwasconvictedoftaking100millionKRW(50,000GBP)inbribesfromtwolocalconglomerates,whileKimHong‐upwasfoundguiltyofreceivingabout2.5bil‐lionKRW(1.2millionGBP)fromseveralcompaniesinJuly2002.LeeYong‐heereceivedasuspendedjailtermfortakingbribes.53TheonlyallegedcaseofaboughtNationalAssemblyseatinthe2008electionconcernedtheProPro‐ParkGeun‐hyeAlliance–asplinterpartyfromtheGNP–whichplacedpubliclyunknownYangJung‐ryeasthenumberonecandidateonitspartylist–afterhermotherhaddonated1.55billionKRW(about782,000GBP)totheparty.However,thepartyclaimsthatitonlyborrowedthemoneytocoverelectoralcampaigncosts.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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chicalsystemofdelegation,butrathermorecontemporarymodelsofpartyorgani‐
sationandtheprincipleof“onemember,onevote”.Thisweakensthepartyonthe
ground,asmembersareatomisedandwillthushavedifficultiescoordinatingaseri‐
ouschallengetotheothertwofaces.However, inordertodeterminewhichof the
organisationalfaceswithineachoftheKoreanpartiesshouldberegardedasdomi‐
nant,letusturntothenextsection.
Distributionofresourcesanddecision‐makingpositions
Whendiscussing the distribution of internal resources inKoreanpolitical parties,
wecanonceagainobservesignificantdifferencesbetweenthepartiesof thethree
Kims,ontheonehand,andtheirsuccessorpartiesontheother. Duringthe“three
Kims” era, all politically relevant resourceswere channelled through thehandsof
the respective party leader. Given that the three Kims shared almost the total
national vote among them, aspiring politicianswere practically forced to join the
partyofoneoftheKims.Establishingafourthpartyorstandingasanindependent
candidate would have been futile, since the regional electoral strongholds of the
threeKimswereimpossibletobreak.Moreover,thethreeKimsdidnotonlyattract
themajorityofvotes,butatthesametimeactedasa“magnet”forsubstantialfinan‐
cialdonations.Similarlytovoters,whowouldnotwastetheirvoteonafourthparty,
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businesseswouldnot invest inaparty thatcouldnotbeexpected towin.Particu‐
larlytherulingpartywasthusapopularchoiceforcorporatedonations,whichwere
oftenpaidas“quasi‐taxes”–principallybythelargeconglomerates,thejaebol(Kang
2002;seealsoParkB.S.1995).
Asdonationsweregivendirectlytothepartyleader,thisledtotheemergenceof
a hierarchical exchange ofmoney and loyalty through a system of patronage em‐
beddedwithinthepoliticalparties.Moneywashandeddowntothefactionleaders
fortheirpoliticalsupport,whowouldtheninjectthemoneyintotheirownclientel‐
isticnetworksuntilitreachedthegrassrootsmembers.Thishighdegreeofcontrol
thethreeKimsexertedoverboththecollectionanddistributionofpartyfundsmade
assemblymenandcandidateshighlydependentontheirrespectivepartyleader.Ex‐
pressed in thewordsof a civic group leader cited inThorntonandKovick (2003:
293), “money is thechannel throughwhichpartybosseskeepcandidatessubordi‐
nate”.
However,notonly assemblymenand candidatesdependedon theparty leader
fortheirpoliticalsurvival,butthewholepartyasanorganisation.Thisexplainsthe
short lifespanofKoreanpoliticalparties throughout the1990s,sincepartiesonly
existedatthemercyoftheirleader,andweredissolved,mergedorrenamedaccord‐
ingtotheleader’sowninterest.Incasetheleaderchosetoleavetheparty,theparty
wouldsimplydie,asithadnovalueinitself.AlthoughthepartiesofthethreeKims
werehighlybureaucratised, thepartybureaucracywouldusually follow theparty
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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leaderintohisnewpartyorceasetoexistwiththenewone.54Thisshowsthatthe
party centralwas best understood as the “property” of the party boss, solely em‐
ployedtoperformorganisationalandadministrativetasks.
Asaresultofthisdependencyonthepartyleader,thethreeKimsalsomonopo‐
lised all decision‐making responsibilities. In the parliamentary party, the unques‐
tionedauthorityoftheleaderwasfurtherstrengthenedbythepracticeofnominat‐
ing a large number of fresh candidates who, when and if elected, were placed
aroundacoreofveryexperiencedparliamentarians.Theseexperiencedlawmakers
conducted thework in committees and theparty’s caucus according to theguide‐
lines of the party leader. While more experienced parliamentarians were often
boundtothepartyleaderbydecadeslongpoliticalloyalty,thenewlyelecteddepu‐
tieswere normally inexperienced, did not have their own political networks, and
dependedverymuchonthesupportofthepartypatronwhenitcametotheirpoliti‐
calcareer(Croissant2002).Finally–asanindicatorofthepartyleader’sdecision‐
makingauthorityandafactorthatfurtherreinforcedhisauthority–thefloorleader
wasnotusuallychosenbytheAssemblymembersofthepartybutappointedbythe
partypresident.
ThedependencyonindividualpartyleadersdecreasedwhenthethreeKimsleft
politics.Moreover,stricterpoliticalfinancinglawswerecrafted,whichmeantthatit
becamemoredifficultforindividualpoliticianstocollectlargecorporatedonations.
54Forinstance,thesecretariatofKimYoung‐sam’sNKPwasalargeorganisationwiththree‐tierof‐ficesonageographicalbasis(thecentraloffice,theprovince/cityofficesandtheelectoraldistrictoffices),employingabout1,200full‐timestaff.KimDae‐jung’sNCNP,whichwasinoppositionthen,stillhad300partyemployeesonitspayroll(KimY.H.1998:150).
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Already in1999,presidentKimDae‐jung launchedanational anti‐corruptionpro‐
gramme,whichtightenedtheregulationsondonationsandcontributions,imposing
ceilingsontheamounts individualsandcorporatebodiescouldgiveto thecentral
party organisation or a local branch.Moreover, the newPolitical FundAct estab‐
lished an annual government subsidy forpolitical parties calculated at the rate of
800KRW(0.40GBP)foreachvotecastinthemostrecentNationalAssemblyelec‐
tion.However,givenboththehighrunningexpensesofKoreanpartiesandtheem‐
barrassingcorruptionscandalsurroundingKimDae‐jung’sownsonin2000,theef‐
fectiveness andwholeheartedness of these reformsmust be seriously questioned
(Ferdinand2003:65).
Amore serious attempt to reform political financing laws wasmade in 2004.
Firstofall,alowerlimitforfinancialcontributionswasset,asthemaximumamount
moneyeachassemblymanisallowedtocollecteachyeardecreasedbyhalf– from
threebillionKRW(150,000GBP) tooneandahalfbillionKRW–while themaxi‐
mumamounteachvotercandonateayearwasloweredto20millionKRW(10,000
GBP),whichisonlyonesixthofthepreviouslimit.Secondly,thenewlawsregulate
unidentifiablemoney:Themaximumamountforanonymousdonations,perperson
and per donation, is now 100,000 KRW (50 GBP) – lowered by one tenth – and
donations larger than 500,000KRW (250GBP)must nowbe transferred through
checkorcreditcard.Thenewpoliticalfundinglawswerepassedthroughtheinitia‐
tiveofyoungerpoliticiansacrossdifferentparties.Theydidthiswiththesupportof
civilsocietyorganisations,whichhadbeenblackballingcorruptpoliticianssincethe
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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late 1990s, thereby putting public pressure on those legislatorswho opposed re‐
formingthepoliticalfinancelaws(seeHorowitzandKim2002).
However,althoughformalpoliticalfundinglawshavebecomemoreeffective,the
partybureaucracyremainspowerlessasanorganisationalelement.Tostartwith,an
amendmenttothePoliticalPartyActin2002stipulatesthatpartiesareonlyallowed
tohave150salariedemployeesatthecentralpartylevel,meaningthattheparties
had to considerably slim down their bureaucratic apparatus.Moreover, the party
centralofficeenjoysnorepresentationinanyoftheparties’decision‐makingbodies.
ThemembersofboththeGNP’sandUDP’sexecutivecommitteeareallelected,and
therearenodesignatedex‐officiopostswithin thesebodies.55Similarly,no repre‐
sentativeofthepartybureaucracyhasvotingrightsintheparties’NationalAssem‐
blycaucuses,butthesearecomprisedofassemblymenonly,whowillalsoelecttheir
floorleaderwithoutinterferencefromoutside.Finally,inbothparties–andincon‐
trasttothetypicalWesternEuropeanmodel–thegeneralsecretaryhasinthepast
alwaysbeenaparliamentarian,appointedbythepartychairman(inthecaseofthe
GNP)ortheexecutivecommittee(UDP).56
Thepartybureaucracydoesnothaveanypowertodemandparticipationinthe
parties’decisionmaking,becausethepartyinpublicofficeislargelyself‐sufficient.
Firstofall,aswasdiscussedearlier,assemblymenhavetheirownnetworksofsup‐
porters and do not have to rely on the party central office to communicate with 55TheexecutivecommitteeoftheGNPconsistsofninemembers,allofwhomneedtobeapprovedbythepartycongress.The10membersoftheUDP’sexecutivecommittee,ontheotherhand,areelectedbyallpartymembers.56TheinformationinthisparagraphwasobtainedthroughpersonalcommunicationwiththeGNP(17April2008)andtheUDP(24April2008)respectively.
OLIVERHELLMANN
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grassrootsmembers. Secondly, assemblymen are financially independent, as their
respective party’s contribution to their electoral campaign budget isminimal, but
themoneycomesalmostexclusivelyfromdonationsthecandidatecollectshim‐or
herself.Finally,parliamentariansareprovidedwithadministrativeassistantsbythe
NationalAssembly,anddonotdependonstaffallocatedbythepartycentraloffice.
In theKDLP, in stark contrast, theparty central office ismuchmorepowerful.
Firstofall,theparty’sconstitutiondeclaresthatthepartycentralofficemustberep‐
resented in all decision‐making bodies. Accordingly, the supreme committee, the
party’shighestexecutivebody,iscomposedofthepartychairman,theleaderofthe
parliamentaryparty,thegeneralsecretary,thechairpersonofthepolicycommittee
andsevenotherelectedmembers.Thegeneralsecretary,who–incontrasttoother
Koreanparties– isusuallyapartybureaucrat,alsoparticipates in themeetingsof
theparty’scaucusintheNationalAssembly.Moreover,KDLPparliamentariansare
notonlyobligedtoforwardalldonationstheycollecttothepartycentraloffice,but,
inaddition,theymusthandovermuchoftheirassemblymansalarysotheydonot
earnmorethantheaverageKoreanworker.57
Tosumup,duringthethreeKimseraallpoliticallyrelevantresourcesweremo‐
nopolisedbythepartyleader.SinceKimYoung‐samandKimDae‐jungleftpolitics,
resources in theirrespectiveparties(andtheirsuccessorparties)havebeenmore
evenlydistributedamonga largernumberofpoliticians,withaparticularconcen‐
trationintheNationalAssembly.However,itisdoubtfulwhetherwecanthuscon‐
57PersonalcommunicationwiththeKDLP,15April2008.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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clude that theparty inpublicoffice is thedominantorganisational face in this re‐
gard.Firstofall,significantresourcesarealsoheldbypoliticalbosseswhodonot
occupyapublicoffice.Secondly,itisnotthepartyinpublicofficeassuchthatcon‐
trolstheresources,butrathereachindividualpoliticiancontrolshisorherownre‐
sources.Incontrast,intheKDLPpoliticalresourcesaremainlylocatedintheparty
centraloffice,which,consequently, isalsoempoweredtoparticipate in theparty’s
decision‐makingprocess.
Summary
Theenvironmental context inpost‐autocraticSouthKoreaclearly favoursclientel‐
isticoverprogrammaticelectoralstrategies:Firstofall,similartoothernewerde‐
mocraciesofthe“thirdwave”,theworkingclassisdifficulttomobiliseforelectoral
meansbecauseofthevirulentanti‐communismandtherepressiveanti‐unionlaws
that accompanied the process of industrialisation under the authoritarian regime.
Secondly, both the regime and the pro‐democratic opposition used clientelistic
formsofelectoralmobilisationintheregime’spseudo‐elections,andthroughane‐
gotiated democratic transition were able to transfer their patron‐client networks
into the new democratic arena. These networks are deeply embedded in Korean
masspoliticalcultureandhavethustakenonalifeoftheirown–independentofthe
OLIVERHELLMANN
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conditionsof lowsocio‐economicdevelopmentthatallowedtheirestablishment in
thefirstplace.
Therefore, as clientelism is the outcome strategically selected for by the envi‐
ronmentalcontext,themajorpoliticalpartiesinSouthKoreaarenothingbutafor‐
malfaçadeforinformalpatron‐clientnetworksthatconnectpoliticiansandvoters.
Verymuch like in theclassical cadreparty inearly‐democraticEurope, the formal
partyorganisationsremainsunderdevelopedandthethreefacesofpartyorganisa‐
tionareindistinguishable:Partymembersdonotdiffermuchfromcommoncitizens
in terms of their rightswithin and their obligations towards the party, the party
centralleadershipselectsitselfascandidatesforpublicelectionsandthepartycent‐
ralofficeismerelyapassivebureaucraticbodywithoutanyindependentdecision‐
makingpower.
However, after losing their charismatic leaders, Kim Young‐sam andKimDae‐
jung, themajorKoreanpartieshave increasinglybecomeaffectedby internal con‐
flictsbetweenfactionsofyoungerpoliticiansandoldguards.Astheseyoungerpoli‐
ticiansarenotembeddedintotheexistingclientelisticnetworksandlacktheneces‐
sary private resources to establish similar patron‐client relationships, they intro‐
duced public economic incentives into the regional electoral conflict. Simulta‐
neously,theyhavebeentryingtooverpowertheoldergenerationwithinthemajor
parties by introducing party membership fees – which failed – give the right to
nominate candidates forpublic election to independent forcesoutside theparty–
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–175–
eitherthroughscreeningcommitteesorpublicopinionpolls–andpassstricterpo‐
liticalfinancelegislation.
While thesemeasureshavenot led to theemergenceofanewtypeofpolitical
party in SouthKorea, party internal processes have becomemore formalised and
transparent.Thisisparticularlytruefortheselectionofcandidatesforpublicelec‐
tion,whichisnowlessdependentonresourcescontrolledbyindividualpoliticians
andfactions,particularlyvotesandmoney.Moreover, theparty internalallocation
ofresourcesismuchmorecloselyregulatedbylaw,makingitimpossibleforsingle
politicianstogaincontroloftheparty,ashappenedduringthe“threeKims”era.In
otherwords,asintheclassicalcadreparty,thedifferentelementsofpartyorganisa‐
tion are still indistinguishable, as extra‐parliamentary organisation is minimal.
However,verysimilartoKoole’s(1994)“moderncadreparty”thereseemstoexista
stronger link of accountability between theparty public office andboth theparty
membersandthewiderpublic.
Althoughthesepartyinternalconflictsareagoodexampleofhowactorscande‐
velopdifferentstrategieswithinthesamecontext,whichthentranslateintodiver‐
gingpreferencesregardingthepartyorganisation,theoutcomeisnotverydifferent
from the outcome strategically selected for the environment. Therefore, a much
morevaluablecasetostudyistheKDLP,whichistheonlymajorpartythatbreaks
withthetraditionalpatternofKoreanpoliticalpartyorganisation.Tobeginwith,the
massmembershipwithintheKDLPholdssignificantpowerasitcontributessignifi‐
cantlytotheparty’sfinancialsurvival.Inreturnforthiscontribution,themember‐
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ship is granted significant participatory rights in the party’s process of candidate
selection.However,candidateselectionisorganisedasaclosedprimary,whichat‐
omisesandthussomehowweakensthepartyontheground.Thisgivesconsiderable
powertothepartycentraloffice,whichadministersthepartymembershipregister,
thusforcingthepartyinpublicofficetorelyonthebureaucracyforanycommunica‐
tionwith the rank‐and‐file.Moreover, the party in central office also controls the
financial resources of the party and has considerable participatory rights in the
party’s internaldecision‐makingprocedures.Wecan thusconclude that– in stark
contrasttothetwoothermajorKoreanparties–itisthepartyincentralofficethat
dominatestheKDLP.Thisparticularoutcomeis,again,closelylinkedtothekeyac‐
tor’s electoral strategy,which, in the case of theKDLP is basedon anarrowly fo‐
cusedprogrammaticplatform.Thus,similartothesocialistmasspartiesinlate19th
century,theKDLPneedsastrongpartybureaucracyinordertodisciplinethemem‐
bersofthepartyinpublicoffice.
Inshort, theKDLPisaperfectexampleofhowactorscanmakedivergingstra‐
tegic choices within the same environment. This could be because actors in the
KDLPeither lack thenecessary resources to establish clientelisticnetworksor in‐
terpret the context through a different set of ideas than other actors. However,
whatever thereason, the importantpoint tonote is that theoutcomestrategically
selectedforbythecontext–elitistpartiescharacterisedbythelackofformalfaces
ofpartyorganisation– isbynomeans inevitable.Moreover, as thebitter internal
conflictswithinthetwomajorKoreanpartiesshow,eventhestrategicallyselected
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–177–
outcomeisnotadirectproductoftheenvironment,butitisconstantlycontestedby
actorswithdifferentsetsofresourcesorideas.Therefore,althoughtheconstellation
ofpartyorganisations inpost‐autocraticKorea is very similar toparty systems in
19thcenturyEurope,withmasspartieschallengingthehegemonicpositionofcadre
parties, this should not be understood as a case of “history repeating itself”, but
partyorganisationsinKoreaaretheproductofstrategiccalculationsmadeinapar‐
ticularcontextthatfavourscertainstrategiesoverothers.
OLIVERHELLMANN
–178–
–5–
TAIWAN
Political parties in Taiwan share many similarities with contemporary parties in
WesternEurope,asthepartyinpublicofficeisclearlythedominantorganisational
element.However,asouranalysiswillshow,theyarrivedatthisstagenotthrough
an“evolutionaryleap”,buteachofthepartiesfollowedaverydistinctivepathofor‐
ganisationaldevelopment,constrainedbytheinter‐factionalconflictwithineachof
thepartiesandtheparticularenvironmentalcontext.
Theenvironmentalcontext
The change of the Taiwanese political system from a one‐party state to a fully‐
fledged democracy happened through a transformation guided from above (Tien
1997:124).TherulingKuomintang(KMT,ChineseNationalistParty)neverlostcon‐
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–179–
troloftheprotractedtransitionprocess,whilethepro‐democraticoppositioncould
onlysitandwatchasdifferentgroupingswithintheregimenegotiatedthenewrules
of the electoral game. Therefore, the clientelistic networks the regime had built
aroundlocalpowerbrokersinordertomobilisevotersinlocal‐levelelectionssur‐
vived the transformation of the political system andwe should expect these net‐
workstobeusedtoactivateelectoralsupportalsounderthenewdemocraticrules–
despitethehighlevelofsocio‐economicdevelopmentthatcharacterisesTaiwanto‐
day.
TheKMTimposedmartiallawonTaiwanin1949afterthenationalgovernment
ofChinaaroundChiangKai‐shekwasforcedtofleethemainlandfromtheadvancing
communist forces. Thatway,Taiwanbecame the last fallbackposition for theRe‐
publicofChina, leadingtoasuddeninfluxoftwomillionpartyfunctionaries,state
officials, soldiers andentrepreneurs.TheKMT,whichafter thedefeat reorganised
itself according toLeninistprinciples inorder toemulate theCommunistPartyof
China(CPC), soonbeganto “colonise” the islandbyplacingpartycadres inallkey
positions of the state apparatus – including themilitary – and integrating society
intopartymassorganisations (Dickson1993).All otherpartieswerebanned, and
electionsonlyheldatlocallevel,whilethedistributionofseatsinthenationalpar‐
liamentwas “frozen”.TheTaiwanese,who still constituted theoverwhelmingma‐
jorityof society,were thuspracticallyexcluded fromthepoliticaldecision‐making
OLIVERHELLMANN
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process.58 The KMT legitimised its authoritarian rule by declaring itself to be the
solelegalgovernmentofChina,withtheaimoftemporarilyrebuildingmilitaryforce
onTaiwanbeforeretakingthemainlandfromthecommunists.Moreover,legitimacy
also stemmed from the miraculous economic development that Taiwan enjoyed
underKMTgovernment(Roy2003:104).Muchofthiseconomicsuccesscanbeex‐
plainedbystrongstateinterventionintothemarket(Wade2004).TheKMTshaped
themarket by laws, regulations and fiscal policies, but also by becoming an eco‐
nomicactoritself,usingitsmonopolyonvitalinputs–suchassteel,petrochemicals
and heavy machines – to build an “array of satellite suppliers and subservient
downstreamfirms”(ChengandChu2002:200).
TABLE10: SOCIO‐ECONOMICDEVELOPMENTINTAIWAN
GDPpercapita(USDollars)
GiniCoefficientDegreeof
urbanisation(inpercent)
Literacy(inpercent)
Taiwan 7,981(1990)
17,116(2008)
0.312(1990)
0.326(2000)
74.1(1989)
80.0(2008)
94.0(1990)
97.2(2004)
Germany 29,461(2006) 0.283(2007) 75.2(2005) 99.0(2006)
UnitedKingdom 33,238(2005) 0.360(2007) 89.7(2005) 99.0(2005)
Source: DepartmentofInvestmentServices(undated);GovernmentInformationOffice(undated);Tsai(1996)
58Theterm“Taiwanese”inthisregardreferstoethnicChinese,whoimmigratedtoTaiwanfromthe17thcenturyonwardsmainlyfromthecoastalregionsofFujianandGuangdong.Today,slightlylessthan85percentoftheisland’spopulationareconsideredasTaiwanese,whereasmainlandChineseaccountforapproximately14percentofthepopulation(Copper1996:12).
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However,when,inthelate1970s,itbecameclearthattheinternationalcommunity
wasnolongerwillingtosupporttheKMT’sclaimofsovereigntyoverChina,theKMT
suffered a severe blow to its credibility (Wachman1994: 135). At the same time,
Taiwan’srapidindustrialisationhadledtotheemergenceofanewmiddleclass(see
Table 10), which clearly reflected the sub‐ethnic division in society: “As national
politicswasprimarily reserved formainlanders, […]Taiwanesepursuedeconomic
advancementforsocialupwardmobility”(Cheng1989:482;emphasisadded).The
politicaldemandofthegrowingmiddleclasswasclear:Taiwanshouldbegoverned
bytheTaiwanesemajority,notbyasmallminorityasapartofChina.
UndertheleadershipofChiangChing‐kuo,thesonofChiangKai‐shek,whosuc‐
ceededhisfatherinpowerin1978,theKMTreactedtothislossoflegitimacywitha
strategy of “Taiwanisation”, opening top ranks in the party and in government to
sub‐ethnicTaiwanese(Hood1997:65).Consequently,theproportionofTaiwanese
members of the KMT’s central standing committee rose from 14.3% in 1973 to
57.1% in 1993 (Huang 1996: 119‐120). By the late 1980s this sub‐ethnic divide
within theKMTgaverise to the formationof two larger factions: theMainstream,
includingmostlyTaiwanese,and theNon‐mainstream,mainlyagroupingofmain‐
land‐bornpoliticiansandchildrenofmainlandersbornonTaiwan.Boththese fac‐
tionsconsistofanumberofsmaller factions,whichareallmoreserious thanten‐
denciesorcliques,sincemembersneedtoenlistofficially,andtheleadershipteam
meetsregularlytodiscussfactionmatters(ChengandChou2000:61‐62).
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Simultaneously, the regime decided to hold “supplementary” elections on the
nationallevelinordertoreplacethoseparliamentarianswhohadeitherbecometoo
oldtogovernorhadpassedaway.Marginalised intheparty internalpowergame,
membersof theMainstream factionstarteddeveloping linkswith local factions to
mobilisesupport in theseand localelections(Hood1997:109).Local factions(di
fang paixi) are large interpersonal networks that are held together byguanxi – a
term connoting social ties and connections (kin, patron‐client, friendship, neigh‐
bourhood,schooletcetera)(Bosco1992:158).Theelectoralmobilisationof these
groupswasachievedthroughvote‐brokers(calledtiauakainTaiwanese),utilising
politicalcampaigns,personalrelationships,themobilisationofemployeesandvote‐
buying.
Thebanonpoliticalpartiesremainedinforce,butoppositioncandidatesbegan
tocoordinatetheircampaignactivitiesintheso‐calleddangwai‐movement(literally,
“outside theparty”).However, therewasdisagreementoverwhether thiswas the
beststrategytobringdowntheKMTregime,resultinginasplitbetweenradicaland
moderategroupings(Tsang1999:12).WhereasboththeMainstreamfaction,ledby
KangNing‐hsiang,andtheFormosafactionadvocatedpoliticalchangethroughelec‐
tions,theNewTidefactionwascommittedtopushfordemocratisationfromoutside
thesystem.Astheoppositionstillhadhardlyanyinfluenceoverlegislation,there‐
sulting frustrations favoured the radicalswithin thedangwai (ChengandHaggard
1990:68).At thesame time, the regimeperceived the limitedelectoral successof
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thedangwaiasaseriousthreat,whichprovokedasplitwithintheregimebetween
hard‐andsoft‐liners,withthehard‐linersinstantlygainingtheupperhand.
Themoreradicaltacticsofthedangwai–whichwerecentredonsocialmobilisa‐
tion–weresooncrushedbytheregimehardlinerswhenamassdemonstrationheld
inKaohsiungon10December1979wasputtoaviolentendbyriotpolice,andmost
leadersoftheradicalfactionwithintheoppositionwerejailed.Thistippedthebal‐
anceback in favourof themoderate forces intheoppositioncamp,which, inturn,
advantagedtheKMTsoft‐liners,whosoonresumedtheprocessofpoliticalliberali‐
sation (Cheng1989:486‐487). With themoderates in control, thedangwai again
concentrated on institutionalising a competitive electoral organisation, eventually
leading to the founding of theDemocratic Progressive Party (DPP,Minjindang) in
September1986.TheKMTsilentlytoleratedthismove,beforeproclaimingtheend
ofmartial lawand,onlyafewweekslater,theprohibitionofpoliticalassociations.
Thefirstfreeandfairelectionsforanationalparliamentwereheldin1991.
Actorsandtheirstrategies
ThestrategiccalculationsmadebytheKMT’ssoft‐linersturnedouttobecorrect,as
thepartysucceededinstayinginpoweruntil2000.TheelectoralsuccessoftheKMT
duringthatdecadewastoalargeextentbasedontheMainstreamfaction’sclientel‐
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isticconnectionswithlocalfactions.Ontheotherhand, lackingsimilarclientelistic
links, both theNon‐mainstream factionwithin theKMTaswell as theDPPdevel‐
opedprogrammaticappeals.Therefore,whentheDPPtookpowerattheturnofthe
millennium, clientelism ceased to be a viable strategic option. This is because the
KMTfounditselfexcludedfromaccesstostateresources,whiletheDPPwasunable
touseitsnewly‐achievedexecutivepowertoestablishclientelisticlinkageswiththe
electorate, since its electoral success was largely built on criticising the growing
levelofcorruptionduetheKMT’sclientelisticmoneypolitics.
Aone‐partydominantsystem(1991‐2000)
Someauthorshavedescribed theprocessofdemocratisation inTaiwanasa “pro‐
tractedtransition”(Rigger2000),giventhattheKMTcontinuedtodominateparty
politics for almost a decade after holding the first free and fair elections. In fact,
throughoutthe1990s,theeffectivenumberofparliamentarypartiesneverexceeded
2.5, as theKMT successfullymanaged tomaintain its absolute parliamentaryma‐
jority. Similarly, volatility remained at a relatively low level for newdemocracies,
indicatingthatvotersdidnotswitchtheirvotesfromtheregimepartytootheral‐
ternatives(seeTable11).Asaresult,theDPP,asthemainoppositionparty,failedto
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significantly increase its seat share in 1990s elections and never posed a serious
threattotheformerregimeparty(seeTable12).
Turningourattention towards the intra‐party level,we canobserve that, from
thebeginning,apower‐sharingagreementwas institutionalisedwithin theDPP to
accommodate thedifferentgroupings:While themoderatesdominated theparty’s
decision‐makingapparatus(thepartychairandthecentralstandingcommittee),the
NewTideobtainedadisproportionateshareofpostsinthepartybureaucracy(Rig‐
ger 2001a: 25). In order to diminish the influence of theNewTide, themoderate
forceswithin theDPPmergedwith the Formosa Faction,which had risen to high
prominence after its leaderswere pardoned and released from prison in the late
1980s.
TABLE11: TAIWAN–PARTYSYSTEMINDICATORS
ENEPa ENPPb Volatilityc
1992 1.95 1.86 ‐1995 2.51 2.42 16.701998 2.65 2.25 11.302001 4.12 3.47 28.602004 3.71 3.25 7.102008 2.30 1.75 23.30Average 2.85 2.50 17.40
Notes:aEffectivenumberofelectoralpartiescalculatedontheshareofvotesinelec‐tionstotheLegislativeYuan(for2008usingthevoteforthesingle‐memberconstituency).bEffectivenumberofparliamentarypartiesintheLegislativeYuan.cFor2008basedonthevoteforthesingle‐memberconstituency.Source: Author’sowncalculationsbasedonTable12.
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FactionalpoliticsintheDPPwerethuscharacterisedbyintenseconfrontation.Con‐
flict between the two factions revolvedmainly around the search for an efficient
electoral strategy.Once theKMT followed throughwith its promise to liftmartial
lawandholdfreeandfairelections,theissueofdemocraticreformlostitsvalueasa
vehicleforvotermobilisation(Rigger1999:148).Itsoonbecameapparentthatthe
DPPhadbeennothingmorethanan“umbrella”partyforadversariesoftheKMTre‐
gime.Whereas theFormosa factiongatheredmostof theopposition’spolitical ce‐
lebrities,thuscombiningcharismawithacatch‐allprogrammaticstrategy,theNew
Tidefollowedaverynarrowideology,stressingthesub‐ethniccleavageandcalling
blatantlyforTaiwaneseindependencefrommainlandChina.TheFormosagroup,in
contrast, took a much more moderate standpoint, and argued that self‐
determination could only be achieved through open debates and referenda (Chao
2002: 108). Both factions also differed as to their level of institutionalisation.
WhereastheFormosafactioncouldbeclassifiedasapersonalisedfaction,theNew
Tide is virtually a “partywithin a party” (Arrigo 1994: 161)with its own profes‐
sionalstaff,andahighlysophisticatedorganisationalapparatus.
IntheinitialyearsaftertheDPP’sfounding,theFormosafactionprevailedover
theNewTide.However, thingschangedwhenoverseasadvocatesofTaiwan inde‐
pendencewere allowed back into the country.Many of the returning exiles soon
joinedtheDPP,therebytippingtheinter‐factionalbalanceinfavouroftheNewTide
(Wachman1994:118).ThisallowedtheNewTidetolaunchacredibleattackonthe
party’s policy platform at the 1991 national party congress to include the goal of
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Taiwanindependence.Afterseveralroundsofnegotiationsthetwofactionsfinally
cametoacompromise.TheFormosafactionwasallowedtorenewitspartyleader‐
ship, while the New Tide’s urge for national sovereignty for Taiwan became the
DPP’sofficialideologicalline(ChengandHsu1996:147).
TABLE12: TAIWAN–RESULTSFORLEGISLATIVEYUANELECTIONS
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2008aParty
Vb Sc V S V S V S V S V S
KMT 53.0 59.0 46.1 51.8 46.4 54.7 28.6 30.2 32.8 35.1 53.5 71.7DPP 31.0 31.7 33.2 32.9 29.6 31.1 33.4 38.7 35.7 39.6 38.2 23.9NP ‐ ‐ 13.0 12.8 7.1 4.9 2.6 0.4 0.1 0.4 ‐ ‐TAIP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1.4 0.4 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐PFP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 18.6 20.4 13.9 15.1 0.3 0.9TSU ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 7.8 5.8 7.8 5.3 0.9 0.0Other 16.0 9.3 7.7 2.5 15.5 8.9 9.0 4.5 9.6 2.8 3.1 3.2
Notes:aTheshareofvotesforthe2008electionsiscalculatedontheabsolutenumberofvotesreceivedbypartiesinthesingle‐memberconstituencies.bShareofvotes(inpercent)cShareofseats(inpercent)Source: Rinza(2001);LinJ.W.(2002);ChenC.F.(2006);TaipeiTimes(2008)
Thus,theissueofnational identitywasintroducedintotheelectoralarena,almost
immediatelydevelopingintothemostimportantfactorwithwhichtoexplainvoting
behaviour (Hsieh 2002: 38). If the KMTwanted to compete successfullywith the
DPPunder thenewdemocratic rules, itneeded to takeastandon thequestionof
national identity. This caused intense factional conflict within the former regime
party.Whereas theconservativeNon‐mainstreamheld theorthodoxview that the
government inTaipeiwas thesole legitimategovernmentofChina,whichhad the
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dutytopromoteChineseunificationandnationalism,theMainstream–althoughnot
rulingoutthepossibilityofaunifiedChinainthefuture–maintainedthatTaiwan
wasdefactoindependent(Hood1996).
TABLE13: TAIWAN–VOTERS’ATTITUDESTOWARDSTHENATIONALIDENTITYISSUE(%)
EISa MISb SQSc MUSd EUSe
December‘92 6.2 6.3 30.6 30.1 26.9January‘95 6.6 8.6 51.1 20.7 12.9March‘96 9.1 12.4 53.5 15.4 9.7January‘99 12.9 14.8 43.5 17.4 11.4June‘00 6.2 15.3 46.0 22.4 10.1
Notes:aExtremeindependencesupporter.bModerateindependencesupporter.cStatusquosupporter.dModerateunificationsupporter.eExtremeunificationsupporter.Source: Hsieh(2001:935)
AscanbeseenfromTable13,publicopinionbenefitedtheKMTMainstream,asthe
largestshareofvoterswasgroupedaroundthecentreofthespectrum,eitherpre‐
ferringtoretainthestatusquoorsupportingunificationwithChinaonlyundercer‐
taincircumstances.Moreover, theMainstreamfaction’sstrong linkswith local fac‐
tions proved to be very effective channels for electoralmobilisation, allowing the
MainstreamtobecomethedominantfactionwithintheKMT(Hood1997:109).Al‐
ready in 1988, Taiwanese Lee Teng‐hui had been elected the party’s chairman,
thereby automatically also becoming president of theRepublic of China.With the
governmentresourcesathisdisposal,Leeslowlyconsolidatedhispowerbybring‐
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ingpeoplewhosupportedhimintoimportantdecision‐makingpositionswithinthe
partyandthestate(Tan2002:157).UndertheleadershipofLeeTeng‐huitheKMT
thenshiftedtowardsamoremoderatepositionontheTaiwanidentityversusChi‐
neseidentityspectrum(Fell2005:111).
Wecanthereforesummarisethatbothmajorparties inTaiwanwereeachsplit
into two larger factions, which differed considerably in their electoral strategies.
Thisagainsupportsourviewthatsocialagentsareabletodevelopalternativestra‐
tegicreactionstothesamecontext.IntheKMT,theMainstreamfaction,basedonits
close linkwithlocal factions, followedaclientelisticstrategyofvotermobilisation.
Thefactionalsogaveitselfabroadprogrammaticimagetodistanceitselffromthe
Non‐mainstream, which campaigned on very narrowly defined programmatic ap‐
peals,pushingforre‐unificationwiththeChinesemainland.IntheDPP,too,factions
weredividedoverstrategiesforvotermobilisation:WhiletheFormosafactioncam‐
paignedonabroadprogrammaticplatform,supportedbythecharismaofits lead‐
ers,theNewTidetargetedverynarrowlydefinedsocialgroupswithitscallforTai‐
wanese independence.The reasonswhy thesevariousactorsdevelopeddivergent
electoralstrategiesarebeyondthescopeof thisanalysis–most likelybecauseac‐
torsholddifferentsetsofresourcesorideas–buttheimportantpointtonoteisthat
themajorTaiwanesepartiesweredeeplyrivenbyfactionalism.
However,intheDPP,theinter‐factionalconflictoverthebestelectoralstrategy
lessenedthroughthe1990s.WhentheDPPmovedtothefarleftoftheunification‐
independencespectrumin1991,thiswasheavilypenalisedbytheelectorate,asthe
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partyonlywon29.34%ofthevotesinthefirstfreeandfairelectionstotheNational
Assembly (compared to 71.17won by the KMT). After this disastrous defeat, the
DPPbegantoredraftitsindependencepolicy,bringingitintolinewithpublicopin‐
ion (Rigger 2001a: 126). However, the failure of the pure Taiwan independence
platformdidnotweakenthepositionoftheNewTidewithintheDPP.Infact,forthe
subsequentyearstheDPPwascontrolledbyabalancedNewTide‐Formosacoalition
that was pitted against smaller factions that emerged in the early 1990s (Fulda
2002: 331). Rather, theNewTidemoderated its own ideology (Chao 2002: 113).
Particularlyafterthe1996presidentialelection,whichwasovershadowedbymili‐
tarymanoeuvresheldbythePeople’sRepublicofChinaintheTaiwanStrait,ithas
becomeclearthatTaiwaneseindependencecanonlybeachievedbyriskingamajor
war.Inthesameyear,agroupofdie‐hardradical independenceadvocatesleftthe
DPP,andfoundedtheirownparty–theTaiwanIndependenceParty(TAIP,Jianguo
dang).
WhentheDPPmovedfurthertothecentreoftheideologicalspectrum,theKMT
hadtofollow,ifitdidnotwanttolosetheelectoralfightforthemedianvoter.This,
again, helped theMainstream to tighten its grip on power. Moreover, bymoving
away from the revolutionary mission of the KMT, and taking a more Taiwan‐
orientedstance,theMainstreamdisappointedmanywhowishedtoupholdthepo‐
litical legacyofChiangKai‐shek.Ultimately, in1993, theNewAlliance,a factionof
mainlysecondgenerationmainlanderswithintheNon‐mainstream,decidedtosplit
awayfromtheKMTinordertoestablishtheNewParty(NP,Xindang)(Hood1996:
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477).This gave theMainstreamyetmore leverageover theKMTdecision‐making
apparatus,allowingLeeTeng‐huitomovethepartyevenfurthertothecentreofthe
nationalidentityspectrum.Finally,afterwinningthe1996presidentialelectionLee
andhis factionultimatelybeat theNon‐mainstream in the inter‐factional struggle,
makingthedistinctionbetweenthetwofactionsobsolete.Asanexpressionof this
dominance Lee proclaimed his “two‐states theory” in July 1999, which held that
TaiwanandthePeople’sRepublicofChinaenjoyed“specialstatetostaterelations”
(Schubert2004:540).
However, Lee’s leadership did not go unchallenged, as the highly charismatic
JamesSoongemergedasa seriousopponent.Onceclosepartyassociates,Leehad
appointedSoongasthegovernorofTaiwanProvincein1993.59Thingsbecamesour
between the twowhenLeeperceivedSoong’s increasingpopularitywith theelec‐
torateasathreattohisownstatusandthusdidnotnominateSoongasprimeminis‐
terin1996,althoughSoongfeltthatasthegovernorofTaiwanheshouldhavenatu‐
rallybeenselected.Moreover,in1998,theLeegovernmentdecidedtoabolishTai‐
wanProvinceasanadministrativeunit,thereby–asSoongandhissupportersbe‐
lieved–destroyingSoong’spowerbase.Finally,whenSoonglosttheKMT’snomina‐
tionforthepresidentialcandidatein2000againstLienChan,whoLeeendorsedas
hissuccessor,SoongleftthepartytostandasanindependentandestablishthePeo‐
pleFirstParty(PFP,Qinmindang)shortlybeforethe2001LegislativeYuanelections.
59WhentheKMTarrivedinTaiwanin1949theadministrationthatruledTaiwanasaprovinceoftheRepublicofChinawasleftuntouched.However,sinceTaiwanalsobecamethelastterritorytobeef‐fectivelyruledbythegovernmentoftheRepublicofChina,thisgaverisetoanodddoubleadminis‐trativestructure.
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Atwo‐partysystememerges
Lee’s powerful positionwithin the KMT suddenly collapsedwhen Lien Chan only
finished third in the presidential election behind the DPP’s Chen Shui‐bian and
JamesSoong.RumoursstartedspreadingwithintheKMTthatLeehadonlyfavoured
theunpopularLienChantosecretlysupportChenShui‐bian,whootherwisewould
nothavebeenstrongenoughtobeatSoong.Asaresult,Leehadtoresignfromthe
partychairmanshiptotakeresponsibilityforthedevastatingresult,andLienChan
waselectedashissuccessorbythenationalpartycongress in June2000. Immedi‐
atelyafterassumingchairmanship,LienChanformedareformcommitteetoexam‐
ine ways that the party could reform itself andmake itself competitive in future
elections(Tan2002:158).OnestrategicmistakeidentifiedwastheKMT’sproblem‐
aticpositionat the ideologicalcentreof thenational identityspectrum.UnderLee
Teng‐hui,theKMTattackedboththeDPPforpushingforindependence,andtheNP
foradvocatingrapidunification.ItwasfeltthatthiscontradictorytonelosttheKMT
votesonbothsides(Fell2005:120).Accordingly,thenewpartyleadershipdecided
tomovethepartybacktothecentre‐right.Moreover,theMainstream’srelianceon
itslinkswithlocalfactionsforelectoralmobilisationhadpavedthewayfororgan‐
isedcrimeintotheLegislativeYuanandledtoincreasinglevelsofpoliticalcorrup‐
tionatthenationallevel(Yuetal.2008).TheDPPsuccessfullyattackedtheKMTon
the“blackgold”issue,forcingthepartytotakeatougherlineoncorruptionandcut‐
tingtheconnectionstolocalfactions.
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Consequently, since 2000 more programmatic‐oriented forces have come to
dominate the KMT,which, in turn, have reintroducedmany traditional principles
into the party’s policy platform. TheKMT clearly returned to the formula of “one
China, twopoliticalentities”,whichadvocatesunificationofTaiwanandthemain‐
landinaChineseconfederation(Schubert2004:541).Asaresultoftheideological
shifttotheright,supportersofthepoliciesadvocatedbyLeeTeng‐huilefttheKMT
inorder toestablish theTaiwanSolidarityUnion (TSU,TaiwanTuanjieLianmeng),
shortlybeforethe2001LegislativeYuanelections.However,thisdidnotmeanthe
endofideologicalconflictwithintheKMT,astheKMTsawtheemergenceofanew
faction,theBentupaifaction.60ThefactionarosebecauseKMTpoliticiansincentral
andsouthernTaiwan,wherecompetitionwiththeDPPisfiercest,sawthenecessity
totakeamoremoderatepositiononthenationalidentityissueinordernottojeop‐
ardisetheirelectoralchances.61WangJinpyng,speakeroftheLegislativeYuansince
1999,iswidelyseenastheleaderoftheBentupai.
Hence,while theKMThas remembered its ideological roots, theDPPhas con‐
tinued its ideologicalmoderation.Sincewinning thepresidency in2000, theparty
has repeatedly expressed itswish to conserve the status quo in the relations be‐
tweenTaiwanandPRC,whileleavinganydecisionaboutfuturechangestotheTai‐
60Bentuliterallymeans“homeland”.InpoliticalTaiwan,thetermbentupaireferstoanypublicfigureorgroupwhoidentifywithTaiwanandgiveprioritytothewell‐beingoftheTaiwaneseaheadofcon‐cernsfortheChinesenation.61Traditionally,theKMTisstrongerinthenorthofTaiwanaroundthecapitalofTaipeibecausethisareawasthemaintargetforpublicinfrastructuralinvestmentsundermartiallaw.Moreover,TaipeiisweremostsupportersoftheKMTsettledaftertheyfledthemainlandin1949.Conversely,votersinthesoutharemorelikelytofeelTaiwaneseratherthanChineseandsupportanindependentTai‐wan(LeeP.S.andHsu2002).
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wanesepopulation(Chao2003).AstothefactionalconfigurationwithintheDPP,it
canbenotedthattheNewTideisnowtheonlyfoundingfactionleft,astheFormosa
factionincreasinglymergedintootherfactionsandceasedtoexist.Themainreason
foritsdisintegrationwasthedecisionofitslong‐termpatron,XuXinliang,torunas
anindependentcandidateinthe2000presidentialelection(Fulda2002:331).Other
prominent Formosa members established their own factions: Zhang Junhong
founded theNewEra faction, XuRongshuorganised theNewEnergy faction. The
NewEnergyandothersmallerfactionsalliedattheparliamentaryleveltoformthe
MainstreamAllianceinordertosupportpresidentChenShui‐bianintheLegislative
Yuan.
Chen Shui‐bian also won the 2004 presidential election, thereby forcing Lien
ChantostepdownasKMTchairman.InordertoelectanewleadertheKMT–for
the first time in itshistory–helda closedprimary in2005 that allowedallparty
memberstoparticipate inthevoting.Twopoliticiansputforwardtheircandidacy:
Wang Jinpyng andMaYing‐jeou, the thenmayor of Taipei. The primary again re‐
flectedtheideologicalconflictwithintheparty.WhileWanghadtheloyalsupportof
theBentupai, Ma, born in Hong Kong tomainland parents, represented themore
traditionalforcesintheKMT.MadefeatedWangwithaclear72to28percentmar‐
gin, butwas forced to step down as chairman only two years laterwhen hewas
chargedovermisuseofpublicfundsduringhistenureasmayorofTaipei.However,
afterhewasfoundnotguilty,Mamadeaswiftcomebackandwasnominatedasthe
KMT’scandidateforthe2008presidentialelection.
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Meanwhile,theDPP’sthevictoryinthe2004presidentialelectionsallowedChen
Shui‐bian to further consolidate its power over the smaller personalised factions.
ThisdominancecontinueddespitesharplydroppingpopularityratingsforChenaf‐
teraseriesofcorruptionandinsidertradingscandalsinvolvingChenandhisfamily
becamepublicin2006.Accordingtosomeobservers,thisisprobablyduetothefact
thatseveralfactionleaders–withChen’sknowledge–werealsoinvolvedincorrup‐
tion,givingCheneffectiveblackmailmaterial.62
ThecaseofTaiwanconfirmsoneofthecentraltheoreticalfoundationsofhistori‐
calinstitutionalism:Surroundedbythesameexternalcontext,partyinternalactors
havesincetheintroductionoffreeandfairelectionssimultaneouslydevelopedvery
different electoral strategies tomobilise voters.Within the KMT, theMainstream
factionused itsstrong linkswith local factionsto integratevoters intoclientelistic
exchange networks, while the Non‐mainstream faction – either because it lacked
similarpatron‐clientlinksorbecauseitsinterpretationoftheenvironmentdidnot
allow the faction to recognise these opportunities – developed programmatic ap‐
pealstargetingtraditionalKMTsupportergroups.Similarly,usingaresource‐based
approachtoexplaindifferentelectoralstrategies,fortheDPPclientelismasanelec‐
toral strategy was not an option either, since it took the party nine years to be
elected into national government. Therefore, the major factions within the DPP
competedoveraprogrammaticprofilefortheparty:WhiletheNewTide–atleast
initially–pushed fora ratherextremistplatform,openly calling for independence
62PersonalcommunicationwithI‐ChouLiu,8May2008.
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from China, the Formosa faction combined a catch‐all electoral strategy with the
charismaticqualitiesofitsleaders.
A central aspect of theDPP’s programmatic profilewas the call for clean gov‐
ernment,wherebythepartycreatedapublicdiscourseveryhostiletoclientelism.In
otherwords,whentheDPPwonthepresidencyin2000thepartywasunabletouse
itsaccesstostateresourcestoemployaclientelisticstrategyforvotermobilisation,
but it had to follow through with its electoral promises to implement anti‐
corruptionreforms(seeGöbel2004).An importantcondition for thisdiscourse to
emergewasclearlythehighlevelofsocio‐economicdevelopmentinTaiwan,mean‐
ing that voters were not caught in a dependency relationship but able to assess
otheroptionsanddefect from theclientelisticgame.Clientelismonly continues to
play a role in local‐level elections, where electoral districts are small enough for
peopletoknoweachotherandvoterswillthusfinditverydifficultnottovotefor
theirrespectivelocalfaction(Mattlin2004).Fuelledbyitsearlyelectoralsuccessat
locallevel,eventheDPPhasdevelopedextensiveclientelisticlinkageswiththeelec‐
torateincounty,townshipandvillageelections.63
Concerning the organisational development of political parties in Taiwan, we
shouldthereforeexpecttheKMTMainstreamtoinvestmostofitsresourcesintoin‐
formal clientelistic networks, while the Non‐mainstream should be interested in
strengtheningthepartyasaformalinstitutionfordecision‐making.Similarly,inthe
DPP,theFormosafactionandothersmallerpersonalisedfactionsheavilyrelyingon
63PersonalcommunicationwithChung‐liWu,1May2008.
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the charisma of their leaders for voter mobilisation should have little interest in
strengtheningthepartycentraloffice.TheNewTide,ontheotherhand,which–at
leastintothesecondhalfofthe1990s–campaignedonaclearprogrammaticplat‐
form, can be expected to push for strong formalmechanisms to centrally enforce
partydiscipline.
Partyorganisation
Aswill be shown in the following sections, our expectations are indeedmet. This
means that, currently, as theNon‐mainstream is now the dominant faction in the
KMT,whiletheDPP’sNewTidehasbroadeneditsownprogrammaticappealsintoa
broadcatch‐allstrategy,thetwomajorpoliticalpartiesinTaiwansharemanysimi‐
laritieswith their counterparts in contemporaryWesternEurope: Partymembers
donotdiffersignificantlyintheirrightsandobligationsfromordinarycitizens,the
procedures of candidate selection are highly inclusive – extending participatory
rightstovotersoutsidetheparty–andtheroleofthepartybureaucracyislimited
totheprofessionaladministrationoftheparty’sresources.Thisalltranslatestothe
party inpublicofficebeing thedominantelementofpartyorganisation.However,
partiesinTaiwanarrivedatthisstagenotthroughan“evolutionaryleap”,butthey
followed very distinctive paths of organisational development, constrained by the
OLIVERHELLMANN
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inter‐factionalconflictwithineachof thepartiesand theparticularenvironmental
context.
Partymembership
InTaiwan, as in SouthKorea,manypartymembersdonot join thepartybecause
they identifywith theparty’s ideologyorpolicyprogramme,butbecause theyare
recruitedthroughthepersonalnetworkofapoliticianwithintheparty.Thepoliti‐
cianwillthenpaythemembershipfees,administerthemembershipIDsandinstruct
themembershowtovoteinpartyinternalelections.However,thisformof“party”
membership–solelymotivatedthroughtheinterpersonalrelationshipbetweenthe
memberandthepolitician–isnotthegeneralcase.Whileitisimpossibletopresent
figures thatwould reflect the exact share ofmemberswho are simply power re‐
sourcesinthehandsofapoliticalboss,anumberofindirectindicatorscanhelpto
achievearoughestimate.Firstofall,thefactthatthereareseveralwordsinpolitical
Taiwan to describe this type ofmembers – rentoudangyuan (literally, headmem‐
bers)orkoudaidangyuan(pocketmembers)–thusdistinguishingthemfromregular
partymembersinamoreWesternEuropeanunderstanding,showsthattheyarenot
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thegeneralrule.64Moreover,pocketmembershaveusuallybeenregardedmoreasa
problemoftheDPPratherthantheKMT,simplybecausetheKMThasamuchlarger
membership, therebymaking itmoredifficult forsinglepoliticians tohavea large
enoughpersonalnetworkofsupportersthatcouldinfluencepartyinternaldecision‐
makinginhisorherfavour.
TABLE14: TAIWAN–PARTYMEMBERSHIP
KMT DPP
Ma M/Vb M/Ec M M/V M/E
TotalM/E
1950 80,043 n/a n/a ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐1975 1,448,106 n/a n/a ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐1990 2,546,429 n/a n/a ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐1991 2,570,904 42.1 17.8 24,546 1.2 0.1 17.91992 2,617,651 52.0 18.6 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐1995 ‐ ‐ ‐ 49,674 1.6 0.4 ‐2000 2,200,000 47.2 15.7 150,000 5.1 1.1 16.82005 900,000 28.2 6.4 400,000 11.5 2.9 9.32008 1,000,000 18.9 7.0 250,000 6.6 1.8 8.8
Notes:aPartymembership–realfiguresandestimates.bMembership/voterratio.cMembership/electorateratio.Source: WuC.L.(1997:236);Guo,HuangandChiang(1998:195);andpersonalcommunicationwiththe
politicalparties.
Undertheone‐partyregimeoftheKMTpartymembershipfigureshavetraditionally
been relatively high. In an attempt to imitate the organisational structures of the
Communist Party of China (CPC), the KMT, in the early 1950s, started building a
64Theterm“headmembers”referstothefactthatmemberswhosemembershipfeesarebeingpaidbypowerfulbossesarenothingmorethanpiecesinthestrategicgamesplayedbythesebosses.Simi‐larly,“pocketmembers”isusedtodescribethecommonpracticeofbosseskeeping“their”members’membershipcardsintheirown“pockets”andonlyhandingthemouttotheactualmemberbeforeapartyinternalelection.
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massmembershipfoundationthatwouldincorporateallsectorsofsocietyintothe
party.Memberswereorganised into about30,000party cells in geographical and
administrativeunits(downtovillagelevel)aswellasattheworkplace(suchasin
government offices, schools, businesses and the transportation sector). Party
membershipsizegrewfrom80,043in1950tomorethan2.6millionin1992.Even
aftertheintroductionoffreeandfairelections,themembershiplevelremainedwell
abovethe2millionmark,whichtranslatesintomoreorless14percentofthetotal
electorate. However, these figures were based on outdated records that included
peoplewho had died, changed residence, or shifted party loyalties. Consequently,
whentheKMTaskeditsmemberstore‐registerin2000–afterthedevastatingde‐
feat in the presidential elections – this resulted in amembership of 900,000 – or
aboutsixpercentofthetotalelectorate(seeTable14).
However, the sharp drop inmembership figureswas not only the result of an
updateof theofficialmembership records,but the re‐registrationprocess also in‐
cludedmeasuresthatwereaimedatexcludingpocketmembers–orfakemembers
(whoonlyexistedonpaper)–fromtheparty.Inordertore‐registerpartymembers
hadtopaytheirannualmembershipfeeatalocalconveniencestore,andthensend
the receipt together with the completed membership form to the national KMT
headquarters. Collective receipts that listed more than one membership fee pay‐
mentwerenotaccepted.Whatismore,thenationalpartyconductedspotchecksto
makesurethatthecitizenswhoregistereddidindeedexistandprovidedthecorrect
contactdetails.
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Although this systemstill contains some loopholes, recruitingpocketmembers
has definitely become more difficult, as can also be deduced from the smaller
membershipfigureafter2000.Inotherwords,wecanassumethatthemajorityof
partymembersjointheKMTbecausetheyfeelpsychologicallyattachedtoitsideo‐
logicalprogramme,andnotduetotheirroleasaclient inapatron‐clientrelation‐
ship.Thereforethere‐registrationprocessmustbeunderstoodasanattemptbythe
Non‐mainstream faction, which re‐established itself as the dominant faction after
thedisastrous2000presidentialelection,tocleansethepartymembershipofMain‐
streamfollowers.WhiletheMainstreamhadbeenattractingthelargestshareofits
supportersthroughtheclientelisticdistributionofmaterialrewards,supportersof
theNon‐mainstreamaremore interestedincollective incentives–sharingthefac‐
tion’s goal of reunificationwith the Chinesemainland in the long run – and thus
morelikelytopayregularpartymembershipfees.
One party internal group that has traditionally been characterised by a high
share of die‐hard ideologists is the party’sHuang Fuhsing division.65 This special
branch consistsmainly ofmilitary servicemen and veterans aswell as their rela‐
tives,mostofwhomaremainlandChineseandstillhavestrong feelings forChina.
TheHuangFuhsing had losta largenumberof itsmembersdue toLeeTeng‐hui’s
pro‐Taiwanpolicy,butwhentheKMTreturnedto itsmore traditionalpositionon
theChinaquestionmanyre‐joinedtheparty(particularlyfromtheNP),bringingthe
65PersonalcommunicationwithChung‐liWu,1May2008.
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membershipfigureofthesub‐partygroupingbacktoabout200,000(TaipeiTimes
2001).
IntheDPP,becausethepartymembershipismuchsmaller,pocketmembersare
amore serious problem.As can be seen fromTable 14, evennine years after the
party’s founding only 50,000 voters had registered asDPPmembers. Evenbefore
the2000presidentialelectionsthefigurehadonlyrisento150,000.Thesuddenin‐
creaseto400,000afterChenShui‐bian’shistoricalvictorywas interpretedbyDPP
leadersasasignthat fearsofpersecutionbasedonpoliticalaffiliationstillexisted
underthenewlycrafteddemocraticrules.However,astheDPPbecamethepartyin
power, thereby gaining immense powers of patronage and government spending,
thisalsoledtoanincreaseofpocketmembers.EstablishedfiguresintheDPPsud‐
denlyfoundthemselvesclosetorealpoliticalpowerandmanysawtherecruitment
ofpocketmembers as an effectiveway topromote their own interestswithin the
party(Rigger2001a:65). Inotherwords, theballooningof theDPP’smembership
sizeafter2000mustbetakenwithapinchofsalt,sincealargenumberofmembers
onlyjoinedbecausetheywerepaidbypoliticallyambitiousbosses.
In2006theDPPpassedaresolutionstipulatingthatthepartywouldexpelpeo‐
plewho"buy"members,andthatthosewhoselltheirnameswouldnotbeableto
jointheparty for twoyears.Clearly, theNewTide factionwithintheDPPmustbe
interestedincombatingpocketmembers,sincethefaction’smembershiphastradi‐
tionally been highly exclusive, making admission dependent on ideological com‐
mitments.However,aswillbeshownbelow,theDPPisfinanciallydependentonthe
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membershipduespaid forpocketmembers.Moreover,a largeshareof thepocket
membersisrecruitedbylocal‐levelpoliticians.Crackingdownonpocketmembers
couldthereforeprovokethesepoliticianstorunasindependents,therebyreducing
theDPP’salreadysmallpoolofcandidatesevenfurther.
Asaresult,unlike intheKMT, theresolution issued in2006wasnotaccompa‐
niedbyanymeasuresthatwouldeffectivelyhelptoidentifypocketmembers,such
as re‐registeringpartymembership inperson.Thedramaticdropof themember‐
shipsizeto250,000in2008thusseemstobeunrelatedtothismeasure,particularly
since in the same yearWuChin‐tai, amember of theDPP’s youth committee still
complainedthat“theoldsystemofcollectivevoting[ofpocketmembers]willcon‐
tinueandthesameoldfaceswillruntheparty”(WuC.T.2008).
WecanthussumupthatthemajorityofpartymembersinTaiwanjoinaparty
because they identify with its policy goals. However, particularly within the DPP
there isa largeshareofpocketmembersamongtherankand file,while theKMT,
which–becauseofitslargermembershiphadneverbeenaffectedbythisproblem
tothesameextent–implementedfairlyeffectivemeasurestoexcludepocketmem‐
bers from the party in 2000. Pocketmembers do not enjoy any powers as party
members,sincetheirmembershipfeesarepaidbytherespectiveboss,whowillalso
instructthemhowtovoteinpartyinternalelections.Thequestionthatremainsto
beansweredishowpowerfulregularmembersare.
TherequirementstobecomeamemberinoneofTaiwan’stwomajorpartiesare
relativelylow.Theonlyobligationsthatcomewithpartymembershipareabidingto
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therespectiveparty’sstatutesandpayingregularfees.Upuntil2000,theKMTdid
not evenenforce thepaymentofmembershipdues.A strictly enforced feeof 200
NTD(about3.30GBP)perannumwasonlyintroducedinthecontextofthemember
re‐registrationprocess66,whichshouldbeunderstoodprimarilyasastrategicmove
bytheNon‐mainstreamfactiontomakeitmoredifficultfortheMainstreamfaction
tosustaintheirclientelisticnetworks.Incontrast,DPPmembershavealwaysbeen
requiredtopayregularpartyduesorotherwisetheirpartyrightswillbesuspended.
Atthemomenttheannualfeeamountsto300NTD(about5GBP).67WhiletheDPP
reliesheavilyon these fees for its financialsurvival, theKMT,aswillbediscussed
later, has a number ofmore profitable sources of income, withmembership fees
only accounting for a small share of the party’s overall budget. In other words,
members in theDPPhold an important resource,which– in comparison–makes
themmore powerful thanmemberswithin the KMT. Yet, we should remind our‐
selvesthat,often,themembershipfeesarepaidcollectivelybypoliticalbosses,not
bythemembersthemselves.
However, the fact that the KMT regularly communicates with its members
(through an electronic newsletter and a frequently updated news‐section on the
party’swebsite), provides training to the heads of the local branches (in election
campaigning, votemonitoringet cetera) andholds introductory seminars fornew
members,showsthat thepartyvalues itsmembersmorethan justasamerestat‐
istic. Similarly, the DPP sends aweekly electronic newsletter to itsmembers and
66PersonalcommunicationwiththeKMT,12May2008.67PersonalcommunicationwiththeDPP,8May2008.
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frequently communicates with the rank‐and‐file via e‐mail and text‐messaging.
Moreover, thepartyalsohasa trainingprogrammethat includespresentationsby
seniorparty leadersonparty idealsaswellaseducativesessionsonpartyregula‐
tionsandthepartyplatform.
Nevertheless,in‐betweenelectionsmembersinbothpartiesarelargelyinactive.
Before2000,intheKMT,eachlocalbranchwasrequiredtoholdamonthlymeeting
andreportbacktothenationalpartycentral,butthiswasamereformalitytokeep
upthefaçadeofaLeninistmassparty.68IntheDPP,localbranchesenjoyahighde‐
greeofindependencefromthepartycentral(Rigger2001a:58).Therefore,theac‐
tivityofmemberswillvaryfrombranchtobranch,withthoselocalpartychapters
that are filledwith pocketmembers usually characterised by the lowest levels of
membershipactivity.
Wecanthusconcludethat,ingeneral,thepartyonthegroundinboththeKMT
andtheDPPisnotaverypowerfulorganisationalelement.Putincomparativeper‐
spective, it is probably safe to say that partymemberships in Taiwan show very
similar characteristics to partymemberships in contemporaryWestern European
politicalpartiesintermsofsizeandinclusiveness.69However,themembershipor‐
ganisationsinboththeKMTandDPPhavedevelopedinverydifferentways,which
canbeexplainedthroughthedifferentelectoralstrategiesfollowedbythemainfac‐
tionsineachoftheparties.WhereastheKMT’sMainstream,whichusedclientelistic
68PersonalcommunicationwithI‐ChouLiu,8May2008.69Asamatteroffact,thetotalmembership/electorateratioinTaiwanisevenhigherthaninanyWesternEuropeandemocracyinthelate1990s,withtheexceptionofAustriaandFinland(seeMairandvanBiezen2001).
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networkstomobilisevoters,wasnotinterestedinastrongpartyontheground,the
Non‐mainstream,followingaprogrammaticelectoralstrategy,pushedforalessin‐
clusive–andthusmorepowerful–partymembership,asthiswouldexcludemem‐
berswhowerenotideologicallycommitted,butwhoonlyjoinedthepartyaspocket
memberspaidbyleadingpoliticiansoftheMainstreamfaction.Asaresult,whenthe
Non‐mainstreambecame theKMT’s dominant faction in 2000, the party asked all
memberstore‐registerandintroducedmembershipfees.
IntheDPP,ontheotherhand,pocketmembersremainacharacteristicfeature,
as the membership is relatively small and many politicians – particularly those
competinginlocalelections,whereclientelismcontinuestoplayanimportantrole
forthemobilisationofvoters–donotfaceanysanctionswhenpayingthemember‐
ship fees for their supporters. The New Tide faction, which, like the KMT’s Non‐
mainstream, follows a programmatic strategy to gather votes, has been unable to
crack down on the problem of pocketmembers, since the party is financially de‐
pendentontheregularfeespaidforthesemembersbylocalbosses.Instead,asthe
nextsectionwillshow,theNewTidehas,overthepastfewyears,openedtheselec‐
tionofcandidates forpublicelections to thewiderelectorate inorder todiminish
theinfluenceofpocketmembersintheinternaldecision‐makingprocess–astrat‐
egyalsopursuedbytheKMT’sNon‐mainstream.
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Candidateselection
InbothlargerTaiwanesepartiestheprocedurestonominatecandidatesforpublic
electionsonthenational levelhavegonethroughsomeconsiderablechangesover
thelasttwodecades.Alreadyinthelate1980stheKMTmadesignificantreformsto
itsregulationsofcandidateselection.Inordertopickcandidatesforthe1989“sup‐
plementary”electionstotheLegislativeYuan,theregime‐partysoftenedthehighly
exclusivenominationsystemthathadbeenuseduptothattime,andheldaclosed
primary.Soonafter,theDPPannounceditsintentiontoadoptaverysimilarprimary
system,hencealsoleavingtheselectionofcandidatestotherank‐and‐file.
IntheKMT,wheretheNon‐mainstream–althoughincreasingly losingpower–
wasstillthedominantfaction,aclosedprimarywasusedtomakeitmoredifficult
fortheMainstreamfactiontouseitsstronglinkswithlocalfactionsasaresourcein
the inter‐factional conflict. Itwas hoped that by forcing candidates to compete in
party primaries, the party would not have to negotiate with local factions over
nominationsandresourcesheldby local factionscouldgraduallybetakenoverby
theparty(RobinsonandBaum1993). Inotherwords, “thepartywasusing inner‐
partydemocratizationasa tool in its inner‐partypowerstruggleagainst local fac‐
tions”(Fell2006:176).
Moreover, the Non‐mainstream calculated that conservative party members,
particularlythosegroupedintheHuangFuhsing,wouldbeeasiertomobilisethan
the less ideologically‐committed supporters of the Mainstream faction (Wu C.L.
OLIVERHELLMANN
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2001: 108). Similarly, in the DPP, the dominant Formosa faction estimated a nu‐
mericaladvantageovertheNewTide,basedonthetwofactions’differingorganisa‐
tionalstructures.AsRigger(2001a:27)pointsout,
[f]romthebeginning,theFormosaFactionwascentredonperson‐
alities, not issues. […]Aspiring politicians affiliatedwith Formosa
becausetheywantedtopartakeofitspoliticalresources:itspower
innominationsforelectoralandpartyoffices,itscontactswithpo‐
litical heavyweights, and its connections with local political net‐
works capableofmobilizingvotes and raisingmoney.The faction
didnot imposemuchdisciplineonitsmembers,nordid itrequire
themtoembraceaparticularideologyofplatform.Theonlyobliga‐
tion Formosa imposed upon faction members was to support its
leadersincontestforpowerwithintheparty.
TheNewTide,incontrast,wascharacterisedbystrongideologicalidentity.Admis‐
siontothefactionwasbasedonquality,notquantity.Evengrassroots‐levelactivists
were required to pay regular dues, attendmeetings, and commit vast amounts of
time and energy to faction activities.Hence, the Formosa faction couldbe sure to
rallymoresupportfortheircandidateswithinthepartythantheNewTide.Asare‐
sult,aclosedprimarywasimplementedinthelate1980s.
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Taiwanesedemocratisationtookacrucialstepwhentheregimedeclaredtohold
electionsforanewNationalAssemblyin1991,andanewLegislativeYuanoneyear
later. Intherun‐uptothese foundingelections, theKMTcraftedconsiderablepro‐
ceduralrevisions.Candidateswerenowselectedbywhatthepartycalleda“revised”
closedprimary. In thenewsystempartymemberswere still givenavote,but the
outcomedidnotserveastheonlyfoundationonwhichthecentralstandingcommit‐
tee nominated the candidates. The evaluation by local cadres contributed 40 per
centin1991,and50percentin1992(WuC.L.2001:109).TheDPP,incontrast,re‐
tainedthegenuineclosedprimarysystem.
In the followingyears theKMTcontinued to curtailmembershipparticipation.
Toselect candidates for the1995LegislativeYuanelectionand the1996National
Assembly election, the former regimeparty conductednon‐bindingopinion inqui‐
riesamongitsmembers.Allpowertonominatecandidateswasnowwiththecent‐
ralstandingcommittee.Thenominationofthecentralstandingcommitteemembers
inturnwasverymuchcentralisedinthehandsofthepartychairmanwho,sincethe
14thpartycongressin1993,appointedhalfofthemembersplusone,whilethere‐
mainingmembersneededtheapprovalofthecentralcommittee,whichagainwasto
beelectedbythedelegatesinthenationalcongress(Huang1996:112).
ThisincreasingcentralisationofthecandidateselectionprocesswithintheKMT
canbeexplainedbythegrowingdominanceoftheMainstreamfaction.Inparticular,
after leading figuresof theNon‐mainstream left theparty in1993toestablish the
NP, the Mainstream tightened its grip on party internal power. Centralising the
OLIVERHELLMANN
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nomination procedure became necessary to nourish the clientelistic networks on
whichtheMainstreamfactionbaseditsstrategyofvotermobilisation.Localfactions
notonlyreceivedmaterialrewardsinreturnfortheirelectoralsupport70,butlocal
factionmemberswerethemselvesnominatedascandidates.Asaconsequence,the
percentage of legislators with a local faction background increased steadily
throughoutthe1990s,leadingsomeobserverstoestimatethatabout60percentof
KMTlegislators inthe1992LegislativeYuanrepresentedlocal factions(ChenM.T.
1996:189).InordertostrategicallyallocatenominationstolocalfactionstheMain‐
streamneeded to centralise theprocedure for candidate selectionandabolish the
closedprimarysystem,whichdidnotallowformuchcontrolovertheoutcome.
TheDPPalsodevisednewrulesthatcurbedthepowerofthemembership,albeit
farlessdrasticallythantheKMT.In1995and1996thepartyselectedcandidatesby
holding a ballot among party officers and elected officials at the national level as
wellasamongpartymembers,withbothresultscontributing50percenttothefinal
outcome(Guo,HuangandChiang1998:200‐201).AsintheKMT,thisreformofthe
candidate selection procedure can be explained by changes in the inter‐factional
powerbalancewithin theparty.With theNewTidegrowing increasinglystronger
vis‐à‐vistheFormosafaction,bothfactionswereeventuallylockedinastalemateby
themid‐1990s.Dueto thisperfectbalanceofpower, theDPPadoptedasystemof
candidateselectionthatpleasedbothmajorfactions:Whilethe50percentthrough
70Partofthesematerialrewardswastakenfromthepartycoffers,butthelargestshareconsistedofpublicresources,extractedfromlocalmonopolyandoligopolyrightsand“moneymachines”likethecreditdepartmentsofthefishermens'associations(yuhui),thewaterconservancyassociations(shuilihui),andthefarmer'sassociations(nonghui).
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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membershipvotessatisfied theFormosa faction, theadjacent50percent through
partycadrevoteswasaconcessiontotheNewTide,whichhadanumericaladvan‐
tageintheintermediaryparty‐structures.
1996notonlysawelectionstotheNationalAssembly,butalsothefirstpopular
presidentialelectionsinthehistoryoftheRepublicofChina.Inordertoselecttheir
presidential candidate, bothmajor parties implemented systems thatwere rather
differentfromtheonesusedfortheselectionofcandidatesforparliamentaryelec‐
tions.Accordingtothenewlydesignedregulations,thepresidentialcandidateofthe
KMTneededthesupportoftheparty’snationalconvention.Delegatesincludedtwo
categories:700ex‐officiodelegates, and1,400electedby thegrassrootsmembers
(Wu C.L. 2001: 109). TheDPP, on its part, employed a primary consisting of two
stages.Thefirststageequalledthesystemusedfortheselectionoflegislativecandi‐
dates.Inthesecondstage,thetwowinnersthencompetedinanopenprimary.For
this, theDPP carried out 49 publicmeetings atwhich the candidates spoke, after
whichvoteswerecollected(Rigger2001a:78).
Thedifferentselectoratesforthenominationofpresidentialandlegislativecan‐
didatesareeasy toexplain.Regarding theKMT,althoughrelativelydemocraticon
paper,thesystemtoselectthepresidentialcandidatewas,inreality,stillhighlycen‐
tralised, as the national convention “served as nomore than a rubber stamp for
partychairLeeTeng‐hui’sdecisions”(Fell2006:180).IntheDPP,consideringthat
thenominationofthepresidentialcandidateisawinner‐takes‐it‐allgame,itwould
have been difficult to reach an agreement through inter‐factional negotiations,
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whichiswhyamoredemocraticprocedureneededtobeinstitutionalised.Anopen
primaryallowsforthelargestselectoratepossible,therebyalsomakingitdifficultto
influencethefinaloutcomethroughthemobilisationofpocketmemberswithinthe
party.
Whereas theKMTheld on to the regulations just described up until 2001, the
DPP introducednewregulationsagainbeforethe1998electionsto theLegislative
Yuan. Party cadres and elected party officials were excluded from the decision‐
makingprocess.Instead,nominationswerebasedonapartymemberprimaryand
publicopinionsurveys,withbothresultsbeingweightedequally.71Ashasbeende‐
scribedabove,afterthedisastrous1996presidentialelections,theNewTidefaction,
whichwasgrowingstrongerandstronger,felttheneedtomoderateitsideological
stanceandmoveawayfromitsunrestrictedindependencepolicy.Thismadeitne‐
cessary for the faction’s leadership to gain independence from themore ideologi‐
callyradicalmembersintheintermediaryparty‐structures.Asamatteroffact,the
foundingoftheTAIPdidnotattractmanypro‐independencehardlinersfromwithin
theDPP(Rigger2001b:954)Hence,inlinewiththemoretheoreticalargumentsde‐
velopedbyKatz (2001) and Scarrow,WebbandFarrell (2000), theNewTidede‐
cidedtorendertheselectoratemoreinclusive.TheNewTideoptedforpublicopin‐
ion polls for two main reasons. First of all, members‐only primaries would have
translatedintoanumericaladvantagefortheFormosafaction.Secondly,theexperi‐ 71TheDPPconductsthepublicopinionpollsthroughitsownsurveycentre,whichhaseightfull‐timestaffmembers.Respondentsareofferedalistofprospectivecandidates,andaskedtochoosetheirfirstandsecondpreferences.Partymembersarenotsurveyed.Theresultsofthesurveysarekeptsecret,evenfromthecandidates,whoaregivenonlytheirownresultsandasummaryoftheircom‐petitors’results.
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ence with an open primary in the run‐up to the 1996 presidential election had
shownthatfarfewerballotswerecastatthemassmeetingsthanexpected(Rigger
2001a: 99),meaning that outcome could be influenced by those politicians in the
partycontrollingalargeshareofpocketmembers.
Moreover,theDPPredesignedthenominationprocessforthe2000presidential
election.Underthenewrules,acandidateneededtheendorsementof40partyoffi‐
cials(includingprofessionalstaffandelectedofficials). Ifmorethanonecandidate
hadreceivedarecommendation,thepartywouldhaveheldaclosedprimary(Rig‐
ger2001a:101).However,asitturnedout,onlyonecandidatewasrecommended.
In this case the party regulations only demanded a three‐fifths approval by the
nationalpartycongress,which,accordingtoFell(2006:186),wasmerelyaquestion
ofrubber‐stampingChenShui‐bian’scandidacy.
Facing the 2001 Legislative Yuan elections, the KMT adopted the system em‐
ployed by the DPP for the 1998 elections. Candidates were chosen on an equal
weightingoftwofactors:aclosedprimaryandpublicopinionsurveys.Thelogicbe‐
hind this radical reformcanagainbe found in theparty internal conflictbetween
differentfactions:AfterthehumiliatingdefeatofLienChaninthe2000presidential
electionsandLeeTeng‐hui’s resignationasparty chairman,more traditional, pro‐
grammaticallyorientedforceswithintheKMTregainedpowerandbegantodestroy
theMainstream’s capacities to followa clientelistic strategy of votermobilisation.
Theythushadtocutthelinkstolocalfactionsbymakingitmoredifficultforanyone
withintheKMTtoallocatenominationstolocalfactionsinreturnforelectoralsup‐
OLIVERHELLMANN
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port.Hence,ratherthancentralisingtheselectionofcandidatesinthepartyleader‐
ship,publicopinionpollswere introduced.Thebasiccalculationwas thatbecause
manyofLeeTeng‐hui’sfollowershadbeenrecruitedthroughlocalfactionsandthus
weregenerallyassociatedwithorganisedcrime,corruptionandotherillegalactivi‐
ties,theywereunlikelytodoverywellinpublicopinionpolls.However,inorderto
includepartymembers in the internaldecision‐makingprocess in return for their
financial contribution, public opinion pollswere supplementedwith a closed pri‐
mary. The compulsory re‐registration of partymembers and the introduction of
membership fees meant that most pocket members had been excluded, with the
shareofideologicallydrivenmemberslikelytoincrease.
WhiletheKMTintroducedpublicopinionpollsforthefirsttimein2001,theDPP
decidedtoputmoreweightontheopinionpolls,whichnowconstituted70percent
of the total result.This ratiowas thenagainadoptedby theKMTbefore the2004
parliamentaryelections,while theDPPdidnotundertakeanyproceduralreforms.
Inbothpartiesthesechangescanagainbeexplainedbytherespectivedominantfac‐
tionincreasingitspowerevenfurther‐theNewTideintheDPPandtraditionalfor‐
ces–nowrallyingbehindpresidentMaYing‐jeou–intheKMT.
However,notonlydid theKMTcopy theDPP’s system toselect candidates for
parliamentaryelections,butitalsotookonaverysimilarsystemforthenomination
ofitspresidentialcandidatein2004.Accordingtothenewlyintroducedregulations,
acandidatemustobtaintheendorsementof50,000partymembers.Ifonlyonecan‐
didatemeets the required benchmark, voting will be held at the party’s national
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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congress.Otherwiseaclosedprimaryandopinionpollswillbeusedtofindthewin‐
ner.Yet,asinthecaseoftheDPP,therewasonlyoneapplicant,meaningthatboth
parties only alloweddelegates in thenational party congress toparticipate in the
decision‐makingprocess.Therealdecisionwasmadebehindcloseddoorsandthen
merelyrubber‐stampedbythedelegates’vote(Fell2006:183).
Thedevelopmentof candidate selection in theKMTandDPP is summarised in
Figure4.As canbe seen,bothpartiesbeganwith relatively inclusive selectorates,
givingallpartymemberstherighttovote.However,theythenmovedtowardsmore
exclusive procedures of candidate selection. The KMT, in particular, underwent a
considerable regression to a much less democratic past, when before the 1995
Legislative Yuan election the nomination of candidateswas centralised in a party
agency (central standing committee) that was half‐elected, half‐appointed by the
party leader.TheDPPalsoreachedits lowinselectorate inclusiveness in1995,by
basingnominationsonanequallyweightedvotebypartymembersandaselected
party agency (party cadres). Since then, however, both parties have returned to
moreinclusivemethodsofcandidateselection.Theynowemployaratherunusual
combinationofbindingopinionpollsandclosedmemberprimaries.Bindingopinion
polls, which are not covered by the analytical framework by Rahat and Hazan
(2001), should be settled halfway between open and closed primaries, since they
take candidate selection outside the political party, while choosing the voters
throughscientificsamplingmethods.
OLIVERHELLMANN
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TheparticulardevelopmentofcandidateselectioninTaiwancanagainbeexplained
bytheinter‐factionalconflictwithineachofthemajorparties.IntheKMT,candidate
selectionwascentralisedbecausetheMainstreamfaction,whichgrewincreasingly
powerfulthroughouttheearly1990s,followedaclientelisticstrategyofvotermobi‐
lisation,meaning that the allocationof nominations for public electionshad to be
concentratedinthehandsofthepartyleadership.IntheDPP,ontheotherhand,the
selectionofcandidatesunderwentaprocessofcentralisation–albeitlessdramati‐
cally than in the KMT – as the increasingly powerful New Tide, following a pro‐
grammatic electoral strategy, wanted to transfer decision‐making power to the
intermediarypartystructuresinordertoincreasepartydiscipline.
0
2
4
6
1989
1991
1992
1995
1996
1998
2001
2004
KMT
DPP
FIGURE4: TAIWAN–INCLUSIVENESSOFTHESELECTORATEIN THEPROCESSOFCANDIDATESELECTION
Notes:Thedifferentcategoriestomeasuretheinclusivenessoftheselectoratewerecodifiedasfol‐lows:(1)non‐selectedpartyleader,(2)selectedpartyleader,(3)non‐selectedpartyagency,(4)selectedpartyagency,(5)partymembers,and(6)electorate.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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Thisprocesswasreversedonlyafewyearslater,whentheNewTidebroadened
itsprogrammaticappealsintoacatch‐allelectoralstrategy,forcingthepartyleader‐
shipto free itself fromtheconstraininggripof thehardcore ideologistswithinthe
party.However,atomisingthepartymembershipthrougheitheranopenoraclosed
primarywasnotanoption,asthiswouldhaveplayedintothehandsoftheFormosa
and other smaller personalised factions,which controlled a large share of pocket
members.TheNewTidethereforeoptedforbindingpublicopinionpollsinorderto
limit theopportunities forvote‐buying.Basedonsimilarstrategiccalculations, the
KMT’sNon‐mainstream,afterre‐establishing itselfastheparty’sdominant faction,
copied this system to diminish the influence of theMainstream’s clientelistic net‐
worksoverthefinaloutcomeofthecandidateselectionprocedure.
Distributionofresourcesanddecision‐makingpositions
While the twomajor Taiwanese political parties showmany similarities with re‐
gardstothetwoorganisationaldimensionsdiscussedsofar,theydiffersubstantially
in their endowmentwith politically relevant resources – particularly financial re‐
sources:WhereastheKMTisconsideredbysometobethewealthiestpartyinthe
world, the financial survival of the DPP has long been hanging from a very thin
thread, and to this day the party has to operate under an extremely tight budget
OLIVERHELLMANN
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(Rigger2001a:69).TheKMT’s financialsuperiority lies in itsbusinessoperations,
whichthepartysetupinTaiwanafterfleeingtheChinesemainlandfromthecom‐
munist forces.Theseenterprises, includingconstructioncompanies, financial insti‐
tutions,computercompanies,electricalappliancecompanies,newspapersandtele‐
visionstations,wererunincloseassociationwiththestateandprosperedwiththe
strong economic development in Taiwan. As of the turn of the century, estimates
suggestthattheKMT’saccumulatedassetswereworthasmuchas200billionNTD
(about3.4millionGBP)(Matsumoto2002:360).
Whenthedemocratisationprocesssetininthelate1980stheKMTwasreluctant
togiveup itsorganisationalwealth.Althoughthepartyclaims itswealthhasbeen
accumulated through legalmeans, there isvery little transparency in themanage‐
mentofthefinancialresourcesastheKMT’sassetshaveneverbeendisclosedtothe
publicoreventopartymembers.Before1994allpartyassetswereheldinaccounts
underthenamesofindividualpartyleaders.Whenthepartytookcontroloftheas‐
sets, a centralised finance committeewas established to supervise party finances,
andpartyregulationsweredevelopedtorestrictthebuyingandsellingofpartyas‐
sets.Moreover,in2005,facingincreasingpublicaccusationsofcorruptionanddirty
moneypolitics,theKMTdecidedtotransferallitsassetsintoafundmanagedbya
privatefinancialmanagementcompany,whilethepartyitselfwouldceasetoengage
in any profit‐seeking activities. However, the KMT still benefits from the revenue
generatedbyitsassetsaswellasfromprofitsmadefromsellingassets,thusprovid‐
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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ingthepartywithalargewarchest,whichensuresthattheKMTdoesnothaveto
relyonmoretraditionalfundraisingactivitiesforitsorganisationalsurvival.72
TheDPP,incontrast,hastofollowastrategyofdiversificationandcurrentlyde‐
pendsonfourprimarysourcesofincome:(1)governmentsubsidies,(2)mandatory
contributions from elected politicians, (3)membership dues, and (4) private and
corporate donations (Rigger 2001a: 67‐69). Public subsidies for political parties,
introducedin1997,aretheDPP’smainsourceoffunding.However,astheywillde‐
pendontheparty’selectoralperformance, theyarenotaverystablesourceof in‐
come.Inthepresidentialelection,partiesreceive30NTD(0.51GBP)foreachvote
obtainedabovethethresholdofone‐thirdofthevotesrequiredforelection,whilein
legislativeelectionspartiesreceiveasubsidyof10NTD(0.17GBP)pervoteforeach
voteobtainedabovethethresholdofthree‐quartersofthevotesrequiredforelec‐
tion.Onlytheformersubsidy,however,ispaiddirectlytotheparty.Moreover,par‐
ties that surpass the threshold of five per cent of national votes in the legislative
electionsreceiveanannualsubsidyof50NTD(0.86GBP)pervote.
Inaddition to thepublicsubsidy, theDPPrequires itselectedofficials topaya
certainpercentageoftheirincomefromthegovernmenttotheparty.Thenational
presidentmustcontribute8millionNTD(137,000GBP),thevicepresident5million
NTD (86,000 GBP), the party chairperson 5 million NTD, committee members
500,000NTD(8,600GBP),nationallegislators300,000NTD(5,200GBP),localrep‐
resentatives200,000NTD(3,400GBP)andpartylistlegislators100,000NTD(1,700
72PersonalcommunicationwithShiow‐duanHawang,15May2008.
OLIVERHELLMANN
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GBP).73 However, as with public subsidies, this source of income will again ulti‐
matelydependontheparty’selectoralperformance.TheDPPthusalsocontinuesto
relyonbothmembershipfeesaswellasprivateandcorporatedonations.
Yet,neitherofthesetwolattersourcesofincomebenefitsthepartycentraloffice.
Firstofall,astheparty’sownregulationsstipulate,ninetypercentofmembership
duesaretobeallocatedtopartybranches,andonlytheremainingtenpercentto
thenationalheadquarters.74Secondly, inTaiwan’scandidate‐centredelectoralsys‐
tem,candidatesgenerallyfinditeasiertoraisefundsthanpoliticalparties(Kovick
2003).Whatismore,theDPPstatutesrulethatthosefinancialcontributionsraised
bythelocalbrancharetostaywiththelocalbranch.Inotherwords,thepartycent‐
ralofficeadministersonlyasmallproportionoftheparty’sincome,mostofwhichis
spentoncoveringtheexpensesofthecentraloffice itself.Asaresult,“theparty is
almosttotallywithoutfinancial leveragetouseindiscipliningitscandidates”(Rig‐
ger2001a:69).Inotherwords,candidatescanexpectverylittlefinancialassistance
from the party for their electoral campaigns. Rather, candidates need to raise the
necessaryfundsthemselves.
IntheKMT,ontheotherhand, thenationalpartyheadquarterscontrolsavery
largeshareof the fundsat thedisposalof theKMT’scandidates (Ferdinand2003:
60).Thisdependenceofthecandidateonthecentralpartyisfurtherreinforcedby
thefactthattheTaiwaneseelectionlawrequiresindividualcandidatestofileacam‐
paign spending report,while there areno restrictions as to the amount theparty
73PersonalcommunicationwiththeDPP,8May2008.74PersonalcommunicationwiththeDPP,8May2008.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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headquarters can spend.Moreover, KMT candidates verymuch rely on the party
centralofficeforthemobilisationofcampaignworkersandvotersamongtheparty
rank‐and‐file75,whereas in theDPP,wherethemembershipregister ismaintained
bythelocalbranches,and–aswasdiscussedearlier–manybrancheshavebeenhi‐
jackedbylocalbossesfortheirownparticularisticinterests,thepartycentraloffice
playsamuchlessimportantroleintheorganisationofelectoralcampaigns.Orput
inmoregeneralterms,thepartycentralofficeintheKMTseemstobeamorepow‐
erfulorganisationalelementthantheDPP’sbureaucracy.
However,interestingly,theimportanceoftheKMT’scentralofficeasanadminis‐
trative apparatus does not automatically translate into decision‐making power
withintheparty.Traditionally,theKMToperatedaccordingtoatop‐downLeninist
hierarchyinwhichthehigherbodiesappointedthosebeneaththemandallpower
originatedfromthechairperson.Hence,thechairpersonwouldnominateallmem‐
bersofthecentralstandingcommittee,whowouldthenselectthemembersofthe
centralcommittee,who,inturn,appointedthedelegatesforthenationalassembly.
Whilefirstchangestotheseregulationswerealreadyimplementedunderthelead‐
ershipofLeeTeng‐hui(seeabove),morefar‐reachingreformswereonlypassedin
2001.Accordingtothenewrules,thedelegatesofthenationalassemblywilleither
beelectedbyallpartymembersatthelocallevel(900delegates)orbedrawnfrom
elected leadersandpartyofficials(600delegates, includingcommitteeandbranch
chairpersons).Thenationalassemblywillthenelectthe210membersofthecentral
75PersonalcommunicationwithSzu‐yinHo,6May2008.
OLIVERHELLMANN
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committee,which then, finally,nominates the31membersof thecentral standing
committee.76Inotherwords,therehasneverbeenaprovisionthatguaranteedparty
bureaucratsaseatinthetwohighestexecutivebodiesoftheparty,buttheirnomi‐
nationalwayshadtobeconfirmedbyeitherthenexthighestornextlowestbodyin
theparty.
Astobeexpected,thesameappliestotheDPP.Thenationalcongress,thehigh‐
est decision‐making body in the party, is composed of 150 delegates that are di‐
rectlyelectedbylocalpartymembers,and150nationallyelectedleadersrepresent‐
ingtheDPPingovernment.Thenationalcongressthenelectsa31‐membercentral
executive committee, which, in turn, selects 10 of its members to serve on the
party’scentralstandingcommittee.77
Therefore,asthepartycentralofficedoesnotenjoyautomaticdecision‐making
power in the KMT or the DPP, the distribution of professional staff between the
partybureaucracyandthepartyinpublicofficeasanindicatorforthedistribution
ofpowerwithinthepartycanbemisleading.Infact,neitherpartyallocatesanyfull‐
time staff to the party in public office. Any assistants to the legislators are either
paidbythestateorbythelegislatorsthemselves.Hence,althoughbothpartiesem‐
ployaround100membersofstaffintheirheadquarters–withtheKMTemploying
another700acrossitslocalbranches78–neitheroftheparty’sbureaucracyplaysan
76PersonalcommunicationwiththeKMT,12May2008.77PersonalcommunicationwiththeDPP,8May200878Personalcommunicationwiththerespectivepoliticalparty.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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autonomousroleinpartyinternalpolitics,buttheyareratheranadministrativetool
atthedisposalofthepartyinpublicoffice.
Thisimpressionisconfirmedbylookingattheregulationsconcerningtheinner‐
workingsof theparty inpublic office.79 First of all, theparliamentary caucusesof
boththeKMTandDPPelecttheirownleadershipwithout interferencefromother
bodiesoftherespectiveparty.Secondly,novotingpowerisgiventomembersofthe
partycentralofficetakingpartinmeetingsofthecaucus.Andthirdly,theparliamen‐
taryparties of both theKMTand theDPPmake their owndecision‐making rules.
This inparticularconcernstheregulationstoenforcedisciplineamongthe legisla‐
tors.Bothparliamentarypartiesestablishedasystemoffinesthatpenaliselegisla‐
torsfornotattendingimportantplenarysessionsorvotingagainsttheofficialparty
line.
Wecan thus summarise thatorganisational resourcesarehighly centralised in
theKMT,whereasintheDPPtheyaremoreevenlydistributedamongelectedpoliti‐
cians, candidatesand localbranches. In theKMT, theparty inpublicoffice largely
depends on the central office for financial support and communicating with the
rank‐and‐file.IntheDPP,ontheotherhand,candidatescultivatetheirownsources
ofincomeandhaveeasyaccesstothepartymembershipregisterthroughthelocal
branches. However, the vital role of the KMT’s bureaucracy in administering the
profits generated through the party’s business assets and in maintaining the
membershipregisterdonottranslateintoformaldecision‐makingpower.Itisthus
79Theinformationcontainedinthisparagraphwascollectedthroughpersonalcommunicationwiththepoliticalparties.
OLIVERHELLMANN
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highlyquestionablewhetherthebureaucracy’sadministrativefunctionsamountto
aqualitativelydifferentpositionofthepartycentralofficewithinthepartyinternal
powerstructure,compared to thatof theDPP. Rather,as in theDPP, theparty in
publicofficeseemstodominateoverthecentraloffice.
Thisdistributionofpowerbetweenthepartycentralofficeandthepartyinpub‐
licofficeisperfectlyinlinewiththeelectoralstrategiesfollowedbythemainactors
withineachoftheparties.Factionsadoptingaclientelistic(theKMT’sMainstream)
orcharismaticstrategy(theDPP’sFormosa)werenot interested inastrongparty
centraloffice,becauseactorswouldhavehadtopooltheirpoliticalresourcesunder
the party’s centralistic control. Similarly, factions pursuing more programmatic
strategies – theNon‐mainstream in theKMT and theNewTide in theDPP – also
haveaninterestinapowerfulpartyinpublicoffice,sincetheydonottargetclearly
defined social groups but develop broader policy appeals. In order to do so they
needsufficientautonomyfromthepartycentraloffice.Theonlyfactionthatshould
have been interested in a strong, disciplining role of the central office over the
party’s legislatorswas theNewTide, in the early 1990s,when the faction openly
called for independence fromTaiwan.However, neitherwas theNewTide strong
enoughtorealisesuchareform,nordidtheDPPcontrolenoughresourcestogain
controloveritslocalbranchesandelectedpoliticians.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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Summary
ThecaseofTaiwanconfirmsoneofthecentralassumptionsofhistoricalinstitution‐
alism–thatagentsareknowledgeableandreflexive,andthusabletodevelopdiffer‐
ent strategies to overcome the same environmental barriers. During the KMT’s
authoritarian ruleonlyonegroupwithin the rulingparty, theMainstream faction,
developedclientelisticnetworks tomobilisevoters in thepseudo‐democraticelec‐
tions.Giventhetop‐downprocessofdemocratisationthesenetworkssurvivedthe
introductionof freeand fairelections,andallowed theMainstreamtobecomethe
dominant factionwithin theKMT. Incontrast,othergroupings in theKMT,mainly
theNon‐mainstream faction,aswellas themainoppositionparty, theDPP,devel‐
opedprogrammaticappealsastheirelectoralstrategy.Thiscouldpossiblybedueto
thefactthattheseactorshelddifferentsetsofideastotheNon‐mainstream,ordue
to their lack of similar links to local vote brokers. Assuming the latter, setting up
newclientelisticnetworkswasnotanoption,sinceboththeKMT’sNon‐mainstream
andtheDPPremainedexcludedfromaccesstopublicresources,whilethehighlevel
of socio‐economicdevelopmentmeant that investingpoliticians’private resources
wasunlikelytobesuccessful.Instead,theDPPturnedtheKMT’smoneypoliticsinto
an effective campaign issue, ultimately superseding the KMT in power in 2000.
However,thisdidnotmeanthattheDPPcouldnowchangetoaclientelisticstrategy
ofvotermobilisation,asits“blackgold”campaignhadcreatednegativepublicopin‐
ionagainstvote‐buyingandotherparticularisticmeansofelectoralcampaigning.
OLIVERHELLMANN
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Theconflictbetweenthesedifferentelectoralstrategiesclearlyreflectsintheor‐
ganisationaldevelopmentofpoliticalpartiesinTaiwan.Inordertofacilitatetheim‐
plementationofitsclientelisticdealings,theKMT’sMainstreamcentralisedalldeci‐
sion‐makingandthepowertoallocatepoliticallyrelevantresources.Asaresult,the
boundariesbetweenthethreefacesofpartyorganisationslowlybegantofade.Only
whenthepartylostthe2000elections,givingtheNon‐mainstreamtheopportunity
tore‐establish itselfas thedominant faction,wasthisprocessreversedbymaking
thepartymembershiplessinclusive,democratisingcandidateselectionandrender‐
ingtheallocationofresourcesmoretransparent.Assuch,thepartyinpublicofficeis
nowthestrongestorganisationalfacewithintheKMT.
ThesamecanbesaidabouttheDPP.However,theDPParrivedatthesamestage
viaaverydifferentpathoforganisationaldevelopment.Throughoutthe1990s,the
increasinglydominantNewTidepushedforastrongerpartycentralofficeinorder
to increase party discipline. However, it faced opposition by the Formosa faction,
whichmobilisedvotersprimarily through the charismaof its leaders andabroad
catch‐allstrategy,andwasthereforeinterestedinmakingthepartyinpublicoffice
thedominantorganisationalface.Moreover,astheDPPhasseverefinancialdifficul‐
ties, theNewTidewasunable to introducemoreexclusivepartymembershipcri‐
teria (particularly higher membership fees) and make politicians financially de‐
pendenton theparty centraloffice.Asa result, theonly significantorganisational
changetookplaceincandidateselection,wheredecision‐makingpowerwasshifted
to the intermediary party structures. However, this decision was soon reversed
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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whentheNewTidemoderated itsownpolicyplatform,making itnecessarytore‐
gain independence from hardcore ideologists among the mid‐level functionaries.
Thefactionthereforeintroducedbindingopinionpollsin1998,which,atthesame
time,underminedtheinfluenceofpocketmembersinanyvotingprocess.
As a result, bothmajor political parties now share central characteristicswith
political parties in contemporary Western Europe: The inclusiveness of party
membership falls somewhere between “indistinguishable from ordinary citizens”
and “highly selective”; the selection of candidates is open to citizens outside the
party;andthepartyinpublicofficedecidesabouttheallocationofresources.Politi‐
calpartieswereabletoestablishthepartyinpublicofficeasthedominantorganisa‐
tional face, because environmental uncertainty for political parties in post‐
autocraticTaiwan is relatively low(as indicatedby the low levelsofpartysystem
fragmentationandelectoralvolatility).Therefore,actorscampaigningonacatch‐all
electoral strategy did not feel forced to strengthen the party central office to in‐
creasepartydisciplineasameanstocontrolexternaluncertainty.Infact,itcanbe
argued that on the inter‐party level the twomajor political parties exhibit typical
cartelbehaviour.This canbeexemplifiedby the reformof theelectoral system in
2008, which replaced the single nontransferable vote systemwith singlemember
plurality, thereby considerably reducing the electoral chances of smaller political
parties. Inotherwords, similar tomanycontemporaryparties inWesternEurope,
thetwomajorpoliticalpartiesinTaiwanworktogethertokeepenvironmentalun‐
OLIVERHELLMANN
–228–
certaintyataminimum,whichallowstheparliamentarypartytomaintainitsinde‐
pendencefromtherestoftheparty.
However,despitethesestrikingsimilaritiesbetweenTaiwanesepartiesandtheir
contemporarycounterpartsinWestern,thisdoesnotmeanthattheformertookan
“evolutionaryleap”asthe“periodeffect”approachwouldwantustobelieve.Rather,
as our analysis has shown, eachmajor political party followed its owndistinctive
path of organisational development, constrained by the inter‐factional conflict
withineachofthepartiesandtheparticularenvironmentalcontext.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–229–
–6–
THEPHILIPPINES
UnlikeinSouthKoreaorTaiwan,thedemocratisationofthepoliticalsysteminthe
Philippineswasnotdrivenbysocio‐economicgrowth.Asaresult,theenvironment
politicalactorsfacewhendevelopingelectoralstrategiesheavilyfavoursclientelism
asamechanismtomobilisevoters.Similartotheclassicalcadreinearly‐democratic
Europe, parties are therefore nomore than formal cloaks around highly informal
patron‐client networks. However, this does notmean that political parties in the
Philippinesarefollowingtheexactsamepathoforganisationaldevelopmentaspar‐
ties in Europe. Rather, because of the particular context in the Philippines, pro‐
grammaticmasspartiesareveryweak,meaningthatthereislittlepressureonthe
majorpartiestoopenupforwiderparticipation.
OLIVERHELLMANN
–230–
Theenvironmentalcontext
TheprocessofdemocratictransitioninthePhilippinescanprimarilybecharacter‐
isedasareplacement,asitbeganasasociety‐ledupheaval.Thisupheaval,however,
requiredalmostnoviolence,sincepartsofthearmedforcessidedwiththereformist
civiliangroups (Wurfel1990). Ithasbeenargued thatanoverthrowwas theonly
way to re‐establish democratic rule, because the highly personalistic character of
FerdinandMarcos’ dictatorshipmeant that therewere no collective interests that
couldbesavedonceMarcosrelinquishedoffice(Thompson1996).Hence,asthere
was little hope he couldwin competitive elections,Marcos refused to negotiate a
democratisationofthepoliticalsystembutheldontopoweraslongashecould.
Marcos justifiedthedeclarationofmartial lawin1972withtheneedforpeace
andorder–overplayingthestrengthofthecommunistinsurgency–andtheprom‐
iseofeconomicgrowth.Congresswasclosedandthetwotraditionalparties,theNa
cionalistaPartyandLiberalParty,soonwithered,astheirlegislativefunctionswere
supplantedbypresidentialdecreesandinstructions.Thereby,Marcosputanendto
the two‐partycycle,which, since theendof theAmericancolonialperiod,haden‐
sured that the country’s elites would alternate in government “with almost me‐
chanicalregularity”(Thompson1995:15).Hethusbarredtheotherelitesfromac‐
cess to thegovernment‐distributedporkbarrel,but instead–after initially imple‐
menting a number of auspicious reforms –Marcos’ authoritarian rule lapsed into
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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“cronycapitalism”,whichonlynurturedfamilymembersandclosefriendswithjobs
inthestateapparatus,operatinglicences,statecontracts,andcheapcredit.
AsaresultofMarcos’patrimonialistsdealings,thePhilippineeconomydeterio‐
rated,realwagesdeclined,andruralpovertyincreased.Thisandtheincreasingpat‐
rimonialisationof themilitary,whichseriouslyundermined itsprofessionalisation
and fighting effectiveness, led to a dramatic growth of the communistmovement.
Faced with a severe loss of legitimacy, Marcos decided to liberalise the system.
Hence,in1978,legislative“elections”wereheld,and,in1981,Marcosdeclaredthe
liftingofmartiallawandcalledforpresidentialelections.Fraudandtheabsenceof
realopposition,however,robbedtheelectoralprocessofanylegitimisingeffect,and
thedominanceofMarcos’NewSocietyMovement(KilusangBagongLipunan,KBL)
remainedunthreatened.Moreover, theKBLboughtelectoralsupportdirectly from
votersthroughclientelisticexchangemechanisms.Inordertofacilitatethemonitor‐
ing of voters,Marcos introduced thebarangay as the smallest administrativeunit
(100to500people),withthebarangaycaptainusuallyactingasvotebroker(Wur‐
fel1988:131).
The legitimacy crisis worsened when opposition politician Benigno Aquino,
uponreturningfromexileintheUnitedStatesin1983tocompeteinthe1984par‐
liamentary elections, was shot at Manila airport. This clumsy assassination, evi‐
dentlyplannedbyMarcos’wife,Imelda,andhermilitaryallies,energisedtheexist‐
ingoppositionandpoliticisednewsectorsofsociety(Timberman1991:126).The
civiliancoalitionagainstMarcos–theCatholicChurch,themiddleclassandtheold
OLIVERHELLMANN
–232–
economicelite–cooperatedinformingapollwatchersgroup,NAMFREL(National
Movement for Free Elections). Under the monitoring activities by NAMFREL, the
pro‐democratic opposition, led by theUnitedNationalistDemocraticOrganization
(UNIDO) and thePartido Demokratiko PilipinoLakas ng Bayan (Philippine Demo‐
craticParty‐People’sPower,PDP‐Laban),performedrelativelybetter.
Inaneffortto,again,demonstratehispolitical legitimacy,Marcoscalledasnap
presidentialelectioninFebruary1986.However,againstMarcos’strategiccalcula‐
tions, the reform movement united behind Corazón Aquino, widow of Benigno
Aquino,astheirsinglecandidate.OnlytheCommunistParty,variouslabourunions
and peasant organisations chose to boycott the elections. When voting finished,
Marcoswasdeclaredthewinner,butNAMFRELandotherpollwatchingorganisa‐
tions reportednumerouscasesofelectoral fraud.Aquinorespondedbyappearing
beforeaManilacrowdofmorethanhalfamilliontoproclaimherownvictoryand
to launchacampaignof civildisobedience. Itwas the involvementof themilitary,
however,thattippedthescales,whenafactionofyoungofficersledbythedefence
minister,JuanPonceEnrile,andthedeputychiefofstaff,FidelRamos,seizedcontrol
ofabuildinginthearmedforcesheadquartersanddeclaredtheirrebellionagainst
Marcos (Wurfel 1990: 119‐122). Having no firepower, the rebels turned to the
Aquino camp forprotection.Theevent that followedwentdown inhistory as the
“peoplepower”revolution,astensofthousandsofciviliansfollowedanappealover
theradiobyCardinalSintosupporttherebelswithfoodandhumanshields.With
therefusalofthesecurityforcestoactagainstcivilians,theUnitedStatesintervened
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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topersuadeMarcos to leave the country for exile inHawaii.Aquinowasdeclared
presidentandsetaboutrestoringthedemocraticconstitutionalstructure.
TABLE15: SOCIO‐ECONOMICDEVELOPMENTINTHEPHILIPPINES
GDPpercapita(USDollars)
GiniCoefficientDegreeof
urbanisation(inpercent)
Literacy(inpercent)
Philippines 719(1990)
1,192(2005)
0.468(1991)
0.445(2005)
27.0(1990)
48.0(2000)
93.6(1990)
92.6(2005)
Germany 29,461(2006) 0.283(2007) 75.2(2005) 99.0(2006)
UnitedKingdom 33,238(2005) 0.360(2007) 89.7(2005) 99.0(2005)
Source: UnitedNationsESCAP(undated);UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(undated);Solon(1996)
UnlikeinSouthKoreaandTaiwan,theprocessofdemocratisationinthePhilippines
wasnot accompaniedby socio‐economicdevelopment.Although theeconomyhas
been slowly growing since the overthrow of Marcos, this growth has yet not re‐
flected in a more even distribution of wealth (see Table 15). In other words, al‐
thoughthedemocratictransitioncanbecharacterisedasacompletereplacementof
the authoritarian regime, we should expect the environment in the post‐Marcos
Philippines tobe favourable to clientelistic strategiesof votermobilisation, as the
economicelitecanusetheirrelativefinancialstrengthtoinvestintheestablishment
ofnewexchangenetworks.Thisisencouragedevenfurtherbythelowdegreeofur‐
banisation, which helps to ensure that voters do not defect from the clientelistic
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game,asmostvoters live insmall ruralcommunities,whichareeasier tomonitor
forelectoralcompliance.
Actorsandtheirstrategies
Infact,studiesofvotingbehaviourhaveshownthatvotersinthePhilippinestendto
supportthecandidatewhois“helpfultothoseinneed”and“establishesgovernment
programsfordevelopment”(InstituteforPoliticalandElectoralReforms2004).The
effectivenessof clientelistic strategies tomobilisevotershas ledobserversofFili‐
pinopoliticstodescribethepost‐Marcospoliticalsystemas“elitedemocracy”(Bello
andGershman1990)or“caciquedemocracy”(Anderson1988),basedontheobser‐
vationthatthecountryisrunbyasmallnumberofinfluentialfamilies.Atthesame
time,thereishardlyanypressurefromthelowerspheresofsociety.Neitherhasthe
large non‐governmental organisation (NGO) community been able to break the
dominanceof traditionaleliteclans(Eaton2003),norhavepoliticalpartiesrepre‐
sentingthepoorsucceededinplayingamoresignificantroleintheelectoralcompe‐
tition(Quimpo2005).
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Elitefamiliesinpost‐MarcosPhilippines
Most lawmakers in the post‐authoritarian Philippines come from political clans –
thatis,theyaretiedtoafamilybasewhosemembersarecurrentlyholdingoronce
heldelectiveposts.IntheHouseofRepresentatives,twoofeverythreecongressmen
aremembersofpoliticalclans.80Thevastmajorityof thesearesecond‐andthird‐
generation politicians with parents and grandparents who had in the past been
elected into public office (Co et al. 2005: 50). In most cases they will also have
multiplerelativeswhoarecurrentlyinpublicoffice.
Democratic politics in the Philippineswork according to the logic that – once
electedintopublicoffice–politicianswillseektotransformthepublicofficeintoa
privatelegacyfortheirfamily.Filipinocultureputsstrongemphasisonthefamilyas
thebasicunitofsociety,withfamiliesoftenperformingabroadrangeofeconomic,
socialandpolitical functions.Thispoliticade familia, conditionedby interpersonal
reciprocityandsocialobligations,ensures“thattheFilipinoismoreinclinedtoper‐
ceivetheworldintermsofhowoutsideresourcescouldbeusedtoimprovethatsta‐
tusofthefamilyinsocio‐economicterms”(Roces2000:188).AsWurfel(1988:34)
explains,
[t]hefamilyhaslongbeenthecenterofFilipinosociety.Asinmost
80Forinstance,80percentofthecongressmenelectedin1987couldbeclassifiedasbelongingto“traditionalclans”(Gutierrez,TorrenteandNarca1992:25).
OLIVERHELLMANN
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parts of SoutheastAsia kinship is essentially bilateral; that is, an‐
cestryistracedthroughboththemother’sandthefather’sline.Ef‐
fectivekinshiptiesaremaintainedwithrelativesofbothparents.A
bilateralsystemgivesapotentiallyhugenumberoflivingkin,espe‐
ciallyasfivetotenchildrenarenotuncommoneventodayineach
nuclearfamilyofeachgeneration.
TheFilipinoconstitutioncontainsexplicitprovisionsonpoliticalclans,openingthe
possibility for a law that prohibits political dynasties.However, such a law is un‐
likelytobepassedinthenearfuture.Similarly,theexistingconstitutionallawthat
bansrepresentativesfromseekingmorethanthreeconsecutivetermsisnotanef‐
fective obstacle either, since clans simply field other family members to replace
thosewhofacetermlimits,or–inothercases–theplaceoftheincumbentistaken
byrivalclans.
ElectionsinthePhilippines,inotherwords,canthusbestbedescribedasanar‐
chiccompetitionamongdominantelitefamilies.81Inordertobeelectedintooffice,
politiciansprimarilymobilisetheirkinshipnetworksandfamilyassets.Iftheywin,
theywill repay their family by using their legislative post to expand the family’s
economicinterests–forexamplethroughloans,monopolies,taxexemptions,cheap
foreignexchangeorsubsidies. Inaddition, legislatorswill strengthentheirrespec‐
tivekinshipnetworkthroughthedistributionofpatronage:
81Theterm“anarchic”isborrowedfromthetitleofMcCoy’s(1994)openingchapterinthebookofthesametitle“Ananarchyoffamilies”.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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Onceinoffice,theypavethewayforotherrelativestobeeitherap‐
pointedtothebureaucracyorelectedtogovernmentposts.Within
afewyears,anewlyelectedlegislatorwilllikelyhavekininlocalof‐
fice, various government agencies, and state‐owned corporations.
Beforelong,thenextgenerationtakesover.
(Coroneletal.2004:11)
However,whilethisexplainsthegeneralreproductionofelitefamilydominancein
theFilipinoCongress, itcanneitherexplainhowthesefamiliesbecametheelite in
the firstplacenorwhysomepoliticaldynastieshavedisappearedwhilenewones
haveemerged.TherehasalwaysbeenaFilipinoupperclass,whosepositionisbased
oncombinedeconomicandpoliticalpower,asParedes(1994)pointsout.However,
the composition of this class – the actual families that comprise it – is constantly
changing.Wemustthusdistinguishbetweendifferenttypesofpoliticalclans,which
use very different resources and strategies to compete successfully in the demo‐
craticgame.
Traditionally,thenationalpoliticaloligarchywascomposedofmembersofweal‐
thy landowning families – particularly those involved in export agriculture – that
emergedinthe19thcentury,suchastheAranetas,theCojuangcos,theJacintos,the
MadrigalsortheYulos.Today,thesefamiliesaremuchlesspowerful,asisindicated
by the relatively small percentage of lawmakers in the House of Representatives
who own agricultural land (Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism 2004).
OLIVERHELLMANN
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However,becauseoftheirsheerwealththetraditionallandedelitesarestillastrong
electoral force.Moreover, theirplantationsprovidethesefamilieswithanefficient
machine tomobilisevotesamong theirworkersand tenants,while theirhacienda
organisationcanbeusedtoconducttheelectoralcampaign.
Theinfluenceoflandedfamiliesbegantowaneafter1945,astheJapaneseoccu‐
pationofthePhilippinesduringtheSecondWorldWarhaddisruptedthetraditional
economy, while the landowners’ collaboration with the Japanese weakened their
moral hold on the peasantry. A new type of elite swiftly moved into this power
vacuum: localwarlords.Politicalwarlordismwas the result of theproliferationof
armsandtheweakeningofthecentralauthorityintheprovincesattheendofthe
war.FamousfamiliesthatrosetopowerthrougharmedviolenceincludedtheLluch‐
BadellesclanofLanao– thoughtheywere latereclipsedbythemoreviolentwar‐
lordAliMohamadDimaporo–theRemullasofCaviteandtheDuranosofCebu.Al‐
thoughwarlordisminthenarrowsenseisnowadayslimitedtoveryfewareas,par‐
ticularlyMindanao,many clans still relyonviolence and coercion inorder towin
elections – a phenomenon that has beendescribed as “bossism” (Sidel 1999) and
“authoritarian clientelism” (Franco 2001). During the campaign period election‐
related violence can range from intimidating and threatening people with bodily
harm, tokidnappingsandmurder,aswellasarsonandbombings.Notonlycandi‐
datesandtheircampaignstaffaretargeted,butalsotheirsupportersaswellasor‐
dinaryvoters.Onelectionday itself, thethreatanduseofviolencealsoextendsto
poll watchers and election officials, and it is no rarity to see burning voting sta‐
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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tions.82Thestate,onitspart,isunabletoenforcetherulesofthedemocraticgame,
whichhas ledtotheobservationthat“membersof thegoverningclassare[…]ex‐
emptfromtheruleoflaw”(Rogers2004:116).
The1960ssawtheemergenceofyetanothertypeofpoliticalclan:thenouveaux
riches.Unlikethetraditionalelite,thesefamilies–amongthemtheEnriles,Puyats,
Sarmientos andSilverios–didnothaveabase in landholdings, but theyamassed
wealththroughindustrialmanufacturing.Theythenexpandedtheireconomicbase
afterwinningoffice, therebygainingaccess togovernmentcreditand licensesand
government‐administeredforeignaidandloans.Inordertogetanideaofhowthis
business elite dominates electoral politics in the Philippines, one can look at the
socialcompositionofCongress. In2001,onaverage,eachmemberoftheHouseof
Representativesheldassetsworth22millionPHP(262,000GBP)–accordingtothe
legislators’ownreportingandthusprobablyunderstated‐while intheSenatethe
averagenetworthwas59millionPHP(704,000GBP).Incontrast,in2000,thetypi‐
calFilipinohadanannualincomeofabout150,000PHP(1,800GBP)(Coroneletal.
2004).
Finally, in the1990sanumberofnewpoliticaldynastieswerebuilt simplyon
popularity.While, in thepast,popularstarlets fromshowbusinessandsportshad
onlybeenhiredbyestablishedpoliticianstoattractvoters,celebrities increasingly
realised that they themselves had the potential to win public office, thereby – in
82Accordingtodifferentpresssources,126peoplewerekilledand148otherswoundedinviolenceleadinguptoandduringthe2007parliamentaryandlocalelections.Inthe2004presidentialelec‐tions,election‐relatedviolenceclaimed189lives.ForolderfiguresseePatinoandVelasco(2004).
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somecases– laying the foundation for influential showbizclans.Themostpromi‐
nentamongthesearetheEjercitosaroundmoviestarJosephEstrada,theRevillas–
actorRamonRevillahas80childrenwithdifferentwives,manyofwhomholdpublic
office – and the family of Robert Jaworski, former basketball player and coach.
Meanwhile, anumberofmore traditionalpolitical familieshavebeen trying to in‐
crease their own popularity by either marrying a celebrity83 or going into show
businessthemselves.84
WecanthussummarisethatFilipinoelectoralpoliticsaredominatedbyasmall
numberof influential families,whousedifferent resources towinelections.How‐
ever, the differences between traditional landed elites,warlords, nouveaux riches
andcelebrities isnotclear‐cut.Rather, theyall followamixofelectoralstrategies,
primarilyrelyingonclientelism,withcharismaandcoercionascomplementarysub‐
strategies.
83Forinstance,in2002,NegrosOccidentalrepresentativeJulio'Jules'LedesmaIVwalkeddowntheaislewithmoviestarAssuntadeRossiinatelevisedceremonyathishacienda.Earlier,Batangasrep‐resentativeandnowSenatorRalphRectowedpopularmovieactressVilmaSantosin1992,amar‐riagethathelpedcatapultthethird‐generationlegislatorintotheSenate.OthercelebritymarriagesofpoliticalclansintheHouseincludethoseofNegrosOccidentalrepresentativeCarlosCojuangco,sonofSanMiguelCorporationchairmanEduardo'Danding'Cojuangco,tothelateactressRioDiaz,andthatofAntonio'Tonyboy'FloirendotoformerMissUniverseandTVhostMargieMoran.84Severalpoliticianshosttalkshowsonradioortelevision.Forinstance,IlocosNorterepresentativeImeeMarcos,daughterofFerdinandMarcos,anchoredanentertainmenttalkshowonthepopularradiostationDZBB,andhasmadeappearancesinTVsoapsandcomedies.RenatoCayetano,whodiedin2003,waselectedtotheSenatein1998mainlybecausehehostedapopularradioandTVtalkshowwherehegavefreelegaladvice.
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Politicalpartiesascoalitionsbetweenfamilies
Politicalclansdonotcontrolapoliticalpartyeach,butpartiesareusuallycoalitions
ofseveralpowerful families(McCoy1994:8).However,thesecoalitionsarehighly
unstable,which iswhy it is difficult to establish personal continuity between the
myriadofpoliticalparties thathaveemergedanddied since theoustingof Ferdi‐
nandMarcos in1986.As clans enter intonew coalitionswithother clans, theold
partywillbedissolvedandanewpartywillbefoundedinordertoprovideaformal
framework – or organisationalmanifestation – for the newly forged coalition.We
canthussummarise,inthewordsofCoroneletal.(2004:7),that
[l]ookingatthehistoryofthePhilippinelegislaturesfromthe1898
MalolosCongress,itwouldseemthatfamilies,notparties,aretheir
most enduring feature. Regimes come and go but the families re‐
main.Politicalpartiesareformedanddisbandedbuttheclansthat
makethemupstayon.
ThefluidnatureoftheFilipinopartysystemreflectsclearlyintherelativelyhighef
fective number of political parties and the high degree of electoral volatility (see
Table16).However,despitethetransientlifeofpoliticalpartiesinthePhilippines,it
isstillpossibletofindpartiesthatfulfilourcriteriaofcaseselection.Themostnot‐
ablecasesarewithoutdoubttheLiberalParty(PartidoLiberalngPilipinas,LP)and
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theNacionalistaParty(NP).Foundedin1907,whenseveralpro‐independencepar‐
tiesunitedtocontesttheelectionstothefirstFilipinoparliament,theNPistheold‐
estpartyinthePhilippines.ItdominatedPhilippinepoliticsuntil1945,whentheLP
formedasasplinterparty.From1946until1972(theyearMarcosdeclaredmartial
law), these twoparties constituted theparty systemand regularly shifted control
over thepresidencybetweenthem.However,afterMarcos’authoritarian interreg‐
numthefragmentationofthepartysystemexploded,leavingtheNPandtheLPas
twopartiesamongmany.
TABLE16: PHILIPPINES–PARTYSYSTEMINDICATORSa
ENEPb ENPPc Volatility
1987 7.68 5.84 ‐1992 4.81 3.84 43.001998 3.10 2.69 48.502001 ‐ 5.03 ‐2004 ‐ 4.06 ‐2007 ‐ 4.60 ‐Average 5.20 4.34 45.75Notes:aThevotingresultsprovidedbytheelectoralcommissionCOMELEChaveoftenbeenincompleteinthepast,henceforsomeyearsnoindicatorscouldbecalcu‐lated.bEffectivenumberofelectoralpartiesbasedonthefirstvoteinelectionstotheHouseofRepresentatives.cEffectivenumberofparliamentarypartiesintheHouseofRepresentatives.Source: Author’sowncalculationsbasedonTable17andTeehankee(2002;
2006).
Of themyriad of political parties that have been established since the ousting of
FerdinandMarcosin1987,onlyafewhavebeenabletosurviveforlongerthanone
election, while, at the same time, regularly winning national parliamentary man‐
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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dates.OneofthemistheLabanngDemokratikongPilipino(StruggleofDemocratic
Filipinos, LDP), which was formed in 1988 from a merger between two parties
closely associatedwith thenpresident CorazonAquino:Lakas ngBayan (LABAN),
the coalition that had supported Aquino in the 1987 presidential election, and a
splintergroupofPartidoDemokratikoPilipino(PDP), ledbyAquino’sbrother, Jose
‘Peping’Cojuango.
Unable to secure the LDP’s nomination as presidential candidate for the 1992
elections,FidelV.Ramos,defenceministerunderAquino,leftthepartytoestablish
thePartidoLakasTao(Lakas).Onlyafewmonthslater,hethenmergedLakaswith
theNationalUnionofChristianDemocrats(NUCD),whichwasledbythensecretary
for foreign affairs RaulManglapus. Shortly after, theUnitedMuslimDemocrats of
thePhilippines(UMDP)joinedthebandwagon,givingRamosthenecessarysupport
towinthepresidency.
For the1998 elections, Lakas‐NUCD‐UMDP joined a coalitionwithKAMPI (Ka
balikat ngMalayangPilipino, Partner of the Free Filipino), a splinter groupof the
LPD that supported thepolitical aspirationsofGloriaMacapagal‐Arroyo.TheLDP,
ontheotherhand,formedacoalitioncalledLabanngMakabayangMasangPilipino
(LAMMP)withtwootherparties:theNationalistPeople’sCoalition(NPC)–founded
in1992asagroupingofsmallerpartiesandmembersoftheNP(Rodriguezwing)–
and thePartidongMasangPilipino (PMP)ofmoviestar JosephEstrada.WhileEs‐
trada won the presidency, Arroyo of the Lakas‐NUCD‐UMDP‐KAMPI coalition as‐
sumed the vice‐presidency. However, when, in 2001, Estrada was forced to step
OLIVERHELLMANN
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down,Arroyoautomaticallybecamepresident.
TABLE17: PHILIPPINES–RESULTSFORHOUSEOFREPRESENTATIVESELECTIONSa
Party 1987 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
GovernmentCoalition 29.5 0.5 4.4 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐LABAN 14.5 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐PDP‐Laban 12.0 ‐ 0.5 ‐ ‐ ‐ 1.7LP 8.5 ‐ 2.5 6.8 9.0 12.0 6.6UNIDO 8.0 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐KBL 6.5 2.0 0.5 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐GAD 5.0 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐NP 2.0 3.0 0.5 ‐ ‐ ‐ 3.3LDP ‐ 43.0 8.3 ‐ 9.0 5.0 1.3Lakas‐NUCD‐UMDP ‐ 21.5 49.0 50.5 36.0 40.0 38.0NPC ‐ 17.0 10.8 4.1 23.0 23.0 11.6LP‐PDP ‐ 6.0 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐LDP/Lakas ‐ ‐ 12.3 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐LAMMP ‐ ‐ ‐ 25.0 ‐ ‐ ‐KAMPI ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 20.3Independents 11.5 0.5 3.4 0.9 4.0 2.0 1.7Partylist ‐ ‐ ‐ 6.4 9.0 10.0 8.7Other 3.5 6.5 7.8 6.3 8.0 10.0 6.8
Notes:aShareofseats(inpercent).Source: Hartmann,HassallandSantos(2001);Teehankee(2006);HouseofRepresentatives
(undated)
These parties again played the most important role in all subsequent elections.
However,thecoalitionlandscapehasbeensubjectedtosignificantchanges.In2001,
thethreecoalitionpartnersofLAMMP–LDP,NPCandPMP–formedanewcoali‐
tion,PuwersangMasa(ForceoftheMasses),alongwithothersmallerparties.Sup‐
porters of Arroyo, on the other hand formed the People Power Coalition (PPC),
comprising Lakas‐NUCD‐UMDP, the Liberal Party and a number ofminor parties.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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Beforethe2004electionthecoalitionswerere‐shuffledagain,withKAMPI,LP,La‐
kas, NPC and NP forming the Coalition of Experience and Fidelity for the Future
(Koalisyon ngKaranasan atKatapatan saKinabukasan, K4) supporting incumbent
presidentGloriaMacapagalArroyo,whiletheLDPandanumberofsmallerparties
united behind opposition candidate FernandoPoe Jr. in the Coalition forNational
Unity(KoalisyonngNagkakaisangPilipino,KNP).Finally,in2007,supportersofAr‐
royo – most notably Lakas, KAMPI and the LDP – grouped under the banner of
TEAMUnity,while those in favour of impeachingArroyo established theGenuine
Opposition.
ItcanthusbesummarisedthatwiththeexceptionoftheNPConlythetwotradi‐
tionalparties,LPandNP,andpartiesofformerpresidents,theLDP(Aquino),Lakas
(Ramos)andKAMPI(Arroyo),havebeenable tomaintain themselves in theparty
system.Moreover,alreadythisshorthistoricaloverviewhintedatthelogicofparty
formationinthePhilippines:Politicalpartiesareestablishedasfamiliesrallybehind
presidentialcandidatesinlargeelectoralcoalitions.Politicalclanswhosupportthe
winningpresidential candidate canexpect tobe rewardedafter theelections.The
presidentialsystemofthePhilippinesisoneofspoils:Thepresidentcanappointhis
orherchoicestomorethan6,000positionsinthebureaucracy.Traditionally,these
aregivenouttopoliticalsupporters.Moreover,beingapresidentialallyalsomeans
accesstogovernmentloans,contracts,andotherbenefits.
In return, thepresidential candidatewill expectelectoral support.Familiesare
themselves highly efficient political machines to mobilise votes and ensure that
OLIVERHELLMANN
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these votes are properly counted in the election process, but families also extend
thesemachinesbeyondfamilyloyalties–particularlyiftheyareaimingforofficeat
thenationallevel.Acongressman'spoliticalmachinetypicallyincludesanetworkof
lideratthevillageorbarangaylevel.Thelidercanbeeitherthebarangaycaptain,a
councilmember,oranyotherinfluentialperson,suchasasuccessfullocalentrepre‐
neurortheheadofacommunityorganisation.Thisliderinturnmobilisesanetwork
of supporters for the candidate,whowill helpwith the election campaign (for in‐
stance,byputtinguppostersandconductingdoor‐to‐doorcanvassing),serveaspoll
watchersonelectionday,andlastbutnotleastgivetheirvotetothecandidateen‐
dorsedbythelider.Theliderusuallygetspaidforhisorherwork;insomecaseshe
or she even receives regularmonthly allowances from the congressman’s payroll,
while sometimes liders are bought off by other candidates who offer bigger re‐
wards.85
Astheinfluenceofafamily–andtheeffectivenessoftheirpoliticalmachine–is
usuallylimitedtothelocallevelandthefamily’sownbailiwick,familieswhowishto
win thepresidencyoraseat ineither theSenateor theHouseofRepresentatives,
will have to enter into coalitions with families who dominate other geographical
areas of the country. In return, the latter will expect their fair share of state re‐
sources. Political parties are thus, put simply, the formal manifestation of these
temporary patron‐client networks, in which the access to state resources is ex‐
changedfororganisationalsupportduringelections(votermobilisation,campaign‐
85Theinformationcontainedinthisandthefollowingparagraphwasgainedthroughpersonalcom‐municationwithRamonC.Casiple,19June2008.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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ing,pollwatching).Or in thewordsofCoet al. (2005:82): “Parties represent the
mechanism for rendering and sustaining [the] exchangeof political resources and
support”. It thus still holds true what Landé (1965: 24) observed about Filipino
democraticpoliticsinthemid‐1960s:
Candidates fornationalofficeneedvotes,which local leaderswith
theirprimaryholduponthe loyaltyof theruralelectoratecande‐
liver. Local leaders in turn needmoney to do favors for their fol‐
lowers, and this the candidate forhighoffices cansupply […]The
result is a functional interdependence of local, provincial, and
nationalleaderswhichpromotesaclosearticulationofeachlevelof
partyorganizationwiththoseaboveandbelowit.
Moreover, parties not only serve as the formal framework for coalitions between
political clans fromdifferent administrative levels, but therearealsoanumberof
legalprovisionsthatencouragetheseelitistfamiliestoestablishpoliticalparties.For
instance,beingamemberofapoliticalpartyallowsacandidatetoextendthelegal
campaign‐spendinglimit,aspartiesareallowedtospendanadditional5PHP(0.06
GBP) per voter registered in the constituencieswhere the party is fielding candi‐
dates.Yet,mostimportantly,theelectorallawstipulatesthatonlythethreestrong‐
estpartiesaretoreceivedetailedcopiesofthecertificateofcanvassthatisbasedon
the tally of elections returns from the different polling precincts. Access to these
OLIVERHELLMANN
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documentsprovidesastrongsafeguard for thecandidateagainstbeingcheated in
thevotecountingprocess.
However,despitethesereasonstoestablishpoliticalparties,thebindingpower
ofthecoalitionagreementsbetweenthedifferentfamiliesisveryweak,andboun‐
daries between political parties are thus highly permeable. Candidates frequently
run for several differentparties at the same time;political clans –while affiliated
withoneparty–oftensupportcandidatesofotherparties;andsometimespolitical
partyaffiliationdoesnotbecomeclearatall.
Afterelections,winningcandidateswhosupportedanon‐successfulpresidential
runnerwill, in largenumbers, flocktothepartyofthenewlyelectedpresident.As
Villanueva points out, “[p]oliticians change party identification as fast as they
changetheirclothes”(1996:180).86However,thepresidentwillnotdistributestate
resources exclusively to his own party, but in order to build a broad coalition of
supportinparliamentresourcesalsoflowtootherparties.Forinstance,asof2008,
presidentArroyowasthechairpersonofthreeparties,whichagainshowsjusthow
little political party boundariesmatter as an organising principle for the political
process. Rather, political clans and the coalitions forged between them – often
acrossparties–arethekeytounderstandingFilipinopolitics.
Tosumup,thepost‐autocraticenvironmentalcontextinthePhilippinesstrategi‐
cally selects for clientelism,whilemilitating against programmatic electoral strat‐
egies.Most importantly, thehigh levelof income inequalityand the lowdegreeof
86Forinstance,rightafterthe2004elections,24outof210legislatorschangedtheirpartyaffiliationintheHouseofRepresentatives(Teehankee2006:239).
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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urbanisation increase the certainty that setting uppatron‐client relationshipswill
notfailwitheitherofthetwosidesdefecting.Thecontextthusgivesanadvantageto
political actorswith the necessary resources to establish a clientelistic network –
thatis,thecountry’seconomicelite.Thiselitederivesitseconomicpowerfromdif‐
ferentsources–traditional landownership, largebusiness,celebritystatusor local
monopoliesofviolence–but, irrespectiveof the source, actorswill thenuse their
accesstogovernmenttoenhancethewealthoftheirfamiliesevenfurther.However,
as historical institutionalismmaintains, even in a context strongly biased toward
one outcome, social agents should be able to develop alternative strategies that
deviatefromthisstrategicallyselectedoutcome.Infact,towardsthebottomendof
theFilipinoparty systemwe can findpoliticalparties that campaignonprogram‐
maticappealstoattractvoters.Themostnotableexampleofthese,AKBAYAN!,will
be discussed in a separate section, as its electoral success is too limited to be in‐
cludedinourinitialcaseselection.
Partyorganisation
Ascanbeexpectedfromthepreviousdiscussionofelectoralstrategies,allmajorpo‐
liticalparties in thePhilippinesareverysimilar in theirorganisational structures.
First of all, parties are generally characterised by the total lack of a rank‐and‐file
OLIVERHELLMANN
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membership.Asaresult,thesmallelitistcircleofpartyleaderslargelyselectthem‐
selvesascandidatesforpublicoffice,whileaccessintothesehighlyexclusiveparties
hastobeboughtwithpoliticallyrelevantresources.Itfollowsfromthisthatthereis
noclearseparationbetweenthethreefacesofpartyorganisation,buttheparty in
publicofficelargelyoverlapswiththepartyontheground,whichthereforemeans
thatthereisnoneedforapartycentralofficeoutsidetheparliamentaryparty.
Partymembership
Asshouldhavebecomeclearfromthepreviousdiscussion,theFilipinopartysystem
is largelycomprisedofpartiesthatareessentiallycoalitionsof influential families,
providing a clientelistic network that links local political bosses at the barangay
level to national politicians. Not surprisingly then, themembership base of these
parties is almost entirely drawn from the politically active elite, particularly from
powerfulpoliticalclans(Velasco1999:176).OrasRocamoraputsit,Philippinepo‐
liticalpartiesare“unabashedboysclubs”(2002:para.13). Inotherwords,parties
donothaveordinarymemberswhojointhepartybecauseofcollectiveincentives,
but the partymembership overlaps with the party’s pool of candidates, meaning
thatonlythosewhocanbeexpectedtowinapoliticalmandatewillbeconsideredas
partymembers.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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AlthoughFilipinopoliticalpartiesclaimtohaveordinarymembers,noneofthe
majorpartiesmaintainsamembershipregisterthatwouldlistallthememberswith
theirpersonaldetailsandcontactaddress.Whatismore,thereisnoformalproced‐
urethatneedstobeobservedwhenapplyingforpartymembership,nordoparties
handoutmembershipcardsthatwouldidentifytheirmembersassuch.Intheircon‐
stitutions,politicalpartiesonlylistanumberofcriteriathatmembersneedtofulfil,
ranging fromveryspecificrequirements, suchasminimumageorFilipinocitizen‐
ship, to very vaguely formulated conditions, such as expressing a belief in the re‐
spectiveparty’s ideologyandobjectives.87 Hence,whatFilipinopartiesrefer toas
ordinary“members”arenothingbutloyalsupporterswhodonotdifferfromcom‐
moncitizensinanyrespect.Membershipfiguresprovidedbythepartiesarethere‐
forewithoutanymeaning,asarereferencesto“members”intheparties’formalde‐
cision‐makingstatutes.Moreover,thesesupportersarenotloyaltothepartyitself,
buttheyaremobilisedthroughclientelisticnetworksofleadersatthelocallevel.If
theselocalelitesdecidetojoinadifferentparty,becausethelatteroffersbetterma‐
terialreturnsfortheirpoliticalsupport, thesupporterswillbetransferreden‐bloc
tothenewparty.
However,notonlyisitdifficult–ifnotimpossible–todistinguishordinaryparty
members fromregularvoters,butevenontheelite levelpartyaffiliationdoesnot
alwaysbecomeclear.Duringelections,duetothefactthattheelectorallawallows
parties to nominate candidateswho arenot partymembers, often confusing elec‐
87Personalcommunicationwiththepoliticalparties.
OLIVERHELLMANN
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toralslatesofmixedpartycandidatesarecreated.Andevenafterelectionsitisvery
difficulttoidentifythepoliticalpartytowhichpoliticiansbelong,aspartyloyaltyis
generally very weak. Party defections are thus a daily part of political life in the
Philippines.
Moreover,thehighlyelitistnatureofFilipinopoliticalpartiesalsoreflectsinthe
parties’ local organisational structures. Although political parties are by law re‐
quired to establish party chapters in the majority of the country’s regions and,
within each region, in themajority of provinces, towns and barangays, this legal
provision is rarely enforced. Rather, the common practice is for the local party
leader’sresidenceoroffice toserveas theparty’s localbranch(LeonesandMora‐
leda1998:310).In‐betweenelectionsthe“branch”willbedormant,andusuallyno
full‐timemembersof staffwillbeemployed.Onlyshortlybeforeelectionswill the
branch become active and perform campaign‐related functions. Labour‐intensive
campaignworkthat–inWesternEuropeanparties–isusuallycarriedoutbyparty
members on a voluntary basis, such as door‐to‐door canvassing, organisingmass
eventsorposting campaignposters,will bedelegated to localpoliticians’ clientel‐
isticnetworks.Clientsperformthisroleaspartoftheirpromiseofpoliticalsupport
inreturnformaterialbenefits.88
Political parties in thePhilippines, as an abstract organisation, do thusnot re‐
cruit members – neither as financial assets (through the regular payment of
membershipfees)norasfreelabour.Giventhatpartiesonlyplayanegligiblerolein
88PersonalcommunicationwithJoelRocamora,26June2008.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–253–
voters’decisionsintheelectionprocess,partiesdonotevenseemtobeinterestedin
membersasstatistics,whichcouldcreateapublic imageofpartiesaseffectiveag‐
gregatorsofsocialinterests.Instead,theonlyfeaturethatdistinguishespartymem‐
bersfromordinarycitizensisthattheyhavebeennominatedbytherespectivepar‐
tiesascandidatesforanupcomingelection.ThemembershipsizeofthemajorFili‐
pino parties is therefore always limited to the number of nominations for public
elections.Asthenextsectionwillshow,inordertogainaccesstothishighlyexclu‐
sivecircleofpartymembers,individualswillhavetoprovidepoliticallyrelevantre‐
sourcesthatwillmakeupforthelackofamasspartymembership.
Inshort,themajorpoliticalpartiesinthePhilippinesarecharacterisedbyatotal
absence of a party on the ground, as there are no criteria that clearly distinguish
rank‐and‐file members from ordinary voters. Rather, we find all party members
concentratedinthepartyinpublicoffice.However,evenhereit isverydifficultto
establishwho isamemberandwho isnot,as theboundariesbetweenpartiesare
highly permeable. It is thus very doubtful whether elected politicians identify as
members of a party in public office. Instead, as discussed earlier, politicians are
morelikelytoidentifywiththeirownpoliticalclan.
OLIVERHELLMANN
–254–
Candidateselection
Intheirconstitutions,allmajorpoliticalpartiesinthePhilippinesmakespecificpro‐
visionsregardingtheselectionofcandidatesforpublicelection.Inmostpartiesthe
respectiveparty’snationalconventionissupposedtonominatethecandidates(La‐
kas,LDP,LP,NPandKAMPI),whileintheNPCthenationalcentralcommittee,the
party’s highest executive body, has the right to decide on the selection of candi‐
dates.89However,giventhelackofamasspartymembership,itisobviousthatthese
formalregulationsarenothingbutafaçadetoportraypoliticalpartiesasdemocrati‐
callyorganisedinstitutionsthateffectivelymediatebetweensocietyandthestate.A
moreprecisedescriptionofthelevelofinternaldemocratisationinFilipinopolitical
partiesisprovidedbyLeonesandMoraleda(1998:307):
Althoughmost political partiesmay claim that almost all sectoral
groups arewell represented in their organizational structure and
membership, the real influence – that is, in decision‐making and
control–remainslargelywithitselite‐dominatedhigherorgans.
In fact,party conventions in thePhilippines– if theyareheldatall90–havebeen
89Personalcommunicationwiththepoliticalparties.90Forinstance,theconstitutionofLakasstipulatesthatapartyconventionshouldbeheldatleasteverytwoyears.However,inpractice,lackofsufficientfinancialresources–thepartyclaims–haspreventedtheconventionfrommeetingonaregularbasis.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–255–
compared toRomanorgies,whichareorganisedby theparty leadership solely to
entertain the clientswith “wine,womenandsong” (Rocamora2001:6).As itwas
discussedearlier,nationalpoliticiansneedthesupportof localfamiliesinorderto
mobilise voters at the grassroots level. In turn, local politicians are dependent on
national candidates and their parties for financial support. It is thus at the party
conventionswheretheseinformalexchangeagreementsarecelebrated,andpoliti‐
cians from lower administrative levels are rewarded for their loyalty towards the
nationalelites.91
Candidatesfornationalelectionsarethusnotselectedbydelegatestotheparty
convention,asstipulatedinmostoftheparties’conventions,butrather,becauseof
the total lack of a party on the ground, the party in public office selects itself. In
otherwords,inordertobenominatedasacandidateforalargerparty,politicians
needtogainaccesstothesmallelitistcircleofpartymembers.Theselectionofcan‐
didatesisthereforelargelynon‐transparentandundemocratic,andwillprimarilybe
decidedthroughhorse‐tradingandbargaining(Coetal.2005:95).Factorsthatwill
play an important role in these negotiationswill be the candidate’s past electoral
performance, politicalmachinery, popularity (name recall and public acceptance),
geographicalbaseandsupport,andfinancialresources(Rocamora1998:6).Thede‐
cision whether a candidate will be admitted to the party is made by the highest
executivebodyintheparty,whichisusuallycomprisedofhigh‐rankingincumbent
91Forinstance,Rocamora(2001:6)receivedreportsthatduringtheLakasconventionin1998about60millionPHP(716,000GBP)wasdistributedtothedelegatesinordertosecureDeVenecia’snomi‐nationastheparty’snextpresidentialcandidate–300,000PHP(3,600GBP)toeachmemberofCon‐gress,200,000PHP(2,400GBP)togovernors,and100,000PHP(1,200GBP)tocitymayors.
OLIVERHELLMANN
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(orformer)electedofficials.Incumbents,ontheotherhand,will–asageneralrule–
benominatedautomatically.
However,asHutchcroftandRocamora(2003:278)pointout,“itisthenumberof
candidatesthatdeterminesthenumberofparties,notviceversa”.Thatistosay,ifa
candidate isrefusedbyoneparty,heorshewillsimplyestablishanotherpartyor
formasplintergroup.Theproceduresforcandidateselectionarethereforenotonly
highlyinformal,but–becauseofthevolatilepropertiesoftheFilipinopartysystem
–theyalsofailtoreducethenumberofcandidates.Nevertheless,ascandidateswill
aimtobenominatedbythepartyofastrongpresidentialcandidate–inordertobe
included in the distributive coalition after the election – candidate selection still
servesasavaluableindicatorforthepartyinternaldistributionofpower.
WecanthussumupthatinallmajorFilipinopoliticalpartiesthepartyinpublic
officewillsimplyre‐nominateitself.However,electedpoliticiansarenotveryloyal
towardstheirpartyandtheywillgenerallytrytojointhepartyofthepresidential
candidate,whotheythinkismostlikelytowin.Presidentialcandidates,inturn,are
lookingforlegislativecandidateswhoarethemselvesstrongcandidates,soafterthe
electiontheywillhavebroadsupport inCongress.Accesstoapartywill therefore
dependonthecandidate’sbargainingskillsandpoliticallyrelevantresources.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–257–
Distributionofresourcesanddecision‐makingpositions
Partymembership–andhenceanominationforpublicelections–canthusliterally
bebought fromtheparty leadership.Thishas ledCoetal. (2005:101)toobserve
that,although“thereisnolegalrestrictiontopartymembership,inpracticethesys‐
tem excludes those who cannot afford to shoulder or attract sufficient campaign
funds.”However,itmustbenotedthattheresourcescandidatesneedinordertobe
admittedtothepartyarethennottransferredtothepartyasanabstractinstitution,
buttheyaredistributedtootherindividualpoliticianswithinthepartyinreturnfor
politicalsupport.AsRocamora(2001:6)explains,
[t]o gain the support of lower level leaders in support of his/her
nomination by the party, [and] to organize the campaign, candi‐
dateshave to spendprodigiousamountsofmoney.Thehigherup
theladder,culminatinginthepresidentialcandidate,themoreyou
havetospend.Notjustforyourowncampaign,buttofinancethose
ofpartymatesandothersupporters running for lower levelposi‐
tions.
Putdifferently,itiscommonpracticeinFilipinopartiesforcandidatesataparticu‐
laradministrativeleveltoshoulderthecampaignexpensesofthenextlowerpoliti‐
caloffice.Thatistosay,thecampaignexpensesofbarangaycaptainsarefundedby
OLIVERHELLMANN
–258–
thecouncillor,whilethecouncillors’expensesarecoveredbythemayor,andsoon,
untilthesubsidyladderreachesthecandidateforpresident.
Thepoliticalparty itselfhas traditionallynotbeenamajorsourceof campaign
fundinginthePhilippines.Thisislargelyduetothefactthatpartiesthemselvesdo
notcultivatetheirownsourcesofincome.Sincethereisnopublicfundingavailable
forpoliticalparties,mostparties(LDP,LP,NP,NPC)do largelyrelyonmandatory
contributionsfromtheirelectedofficials.92Private–includingcorporate–donations
are almost exclusivelypaid to individual candidates, not toparties. The twomain
sources for candidates’ campaign funds are ethnic Chinese businessmen and the
“grey”economy(ArlegueandCoronel2003:231).TheethnicChinesedominatethe
businesssector,butbecauseoftheirnumericalminoritystatustheyareeffectively
barred from the political process, thereby leaving campaign financing as the only
way to safeguard their business interests. Grey contributions, on the other hand,
come mainly from illegal gambling, prostitution and drug smuggling syndicates,
seekingtheprotectionofthepolitician.
Thepartycentralofficethuscompletelydependsonthepartyinpublicofficefor
its financial survival.As a result, theparties in thePhilippineshardlyhave anor‐
ganisational representation outside of parliament. Usually, parties do not have
national headquarters, but the party central office tends be located in the private
officeof itsparty leader. In‐betweenelectionspartieshardlyemployany full‐time
staff, andevenduring campaigningperiodsmanyof the functions thatweusually
92Personalcommunicationwiththepoliticalparties.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–259–
associate with the party bureaucracy will be performed by externally contracted
media professionals (Velasco 1999: 175). In other words, political parties in the
Philippinesdonotonlylackapartyontheground,butalsoapartyincentraloffice.
Those members of staff employed to co‐ordinate the election campaign or fulfil
otheradministrativerolessimplyservethepoliticalambitionsoftheparty leader‐
ship–theydonotthemselvesholdsignificantpoliticalresourcesanddonotqualify
asadistinctiveorganisationalelementwithintheparty.
Thepartyinpublicofficeisthusthedominant–orevenonly–faceinpolitical
parties in the Philippines. However, again, political resources are not held by the
partyinpublicoffice,butbyindividualpoliticians.Thisisthemainreasonwhythe
partyleadershipinCongresscannotexertpressureonlegislatorstoenforcevoting
behaviour along the official party line (Croissant 2003: 82). Rather, the degree of
cohesioninthepartyinpublicofficeisverylow,asisreflectedinthefrequentoc‐
currences of party switching. This further contributes to the difficulty identified
earlierofclearlydistinguishingbetweenthreedistinctiveelementsofpartyorgani‐
sationwithinmajorpoliticalpartiesinthePhilippines.
OLIVERHELLMANN
–260–
Adeviantcase:AKBAYAN!93
AKBAYAN!was founded in1998 inorder tocompete forseats in thenewly intro‐
ducedpartylistsystemfortheHouseofRepresentatives.94Thepartyonlywonone
mandate in the firstelectionbut thencontinuously increased itsnumberofrepre‐
sentatives–twoin2001andthreein2004–beforesufferingasetbackinthelatest
electionsin2007,whenitonlywonenoughvotesfortwoseatsintheHouseofRep‐
resentatives.IncontrasttothemajorpoliticalpartiesinthePhilippines,AKBAYAN!
hasworkedveryhardtodevelopaprogrammaticplatform,primarilytargetingthe
socially marginalised with demands for far‐reaching reforms of the political and
socialsystem.Thisprogrammaticelectoralstrategyclearlyreflectsintheparty’sor‐
ganisation,which is verydifferent to the typical elitistpartydescribed in the sec‐
tionsabove.
Tobeginwith,AKBAYAN! is theonlyFilipinopartywithacentralmembership
register anda sophisticatedmembership ID card system.Although thepartydoes
not require itsmembers to pay regular dues,membership is tied to a number of
other requirements that clearly distinguish members from ordinary voters. Most
importantly,newmembershavetoattendabasicintroductoryseminarwherethey
93AllinformationinthefollowingparagraphswasgainedthroughpersonalcommunicationwithAKBAYAN!,23June2008.94Upto52seats(20percentoftotalseats)areallottedinaseparateballotonanationallistaccord‐ingtoproportionalrepresentation.PartiesneedtwopercentofthetotalvalidvotesforthePR‐listsinordertogainparliamentaryrepresentation.Theyobtainoneseatforeverytwopercentofthetotalvotes,butcanonlyholdamaximumofthreeseats.Thus,only14ofthepossible52seatswerefilledin1998,20in2001,and24in2004.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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learnabouttheparty’sprinciplesandstructures.Theyarethenassignedtoaparty
unit–eitherbasedongeographyorfunctionality–wheremembersareexpectedto
regularlyparticipateinpartyactivities.Typicalactivitiesoflocalpartybranchesin‐
cludesupportingassociatedNGOsintheirwork,providingassistancetolocalcom‐
munities(suchaspara‐legalaid,education,basichealthcare)andhelpingtoorgan‐
isecitizens’protestregardingissuesclosetotheparty’scentralprinciples.
Inreturnfortheirvoluntarylabour,partymembersaregivenextensivepartici‐
patoryrightsregardinginternaldecision‐making.Hence,theselectionofcandidates
forpublicelectionisnotdecidedbehindcloseddoorsbyasmallcircleofpartylead‐
ers, as in all themajorFilipinoparties, but theprocedure isorganised in ahighly
democratic fashion. For instance, the composition of the party list for the lower
houseofCongressmustbeapprovedbythepartycongress,whichconsistsofrepre‐
sentatives from each of the party’s local chapters.Nominations for local elections
aredecidedbyvotefromallmembersintherespectivelocalpartybranch.
Politicallyrelevantresourcesaremobilisedbytheparty,notbyindividualmem‐
bersorcandidates.AKBAYAN!’smainsourcesofincomeare(indescendingorderof
importance):foreignfinancialsupportforjointprojectswithNGOs(asdirectforeign
fundingforpoliticalpartiesisillegal),localgovernmentprogrammes,contributions
frompublicofficials,fund‐raisingactivities(suchasconcerts)anddonations.Local
branches are usually financially self‐sufficient,while theparty central office is re‐
sponsibleforfundingelectoralcampaigns,membershiptrainingandeducationpro‐
grammes.
OLIVERHELLMANN
–262–
Given the importantroleof thepartybureaucracy inmaintaining themember‐
shipregisterandmobilisingresources,representativesofthepartycentralofficeare
givenex‐officioseatsontheparty’sexecutivecommittee.Specifically,theexecutive
committee comprises the party’s Congress representatives as well as the party
president, vice‐president, the general secretary and five additionalmemberswho
areelectedbytheparty’snationalconvention.Thepartycentralofficethusclearly
hasmorepowerthanthepartyinpublicoffice,allowingittostrictlyenforcedisci‐
plineamongtheparty’selectedrepresentatives.
Summary
Fromthisdescriptiveanalysis itcanthusbeconcludedthatpoliticalparties inthe
Philippinessharemanyorganisationalsimilaritieswiththeclassicalcadrepartyof
19th century Europe. The most striking analogy is the difficulty of clearly distin‐
guishingbetweenthedifferentelementsofpartyorganisation.Rather,thepartyin
publicoffice largelyoverlapswiththepartymembership,sincetheonlycriteriato
separatemembers fromordinarycitizens is theparty’snominationasacandidate
forpublicelection.Theprocedureforcandidateselectionisthushighlyinformaland
obscure, with the party in public office usually nominating themselves. Similarly,
partieshardlymaintainanorganisationalapparatusoutsideofparliament,butgen‐
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–263–
eraladministrativefunctionsandcampaignstrategiestendtobemanagedbyparty
externalprofessionals,whoarehiredattheexpenseofthepartyinpublicoffice.
This observation is clearly in linewith the clientelistic electoral strategies fol‐
lowedbythemajorparties inthePhilippines.Partiesaremerelyformalcloaksfor
more informal alliances between political families, linking national politicians to
local bosses through the exchange of political support for material inducements.
Theseclientelisticchannelsserveasthemainvehicletomobilisevotes,recruitcan‐
didatesandallocateresources,whilethepoliticalparty’sprimaryreasonforexist‐
ence is to provide a formal label for the clientelistic alliances between powerful
familiesinordertocoordinateelectoralcampaigningefforts.Moreover,thelogicof
party formationalsohasa legaldimension,asonly the threestrongestparties re‐
ceivedetailedcopiesoftheofficialelectionresults.Consequently,thereisnoneedto
developastrongformalpartyorganisation,whichmakesitimpossibletodistinguish
betweenthepartyontheground,thepartycentralofficeandthepartyinpublicof‐
fice.
However, while the environmental context favours a clientelistic strategy of
votermobilisation, there are a few cases of political parties developing program‐
matic appeals, themostnotableexamplebeingAKBAYAN!. Similar to the classical
masspartyin late19thcenturyEurope,AKBAYAN!wasestablishedoutsideofgov‐
ernment,withtheaimofchallengingelitistpartiesthatusetheiraccesstostatere‐
sourcestomobilisevotersthroughpatron‐clientexchangerelationships.Eitherbe‐
causethepartylacksthenecessaryresourcesorbecausepartyinternalactorsusea
OLIVERHELLMANN
–264–
differentsetofideastomapthecontextualterrain,AKBAYAN!developedprogram‐
maticappeals.This,inturn,madeitnecessarytodevelopapartyorganisationthat
aggregatessocialintereststhroughstronggrassrootslinksandarticulatesthesein‐
terestsaspolicyproposals throughastronglydisciplinedparty inpublicoffice.So
far, however, this strategyhasnot translated intomajor electoral success and the
Filipinopartysystemremainsdominatedbyclientelisticpartieswithoutnotableor‐
ganisationalfoundations.
ThecaseofthePhilippinesthereforeagaindemonstratesthatactorscandevelop
differentelectoralandorganisationalstrategieswithinthesamecontext.However,
theneo‐democraticenvironmentinthePhilippinesheavilyfavoursclientelismover
otherstrategies.Thisisbecausehighlevelsofpovertymeanthatvotersareunlikely
todefectfromtheclientelisticexchangeagreement,whilelowdegreesofurbanisa‐
tion facilitate themonitoringofvoters’behaviour.Asa result,politicalpartiesare
generallynomorethanaformalfaçadeforhighlyinformalpatron‐clientnetworks,
linkingpoliticianstovoters.Actorsdevelopingprogrammaticappeals,ontheother
hand,faceenormousdifficulties.Itthereforeseemshighlyunlikelythatmassparties
willenjoysimilarelectoralsuccesscomparedtocommunistandsocialistpartiesin
late 19th century Europe. Thus, rather than following the same path of organisa‐
tionaldevelopmentastheircounterpartsinWesternEurope,politicalpartiesinthe
Philippinesmightbeabletomaintaintheirhighlyelitistcharacterforanunforesee‐
abletimetocome.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–265–
–7–
INDONESIA
SimilartothePhilippines,thepost‐authoritarianpartysysteminIndonesiaisdomi‐
natedbypoliticalpartiesclosetotheclassicalcadreparty.Thesepartiesareheavily
populatedbyelementsof theancienrégime,whocontrolled thedemocratic trans‐
formationfromaboveandwerethusabletokeeptheirinfluentialpositionswithin
extensivepatron‐clientnetworks.However,theregime‐populatedpartiesfaceseri‐
ous electoral competition from parties campaigning on programmatic appeals,
whichwereestablishedbyactorsopposingtheregime.Themostnotableexampleof
theseparties is theProsperous JusticeParty (PKS),which, aswewould expect, is
basedonamasspartymembershipandcharacterisedbyastrongpartycentralof‐
fice. This should not be interpreted as a confirmation of the “life cycle” theory of
partyorganisation,withIndonesianpartiesfollowingthesamepathofdevelopment
asWestern European parties. Rather, aswill be explained, party organisations in
Indonesiaaretheproductofstrategicdecisionsmadeintheparticularcountrycon‐
text.
OLIVERHELLMANN
–266–
Theenvironmentalcontext
ClassifyingtheendofSuharto’s“NewOrder”regimeinIndonesiainMay1998isnot
without difficulties. Although the collapse of the regime was initiated by student
protestsandmassriots, thepro‐democraticoppositiondidnothaveany influence
on the transformation of the political system. Rather, negotiations over the new
rulesof thepoliticalgametookplacealmostentirelybetweensoft‐linerandhard‐
liner groups within the authoritarian regime, not between regime defenders and
challengers (Malley 2000: 153). As a result, the transition to democracy left the
statusesofmanyelementsof theauthoritarianregimeuntouched,providing these
elementswiththeopportunitytore‐positionthemselvesunderthenewdemocratic
rulesbycapturingexistingpartiesorestablishingtheirownparties.
Suharto, then a major‐general in the Indonesian army, seized power in 1967,
throughastealthycoupd’étatagainstthefirstpresidentofIndonesia,Sukarno,who
had abolished democracy in 1957 to rule under martial law. While the officially
stated goal of the New Orderwas socio‐economic development, political stability
andsecurityweredeclaredasitsnecessaryconditions(Vatikiotis1998:33‐35).The
ideologicalcentrepieceofthisurgeforharmonyinsuchanethnicallyandreligiously
diversesocietyas IndonesiawasthenationalphilosophyofPancasila.95 Inaccord‐
ancewithPancasila,only40percentofparliamentwasopenlyelected,andmulti‐
95Literallythe“fivepillars”,orprinciples,Pancasilacomprises:(1)beliefinoneGod,(2)justandcivilisedhumanitarianism,(3)aunitedIndonesia,(4)democracyguidedbywisdom,throughconsul‐tationandrepresentation,and(5)socialjusticeforalltheIndonesianpeople.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–267–
partypoliticswerevirtuallybannedbymergingalloppositionpartiesintotwolar‐
gerparties.Thesecular‐nationalistpartieshadtouniteunderthebannerofthePar
taiDemokrasiIndonesia(IndonesianDemocraticParty,PDI),whiletheMuslimpar‐
tieswere forced to fuse into thePartai PersatuanPembangunan (UnitedDevelop‐
mentParty,PPP).TheregimeitselfusedGolonganKarya(orGolkar)asitselectoral
vehicle.96
Political power under the New Order was initially shared by four actors: (1)
presidentSuharto,(2)thearmedforces,(3)thebureaucracy,and(4)largebusiness
conglomerates,mostlyownedbyethnicChinese(Liddle1985;1999).Attheheartof
theregimelaidacomplicatedsystemofpatronagethroughwhichSuhartoskilfully
managedcompetingtensionsbetweentheelites,andwhichsoonallowedSuhartoto
becomethedominantplayer.Personal loyaltyinSuharto’sincreasingly“sultanistic
regime”(ChehabiandLinz1998)wasrewardedwithpromotions,businesslicences,
subsidies, loans and other gifts. This system worked extremely well, as the New
Orderregimedelivereditspromiseofsocio‐economicmodernisation,henceproduc‐
ingenoughspoilstobedistributedamongtheelites.
Inlinewiththeargumentsofmodernisationtheory(seeLipset1981),however,
through the success of its economic policies theNewOrder regime gave rise to a
96Asitwasnotregardedasapartyinthelegalsense,butratherasa“functionalgroup”,Golkarwasnotrestrictedbygovernmentregulationsontheconductofparties.Incontrast,boththePDIandthePPPwereseriouslyconstrainedintheirelectioncampaigns.Forinstance,neitherpartywasallowedtodirectlycriticisethegovernmentoritspolicies,nocampaigningwasallowedinvillages(wheremostpeoplelived),andgovernmentpermissionwasrequiredforallrallies.Furthermore,partynomineesforlegislativeofficewerescreenedbytheregimeforpossible“extremeleft”(communism)or“extremeright”(militantMuslim)connectionsortendencies.Andfinally,neitherthePDInorthePPPwasallowedtohavebranchesbelowthedistrictlevel.
OLIVERHELLMANN
–268–
newmiddleclass.Manymembersofthisemergingurbanmiddleclassfounditdiffi‐
culttoadjustfromthecollectivismintheirvillagestotheinvidualisminbigcities,
suchas Jakarta,andturned fromtheir “statistical” Islamtowardsmoreactivepar‐
ticipation in search for moral guidance and orientation.97 This growing Islamist
movement soon became a hotbed for political discontent that threatened the sta‐
bilityoftheNewOrder(Hefner2000:123‐126).Suhartorespondedtothismenace
by announcing a new policy of openness, or keterbukaan. Moreover, he co‐opted
Muslim leaders,suchasAmienRais, intotheregime, throughtheestablishmentof
theAssociationofIndonesianMuslimIntellectuals(ICMI)in1990,andbyenactinga
numberofconservativereligiouslaws.
Still,severalinfluentialIslamicleaders,includingAbdurrahmanWahid,thehead
of Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation,Nahdatul Ulama (NU), decided not to
join the ICMI, and continued to publicly debate the need for political reforms.
Meanwhile, thePDI, now ledby Sukarno’s daughter,Megawati,managed towin a
historic15percentofthevoteinthe1992legislativeelectionsbyappealingdirectly
tothelowerclasseswhofeltmarginalisedbytheprocessofindustrialisation.How‐
ever,astheregimesoonmovedtoagainendtheeraofopenness,ittookanexternal
triggertobringdownSuharto.WhentheAsianeconomiccrisishitIndonesiainlate
1997,studentsandtheurbanpoorpouredintothestreetsinthousands,protesting 97DuetotheparticularpatternofIslamicconversion,IndonesianMuslimsformaveryheterogeneouscommunity.Firstofall,itispossibletodistinguishpracticingMuslimsfromnominalMuslims:WhilesantriareMuslimsofastrictorthodoxy,abangan,althoughacknowledginganadherencetoIslam,ordertheirlivesaccordingtomoreindigenouspreceptsandpractices.Moroever,santricanbefur‐thersubdividedintomodernistsandtraditionalists.WhereasmodernistsacceptthevalidityofnonebuttheprimarytextsoftheIslamictradition(theQur’anandtheHadith,thetraditionsoftheprophetMohammed),traditionalistsalsolooktowardsmysticismandritualpractice.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–269–
againstunemployment, foodshortagesandeconomichardship,whichtheyblamed
on Suharto’s patrimonialistic and nepotistic dealings. Themost violent riots took
place in Jakarta on 14‐15May, 1998,mainly targeting properties and businesses
ownedbyethnicChinese,leavingmorethan1,000dead.
TABLE18: SOCIO‐ECONOMICDEVELOPMENTININDONESIA
GDPpercapita(USDollars)
GiniCoefficientDegreeof
urbanisation(inpercent)
Literacy(inpercent)
Indonesia 516(1998)
1,824(2007)
0.310(1999)
0.376(2007)
48.0(2000) 90.0(2000‐05)
Germany 29,461(2006) 0.283(2007) 75.2(2005) 99.0(2006)
UnitedKingdom 33,238(2005) 0.360(2007) 89.7(2005) 99.0(2005)
Source: UnitedNationsESCAP(undated);UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(undated)
Atthesametime,sincetherewerenolongeranyeconomicrewardsforsupporting
Suharto,manyelitesabandonedtheirsupportfortheregime(Eklöf1999:235).Of
crucial importance was the decision by the armed forces to refrain from force
againstthestudentsortheriotersinJakarta.Anessentialparameterinthesestra‐
tegic calculationswas the organisational weakness of the pro‐democratic opposi‐
tion.AfterafailedattemptbyAmienRais,whoresignedfromtheICMIin1997,to
unite hisMuhammadiyahwithWahid’sNU andMegawati’s PDI into a broad anti‐
Suhartoalliance, itbecameclearthattheoppositionmovementwasrivenbyideo‐
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logical andpersonal feuds.98Hence, the ruling elite agreed to demands for demo‐
cratization,andforcedSuhartotostepdown,because“[t]herewerefewprospectsof
aseriousoverturningofthesocialorder”(Aspinall2005:264).
These calculations were supported by the socio‐economic context in the late
1990s.Althoughtherawfiguressuggestthattheprocessoflateindustrialisationled
toarelativelyfairdistributionofincomecomparabletothoseofWesternEuropean
countries(seeTable18),thereareinrealitywidedisparitiesbetweendifferentgeo‐
graphical areas, andpocketsofpovertyalsoarealsoevidentwithinmoreaffluent
provinces (World Bank 2006: 36‐37). Moreover, Indonesia is characterised by a
relativelylowlevelofurbanisation,creatingperfectconditionsfortheimplementa‐
tionofclientelisticstrategiesofvotermobilisation.Inotherwords,weshouldexpect
elementsoftheNewOrderregimetousetheiraccesstostateresources,whichwas
left untouched by the process of democratisation, to attractmostly impoverished
votersinalargelyruralcontext,throughthedistributionofclientelisticincentives.
98MuhammadiyahisthemainorganisationtorepresentmodernistMuslims.Itwasestablishedin1912,andnowencompassesapproximatelytwelvemillionmembers.Inlinewithitsphilosophy,namelytoreconcileIslamwiththemodernworldthrougheducationandwelfare,Muhammadiyahisbasedonabroadnetworkofeducationalinstitutionsrangingfromkindergartenstouniversities.NahdatulUlama(NU)isthemaintraditionalistIslamicorganisation.Foundedin1926,itcommands,atpresent,thesupportofsome30millionMuslims.Alsoactiveineducationandwelfare,NUrunsthemajorityofruralreligiousboardingschools(pesantren).
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Actorsandtheirstrategies
Indeed, the strategic calculationsmade by the former regime elites held true. As
several observers of Indonesian politics point out, the first free and fair elections
conductedin1999didnotundermineelitestatusesandinterests,butmanymem‐
bersof theoldelitewereable to reconstitute theirpositionsofpower in thenew
democratic environment (for example Case 2002: 69; Ghoshal 2004: 515). In a
widelyacceptedargumentSlater(2004)observesthatthemajorpoliticalpartiesin
post‐authoritarian Indonesianow forma “cartel”,whichmakes itverydifficult for
newpartiestowinparliamentaryrepresentation.Thecartelisbuiltoninformal,in‐
ter‐personal networks that span across party boundaries, and highly restrictive
partylaws.99Theobviousevidencefortheexistenceofsuchacartelisthepractice
offormingoversizedcoalitions,whichinvolvemorepartiesthanneededforalegis‐
lativemajority.100 The “cartelised elite sees politics to a great extent as business”
(Ufen2006:29),andalargegovernmentcoalitionisthemechanismwithwhichto
99Toparticipateinthe1999parliamentaryelectionspartieshadtohavebranchesinatleast9outofthe27provincesofthecountry,andwithinthem,atleastinone‐halfoftherespectiveadministrativesub‐units.OnlythosepartiesconqueringatleasttwopercentoftheseatsinthePeople’sRepresenta‐tiveCouncil(DewanPerwakilanRakyat,DPR)oratleastthreepercentoftheseatsinlocallegisla‐tureswerethenallowedtoruninthe2004election.Similarly,onlypartiesorcoalitionsofpartiesthatobtainedaminimumofthreepercentoftheseatsorfivepercentofthevotesinthe2004par‐liamentaryelectionwereallowedtonominatecandidatesforthepresidentialelection.Forthe2009presidentialelection,theminimumwillbe15percentoftheseatsand20percentofthevotes.100WhileMegawatiSukarnoputri formedaKabinetPelangi (RainbowCoaliton), includingherparty(PDI‐P),Golkar,PPP,PANandotherparties,hersuccessorYudhoyono formed theso‐calledKoalisiKerakyatan(People’sCoalition),whichalliedhisPDwithsixotherparties,givinghimthesupportof73.6%ofrepresentativesintheDPR.
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distributethespoilsofofficeevenlyamongthemembersofthiselite.Electoralcom‐
petitionisthuslargely
about furtheringdominanceover the institutionsof the state, and
their resources and coercive power, and about developing net‐
worksofpatronageandprotection.
(RobisonandHadiz2004:245)
ThemajorpoliticalpartiesinIndonesiaarethusfilledwithrent‐seekingpoliticians,
who are exclusively interested in gaining office in order to get access to state re‐
sources.Elitesthenusetheseresourcestomaintainclientelisticnetworkstomobi‐
lisevoters.However,aswillbeseen,verylittleisactuallydistributedtotheelector‐
ate, but clientelism is rather a mechanism to accommodate elites both at the
nationalandthelocallevel.
Conflictbetweenpersonalisticfactions
Thepost‐autocraticpartysysteminIndonesiaisdominatedbyactors,whoalready
playedanimportantroleundertheNewOrderregime:Golkar,itstwosatellitepar‐
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ties(thePPPandPDI‐P101),andthepartiesofreligiousleadersWahidandRais,the
National Awakening Party (PKB) and the National Mandate Party (PAN) respec‐
tively.Thesefivepartiesemergedasthewinnersinthe1999elections,butthenlost
electoralstrengthinthe2004elections,whichtranslatesintoanincreasinglevelof
partysystemfragmentation(seeTable19).Allfivepartiesfollowclientelisticstrat‐
egiesforvotermobilisation,whichisclearlyreflectedinthefactthatconflictwithin
thepartiesisnotdrivenbyideologicaldifferences,butpartyinternalfactionsgroup
around individual politicianswho control patronage andotherpolitically relevant
resources.
TABLE19: INDONESIA–PARTYSYSTEMINDICATORS
ENEPa ENPPb Volatility
1999 5.10 4.68 ‐2004 8.55 7.07 28.55Average 6.86 5.88 28.55Notes:aEffectivenumberofelectoralpartiescalculatedontheshareofvotesinelec‐tionstothePeople’sRepresentativeCouncil.bEffectivenumberofparliamentarypartiesinthePeople’sRepresentativeCouncil.Source: JohnsonTan(2006)andauthor’sowncalculationbasedonAnanta,
ArifinandSuryadinata(2005)
Thispatternofparty internal conflict isparticularlyobvious in the formerregime
party, Golkar,where no single politician has so far been able to establish him‐ or
herselfasthedominantleader.Rather,theoustingofSuhartoleftapowervacuum
101ThePDI‐PwasestablishedasasplinterpartyfromthePDIin1998.
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intheparty,withseveralindividualscompetingforthepositionatthetop.102When
then vice‐president Habibie took over from Suharto inMay 1998, Golkarwas di‐
vided into two groups: one led by Habibie himself, consisting mainly of civilians
closelylinkedtoSuharto,theotheramilitaryfactioncriticalofSuharto.TheGolkar
chairmanelection in July1998turned intoanopencontestbetweenthesegroups,
withAkbarTandjung, the candidateof theHabibie group,winningoverhis oppo‐
nent, and themilitary leavingGolkar–at least in termsof formal structure.How‐
ever,soonafterhisvictory,Akbardecidedthatitwastimetodistancehimselffrom
Suharto andHabibie. As the former chairmanof the Islamic StudentsAssociation,
Akbarbenefitted fromastrongnetworkofsupporterswithin theparty,andwhen
Habibiewithdrewhispresidential candidacy for the1999elections– afterhis ac‐
countabilityspeechhadbeenrejectedbyparliament–Akbarbecamethedominant
leaderofGolkar.
However,Akbar’sdominancewasonlyshort‐lived,asseveralaffluentbusiness‐
menenteredthepartyinordertobenominatedasGolkar’spresidentialcandidate
for2004.Themostpowerfulof thesewereAburizalBakrie, chairmanof the large
Bakrieconglomerate,SuryahPaloh, themedia tycoonbehindMetroTVandMedia
Indonesia,AgungLaksono,thefounderofAdamAirandnowspeakerofthePeople’s
Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) and Prabowo Subianto,
Suharto’sson‐in‐law.Despitethesecandidates’economicpower,Golkar’spresiden‐
tial nomination, nevertheless, went to General Wiranto, who had risen to power
102Foramoredetailedanalysisofinter‐factionalconflictwithinGolkarafterthefallofSuhartoseeTomsa(2006)andSuryadinata(2007).
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through a steepmilitary career under theNewOrder, eventually appointed army
chiefofstaffin1997.Similarly,theGolkarchairmanelectionwasalsofiercelycon‐
tested,withWirantosupportingAkbar,butallotherbigplayersthrowingtheirsup‐
portbehindJusufKalla.Kalla,againanaffluentbusinessman,hadrunsuccessfullyas
vice‐presidentforYudhoyonoandthusofferedmuchbetteraccesstostatepatron‐
agethanAkbar.
TABLE20: INDONESIA–PARLIAMENTARYELECTIONRESULTS
1998a 2004Party
Vb Sc V S
PDI‐P 33.8 30.8 18.6 19.8Golkar 22.5 24.0 21.6 23.1PKB 12.6 10.2 10.6 9.5PPP 10.7 11.8 8.2 10.5PAN 7.1 7.0 6.4 9.6PBB 1.9 2.6 2.6 2.0PD ‐ ‐ 7.5 10.2PKS ‐ ‐ 7.3 8.2Other 11.4 13.6 17.2 7.1
Notes:a38additionalseatswerereservedforthearmedforces.bShareofvotes(inpercent)inelectionstothePeople’sRepresentativeCouncil.cShareofseats(inpercent)inthePeople’sRepresentativeCouncil.Source: Rüland(2001);naThalang(2005)
Inotherpartiesthedistributionofpowerismuchclearer.Thisisespeciallytruefor
thePDI‐PandthePKB,inwhichtheparties’respectiveleaders,MegawatiSukarno‐
putriandAbdurrahmanWahid,“havealmostcultstatusandattractunquestioning,
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oftenfanatical,loyaltyfrommanyoftheirgrassrootssupporters”(Fealy2001:102).
InthecaseofthePDI‐P,thisloyaltyislargelybasedonMegawatibeingthedaughter
ofSukarno– the founderofmodern Indonesia–andheractive role inopposition
againstSuharto.Hence,despitedramaticvotelossesinthe2004parliamentaryelec‐
tion(seeTable20),Megawatiandherclanledbyherhusband,TaufikKiemas,con‐
tinuetoexertimmeasurablepoweratthetopoftheparty.103Criticsarerigorously
silenced and often only left with the option of exiting the party. So, for instance,
MegawatiopponentsaroundleadingpartyexecutiveArifinPanigoroestablishedthe
so‐called PDI‐P ReformMovement (Gerakan Pembaruan) in December 2005. The
driving forcebehind thismove,however,wasnotan interest indemocratising in‐
ternaldecision‐making,asthenameofthenewpartymaysuggest.Rather,because
thedifferencesbetweenMegawatiandtheYudhoyonogovernmentseemedirrecon‐
cilable,Arifinandhiscronieswereeffectivelybarredfromaccesstolucrativestate
resources.
Similarly,inthePKB,AbdurrahmanWahidhasbeenabletofightoffanyserious
internaloppositionagainsthisleadership.AsthegrandsonofthefounderofNahda
tulUlama(NU),WahidenjoysextraordinarysupportamongmodernistMuslims,al‐
lowinghimtomaintainhispowerfulpositionwithinthepartydespitechallengesby
MatoriAbdulDjali, in2001, andAlwiAbdurrahmanShihabandSaifullahYusuf in
2004‐5,whichbotheventuallyhadtobesettledincourtaseachsideclaimedtobe
thetruerepresentativeofthePKB.Between2006and2007,somelocalpartychap‐
103PersonalcommunicationwithIgnasKleden,14July2008.
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tersrefusedtofollowdirectionsfromtheleadershipinJakarta,resultingintheclos‐
ureof40partybranches,butWahidremainsinstrongcontroloftheparty,asisre‐
flectedinthefactthatSaifullahleftthePKBinJanuary2007tojointhePPP.More‐
over,thePKBsplitonceagaininMay2008whenWahidoustedMuhaiminIskandar
aspartychairman,whothenclaimedtoleadtherealPKB–thusleadingtothecur‐
rentsituationwheretherearetwoPKBs.
Albeit less powerful thanWahid, Amien Rais, the former leader of Indonesia’s
second‐largestMuslimorganisation,Muhammadiyah,alsoplaysastrongrolewithin
hisownparty,PAN.Althoughherelinquishedformalcontrolof thepartyafterthe
2004 election,AmienRais is still ensured influencewithin thePAN, afterpushing
throughtheelectionofacloseconfidant,businessmanSustrinoBachir,asnewparty
chairman.104Amien also retains the influential positionof chairmanof theparty’s
advisorycouncil.ThestrongestopponentofBachirisHattaRajasa,thecurrentgen‐
eralsecretaryofPANandcabinetministerfortransportation.UnlikeWahid,Amien
Raisisunabletoextinguishpartyinternalopposition,largelybecauseMuhammadi
yah, incontrast toNU, isnotapersonalisedbutanabstractorganisation,meaning
thatAmienRaisdoesnotenjoyunconditionalgrassrootssupport.105Infact,thecon‐
nectionbetweenMuhammadiyah andPANhasbecome increasingly looseover the
years,eventuallyendinginastatementissuedbytheMuhammadiyahleadershipin
2006thatexplicitlyallowedtherank‐and‐filetovoteforanypartytheywanted.
104PersonalcommunicationwithRizalSukma,15July2008.105PersonalcommunicationwithIgnasKleden,14July2008.
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IncontrasttobothPKBandPAN,afurtherMuslimparty,thePPP,hasneverbeen
dominated by a charismatic leader. From 1998 to 2007 the party was under the
leadershipofHamzahHaz,anexperiencedbutuninspiringcareerpoliticianwhohad
been active in politics since the earlyNewOrder days. For a long timeHamzah’s
leadershipremainedlargelyunchallenged,andthemostseriousconflictwastaken
outsidethepartywhenthepopularpreacherZainuddinMZdefectedfromthePPP
in2002andfoundedtheReformStarParty(PartaiBintangReformasi,PBR).How‐
ever,in2005,agroupledbydeputychairmanandcabinetministerSuryadharmaAli
organisedahugeinformalgatheringofhundredsofpartyexecutivesfromalladmin‐
istrative levels,whichseverelyweakenedHamzah’s leadership, leadinghim toan‐
nounce thathewouldnotcontest thechairmanship in2007.Again,whileHamzah
losthispositionasvice‐president in2004,Suryadharma, inhisroleasministerof
cooperativesandstateandmediumenterprises inpresidentYudhoyono's cabinet,
couldprovidemuchbetteraccesstothestate’sinstitutions.
Socialidentitiesasdriversforvotingbehaviour
Internalconflictwithin themajorpoliticalparties in Indonesia is thereforealmost
exclusively about the distribution of patronage and other politically relevant re‐
sources. Ideological issues, on the other hand, are very rarely sources of internal
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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conflict,sinceactorswithinthemajorpartiesarenotinterestedindevelopingpolicy
platforms. Interestingly, thisseemstocontradict theelectoralbehaviourofvoters,
whoshowstrongreligious,regionalandsocialaffiliations,leadingtoastrikingcon‐
tinuityinvotingpatterns(Ananta,ArifinandSuryadinata2004;King,Baswedanand
Harjanto2005).Inotherwords,althoughpartieshavedoneverylittleinthewayof
developing clear policy directions that would relate to the interests of the social
groupswho support them, electoral studieshave revealed long lasting allegiances
betweenthemajorpartiesandthevariousreligious,classandregionalgroupingsin
Indonesiansociety.
Tomaintaintheseallegiancespartiesbuildconnectionswithlocalnotableswho
haveastronginfluenceoverthecultural,economicandpubliclifeintheregion,and
whowilltheneitherimplicitlyendorsethepartyorexplicitlyinstructtheirfollow‐
ershowtovote(Sherlock2004:22‐23). Ifvotersseeapartyaswell‐connected to
theleadersofaparticularsocialgroup,thepartyisconsideredtobeabletorepre‐
senttheinterestsofthatsocialgroup.Moreover,partiesnotonlybuildnetworksof
localnotables toestablish themselvesas representativesofwell‐definedsegments
inIndonesiansociety,butsomeofthem–especiallythePDI‐P,thePANandthePKB
–relyheavilyonthepersonalityoftheirrespectiveleader.106Hence,whileMegawati
still embodiesher father’svision for social justice, thusmaking thePDI‐Pparticu‐
larly popular among rural and urbanworkers, both the PAN and the PKB benefit
106ForamoredetailedanalysisofpartyleadersasanimportantfactortoexplainvotingbehaviourinIndonesiaseeLiddleandMujani(2007).
OLIVERHELLMANN
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fromthepersonificationofreligioustraditionsintheirrespectiveleaders–modern‐
istIslaminAmienRais,traditionalistIslaminWahid.
Inshort,themajorpoliticalpartiesinIndonesiaallfollowaclientelisticstrategy
ofvotermobilisation,whichinsomecasesissupportedbythecharismaoftheparty
leader.107However,verylittletricklesdowntothevoterthroughtheseclientelistic
networks,asthephenomenonofvote‐buyingisalmostunheardofintheIndonesian
context (Hadiwinata2006).Rather, citizensvoteaccording to their religious, class
or regional identity. Therefore, as van deWalle (2003: 313) observed for African
partysystems,
itismoreusefultothinkofclientelisticpoliticsasconstitutingpri‐
marilyamechanismforaccommodationandintegrationofafairly
narrowpoliticalelitethanasaformofmasspartypatronage.Most
of thematerialgains fromclientelismare limitedto thiselite.The
stronger link between political elites and the citizenry is through
thelesstangiblebondsofethnicidentity.
Inotherwords,votermobilisationinIndonesiaisorganisedthroughintra‐elitenet‐
works based on clientelistic exchange relationships between politicians at the
nationallevelandlocalnotables.Thesenetworkssurvivedthedemocratictransition
andallowedelementsoftheoldregimetomaintaintheirpositionsofpowerinthe
107Moreover, several localpoliticiansused their considerable financial resources tohireorganisedgangsofthugs(preman)tointimidatebothvotersandothercandidates(Wilson2006:270‐5).
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–281–
electoralmarket.However,thepatron‐clientrelationshipsinheritedfromSuharto’s
regimedonot reachdown tovoter level.This is because, in the regime’spseudo‐
elections,voteswereboughtthroughthelocalbranchesofthestateadministration,
which iswhyvoters in Indonesia todayarenotused to receivingmoney for their
votesfromparties.108Instead,theconnectionbetweenthepoliticianandthevoteris
madeascommonpeopleadoptlocalnotablesastheirbabak,orfather,basedonre‐
ligious, ethnic or class identities (see Cederroth 2004). That is to say, there is no
need for politicians to extend the clientelistic network beyond local notables, be‐
causevoterswillvoteforthepartyendorsedbytheirrespectivebabak,irrespective
ofmaterialincentives.
Thecontext inpost‐SuhartoIndonesiathusfavoursactorswhohavetheneces‐
sary resources to integrate localpowerholders intoa clientelisticnetwork.These
actors are – as the examples of Golkar and PAN illustrate in particular – mostly
membersofIndonesia’seconomicelite.Moreover,otheractors,especiallyeliteswho
belongedtotheclosecirclearoundSuharto’sregime,wereabletothetransferthe
clientelisticconnectionstheyhadbeendevelopingthroughdecadesofauthoritarian
ruleintothedemocraticarena,suchasHamzahHaz,theleaderofthePPP,Wiranto
and Akbar of Golkar, or current president Yudhoyono. Finally, some actors base
theirelectoralstrategynotonlyonclientelism,butalsobenefitfromtheirpersonal
charisma –most notablyWahid andMegawati. However,whatever actors’ source
forclientelisticpower, theseactors formaclosecartelbasedonpersonalrelation‐
108PersonalcommunicationwithAniesBaswedan,17July2008.
OLIVERHELLMANN
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ships thatensuresgovernmentparticipation,whileexcludingsmallerparties.This
therebyallowsallelitesaccesstopublicresourcesasanadditionalsourcetofurther
consolidatetheirclientelisticnetworks.
Yet,whilethecontextualenvironmentclearlyselectsforclientelisticstrategiesof
votermobilisation,itisimportanttopointoutthatnotallrelevantpoliticalparties
followaclientelisticstrategy,henceconfirmingourargumentthatsocialagentscan
developalternative strategic responses to the same context.Themostnotable ex‐
ampleofaprogrammaticparty is thePKS,whichwasestablishedunder thename
JusticePartyinJuly1998byactivistsoftheIslamiststudentmovement.Whilstnot
openlypushing foran Islamicstateor theadoptionofsharia law, theparty’splat‐
formfocusesontheneedtoeducatethemassesonshariathroughda’wah(inviting
peopletolearnabouttheQu’ranandotherIslamicsources),whichimpliesthatthe
PKSseesthe incorporationof Islamic lawintotheconstitutionasa longtermgoal
(Baswedan2004).Thepartyonlyachieved1.8%ofthevotesinthe1999,failingto
achievethetwo‐percentelectoralthresholdthatwaslegallyrequiredtocompetein
the 2004 legislative elections. Itwas thus reconstituted as the Prosperous Justice
Party,andthistimemanagedtowin7.3%ofthevotesand45outof550seats,mak‐
ingthePKStheseventh‐largestpartyinparliament.
ThePKS’ssearchforapolicyplatformclearlyreflectsintheconflictbetweenits
partyinternalfactions.Foralongtimethepartyhadbeenabletocontainitsinternal
differencesandpreventadividingschism.However, factional tensionssurfaced in
the run‐up to the 2004 presidential election, deriving from the tension between
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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Islamistgoalsandacommitmenttodemocracy.Whilethepartymainstreamaround
thenpartyleaderHidayatNurWahidwantedPKStosupportAmienRaisasapresi‐
dentialcandidate,ahardlinefactionaroundtheparty’sgeneral‐secretaryAnisMatta
argued that thePKSshouldput itsweightbehindGolkar‐nomineeWiranto,who–
althougha lessdevoutMuslim thanAmienRais–wasconsideredashavingmuch
betterchancesofwinningtheelection.FactionalisminthePKSisthusnotdrivenby
patronageandclientelism.Rather,thepartyissplitbetweenmoderatescommitted
to Islam and democracy, and more radical forces who seek power in order to
achieveIslamistgoals.109
Thedrivingmotivationsbehindactors’strategiccalculationsareagaindifficultto
identifyandnotpartofthisanalysis.Takingamoreresource‐focusedapproach,we
couldarguethat–asthePKSwasformedexternally tothepartycartel–theparty
lackedthenecessarymeanstodevelopaclientelisticstrategyforvotermobilisation
and thus had to focus on programmatic appeals instead. Alternatively, we could
buildanargumentbasedonideas,arguingthatagentswithinthePKSholdcertain
viewsabouttheirenvironment,whichdonotallowthemtorealisetheopportunities
for clientelism presented by that environment. More precisely, actors in the PKS
could genuinely be interested in introducing sharia law through da’wah, leading
themtorejectclientelismasparticularisticrelationshipsnotconducive to theuni‐
versalextensionofIslam.
109PersonalcommunicationwithRizalSukma,15July2008.
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–284–
WhateverthereasonbehindthePKS’sprogrammaticplatform,thecentrallesson
tobedrawnfromthisexample is that–althoughthecontextualenviromentalwill
strategically select for a particular outcome – this outcome is not inevitable, but
social actors can follow alternative courses of action. However, the characteristic
regularity thatwe can identify in themajor political parties in post‐authoritarian
Indonesia is that they are dominated by elites who had been embedded into Su‐
harto’sdistributivecoalition.Aftertheintroductionof freeandfairelectiontheel‐
ites used these inter‐personal channels and their access to state resources for an
electoral strategy based primarily on clientelism. Itmust be noted, however, that
clientelismintheIndonesiancontextismainlyastrategytoaccommodatethepoliti‐
cal elite,while voters are linked topoliticians through religious, ethnic and social
identities.
Partyorganisation
TheclientelisticstrategiesofthemajorIndonesianpartiesclearlyreflectintheiror‐
ganisation,asallinternaldecisionsaremadeinformally,whiletheformalelements
ofthepartyorganisationareimpossibletodistinguish.Rather,asinthePhilippines,
thepartymembership largelyoverlapswith theparty inpublicoffice andaparty
bureaucracyisalmostnon‐existent.Actorsinvestheavilyinthemaintenanceofin‐
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–285–
tra‐elite clientelistic networks, with the function of the formal party organisation
reducedtoamerefaçade.Incontrast,thePKS,whichfollowsaprogrammaticstrat‐
egyofvotermobilisation,hasdevelopedastrongmassmembershiporganisation,in
whichthepartycentralofficeclearlyplaysthedominantrole.
Membership
In accordance with the amended Law on Political Parties, which was ratified in
December2007,apoliticalpartyinIndonesiamusthavebranchesin60percentof
theprovinces,50percentof thedistricts ineachprovince,and25percentof the
sub‐districts in each district. These requirements were put into effect, as it was
fearedthat–inthemulticulturalsocietythatisIndonesia–politicalpartiescouldbe
usedtopromoteracial,religiousorethnichatred,ortoencouragethesecessionof
certain regions from the Indonesian state. In accordance with these legal regula‐
tions,allmajorIndonesianpartieshaveestablishedformalrepresentativeofficesin
most provinces and inmany districts across thewhole archipelago. For instance,
Golkar,which as the former regime party enjoyed a considerable head start con‐
cerningtheconstructionofanorganisationalapparatus,claimstohave30provin‐
cialbranches,around380districtand3,900sub‐districtbranches.110
110PersonalcommunicationwithGolkar,2July2008.
OLIVERHELLMANN
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However,ingeneral,thequalityoftheseofficesandtheirabilitytocommunicate
withthepeopleatthegrassrootslevelisverypoor.Infact,partybranchesareusu‐
allyonlyorganisedasanemptyshellinordertomeetthelegalrequirementssetout
inthepartylaw.In‐betweenelectionsIndonesia’spartyorganisationswitheraway
and party activities are almost non‐existent (Johnson Tan 2006: 107). Given the
littleinterestnationalpartyleadershipshaveinorganisingandmaintainingastrong
localorganisation,partybrancheshave,inmostcases,been“hijacked”bylocalnot‐
ables – such as wealthy businesspeople, well‐connected bureaucrats, traditional
noblemen, or violent gangsters. Thepoliticians thenuse the local party branch to
contestforpublicofficesatloweradministrativelevels,whichthroughtheprocess
of decentralising administrative governance and fiscal governance – initiated in
1999–havebecomeincreasinglyinteresting(Hadiz2004;Choi2004a).
Local party branches are thus highly independent from the central party
(Buehler and Tan 2007). This independence goes so far that in order tomobilise
supportfortheelectioncampaign,candidatesfornationalelectionswillhavetopay
the party branches in their respective constituency for their loyalty.111 In other
words,adyadicpatron‐clientrelationconnectsthenationalpoliticiantotheheadof
thelocalpartybranch.Thelatterwillthenusethismoneytoreimbursepartywork‐
ersfortheirservicesduringthecampaign(suchascanvassing,puttinguppostersor
participatinginamassrally).Thepaymentismadeeitherincashorthroughother
111PersonalcommunicationwithBennySubianto,3July2008.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–287–
gifts, suchasa freemeal, vouchers for local transportorentertainment througha
musicshow.
Ordinarypartymembers,whowouldperformthesecampaign‐relatedtasksona
voluntarybasis–asisthecommonpracticeinmostWestEuropeanparties–donot
exist in Indonesia. Political parties provide membership figures on request, but
withoutapartymembershipregisterandasophisticatedsystemofmembershipID
cards,thesefiguresarewithoutvalue,sincedistinguishingpartymembersfromor‐
dinaryvotersbecomesimpossible.Theparties’statutesmerelylistanumberofvery
generalrequirementsmembersneedtomeet–withGolkarmakingadistinctionbe‐
tweenmembersandcadres112–not includingthepaymentofregularmembership
fees.113Instead,party“members”arepaidbytheparty–orrather,thelocalpoliti‐
cian–toputtheirlabourforceintotheparty’sservice.
TheonlynotableexceptiontothispatternisthePKS,which“hasprovidedIndo‐
nesia with an alternative model of grassroots party building centred around re‐
cruitment” (Fionna2008: para. 1). To startwith,members are required to attend
weeklypartymeetings,which take the formofQur’anic study sessions (tarbiyah),
covering the main topics of Islam: God, the prophet, and Islamic regulations.114
Moreover,whilethere isnofixedmembershipfee,partymembersareexpectedto
donatepartoftheirincometothepartythroughobligatoryinfaq–adonationbene‐ 112Golkarclaimstohaveabout14millioncadresandordinarymembers.Theeligibilitycriteria forordinarymembershipincludeage,literacy,acceptanceoftheparty’splatformetcetera,whilecadres,inaddition,havetopassapoliticaltrainingandeducationprogramme.113ThePANenvisionedregularmembershipfeeswhenitwasfoundedin1998,butthisrequirementwassoondroppedastheenforcementprovedverydifficult.114TheauthorgainedtheinformationcontainedinthisparagraphthroughpersonalcommunicationwiththePKSon9July2008.
OLIVERHELLMANN
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ficialtoIslam,repeatedlymentionedthroughouttheQu’ran.Aswillbeshownlater,
thePKS reliesheavilyon the financial contributionsof itsmembers. It is thusnot
surprisingthatthepartyactivelyengagesintherecruitmentofnewmembers,such
asthrough“openhouses”–Qu’ranicstudysessionsopentonon‐members.Thesuc‐
cessofIslamasarecruitmenttoolreflectsintheparty’smembershipfigures:Asof
2008,thePKSclaimstohave2millionmembers,whichtranslatesinto24percentof
theparty’selectorateor1.4%ofthetotalelectorate.115This isarelatively impres‐
sive figure–particularly ifweconsiderthatothermajorpartiesdonotattachany
requirementstopartymembershipatall.
WecanthusconcludethatinmostofthemajorIndonesianpartiesapartyonthe
ground isnon‐existent, sincewhat thepartiesdescribeas “members”are indistin‐
guishable from ordinary voters. Rather, party “members” are recruited as clients
through the clientelistic networksof local notableswhohave taken control of the
partybranches.Hence,intheIndonesiancontext,therealstrengthofapartyisnot
measuredbythesheernumberofitsofficesandmembers,butratherinitsabilityto
accommodate informal localpowerholders into theparty’spatronagenetwork. In
contrast,thePKSdefinesitselftogreatextentthroughitsmassgrassrootsorganisa‐
tionwithideologicallycommittedmembers.However,aswillbeshowninthenext
section, this membership commitment does not equate a powerful party on the
ground–asinthetraditionalWestEuropeanmassparty–butalldecision‐making
powerishighlycentralisedinthepartyleadership.
115Thecalculationisbasedontheresultsofthe2004legislativeelections.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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Candidateselection
AllpoliticalpartiesinIndonesiamakereferencetothenominationofcandidatesfor
publicelectionintheirofficialstatutes,buttheseproceduralguidelinesareusually
verygeneral,leavingampleroomforinterpretationbythepartyleadership.Infact,
theactualpracticeofcandidateselection in themajor Indonesianparties isavery
obscureprocess,with the finaldecisionmadeby thehighest strataofparty elites
behindcloseddoors(Haris2005).EveninthePKS,whichdiffersconsiderablyfrom
the other major parties regarding its grassroots organisation, the nomination of
candidatesforpublicelectionsishighlycentralisedatthetopoftheparty.116
DespitetheofcandidateselectioninthemajorpoliticalpartiesinIndonesia,ob‐
servers of Indonesian politics have identified a number of factors thatwill play a
roleinthenominationprocess.Themostimportantoftheseappearstobethecon‐
troloverfinancialresources.AsMietzner(2007:251)explains,
Politicalparties in Indonesia […]have inan increasingnumberof
cases sold the nominations for legislative and executive office to
wealthyindividualswhohadnoparticularconnectiontotheparty
or itsbeliefs,butwhocouldafford topay largesumsofmoney to
theparty.
116Foramoregeneralcritiqueoftheelitistdecision‐makingstructuresinthePKSandtheverylim‐itedopportunitiesforparticipationbytherank‐and‐fileseeWanandi(2007).
OLIVERHELLMANN
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For national legislative elections the prices for nominations are usually staggered
according to therankingon theparty list,withhighrankings thatvirtuallysecure
election into parliament being significantly more expensive than lower positions
thatdonotcomewithasimilarguaranteeofsuccess.Forinstance, in2004,candi‐
dateswhowantedtobenominatedforthehighestlistplacesinGolkarwereasked
topayupto100millionIDR(about5,840GBP)(Tomsa2008:64).However,asthis
ispreciselytheamountofmoneyaprivateindividualislegallyallowedtodonateto
apoliticalparty,itcanbeassumedthatthepriceforaplaceonthepartylistwasin
factmuchhigher.
Moreover,candidatesarenotonlyrequiredtopaytheirrespectivepartyforthe
candidacy,but,inaddition,candidatesneedtoprovethattheywillbeabletoshoul‐
der the financial costs of their own personal election campaign (Ufen 2008: 27).
Giventheexplosionofcampaigncostssince1999,thissumismuchlargerthanthe
“donation”totheparty,resultinginagrowinginfluxofwealthybusinesspeopleinto
the political parties, as is best exemplified by JusufKalla and SutrisnoBachir, the
partyleadersofGolkarandPANrespectively.Conversely,lessaffluentpartypoliti‐
cianshavefoundthemselvesincreasinglymarginalised,sincethepartyitselfisusu‐
allynotasourceofcampaignfunding(Choi2004b:342).Ingeneral,partieswillfi‐
nancethenationalmediacampaign,whilecandidatesareexpectedtofundthecam‐
paign “on the ground”.117 The only exception to this rule is again the PKS,where
moneydoesnotseemtoinfluencethecandidateselectionprocessandthepartyal‐
117PersonalcommunicationwithMarcusMietzner,28June2008.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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locates a large share of its budget for campaign purposes (Manikas and Emling
2003:123).
However,money isnottheonly factorthatwilldecidewhogetsnominatedfor
public election. Candidates will also have to demonstrate to the party leadership
that they are able to mobilise voters in their respective constituencies. Broadly
speaking,thisinvolvesprovingtwothings.First,thatoneiswell‐connectedtolocal
power brokers, such as religious leaders, key bureaucrats and traditional aristo‐
craticelites.Second,thatonehasthesupportoftheconstituency’slocalpartychap‐
ters,which–aswasdiscussedearlier–haveinmostcasesfallenpreytotheinter‐
estsoflocalbossesandenjoyahighdegreeofautonomyfromthepartycentral.118
Both of these informal norms require the candidate to span a dense clientelistic
networkacrosstheconstituencythatcanthenbeusedasavotemobilisingmachine.
Finally,inaddition,partyleadersalsotakeintoconsiderationthecandidate’spopu‐
laritywiththeelectorate,withpartiesmakingincreasinguseofpublicopinionpolls
inordertoidentifythecandidateswiththehighestpopularityrating(seeMietzner
2009a).
Asageneralrulecanbeformulatedthatthebettercandidatesscoreontheselat‐
terfactors,thelesstheywillhavetocontributeintermsoffinancialresources.119In
fact,partiesusuallyreservearoundtenpercentoftheplacesonthepartylistforbig
“vote‐getters”, such as popular artists and show‐biz celebrities, whose campaign
118PersonalcommunicationwithRainerHeufers,14July2008.119PersonalcommunicationwithBennySubianto,3July2008.
OLIVERHELLMANN
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costswill be fully coveredby the respectivepolitical party.120 For instance, in the
2004electionthePDI‐PrecruitedtheactressesDesyRatnasari,MarissaHaqueand
Deddy Sutomo and singer Franky Sahilatua, while the PKB enlisted actors Rieke
Dyah Pitaloka and Ayu Azharia, and Golkar nominated actress Nurul Arifin. This
trend is interpretedbyUfen(2006:18)asone indicationofan increasing “Philip‐
pinisation”oftheIndonesianpartysystem.
Whilethisprocessisthushighlyundemocratic,thenominationofthepresiden‐
tialcandidatetendstobeevenmoreelitist:Usually,thepartyleaderwillbeselected
automatically without any serious opposition. Only in parties that are not domi‐
natedbyasingleleadercanthenominationprocessturnintoseriouscompetition.
The only significant example of such a case is Golkar,which – aswasmentioned
earlier–plungedintoapowervacuumaftertheoustingofSuharto,leavingseveral
strongcontenderscompetingfortheparty’spresidentialnominationin2004.How‐
ever,thisprocesswasonlydemocraticinaformalsense,astheracewasinfactde‐
cided bywhichever candidate “bought” the support of themajority of local party
chapters(Tomsa2008:88).
Tosumup,theselectionofcandidatesfornationalelections inthemajorIndo‐
nesianpoliticalparties isbothahighlycentralisedandhighly informalprocess.As
thereisnopartyontheground,candidatesarerecruitedfromoutsidetheparty.In
ordertobeadmittedasacandidate,politiciansneedtocontributefinanciallytothe
respective party’s electoral campaign, control an effective clientelistic network
120PersonalcommunicationwithMarcusMietzner,28June2008.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
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downtothegrassrootslevel,and–lessimportantly–scorehighinpopularityrat‐
ings.InthePKS,ontheotherhand,wherethemembershipwouldbelargeenoughto
serveasarecruitmentpool,partyleadersusetheirreligiousauthoritytolegitimise
acentralisationofdecision‐makingpower.
Distributionofresourcesanddecision‐makingpositions
TheprevioussectionidentifiedanimportantsourceofincomeforIndonesianpoliti‐
cal parties: the “auctioning” of nominations for public elections.Once elected into
parliament, legislators will then be asked to make regular contributions to their
party–sometimesreachingupto40percentoftheirsalary.121 Moreover,cabinet
memberswillbeputunderintensepressuretousetheiraccesstostateresourcesto
syphonoffpublicmoneyintopartycoffers,mostlybyofferingprojectstobusinesses
andindividualscloselyassociatedwiththeparty.Twoexemplarycasesofthisprac‐
tice that became public were the Baligate scandal in 1999, when Golkar officials
managed toextort546billion IDR(about32.5millionGBP) fromthestate‐owned
BaliBankforquestionableconsultancyservices,andtheBuloggatescandalin2000,
in which then president Wahid was accused of diverting substantial amounts of
moneybelongingtothenationalfoodagency,Bulog,tofoundationsclosetothePKB.
121OnthisandtherestoftheparagraphseeMietzner(2007).
OLIVERHELLMANN
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Finally, parties also rely heavily on external contributions, particularly frombusi‐
nesspeople.Thesedonationsareusuallyhandedtoseniorpartyleaders,whooften
keepthemoneyfor themselves.Onlyduringelectiontime,whenmostparty funds
are pooled in a number of central accounts to coordinate the financing of the
national campaign, do entrepreneurs use the official party treasury as theirmain
entrypointfordonations.Partyfinancinglaws–settingamaximumlimitfordona‐
tions–exist,butviolationsarehardlyeverpunished(Hadiwinata2006:106).
The financial survival of themajor political parties in Indonesia thus strongly
dependsontheparties’candidatesandrepresentativesinpublicoffice.Statesubsi‐
diesforparties,itshouldbenoted,areinsignificant.Money,astheexampleofexter‐
nal donations shows, is generallynot channelled through theparty as an abstract
organisation,butthroughindividualpartyleaders.Thisissupportedbytheobserva‐
tion that Indonesianpartiesareonlyweaklybureaucratised.EvenGolkar, the for‐
mer regime party, which had decades to establish a bureaucratic apparatus, only
employsabout100permanentmembersofstaffinitsheadquarters.122Rather,man‐
agerialandadministrativefunctionsarelargelyperformedbyexternalprofessionals
withoutpolitical links to theparties (Mietzner2007:255).As JohnsonTan(2006:
107)explains,
duetothestrongconcentrationofdecision‐makingauthorityatthe
partycentreandthemagneticroleofparty leaders,otherarmsof
122PersonalcommunicationwithGolkar,2July2008.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–295–
theorganizationdonotdevelop:thisisrationalinthatotherparts
oftheorganizationareneitherwantednorneeded.
TheonlypartythatdeviatesfromthispatternisonceagainthePKS.Although–like
otherIndonesianparties–thePKSwithholdspartsofthesalaryof itselectedoffi‐
cials(25percent),themajorityoffundingcomesfrompartymembercontributions
(Manikas and Emling 2003: 124). Furthermore, the PKS also receives funding
through infaq and shadaqh (voluntary charity for the cause of Allah) from non‐
members.Partypoliticianswho receive suchdonationsmust transfer them to the
officialpartytreasury.Finally,thepartyalsobenefitsfromwakaf–propertyorland
endowed for public use – a tradition highly encouraged through the teachings of
Muhammad.
The importance of theparty central office in administering financial resources
clearlyreflectsintheparty’sdecision‐makingstructures.Allmembersoftheparty’s
central executive council (referred to within all Indonesian parties as the dewan
pimpinanpusatorDPP)areselectedbytheconsultativecouncil(majelissyuro)–the
highestexecutiveauthoritywithin theparty, composedmainlyof Islamic teachers
and clerics. The consultative council also nominates the members of the sharia
council,whosemaindutyistoensurethattheparty’spoliciesandplatformconform
tobasicIslamiclawsandprinciples.123
123PersonalcommunicationwiththePKS,9July2008.
OLIVERHELLMANN
–296–
InallIndonesianpartiestheDPPhasmorepowerthanthepartyinpublicoffice.
Themostpowerfulmechanismofcontrolistherighttorecallparliamentarians–as
statedinArticle12ofthepoliticalpartylaw–i.e.towithdrawtheirpartymember‐
ship,throughwhichtheywillautomaticallybedismissedfromthelegislature,since
independentlawmakersarenotpermitted.Moreover,theDPPwillusuallyalsoap‐
pointtheleadershipoftheparliamentarypartygroup(fraksi),therebyseverelycur‐
tailingthelatter’sfreedomofdecision‐making.124
Wecanthusconcludethatinallmajorparties–withtheexceptionofthePKS–
thepartyincentralofficeisonlyweaklydeveloped.Resourcesarenotmobilisedby
the party as an abstract organisation, but the organisational survival largely de‐
pendsonfinancialcontributionsbycandidatesforpublicelections.Underthesecir‐
cumstances, the functionof thepartybureaucracy is largely reduced tomanaging
thefundsforthenationalelectioncampaign,leavingthepartyinpublicofficeasthe
dominant–andprobablyonly – faceof thepartyorganisation. In thePKS, incon‐
trast, theparty central office ismuchmorepowerful.Although theparty’s official
rulesdenybureaucratsavoteinpartyinternalmatters,alldecision‐makingpower
ismonopolisedintheconsultativecouncil–thepartyleadership.
124PersonalcommunicationwithFrankFeulner,28June2008.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–297–
Summary
Aswewouldexpectina“thirdwave”democracy,thesuddenarrivalofdemocracyin
Indonesia did not leave actorsmuch time to develop programmatic strategies for
votermobilisation.Asaresult,thewinnersinthecountry’sfirsttwoelectionswere
those political partieswith significant links to parties that dominated Indonesia’s
firstdemocraticpartysysteminthe1950s(Mietzner2008:439).WhilethePDI‐Pis
perceived as continuing Sukarno’s legacy of socialist secularism, several religious
partieshavestronghistoricalrootsindifferentgroupswithintheMuslimpopulation
–Wahid’s PKB representsNahdatul Ulama, Rais’ PAN is closely connected toMu
hammadiyahandthePPPclaimssuccessiontoMasyumi,thelargestmodernistMus‐
lim party in Indonesia’s post‐independence democracy. In addition to these four
“historical”parties,Golkarwasabletomaintainitssupportbasethroughthedemo‐
cratic transition, allowing the former regimeparty to finish first in the1999elec‐
tions.
However,votersdonotonlyvoteforthesepartiesonthebasisofhistoricallyin‐
formedpsychologicalattachments,butpoliticalpartiesneedtostrengthentheirtra‐
ditionallinkswiththerespectivecommunitiesbygainingtheendorsementoflocal
notables representing these communities. Accordingly, the context favours actors
who already control clientelistic networks that integrate a large number of local
powerholders,orwhopossessthenecessaryfinancialresourcestoestablishsucha
networkinashortperiodof time.That is tosay, thecontextualenvironmentstra‐
OLIVERHELLMANN
–298–
tegicallyselectsclientelismasthedominantstrategyforvotermobilisation.Itmust
benoted,however, that thepatron‐clientrelationshipsrarelyreachdowntovoter
level,buttheyareprimarilyamechanismtoaccommodateelitesfromthenational
andlocallevel.
Nevertheless, verymuch like the classical cadre party in early democratic Eu‐
rope,politicalpartiesinIndonesiadonotinvestinaformalpartyorganisation.Party
leaderswantmaximum freedom in themanagement of their intra‐elite networks
andarethereforenotinterestedinaformalpartymembershipandapowerfulparty
bureaucracy.Rather,theformalpartyorganisationonlyservesasacloaktoconceal
theclientelisticdealings.Allfunctionsusuallyassociatedwithpoliticalparties,such
astherecruitmentofcandidates,themobilisationoffundingandtheorganisationof
electoralcampaigns,areperformedbytheinformalnetworkswithinthatcloak.Asa
result, the three formal facesofpartyorganisation– thepartyon theground, the
party central office and the party in public office – are indistinguishable. Instead,
thereisastrongpersonaloverlapbetweenthethreefaces,aspartymembershipis
restricted to actorswho have the necessary resources to run their own electoral
campaign,whilefunctionsusuallyassociatedwiththepartybureaucracyaremainly
performedbyexternalprofessionals.
However,whileclientelismistheoutcomestrategicallyselectedbythecontext,
agents have developed alternative strategic reactions to the environment around
them.Themostnotableexampleofsuchpoliticalparties isthePKS,whichtriesto
mobilisevotersthroughIslamistpolicyideas.Findingitselfinasimilarsituationas
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–299–
socialist andcommunistmassparties in late19th centuryEurope– that is, having
been establishedexternal to government – thePKS combines theseprogrammatic
appealswithamassmembershiporganisation.Themassmembershipprovidesthe
PKSwith financialresourcesandconnects thepartytothesocialmilieuwhose in‐
terests itclaimstorepresent.However, incontrast to theclassicalmassparty, the
PKS is not democratically organised, but decision‐making is controlled by a small
group of religious preachers and scholars. The party central office therefore pos‐
sesses powerful means to enforce discipline among the members of the party in
publicofficeinordertopushforwardtheparty’sideologicalprogramme.
Despite the similarities to party systems in 19th century Europe, the case of
Indonesia shouldnotbeviewedasevidenceofpoliticalparties in the country fol‐
lowingthesamepathoforganisationaldevelopmentaspartiesinWesternEurope.
Rather,ashasbeenshown,partyorganisationsinIndonesiaaretheproductofstra‐
tegicdecisionstakenwithinacontextthatfavoursclientelismoverotherstrategies
for voter mobilisation. Unlike in South Korea or the Philippines, clientelistic net‐
works in Indonesiadogenerallynotprovidematerial incentives tovoters,but the
exchange relations tend to be limited to the intra‐party level. The connection be‐
tweenvotersandpoliticiansismadeastheestablishedpoliticalpartiesbenefitfrom
theirtraditionalimagesasrepresentativesofcertainsocialcommunities.
However,astheresultsforthe2009legislativeelectionssuggest,thispatternof
votermobilisation could slowlybe changing, since allmajorparties lost consider‐
OLIVERHELLMANN
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ablesupport.125Instead,thebigwinnerwaspresidentYudhyono’sPartaiDemokrat
(DemocraticParty,PD),whichgathered21percentofthevote–anincreaseofal‐
most14percentagepointsover2004.AsseveralobserversofIndonesianelectoral
politicshavepointedout,Yudhyono’ssuccesswaslargelyduetothegovernment’s
schemeofhandingoutmillionsincashtopoorcitizensshortlybeforetheelectionin
–whatwasclaimedas–acompensationforrising fuelprices(Sherlock2009;Mi‐
etzner2009b).Hence,asundertheNewOrderregime,votersarereceivingmaterial
incentives forelectoralsupport throughchannelsof thestateadministration.How
otherpartieswill react to thesechangingcircumstances remains tobe seen:They
couldextendtheirclientelisticnetworkstotheelectorateordevelopprogrammatic
appeals.WhileweshouldnotseeanychangesinthewayIndonesianpartiesareor‐
ganised if clientalistic networks are extended, organisational changeswill be dra‐
maticifactorsdecidetotaketheprogrammaticroute.
125Allfivepartiesthatemergedasthemajorplayersinthe1999electionssufferedsignificantlossescomparedtothe2004elections.TwoofthebiggestloserswereGolkarandthePDI‐P:Golkar’svotefellby7%to14.5%,whilethePDI‐Plost4.5%to14%.TheIslamicpartieswerealsohitbyamajordeclineinvoteshare:ThePKBonlywon5.0%ofthevote(‐5.6),thePPP5.3(‐2.9)andthePAN6.0(‐0.4).ThePKS,ontheotherhand,followingaprogrammaticstrategyofvotermobilisation,wasabletoslightlyincreaseitsvoteto7.9%(+0.6).
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–301–
–8–
CONCLUSION
Towardsanewframeworkforpartyorganisationanalysis
Thestartingpointofthispieceofresearchwastheobservationthattheliteratureon
party organisational formation and change is divided along an agency‐structure
spectrum. Although several scholars of party politics have, in the past, implicitly
hinted at the division between theories stressing the explanatory power of struc‐
turesandthosearguingforamoreagent‐centredapproachtothestudyofpartyor‐
ganisation,nobodyhasfullyrecognisedyettheimplicationsoftheconflictbetween
these two theoretical strands for ourunderstandingof party organisation. In fact,
thefirstsectionofthispaperoffersthefirsteverreviewoftherelevantpartylitera‐
turebasedonhowmuchsignificanceauthorsattachtoeitherstructuralvariablesor
politicalactorsasautonomousandreflexiveagents.
Within the structural strandwe then distinguished between three further ap‐
proaches,dependingonwhethertheyputmoreemphasisoneither internalorex‐
OLIVERHELLMANN
–302–
ternalfactors–orboth.Whilethe“life‐cycle”approachbelievesthateachpartyfol‐
lowsthesameevolutionarypatterninitsdevelopmentasaconsequenceofalargely
endogenous process ofmaturation and institutionalisation, the “period‐effect” ap‐
proachgivessoleattentiontotheexternalenvironment,arguingthatpartiesneedto
evolvewithchangingpoliticalandsocial circumstancesorotherwise theywillnot
surviveinthe“survivalofthefittest”.Finally,the“generationeffect”approachcom‐
binesthesetwoapproaches,maintainingthattheformationofapartywillbedriven
byexternalcircumstance,whereasthefurtherdevelopmentwillthenbedetermined
byinternaldynamics.
Subsequently,wearguedthatthehardenedstand‐offbetweenstructuralistand
voluntaristapproachesseriouslyweakensourcomprehensionofhowpoliticalpar‐
tiesestablishandchangetheirorganisations.Thisargumenthasbothanempirical
andameta‐theoreticaldimension.Usingexamplesfromestablisheddemocraciesin
WesternEurope,weshowedhowthestrengthofoneapproachistheweaknessof
another, andviceversa.Moreover,onamoreabstract level,weargued that there
existsadialecticalrelationshipbetweenstructuresandagents,ratherthanalinear
causal linkinonlyonedirection–dependingonwhetheronetakesastructuralor
an actor‐centred approach. Following the basic propositions of historical institu‐
tionalism,wearguedthatsocialactorsareknowledgeableandreflexive,whichgives
themtheabilitytodevelopdifferentstrategieswithinacontextthatfavourscertain
strategiesoverothers.Inotherwords,ifweonlyfocusonstructurestoexplaindif‐
ferent typesofpartyorganisationwe ignore theabilityof actors todevelop strat‐
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–303–
egiesthatwillhelpthemovercometheproblemsposedbystructuresaroundthem.
On the flipside, only focussing on agents means neglecting the context as a con‐
touredterrainwhichselectsforcertainoutcomes.
Itisimportanttonotethatthisdoesnotmeanthatweneedtorefuseallexisting
theories of party organisation –we only need to revise the relationship between
them.Fortunately,historical institutionalismnotonlyoffersamediumforcritique
butalsoaframeworkforhowtointegrateexplanatoryfactorsfromdifferentlevels
of analysis into a single theoreticalmodel.More specifically, historical institution‐
alism helps us understand that,within a given context, there is not a single ideal
typeofpartyorganisation,butpoliticalactorscandevelopdifferentorganisational
strategiestodealwiththeproblemspresentedtothembytheenvironment.Atthe
sametime,however,theenvironmentisstrategicallyselective,meaningthatactors
arenottotallyfreeindesigningpartyorganisations.Instead,theywillhavetoorien‐
tate themselves towards theenvironment inwhich theirparty is to competewith
other parties. Moreover, historical institutionalism provides us with a convincing
mechanismtoexplainthereproductionofpartyorganisations,whichalsocarriesin
itselfanexplanationforthedisruptionofthisreproductiveprocess:thatis,thedis‐
tributionofpoweramongpartyinternalactors.Putbriefly,partyorganisationsre‐
produceovertimeasdifferentfactionsoftenpushfordifferenttypesoforganisation
andspaceforagencytochangetheorganisationalstructuresofthepartywillonly
openupiftheinter‐factionalpowerconfigurationissignificantlyaltered.
OLIVERHELLMANN
–304–
Asthedefiningfunctionofpoliticalpartiesistocompeteinpublicelections,or‐
ganisational strategies are inseparably linked to strategies of voter mobilisation.
Broadlyspeaking,wecandistinguishtwobasicelectoralstrategies:clientelisticex‐
change relationships and programmatic appeals. Politicianswho follow a clientel‐
isticstrategywillinvestthelargestshareoftheirresourcesintotheconstructionof
patron‐client networks, in which political support will be exchanged formaterial
goods,suchasmoney,jobsorservices.Thepoliticalpartywillthusonlyberudimen‐
tarilyorganised,merelyservingastheformalshellforthesenetworks.Verysimilar
totheclassicalcadrepartyin19thcenturyEurope,thethreefacesofpartyorganisa‐
tion–thepartyontheground,thepartycentralofficeandthepartyinpublicoffice
–willbeindistinguishable.Incontrast,aprogrammaticstrategyrequiresaninvest‐
mentintothepartyasanabstractorganisation,whichwillhavetobeopenforwider
popularparticipationandprovideformalmechanismsforconflictresolution.Parties
will thus be characterised by (1) a strong party central office, if politicians target
clearlyidentifiablesocialmilieus,or(2)bedominatedbythepartyinpublicoffice,if
theelectoralappealistargetedatthemedianvoter.
Newer democracies of the “thirdwave” are generally selective towards either
clientelismorcatch‐allstrategies,becausethetypicalabruptnessofthedemocratic
transitiondoesnot leave actors enough time to develop clearly focusedprogram‐
matic platforms.Moreover, unlike in the “firstwave” of democratisation, inmany
youngerdemocraciesprocessesofindustrialisationandnation‐buildingdidnotpre‐
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–305–
cedethedemocratisationofthepoliticalsystem,meaningthatelectoralcleavageson
whichtomobilisevotersaroundideologicalprogrammeshavenotemerged.
Whethertheparticularcontextfavourseitherclientelisticorcatch‐allstrategies
willthendependonanumberofotherfactorsatthepolitylevel.Broadlyspeaking,
thestructuralenvironmentselects forclientelismundereither,orboth,of the fol‐
lowing two conditions: (1) The outgoing autocratic regime legitimised its non‐
democraticrulethroughtheclientelisticdistributionofgoodsandhadatleastpar‐
tial control of the democratisation process; or (2) the level of economic develop‐
mentissolowthatclientelismcanbesetupasanewgame,withoutahighriskof
eitherofthetwosidesdefecting.Conversely,catch‐allstrategiesarethestrategically
selected outcome if – under conditions of high economic development – (1) the
democratictransitionwascontrolled“frombelow”,completelyremovingtheregime
frompower,or(2)theautocraticregimedidnotuseclientelisticmechanismstole‐
gitimiseitsnon‐democraticpower.
However, thisdoesnotmean thatweshouldexpectonly two typesofpolitical
parties to emerge in new democracies (i.e. parties with no formal organisational
facesandpartiesdominatedbythepartyinpublicoffice).Infact,underconditions
ofhighenvironmentaluncertainty,actorsfollowingacatch‐allelectoralstrategywill
sufferdifficultiesinenforcingpartydiscipline,whichcouldforcethemtostrengthen
thepartycentralofficeoverthepartyinpublicoffice.Environmentaluncertainty,in
turn,islargelytheproductofpropertiesofthepartysystem,particularlyfragmenta‐
tion and volatility. That is to say, strengthening the party central office could be‐
OLIVERHELLMANN
–306–
comenecessaryunderconditionsofhighpartysystemfragmentationandhighelec‐
toralvolatility.
Asiancontextsandactors’strategies
InmostnewerdemocraciesinEastAsia,thecontextualenvironmentishighlyselec‐
tive towardsclientelism.This isnotanewphenomenon–clientelismasamecha‐
nismtosecurepoliticalpowerhasdeephistoricalrootsinmanyEastAsiansocieties
andallautocraticregimesthatprecededthe“thirdwave”ofdemocratisationused,
in oneway or the other, clientelistic incentives to legitimise their dictatorial rule.
ThiswasmostobviousinthePhilippines,IndonesiaandSouthKorea:Althoughdif‐
feringwidelyintermsofpowerstructures–themoresultanisticregimesofMarcos
andSuhartoononeside,andthemilitary‐bureaucraticregimeinKoreaontheother
side – all three regimes used public money to “buy” voters in the regularly held
pseudo‐elections.InSouthKorea,eventhepro‐democraticoppositionreliedoncli‐
entelisticpracticestomobiliseelectoralsupport,whileinIndonesiaclientelisticin‐
centives were distributed through the state administration, not political parties.
Finally, inTaiwan, theKMTregime,afterretreatingtothe islandfromtheChinese
mainland,didnotdeveloppatron‐client linkageswith the localpopulation,but in‐
stead integrated society into an extensive network of party cells and branches.
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However, after higher party ranks were opened to sub‐ethnic Taiwanese in the
1970s,theemergingMainstreamfactionofTaiwanesepoliticiansusedtheirconnec‐
tions to local factions to mobilise voters in local and supplementary elections
throughclientelisticmeans.ThiseventuallyallowedtheMainstreamtobecomethe
dominant forcewithin theKMT, sidelining themore traditional groupswithin the
party.
InthePhilippines,thedemocratictransitioncompletelyremovedMarcos’sultan‐
isticregime,whichalsoresultedinthedestructionofexistingpatron‐clientlinkages.
However,thelowlevelofsocio‐economicdevelopmentmeantthatclientelismcould
beestablishedasanewgamewithoutahighriskofeitherthepoliticianorthevoter
defecting.Moreover,Marcoshadleftinstitutionalstructuresveryfavourabletoset‐
tingupclientelisticnetworksbyintroducingthebarangayasthesmallestadminis‐
trativeunit. These conditions strongly benefit the country’s economic elite,which
canuseitsprivatewealthasclientelisticincentives,whiletheimpoverishedmassof
thepopulationseetheseincentivesasameansofimprovingtheireverydaylives.In
somecases, politicians combine clientelismwith charisma– either theirowncha‐
rismaorcharismabyassociation,bymarryingacelebrity.Somepoliticiansevenuse
violent coercion, particularly in Mindanao, where the Filipino state struggles to
maintainamonopolyontheuseofforce.
Incontrast,inIndonesia,SouthKoreaandTaiwan,theclientelisticnetworkses‐
tablished under autocratic rulewere largely left untouched by the process of de‐
mocratisation,meaningthatpoliticalactorscouldcontinueusingtheminelections
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under the newly implemented democratic rules. In Indonesia, democracywas in‐
stalled throughapalace coupagainst Suharto,whichgave central elementsof the
regimetheopportunitytore‐positionthemselvesintheelectoralmarketbyhijack‐
ingexistingpartiesorestablishingtheirownpoliticalvehicles.Regardingthemobi‐
lisationofvoters,themajorpartiesinpost‐SuhartoIndonesiabenefitfromtheirhis‐
toricallinkageswiththespecificsocialmilieuswhoseintereststheyclaimtorepre‐
sent.However,thelinkagebetweenpoliticiansandvotersisnotmadethroughapol‐
icyplatformthataggregatestheinterestofthepolitician’sspecificconstituency.In‐
stead,politiciansprovide clientelistic incentives to localnotablesexercisingmoral
authority over their respective constituency in return for their endorsement in
nationalelections.Hence,clientelisminIndonesiaisbestdescribedasamechanism
toaccommodatepolitical elites from thenational and local level,withonlyavery
smallshareofmaterialgainstricklingdowntothevoter.
InSouthKorea,ontheotherhand,clientelismisadirectexchangerelationship
betweenthepoliticianandthevoter,inwhichmaterialgoodsandservicesarepro‐
vided in return for electoral support. Somewhat unusually, under the military‐
bureaucraticregime,theregimepartywasnottheonlypartytoemployclientelistic
strategies,butthepro‐democraticoppositionalsomobilisedvotersthroughclientel‐
istic incentives. It isthusnosurprisethattheseclientelisticnetworkssurvivedthe
negotiated transition todemocracyandcontinue tobeusedunder thenewdemo‐
craticrules.Whatismore,clientelismpersistsdespiteagrowinglevelofeconomic
development in South Korea, which shows that the prisoner’s dilemma does not
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arise when clientelism is embedded in social structures. However, the nature of
electoralclientelism inSouthKoreahasrecentlybeenchanging,asyoungerpoliti‐
ciansarepushingintothemajorpoliticalparties.Thisyoungergenerationofpoliti‐
cians is not integrated into the existing clientelistic networks and has thus re‐
introducedpubliceconomicincentivesintotheregionalcleavage,ratherthandistri‐
butingprivategoods.Putinmoreabstractterms,thisisthereforeanexampleofhow
socialagentscandevelopalternativestrategicresponsestothesamestructuralter‐
rain.
Anevenstrongercasefortheargumentthatactorsarestrategicallyreflexivecan
bemadebylookingatpoliticalpartycompetitioninTaiwan.Evenbeforethearrival
ofdemocracy,theKMThadbeendividedoverthebestelectoralstrategy:Whilethe
Mainstreamfactionuseditslinkstolocalfactionstomobilisevotersthroughclien‐
telistic practices, the Non‐mainstream followed a strategy of party organisational
penetrationintosociety,basedonanideologyofChinesenationalism.AstheKMT–
orrathertheMainstreamfaction–remainedintightcontrolofthedemocratisation
process,theclientelisticnetworksestablishedbytheMainstreamunderauthoritar‐
ian rule were successfully transferred into the new democratic arena. The Non‐
mainstream, on the other hand, continued to campaign of programmatic appeals,
demandingreunificationwith theChinesemainland.Thereasons for thisstrategic
choicearebeyondthescopeofthisanalysis,buttwopossibleexplanationscouldbe
theNon‐mainstream’slackofrelationstolocalfactionsoritsdivergingunderstand‐
ingoftheenvironmentthroughaparticularsetofideas.Forsimilarreasons,actors
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withinthe largestoppositionparty, theDPPalsodevelopedprogrammaticappeals
ratherthanpatron‐clientrelationships.WhereastheNewTidefactionbuiltapolicy
platformpromotingindependenceforTaiwan,theFormosafactionfollowedawider
electoralagenda,supportedbythepersonalcharismaofitsleaders.
BoththeKMT’sNon‐mainstreamandtheDPP’sNewTidefactionthusoptedfor
relatively narrow programmatic strategies, whichwe should theoretically not ex‐
pectinnewerdemocracies.Theyarethereforegoodexamplesofhowsocialactors
candevelop strategies that deviate from the outcome strategically selected for by
the structural context. Even clearer cases of politiciansmobilising clearly defined
socialgroupsthroughideologicalplatformscanbefoundinSouthKorea,thePhilip‐
pinesandIndonesia.Althoughinallthreecountriestheenvironmentishighlyselec‐
tivetowardsclientelism,politicalpartieshaveemergedthataggregatetheinterests
of certain constituencies in detailed policy agendas: The Korean DLP targets the
workingclass;theIndonesianPKSrepresentstheinterestsofconservativeMuslims;
and,inthePhilippines,AKBAYAN!servesasavoiceforthepoor.Again,themotivat‐
ing factorsbehind theseprogrammatic strategiesarenotpartof thisanalysis,but
actorscouldholdspecificsetsofvaluesthatdonotallowthemtorealisetheoppor‐
tunitiesforclientelismprovidedbythecontext–Marxistideasofsocialequalityin
theKDLPandAKBAYAN!,andIslamicvaluesofpietyandbelief inGod inthePKS.
Alternatively, these parties might have developed narrow programmatic appeals
because they do not control the necessary resources for a clientelistic strategy of
votermobilisation. Inorder tomakeup for the lackof resources, theparties’pro‐
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grammatic platforms provide citizens with collective incentives to join the party,
andcontributemoneyand/orlabour.
Althoughtheelectoralsuccessofthesethreepartieshassofarbeenlimited,they
arenonethelessexcellent examplesof theabilityof agents tomake strategicdeci‐
sions in a strategically selective context.Moreover, factional conflict in themajor
partiesinKoreaandparticularlyinTaiwanshowsthatsocialactorswithdiverging
strategicresponsestothesameenvironmentcanalsoco‐existwithinthesamepo‐
liticalparty.Sinceelectoralstrategiesfeeddirectlyintopreferencesregardingparty
organisation, political parties are therefore best described as constellations of
powerbetweendifferentpartyinternalactors.Accordingly,partyorganisationsre‐
produceandchange,asactorswillpushforthoseorganisationalstructuresthatwill
bestallowtheimplementationoftheirelectoralstrategy.Thatistosay,byfavouring
certainelectoralstrategiesoverothers,theenvironmentalcontextwillstrategically
selectforacertaintypeofpartyorganisation.However,givenactors’abilitytode‐
velopdifferentelectoralstrategieswithinthesamecontext,thisoutcomeisnotin‐
evitable. Indeed, aswe have seen, thewide variety of electoral strategies used to
mobilisevoters in theyoungerdemocraciesofEastAsia translates intoanequally
largevarietyofpartyorganisationsinthepost‐autocraticpartysystems.
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PartyorganisationinEastAsia
Asthepost‐autocraticenvironmentsinEastAsiaaregenerallyselectivetowardscli‐
entelism,mostpolitical parties are characterisedby their lackof formal organisa‐
tionalfaces.Instead,asintheclassicalcadreparty,thereisanalmostcompleteover‐
lapbetweenthepartyontheground,thepartycentralofficeandthepartyinpublic
office.However,sinceactorsareabletodevelopalternativeelectoralstrategies,we
canalsofindpartiesthathavetranslatedthedistributionbetweenpartyinternalac‐
tors into formal norms and regulations. Taiwanese parties, which have, since the
introductionofdemocracy,beendeeplyfragmentedwithfactionalconflictoverthe
best electoral strategy, are now dominated by actors following catch‐all electoral
strategies,resultinginthepartyinpublicofficeasthemostpowerfulorganisational
element. Moreover, party systems in South Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines
containsinglepartiesthatmobilisevotersonnarrowlyfocusedprogrammaticstrat‐
egies,whichmeansactorswithinthesepartieshavedevelopedthepartycentralof‐
ficeas thedominant faceasameansto increasepartydisciplineamongthemem‐
bersinpublicoffice.
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Partymembership
MostpoliticalpartiesinEastAsiaareveryvagueabouttheconditionstheyattachto
partymembership.TheconstitutionsofthedominantpartiesinSouthKorea,Indo‐
nesiaandthePhilippinesonlylistgeneralrequirements,suchasnationality,ageand
identificationwith the party’s principles. In addition to these basic criteria, party
membershipdoesusuallynotcarryanyotherobligations.Inparticular,partymem‐
bersarenotrequiredtoattendregularpartymeetingsorpayregularmembership
fees. Moreover, there is no formal procedure that needs to be followed to join a
party as amember: There is no application process, no ID cards are given out to
partymembersandnocentrallyadministeredmembershipregisterexistsbywhich
torecordthepersonaldetailsofmembers.Asaresult,itisimpossibletodistinguish
partymembersfromregularvoters,which,inturn,meansthatitisalsoimpossible
toprovidemeaningfulmembershipfiguresfortheseparties.
Theonlycriterion to identifypartymembers iswhether theyhavebeennomi‐
natedascandidates forapublicelectionby therespectiveparty–although in the
Philippineseventhiscriterion isnot free fromproblems,ascandidatesoftencam‐
paignunderthebannerofmorethanoneparty.Thereisthereforeastrongoverlap
between the party on the ground and the party in public office. Admittance as a
partymember/candidatewilldependonwhethertheindividualcancontributere‐
sourcestoundertakeasuccessfulelectoralcampaign.Giventhatthesepartiesfollow
clientelisticelectoral strategies, relevant resources tend to includemoney,patron‐
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clientnetworks,personalcharisma,and(inIndonesiaandthePhilippines)militant
organisations to intimidate candidates and supporters of other parties. Ordinary
members,ontheotherhand,havenovaluetotheseparties,aspartiesdonothaveto
rely on membership fees for their financial survival. Moreover, campaign‐related
functions traditionallyperformedbypartymembersonavoluntarybasis, suchas
canvassingorattendingrallies,arecarriedoutbyclientsofpowerfulpoliticiansin
returnformaterialincentives.Finally,membersarenotevenvaluedasmerestatist‐
ics:Sincevotersaremobilisedthroughclientelisticpractices,partiesdonotneedto
createtheimpressionthattheyarestronglyrootedinsociety.Inshort,theorganisa‐
tional strengthof theseparties should thereforenotbemeasuredasa functionof
their membership size, but on their ability to integrate resourceful politicians as
candidatesforpublicelections.
PartymembershipismoreexclusiveinTaiwaninthesensethatpartymembers
canbedistinguishedfromordinaryvoters.Mostnotably, inbothmajorTaiwanese
parties,theKMTandtheDPP,thereisanofficialmembershipregisterandmembers
areissuedwithmembershipcards.Currently,thetwopartiesenjoyamembership‐
electorateratioofroughlysevenandtwopercentrespectively,whichiscomparable
tomanyparties incontemporaryWesternEurope.However, inboth theKMTand
theDPPalargeshareofthepartymembershipareso‐called“pocketmembers”,who
donot jointhepartybecausetheyidentifywiththeparty’spolicyprogramme,but
because they have been recruited through the personal network of a local boss.
Thesepoliticianswillthenuse“their”memberstoinfluencepartyinternalvoting.In
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theKMT,theNon‐mainstreamfaction,whichbecamethedominantfactionafterthe
disastrous 2000 presidential election, cracked down on the problem of “pocket
members” by enforcing stricter registration procedures and introducing a small
membershipfee.
IntheDPP,membershavehadtopayregularfeessincetheparty’sfounding,but
“pocketmembers”remainamoreseriousproblemthanintheKMT,becauseofthe
party’s smaller overall membership. However, the dominant New Tide faction –
whichhastraditionallybeencharacterisedbyastrongideologicalidentityandthus
strictlyopposes the recruitmentof “pocketmembers” –has so farbeenunable to
implementefficientmeasuresagainst“pocketmembers”,becausetheDPPishighly
dependentoncollectivemembership feespaidby localbosses.FortheDPP,mem‐
bers’ financial contributions are therefore an important reason formaintaining a
formalpartymembership. In theKMT,on theotherhand, financial considerations
were not an important motivating factor when introducing membership fees in
2000. Instead, thedecisiontomakepartymembershipmoreexclusivewas largely
drivenbyfactionalrivalriesandcalculationsbythedominantNon‐mainstreamthat
this would exclude large numbers of “pocket members” controlled by the Main‐
streamfaction.AsintheDPP,however,membersarevaluedfortheirfreelabour–
particularlyduringcampaign times–andas statistic, thusgiving thepartya sem‐
blanceofsocialrepresentation.
WhilepartymembershipinTaiwanisthusmoreexclusivethaninthedominant
parties in other newer democracies of East Asia, membership criteria are even
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stricter in the Korean DLP, the Filipino AKBAYAN! and the Indonesian PKS.Most
notably,newmembersneedtoattendintroductoryseminars,wheretheyaretaught
about theparty’s goals andvalues.Moreover, partybranchesarehighly active in‐
betweenelectionsandattendanceofregularpartymeetingsisevencompulsoryin
thePKS(intheformofweeklyQu’ranicstudysessions)andAKBAYAN!,whereparty
members need to contribute labour to local party projects as a substitute for not
payingmembershipfees.Therefore,morethanTaiwaneseparties,thesethreepar‐
tiesconstantlyengagetheirmembersinpartyrelatedactivities,therebyindoctrinat‐
ingthemwiththeparty’sideology.Itisthussafetosaythat,inadditiontosourcesof
financialsupportandfreelabour,thesepartiesperceivetheirmembershipasapool
ofcandidatesforpublicelections,whoneedtobetrainedandeducatedinallaspects
ofpolitics.SincetheKLDP,AKBAYAN!andthePKSallfollownarrowlyfocusedelec‐
toral strategies, strict party discipline is an important condition for working to‐
wards the implementation of the party’s clearly defined goals. Educating and re‐
cruitingcandidatesfromwithinthepartyisaneffectivewayofcommittingtheparty
inpublicofficetotheparty’spolicyprogramme.
WecanthereforesummarisethatmostpartiesinthenewerdemocraciesinEast
Asiahavenotdevelopedaformalpartyontheground.Thisisbecausetheymobilise
votersthroughclientelisticincentives,whichmeansthatthepatron‐clientnetworks
employed in elections can also be used to recruit campaign supporters,while the
necessary financialresourcesareprovidedbytheelectoralcandidatesthemselves.
InTaiwan,ontheotherhand,partymemberscanclearlybedistinguishedfromthe
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restoftheelectorate,largelybecausepartieswanttoaddsubstancetotheircatch‐
all strategies by giving the impression that they are strongly rooted in society.
Moreover, the DPP is also highly dependent onmembership fees for its financial
survival,whileintheKMTtheintroductionofregulardueswasdrivenbyfactional
rivalries. Finally, parties campaigning on a narrow programmatic platform – the
KDLP,AKBAYAN!andthePKS– featurethestrongestpartiesontheground,since
members arenot only seen as sourcesofmoneyand labour, but also aspotential
candidatesforpublicelections.
Candidateselection
Ashighlightedearlier,inthemajorpartiesinSouthKorea,thePhilippinesandIndo‐
nesia the only criterion to distinguish party members from ordinary citizens is
whethertheyhavebeennominatedascandidatesforpublicelections.Thereisthus
nopartyonthegroundthatcoulddemocraticallylegitimisethenominationofcan‐
didates by vote. Instead, candidate selection is a highly informal and centralised
process,controlledbytheclosestcircleofpartyleaders.Nominationusuallyhasto
be“bought”withmoneyorotherpoliticallyrelevantresources.InSouthKoreaand
Indonesia,whereclosedpartylistsystemsareusedtoelectnationallegislators,the
higheronewantstoberankedonthelist,thehigherthefinancialcontributionwill
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havetobe.Evenpartyinternalelectionsthatseemsuperficiallydemocratic–exam‐
plesincludethenominationofcandidatesintheKoreanNKPin1998,partyconven‐
tionsheldbytheFilipinoLakasandtheraceforpresidentialcandidateinGolkarin
2004–arehighlycorruptedbymoneypolitics,astheoutcomeiseffectivelydecided
bywhocanbuythemostsupportfromlowerpartylevels.Ultimately,thispatternof
candidateselectionreflectsthelogicofclientelism–thatis,theactorswiththemost
resourceswillbepositionedatthetopoftheclientelisticnetwork,channellingpart
oftheseresourcesfurtherdownthepyramidinreturnforpoliticalsupport.
CandidateselectionisalsohighlycentralisedintheIndonesianPKS.Althoughthe
partywouldhavethenecessarypartyonthegroundtoconductademocraticnomi‐
nation process, party leaders use their religious authority to legitimise a decision
behindcloseddoors.However,unlikeinotherIndonesianparties,thisdecisiondoes
atleastnotseemtobeaffectedbymoneypolitics.Incontrast,otherpartieswitha
massmembershiporganisetheselectionofcandidatesinamuchmoredemocratic
way:While in the Filipino AKBAYAN! candidates for national elections get nomi‐
natedbythepartycongress,theKoreanDLPholdsclosedprimaries.Similartothe
classical mass party, both of these parties thus give their members participatory
rightsinreturnfortheirlabourandfinancialcontributions.InthePKS,ontheother
hand, the payment of regularmembership fees is justified through religious con‐
ceptsintheQu’ran,suchasinfaqandshadaqh–donationsforthecauseofAllah.
InthemajorTaiwaneseparties,theprocessofcandidateselectionhasinthepast
been a frequent target for party organisational reform, reflecting theongoing fac‐
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tional conflictwithin the parties. Initially, both theKMTand theDPPused closed
primaries to select candidates for parliamentary elections. In the KMT, the then
dominantNon‐mainstreamfactionwashopingthatthiswouldlimittheinfluenceof
localfactionscloselylinkedwiththeopposingMainstreamfaction,whileintheDPP
the dominant Formosa faction calculated that the “one member, one vote” rule
wouldgiveitanumericaladvantageovertheNewTide.However,bothpartiesthen
graduallycurtailedmembershipparticipation:IntheKMT,theincreasinglypower‐
ful Mainstream centralised candidate selection in the central standing committee
because the faction’s clientelistic strategydemanded special allocationof nomina‐
tionstolocalfactionsinreturnfortheirpoliticalsupport,whileintheDPPtheNew
Tidesucceededinmovingdecision‐makingintothemiddletiersoftheparty,which
iswherethefactionhadmostofitssupporters.
However,morerecently,boththeKMTandtheDPPhaveagaindecentralisedthe
nominationprocedure. In theDPP,after thedisastrous1996presidential election,
theNewTidebegantobroadenitselectoralappeal,effectivelyreplacingitsnarrow
programmaticstrategywithacatch‐allstrategy.Inordertodothisthefactionhad
to free itself from ideologically radicalmembers in the intermediary party struc‐
tures,which,inturn,madeitnecessarytoincreasetheinclusivenessoftheselector‐
ate. The New Tide did this by introducing public opinion polls, because a closed
primarywouldhavetranslatedintoanumericaladvantagefortheFormosafaction.
Similarly, in theKMT, theNon‐mainstream faction,whichagainbecame thedomi‐
nant factionafterLeeTeng‐hui’s resignationas chairman in2000, adoptedavery
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similarsystem.ThiswasbecausetheNon‐mainstreamanticipatedthatcandidatesof
theMainstreamfaction,whoaregenerallyassociatedwithcorruptionandotheril‐
legalactivities,woulddorelativelybadly inpublicopinion. Inotherwords, inTai‐
wan, the decision over the nomination of candidates for public elections is now
largelymadeoutsidethemajorpoliticalparties.
Inrecentyears,asimilartrendcanbeobservedinthemajorSouthKoreanpar‐
ties. As younger politicians, who are not integrated into existing clientelistic net‐
works,areenteringthetwolargestparties,theoldpatternofcandidateselection,in
whichnominationscanbebought throughclientelistic incentives,hascomeunder
attack.However,as in the twoTaiwaneseparties,democratisingtheprocedureby
extendingthevotetomembersandevennon‐membersisnotanoption,sincetheir
clientelistic networks would give the old guards a competitive advantage in any
election.Therefore,youngerpoliticianshavesuccessfullypushedfortheimplemen‐
tationofindependentscreeningcommittees,whichincluderespectedpersonalities
of Korean society. Before the 2008 elections, these committees refused to re‐
nominatemanyoftheguardsbecausetheyhadbeeninvolvedincorruptactivities.
However, this new procedure for candidate selection in Korea has not signifi‐
cantlyalteredthepartyinternaldistributionofpower.Asinthedominantpartiesin
thePhilippinesandIndonesia,thethreefacesofpartyorganisationremainindistin‐
guishable.Nevertheless,thefinaloutcomehasbecomemoreformalisedandlessde‐
pendentfrommoneypolitics.IntheTaiwaneseparties,ontheotherhand,wherewe
canclearlydistinguishbetweenthethreeformalelementsofpartyorganisation,the
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systemofpublicopinionpollsstrengthensthepartyinpublicoffice.Thisisbecause
legislators and cabinetmembers are regularly in the news,which increases their
chancesofpeople recognising theirnames inpublicopinionpolls. In contrast, the
centralised procedure of candidate selection used in the PKS clearly benefits the
partycentraloffice,whilethehighlydemocraticproceduresemployedinAKBAYAN!
and the KDLP are a power asset for the party on the ground – more so in
AKABAYAN!,astheopenprimaryintheKDLPmeansthatthemembershipwillbe
atomised.
Distributionofresourcesanddecision‐makingpositions
InmostEastAsianparties,thelargestshareofpoliticallyrelevantresourcesareheld
bypoliticiansas individuals,not thepoliticalpartyasanabstractorganisation.As
discussedabove,inordertobenominatedascandidates,politiciansusuallyneedto
contributesubstantialresourcesforelectoralcampaignpurposes.Thepartyitselfis
hardlyeverasourceoffinancialsupport.InIndonesia,partieswillfundthenational
mediacampaign,butcandidateswillhavetofinancethecampaign“ontheground”.
InFilipinoparties,thegeneralpatternisforcampaignexpensesataparticularad‐
ministrativeleveltobeshoulderedbythenexthigherpoliticaloffice,whileinKorea
candidates maintain their own political machines (sajojik) outside the political
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party,which are used tomobilise both voters and donations. It follows from this
thatpartiesdonotdevelopastrongpartybureaucracy,asabureaucraticapparatus
isneitherwantednorneeded:Giventhattheyfollowclientelisticstrategiesofvoter
mobilisiation,politiciansarenotwillingtopooltheirresourcesunderthecontrolof
apartycentraloffice,while functionsusuallyperformedby thepartybureaucracy
canbecarriedoutbyexternallyhiredprofessionals.
In Taiwan, too, a large share of politically relevant resources is controlled by
politiciansandnot thepoliticalparties–particularly in theDPP.However, incon‐
trasttothedominantpartiesinSouthKorea,thePhilippinesandIndonesia,boththe
KMTandtheDPPhavedevelopedapartycentralofficeasadistinctivefaceofparty
organisation.Thisis,firstofall,duetothefactthatbothpartieshaveapartyonthe
ground,whichrequirespermanentbureaucraticmanagement,suchasmaintaining
the membership register and collecting membership fees. Secondly, both parties
haveopenedtheirownsourcesofincome,theadministrationofwhichagainneeds
permanentbureaucraticstructures.TheKMTinparticular,whichisoftenregarded
astherichestpartyintheworld,commandsahugecampaignwarchest.Initially,all
partyassetsweheldbyindividualpartyleaders.OnlyaftertheMainstreamhades‐
tablished itselfasthedominant faction intheearly1990swereparty financesput
undercentralsupervisioninordertofacilitateacentralallocationofresourcesfor
clientelisticpurposes.However,thesevitalfunctionsperformedbythepartycentral
officedonottranslateintodecision‐makingpower.AsintheDPP,thepartycentral
officedoesnotenjoyautomatic representation in theparty’skeyexecutivebodies
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and the party in public office elects its own leadershipwithout interference from
outside.
In theKDLP,AKBAYAN!and thePKS, in contrast, theparty central controls all
politicallyrelevantresources.Notonlydotherespectivepartybureaucracieshave
their own sources of income, but, in addition, all financial resourcesmobilisedby
partypoliticiansneedtobetransferredtotheofficialpartytreasury.Asaresult,in
all three parties, the party in public office is completely dependent on the party
centralofficeforthefinancingofelectoralcampaigns.Thisputsthepartycentralof‐
fice inaverypowerfulposition,whichalsoreflects intheparties’ formaldecision‐
makingrules:While in theKDLPandAKBAYAN! thepartybureaucracyenjoysex‐
officio representation in all central executive bodies, in thePKS, theparty central
office is itself the highest authority in the party (in the form of the consultative
council), retainingtheright toappointallmembersof theparty’sdecision‐making
committees.
Tosumup,inthedominantpartiesofSouthKorea,thePhilippinesandIndonesia
wedonotwitness theemergenceofapartybureaucracyasanautonomousactor.
Thisisbecausethelargestshareofpoliticallyrelevantresourcesiscontrolledbyin‐
dividual politicians,who use these resources to feed their patron‐client networks
formobilising votes in bothparty andpublic elections. The twomajorTaiwanese
parties,ontheotherhand,featureaformalpartycentraloffice.Thisisbecause,most
importantly,permanentorganisational structuresbecomenecessary toadminister
thepartymembershipandmanagetheparty’sownsourcesofincome.However,as
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in the other countries of East Asia, politicians in Taiwan also control their own
funds,whichiswhythepartycentralofficedoesnotenjoyautomaticrepresentation
in any of the executive bodies within either the KMT or the DPP. In the KDLP,
AKBAYAN! and the PKS, in contrast, all resources are controlled by the party bu‐
reaucracy, which ultimately translates into ex‐officio decision‐making powers for
thepartycentraloffice.
Summary
Since most contextual environments in the newer democracies of East Asia are
highlyselectivetowardsclientelism,mostpoliticalpartiesarenomorethanaformal
cloakaroundpatron‐clientnetworksusedtomobilisevotesinpublicelections.Asa
result,whendescribedaccordingtotheirformalproperties,thesepartiesarechar‐
acterised by the following organisational features: (1) there is no formal party
membership thatcouldbedistinguished fromthecommonelectoratebasedon its
rights and obligations towards the party; (2) the selection of candidates is highly
centralisedwithinthepartyleadership,withthepartyleadershipusuallynominat‐
ing themselves; and (3) politically relevant resources are held by the politicians
themselves,notbythepartycentralofficeasanabstractinstitution.Accordingly,as
intheclassicalcadrepartyof19thcenturyEurope,wecanobservealargepersonal
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overlapbetweenthethreeelementsofpartyorganisation,making it impossible to
distinguishbetweenthepartyontheground,thepartycentralofficeandtheparty
inpublicoffice.
Theonlycontext thatdoesnot favourclientelisticoverprogrammaticelectoral
strategiescanbefoundinTaiwan.Instead,ascanbeexpectedinyoungerdemocra‐
ciesofthe“thirdwave”,theenvironmentisstrategicallyselectivetowardscatch‐all
strategies.As a result, the twomajorparties inTaiwan– theKMTand theDPP–
sharemany central characteristicswith thedominantparty type in contemporary
WesternEurope–thecartelparty:Requirementsforpartymembershiparenotvery
demanding,candidateselectionishighlyinclusive,andtheparliamentarypartycon‐
trolsitsownresourcesanddecision‐making.Allthisamountstothepartyinpublic
inofficebeingthedominantfaceofthepartyorganisation.Theresultingautonomy
for theparliamentarypartyhasallowedbothparties toworkclosely together ina
cartel toexcludeminorparties fromgovernmentparticipation,as isbestexempli‐
fiedbytheintroductionofasingle‐memberpluralityelectoralsystemforLegislative
Yuanelectionsin2008.
However,againstourtheoreticalexpectations,wecanalsofindpoliticalparties
whohavedevelopednarrowprogrammaticappeals.Themostnotableexamplesare
theKoreanDemocraticLabourParty(KDPL),theFilipinoAKBAYAN!andtheIndo‐
nesianProsperousJusticeParty(PKS).Sincetheimplementationofclearlydefined
programmatic goals requires strong party discipline, all three parties have devel‐
oped the party central office as the dominant organisational element. The party
OLIVERHELLMANN
–326–
centralofficeperforms twocentral functions.Firstofall, aneffectivebureaucratic
apparatusisrequiredtoperformessentialfunctionsrelatedtoamassmembership.
Thesepartiesdonotonlyvaluemembersasasourceofincome(exceptAKBAYAN!)
andprovidersoffreelabour,buttheyalsoperceivethemasapoolofpotentialcan‐
didatesforpublicelection.Recruitingcandidatesfromwithinthepartyisaneffec‐
tivemechanism to increasepartydiscipline, and theparty central officeplays the
keyroleinsettinguptrainingprogrammesandkeepingthemembersengagedwith
the party’s ideology. Secondly, party discipline is also strengthenedby pooling all
resources in thepartybureaucracy,whichgives thepartycentralofficean instru‐
ment to imposeeffective sanctionsonnoncompliant legislators.Most importantly,
lawmakerswill bedependent on theparty central office for the financingof elec‐
toralcampaigns.
In short, ithasbecomeclear thatpoliticalparties in thenewerdemocraciesof
EastAsiaarenot followingthesamepathofdevelopmentasWesternEurope,nor
havetheytakenan“evolutionaryleap”towardsmorecontemporarytypesofparty
organisation.Instead,wefindverydifferenttypesofpartyorganisationwithinenvi‐
ronmental contexts that are very similar. The analysis has therefore shown that
partyorganisation is theproductof strategic choicesmadebyknowledgeableand
reflexive actors within a context that favours certain strategies over others. This
demonstrates again that the hardened stand‐off between structuralist and actor‐
centred approaches to the study of party organisation seriously limits our under‐
standing of party formation and change, as the strength of one approach is the
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–327–
weakness of another and vice versa. This does notmean that existing theories of
partyorganisationneedtoberefusedalltogether,butweneedtorethinktherela‐
tionshipbetween them.Hopefully, the analytical frameworkofferedhere is a first
bigstepintothatdirection,offeringscholarsaroundtheworldanewperspectiveto
thinkaboutpartypoliticsintheirgeographicalareaofspecialisation.
Theimplicationsforthestudyofpartyorganisationin
WesternEurope
AsthedevelopmentofpartyorganisationsinWesternEuropeistheempiricalbasis
forthelargestshareofexistingtheoriesofpartyformationandchange,itseemsne‐
cessarytodiscusswhattheanalyticalframeworkdevelopedherewillmeanforthe
studyofpartypoliticsinWesternEurope.Firstofall, itmustbenotedthatthede‐
velopmentofpoliticalpartiesinWesternEuropeisneitheruniquenortheonlypos‐
siblepathoforganisationaldevelopment.Rather, itshouldbeunderstoodinterms
of strategic decisions and strategically selective contexts.While strategies can be
distinguished along a clientelistic‐programmatic spectrum, the context should be
describedaccordingtofactorsfavourabletoeitherofthesestrategies.
Infact,thecontextin19thcenturyEuropefeaturedmanycharacteristicswecan
alsoobserveintheyoungerdemocraciesofSouthKorea,thePhilippinesandIndo‐
OLIVERHELLMANN
–328–
nesia.Mostimportantly,asonlyasmallminoritywaseligibletovoteundertheelec‐
toralrulesof therégimecensitaire,voterscouldeasilybemobilisedthrough inter‐
personalnetworks,therebyeliminatingtheneedforastrongpartyorganisation.In‐
stead,politicalactorsinvestedthelargestshareoftheirresourcesintopatron‐client
relationships,whichresultedintheemergenceoftheclassicalcadreparty,charac‐
terisedbyanalmostcompleteoverlapofthepartyontheground,thepartycentral
officeandthepartyinpublicoffice.Meanwhile,politicalactorsexcludedfromgov‐
ernment and lacking the necessary resources to establish similar clientelistic net‐
worksdevelopedprogrammaticappealstargetedatclearlydefinedsocialgroups.By
providingcollectiveincentivesandopeningdecision‐makingtowiderparticipation,
these parties successfully recruited large groups of fee‐paying members, thereby
makinguptheirlackofresourcesthroughmassmemberships.Asthemanagement
ofthemembershipandtheenforcementofdisciplineintheparliamentarypartyre‐
quiredeffectiveparty internalcontrol, thesemasspartieswerecharacterisedbya
strongpartycentraloffice.
However, both cadre andmass partieswere soon forced to rethink their elec‐
toralstrategies:Whiletheliftingoftherégimecensitairemeantthatclientelismwas
far lessefficientnow,asagrowingnumberofvotershadtobe integrated intothe
patron‐clientnetworks, therising levelofsocio‐economicdevelopmentmeantthat
targeting specific social groups through narrow programmatic platforms had be‐
comemoredifficulttoo,sincelessandlessvoterswouldfeellikemembersofthese
groups.Hence,bothtypesofpartiesbegancampaigningonprogrammaticappeals,
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–329–
aimed atwinning the vote of themedian voter. As a result, both types of parties
transformedintothesamepartytype:thecatch‐allparty.Thetrendbecametomake
partymembershipmoreinclusiveandextendparticipatoryrightstoawidergroup,
therebymakingthepartyinpublicofficemoreautonomousfromtherestoftheex‐
tra‐parliamentary party. This development has now reached its temporary peak
withtheemergenceofthecartelparty,inwhichthepartyinpublicofficeclearlyis
thedominantorganisationalelement.
However,aspoliticiansarebecomingmoreandmoreprofessionalised,theprob‐
lemwithcatch‐allelectoralstrategiesisthattheyfailtodifferentiatepoliticalparties
intheelectoralmarket:Ifallpartiespositionthemselvesasresponsiblemanagersof
the state, this will not set them apart from their competitors. In the future, we
shouldthereforeexpectpoliticalpartiesinWesternEuropetoincreasinglysupple‐
ment their catch‐all strategieswith secondary electoral strategies. One such com‐
plementarystrategythatwillhelppartiestodifferentiatethemselvesfromthecom‐
petitionischarisma.Althoughrecentempiricalevidencesuggeststhatpoliticalpar‐
tiesstillhaveamoresignificant influenceonvotingbehaviourthanleadershipap‐
peals,itisclearthat“inanageofincreasinglycompetitiveelections,electorallyap‐
pealing leadersmaymake all the difference” (Webb and Poguntke 2007: 346). A
secondstrategypoliticalpartiescanusetoseparatethemselves fromthecompeti‐
tionispatronage.However,unlikeinthenewerdemocraciesofEastAsia,patronage
willnotbedirectedattheelectorateasaclientelisticmechanismofvotermobilisi‐
ation (since thiswill be difficult to realise in the highly developed context that is
OLIVERHELLMANN
–330–
WesternEurope),butitwillbeusedasaninstrumentofgovernance.Politicalpar‐
tieswillmake increasinguseofpatronage tobuildorganisationalnetworks in the
state (and semi‐state) sector that will combine political loyalty with technocratic
expertise. These networks will facilitate the implementation of public policies,
thereby helping parties to boost their image of efficient managers of the state
(KopeckýandMair2006).
Although not targeted at themass electorate, patronage in theWestern Euro‐
pean contextwill have a similar effect on party organisation as clientelistic strat‐
egiesofvotermobilisationinthenewerdemocraciesofEastAsia.Moreprecisely,it
willaccelerateaprocessthatisalreadyunderway.Firstofall,politicalpartieswill
bemoreinterestedinmembershipqualitythanquantity,withqualitymeasuredin
termsoftechnocraticexpertise.Secondly,thedecreasingsizeofpartymemberships
willmakeitnecessarytoopencandidateselectiontothewiderelectorate,thereby
making it evenmore difficult to distinguish between partymembers and normal
citizens.Thirdly, thiswill furtherweaken thepartycentralofficeas themediating
linkbetweenthepartyinpublicofficeandthepartyontheground,whiletheparty
inpublic officewill be strengthenedas the coordinatingbody in the growingpat‐
ronagenetwork.Inshort,thepartyinpublicofficewillfurtherconsolidateitsposi‐
tionas thedominantpartyorganisational face,until itmayeventuallybecome im‐
possibletodistinguishbetweenthethreeformalfacesoforganisation.Instead,the
functionofpoliticalpartiescouldbereducedtonomorethanthatofaformalcloak
aroundinter‐personalnetworksthatconnectthepartyleadershiptoappointedpar‐
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–331–
tisansatdifferentlevelsofgovernance.Thegrowingfocusofelectoralcampaignson
the charismatic qualities of single political leaders – as already addressed by our
analyticalframework–willstimulatethisprocessevenfurther.
However, itmustbenoted thatpredictionsabout the futureofpartyorganisa‐
tion,suchasthisone,willalwaysbelimitedtostrategicallyselectedoutcomes.They
thereby deny actors the ability to develop organisational strategies that deviate
from the expected outcome. As our analysis of political parties in East Asia has
shown,thisisneitherempiricallyortheoreticallyafairassumption.Rather,wemust
acknowledgethefactthat–althoughthestrategicselectivityofacontextwillthrow
upregularitiesovertime–singleorganisationaldecisionsarealwaysunpredictable.
Infact,thepredictiondescribedaboverestsonthepremisethatpartieshaveaccess
tocertainresources(most importantly,governmentspoilsandcharisma).Political
partieslackingtheseresourceswillthereforebeforcedtotakealternativeroutesof
organisational development.Moreover,wehave certainly not reached “the end of
history” (Fukuyama1992)–andweprobablyneverwill–butpoliticalactorswill
always hold diverging sets of ideas through which to interpret the environment
aroundthem.Asintepretationsoftheopportunitiesprovidedbyacontextwilldiffer
betweenactors,sowillstrategicresponsestothissamecontext.
Similarly, althoughphrased in termsof strategicdecisionsandstrategically se‐
lective contexts, the brief historical summary of political party development in
WesternEuropeabovecutsoutthemanyhistoricalcasesofpoliticalpartiesthatdo
notfitintoageneralisednarrative.However,itispreciselythesecasesthatdeviate
OLIVERHELLMANN
–332–
from the general pattern of structured outcomes that can help us gain a better
understandingof therelationshipbetweenstructureandagency,andprocessesof
party formationand changemore specifically.Thereare, for instance,manyparty
systems in which the cartel party has not emerged as the dominant party type.
WhileseveralauthorshavemadethisobservationindemocraciesoutsideofWest‐
ernEurope(suchasYoung(1998)inCanadaorYishai(2001)inIsrael),Detterbeck
(2002;2005),studyingpoliticalpartiesinDenmark,Germany,BritainandSwitzer‐
land,claimsthattheemergenceofcartelpartiesdependsonanumberofcontextual
factors:(1)theinstitutionalsetting,(2)politicalcultureand(3)thelevelofpolitical
professionalisation.Thisheterogeneityacrosspolities,combinedwithhomogeneity
withinpolities,showsthatexternalstructuresmatter.Approachestopartyorgani‐
sation that focuseitheron thecausalpowerof internal structures (“life cycle”ap‐
proach)ortheroleofagencythereforestruggletoaccountforthesecases.
However, heterogeneity of party organisation cannot only be observed across
countriesbutalsowithincountries.AsdiscussedinChapter2,theItalianpartysys‐
temisagoodexample inthisregard,since,atanypoint intime,differenttypesof
partyorganisationhaveexistedsidebyside–catch‐allandmasspartiesupuntilthe
1990s,andmodernisedmassand“businessfirm”partiesmorerecently.Thus,theo‐
riesofpartyorganisationemphasising the importanceofexternal structures (“pe‐
riodeffect”approach)runintoseveredifficultieswhentryingtoaccountfordiffer‐
enttypesofpartyorganisationwithinthesamepolity,asthereareobviouslyfactors
belowthesystemiclevelwithastronginfluenceonhowpartiesorganise.Theonly
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–333–
theorythatintegratesfactorsfromdifferentlevelsofanalysisisPanebianco’s“gen‐
erationeffect”approach,whicharguesthattheformationofapartywillbedriven
by external circumstances, while its further development will be severely con‐
strained by internal dynamics. However, this approach underestimates actors’
abilitytodrasticallyreformtheorganisationofapoliticalparty,ascanbeexempli‐
fiedbythe fact that the Italiancommunistandsocialistpartieshavegonethrough
considerableorganisationalchange.Evenclearerexamplesofpartychangearepar‐
tiesofthenewright.TheFrenchFNandtheAustrianFPÖ,forexample,haveboth
gonethroughacontinuousprocessofinstitutionalisation,makingthemselvesmuch
lessdependentontheirrespectivecharismaticleader.
Inotherwords,noexistingtheoryofpartyorganisationhasyetbeenabletoac‐
countforbothsystemicallystructuredoutcomesandthenumerouscasesdeviating
fromtheseregularities.Existingtheoreticalframeworkscanonlydosoonanad‐hoc
basis by borrowing from other approaches: While structuralist approaches need
help from voluntarist approaches to explain diversity, actor‐focused approaches
needtoturnforsupporttostructuralisttheorieswhenfacinghomogenouslydistri‐
butedoutcomes.Theanalyticalframeworkdevelopedhereisthereforethefirstat‐
tempttointegratefactorsfromdifferentlevelsofanalysisintoasinglemodelbyac‐
knowledging a dialectical relationship between structure and agency. Future re‐
searchmight showthat thecontextual factors included in this frameworkare less
meaningful in the context of established democracies, and actors might develop
strategiesneverobservedbefore,butthebasicrelationshipbetweenstructuresand
OLIVERHELLMANN
–334–
agentswillremainthesameacrossspaceandtime.Inotherwords,partyorganisa‐
tionwillalwaysbetheproductofstrategicdecisionsmadewithinastrategicallyse‐
lectivecontext.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–335–
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Casiple,RamonC.(19June2008,QuezonCity,Philippines)ExecutiveDirectorofthe
InstituteforPoliticalandElectoralReform(IPER).
Cha, Young (24April 2008, Seoul, SouthKorea)Chief PressOfficer,UnitedDemo‐
craticParty(UDP).
Cho,Soo‐Yeon(15April2008,Seoul,SouthKorea)ExternalRelationsUnitDirector,
KoreanDemocraticLabourParty(KDLP).
Chung,Jin‐Min(16April2008,Seoul,SouthKorea)ProfessorattheDepartmentof
PoliticalScience,MyongjiUniversity.
Co,EdnaE.A.(23June2008,MakatiCity,Philippines)ProfessorattheNationalCol‐
legeofPublicAdministrationandGovernance,UniversityofthePhilippines.
Feulner, Frank (28 June 2008, Jakarta, Indonesia) Parliamentary Adviser, United
NationsDevelopmentProgramme.
OLIVERHELLMANN
–380–
Hawang,Shiow‐duan(15May2008,Taipei,Taiwan)ProfessorattheDepartmentof
PoliticalScience,SouchowUniversity.
Herberg,Mirko (18 June2008, PasigCity, Philippines)ResidentRepresentative of
theFriedrichEbertFoundation.
Hermanns, Heike (16 April 2008, Seoul, South Korea) Professor at the College of
SocialSciences,InhaUniversity.
Heufers, Rainer (14 July, Jakarta, Indonesia) Project Director, Friedrich Naumann
Foundation.
Ho,Szu‐yin (6May2008,Taipei,Taiwan)Professorat theDepartmentofPolitical
Science,NationalChengchiUniversity.
Im,Hyug‐Baeg (3April 2008, Seoul, SouthKorea) Professor at theDepartment of
PoliticalScience,KoreaUniversity.
Kamppeter,Werner(15April2008,Seoul,SouthKorea)ResidentRepresentativeof
theFriedrichEbertFoundation.
Kim,Wook(17April2008,Seoul,SouthKorea)AssociateProfessorofPoliticalSci‐
enceatPaiChaiUniversity.
Kim,Yong‐Ho(12April2008,Seoul,SouthKorea)DeanofGraduateSchoolofPublic
Administration,InhaUniversity.
Kim,YoungIn(17April2008,Seoul,SouthKorea)HeadofCommunicationsOffice,
GrandNationalParty(GNP).
Kleden, Ignas (14 July2008, Jakarta, Indonesia)Chairmanof the IndonesianCom‐
munityforDemocracy(KID).
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–381–
Kuo,Yun‐Kuang(12May2008,Taipei,Taiwan)DirectoroftheDepartmentofOver‐
seasAffairs,ChineseNationalistParty(KMT).
Kwon,HyeokYong(7April2008,Seoul,SouthKorea)AssistantProfessorattheDe‐
partmentofPoliticalScience,KoreaUniversity.
Lai, I‐Chung (8May2008, Taipei, Taiwan)Director of theDepartment of Interna‐
tionalAffairs,DemocraticProgressiveParty(DPP).
Lee,Eun‐Jeung(15April2008,Seoul,SouthKorea)ProfessorattheDepartmentof
PoliticalScience,Martin‐LutherUniversityHalleWittenberg.
Lin,Jih‐wen(7May2008,Taipei,Taiwan)ResearchFellowattheInstituteofPoliti‐
calScience,AcademiaSinica.
Liu, I‐Chou (8May2008,Taipei, Taiwan)Professor at theDepartment of Political
Science,NationalChengchiUniversity.
Mandan,AriefMudatsir(10July2008,Jakarta,Indonesia)DeputyChairman,United
DevelopmentParty(PPP).
Mangahas, Mahar (16 June 2008, Quezon City, Philippines) President of Social
WeatherStations.
Manglapus,FrancisXavier(13June2008,MandaluyongCity,Philippines)Secretary
General,LakasChristianMuslimDemocrats(Lakas‐CMD).
Mietzner,Marcus(28June2008,Jakarta,Indonesia)LecturerinIndonesianStudies
attheAustralianNationalUniversity.
Moon,ChungSang(11April2008,Seoul,SouthKorea)ProgramOfficeratTheAsia
Foundation.
OLIVERHELLMANN
–382–
Pranowo,Gandjar(9July2008,Jakarta,Indonesia)MemberoftheHouseofRepre‐
sentatives,IndonesianDemocraticParty–Struggle(PDI‐P).
Refrizal(9July2008, Jakarta, Indonesia)MemberoftheHouseofRepresentatives,
ProsperousJusticeParty(PKS).
Rocamora,Joel(26June2008,QuezonCity,Philippines)DirectoroftheInstitutefor
PopularDemocracy(IPD).
Rowland,W.Paul (2 July2008, Jakarta, Indonesia)ResidentRepresentativeof the
NationalDemocraticInstitute(NDI).
SanJuan,Chyn(12June2008,MakatiCity,Philippines)SeniorProjectCoordinator,
InternationalFoundationforElectoralSystems(IFES).
Santos,Arlene(23June2008,QuezonCity,Philippines)GeneralSecretary,Citizens’
ActionParty(AKBAYAN!).
Subianto,Benny(3July2008,Jakarta,Indonesia)ConsultanttotheNetherlandsIn‐
stituteforMultipartyDemocracy(NIMD).
Sugiarto,BimaArya(8July2008,Jakarta,Indonesia)LecturerattheDepartmentof
InternationalRelations,ParamadinaUniversity,andconsultanttotheNational
MandateParty(PAN).
Sukma, Rizal (15 July 2008, Jakarta, Indonesia) Deputy Executive Director of the
CentreforStrategicandInternationalStudies(CSIS).
Susanti,Bivitri(1July2008,Jakarta,Indonesia)ExecutiveDirectoroftheIndonesian
CentreforLawandPolicyStudies.
POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA
–383–
Wang, Yeh‐li (29 April 2008, Taichung, Taiwan) Professor of Political Science at
TunghaiUniversity.
Weck, Winfried (3 July 2008, Jakarta, Indonesia) Resident Representative of the
KonradAdenauerFoundation.
Wu,Chung‐li (1May2008,Taipei,Taiwan)AssociateResearchFellowat theInsti‐
tuteofPoliticalScience,AcademiaSinica.
OLIVERHELLMANN
–384–
–Appendix–
OliverHellmannUniversityofBirmingham
QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE ORGANISATION AND FACTIONALISATION OF
POLITICAL PARTIES NameofpoliticalpartyNameofintervieweeJobtitleDateofinterviewSECTION 1: General Information Q1 Dowrittenorganisationalrulesexisttoguidethefunctioningoftheparty?
Yes. No.Q2 Whatisthenameofthenationalexecutivebodyoftheparty?Q3 Howmanymembersdoesthisbodyhave,andhowarethesememberselectedor
appointed?Checkallthatapplyandspecifyeach.
Partyleader(s). Parliamentaryparty. Localorregionalpartybranches. Delegatestoapartycongress. Partymembers. Other. Totalnumberofmembers: Q4 Whatisthenameofthehighestdecisionmakingbodyintheparty?Q5 Howmanymembersdoesthisbodyhave,andhowarethesememberselectedor
appointed?Checkallthatapplyandspecifyeach.
Nationalexecutivebody(seeabove). Partyleader(s). Parliamentaryparty. Localorregionalpartybranches. Delegatestoapartycongress. Partymembers. Other. Totalnumberofmembers:
Q6 Which,ifany,oftheabovehaschangedsincethepartywasfounded?SECTION 2: Party Membership Q7a Isthereanofficialmembershipregister?
Yes. No.Q7b IfQ7a=yes,whomaintainstheregister?
Nationalparty. Regionalbranches. Localbranches Other(pleasespecify): Q8 Howmanymembersdoesthepartyhave,andhowhasthischangedsincetheparty’s
founding?Provideyearandindicateifrealfiguresorestimates.
Membershipsize Year Realfigure Estimate Q9 Whatistheparty’smembershipfee?
Fixedamount.Pleasespecify(inlocalcurrency): Voluntarycontribution. Nomembershipfee.Q10 Wherecancitizensregisteraspartymembers?
Nationalpartyoffice. Regionalbranch. Localbranch. Partywebsite. Other(pleasespecify): Q11 What,ifany,requirements/criteriaexisttobeeligibleformembership?Checkall
thatapplyandspecifyeachrequirement.
Belongingtoacertainethnicgroup. Comingfromacertaingeographicalarea. Age. Other. Q12 What,ifany,responsibilitiescomewithpartymembership?
Adherencetopartystatutes. Unpaidwork. Other(pleasespecify):
Q13 What,ifany,formalrightscomewithpartymembership?
Discountswithmerchants. Votingrightsatpartymeetings. Other(pleasespecify): Q14 How,ifatall,doesthepartyseektorecruitmembersbetweenelections?
Party‐organisedmassevents. Informationtablesinpublicplaces. Door‐to‐door. Advertising. Other(pleasespecify): Q15 Howoften,ifatall,doesthepartycommunicatewithitsmembers?Checkallthat
applyandspecifyeach.
Electronicnewsletter. Papernewsletter. Individualcorrespondence. Meetings. Website. Other. Q16 Towhomdoesthepartyprovidetraining?Checkallthatapplyanddescribetypeof
trainingandatwhatlevel.
Campaignvolunteers. Candidates. Electedmembers. Generalmembers. Partyofficials. Other. Notraining. Q17 Which,ifany,oftheabovehaschangedsincethepartywasfounded?
a) Parliamentary elections Q18 Whataretheeligibilityrequirementsestablishedbythepartyrulestobecome
s/electedasacandidate?Checkallthatapplyandspecifyeachrequirement.
Membershipintheparty. Endorsementbypartybody. Certainpositionintheparty. Signatures. Age. Qualifications. Other.
SECTION 3: Selection of Candidates for National Elections
Q19 Whoisentitledtovoteintheselectionprocess/nominatesthecandidates?Checkallthatapplyandprovidemoredetailsforeach.
Allvoters. Partymembers. Electedpartyagency. Non‐electedpartyagency. Electedpartyleader. Non‐electedpartyleader. Other. Q20 Whatinformalpractices,ifany,underminethewrittenpartyrules?Q21 Which,ifany,oftheabovehaschangedsincethepartywasfounded?b) Presidential elections (if applicable) Q22 Whataretheeligibilityrequirementsestablishedbythepartyrulestobecome
s/electedasthepresidentialcandidate?Checkallthatapplyandspecifyeachrequirement.
Membershipintheparty. Endorsementbypartybody. Certainpositionintheparty. Signatures. Age. Qualifications. Other. Q23 Whoisentitledtovoteintheselectionprocess/nominatesthecandidate?Checkall
thatapplyandprovidemoredetailsforeach.
Allvoters. Partymembers. Electedpartyagency. Non‐electedpartyagency. Electedpartyleader. Non‐electedpartyleader. Other. Q24 Whatinformalpractices,ifany,underminethewrittenpartyrules?Q25 Which,ifany,oftheabovehaschangedsincethepartywasfounded?
SECTION 4: Internal Distribution of Resources Q26 Whataretheparty’smainsourcesofincome?Provideanestimateinpercentand
indicatethetotalamountinlocalcurrency.
Year Publicstatefunding
Membershipfees
Donations Party‐ownedbusinesses
Other:
Total
Q27 Howisthisincomedispersedwithintheparty?Q28 Whatamountoffundingdocandidatesreceivefromthepartyfortheirpersonal
electioncampaigns?Specifyamountinlocalcurrencyandprovideapercentageestimateoftheaverageshareinthecandidates’budgets.
Q29 Howmanyprofessionalstaffdoesthepartyemploy?Provideanestimateofthetotal
numberandindicatehowtheyareallocatedbetweenthecentralpartybureaucracyandthepartyinthenationalparliament.
Year Partybureaucracy Parliamentaryparty Total
Q30 Which,ifany,oftheabovehaschangedsincethepartywasfounded?SECTION 5: Status of Parliamentary Party Q31 Arethereproceduralrulestoselectthedecisionmakingbodyoftheparliamentary
party?Ifyes,describeinmoredetail.
Yes,formalrules. Yes,informalrules. No. Q32 Arethereformalrulesfordecisionmakingintheparliamentaryparty?Ifyes,
describehowtheserulesaremade.
Yes. No.
Q33 How,ifatall,canparliamentariansbeheldaccountablefornotfollowingpartypolicydecisions?
Exclusionfrompromotionwithinpartyranks. Demotionwithinpartyranks. Expulsionfromtheparty. Other(pleasespecify): Q34 Which,ifany,oftheabovehaschangedsincethepartywasfounded?
SECTION 6: Factionalisation Q35 Whatarethemainfactionswithintheparty?Foreachfactionpleaseindicatethe
mainfunctionsofthefaction(multipleanswersarepossible)andspecifythese,andratethefaction’sdegreeofinstitutionalisation.
NameoffactionFunction
Articulatespecificpolicyidea:
Allocatepostsandresources:
Representspecificsocialgroup:1
Institutionalisation
Noroutinised
procedures. Informallyroutinisedrules. Formally
routinisedrules.
Nameoffaction
Function
Articulatespecificpolicyidea:
Allocatepostsandresources:
Representspecificsocialgroup:2
Institutionalisation
Noroutinisedprocedures.
Informallyroutinisedrules.
Formallyroutinisedrules.
Nameoffaction
Function
Articulatespecificpolicyidea:
Allocatepostsandresources:
Representspecificsocialgroup:3
Institutionalisation
Noroutinisedprocedures.
Informallyroutinisedrules.
Formallyroutinisedrules.
Nameoffaction
Function
Articulatespecificpolicyidea:
Allocatepostsandresources:
Representspecificsocialgroup:4
Institutionalisation
Noroutinisedprocedures.
Informallyroutinisedrules.
Formallyroutinisedrules.
Nameoffaction
Function
Articulatespecificpolicyidea:
Allocatepostsandresources:
Representspecificsocialgroup:5
Institutionalisation
Noroutinisedprocedures.
Informallyroutinisedrules.
Formallyroutinisedrules.
Q36 Outlinethedevelopmentoftheinterfactionalpowerrelations.Identifythe
dominantfaction,anddescribesignificantchangesinthedistributionofpoweramongfactions.