G.R. NO. 132197 : August 16, 2005]
ROSS RICA SALES CENTER, INC. and JUANITO KING & SONS, INC., Petitioners, v.SPOUSES GERRY ONG and ELIZABETH ONG, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
In a Decision1 dated 6 January 1998, the Former First Division of the Court of Appeals overturned the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, ruling instead that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject complaint for unlawful detainer. This Petition for Review prays for the reversal of the aforesaid Court of Appeals' Decision.
The case originated from a complaint for ejectment filed by petitioners against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 2376, before the MTC of Mandaue City, Branch I. In the complaint, petitioners alleged the fact of their ownership of three (3) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. Petitioners likewise acknowledged respondent Elizabeth Ong's ownership of the lots previous to theirs. On 26 January 1995, Atty. Joseph M. Baduel, representing Mandaue Prime Estate Realty, wrote respondents informing them of its intent to use the lots and asking them to vacate within thirty (30) days from receipt of the letter. But respondents refused to vacate, thereby unlawfully withholding possession of said lots, so petitioners alleged.
Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. and Juanito King and Sons, Inc. (petitioners) had acquired the lands from Mandaue Prime Estate Realty through a sale made on 23 March 1995. In turn, it appears that Mandaue Prime Estate Realty had acquired the properties from the respondents through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 14 July 1994. However, this latter deed of sale and the transfers of title consequential thereto were subsequently sought to be annulled by respondents in a complaint filed on 13 February 1995 before the Mandaue RTC against Mandaue Prime Estate Realty.2 Per record, this case is still pending resolution.
Meanwhile, the MYC resolved the ejectment case on 24 April 1996, with the decision ordering respondents to vacate the premises in question and to peacefully turn over possession thereof to petitioners.
On appeal, the RTC rendered on 1 March 1997 a judgment affirming the MTC's decision in its entirety.
On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a notice of appeal. However, on the following day, they filed a motion for reconsideration.
On 23 June 1997, the RTC issued an Order which concurrently gave due course to respondents' notice of appeal filed on 8 May 1997; denied their motion for reconsideration dated 9 May 1997,3 and granted petitioners' motion for immediate execution pending appeal.
In a Petition for Certiorari with Injunction filed with the Court of Appeals and treated as aPetition for Review, the appellate court ruled that the MTC had no jurisdiction over said case as there was no contract between the parties, express or implied, as would qualify the same as one for unlawful detainer. Thus, the assailed Orders of the MTC and RTC were set aside.
Petitioners then took this recourse via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The principal issues raised before this Court are: (i) whether the RTC decision has already become final and executory at the time the Petition for Review was filed; (ii) whether the allegations in the complaint constitute a case for unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC; and, (iii) whether petitioners, as registered owners, are entitled to the possession of the subject premises.
We resolve the first argument to be without merit.
The following sequence of events is undisputed:
(1) On 1 March 1997, the RTC rendered the questioned decision affirming the judgment of the MTC.
(2) On 28 April 1997, respondents received a copy of the aforementioned decision.
(3) On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC.
(4) On 9 May 1997, respondents filed likewise with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned 1 March 1997 decision.
(5) On 23 June 1997, the RTC of Mandaue issued an Order denying respondents' Motion for Reconsideration.
(6) On 9 July 1997, respondents received a copy of the aforementioned 23 June 1997Order.
(7) On 24 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their motion for an additional period of ten (10) days within which to file their Petition for Review.
(8) On 30 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their Petition for Review.
Petitioners assert that the Petition for Review was filed beyond the fifteen (15)-day period for appeal. They theorize that the period started running on 28 April 1995, the date of receipt of the RTC decision, and ended on 13 May 1997. According to them, this reglementary period could not have been interrupted by the filing on 9 May 1997 of theMotion for
Reconsideration because of the filing one day earlier of the Notice of Appeal. This Notice of Appeal dated 8 May 1997, albeit the wrong mode of appeal, expressly manifested their intention to file a Petition for Review to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.4
Petitioners further argue that respondents, after having filed the Notice of Appeal which was given due course by the RTC, cannot take an inconsistent stand such as filing a Motion for Reconsideration. Such filing, therefore, did not toll the fifteen (15)-day period which started running from the date of receipt of the RTC decision on 28 April 1997 and ended on 13 May 1997.
Respondents, in their Comment,5 submit that the filing of the Notice of Appeal dated 8 May 1997 was improper, and as such did not produce any legal effect. Therefore, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration immediately on the following day cured this defect. The RTC refused to subscribe respondents' position. It justified the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the respondents had already filed a Notice of Appeal. The Order dated 23 June 1997 stated:
On record is a Notice of Appeal by Certiorari filed by Defendants on May 8, 1997.
Likewise filed by Defendants on May 9, 1997 is a Motion for Reconsideration.
Considering the Notice of Appeal filed earlier which the court hereby approves, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
The Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal being meritorious, is GRANTED.6(Emphasis in the original.)
Strangely enough, the Court of Appeals passed no comment on this point when it took cognizance of respondents' position and reversed the RTC. But does this necessarily mean that the RTC was correct when it declared that the Motion for Reconsideration was barred by the filing of the Notice of Appeal, no matter how erroneous the latter mode was?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Rule 42 governs the mode of appeal applicable in this case. Sec. 1 provides:
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. - - A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of
Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the Petition for Review . No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC, petitioners should have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals and not aNotice of Appeal with the RTC. However, we consider this to have been remedied by the timely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the filing of the appellee's brief. Applying this rule contextually, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal of the defective Notice of Appeal.
Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for Reconsideration and started to run again from the receipt of the order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. A Motion for Additional Time to File the Petition was likewise filed with the Court of Appeals. Counting fifteen (15) days from receipt of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and the ten (10)-day request for additional period, it is clear that respondents filed theirPetition for Review on time.
Petitioners invoke to the ruling in People v. De la Cruz7 that once a notice of appeal is filed, it cannot be validly withdrawn to give way to a motion for reconsideration. The factual circumstances in the two cases are different.
De la Cruz is a criminal case, governed by criminal procedure. Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC is a notice of appeal and an appeal is deemed perfected upon filing of the notice of appeal.
In the case at bar, a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals is the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC. Since the filing of the notice of appeal is erroneous, it is considered as if no appeal was interposed.
Now on the second and more important issue raised by petitioners: whether the Complaintsatisfies the jurisdictional requirements for a case of unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC.
The MTC considered itself as having jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint and disposed of the same in favor of petitioners. Said ruling was affirmed by the RTC. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts and found the complaint to be one not for unlawful detainer based on two (2) grounds, namely: that the allegations fail to show that petitioners were deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and that there is no contract, express or implied, between the parties as would qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals.
The complaint for unlawful detainer contained the following material allegations:
. . . .
3. That plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 2, which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36466 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City, Lot No. 1-A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36467 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City and Lot No. 86-A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36468 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City, all situated in the City of Mandaue. Copies of said Transfer Certificate of Titles are hereto attached as Annexes "A", "B", and "C" respectively and made an integral part hereof;
4. That defendant Elizabeth Ong is the previous registered owner of said lots;
5. That as the previous registered owner of said lots, defendant Elizabeth Ong and her husband and co-defendant Jerry Ong have been living in the house constructed on said lots;
6. That on May 6, 1995, plaintiffs, through the undersigned counsel, wrote defendants a letter informing them or their intent to use said lots and demanded of them to vacate said lots within 30 days from receipt of said letter. Copy of said letter is hereto attached as Annex "D" and made an integral part thereof;
7. That despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots;
8. That in unlawfully withholding the possession of said lots from the plaintiffs, plaintiffs have suffered damages in the form of unearned rentals in the amount of P10,000.00 a month
. . . .8
Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.9
Respondents contend that the complaint did not allege that petitioners' possession was originally lawful but had ceased to be so due to the expiration of the right to possess by virtue of any express or implied contract.
The emphasis placed by the Court of Appeals on the presence of a contract as a requisite to qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer contradicts the various jurisprudence dealing on the matter.
In Javelosa v. Court of the Appeals,10 it was held that the allegation in the complaint that there was unlawful withholding of possession is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful detainer. It is equally settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.11
Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant.12 In Rosanna B. Barba v. Court of Appeals,13 we held that a simple allegation
that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is sufficient.
Based on this premise, the allegation in the Complaint that:
. . . . despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots;14
is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case.
In the subject complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. By their implied tolerance, they have allowed respondents, the former owners of the properties, to remain therein. Nonetheless, they eventually sent a letter to respondents asking that the latter vacate the said lots. Respondents refused, thereby depriving petitioners of possession of the lots. Clearly, the complaint establishes the basic elements of an unlawful detainer case, certainly sufficient for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction over it in the MTC.
Respondents would like to capitalize on the requisites as cited in the case of Raymundo dela Paz v. Panis.15 But the citation is a mere reiteration of Sec. 1, Rule 7016 of the Rules of Court. The case doesid not provide for rigid standards in the drafting of the ejectment complaint. The case of Co Tiamco v. Diaz17 justifies a more liberal approach, thus:
. . . The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of pleadings in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases rests upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature, for they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure should be carefully avoided.18
Moreover, petitioners fail to mention any of the incidents of the pending case involving the annulment of deed of sale and title over said property. Petitioners know better than to question this in an ejectment proceeding, which brings us to the nature of the action in this case.
Respondents insist that the RTC, and not the MTC, had jurisdiction over the action, it being an accion reivindicatoria according to them, on the ground that petitioners were constantly claiming ownership over the lands in the guise of filing an action for ejectment. In theirComment,19 respondents maintain that they occupy the subject lots as the legal owners. Petitioners, on the other hand, are seeking recovery of possession under a claim of ownership
which is tantamount to recovery of possession based on alleged title to the lands, and therefore is within the original jurisdiction of the RTC, so respondents conclude.
This contention is not tenable.
The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real property. This differs from accion publiciana where the issue is the better right of possession or possession de jure, and accion interdictal where the issue is material possession or possession de facto. In an action for unlawful detainer, the question of possession is primordial while the issue of ownership is generally unessential.20
Neither the allegation in petitioners' complaint for ejectment nor the defenses thereto raised by respondents sufficiently convert this case into an accion reivindicatoria which is beyond the province of the MTC to decide. Petitioners did not institute the complaint for ejectment as a means of claiming or obtaining ownership of the properties. The acknowledgment in their pleadings of the fact of prior ownership by respondents does not constitute a recognition of respondents' present ownership. This is meant only to establish one of the necessary elements for a case of unlawful detainer, specifically the unlawful withholding of possession. Petitioners, in all their pleadings, only sought to recover physical possession of the subject property. The mere fact that they claim ownership over the parcels of land as well did not deprive the MTC of jurisdiction to try the ejectment case.
Even if respondents claim ownership as a defense to the complaint for ejectment, the conclusion would be the same for mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case will not therefore oust the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction.21This Court in Ganadin
v. Ramos22 stated that if what is prayed for is ejectment or recovery of possession, it does not matter if ownership is claimed by either party. Therefore, the pending actions for declaration of nullity of deed of sale and Transfer Certificates of Title and quieting of title in Civil Case No. MAN-2356 will not abate the ejectment case.
In Drilon v. Gaurana,23 this Court ruled that the filing of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property or for annulment of the deed of sale over the land does not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before it, the rationale being that, while there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the forcible entry case and the suit for annulment of title and/or reconveyance, the rights asserted and the relief prayed for are not the same.24
In Oronce v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court held that the fact that respondents had previously filed a separate action for the reformation of a deed of absolute sale into one ofpacto de retro sale or equitable mortgage in the same
Court of First Instance is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary remedy of ejectment afforded by law to the plaintiff. Consequently, an adjudication made in an ejectment proceeding regarding the issue of ownership should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land. The foregoing doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure.
The Court reiterated this in the case of Tecson v. Gutierrez26 when it ruled:
We must stress, however, that before us is only the initial determination of ownership over the lot in dispute, for the purpose of settling the issue of possession, although the issue of ownership is inseparably linked thereto. As such, the lower court's adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is merely provisional, and our affirmance of the trial courts' decisions as well, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property, if and when such action is brought seasonably before the proper forum.
The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be subject of a collateral attack.
In Apostol v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court had the occasion to clarify this:
. . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the court a quo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.28
With the conclusion of the second issue in favor of petitioners, there is no need to discuss the third assignment of error which is related to the second issue.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 January 1998 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision dated 24
April 1996 of the Municipal Trial Court of Mandaue City REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Austria-Martinez, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 102693. September 23, 1992.]
SPOUSES AGOSTO MUÑOZ AND ROSARIO MUÑOZ, SPS. JESSIE (JESUS) CAGUIOA AND EMMA
FUMAR, SPS. RICARDO LOPEZ AND APOLONIA FABIAN, ZACARIA MARCELINO, MR. CRISANTO CLARIN, MR. HONORIO YUMUL, MR. EDUARDO YUMUL, MRS. VICTORIA CAYANAN, MR. ALEXANDER FABIAN AND MR. DIOSDADO SANTOS, Petitioner, v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND NICOLAS P. GARCIA, Respondents.
Public Attorney’s Office, for Petitioners.
Jose P. Bondoc for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; FORCIBLE ENTRY; DISTINGUISHED FROM UNLAWFUL DETAINER. — The summary actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry may be distinguished from each other, as follows: "a. In forcible entry, the possession of the land by the defendant is unlawful from the beginning as he acquires possession thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; while in unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant is inceptively lawful but it becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right to the possession of the property under his contract with the plaintiff (Dikit v. Icasiano, 89 Phil. 44). "b. In forcible entry, the law does not require a previous demand for the defendant to vacate the premises; but in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff must first make such demand, which is jurisdictional in nature (Sec. 2; Medel v. Militante, 41 Phil. 44). "c). In forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until he was deprived thereof by the defendant; in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession (Maddamu v. Judge, 74 Phil. 230; Aguilar v. Cabrera, 74 Phil. 666; Banayos v. Susana Realty, Inc., L-30336, June 30, 1976; Pharma Industries, Inc. v. Pajarillaga, Et Al., L-53788, Oct. 17, 1980). "d. In forcible entry, the one-year period is generally counted from the date of actual entry on the land; in unlawful detainer, from the date of last demand (Sarona, Et. Al. v. Villegas, Et Al., L-22984, Mar. 27, 1968) or last letter of demand (DBP v. Canonoy, L-29422, Sept. 30, 1970; Calibayan v. Pascual, L-22645, Sept. 18, 1967; Racaza v. Susana Realty, Inc., L-20330, Dec. 22, 1966). (Regalado, Florenz D., Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, 5th Revised Edition, pp. 503-504)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MATTERS TO BE RESOLVED IN THE ACTION THEREFOR; RULE. — The questions to be resolved in an action for forcible entry are: First, who had actual possession over the piece of real property? Second, was the possessor ousted therefrom within one year from the filing of the complaint by force, threat, strategy or stealth? And lastly, does the plaintiff ask for the restoration of his possession? (Dizon v. Concina, Et Al., G.R. No. L-23756, December 27, 1969).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECTS OF FAILURE TO ALLEGE THE TIME WHEN UNLAWFUL DEPRIVATION TOOK PLACE. — There was no mention in the complaint nor in the position paper of the private respondent that he or his co-owners were in prior possession of the property. There was an allegation that the property "is presently tenanted" but it did not state when the tenant started
to possess the property. While it is true that possession of the tenant is possession of the owner, the complaint failed to state that Loreta Garcia was in prior possession of the property at the time of entry by the petitioners. And, while the complaint stated that the petitioners obtained possession of the premises through stealth, it failed to aver when this entry was accomplished or when the private respondent learned of such entry. The failure of the private respondent to allege the time when unlawful deprivation took place is fatal because this will determine the start of the counting of the one year period for the filing of the summary action of forcible entry. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the action should either be accion publiciana or reinvindicatoria in the Court of First Instance (nor Regional Trial Court) (Sarona Et. Al. v. Villegas, Et Al., supra).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE CONVERTED TO UNLAWFUL DETAINER BY THE FACT THAT A DEMAND WAS MADE TO VACATE THE SUBJECT PREMISE. — The respondent appellate court erred in holding that this case is one for unlawful detainer. It failed to consider the basic distinction that in forcible entry, possession is illegal at the inception while in unlawful detainer, possession is legal until demand is made to recover such possession or until the possessor does or fails to do an act which makes his continued possession of the premises illegal. The fact that a demand was made by the private respondent for the petitioners to vacate the subject premises cannot change the nature of the latter’s possession of the property and convert the former’s action from forcible entry to one for unlawful detainer. The respondent appellate court likewise erred in applying in this case the doctrine that — "a person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by the implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is proper remedy against them" — because, as We have said here, the possession by defendants was illegal at the inception as alleged in the complaint, hence, there was no tolerance.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A PROPER ACTION TO CLAIM OWNERSHIP. — If the private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises and that possession thereof was deprived from him for more than twelve years, he should present his claim before the Regional Trial Court in an accion publiciana or an accion reinvindicatoria and not before the Municipal Trial Court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if he is the owner, possession of the property cannot be wrested from another who had been in possession thereof for more than twelve (12) years through a summary action for ejectment. "Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not responsibly address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession CAN recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria. (German Management and Services Inc. v. CA, 76216-17, September 14, 1988, 177 SCRA 495, 499)
D E C I S I O N
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This case has its origin from a complaint 1 for unlawful detainer filed by Nicolas P. Garcia (herein respondent) on August 15, 1988 before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Masantol-Macabebe, Masantol, Pampanga. The complainant alleged that he is a co-owner of an agricultural land identified as Lot No. 2790 of Subdivision Plan, Cad. 378-D, Macabebe, Cadastre, situated in the Barrio of Caduang Tete (Saplad David) of the same municipality; that he and his co-owners acquired the lot by succession from their deceased father, Pedro B. Garcia who died on April 6, 1939; that the said lot is tenanted by Loreto Garcia; that the defendants (herein petitioners) constructed their houses on a portion of the lot without the knowledge and consent of the owners; that he sent letters of demand on June 6, 1988 asking the defendants to remove their houses from the lot within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the letters and that despite the demands made by him, the defendants refused to vacate their houses (pp. 21-22, CA Records).
In their answer, (pp. 44-47, CA Records), the defendants denied the allegations of Nicolas Garcia and alleged that the tenant, Loreto Garcia is already deemed the owner of the land pursuant to P.D. 27. The answering defendants also invoked the following alternative defenses, among others: (1) lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Municipal Trial Court, the case being an accion publiciana which is exclusively cognizable by the Regional Trial Court; (2) no prior conciliation before the Lupong Tagapayapa; (3) misjoinder of parties since defendants occupy lots distinct from each other; (4) that the differently lots they are occupying form part of the shore of a navigable river and partly the shoulder of a public road, hence, of public ownership; (5) that they are farmworkers of the lot, and are entitled to security of tenure on the land pursuant to Section 6 of RA 6657 and that they had erected their houses and had continuously resided on the premises in issue since 1976 or for a period of twelve years before the filing of the complaint.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
After the issues had been joined, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court heard the case under the Rules on Summary Procedure and decided the case on the basis of the position papers of the parties.
On December 7, 1988, the municipal court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff Nicolas Garcia, the dispositive portion of which states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1) The defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to remove their houses from Lot
2790 of Subdivision Plan Cad. 378-D, Macabebe Cadastre, situated at Saplad David, Caduang Tete, Macabebe, Pampanga; and to surrender the possession of the same to the plaintiff;
2) Every defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) attorney’s fees; and
3) Every defendants to pay One Hundred Pesos (P100.00) reasonable monthly rental of the land occupied by said defendants from the filing of the complaint on August 15, 1988 up to the time the possession of the land occupied by said defendants is vacated plus the costs." (pp. 72-73, CA Records).
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court found that the plaintiff is one of the co-owners of Lot 2790 of Subdivision Plan Cad. 378-D of Macabebe Cadastre, consisting of five (5) hectares. As such, he had every right to exercise his rights as owner and possessor of the property and to demand the removal of defendants’ houses. The Municipal Court added that while the defendants assert that the premises is of public ownership considering that their houses occupy a part of a shore of a navigable river and part of the shoulder of the public road, this assertion runs counter to the very claim of defendants that they are farmhands in the landholding for more than 12 years. Finally, the Municipal Court also held that since the issue involved in the case is mere possession and the defendants did not claim ownership, therefore, unlawful detainer is the proper action for plaintiff’s recovery of possession.
The defendants appealed to the Regional Trial Court which reversed the decision of the municipal court and dismissed the complaint. The Regional Trial Court held that:cralawnad
"From all the foregoing consideration, the Court finds that plaintiff-appellee fails to establish his proof of prior physical possession over the land subject matter of this case where the respective houses of the defendants-appellants were erected, considering that the case at bar only deals with possession de facto and not possession de jure. The Court also believes that the subject matter of this Court is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Macabebe, Masantol-Macabebe, Pampanga is hereby reversed. The said case is dismissed with costs against the plaintiff." (p. 82, CA Records)
On June 27, 1989, Nicolas Garcia filed a motion for reconsideration of the Regional Trial Court’s decision. The reconsideration sought was denied by order of the same court dated October 11, 1989.
Nicolas Garcia filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision on August 6, 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 19154 reversing and setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court and reinstating the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. The reconsideration sought by the defendants before the appellate court was denied on November 11, 1991.
Hence, this petition.
The principal question for resolution in this petition is whether or not the complaint filed by the private respondent before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court was for the summary proceeding of forcible entry or unlawful detainer or an accion publiciana. In the latter case, the Regional Trial Court and not the Municipal Trial Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and try the complaint.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
The petitioner is of the view that with the following allegations in the complaint, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"2. That the plaintiff is a co-owner of an agricultural land located at Saplad, David, Macabebe, Pampanga identified as lot no. 2790, of the Subdivision Plan, Cad. 378-D, Macabebe, Cadastre, . . .;
"x x x.
"4. That the aforesaid agricultural land is presently tenanted by one farmer in the name of Loreto Garcia with an area of more than five (5) hectares;
"5. That the defendants have constructed their houses on a portion of the said lot no. 2790 without the knowledge and consent of his co-owners;
"6. That the plaintiff has sent the defendants demand letters dated June 6, 1988 asking said defendants to remove their houses from the said lot within a period of fifteen (15) days from their receipt of said letters, . . ." (pp. 21-22, Records).
the complaint which the private respondent filed before the municipal court was an accion publiciana and not one for unlawful detainer as he had captioned it. An accion publiciana is exclusively cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not by the Municipal Court.
For his part, the private respondent alleged that the action which he filed before the municipal court was an action for unlawful detainer. The demand to vacate dated June 6, 1988 which was served upon the petitioners was well within the one (1) year period required by the rules for the filing of the summary action for unlawful detainer the jurisdiction of which belongs to the municipal trial court.
The summary actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry may be distinguished from each other, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"4. . . .
"a. In forcible entry, the possession of the land by the defendant is unlawful from the beginning
as he acquires possession thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth: while in unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant is inceptively lawful but it becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right to the possession of the property under his contract with the plaintiff (Dikit v. Icasiano, 89 Phil. 44).
"b. In forcible entry, the law does not require a previous demand for the defendant to vacate the premises; but in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff must first make such demand, which is jurisdictional in nature (Sec. 2; Medel v. Militante, 41 Phil. 44).
"c. In forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until he was deprived thereof by the defendant; in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession (Maddamu v. Judge, 74 Phil. 230: Aguilar v. Cabrera, 74 Phil. 666; Banayos v. Susana Realty, Inc. L-30336, June 30, 1976: Pharma Industries, Inc. v. Pajarillaga, Et. Al. L-53788, Oct. 17, 1980).
"d. In forcible entry, the one-year period is generally counted from the date of actual entry on the land; in unlawful detainer, from the date of last demand (Sarona, Et. Al. v. Villegas, Et Al., L-22984, Mar. 27, 1968) or last letter of demand (DBP v. Canonoy, L-29422, Sept. 30, 1970; Calibayan v. Pascual, L-22645, Sept. 18, 1967; Racaza v. Susana Realty, Inc., L-20330, Dec. 22, 1966). (Regalado, Florenz D., Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, 5th Revised Edition, pp. 503-504)
The complaint subject of this case was captioned as "unlawful detainer." However, the private respondent alleged therein that from the start, the possession of the petitioner was unlawful as it was stated that the defendants have constructed their houses on the questioned premises stealthily, that is, without the knowledge and consent of his co-owners. This allegation clearly characterized the complaint as one for forcible entry and not for unlawful detainer.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
The questions to be resolved in an action for forcible entry are: First, who had actual possession over the piece of real property? Second, was the possessor ousted therefrom within one year from the filing of the complaint by force, threat, strategy or stealth? And lastly, does the plaintiff ask for the restoration of his possession? (Dizon v. Concina, Et Al., G.R. No. L-23756, December 27, 1969).
There was no mention in the complaint nor in the position paper of the private respondent that he or his co-owners were in prior possession of the property. There was an allegation that the property "is presently tenanted" but did not state when the tenant started to possess the property. While it is true that possession of the tenant is possession of the owner, the complaint failed to state that Loreta Garcia was in prior possession of the property at the time of entry by the petitioners. And, while the complaint stated that the petitioners obtained possession of the premises through stealth, it failed to aver when this entry was accomplished or when the private respondent learned of such entry. The failure of the private respondent to allege the time when unlawful deprivation took place is fatal because this will determine the
start of the counting of the one year period for the filing of the summary action of forcible entry. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the action should either be accion publiciana or reinvindicatoria in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) (Sarona Et. Al., v. Villegas, Et Al., supra).
The respondent appellate court erred in holding that this case is one for unlawful detainer. It failed to consider the basic distinction that in forcible entry, possession is illegal at the inception while in unlawful detainer, possession is legal until demand is made to recover such possession or until the possessor does or fails to do an act which makes his continued possession of the premises illegal. The fact that a demand was made by the private respondent for the petitioners to vacate the subject premises cannot change the nature of the latter’s possession of the property and convert the former’s action from forcible entry to one for unlawful detainer. The respondent appellate court likewise erred in applying in this case the doctrine that — "a person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by the implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is proper remedy against them" — because, as We have said here, the possession by defendants was illegal at the inception as alleged in the complaint, hence, there was no tolerance. As explained in Sarona v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-22984, March 27, 1968, 22 SCRA 1257:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"But will this rule as to tolerance hold true in a case where there was forcible entry at the start, but the lawful possessor did not attempt to oust the intruder for over one year, and only thereafter filed forcible entry suit following demand to vacate?
"x x x.
"A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word ‘tolerance’ confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer — not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons. First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress — in the inferior court — provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action for forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court — upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in — and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action.
"It is well to remember that after the lapse of the one year period, suit must be started in the Court of First Instance in an accion publiciana.
It is also the contention of petitioners that private respondents’ claim of ownership had no basis. He should have at least, introduced muniments of title to show the extent and character of his possession. Moreover, mere allegations of ownership does not ipso facto entitle a person to possession of the property claimed.
The main issue in an action for forcible entry and detainer is one of priority of possession. If the plaintiff can prove prior possession in himself, he may recover such possession even from the owner. This rule however has no application in this case. It is true that the private respondent in this case claimed that he is one of the co-owners of the lot in question. However, he has not presented any evidence in support of such claim of ownership by virtue of which he is entitled to its possession. Moreover, he had not shown nor claimed in his complaint that he was in prior possession of the property. On the contrary, it is the petitioners who claimed possession of the property for more than twelve years.
If the private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises and that possession thereof was deprived from him for more than twelve years, he should present his claim before the Regional Trial Court in an accion publiciana or an accion reinvindicatoria and not before the Municipal Trial Court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if he is the owners possession of the property cannot be wrested from another who had been in possession thereof for more than twelve (12) years through a summary action for ejectment.
"Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not responsibly address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria. (German Management and Services Inc. v. CA, 76216-17, September 14, 1988, 177 SCRA 495, 499).
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 161589, November 24, 2014
PENTA PACIFIC REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is determined from the allegations of the initiatory pleading.
The Case
Under review is the decision promulgated on October 9, 2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered on June 10, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 58, in Makati City2 nullifying for lack of jurisdiction the decision rendered on January 12, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 64, in Makati City.3
Antecedents
The petitioner owned the 25th floor of the Pacific Star Building located in Makati City with an area of 1,068.67 square meters. The respondent leased 444.03 square meters of the premises (subject property) through the petitioner’s authorized agent, Century Properties Management, Inc. (Century Properties). Under the terms of the contract of lease dated January 31, 1997, the petitioner gave the respondent possession of the subject property under a stipulation to the effect that in case of the respondent’s default in its monthly rentals, the petitioner could immediately repossess the subject property.
On March 19, 1997, the respondent expressed the intention to purchase the entire 1,068.67 square meters, including the subject property. The parties executed a contract to sell, denominated as a reservation agreement, in which they set the purchase price at US$3,420,540.00, with the following terms of payment: 20% down payment equivalent of US$684,108.00 payable within eight months; and US$85,513.00/monthly for eight months with interest of 9.75%, commencing on the 6th month. The 80% balance was to be paid in 13 installments beginning on March 1, 1997 until March 1, 1998. The reservation agreement contained the following cancellation or forfeiture provision, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryAny failure on [the respondent’s] part to pay the full downpayment, or deliver the post-dated checks or pay the monthly amortization on the due date, shall entitle [the petitioner], at its option, to impose a penalty interest at the rate of three percent (3%) per month on the outstanding balance or to cancel this agreement without need of any court action and to forfeit, in its favor, any reservation deposits or payments already made on the unit, without prior notice.4
After paying US$538,735.00, the respondent stopped paying the stipulated monthly amortizations. An exchange of letters ensued between Janet C. Ley, President of the respondent, or Efren Yap, Assistant to the President of the respondent, on one hand, and Jose B.E. Antonio, Vice-Chairman of the petitioner, and the petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Reynaldo Dizon, on the other.
In the September 23, 1997 letter,5 the respondent asked the petitioner to modify the terms of the reservation agreement to allow it to purchase only the subject property. In the February 5, 1998 letter,6 the petitioner’s counsel reminded the respondent of its US$961,546.50 liability to the petitioner under the terms of the reservation agreement. In another letter dated February 5, 1998,7the petitioner’s counsel informed the respondent of its failure to pay its amortizations since August 1997, and demanded the payment of US$961,564.50.
Through its letter of February 17, 1998,8 the respondent submitted the following proposals, namely: (1) that the US$538,735.00 paid under the reservation agreement be applied as rental payments for the use and occupation of the subject property in the period from March 1997 to February 28, 1998; (2) that the balance of US$417,355.45 after deducting the rental payments from March 1997 to February 28, 1998 should be returned to it; and (3) that the respondent be allowed to lease the subject property beginning March 1998.
The petitioner, through its counsel’s letter of March 9, 1998,9 rejected the respondent’s proposals, and demanded the payment of US$3,310,568.00, representing the respondent’s unpaid balance (as of March 2, 1998) under the reservation agreement. The petitioner further evinced its intention to cancel the contract to sell, and to charge the respondent for the rentals of the subject property corresponding to the period from August 1997 to March 1998, during which no amortization payments were made.
In the letter dated February 4, 1999,10 the petitioner’s counsel informed the respondent of the cancellation of the reservation agreement and the forfeiture of the respondent’s payments; and demanded that respondent pay the rentals of P9,782,226.50 and vacate the subject property.
In its letter of May 25, 1999,11 the petitioner’s counsel wrote to the respondent thuswise:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryWe write in behalf of our client, Penta Pacific Realty Corporation, regarding the Reservation Agreement and/or sale between you and our client over the latter’s unit located at the 25th Floor, Pacific Star Building, Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue corner Makati Avenue, Makati City.
We regret to inform you that in view of your continued refusal and/or failure to pay to our client the balance of the agreed-upon purchase price of the office unit you are currently occupying, our client is constrained to make a notarial cancellation of the Reservation Agreement and/or sale of the above-mentioned unit and to forfeit the payments you made in favor of our client.
In this connection, there is no more valid reason for you to continue occupying the subject premises. Hence, final and formal demand is hereby made upon you to peacefully and quietly vacate the same within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. Otherwise, we shall be constrained to file the appropriate legal action to protect our client’s interests.
Lastly, we would like to inform you that our client will also be constrained to charge you the amount of P9,782,226.50 corresponding to reasonable rentals and other charges as of January 22, 1999.
Trusting that you are guided accordingly.On July 9, 1999, the petitioner filed the complaint for ejectment in the MeTC following the respondent’s failure to comply with the demands to pay and vacate.
The respondent resisted the complaint,12 arguing that the contract of lease dated January 31, 1997 had been simulated or, in the alternative, had been repealed, negated, extinguished and/or novated by the reservation agreement; that the petitioner had failed to observe its undertaking to allow the respondent to collect rentals from the other lessees of the subject property; that the petitioner had unjustifiably refused to renegotiate or to amend the reservation agreement; and that the petitioner had violated the rule on non-forum shopping considering the pendency of another case between the parties in Branch 57 of the RTC in Makati City.13
Decision of the MeTC
On January 12, 2000, the MeTC, ruling in favor of the petitioner, found that the respondent’s lawful possession of the property had been by virtue of the contract of lease, but had become unlawful when the respondent had failed to comply with its obligation to pay the monthly rentals for the subject property; and that, in any event, the reservation agreement proved that the petitioner had held the better right to possess the subject property as the owner thereof. The MeTC disposed:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryWHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering defendant Ley Construction and Development Corporation and all persons claiming rights under it to vacate and surrender the possession of the Property to the plaintiff; to pay the sum of P32,456,953.06 representing unpaid rentals and other charges as of June 23, 1999; the further amount of P443,741.38 starting July, 1999, and the same amount every month thereafter as reasonable compensation for the continued and illegal use and occupancy of the Property, until finally restituted to the plaintiff; the sum of P100,000.00 for as (sic) attorney’s fees plus cost of suit.14
The respondent appealed to the RTC.
In the meantime, on November 6, 2001, the respondent turned over the possession of the leased premises to the petitioner.
Judgment of the RTC
On June 10, 2002, the RTC rendered its judgment nullifying the MeTC’s decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, holding that the appropriate action was either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria over which the MeTC had no jurisdiction. It found that the basis of recovery of possession by the petitioner was the respondent’s failure to pay the amortizations arising from the violations of the reservation agreement; that the complaint did not specifically aver facts constitutive of unlawful detainer, i.e., it did not show how entry had been effected and how the dispossession had started; and that the requirement of formal demand had not been complied with by the petitioner.
Decision of the CA
The petitioner appealed to the CA.
By its decision promulgated on October 9, 2003, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC,15declaring that the respondent’s possession was not by virtue of the contract of lease but pursuant to the reservation agreement, which was more of a “contract of sale.”16 It concluded that the petitioner’s action was not unlawful detainer, but another kind of action for the recovery of possession.17
Not in agreement with the decision of the CA, the petitioner filed the present petition.
Issue
The decisive question is whether the complaint was for unlawful detainer, or accion publiciana, oraccion reivindicatoria.
The petitioner submits that the MeTC had jurisdiction because its complaint made out a clear case of unlawful detainer, emphasizing that the basis of the complaint was the failure of the respondent to pay the stipulated monthly rentals under the revived contract of lease; that even if the cause of action was upon the nonpayment of the purchase price under the reservation agreement, the MeTC still had jurisdiction over the action because an unlawful detainer case could also arise from a vendor-vendee relationship; and that, accordingly, the nonpayment of rentals or of the purchase price sufficiently established its better right to possess the subject property.
In contrast, the respondent maintains that it had not violated any existing contract of lease with the petitioner because the contract of lease dated January 31, 1997 was based on the agreement between the respondent and Century Properties; that it had entered into the possession of the subject property as the buyer-owner pursuant to the reservation agreement; and that the recovery of possession should have been by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, not unlawful detainer.
Ruling
The appeal has merit.
1.
Kinds of Possessory Actions
There are three kinds of real actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, namely: accion de reivindicacion, accion publiciana and accion interdictal. The first seeks the recovery of ownership as well as possession of realty.18 The second proposes to recover the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding.19 The third refers to the recovery of physical or actual possession only (through a special civil action either for forcible entry or unlawful detainer).
If the dispossession is not alleged to take place by any of the means provided by Section 1,20 Rule 70, Rules of Court, or, if the dispossession allegedly took place by any of such means but the action is not brought within one year from deprivation of possession, the action is properly a plenary action of accion publiciana or accion de reivindicacion. The explanation is simply that the disturbance of the peace and quiet of the local community due to the dispossession did not materialize; hence, the possessor thus deprived has no need for the summary proceeding of accion interdictal under Rule 70.
The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over accion interdictal. Until April 15, 1994, the MTC had no original jurisdiction over the other possessory actions. By such date, its jurisdiction was expanded to vest it with exclusive original jurisdiction over the other possessory actions of accion publiciana and accion de reivindicacion where the assessed value of the realty involved did not exceed P20,000.00, or, if the realty involved was in Metro Manila, such value did not exceed P50,000.00. The expansion of jurisdiction was by virtue of the amendment by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 769121 to make Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 pertinently provide thusly:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarySection 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
x x x x
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
x x x x
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7691 similarly revised Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the provision defining the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC over civil actions) to make the latter provision state, pertinently, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarySection 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
x x x x
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
x x x xAs can be seen, the amendments have made the assessed value of the property whose possession or ownership is in issue, or the assessed value of the adjacent lots if the disputed land is not declared for taxation purposes determinative of jurisdiction. The allegation of the assessed value of the realty must be found in the complaint, if the action (other than forcible entry or unlawful detainer) involves title to or possession of the realty, including quieting of title of the realty. If the assessed value is not found in the complaint, the action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the trial court is not thereby afforded the means of determining from the allegations of the basic pleading whether jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action pertains to it or to another court. Courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the realty.22
2.
MeTC had jurisdiction over the complaint of the petitioner
The settled rule is that the nature of the action as appearing from the averments in the complaint or other initiatory pleading determines the jurisdiction of a court; hence, such averments and the character of the relief sought are to be consulted.23 The court must interpret and apply the law on jurisdiction in relation to the averments of ultimate facts in the complaint or other initiatory pleading regardless of whether or not the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.24 The reliefs to which the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled based on the facts averred, although not the reliefs demanded, determine the nature of the action.25 The defense contained in the answer of the defendant is generally not determinant.26
Is this present action one for unlawful detainer?
A suit for unlawful detainer is premised on Section 1, Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, of which there are two kinds, namely: (1) that filed against a tenant, and (2) that brought against a vendee or vendor, or other person unlawfully withholding possession of any land or building after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.
“In an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the main issue is possession de facto, independently of any claim of ownership or possession de jure that either party may set forth in his pleading.”27 The plaintiff must prove that it was in prior physical possession of the premises until it was deprived thereof by the defendant.28 The principal issue must be possession de facto, or actual possession, and ownership is merely ancillary to such issue. The summary character of the proceedings is designed to quicken the determination of possession de facto in the interest of preserving the peace of the community, but the summary proceedings may not be proper to resolve ownership of the property. Consequently, any issue on ownership arising in forcible entry or unlawful detainer is resolved only provisionally for the purpose of determining the principal issue of possession.29 On the other hand, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property and whatever may be the character of the plaintiff’s prior possession, if it has in its favor priority in time, it has the security that entitles it to remain on the property until it is lawfully ejected through anaccion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria by another having a better right.30
In unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege the cause of action according to the manner set forth in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarySection 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. – Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheldafter the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. (Emphasis supplied)The complaint must further allege the plaintiff’s compliance with the jurisdictional requirement of demand as prescribed by Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarySection 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. — Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings.
For the action to come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, therefore, the complaint must allege that: (a) the defendant originally had lawful possession of the property, either by virtue of a contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (b) the defendant’s possession of the property eventually became illegal or unlawful upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of the expiration or the termination of the defendant’s right of possession; (c) the defendant thereafter remained in possession of the property and thereby deprived the plaintiff the enjoyment thereof; and (d) the plaintiff instituted the action within one year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession.31
The complaint herein sufficiently alleged all the foregoing requisites for unlawful detainer, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryx x x x
3. On January 31, 1997, the defendant and the plaintiff’s authorized agent, Century Properties Management Inc. (CPMI), a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the x x x Philippines x x x entered into a Contract of Lease whereby the latter leased from the former a portion of the 25th Floor of the PSB (hereinafter referred to as the PROPERTY). x x x.
4. On March 19, 1997, the defendant decided to purchase from the plaintiff the 25thFloor of the PSB by virtue of a Reservation Agreement of the same date. x x x.
5. However, on August 1997, the defendant started to default in its amortization payments on the above-mentioned purchase. x x x.
x x x x
8. Sometime in March 1999, the defendant requested from the plaintiff and CPMI that the Reservation Agreement be cancelled and in lieu thereof, the above-mentioned Contract of Lease be revived. The plaintiff and CPMI acceded to such request x x x.
9. However, contrary to the express provisions of the Contract of Lease, the defendant failed to pay to the plaintiff the rentals for the use of the PROPERTY when they fell due.
10. x x x the plaintiff also formally made a notarial cancellation of the aforementioned purchase and demanded that defendant peacefully vacate the PROPERTY. x x x.
11. However, despite such demand, the defendant has failed and/or refused and continues to refuse and fail to peacefully vacate the PROPERTY. x x x.32
As earlier shown, the final letter dated May 25, 1999 of the petitioner’s counsel demanded that the respondent vacate the subject property,33 to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryIn this connection, there is no more valid reason for you to continue occupying the subject premises. Hence, final and formal demand is hereby made upon you to peacefully and quietly vacate the same within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. Otherwise, we shall be constrained to
file the appropriate legal action to protect our client’s interests.
Lastly, we would like to inform you that our client will also be constrained to charge you the amount of P9,782,226.50 corresponding to reasonable rentals and other charges as of January 22, 1999.After the demand went unheeded, the petitioner initiated this suit in the MeTC on July 9, 1999, well within the one-year period from the date of the last demand.
The aforequoted allegations of the complaint made out a case of unlawful detainer, vesting the MeTC with exclusive original jurisdiction over the complaint. As alleged therein, the cause of action of the petitioner was to recover possession of the subject property from the respondent upon the latter’s failure to comply with the former’s demand to vacate the subject property after the latter’s right to remain thereon terminated by virtue of the demand to vacate. Indeed, the possession of the latter, although lawful at its commencement, became unlawful upon its non-compliance with the former’s demand to vacate.
The jurisdiction of the MeTC was not ousted by the fact that what was ultimately proved as to how entry by the respondent had been made or when the dispossession had started might have departed from that alleged in the complaint. As earlier stated, jurisdiction over the subject matter was determined from the allegations of the complaint, which clearly set forth a cause of action for unlawful detainer.34
The MeTC correctly exercised its authority in finding for the petitioner as the plaintiff. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess; hence, the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in the action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the termination of the defendant’s right to continue in possession.35
A defendant’s claim of possession de jure or his averment of ownership does not render the ejectment suit either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The suit remains an accion interdictal, a summary proceeding that can proceed independently of any claim of ownership.36 Even when the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership is to be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.37
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision promulgated on October 9, 2003 by the Court of Appeals affirming the decision rendered on June 10, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 58; REINSTATE the decision rendered on January 12, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 64, of Makati City; and ORDER the respondent to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-38510. March 25, 1975.]
SPOUSES DOLORES MEDINA and MOISES BERNAL, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE NELLY L. ROMERO VALDELLON OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MALOLOS, BULACAN, SPOUSES CIPRIANO VILLANUEVA and RUFINA PANGANIBAN, Respondents.
Ponciano H. Gupit (Citizen Legal Assistance Office), for Petitioners.
Rosendo G. Tansinsin, Jr. for Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Respondent Judge dismissed petitioner’s action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land on the ground that a land registration case between the same parties involving the same parcel of land is pending in another branch of the same court. Petitioners assailed the trial court’s dismissal order and raised the following legal issues for resolution of this Court: (a) whether or not the pendency of a land registration case bars the institution of an action for recovery of possession; and in the negative, (b) whether or not the respondent judge correctly dismissed the latter case in view of the pendency of the land registration case. The Supreme Court annulled the questioned order and directed the court below to revive the complaint and amended complaint and consolidate the trial of the two cases in one branch.
SYLLABUS
1. COURTS; POWER OF CONTEMPT; COUNSEL MAY BE HELD IN CONTEMPT OF COURT FOR DISRESPECTFUL STATEMENT. — For making in his manifestation and/or comment a statement which the Court considered as disrespectful, counsel for respondent was declared in contempt of court and suspended from the practice of law for three months. However, on motion for reconsideration the Court reconsidered the order of suspension and imposed instead a fine P300.00
2. ID.; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE AS COURT LIMITED AND SPECIAL JURISDICTION; EXTENT THEREOF. — Court of First Instance acting as land registration court has a limited and special jurisdiction confined to the determination of the legality and propriety of the issue of title over the land subject matter of registration, and it has no power to entertain issues of rightful possession and claim for damages emanating from ownership.
3. ACTIONS; UNLAWFUL DETAINER DEFINED. — An action for unlawful detainer is defined as "withholding by a person from another for not more than one year, of the possession of a land or building to which the latter is entitled after the expiration or termination of the former’s right to hold possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. ID.; ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION MAY BE FILED IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE WITHOUT REGARD TO THE ONE YEAR PERIOD CONTEMPLATED IN RULE 70 OF THE RULES OF COURT. — Where defendants withheld the possession of land from the plaintiffs for more than the one year period contemplated in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court concerning actions for forcible entry and detainer, plaintiffs’ remedy is to initiate a plenary action for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) in the court of first instance which can be filed before the expiration of the one year period, or thereafter, provided no action for forcible entry and detainer had been commenced during that time in the inferior court.
5. ID.; DISMISSAL; DISMISSAL OF ACTION ON GROUND OF PENDENCY OF ANOTHER UNIDENTICAL ACTION BETWEEN THE SAME PARTIES IS ERRONEOUS. — The dismissal of the action for recovery of possession because there is pending in another branch of the same court a land registration case between the same parties over the same parcel of land is precipitate; for while identity of parties exists, there is no identity of cause of action, rights asserted, or relief prayed for in both cases, so that a judgment rendered in one case is not res judicata for the other case. The rights sought to be enforced and the relief prayed for in the action for recovery of possession are separate and distinct from those sought in the land registration case.
6. ID.; ID.; MERE PLEA OF TITLE OR OWNERSHIP NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSING ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION. — It is a fundamental principle in the law governing unlawful detainer (including recovery of possession cases) that a mere plea of title or ownership over the disputed land by the defendant cannot be used as a sound legal basis for dismissing an action for recovery of possession because an action for recovery of possession can be maintained even against the very owner of the property.
7. ID.; JUDGMENT IN AN ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION IS NOT CONCLUSIVE AS TO QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP. — An action for recovery of possession is totally distinct and different from action for recovery of title or ownership and a judgment rendered in a case of recovery of possession is conclusive only on the question of possession and not that of ownership; hence, it does not bind the title or effect the ownership of the land or building.
8. ID.; CONSOLIDATION; NATURE OF EVIDENCE AS GROUND THEREFOR. — While the issues raised in both cases are not exactly identical, if the evidence involving the issues of possession and ownership over the land are related and its presentation before one court would redound to a speedy disposition of the cases, the consolidation of the trial of both cases may be ordered.
D E C I S I O N
ESGUERRA, J.:
Petition to review by certiorari the order dated October 23, 1973 of the Hon. Nelly L. Romero Valdellon, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I, which dismissed with costs against the plaintiffs its Civil Case No. 4353-M, entitled "Spouses Dolores Medina and Moises Bernal,Plaintiffs, v. Spouses Cipriano Villanueva and Rufina Panganiban, Defendants."cralaw virtua1aw library
The complaint in Civil Case No. 4353-M of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan alleges that plaintiffs (petitioners in this case) are the owners of a parcel of land situated at Bo. San Pascual, Hagonoy, Bulacan, with an assessed value of P800.00 which was purchased sometime in April 1967 from Margarita Punzalan, Rosal Punzalan, Quaquin Gaddi and Paulina Gaddi; "that as defendants are family friends of the plaintiffs, defendants were allowed to remain in the premises and to construct their residential house, subject to the condition that defendants will return unto the plaintiffs the premises upon demand" ; "that much to the surprise of the plaintiffs-spouses, on demand, defendants-spouses refused and remain obstinate in their refusal to surrender the property in question" ; that because of said defendants’ unjustified acts plaintiffs had to institute action and incur damage of P500 as expenses for court litigation; that "the reasonable value of the use of the premises is P100 a month, taking into consideration its commercial value" ; and prayed that the defendants be ordered "to vacate the premises and surrender unto plaintiffs" the said property and defendants he ordered to pay plaintiffs "the amount of P500 as incidental expenses and the amount of P100 a month from the filing of this action to the time they surrender its possession to the plaintiffs."
A subsequent motion to amend and admit amended complaint was filed by plaintiffs, the amendment consisting of:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"4. That as defendants-spouses are family friends of the plaintiffs, they (defendants) were allowed to build a small house in the premises in April 1967, subject to the condition that they will return to the plaintiffs the premises in 1969;
"5. That much to the surprise of the plaintiffs-spouses on demand, defendants-spouses refused and remains obstinate in their refusal to surrender the property in question claiming that they are the owners thereof;"
A motion to dismiss the complaint and an opposition to the motion to amend and admit the amended complaint filed by the defendants (respondents in this case) preceded the respondent court’s questioned order of October 30, 1973, that dismissed the complaint on the ground of "there being another case pending between the same parties over the same property, namely Land Registration Case No. 2814 of this Court." Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent court in its order dated February 8, 1974.
The only legal issues raised are:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Whether or not the pendency of a land registration case will bar the institution of an action for the recovery of possession; and in the negative, whether or not the respondent judge can be
countenanced in her act of dismissing the latter case in view of the pendency of the land registration case."cralaw virtua1aw library
When this Court (First Division) on May 10, 1974, resolved "without giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to comment thereon, within 10 days from notice, and both parties to state whether or not there is any valid reason why Civil Case No. 4353-M of the respondent court should not be tried and decided jointly with Land Registration Case No. 2814 of Branch VI of said court, considering that the claim of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4353-M (herein petitioners) for damages due to alleged illegal occupancy of the land involved by the defendants (respondents herein) may not be properly passed upon and adjudicated in the land registration case, where only the question of title to the property sought to be registered will be decided between the applicants and oppositors," counsel for respondents, Rosendo G. Tansinsin Jr., included in his Manifestation and/or Comment, dated May 20, 1974, the following statement: "nevertheless, from the reading of the resolution aforequoted, one will certainly have no doubt that there is no need for the respondents to make any comment on the matter as the same will be an exercise of futility since this Honorable Court has not only given due course to the petition, but has actually decided the same, . . ." By reason of the disrespectful tone of the aforesaid statement, said counsel was required by this Court’s (First Division) resolution of May 29, 1974, to show cause why he should not be dealt with for contempt of court.
The petitioners by way of compliance with this Court’s aforementioned resolution of May 10, 1974, requested that the order of October 30, 1973 of the respondent court be set aside and that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch I and VI) be ordered to consolidate, try and decide Civil Case No. 4353-M of Branch I and L. R. C. Case No. 2814 of Branch VI.
The explanation submitted by respondents’ counsel, although it contained an apology, was not considered satisfactory by this Court. Hence in its resolution of July 10, 1974, Atty. Rosendo G. Tansinsin Jr. was declared in contempt of court and suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months. His subsequent motion for reconsideration and personal plea for leniency, sympathy and understanding, coupled with his repeated apology and regret and the fact that his act appeared to be his first offense of that nature, made this Court reconsider the suspension from the practice of law and, instead, ordered him to pay a fine of P300.00 which he has paid.
On the principal issues raised in this case, We have no doubt that the nature of the action embodied in the complaint in Civil Case No. 4353-M is one for recovery of possession brought before the Court of First Instance by the alleged owners of a piece of land against the defendants who were supposed to have unlawfully continued in possession since 1969 when they were supposed to return it to plaintiffs, plus damages. That the action is not for unlawful detainer contemplated in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the city courts or municipal courts, is very apparent because an action of unlawful detainer is defined as "withholding by a person from another for not more than one year of the possession of a land or building to which the latter is entitled after the expiration or
termination of the former’s right to hold possession by virtue of a contract express or implied." (Tenorio v. Gomba 81 Phil. 54; Dikit v. Yno 89 Phil. 44) On the basis of the allegations of the complaint in Civil Case No. 4363-M, the defendants withheld possession from the plaintiffs since 1969 or very much more than the one year period contemplated in unlawful detainer cases at the time the complaint was filed in July of 1973. Not all cases of dispossession are covered by Rule 70 of the Rules of Court (Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer cases) because whenever the owner of property is dispossessed by any other means than those mentioned in the aforementioned rule, he may initiate and maintain a plenary action to recover possession in the Court of First Instance, and it is not necessary for him to wait until the expiration of one year before commencing such action. (Gumiran v. Gumiran 21 Phil. 174) It may also be brought after the expiration of said period of one year, if no action had been initiated for forcible entry and detainer during that time in the inferior court. This plenary action to recover possession (accion publiciana) must be instituted in the Court of First Instance as was done in this case.
The respondent court’s action in dismissing Civil Case No. 4353-M on the ground that there is another pending case (L.R.C. No. 2814 of Branch VI of the same court) between the same parties over the same property is to Our mind rather precipitate, for We find sufficient merit in petitioners’ contention that the rights sought to be enforced and the reliefs prayed for in Civil Case 4353-M (recovery of possession and damages) are entirely separate and distinct from that sought in L. R. C. Case No. 2814 (where petitioners as oppositors are seeking the exclusion of their land from that of private respondents’ claim of title over a bigger tract of land). It is likewise true that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VI) acting as a land registration court has a limited and special jurisdiction confined to the determination of the legality and propriety of the issue of title over the land subject matter of registration, and it has no power to entertain issues of rightful possession and claim for damages emanating from ownership. It is a fundamental principle in the law governing unlawful detainer cases (including recovery of possession cases) that a mere plea of title or ownership over the disputed land by the defendant cannot be used as a sound legal basis for dismissing an action for recovery of possession because an action for recovery of possession can be maintained even against the very owner of the property. (Prado v. Calpo et al, G. R. No. L-19379, April 30, 1964) In the case at bar, there is not even a plea of title on the part of private respondents over the disputed property but a mere allegation that there is another action (L. R. C. No. 2814 pending in Branch VI of that court) for registration of title to that land the possession of which is being recovered by petitioners in Civil Case No. 4353-M. An action for recovery of possession is totally distinct and different from an action for recovery of title or ownership. In fact, a judgment rendered in a case of recovery of possession is conclusive only on the question of possession and not that of ownership. It does not in any way bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. (Sec. 7, Rule 70, Revised Rules of Court).
The inevitable conclusion from the foregoing is that Civil Case No. 4353-M (for recovery of possession and damages) was arbitrarily and erroneously dismissed on the basis of the alleged pendency of another action (L. R. C. No. 2814 pending in Branch VI of the same court), because while identity of parties may be established in both cases, there is no identity of cause of action or of rights asserted and relief prayed for, so that judgment which may be rendered in one case
would not necessarily result in res judicata for the other case.
We cannot see any sufficient reason for any of the parties in this case to object to the consolidation of the trial of both cases (L. R. C. Case No. 2814 and Civil Case No. 4353-M), since the evidence that may be presented by the parties involving possession and ownership of the disputed parcel of land may facilitate an expeditious termination of both cases. While the issues raised in both cases are not exactly identical, the evidence involving the issues of possession and ownership over the same land must be related and its presentation before one court of justice would redound to a speedy disposition of this litigation.
WHEREFORE, the respondent court’s orders of October 30, 1973, and February 8, 1974, are hereby declared null and void and set aside; the complaint and amended complaint in Civil Case No. 4353-M revived; both the respondent Judge and the Presiding Judge, Branch VI, of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, being directed to consolidate the trial of L. R. C. No. 2814 and Civil Case No. 4353-M in one branch of that court. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.SECOND DIVISION ESTELA L. BERBA, G.R. No. 160032
Petitioner,Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CALLEJO, SR.,TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ. JOSEPHINE PABLO and THE Promulgated:HEIRS OF CARLOS PALANCA,
Respondents. November 11, 2005x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x D E C I S I O N CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Assailed before the Court on a petition for review on certiorari is the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 73531, affirming the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila in Civil Case No. 170639.
Estela L. Berba, a resident of 978 Maligaya Street, Malate, Manila, was the owner of a parcel of
land located at No. 2338 M. Roxas Street, Sta. Ana, Manila covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 63726. A house was constructed on the lot, which she leased to Josephine
Pablo* and the Heirs of Carlos Palanca sometime in 1976. The lease was covered by a lease
contract. Upon its expiration, the lessees continued leasing the house on a month-to-month
basis.
By 1999, the monthly rental on the property was P3,450.00. The lessees failed to pay
the rentals due, and by May 1999, their arrears amounted to P81,818.00. Berba then filed a
complaint for eviction and collection of unpaid rentals only against Pablo in the Office of
the Punong Barangay. On June 5, 1999, Berba and Pablo executed an Agreement approved by
the pangkat, as follows:
Ako si Josephine Pablo, naninirahan sa 2338 M. Roxas St., Sta. Ana, Manila, na nasasakop ng Barangay 873, Zone 96, ay nangangako kay GG Robert Berba na nagmamay-ari ng aking tinitirahan ay maghuhulog ng halagang Tatlong Libong Piso P3,000.00 kada ika-sampu ng buwan bilang hulog sa aking pagkakautang kay GG Berba na umaabot sa halagang P81,818.00 na ang nasabing halagang ito ay aking huhulugan hanggang aking mabayaran ng buo ang aking pagkakautang. Ako rin, si Josephine Pablo, ay nangangako na ang hindi ko pagsunod o pagbayad ng buwanang hulog, ako ay kusang aalis sa aking tinitirahan. Bukod pa sa hulog sa aking pagkakautang, ako rin ay magbabayad ng halagang P3,450.00 bilang aking upa sa aking tinitirahan.[3]
By May 2000, Pablo and the lessees still had a balance of P71,716.00. As of May 1, 2001, the
total arrearages of the lessees amounted to P135,115.63.[4] On May 2, 2001, Berba, through
counsel, wrote the lessees, demanding payment of the said amount and to vacate the house
within 30 days from notice, otherwise she will sue them.[5] The lessees ignored the demand. On
June 21, 2001, Berba filed a complaint[6] against Josephine Pablo and the Heirs of Carlos Palanca
in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila for unlawful detainer. She prayed that, after
due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed for that judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiff ordering defendant (sic)
a) to vacate the premises situated at 2338 M. Roxas Street, Sta. Ana, City of Manila;
b) to pay plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand One Hundred Fifteen and 63/100 Pesos (P135,115.63) representing monthly rentals in arrears to the present;
c) to pay plaintiff the amount of Four Thousand Five Hundred Sixty-Two and 63/100 Pesos (P4,562.63) per month representing monthly rent on the premises for the year 2001 until finality of the judgment;
d) to pay plaintiff the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) by way of attorneys fees;
e) to reimburse plaintiff all expenses for litigation estimated in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos;
f) to pay costs of suit. Other reliefs just and equitable are, likewise, prayed for under the premises.[7]
Berba, however, failed to append to her complaint a certification from the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa that no conciliation or settlement had been reached.
In their answer to the complaint, the defendants admitted to have stopped paying
rentals because of financial distress. They also alleged that they were not certain if the plaintiff
was the owner of the property. By way of special and affirmative defenses, they averred that
the plaintiff had no cause of action against them as she failed to secure a Certificate to File
Action from the Lupon.[8]
During the pre-trial conference, the parties manifested to the court that, despite
earnest efforts, no amicable settlement was reached. They defined the main issue as whether
or not the plaintiff had a valid cause of action for unlawful detainer against the defendants.[9]
In her position paper, Berba appended an Agreement dated June 5, 1999 between her and
Pablo, which appeared to have been approved by Punong Barangay Cayetano L. Gonzales
of Barangay 873, as well as other members of the Lupon,[10] duly approved by the Pangkat. She
also appended a Statement of Account indicating that the defendants back rentals amounted
to P135,115.63.[11]
In their position paper, the defendants insisted that the dispute did not go through
the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa prior to the filing of the complaint; hence, Berbas complaint
was premature. They also averred that the increase in the rental rates imposed by the plaintiff
was unjustified and illegal.
In her reply, the plaintiff alleged that there was no more need for her to secure a
Certificate to File Action because she was a resident of No. 978 Maligaya Street, Malate, Manila,
while the defendants were residing in Barangay 873, Zone 6 in Sta. Ana, Manila.
On March 14, 2002, the MTC rendered judgment in favor of Berba. The fallo of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate the premises at 2338 M. Roxas St., Sta. Ana, Manila and restore possession thereof to the plaintiff. Ordering the defendant to pay the amount of P135,115.63 representing monthly rentals since 1999 until December 2000. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P4,562.63 per month beginning January 2001 and for the succeeding months until finally vacated. Ordering the defendant to pay the reduced amount ofP10,000.00 as attorneys fees plus the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.[12]
The defendants appealed the decision to the RTC. On motion of the plaintiff, the RTC issued an
order for the execution of the decision pending appeal.[13] The defendants filed a motion for the
recall of the Order,[14] but before the court could resolve the motion, the Sheriff turned over the
physical possession of the property to Berba on May 20, 2002.[15]
In their Appeal Memorandum, Pablo and the heirs of Palanca insisted that Berbas action in the
MTC was premature because of the absence of Certificate to File Action issued by
the Lupon. They also claimed that Berba unlawfully increased the rentals for the house.[16] Berba, on the other hand, averred that there was no need of a prior referral to
theLupon before filing her complaint. The petitioner cited Section 408(f) of the Local
Government Code, pointing out that she resided in a Barangay in Malate, 8 kilometers away
from Barangay 873 in Sta. Ana, where Pablo and the Palanca heirs resided.[17]
On August 20, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting the appeal and setting aside the
appealed decision. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court a quo is ordered set aside. The complaint is also ordered DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Writ of Execution issued by the Court a quo pending appeal is also set aside.
SO ORDERED.[18]
The RTC ruled that under Section 408 of the Local Government Code, parties who
reside in the same city or municipality although in different barangays are mandated to go
through conciliation proceedings in the Lupon.[19] The court cited the rulings of this Court
in Morata v. Go,[20] and Vda. de Borromeo v. Pogoy.[21]
Berba filed a motion for the reconsideration[22] of the decision, which the RTC denied in its
Order[23] dated October 2, 2002. She then elevated the case to the CA via petition for review,
where she averred:
a) The raising of other affirmative defenses apart from the non-referral to the Barangay Court by the respondents constitute a waiver of such requirement; and
b) There was substantial compliance on the part of the petitioner with respect to
referring her complaint before the Barangay Court.[24]
Citing the ruling of this Court in Diu v. Court of Appeals,[25] Berba claimed that Section 408 of the
Local Government Code should be construed liberally together with Section 412. She further
averred that she had complied substantially with the requisites of the law, and recalls that
conciliation proceedings before the Lupon resulted in the execution of an Agreement on June 5,
1999. Upon failure to comply with the agreement, all chances of amicable settlement were
effectively foreclosed. Hence, Pablo and the Heirs of Palanca were estopped from claiming that
she failed to comply with the Local Government Codes requirement of prior referral of their
dispute to the Lupon.
After due proceedings, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and affirming
the RTC decision. Berba moved for a reconsideration of the decision, which proved futile.
In the instant petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner alleges that:THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF DIU VS. COURT OF APPEALS (251 SCRA 478) AND IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE MANDATE OF PD 1508 (NOW R.A. 7160) WITH RESPECT TO PRIOR REFERRAL TO THE BARANGAY COURT, THEREBY DECIDING THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE COURT.[26]
The petitioner avers that she is a sickly widow, in the twilight of her years, and whose
only source of income are the rentals generated from the property, which she also uses to pay
her medical expenses. She avers that the continued denial of her right to the fruits of the
subject property is highly unjust and contrary to the spirit behind the enactment of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1508.[27]
The petitioner also points out that, for her to pay obeisance to the decision of the CA,
she would have to go through the tedious, not to mention horrendous, process of going back to
square one; that is, referring the dispute to the barangay which, in all likelihood, would be
rendered useless considering that respondents had already been validly and effectively ejected
from the leased premises. She would then have to go through the rungs of the judicial ladder a
second time to vindicate her trampled rights. She further claims that the CAs affirmation of
the RTC decision is equivalent to sanctioning a legal anomaly. She points out that the very
purpose of barangay conciliation is to abbreviate disputes between members of the same or
adjacent barangays to the end that their disputes will not reach the doors of the courts. Clearly,
it does not contemplate a protracted process as suggested by the RTC ruling and affirmed by
the CA.[28]
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petitioner was
estopped from relying on the June 5, 1999 Agreement between her and respondent Josephine
Pablo before the Lupon because the respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca were not parties
thereto. The respondents maintained that the petitioner must bear the blame for her failure to
comply with the Local Government Code. At first, she insisted that there was no need for prior
referral of the dispute to the Lupon, claiming that she resided in abarangay other than where
the respondents resided. Thereafter, she made a volte face and invoked the June 5, 1999
Agreement between her and respondent Josephine Pablo. Moreover, the respondents aver, the
MTC had no jurisdiction over the petitioners action for unlawful detainer because it was filed
only on June 21, 2001, or more than one year from June 5, 1999 when the petitioner and
respondent Josephine Pablo executed the agreement. As such, the action should be one for
recovery of possession of property (accion publiciana).
On June 2, 2004, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the
parties to file their respective memoranda.[29] The parties complied.
The Court rules that the CA cannot be faulted for affirming the decision of
the RTC reversing the decision of the MTC and ordering the dismissal of the complaint for
unlawful detainer without prejudice.
The records show that petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo executed an Agreement on
June 5, 1999, which was approved by the Lupon. Respondent Josephine Pablo did not repudiate
the agreement; hence, such agreement of the parties settling the case had the force and effect
of a final judgment. As the Court declared in Vidal v. Escueta,[30] the settlement of the parties
may be enforced by the Lupon, through the punong barangay, within
six months; and if the settlement is not enforced after the lapse of said period, it may be
enforced by an action in the proper city or municipal court, as provided in Section 417 of the
Local Government Code: We also agree that the Secretary of the Lupon is mandated to transmit
the settlement to the appropriate city or municipal court within the time frame under Section 418 of the LGC and to furnish the parties and the Lupon Chairman with copies thereof. The amicable settlement which is not repudiated within the period therefor may be enforced by execution by the Luponthrough the Punong Barangay within a time line of six months, and if the settlement is not so enforced by the Lupon after the lapse of said period, it may be enforced only by an action in the proper city or municipal court as provided for in Section 417 of the LGC of 1991, as amended, which reads:
SEC. 417. Execution. The amicable settlement or arbitration
award may be enforced by execution by the Lupon within six (6) months from the date of the settlement. After the lapse of such time, the settlement may be enforced by action in the proper city or municipal court. (Italics supplied). Section 417 of the Local Government Code provides a mechanism for the
enforcement of a settlement of the parties before the Lupon. It provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement executed by the parties before the Lupon, namely, (a) by execution of the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of the party/parties entitled thereto; and (b) by an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial. Under the first remedy, the proceedings are covered by the LGC and the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Punong Barangay is called upon during the hearing to determine solely the fact of non-compliance of the terms of the settlement and to give the defaulting party another chance at voluntarily complying with his obligation under the settlement. Under the second remedy, the proceedings are governed by the Rules of Court, as amended. The cause of action is the amicable settlement itself, which, by operation of law, has the force and effect of a final judgment.
Section 417 of the LGC grants a period of six months to enforce the
amicable settlement by the Lupon through the Punong Barangay before such party may resort to filing an action with the MTC to enforce the settlement. The raison detre of the law is to afford the parties during the six-month time line, a simple, speedy and less expensive enforcement of their settlement before the Lupon.[31]
In the present case, respondent Josephine Pablo failed to comply with her obligation of
repaying the back rentals of P81,818.00 and the current rentals for the house. Hence, the
petitioner had the right to enforce the Agreement against her and move for her eviction from
the premises. However, instead of filing a motion before the Lupon for the enforcement of
the agreement, or (after six months), an action in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) for the
enforcement of the settlement, the petitioner filed an action against respondent Josephine
Pablo for unlawful detainer and the collection of unpaid rentals, inclusive of those already
due before the June 5, 1999 Agreement was executed. The action of the petitioner against
respondent Pablo was barred by the Agreement of June 5, 1999.
The Court notes that the petitioner even submitted with the MTC a copy of her June 5, 1999
Agreement with respondent Josephine Pablo. Instead of dismissing the complaint as against
such respondent, the MTC rendered judgment against her and ordered her eviction from the
leased premises.
The Court thus rules that the petitioners complaint against respondent Heirs of Carlos
Palanca was premature. It bears stressing that they were not impleaded by the petitioner as
parties-respondents before the Lupon. The petitioner filed her complaint solely against
respondent Josephine Pablo. Moreover, the said respondent heirs were not privy to the said
agreement, and, as such, were not bound by it. Section 412 of the Local Government Code, sets
forth the precondition to filing of complaints in court, to wit:
SEC. 412 Conciliation.- (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon chairman or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.
(b) Where parties may go directly to court. The parties may go directly to
court in the following instances: (1) Where the accused is under detention;
(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;
(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as
preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property, and support pendente lite; and
(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of
limitations. (c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural communities. The
customs and traditions of indigenous cultural communities shall be applied in settling disputes between members of the cultural communities.
Under Sec. 408 of the same Code, parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality are bound to submit their disputes to the Lupon for conciliation/amicable
settlement, unless otherwise provided therein: SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
(a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;
(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;
(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and
the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the luponconcerned for amicable settlement.
If the complainant/plaintiff fails to comply with the requirements of the Local
Government Code, such complaint filed with the court may be dismissed for failure to exhaust
all administrative remedies.[32]
The petitioners reliance on the ruling of this Court in Diu v. Court of Appeals[33] is
misplaced. In that case, there was a confrontation by the parties before the BarangayChairman
and no agreement was reached. Although no pangkat was formed, the Court held in that
instance that there was substantial compliance with the law. In any event, the issue in that case
was whether the failure to specifically allege that there was no compliance with
the barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of that defense. Moreover, no such
confrontation before the Lupon occurred with respect to the unlawful detainer suit against
Josephine Pablo before the MTC.[34]
In this case, the petitioner and the respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca resided in the City
of Manila, albeit in different barangays. The dispute between the petitioner and the respondent
heirs was thus a matter within the authority of the Lupon. Hence, the petitioners complaint for
unlawful detainer and the collection of back rentals should have been first filed before
the Lupon for mandatory conciliation, to afford the parties an opportunity to settle the
case amicably. However, the petitioner filed her complaint against the respondent Heirs of
Carlos Palanca directly with the MTC. Clearly then, her complaint was premature. The execution
of the June 5, 1999 Agreement between petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo does not
amount to substantial compliance to the requirements of the Local Government Code on
mandatory barangay conciliation proceedings.
Indeed, considering that the MTC had already rendered a decision on the merits of the
case, it is not without reluctance that the Court reaches this conclusion which would require
the petitioner to start again from the beginning. The facts of the present case, however, do not
leave us any choice. To grant the petition under these circumstances would amount to refusal
to give effect to the Local Government Code and to wiping it off the statute books insofar as
ejectment and other cases governed by the Rule on Summary
Procedure are concerned. This Court has no authority to do that.[35]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202354 September 24, 2014
AMADA C. ZACARIAS, Petitioner, vs.VICTORIA ANACAY, EDNA ANACAY, CYNTHIAANACAYGUISIC, ANGELITO ANACAY, JERMIL ISRAEL, JIMMY ROY ISRAEL and all other persons claiming authority under them, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is the Decision1 dated June 20, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 123195 which reversed the Decision2 dated August 22, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite, Branch 18, Tagaytay City and affirmed the Decision3 dated October 8, 2010 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Amadeo-Silang, Cavite, Branch 17 in Civil Case No. 862.
The present controversy stemmed from a complaint4 for Ejectment with Damages/Unlawful Detainer filed on December 24, 2008 by petitioner Amada Zacarias thru her son and attorney-in-fact, Cesar C. Zacarias, against the above-named respondents, Victoria Anacay and members of her household. Said respondents are the occupants of a parcel of land with an area of seven hundred sixty-nine (769) square meters, situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st, Silang, Cavite and covered by Tax Declaration No. 18-026-01182 in the name of petitioner and issuedby Municipal Assessor Reynaldo L. Bayot on August 31, 2007.
The parties were ordered to proceed to the Philippine Mediation Center pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Mediation was unsuccessful and thus the case was returned to the court.5
After due proceedings, the MCTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is, hereby, rendered in favor of defendants Victoria Anacay, Edna Anacay, Santiago Amerna, Raymond and Cynthia Guisic, Angelito Anacay and Myrlinda Yalo, and all persons acting under them, and against plaintiff Amada C. Zacarias, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Cesar C. Zacarias, the instant Complaint for ejectment with damages, Unlawful Detainer is, hereby, DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.6
The MCTC held that the allegations of the complaint failed to state the essential elements of an action for unlawful detainer as the claim that petitioner had permitted or tolerated respondents’ occupation of the subject property was unsubstantiated. It noted that the averments in the demand letter sent by petitioner’s counsel that respondents entered the property through stealth and strategy, and in petitioner’s own "Sinumpaang Salaysay", are more consistent withan action for forcible entry which should have been filed within one year from the discovery of the alleged entry. Since petitioner was deprived of the physical possession of her property through illegal means and the complaint was filed after the lapse of one year from her discovery thereof, the MCTC ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the case.
On appeal to the RTC, petitioner argued that unlawful detainer was the proper remedy considering that she merely tolerated respondents’ stay in the premises after demand to vacate was made upon them, and they had in fact entered into an agreement and she was only forced to take legal action when respondents reneged on their promise to vacate the property after the lapse of the period agreed upon.
In reversing the MCTC, the RTC pointed out that in her complaint, petitioner did not state that respondents entered her property through stealth and strategy but that petitioner was in lawful possession and acceded to the request of respondents to stay in the premises until May 2008 but respondents’ reneged on their promise to vacate the property by that time. It held that the
suit is one for unlawful detainer because the respondents unlawfully withheld the property from petitioner after she allowed them to stay there for one year.
With the subsequent oral agreement between the parties, the RTC ruled that respondents’ occupation ofthe property without petitioner’s consent can be converted to a contract, such agreement not being prohibited by law nor contrary to morals or good customs. Having satisfied the requisites for an unlawful detainer action, the RTC found that petitioner’s complaint was filed within the prescribed one-year period counted from the time the final demand to vacate was received by the respondents on July 24, 2008.
The falloof the Decision of the RTC states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Silang-Amadeo dated October 8, 2010 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and a new one is entered ordering the defendants and all claiming under their rights to: (1) vacate the subject property and surrender possession and control over the same to the plaintiff; Pay the sum of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos each as rentals or compensation for the use thereof starting from July 2008 until the same is paid in full, with interests thereon at twelve (12%) percent per annum; (2) pay the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, as moral damages; (3) pay the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, as exemplary damages; and (4) pay the sum of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, as attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.7
With the failure of respondents to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period, the above decision became final and executory.8
On November 28, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution. At the hearing heldon January 4, 2012,respondents were given a period of ten days within which to file their comment. At the next scheduled hearing on February 6, 2012,respondents’ counsel appeared and submitted a Formal Entry of Appearancewith Manifestation informing the court that on the same day they had filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction before the CA, copies ofwhich were served to petitioner thru her counsel and to the RTC. Nonetheless, in its Order dated February 6, 2012, the RTC stated that said manifestation was "tantamount to [a] comment to the pending motion" and thus gave petitioner’s counsel a period of ten (10) days within which to fileher Reply and thereafter the incident will be submitted for resolution.9
On June 20, 2012, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Order dated August 22, 2011 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, 4th Judicial Region, Branch 18, Tagaytay City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated October 8, 2010 rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Branch 17 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.10
The CA held that the MCTC clearlyhad no jurisdiction over the case as the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer. Since the prescriptive period for filing an action for forcible entry has lapsed, petitioner could not convert her action into one for unlawful detainer, reckoning the one-year period to file her action from the time of her demand for respondents to vacate the property.
Further, the CA said that while petitioner has shown that she is the lawful possessor of the subject property,she availed of the wrong remedy to recover possession but nevertheless may still file an accion publicianaor accion reivindicatoria with the proper regional trial court.
Petitioner contends that the CA erred and committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction in nullifying the judgment of the RTC which has long become final and executory. She argues that the suspension of the strictadherence to procedural rules cannot be justified by unsupported allegationsof the respondents as to supposed non-receipt of documents concerning this case.
On their part, respondents maintain that they were not aware of the proceedings before the RTC and were not furnished a copy of the said court’s adverse decision. They also stress that resort to certiorari was proper and the suspension of procedural rules was justified by compelling circumstances such as the imminentdestruction of the only property possessed by respondents who are indigent, respondents’ lack of awareness of unfavorable judgment rendered on appeal by the RTC, substantive merits of the case insofar as the jurisdictional requirements in a suit for unlawful detainer, lack of showing that resortto certiorari petition was frivolous and dilatory, and there being no prejudice caused to the other party.
After a thorough review of the records and the parties’ submissions, we find neither reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA.
SC
The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint.11 In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which Section 112 of Rule 70 provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.13 Such remedy is either forcibleentry or unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In illegal detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or implied.14
The MCTC and CA both ruled thatthe allegations in petitioner’s complaint make out a case for forcible entry but not for unlawful detainer.
In Cabrera v. Getaruela,15 the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by toleranceof the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination ofthe latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property , the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.16
In this case, the Complaint alleged the following:
3. Plaintiff is the owner of that parcel of land situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st, Silang, Cavite with an area of SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY NINE (769) SQUARE METERS, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 18-026-01182 issued by the Municipal Assessor of Silang, Cavite. Copy of said tax declaration is hereto attached as Annex "B";
4. Plaintiff was in lawful possession and control over the subject property. She had it planted to Bananas and other fruit bearing trees. However, sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the defendants have entered the subject property and occupied the same;
5. Consequently, Plaintiff demanded that they leave the premises. The defendants requested for time toleave and she acceded to said request. The defendants committed to vacate the subject property by the end of May, 2008;
6. Inspite of several repeateddemands, defendants unjustifiably refused to vacate the subject premises prompting the Plaintiff to seek the assistance of a lawyer who wrote them a FORMAL and FINAL DEMAND to vacate the premises and to pay reasonable compensation for their illegal use and occupancy of the subject property. A copy of the DEMAND LETTER is hereto attached as Annex "C";
7. Plaintiff also referred this matter to the Lupon Tagapamayapa of Barangay Lalaan 1st for possible conciliation but to no avail as the defendants still refused to vacate the subject property. Thus, the said Barangay issued a CERTIFICATION TOFILE ACTION, as evidenced by a copy thereto attached as Annex "D";
x x x x17
The above complaint failed to allegea cause of action for unlawful detainer as it does not describe possession by the respondents being initially legal or tolerated by the petitioner and which became illegal upon termination by the petitioner of suchlawful possession. Petitioner’s insistence that she actually tolerated respondents’ continued occupation after her discovery of their entry into the subject premises is incorrect. As she had averred, she discovered respondents’occupation in May 2007. Such possession could not have been legal from the start as it was without her knowledge or consent, much less was it based on any contract, express or implied. We stress that the possession ofthe defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.18
In Valdez v. Court of Appeals,19 the Court ruled that where the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case. Thus:
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. As explained in Sarona v. Villegas:
But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction should be made.
If right at the incipiencydefendant’s possession was with plaintiff’s tolerance, we do not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate.
x x x x
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons:First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge tothe right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress – in the inferior court - provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to bespeedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second,if a forcible entry action in the inferior courtis allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court – upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in - and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry
and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. (Italics and underscoring supplied)
It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.
Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publicianaor an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. Thus, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against respondent alleging that they were the owners of the parcel of land through intestate succession which was occupied by respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners as well as their deceased mother. Resolving the issue on whether or not petitioners’ case for unlawful detainer will prosper, the court ruled:
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property registered under TCT No. C-32110 from their parents; that possession thereof by private respondent was by tolerance of their mother, and after her death, by their own tolerance; and that they had served written demand on December, 1994, but that private respondent refused to vacate the property. x x x
It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land the moment he is required to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer cases of this kind, that plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. This is where petitioners’ cause of action fails. The appellate court, in full agreement with the MTC made the conclusion that the alleged tolerance by their mother and after her death, by them, was unsubstantiated. x x x
The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the inception and not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that defendant started to occupy the subject lot and then built a house thereon without the permission and consent of petitioners and before them, their mother. xxx Clearly, defendant’s entry into the land was effected clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muñoz vs. Court of Appeals[224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry x x x.
x x x x
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact that would substantiate petitioners’ claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents. The complaint contains only bare allegations that "respondents without any color of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house in the said land thereby depriving petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has been said on how respondents’ entry was effected or how and when dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. This failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.It is in this light that this Court finds that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint. (Emphasis supplied.)
The complaint in this case is similarly defective as it failed to allege how and when entry was effected. The bare allegation of petitioner that "sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the defendants have enterep the subject property and occupied the same", as correctly found by the MCTC and CA, would show that respondents entered the land and built their houses thereon clandestinely and without petitioner's consent, which facts are constitutive of forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. Consequently, the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the case and the RTC clearly erred in reversing the lower court's ruling and granting reliefs prayed for by the petitioner.
Lastly, petitioner's argument that the CA gravely erred in nullifying a final and executory judgment of the RTC deserves scant consideration.
It is well-settled that a court's jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action.20 Indeed, a void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated June 20, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 123195 is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 151369 March 23, 2011
ANITA MONASTERIO-PE and the SPOUSES ROMULO TAN and EDITHA PE-TAN, Petitioners, vs.JOSE JUAN TONG, herein represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, JOSE Y. ONG, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal and nullification of the Decision1 and Order,2 respectively dated October 24, 2001 and January 18, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 24.
The instant petition stemmed from an action for ejectment filed by herein respondent Jose Juan Tong (Tong) through his representative Jose Y. Ong (Ong) against herein petitioners Anita Monasterio-Pe (Anita) and the spouses Romulo Tan and Editha Pe-Tan (Spouses Tan). The suit was filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 3, Iloilo City and docketed as Civil Case No. 2000(92).
In the Complaint, it was alleged that Tong is the registered owner of two parcels of land known as Lot Nos. 40 and 41 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-9699 and T-9161, together with the improvements thereon, located at Barangay Kauswagan, City Proper, Iloilo City; herein petitioners are occupying the house standing on the said parcels of land without any contract of lease nor are they paying any kind of rental and that their occupation thereof is simply by mere tolerance of Tong; that in a letter dated December 1, 1999, Tong demanded that respondents vacate the house they are occupying, but despite their receipt of the said letter they failed and refused to vacate the same; Tong referred his complaint to the Lupon of Barangay Kauswagan, to no avail.3
In their Answer with Defenses and Counterclaim, herein petitioners alleged that Tong is not the real owner of the disputed property, but is only a dummy of a certain alien named Ong Se Fu, who is not qualified to own the said lot and, as such, Tong's ownership is null and void; petitioners are the true and lawful owners of the property in question and by reason thereof they need not lease nor pay rentals to anybody; a case docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 52676 (RTC Civil Case No. 20181) involving herein petitioner Pe and respondent is pending before the Court of Appeals (CA) where the ownership of the subject property is being litigated; respondent should wait for the resolution of the said action instead of filing the ejectment case; petitioners also claimed that there was, in fact, no proper barangay conciliation as Tong was bent on filing the ejectment case before conciliation proceedings could be validly made.4
On March 19, 2001, the MTCC rendered judgment in favor of herein respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, finding the defendants Anita Monasterio-Pe, and Spouses Romulo Tan and Editha Pe-Tan to be unlawfully withholding the property in litigation, i.e., Lot. Nos. 40 and 41 covered by TCT Nos. T-9699 and 9161, respectively, together with the buildings thereon, located at Brgy. Kauswagan, Iloilo City Proper, and they are hereby ordered together with their families and privies, to vacate the premises and deliver possession to the plaintiff and/or his representative.
The defendants are likewise ordered to pay plaintiff reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises in the amount of P15,000.00 per month starting January, 2000 until they actually vacate and deliver possession to the plaintiff and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00.
Costs against the defendants.
SO DECIDED.5
Aggrieved by the above-quoted judgment, petitioners appealed the decision of the MTCC with the RTC of Iloilo City.
In its presently assailed Decision, the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 24 affirmed in its entirety the appealed decision of the MTCC.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
At the outset, it bears emphasis that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court.6 It is a settled rule that in the exercise of this Court's power of review, it does not inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence presented, consistent with the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts.7 In the instant case, a perusal of the errors assigned by petitioners would readily show that they are raising factual issues the resolution of which requires the examination of evidence. Certainly, issues which are being raised in the present petition, such as the questions of whether the issue of physical possession is already included as one of the issues in a case earlier filed by petitioner Anita and her husband, as well as whether respondent complied with the law and rules on barangayconciliation, are factual in nature.
Moreover, the appeal under Rule 45 of the said Rules contemplates that the RTC rendered the judgment, final order or resolution acting in its original jurisdiction.8 In the present case, the assailed Decision and Order of the RTC were issued in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Thus, petitioners pursued the wrong mode of appeal when they filed the present petition for review on certiorariwith this Court. Instead, they should have filed a petition for review with the CA pursuant to the provisions of Section 1,9 Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
On the foregoing bases alone, the instant petition should be denied.
In any case, the instant petition would still be denied for lack of merit, as discussed below.
In their first assigned error, petitioners contend that the RTC erred in holding that the law authorizes an attorney-in-fact to execute the required certificate against forum shopping in behalf of his or her principal. Petitioners argue that Tong himself, as the principal, and not Ong, should have executed the certificate against forum shopping.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that the first paragraph of Section 5,10 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, requires that the certification should be signed by the "petitioner or principal party" himself. The rationale behind this is because only the petitioner himself has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in different courts or agencies.11 However, the rationale does not apply where, as in this case, it is the attorney-in-fact who instituted the action.12 Such circumstance constitutes reasonable cause to allow the attorney-in-fact to personally sign the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping. Indeed, the settled rule is that the execution of the certification against forum shopping by the attorney-in-fact is not a violation of the requirement that the parties must personally sign the same.13 The attorney-in-fact, who has authority to file, and who actually filed the complaint as the representative of the plaintiff, is a party to the ejectment suit.14 In fact, Section 1,15 Rule 70 of the Rules of Court includes the representative of the owner in an ejectment suit as one of the parties authorized to institute the proceedings. In the present case, there is no dispute that Ong is respondent's attorney-in-fact. Hence, the Court finds that there has been substantial compliance with the rules proscribing forum shopping.
Petitioners also aver that the certificate against forum shopping attached to the complaint in Civil Case No. 2000(92) falsely stated that there is no other case pending before any other tribunal involving the same issues as those raised therein, because at the time the said complaint was filed, Civil Case No. 20181 was, in fact, still pending with the CA (CA-G.R. CV No. 52676), where the very same issues of ejectment and physical possession were already included.
Corollarily, petitioners claim that the MTCC has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 2000(92) on the ground that the issue of physical possession raised therein was already included by agreement of the parties in Civil Case No. 20181. As such, petitioners assert that respondent is barred from filing the ejectment case, because in doing so he splits his cause of action and indirectly engages in forum shopping.
The Court does not agree.
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the disputed properties, along with three other parcels of land, had been the subject of two earlier cases filed by herein petitioner Anita and her husband Francisco against herein respondent and some other persons. The first case is for specific performance and/or rescission of contract and reconveyance of property with
damages. It was filed with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo City and docketed as Civil Case No. 10853. The case was dismissed by the CFI. On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) upheld the decision of the trial court. When the case was brought to this Court,16 the decision of the IAC was affirmed. Subsequently, the Court's judgment in this case became final and executory per Entry of Judgment issued on May 27, 1991.
Subsequently, in 1992, the Spouses Pe filed a case for nullification of contract, cancellation of titles, reconveyance and damages with the RTC of Iloilo City. This is the case presently cited by petitioners. Eventually, the case, docketed as Civil Case No. 20181, was dismissed by the lower court on the ground of res judicata. The RTC held that Civil Case No. 10853 serves as a bar to the filing of Civil Case No. 20181, because both cases involve the same parties, the same subject matter and the same cause of action. On appeal, the CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 20181. Herein petitioner Anita assailed the judgment of the CA before this Court, but her petition for review on certiorari was denied via a Resolution17 dated January 22, 2003. On June 25, 2003, the said Resolution became final and executory. The Court notes that the case was disposed with finality without any showing that the issue of ejectment was ever raised. Hence, respondent is not barred from filing the instant action for ejectment.
In any case, it can be inferred from the judgments of this Court in the two aforementioned cases that respondent, as owner of the subject lots, is entitled to the possession thereof. Settled is the rule that the right of possession is a necessary incident of ownership.18 Petitioners, on the other hand, are consequently barred from claiming that they have the right to possess the disputed parcels of land, because their alleged right is predicated solely on their claim of ownership, which is already effectively debunked by the decisions of this Court affirming the validity of the deeds of sale transferring ownership of the subject properties to respondent.
Petitioners also contend that respondent should have filed an accion publiciana and not an unlawful detainer case, because the one-year period to file a case for unlawful detainer has already lapsed.
The Court does not agree.
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provide:
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings and when. – Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding
or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.
Section 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. – Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings.
Respondent alleged in his complaint that petitioners occupied the subject property by his mere tolerance. While tolerance is lawful, such possession becomes illegal upon demand to vacate by the owner and the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such demand.19 Respondent sent petitioners a demand letter dated December 1, 1999 to vacate the subject property, but petitioners did not comply with the demand. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.20 Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the one-year period within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from the date of demand, because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful.21 Respondent filed the ejectment case against petitioners on March 29, 2000, which was less than a year from December 1, 1999, the date of formal demand. Hence, it is clear that the action was filed within the one-year period prescribed for filing an ejectment or unlawful detainer case.1avvphi1
Neither is the Court persuaded by petitioners' argument that respondent has no cause of action to recover physical possession of the subject properties on the basis of a contract of sale because the thing sold was never delivered to the latter.
It has been established that petitioners validly executed a deed of sale covering the subject parcels of land in favor of respondent after the latter paid the outstanding account of the former with the Philippine Veterans Bank.
Article 1498 of the Civil Code provides that when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. In the instant case, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that they had no intention of delivering the subject lots to respondent when they executed the said deed of sale. Hence, petitioners' execution of the deed of sale is tantamount to a delivery of the subject lots to respondent. The fact that petitioners remained in possession of the disputed properties does not prove that there was no delivery, because as found by the lower courts, such possession is only by respondent's mere tolerance.
Lastly, the Court does not agree with petitioners' assertion that the filing of the unlawful detainer case was premature, because respondent failed to comply with the provisions of the law on barangay conciliation. As held by the RTC, Barangay Kauswagan City Proper, through its Pangkat Secretary and Chairman, issued not one but two certificates to file action after herein petitioners and respondent failed to arrive at an amicable settlement. The Court finds no error in the pronouncement of both the MTCC and the RTC that any error in the previous conciliation proceedings leading to the issuance of the first certificate to file action, which was alleged to be defective, has already been cured by the MTCC's act of referring back the case to the Pangkat Tagapagkasundo of Barangay Kauswagan for proper conciliation and mediation proceedings. These subsequent proceedings led to the issuance anew of a certificate to file action.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 24, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-22984 March 27, 1968
MARGARITO SARONA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.FELIPE VILLEGAS and RAMONA CARILLO, defendants-appellees.
Aportadera & Palabrica for plaintiffs-appellants.Castillo Law Offices for defendants-appellees.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The key question thrust upon us is whether the present is a case of forcible entry or one of unlawful detainer.
The problem arose because on January 28, 1963, plaintiffs lodged with the Municipal Court of Padada, Davao, against defendants as complaint, styled "Unlawful Detainer." 1 They there aver that they are the absolute owners and in possession of a parcel of land in Paligue, Padada. Their complaint then proceeds to recite:
3. That on April 1, 1958, defendants entered upon said land Lot "F" constructed their residential house thereon and up to date remain in possession thereof, unlawfully withholding the possession of the same from the plaintiffs;
4. That the reasonable rental for said Lot is P20.00 per month;
5. That on December 28, 1962, plaintiffs demanded of defendants to vacate the premises and to pay the rentals in arrears but then defendants failed to do so; that defendants' possession thus became clearly unlawful after said demand;
x x x x x x x x x
They asked that they be restored into possession, and that defendants be made to pay rents, attorneys' fees, expenses of litigation, and costs.
Defendants met the complaint with a motion to dismiss on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction of the municipal court. They say that the case is one of forcible entry, and the reglementary one-year period had elapsed before suit was started.
The municipal court overturned the motion to dismiss.
On May 15, 1963, defendants registered their answer. They reiterated the court's lack of jurisdiction, and by way of affirmative defenses, stated that plaintiffs have no cause of action, and that "the present residential house of the defendants was transferred to the present site after plaintiffs sold to defendants a portion of their land, which includes the site of the present house and from and after said sale, defendants have occupied the said portion legally and with the knowledge and consent of plaintiffs." They counterclaimed for damages.
The municipal court's judgment directed defendants to vacate the premises, to pay plaintiffs a monthly rental of P10.00, from April 1, 1958 until possession is restored, and P200.00 as attorneys' fees, and costs.
Defendants, on appeal to the court of First Instance of Davao, 2 renewed their bid to throw out of court plaintiffs' complaint for want of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs' opposition and defendants' reply thereto were also submitted.
On December 26, 1963, the Court of First Instance of Davao dismissed the case. The court reasoned but that the suit was one of forcible entry and was started beyond the reglementary one-year period.
Plaintiffs appealed to this Court.
Plaintiffs' position is that the municipal court had original jurisdiction; that consequently the Court of First Instance had appellate jurisdiction. Their theory is that suit was well within the one-year period. They say that the parting date is December 28, 1962, when plaintiffs demanded of defendants to vacate the premises and pay rentals in arrears; and that the complaint was registered in court on January 28, 1963.
Solution of the problem turns on this question: Is the complaint one of forcible entry or unlawful detainer? 1äwphï1.ñët
1. Section 1, Rule 70 (formerly Section 10, Rule 72) of the Revised Rules of Court, states that a person deprived of possession of land "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth," or a person against whom the possession of any land "is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied," may at any time "within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper inferior court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession." The next legal precept, Section 2 of the same Rule, provides that the landlord may not sue his tenant for ejectment "for failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of his lease, unless the tenant shall have failed to pay such rent or comply with such conditions for a period of fifteen (15) days, or five (5) days in the case of building, after demand therefor, . . . ."
It is plain that the foregoing rules define two entirely distinct causes of action, to wit: (a) action to recover possession founded on illegal occupation from the beginning — forcible entry; and (b) action founded on unlawful detention by a person who originally acquired possession lawfully — unlawful detainer. 3
The law and jurisprudence leave no doubt in our mind that what determines the cause of action is the nature of defendants' entry into the land. If entry is illegal, then the cause of action which may be filed against the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, entry is legal but thereafter possession became illegal, the case is one of illegal detainer which must be filed within one year from the date of the last demand.
2. We observe a lack of precision-tooling in the complaint. Defendants' alleged entry into the land is not characterized — whether legal or illegal. It does not say how defendants entered the land and constructed their residential house thereon. It is silent, too, whether possession became legal before plaintiffs made the demand to vacate and to pay rentals.
Nor does the complaint as much as intimate that defendants are plaintiffs' tenants. So that the case would not come within the coverage of Section 2 of Rule 70 (summary action by landlord against tenant).
Failure to specifically aver in the complaint facts which definitely show that plaintiffs' action is for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, is not to be lightly treated. Jurisdiction here — challenged in a motion to dismiss — depends upon, factual averments. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. Where, as here, the only definite ultimate facts averred are that on April 1, 1958, defendants entered upon the land and constructed their residential house thereon, remained in possession thereof, and that demand to vacate and pay rentals only was made on December 28, 1962, well beyond the one-year period, the municipal court of Padada did not have jurisdiction.
The want of jurisdiction is the more accentuated when we consider the facts that surfaced during the trial as found by the municipal court, viz:
In the course of the hearing of this case it is clear that, according to the plaintiff, Margarito Sarona, the defendants transferred their house on April 1, 1958 to the litigated area which is designated as Lot F, (Exhibit "C-1") without their consent and permission. At that time he was just living 200 meters away from the lot. He requested the defendants not to place the said house in the litigated area but the defendants refused. He did nothing and only on December 28, 1962, when the formal letter of demand to vacate and to pay rental was made by the plaintiff through their lawyer, Atty. Palabrica, and addressed the said letter to the defendants but the defendants refused to vacate the area and to pay a rental of P20.00. . . .
It is then too plain for argument that defendants entered the land on April 1, 1958 without plaintiffs' consent and permission; that plaintiff Margarito Sarona "requested the defendants not to place the said house in the litigated area but the defendants refused."
The findings of the municipal court itself may not be downgraded in the present case. And this, for the reason that the complaint did not specifically state the manner of entry of defendants into the land — legal or illegal. Since the parties went to trial on the merits, and it came to light that defendants' entry was illegal at the inception, the municipal court should have dismissed the case. That court cannot close its eyes to the truth revealed by plaintiffs' own evidence before it. A court of limited jurisdiction, said municipal court, should not have proceeded to render an on-the-merits judgment thereon. 4
Clearly, plaintiffs' case fits in the jurisprudential precept of forcible entry. Because the entry is forcible. Long had it been made evident that in forcible entry cases, no force is really necessary —
In order to constitute the use of "force," as contemplated in this provision, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. Nor is it even necessary that he should use violence against the person of the party in possession. The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary. Under the statute entering upon the premises by strategy or stealth is equally an obnoxious as entering by force. The foundation of the action is really the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without right. The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession, therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of the person already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes such prior possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party. 5
3. But plaintiffs would want to make out a case of illegal detainer upon their belated claim that they tolerated defendants' possession. To be observed on this point is that there has been no allegation in the complaint, and no showing during the trial in the municipal court, that possession of defendants ever changed from illegal to legal any time from their illegal entry to the demand to vacate. No averment there is in the complaint which recites — as a fact — any overt act on plaintiffs' part indicative of permission to occupy the land. Without resorting to mind-reading, we are hard put to conclude that there was such a change from illegal to legal possession of defendants until the demand to vacate was made.
But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction should be made.
If right at the incipiency defendants' possession was with plaintiffs' tolerance, we do not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate. Because, from the date of demand, possession became unlawful. And the case is illegal detainer. 6
But will this rule as to tolerance hold true in a case where there was forcible entry at the start, but the lawful possessor did not attempt to oust the intruder for over one year, and only thereafter filed forcible entry suit following demand to vacate?
Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are "those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the property; they are generally those particular services or benefits which one's property can give to another without material injury or prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy." 7 He adds that: "[t]hey are acts of little disturbances which a person, in the interest of neighborliness or friendly relations, permits others to do on his property, such as passing over the land, tying a horse therein, or getting some water from a well." And, Tolentino continues, even though "this is continued for a long time, no right will be acquired by prescription." 8Further expounding on the concept, Tolentino writes: "There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case of knowledge and silence on the part of the possessor can be considered mere tolerance. By virtue of tolerance that is considered as an authorization, permission or license, acts of possession are realized or performed. The question reduces itself to the existence or non-existence of the permission." 9
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer — not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress — in the inferior court — provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek
relief in the inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court — upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in — and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to the suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. 10
It is well to remember that after the lapse of the one year period, suit must be started in the Court of First Instance in an accion publiciana.
Jurisdiction in the case before us is with the Court of First Instance.
For the reasons given, the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao of December 26, 1963 dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction in the Municipal Court of Padada, is hereby affirmed.
Costs against plaintiffs-appellants. So ordered.