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G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.

CORTES, J.:

Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos.

According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them on November 10, 1972 to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executive Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.

On November 11, 1972, one day after private respondent Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry confronted him by stating that he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys.

On November 20, 1972, when private respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry went up to him and called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies.

On December 6,1972, the Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report (Exh. "A") clearing private respondent of participation in the anomalies.

Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator, retired Col. Jose G. Fernandez, who on December 10, 1972, submitted a report (Exh. "2") finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be conducted.

Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from work preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him.

On December 19,1972, Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle, Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, after investigating other documents pertaining to the alleged anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime report (Exh. "B") reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the checks

and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results.

Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the fact that the report of the private investigator, was, by its own terms, not yet complete, petitioners filed with the City Fiscal of Manila a complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial documents, later amended to just estafa. Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four of which were for estafa through Falsification of commercial document while the fifth was for of Article 290 of' the Revised Penal Code (Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of Correspondence).lâwphî1.ñèt Two of these complaints were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office, which however, remanded them to the fiscal's office. All of the six criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal. Petitioners appealed four of the fiscal's resolutions dismissing the criminal complaints with the Secretary of Justice, who, however, affirmed their dismissal.

In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice (Exh. "F") from petitioners that his employment has been terminated effective December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the labor arbiter's decision. However, the Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision. Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the President. During the pendency of the appeal with said office, petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered into a compromise agreement regarding the latter's complaint for illegal dismissal.

Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.

Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during the hearings. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent by ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, Tobias appealed as to the amount of damages. However, the Court of Appeals, an a decision dated August 31, 1987 affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed.

The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.

Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their right to dismiss private respondent.

On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners' abusive manner in dismissing him as well as for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the Petitioners must indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered.

One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice" (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.

Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that:

Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that:

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.] should "vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes" [Id. it p. 40; See also PNB v. CA, G.R. No. L-27155, May 18,1978, 83 SCRA 237, 247].

In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which can be applied. While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and factual circumstances called for its application [See for e.g., Velayo v. Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd., 100 Phil. 186 (1956); PNB v. CA, supra;Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. L-48250, December 28, 1979, 94 SCRA 953; PAL v. CA, G.R. No. L-46558, July 31,1981,106 SCRA 391; United General Industries, Inc, v. Paler G.R. No. L-30205, March 15,1982,112 SCRA 404; Rubio v. CA, G.R. No. 50911, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 183] the question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. And in the instant case, the Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.

The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias who reported the possible existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry "showed belligerence and told plaintiff (private respondent herein) that he was the number one suspect and to take a one week vacation leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave his keys to said defendant (petitioner Hendry)" [RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 232]. This, petitioners do not dispute. But regardless of whether or not it was private respondent Tobias who reported the anomalies to petitioners, the latter's reaction towards the former upon uncovering the anomalies was less than civil. An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. And this reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private respondent returned to work on November 20, 1972 after his one week forced leave. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said. "Tobby, you are the crook and swindler in this company." Considering that the first report made by the police investigators was submitted only on December 10, 1972 [See Exh. A] the statement made by petitioner Hendry was baseless. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee [Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood Inc., G.R. No. L-38088, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771; See also Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-21871, September 27,1966, 18 SCRA 107] Under the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter

the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts were committed by petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination from work. Towards the latter part of January, 1973, after the filing of the first of six criminal complaints against Tobias, the latter talked to Hendry to protest the actions taken against him. In response, Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by telling him to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." The threat unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand, the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook" and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity [See Article 26, Civil Code].

The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October 1974, stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Because of the letter, Tobias failed to gain employment with RETELCO and as a result of which, Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Petitioners, however, contend that they have a "moral, if not legal, duty to forewarn other employers of the kind of employee the plaintiff (private respondent herein) was." [Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 15]. Petitioners further claim that "it is the accepted moral and societal obligation of every man to advise or warn his fellowmen of any threat or danger to the latter's life, honor or property. And this includes warning one's brethren of the possible dangers involved in dealing with, or accepting into confidence, a man whose honesty and integrity is suspect" [Id.]. These arguments, rather than justify petitioners' act, reveal a seeming obsession to prevent Tobias from getting a job, even after almost two years from the time Tobias was dismissed.

Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias. Petitioners contend that there is no case against them for malicious prosecution and that they cannot be "penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal complaints against an employee who was their principal suspect in the commission of forgeries and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions which defrauded them of substantial sums of money" [Petition, p. 10, Rollo, p. 11].

While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights [Buenaventura v. Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil. 239 (1958)], the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith [Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 5871.] Hence, in Yutuk V. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. L-13016, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 337, the Court held that the right to file criminal complaints should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an indebtedness. To do so would be a clear perversion of the function of the criminal processes and of the courts of justice. And in Hawpia CA, G.R. No. L-20047, June 30, 1967. 20 SCRA 536 the Court upheld the judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages and attorney's fees after making a finding that petitioner, with

persistence, filed at least six criminal complaints against respondent, all of which were dismissed.

To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges were false and groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. L-44190, October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 602]. Concededly, the filing of a suit by itself, does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 52358, May 301983122 SCRA 576]. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith [Sison v. David, G.R. No. L-11268, January 28,1961, 1 SCRA 60].

In the instant case, however, the trial court made a finding that petitioners acted in bad faith in filing the criminal complaints against Tobias, observing that:

x x x

Defendants (petitioners herein) filed with the Fiscal's Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases, five (5) of which were for estafa thru falsification of commercial document and one for violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code "discovering secrets thru seizure of correspondence," and all were dismissed for insufficiency or lack of evidence." The dismissal of four (4) of the cases was appealed to the Ministry of Justice, but said Ministry invariably sustained the dismissal of the cases. As above adverted to, two of these cases were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to railroad plaintiffs arrest and detention in the military stockade, but this was frustrated by a presidential decree transferring criminal cases involving civilians to the civil courts.

x x x

To be sure, when despite the two (2) police reports embodying the findings of Lt. Dioscoro Tagle, Chief Document Examiner of the Manila Police Department, clearing plaintiff of participation or involvement in the fraudulent transactions complained of, despite the negative results of the lie detector tests which defendants compelled plaintiff to undergo, and although the police investigation was "still under follow-up and a supplementary report will be submitted after all the evidence has been gathered," defendants hastily filed six (6) criminal cases with the city Fiscal's Office of Manila, five (5) for estafa thru falsification of commercial document and one (1) for violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code, so much so that as was to be expected, all six (6) cases were dismissed, with one of the investigating fiscals, Asst. Fiscal de Guia, commenting in one case that, "Indeed, the haphazard way this case was investigated is evident. Evident likewise is the flurry

and haste in the filing of this case against respondent Tobias," there can be no mistaking that defendants would not but be motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to plaintiff.

x x x

[RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 235-236].

In addition to the observations made by the trial court, the Court finds it significant that the criminal complaints were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case filed by Tobias against petitioners. This explains the haste in which the complaints were filed, which the trial court earlier noted. But petitioners, to prove their good faith, point to the fact that only six complaints were filed against Tobias when they could have allegedly filed one hundred cases, considering the number of anomalous transactions committed against GLOBE MACKAY. However, petitioners' good faith is belied by the threat made by Hendry after the filing of the first complaint that one hundred more cases would be filed against Tobias. In effect, the possible filing of one hundred more cases was made to hang like the sword of Damocles over the head of Tobias. In fine, considering the haste in which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias.

Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive. In the complaint filed against petitioners, Tobias prayed for the following: one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) as actual damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; eight hundred thousand pesos (P800,000.00) as moral damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees; and costs. The trial court, after making a computation of the damages incurred by Tobias [See RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 154-1551, awarded him the following: eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages; two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages; twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages; thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees; and, costs. It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty of committing several actionable tortious acts, i.e., the abusive manner in which they dismissed Tobias from work including the baseless imputation of guilt and the harassment during the investigations; the defamatory language heaped on Tobias as well as the scornful remark on Filipinos; the poison letter sent to RETELCO which resulted in Tobias' loss of possible employment; and, the malicious filing of the criminal complaints. Considering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias was reasonable under the circumstances.

Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle of damnum absqueinjuria. It is argued that "[t]he only probable actual damage that plaintiff (private respondent herein) could have suffered was a direct result of his having been dismissed from his employment, which was a valid and legal

act of the defendants-appellants (petitioners herein).lâwphî1.ñèt " [Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 18].

According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable [Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-47207, September 25, 1980, 100 SCRA 197; See also Gilchrist v. Cuddy 29 Phil, 542 (1915); The Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-18805, August 14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987]. This principle finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.

Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already ruled in Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964, 12 SCRA 648, 653, that [p]er express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code." Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no error in awarding moral damages to Tobias.

Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. Although Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence," the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L- 28589, January 8, 1973, 49 SCRA 1, ruled that if gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. As in the Zuluetacase, the nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 82146 January 22, 1990

EULOGIO OCCENA, petitioner, vs.HON. PEDRO M. ICAMINA, Presiding Judge, Branch X of the Regional Trial Court Sixth Judicial Region, San Jose, Antique; THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Honorable

FERNAN, C.J.:

On May 31, 1979, herein petitioner Eulogio Occena instituted before the Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sibalom, San Remigio — Belison, Province of Antique, Criminal Case No. 1717, a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against herein private respondent Cristina Vegafria for allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously uttering the following insulting words and statements: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas," which, freely translated, mean: "You are a foolish Barangay Captain, ignoramus, traitor, tyrant, Judas" and other words and statements of similar import which caused great and irreparable damage and injury to his person and honor.

Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued, at which petitioner, without reserving his right to file a separate civil action for damages actively intervened thru a private prosecutor.

After trial, private respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight Oral Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No damages were awarded to petitioner in view of the trial court's opinion that "the facts and circumstances of the case as adduced by the evidence do not warrant the awarding of moral damages." 1

Disagreeing, petitioner sought relief from the Regional Trial Court, which in a decision dated March 16, 1987 disposed of petitioner's appeal as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the civil aspect of the lower court's decision of April 20, 1981 subject of this appeal, for lack of merit, is hereby DENIED.

After the decision shall have become final, remand the records of this case to the court of origin, Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sibalom, San Remigio-Belison, Antique, for the execution of its decision on the criminal aspect.

SO ORDERED. 2

Petitioner is now before us by way of a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul the RTC decision for being contrary to Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code providing that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable, and Article 2219 of the New Civil Code providing that moral damages may be recovered in

libel, slander or any other form of defamation. He submits that public respondent RTC erred in relying on the cases ofRoa vs. de la Cruz, 107 Phil. 10 and Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et al., 91 Phil. 672 cited therein. He differentiates said cases from the case at bar by saying that in the case of Roa, the decision of the trial court had become final before Maria C. Roa instituted a civil action for damages; whereas in the instant case, the decision of the trial court has not yet become final by reason of the timely appeal interposed by him and no civil action for damages has been instituted by petitioner against private respondent for the same cause. Tan, on the other hand, contemplates of two actions, one criminal and one civil, and the prosecution of the criminal case had resulted in the acquittal of the accused, which is not the situation here where the civil aspect was impliedly instituted with the criminal action in accordance with Section 1, Rule 111, of the Rules of Court.

Private respondent for her part argues that the decision of the trial court carries with it the final adjudication of her civil liability. Since petitioner chose to actively intervene in the criminal action without reserving his right to file a separate civil action for damages, he assumed the risk that in the event he failed to recover damages he cannot appeal from the decision of the lower court.

We find merit in the petition.

The issues confronting us in the instant petition is whether or not the decision of the Second Municipal Trial Court of Sibalom, San-Remigio-Belison, Province of Antique constitutes the final adjudication on the merits of private respondent's civil liability; and whether or not petitioner is entitled to an award of damages arising from the remarks uttered by private respondent and found by the trial court to be defamatory.

The decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court as affirmed by the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 1709 cannot be considered as a final adjudication on the civil liability of private respondent simply because said decision has not yet become final due to the timely appeal filed by petitioner with respect to the civil liability of the accused in said case. It was only the unappealed criminal aspect of the case which has become final.

In the case of People vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287, we categorically stated that from a judgment convicting the accused, two (2) appeals may, accordingly, be taken. The accused may seek a review of said judgment, as regards both civil and criminal actions; while the complainant may appeal with respect only to the civil action, either because the lower court has refused to award damages or because the award made is unsatisfactory to him. The right of either to appeal or not to appeal in the event of conviction of the accused is not dependent upon the other. Thus, private respondent's theory that in actively intervening in the criminal action, petitioner waived his right to appeal from the decision that may be rendered therein, is incorrect and inaccurate. Petitioner may, as he did, appeal from the decision on the civil aspect which is deemed instituted with the criminal action and such appeal, timely taken, prevents the decision on the civil liability from attaining finality.

We tackle the second issue by determining the basis of civil liability arising from crime. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses are governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "(E)very person criminally liable for a

felony is also civilly liable," in relation to Article 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict, the provisions for independent civil actions in the Chapter on Human Relations and the provisions regulating damages, also found in the Civil Code.

Underlying the legal principle that a person who is criminally liable is also civilly liable is the view that from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has dual character: (1) as an offense against the state because of the disturbance of the social order; and (2) as an offense against the private person injured by the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime. 3 In the ultimate analysis, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentional or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. 4

In the case at bar, private respondent was found guilty of slight oral defamation and sentenced to a fine of P50.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, but no civil liability arising from the felonious act of the accused was adjudged. This is erroneous. As a general rule, a person who is found to be criminally liable offends two (2) entities: the state or society in which he lives and the individual member of the society or private person who was injured or damaged by the punishable act or omission. The offense of which private respondent was found guilty is not one of those felonies where no civil liability results because either there is no offended party or no damage was caused to a private person. There is here an offended party, whose main contention precisely is that he suffered damages in view of the defamatory words and statements uttered by private respondent, in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral damages and the further sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) as exemplary damages.

Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation This provision of law establishes the right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation. The offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary damages.

It must be remembered that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. And malice may be inferred from the style and tone of publication 5 subject to certain exceptions which are not present in the case at bar.

Calling petitioner who was a barangay captain an ignoramus, traitor, tyrant and Judas is clearly an imputation of defects in petitioner's character sufficient to cause him embarrassment and social humiliation. Petitioner testified to the feelings of shame and anguish he suffered as a result of the incident complained of. 6 It is patently error for the trial court to overlook this vital piece of evidence and to conclude that the "facts and circumstances of the case as adduced by the evidence do not warrant the awarding of moral damages." Having misapprehended the facts, the trial court's findings with respect thereto is not conclusive upon us.

From the evidence presented, we rule that for the injury to his feelings and reputation, being a barangay captain, petitioner is entitled to moral damages in the sum of P5,000.00 and a further sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED and private respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages and another P5,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-17396             May 30, 1962

CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover moral, compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of P94,000.00 exclusive of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.

Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint, set up as a defense that the facts alleged therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.

After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a love affair with one Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman, being a married man himself, declared that defendant cannot be held liable for moral damages it appearing that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant, being aware of his marital status, deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection. So it rendered decision dismissing the complaint.1äwphï1.ñët

Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground that the issues involved are purely of law.

The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in the

town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged love notes with each other the contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for each other but also the extent to which they had carried their relationship. The rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless.

Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at 54-B España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After she left, her brothers and sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone. However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on a small slip of paper approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be that of defendant's. In English it reads:

Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month and we will have a date on the 14th, that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.

Reply

Love

The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but up to the present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts.

The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides:

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that defendant, being a married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. But in spite of the fact that plaintiffs have clearly established that in illicit affair was carried on between defendant and Lolita which caused great damage to the name and reputation of plaintiffs who are her parents, brothers and sisters, the trial court considered their complaint not actionable for the reason that they failed to prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection Thus, the trial court said: "In the absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume that it was the defendant who deliberately induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties and sometimes inexplicable mysteries of the human emotions. It is a possibility that the defendant and Lolita simply fell in love with each other, not only without any desire on their part, but also against their better judgment and in full consciousness of what it will bring to both of them. This is specially so with respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling in love with defendant who is a married man."

We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.

G.R. No. 76487 November 9, 1990

HEIRS OF JOHN Z. SYCIP NAMELY NATIVIDAD D. SYCIP, JOSE SYCIP, JOHN SYCIP, JR., ALFONSO SYCIP ROSE II, MARIE NATIVIDAD D. SYCIP, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, MELENCIO YU AND TALINANAP MATUALAGA respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the September 22, 1986 decision ** of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 69000 entitled "Melencio Yu, et al. v. Heirs of John Z. Sycip" affirming the decision *** of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I dated April 22, 1982 in Civil Case No. 1291 which, among others, adjudged private respondents Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga as the registered absolute owners of Lot No. 4 and ordered the petitioner to deliver to the private respondents the property in question and to pay the attorney's fees.

The decretal portion of the appealed decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed with costs againsts defendant-appellants.

SO ORDERED. (p. 50, Rollo)

The antecedent facts of the case as found by the appellate court are as follows:

The plaintiffs-spouses are native muslims. Prior to 1952, Talinanap Matualaga bought a parcel of land with an area of 54.4980 hectares more or less, situated at Makar, General Santos City (using the money given to her by her parents) from vendors Cosin Bentaib and Hadji Abdaua Mohamad. The land was, however, surveyed in the name of Bangon Yu (father of plaintiff Melencio Yu) on June 14 to 16, 1952 by private surveyor Justino Mendoza which was approved by the Director of Lands on March 4, 1953. On September 11 to 12, 1953, the land was subdivided into five (5) lots in another survey conducted and executed by Justino Mendoza, and approved by the Director of Lands on July 1, 1954. The subdivision was as follows: Lot No. 1 for Bengon Yu; Lot No. 2 for Melencio Yu; Lot No. 3 for Dominga Pinagawang; Lot No. 4 for Talinanap Matualaga and Lot No. 5 for Ison Yu (the brother of plaintiff Melencio Yu). (Exh. "A")

Melencio Yu, together with his wife, Talinanap Matualaga filed on December 21, their respective Free Patent Application for both Lot Nos. 4 and 2. On April 18, 1961, the approval of the Director of Lands of the Free Patent Application, Free Patent No. V-178889 was issued on June 22, 1961 by authority of the President of the Philippines (Exh. "A"). Upon transmittal to the Register of Deeds on July 17, 1961, the latter issued to Melencio Yu, married to Talinanap Matualaga, Original Certificate of Title No. (C-14496) (P-523) on August 23, 1961 (Exh. "B"), "B-1" and "BB"). The owner's copy of said title, however, was not received by the patentee Melencio Yu because the same was given to defendant John Z. Sycip (now deceased).

In 1958, on account of jealousy, Talinanap Matualaga left her husband at Tocanabago, General Santos, South Cotabato, where they had a house in the land in question since their marriage and lived with her parents at Baluan, Cotabato. For the same period, Melencio Yu lived in Tupi South Cotabato. They reconciled, however, in 1963 and since then lived together in Buluan.

Upon their reconciliation, however, Melencio Yu asked his wife if a certain Alfonso Non had approached her regarding the sale of their land to John Sycip. Talinanap Matualaga answered in the negative and further said that she never executed any instrument conveying her property to anyone. Melencio Yu then explained that while they were separated, Alfonso Non approached him and told him that there was a buyer interested in their land at a price of P200.00 per hectare. Melencio told Non that the land belonged to his wife as her paraphernal property, hence, he did not have authority to sell the same. Alfonso Non, however, convinced Melencio that if he would

only sign the documents which Non had prepared then Non will secure the signature of Talinanap in Buluan, and if Non fails to get Talinanap's signature, then Melencio's signature will be null and void. With such understanding, Melencio signed the "Agreement of Transfer of Rights and Deed of Sale" (Exh. "B") and the "Quitclaim Deed" (Exh. "D") without receiving any consideration therefor. It turned out that the deeds involved the sale of the whole parcel of land consisting of more than 54 hectares in favor of John Sycip for a consideration of P9,500.00.

By reason of these information, the spouses sought the assistance of the Commission on National Integration of Southern Mindanao office which informed them that their original certificate of titles were taken and delivered to John Sycip by virtue of the sale documents in question.

Plaintiffs demanded the return of their land to them and the declaration of nullity of the documents in question. (pp. 45-46, Rollo)

On December 6, 1986, private respondents filed a complaint against John Z. Sycip, (later substituted by his heirs upon his death) petitioners herein, before the trial court, docketed as Civil Case No. 969 for the Declaration of Nullity of Document and Recovery of Possession of Real Property with a prayer for a writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages, with Lot No. 4 Psu-135740-Amd, as the subject matter which was adjacent to Lot No. 2, Psu-135740-Amd. (Rollo, p. 149). On March 2, 1971 the trial court upheld the right of the private respondents to be restored to the possession of the aforesaid parcel of land by declaring null and void ab initio or inexistent all documents of conveyance of sale by the petitioners. On appeal, the appellate court in its decision dated October 2, 1978 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Said decision became final and executory and the private respondents were restored to the possession of Lot No. 4 Psu-135740-Amd by virtue of the writ of execution issued by the trial court. (Rollo, p. 150)

Meanwhile, on May 2, 1972, private respondents filed another complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato Branch I for the Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Recovery of Possession of Real Property with a prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages docketed as Civil Case No. 1291, this time it was Lot No. 2 Psu-135740-Amd as the subject matter of the aforesaid case.

On June 21, 1973, the trial court issued its order dismissing the case on the ground of prescription (Rollo, p. 95). It was on July 18, 1973 that private respondents filed their urgent motion for reconsideration to set aside the order dated June 21, 1973 which was denied on October 1, 1973 (Rollo, p. 146).

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, Special Eighth Division, rendered its decision in favor of private respondents thereby setting aside the order of dismissal of the trial court dated June 21, 1973 and remanding the case for further proceedings (Rollo, p. 147).

On April 22, 1981, the trial court in its order adopted the evidence presented in Civil Case No. 969 both oral and documentary and reversed its Order dated June 21, 1973 dismissing the complaint and declared private respondent as the registered and absolute owners of the land in question. (Rollo, p. 147; Record on Appeal p. 71)

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on June 5, 1981. (Rollo, p. 96)

Hence, this petition for review before Us.

The pivotal issue of this case is whether or not the sale of lot No. 2 Psu-135740-Amd is null and void ab initio.

The petition is devoid of merit.

It is not disputed that the private respondents are Muslims who belong to the cultural minority or non-Christian Filipinos as members of the Maguindanao Tribe. Any transaction, involving real property with them is governed by the provisions of Sections 145 and 146 of the Revised Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu, Section 120 of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141), as amended, and Republic Act No. 3872, further amending the Public Land Act.

Section 145 of the Revised Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu provides that any transaction involving real property with said non-Christian tribes shall bear the approval of the provincial governor wherein the same was executed or of his representative duly authorized in writing for such purpose, indorsed upon it. Section 146 of the same code considers every contract or agreement made in violation of Section 145 as null and void. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 120 of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) provides that conveyances and encumbrances made by persons belonging to the so-called "non-Christian tribes" shall be valid if the person making the conveyance or encumbrance is able to read and can understand the language in which the instrument of conveyance or encumbrance is written. Conveyances and encumbrances made by illiterate non-Christians shall not be valid unless duly approved by the Commissioner of Mindanao and Sulu.

Republic Act No. 3872 provides that conveyances and encumbrances made by illiterate non-Christian or literate non-Christians where the instrument of conveyance or encumbrance is in a language not understood by said literate non-Christians shall not be valid unless duly approved by the Chairman of the Commission on National Integration.

All the documents declared null and void or inexistent by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals were found to have been falsified in Civil Case No. 969; without consideration and more importantly without approval by any of the following officials: the Provincial Governor of Cotabato, Commissioner of Mindanao and Sulu, or the Chairman of the Commission on National Integration and therefore nun and void.

With the resolution of this issue there appears to be no necessity to dwell on the other issues of this case.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-46061 November 14, 1984

ST. LOUIS REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and CONRADO J. ARAMIL, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

This case is about the recovery of damages for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where Saint Louis Realty Corporation misrepresented that the house of Doctor Conrado J. Aramil belonged to Arcadio S. Arcadio.

St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission of Arcadio S. Arcadio (but without permission of Doctor Aramil) in the issue of the Sunday Times of December 15, 1968 an advertisement with the heading "WHERE THE HEART IS". Below that heading was the photograph of the residence of Doctor Aramil and theArcadio family and then below the photograph was the following write-up:

Home is where the heart is. And the hearts of MR. AND MRS. ARCADIO S. ARCADIO and their family have been captured by BROOKSIDE HILLS. They used to rent a small 2-bedroom house in a cramped neighborhood, sadly inadequate and unwholesome for the needs of a large family. They dream(ed) of a more pleasant place free from the din and dust of city life yet near all facilities. Plans took shape when they heard of BROOKSIDE HILLS. With thrift and determination, they bought a lot and built their dream house ... for P31,000. The Arcadios are now part of the friendly, thriving community of BROOKSIDE HILLS... a beautiful first-class subdivision planned for wholesome family living.

The same advertisement appeared in the Sunday Times dated January 5, 1969. Doctor Aramil a neuropsychiatrist and a member of the faculty of the U. E. Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital, noticed the mistake. On that same date, he wrote St. Louis Realty the following letter of protest:

Dear Sirs:

This is anent to your advertisements appearing in the December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969 issues of the Sunday Times which boldly depicted my house at the above-mentioned address and

implying that it belonged to another person. I am not aware of any permission or authority on my partfor the use of my house for such publicity.

This unauthorized use of my house for your promotional gain and much more the apparent distortions therein are I believe not only transgression to my private property but also damaging to my prestige in the medical profession I have had invited in several occasions numerous medical colleagues, medical students and friends to my house and after reading your December 15 advertisement some of them have uttered some remarks purporting doubts as to my professional and personal integrity. Such sly remarks although in light vein as "it looks like your house," "how much are you renting from the Arcadios?", " like your wife portrayed in the papers as belonging to another husband," etc., have resulted in no little mental anguish on my part.

I have referred this matter to the Legal Panel of the Philippine Medical Association and their final advice is pending upon my submission of supporting ownership papers.

I will therefore be constrained to pursue court action against your corporation unless you could satisfactorily explain this matter within a week upon receipt of this letter.

The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of St. Louis Realty in charge of advertising. He stopped publication of the advertisement. He contacted Doctor Aramil and offered his apologies. However, no rectification or apology was published.

On February 20, 1969, Aramil's counsel demanded from St. Louis Realty actual, moral and exemplary damages of P110,000 (Exh. D). In its answer dated March 10, St. Louis Realty claimed that there was an honest mistake and that if Aramil so desired, rectification would be published in the Manila Times (Exh. 3).

It published in the issue of the Manila Times of March 18, 1969 a new advertisement with the Arcadio family and their real house. But it did not publish any apology to Doctor Aramil and an explanation of the error.

On March 29, Aramil filed his complaint for damages. St. Louis Realty published in the issue of the Manila Times of April 15, 1969 the following "NOTICE OF RECTIFICATION" in a space 4 by 3 inches:

This will serve as a notice that our print ad 'Where the Heart is' which appeared in the Manila Timesissue of March 18, 1969 is a rectification of the same ad that appeared in the Manila Times issues rectification of the same ad that appeal of December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969 wherein a photo of the house of another Brookside Homeowner (Dr. Aramil-private respondent) was

mistakenly used as a background for the featured homeowner's the Arcadio family.

The ad of March 18, 1969 shows the Arcadio family with their real house in the background, as was intended all along.

Judge Jose M. Leuterio observed that St. Louis Realty should have immediately published a rectification and apology. He found that as a result of St. Louis Realty's mistake, magnified by its utter lack of sincerity, Doctor Aramil suffered mental anguish and his income was reduced by about P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Moreover, there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy (Art. 26, Civil Code).

The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees. St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Appellate Court affirmed that judgment, with Acting Presiding Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan as ponente, and Justices Sixto A. Domondon and Samuel F. Reyes concurring.

The Appellate Court reasoned out that St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps.

In this appeal, St. Louis Realty contends that the Appellate Court ignored certain facts and resorted to surmises and conjectures. This contention is unwarranted. The Appellate Court adopted the facts found by the trial court. Those factual findings are binding on this Court.

St. Louis Realty also contends that the decision is contrary to law and that the case was decided in a way not in conformity with the rulings of this Court. It argues that the case is not covered by article 26 which provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons". "Prying into the privacy of another's residence" and "meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another" and "similar acts", "though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief".

The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code. Article 2219 allows moral damages for acts and actions mentioned in Article 26. As lengthily explained by Justice Gatmaitan, the acts and omissions of the firm fan under Article 26.

St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".

Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-54598 April 15, 1988

JOSE B. LEDESMA, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses PACIFICO DELMO and SANCHA DELMO (as private respondents),respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals which afirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, adjudging the petitioner, who was then the President of the West Visayas College liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for failure to graduate a student with honors.

The facts are not disputed.

An organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by some students of the West Visayas College. They elected the late Violets Delmo as the treasurer. In that capacity, Delmo extended loans from the funds of the club to some of the students of the school. "the petitioner claims that the said act of extending loans was against school rules and regulations. Thus, the petitioner, as President of the School, sent a letter to Delmo informing her that she was being dropped from the membership of the club and that she would not be a candidate for any award or citation from the school.

Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the decision but the petitioner denied it. Delmo, thus, appealed to the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools.

The Director after due investigation, rendered a decison on April 13, 1966 which provided:

Records of the preliminary investigation conducted by one of the legal officers of this Office disclosed the following: That Violeta Delmo was the treasurer of the Student Leadership Club, an exclusive student organization; that pursuant to Article IX of the of the Constitution and By-Laws of the club, it passed Resolution No. 2, authorizing the treasurer to disburse funds of the Club to student for financial aid and other humanitarian purposes; that in

compliance with said resolution and as treasurer of the Club, Violeta Delmo extended loans to some officers and members of the Club upon proper application duly approved by the majority of the members of the Executive Board; and that upon receiving the report from Mr. Jesse Dagoon, adviser of the funds of the Club, that Office conducted an investigation on the matter and having been convinced of the guilt of Violets Delmo and the other officers and members of the Club, that Office rendered the order or decision in question. In justifying that Office's order or decision, it is contended that approval by that Office of the Constitution and By-Laws of the Club is necessary for its effectivity and validity and since it was never submitted to that Office, the Club had no valid constitution and By-Laws and that as a consequence, Resolution No. 2 which was passed based on the Constitution and By-Laws- is without any force and effect and the treasurer, Violeta Delmo, who extended loans to some officers and members of the Club pursuant thereto are illegal (sic), hence, she and the other students involved are deemed guilty of misappropriating the funds of the Club. On the other hand, Raclito Castaneda, Nestor Golez and Violeta Delmo, President, Secretary and Treasurer of the Club, respectively, testified that the Club had adopted its Constitution and By-Laws in a meeting held last October 3, 1965, and that pursuant to Article I of said Constitution and By-Laws, the majority of the members of the Executive Board passed Resolution No. 2, which resolution became the basis for the extension on of loans to some officers and members of the Club, that the Club honestly believed that its Constitution and By-Laws has been approved by the superintendent because the adviser of the Club, Mr. Jesse Dagoon, assured the President of the Club that he will cause the approval of the Constitution and By-Laws by the Superintendent; the officers of the Club have been inducted to office on October 9,1965 by the Superintendent and that the Club had been likewise allowed to cosponsor the Education Week Celebration.

After a careful study of the records, this Office sustains the action taken by the Superintendent in penalizing the adviser of the Club as well as the officers and members thereof by dropping them from membership therein. However, this Office is convinced that Violets M. Delmo had acted in good faith, in her capacity as Club Treasurer, in extending loans to the officers and members of the Student partnership Club. Resolution No. 2 authorizing the Club treasurer to discharge finds to students in need of financial assistance and other humanitarian purposes had been approved by the Club adviser, Mr. Jesse Dagoon, with the notation that approval was given in his capacity as adviser of the Club and extension of the Superintendent's personality. Aside from misleading the officers and members of the Club, Mr. Dagoon, had unsatisfactorily explained why he failed to give the Constitution and By-Laws of the Club to the Superintendent for approval despite his assurance to the Club president that he would do so. With this finding of negligence on the part of the Club adviser, not to mention laxity in

the performance of his duties as such, this Office considers as too severe and unwarranted that portion of the questioned order stating that Violeta Delmo "shall not be a candidate for any award or citation from this school or any organization in this school." Violeta Delmo, it is noted, has been a consistent full scholar of the school and she alone has maintained her scholarship. The decision in question would, therefore, set at naught all her sacrifice and frustrate her dreams of graduating with honors in this year's commencement exercises.

In view of all the foregoing, this Office believes and so holds and hereby directs that appellant Violeta. M. Delmo, and for that matter all other Club members or officers involved in this case, be not deprived of any award, citation or honor from the school, if they are otherwise entitled thereto. (Rollo, pp. 28-30)

On April 27, 1966, the petitioner received by mail the decision of the Director and all the records of the case. On the same day, petitioner received a telegram stating the following:

"AIRMAIL RECORDS DELMO CASE MISSENT THAT OFFICE"

The Director asked for the return only of the records but the petitioner allegedly mistook the telegram as ordering him to also send the decision back. On the same day, he returned by mail all the records plus the decision of the Director to the Bureau of Public Schools.

The next day, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director order him to furnish Delmo with a copy of the decision. The petitioner, in turn, sent a night letter to the Director informing the latter that he had sent the decision back and that he had not retained a copy thereof..

On May 3, 1966, the day of the graduation, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director ordering him not to deprive Delmo of any honors due her. As it was impossible by this time to include Delmo's name in the program as one of the honor students, the petitioner let her graduate as a plain student instead of being awarded the Latin honor of Magna Cum Laude.

To delay the matter further, the petitioner on May 5, 1966, wrote the Director for a reconsideration of the latters" decision because he believed that Delmo should not be allowed to graduate with honors. The Director denied the petitioner's request.

On July 12, 1966, the petitioner finally instructed the Registrar of the school to enter into the scholastic records of Delmo the honor, "Magna Cum Laude."

On July 30, 1966, Delmo, then a minor, was joined by her parents in flag action for damages against the petitioner. During the pendency of the action, however, Delmo passed away, and thus, an Amended and Supplemental Complaint was filed by her parents as her sole and only heirs.

The trial court after hearing rendered judgment against the petitioner and in favor of the spouses Delmo. The court said:

Let us go to specific badges of the defendants (now petitioners) bad faith. Per investigation of Violeta Delmo's appeal to Director Vitaliano Bernardino of the Bureau of Public Schools (Exhibit L it was the defendant who inducted the officers of the Student Leadership Club on October 9, 1965. In fact the Club was allowed to cosponsor the Education Week Celebration. (Exh. "L"). If the defendant he not approve of the constitution and by-laws of the Club, why did he induct the officers into office and allow the Club to sponsor the Education Week Celebration"? It was through his own act that the students were misled to do as they did. Coupled with the defendants tacit recognition of the Club was the assurance of Mr. Jemm Dagoon, Club Adviser, who made the students believe that he was acting as an extension of Mr. Ledesma's personality. (Exhibit "L").

Another badge of the defendan'ts want of good faith is the fact that, although, he kaew as early as April 27,1966 that per on of r Bernardino, Exhibit "L," he was directed to give honors to Miss Delmo, he kept Id information to . He told the Court that he knew that the letter of Director Bernardino directed him not to deprive Miss Delmo the honors due her, but she (sic) says that he has not finished reading the letter-decision, Exhibit "L," of Director Bernardino 0, him to give honors to Miss Delmo. (Tsn, Feb. 5, 1974, testimony of Mr. Ledesma, pp. .33-35). It could not be true that he has not finished reading the letter-decision, Exh. "L," because said letter consisted of only three pages, and the portion which directed that Miss Delmo "be not deprived of any award, citation or honor from the school, if otherwise entitled thereto is found at the last paragraph of the same. How did he know the last paragraph if he did not read the letter.

Defendants actuations regarding Miss Delmo's cam had been one of bias and prejudice. When his action would favor him, he was deliberate and aspect to the utter prejudice and detriment of Miss Delmo. Thus, although, as early as April 27, 1966, he knew of the exoneration of Miss Delino by Director Bernardino, he withheld the information from Miss Delmo. This is eloquently dramatized by Exh. "11" and Exh. "13" On April 29,1966, Director Bernardino cabled him to furnish Violeta Delmo copy of the Decision, Exh. "L," but instead of informing Miss Delmo about the decision, since he said he mailed back the decision on April 28,1966, he sent a night letter on April 29,1966, to Director Bernardino, informing the latter that he had returned the decision (Exh. "l3"), together with the record. Why a night letter when the matter was of utmost urgency to the parties in the case, because graduation day was only four days ahead? An examination of the telegrams sent by the defendant shows that he had been sending ordinary telegram and not night letters. (Exh. "5", Exhibit "7"). At least, if the defendant could not furnish a copy of the

decision, (Exh. "L"), to Miss Delmo, he should have told her about it or that Miss Delmo's honors and citation in the commencement be announced or indicated. But Mr. Ledesma is one who cannot admit a mistake. Very ungentlemanly this is home out by his own testimony despite his knowledge that his decision to deprive Miss Delmo of honors due to her was overturned by Director Bernardino, he on his wrong belief. To quote the defendant,1 believed that she did not deserve those honors(Tsn Feb. 5, 1974, p. 43,Empasized supplied). Despite the telegram of Director Bernardino which the defendant received hours before the commencement executory on May 3-4,1966, he did not obey Director Bernardino because he said in his testimony that he would be embarrassment . Tan Feb 5,1974, P. 46). Evidently, he knew only his embarrassment and not that of r Bernardino whose order was being flagrantly and wantonly disregarded by bim And certainly, not the least of Miss Delmo's embarrassment. His acts speak eloquently of ho bad faith and unjust of mindwarped by his delicate sensitivity for having been challenged by Miss Delmo, a mere student.

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Finally the defendant's behaviour relative to Miss s case smacks of contemptuous arrogance, oppression and abuse of power. Come to think of it. He refused to obey the directive of Be o and instead, chose to feign ignorance of it." (Reward on Appeal, p. 72-76).

The trial court awarded P20,000.00 to the estate of Violeta Delmo and P10,000.00 to her parents for moral damages; P5,000.00 for nominal damages to Violeta's estate; exemplary damages of P10,000.00 and P2,000.00 attorney's fees.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.

The issues raised in this petition can be reduced to the sole question of whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27 of the New Civil Code.

We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts should be reversed. It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was brought about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper. As we have affirmed in the case of (Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440, 448):

There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of defendant's wrongly act or omission." (People v. Baylon, 129 SCRA 62 (1984).

The Solicitor-General tries to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate omission to inform Miss Delmo by stating that it was not the duty of the petitioner to furnish her a copy of the Director's decision. Granting this to be true, it was nevertheless the petitioner's duty to enforce the said decision. He could have done so considering that he received the decision on April 27, 1966 and even though he sent it back with the records of the case, he undoubtedly read the whole of it which consisted of only three pages. Moreover, the petitioner should have had the decency to meet with Mr. Delmo, the girl's father, and inform the latter, at the very least of the decision. This, the petitioner likewise failed to do, and not without the attendant bad faith which the appellate court correctly pointed out in its decision, to wit:

Third, assuming that defendant could not furnish Miss Delmo of a copy of the decision, he could have used his discretion and plain common sense by informing her about it or he could have directed the inclusion of Miss Delmo's honor in the printed commencement program or announced it during the commencement exercises.

Fourth, defendant despite receipt of the telegram of Director Benardino hours before the commencement exercises on May 3-4, 1966, disobeyed his superior by refusing to give the honors due Miss Delmo with a lame excuse that he would be embarrassed if he did so, to the prejudice of and in complete disregard of Miss Delmo's rights.

Fifth, defendant did not even extend the courtesy of meeting Mr. Pacifico Delmo, father of Miss Delmo, who tried several times to see defendant in his office thus Mr. Delmo suffered extreme disappointment and humiliation.

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Defendant, being a public officer should have acted with circumspection and due regard to the rights of Miss Delmo. Inasmuch as he exceeded the scope of his authority by defiantly disobeying the lawful directive of his superior, Director Bernardino, defendant is liable for damages in his personal capacity. . . . (Rollo, pp- 57-58)

Based on the undisputed facts, exemplary damages are also in order. In the same case of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., supra., at p. 450, we ruled:

The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide an example or correction for the public good (Lopez, et al. v. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431).

However, we do not deem it appropriate to award the spouses Delmo damages in the amount of P10,000.00 in their individual capacity, separately from and in addition to what they are already entitled to as sole heirs of the deceased Violeta Delmo. Thus, the

decision is modified insofar as moral damages are awarded to the spouses in their own behalf.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the slight modification as stated in the preceding paragraph. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988

FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner, vs.HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.

The records disclose the following facts of the case.

At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.

Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house about 50 meters away from where the incident happened. Emilio then went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked for barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla had no available medicine.

After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated September 28, 1981) which reads:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier, 20 years of age, married, residing at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and found the following:

1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser palmar prominence, right.

As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This wound was presented to me only for medico-legal examination, as it was already treated by the other doctor. (p. 88, Original Records)

Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police blotter (Exhibit A), to wit:

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Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties appeared before this Station accompanied by brgy. councilman Felipe Solis and settled their case amicably, for they are neighbors and close relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano who shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment, and promising to him and to this Office that this will never be repeated anymore and not to harbour any grudge against each other. (p. 87, Original Records.)

Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the additional P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house in the presence of barangay captain Soliven.

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.

On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The medical findings of Dr. Exconde are as follows:

Date Diagnosis

11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus

adm. at DX TETANUS

1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi-

#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile

11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessa-tion of respiration and HR after muscular spasm. 02 inhalation administered. Ambo bag resuscitation and cardiac massage done but to no avail.Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M.PMC done and cadaver brought home by relatives. (p. 100, Original Records)

In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.

Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view of the nature of his penalty.

The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant.

The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for new trial was based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:

That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to the present having been re-elected to such position in the last barangay elections on May 17, 1982;

That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon that swept Pangasinan and other places of Central Luzon including San Fabian, a town of said province;

That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued irrigation dam which irrigates the ricefields of San Fabian were closed and/or controlled so much so that water and its flow to the canals and ditches were regulated and reduced;

That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to the canals and ditches which will bring water to the ricefields, the water in said canals and ditches became shallow which was suitable for catching mudfishes;

That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected, with my secretary Perfecto Jaravata;

That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late Marcelo Javier catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals with some companions;

That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to know that said Marcelo Javier died of tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)

The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.

In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.

The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).

The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm; that on November 14, 1981 which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition and that on the following day, November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.

Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was declared responsible for Javier's death. Thus, the appellate court said:

The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the deceased was wounded to the time of his death, which covers a period of 23 days does not deserve

serious consideration. True, that the deceased did not die right away from his wound, but the cause of his death was due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said wound which was in the process of healing got infected with tetanus which ultimately caused his death.

Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the victim suffered lockjaw because of the infection of the wound with tetanus. And there is no other way by which he could be infected with tetanus except through the wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently, the proximate cause of the victim's death was the wound which got infected with tetanus. And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C. People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072; People v. Cornel 78 Phil. 418).

Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November, 1980, is an afterthought, and a desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found himself in. If the wound had not yet healed, it is impossible to conceive that the deceased would be reckless enough to work with a disabled hand. (pp. 20-21, Rollo)

The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.

The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record.

In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following definition of proximate cause:

xxx xxx xxx

... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:

... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."And more

comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)

The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.

We look into the nature of tetanus-

The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.

Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.

Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency.

Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death.

Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease.

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).

Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus

may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)

It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At the very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).

We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the recent case ofPeople v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:

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... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).

The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as follows:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability

is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given use to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.

This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnity the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?

"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice-a cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged."

The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial court to P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the

petitioner was not thoroughly examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so minded.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

ABERCA, ET AL. VS VER, ET ALGR No. 69866

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION; DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS; MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES LIABLE. — Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. — The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners’ right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; HABEAS CORPUS; SUSPENSION OF PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT DOES NOT VALIDATE ILLEGAL ARREST OR DETENTION. — The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

4. CIVIL LAW; INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION; DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS; DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR NOT APPLICABLE TO SUPERIOR OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR SUBORDINATES. — The doctrine of respondent superior is inapplicable to the case. We agree. The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONS RESPONSIBLE. — Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly" or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.

7. REMEDIAL LAW’ MOTION TO DISMISS; FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION, A GROUND; DETERMINED BY THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT. — A motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be based on what appears on the face of the complaint. To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered. For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.

8. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; AUTHORITY TO APPEAR FOR A PARTY, ASSUMED. — The authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be assumed, unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party concerned, which was never done in this case.

9. REMEDIAL LAW; COMPLAINT; DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT WITH RESPECT TO PARTIES WHOSE LAWYERS DID NOT SIGN THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintiffs. They needed no specific authority to do that. Thus, it was grave abuse on the part of respondent judge to take it upon himself to rule that the motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1953 dismissing the complaint was filed only by some of the plaintiffs, when by its very language it was clearly intended to be filed by and for the benefit of all of them. It is obvious that the respondent judge took umbrage under a contrived technicality to declare that the dismissal of the complaint had already become final with respect to some of the plaintiffs whose lawyers did not sign the motion for reconsideration. Such action tainted with legal infirmity cannot be sanctioned.

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CIVIL LAW; INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION; DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS; PERSONS COVERED. — All persons, be they public officers or employees, or members of the military or police force or private individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeat, violate or in any manner impede or impair the constitutional rights and civil liberties of another person, stand liable and may be sued in court for damages as provided in Art. 32 of the Civil Code.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR; NOT APPLICABLE TO OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR SUBORDINATES. — The case at bar rejects the automatic application of the principle of respondent superior or

command responsibility that would hold a superior officer jointly and severally accountable for damages, including moral and exemplary, with his subordinates who committed such transgressions.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPERIOR OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR GROSS NEGLIGENCE IN ABDICATION OF PROPER SUPERVISION OF SUBORDINATES. — The judgment gives the caveat that a superior officer must not abdicate is duty to properly supervise his subordinates for he runs the risk of being held responsible for gross negligence and of being held under the cited provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable with the tortfeasor.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — The rationale for this rule of law was best expressed by Brandeis in this wise: "In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes the law breaker, it breeds contempt for the law, it invites every man to become a law unto himself, it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of criminal law the end justifies the means . . . . would bring terrible retribution."

D E C I S I O N

This petition for certiorari presents vital issues not heretofore passed upon by this Court. It poses the question whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well.

This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence suits of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM), ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila." Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.

Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00; moral damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of

P3,000,000.00; and attorney’s fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00.

A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza, alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against the defendants. Opposition to said motion to dismiss was filed by plaintiffs Marco Palo, Danilo de la Fuente, Benjamin Sesgundo, Nel Etabag, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin on July 8, 1983, and by plaintiffs Edwin Lopez, Manuel Mario Guzman, Alan Jasminez, Nestor Bodino, Carlos Palma, Arturo Tabara, Joseph Olayer, Rodolfo Benosa, Belen Diaz Flores, Rogelio Aberca, Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Marcelino on July 21, 1983. On November 7, 1983, a Consolidated Reply was filed by defendants’ counsel.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Then, on November 8, 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 95, Judge Willelmo C. Fortun, Presiding, 1 issued a resolution granting the motion to dismiss. I sustained, lock, stock and barrel, the defendants’ contention (1) the plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) that assuming that the court can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties; and (3) that the complaint states no cause of action against defendants, since there is no allegation that the defendants named in the complaint confiscated plaintiffs’ purely personal properties in violation of their constitutional rights, and with the possible exception of Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Sergeant Bienvenido Balabo, committed acts of torture and maltreatment, or that the defendants had the duty to exercise direct supervision and control of their subordinates or that they had vicarious liability as employers under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court stated, "After a careful study of defendants’ arguments, the court finds the same to be meritorious and must, therefore, be granted. On the other hand, plaintiffs’ arguments in their opposition are lacking in merit."cralaw virtua1aw library

A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental motion for reconsideration was filed by the plaintiffs on November 18, 1983, and November 24, 1983, respectively. On December 9, 1983, the defendants filed a comment on the aforesaid motion of plaintiffs, furnishing a copy thereof to the attorneys of all the plaintiffs, namely, Attys. Jose W. Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Augusto Sanchez, Antonio L. Rosales, Pedro B. Ella, Jr., Arno V. Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas Aquino.

On December 15, 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting himself from further proceeding in the case and leaving the resolution of the motion to set aside the order of dismissal to Judge Lising, "to preclude any suspicion that he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the] aforesaid pending motion with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge and to put an end to plaintiffs assertion that the undersigned has no authority or jurisdiction to resolve said pending motion." This order prompted plaintiffs to file an amplificatory motion for reconsideration signed in the name of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG] of Mabini Legal Aid Committee, by Attys. Joker

P. Arroyo, Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad on April 12, 1984. On May 2, 1984, the defendants filed a comment on said amplificatory motion for reconsideration.

In an order dated May 11, 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising, Presiding, without acting on the motion to set aside order of November 8, 1983, issued an order, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It appearing from the records that, indeed, the following plaintiffs, Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente and Marco Palo, represented by counsel, Atty. Jose W. Diokno, Alan Jasminez, represented by counsel, Atty. Augusto Sanchez, Spouses Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, represented by counsel, Atty. Procopio Beltran, Alfredo Mansos, represented by counsel, Atty. Rene Sarmiento, and Rolando Salutin, represented by counsel, Atty. Efren Mercado, failed to file a motion to reconsider the Order of November 8, 1983, dismissing the complaint, nor interposed an appeal therefrom within the reglementary period, as prayed for by the defendants, said Order is now final against said plaintiffs."cralaw virtua1aw library

Assailing the said order of May 11, 1984, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on May 28, 1984, alleging that it was not true that plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin failed to file a motion to reconsider the order of November 8, 1983 dismissing the complaint, within the reglementary period. Plaintiffs claimed that the motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1983 and the amplificatory motion for reconsideration was filed for all the plaintiffs, although signed by only some of the lawyers.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

In its resolution of September 21, 1984, the respondent court dealt with both motions (1) to reconsider its order of May 11, 1984 declaring that with respect to certain plaintiffs, the resolution of November 8, 1983 had already become final, and (2) to set aside its resolution of November 8, 1983 granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss. In the dispositive portion of the order of September 21, 1984, the respondent court resolved:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) That the motion to set aside the order of finality, dated May 11, 1984, of the Resolution of dismissal of the complaint of plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin is denied for lack of merit;

(2) For lack of cause of action as against the following defendants, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Gen Fabian Ver

2. Col. Fidel Singson

3. Col. Rolando Abadilla

4. Lt. Col. Conrado Lantoria, Jr.

5. Col. Galileo Kintanar

6. Col. Panfilo Lacson

7. Capt. Danilo Pizaro

8. 1Lt Pedro Tango

9. Lt. Romeo Ricardo

10. Lt. Raul Bacalso

the motion to set aside and reconsider the Resolution of dismissal of the present action or complaint, dated November 8, 1983, is also denied; but in so far as it affects and refers to defendants, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo, and

2. Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba,

the motion to reconsider and set aside the Resolution of dismissal dated November 3, 1983 is granted and the Resolution of dismissal is, in this respect, reconsidered and modified."cralaw virtua1aw library

Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on March 15, 1985 seeking to annul and set aside the respondent court’s resolution of November 8, 1983, its order of May 11, 1984, and its resolution dated September 21, 1984. Respondents were required to comment on the petition, which it did on November 9, 1985. A reply was filed by petitioners on August 26, 1986.

We find the petition meritorious and decide to give it due course.

At the heart of petitioners’ complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

ARTICLE 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Freedom of religion;

(2) Freedom of speech;

(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;

(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

(5) Freedom of suffrage;

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

(9) The right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;

(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;

(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;

(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;

(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;

(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;

(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;

(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one’s self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;

(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and

(19) Freedom of access to the courts.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant’s act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate end distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield — borrowing the words of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee — to the law of

force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our commitment to democratic principles and to the rule of law compels us to reject the view which reduces law to nothing but the expression of the will of the predominant power in the community. "Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected by him who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now this respect implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we discover that life demands of us a certain residuum of sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which reason nevertheless controls." 2 

Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as public officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official duties or functions. In support of said contention, respondents maintain that —

"Respondents are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Their primary duty is to safeguard public safety and order. The Constitution no less provides that the President may call them "to prevent or supress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof." (Constitution, Article VII, Section 9).

On January 17, 1981, the President issued Proclamation No. 2045 lifting martial law but providing for the continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in view of the remaining dangers to the security of the nation. The proclamation also provided "that the call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion shall continue to be in force and effect."cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioners allege in their complaint that their causes of action proceed from respondent General Ver’s order to Task Force Makabansa to launch preemptive strikes against communist terrorist underground houses in Metro Manila. Petitioners claim that this order and its subsequent implementation by elements of the task force resulted in the violation of their constitutional rights against unlawful searches, seizures and arrest, rights to counsel and to silence, and the right to property and that, therefore, respondents Ver and the named members of the task force should be held liable for damages.

But, by launching a preemptive strike against communist terrorists, respondent members of the armed forces merely performed their official and constitutional duties. To allow petitioners to recover from respondents by way of damages for acts performed in the exercise of such duties run contrary to the policy considerations to shield respondents as public officers from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability (Aarlon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2731; Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 534), and upon the necessity of protecting the performance of governmental and public functions from being harassed unduly or constantly interrupted by private suits (McCallan v. State, 35 Cal. App. 605; Metran v. Paredes, 79 Phil. 819).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

x       x       x

The immunity of public officers from liability arising from the performance of their duties is now a settled jurisprudence (Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Zulueta v. Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 US 483; 40 L. Ed. 738, 16 S. Ct. 631; Barr v. Mateo, 360; Butz v. Economon, 438 US 478; 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, 98 S. Ct. 2894; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232; Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, supra; Miller v. de Leune, 602 F. 2d 198; Sami v. US, 617 F. 2d 755).

Respondents-defendants who merely obeyed the lawful orders of the President and his call for the suppression of the rebellion involving petitioners enjoy such immunity from suit." 3 

We find respondents’ invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties within the ambit of their powers. As held in Forbes, etc. v. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield: 4 

"No one can be held legally responsible in damages or otherwise for doing in a legal manner what he had authority, under the law, to do. Therefore, if the Governor-General had authority, under the law to deport or expel the defendants, and circumstances justifying the deportation and the method of carrying it out are left to him, then he cannot be held liable in damages for the exercise of this power. Moreover, if the courts are without authority to interfere in any manner, for the purpose of controlling or interferring with the exercise of the political powers vested in the chief executive authority of the Government, then it must follow that the courts cannot intervene for the purpose of declaring that he is liable in damages for the exercise of this authority."cralaw virtua1aw library

It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre-emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.

Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor. We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions and imperil their

very existence. What we are merely trying to say is that in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In the battle of competing ideologies, the struggle for the mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms. The linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or compromised, the struggle may well be abandoned.

We do not find merit in respondents’ suggestion that plaintiffs’ cause of action is barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Respondents contend that "Petitioners cannot circumvent the suspension of the privilege of the writ by resorting to a damage suit aimed at the same purpose - a judicial inquiry into the alleged illegality of their detention. While the main relief they ask by the present action is indemnification for alleged damages they suffered, their causes of action are inextricably based on the same claim of violations of their constitutional rights that they invoked in the habeas corpus case as grounds for release from detention. Were the petitioners allowed the present suit, the judicial inquiry barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ will take place. The net result is that what the courts cannot do, i.e. override the suspension ordered by the President, petitioners will be able to do by the mere expedient of altering the title of their action."cralaw virtua1aw library

We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners’ contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners’ right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized in P.D. No. 1755 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to its text:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year."cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners’ right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents’ confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.

However, we find it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue pressed upon us. On March 25, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 2, revoking Proclamation Nos. 2045 and 2045-A and lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The question therefore has become moot and academic.

This brings us to the crucial issue raised in this petition. May a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated?

Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent superior is inapplicable to the case. We agree. The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates.

Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly" or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.

By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution 5 acquires added meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.

In the case at bar, the trial court dropped defendants General Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Panfilo Lacson, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, 1st Lt. Pedro Tango, Lt. Romeo Ricardo and Lt. Ricardo Bacalso from the complaint on the assumption that under the law, they cannot be held responsible for the wrongful acts of their subordinates. Only Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba were kept as defendants on the ground that they alone "have been specifically mentioned and identified to have allegedly caused injuries on the persons of some of the plaintiffs, which acts of alleged physical violence constitute a delict or wrong that gave rise to a cause of action." But such finding is not supported by the record, nor is it in accord with law and jurisprudence.

Firstly, it is wrong to limit the plaintiffs’ action for damages to "acts of alleged physical violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein, among others —

1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention;

2. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

3. The right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;

4. The privacy of communication and correspondence;

5. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one’s self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make a confession, except when the person confessing becomes a state witness.chanrobles law library

The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches made without search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of "safehouses" where they were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.

Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.

The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be based on what appears on the face of the complaint. 6 To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered. 7 For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 8 

Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court’s ruling, dismissing for lack of cause of action the complaint against all defendants, except Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba. The complaint contained allegations against all the defendants which, if admitted hypothetically, would be sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action against all of them under Article 32 of the Civil Code.

This brings us to the last issue. Was the trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jazminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin, on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file a motion for reconsideration of the court’s resolution of November 8, 1983, granting the respondent’s motion to dismiss?

It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside said order of November 8, 1983 was filed by "plaintiffs, through counsel." True, the motion was signed only by Atty. Joker P. Arroyo, counsel for Benjamin Sesgundo; Atty. Antonio Rosales, counsel for Edwin

Lopez and Manuel Martin Guzman; Atty. Pedro B. Ella, Jr., counsel for Nestor Bodino and Carlos Palma; Atty. Arno V. Sanidad, counsel for Arturo Tabara; Atty. Felicitas S. Aquino, counsel for Joseph Olayer; and Atty. Alexander Padilla, counsel for Rodolfo Benosa.

But the body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs. And this must have been also the understanding of defendants’ counsel himself for when he filed his comment on the motion, he furnished copies thereof, not just to the lawyers who signed the motion, but to all the lawyers of plaintiffs, to wit: Attys. Jose W. Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Augusto Sanchez, Antonio Rosales, Pedro Ella, Jr., Arno Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas S. Aquino.

In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintiffs. They needed no specific authority to do that. The authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be assumed, unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party concerned, which was never done in this case. Thus, it was grave abuse on the part of respondent judge to take it upon himself to rule that the motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1953 dismissing the complaint was filed only by some of the plaintiffs, when by its very language it was clearly intended to be filed by and for the benefit of all of them. It is obvious that the respondent judge took umbrage under a contrived technicality to declare that the dismissal of the complaint had already become final with respect to some of the plaintiffs whose lawyers did not sign the motion for reconsideration. Such action tainted with legal infirmity cannot be sanctioned.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Accordingly, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the resolution of the respondent court, dated November 8, 1983, its order dated May 11, 1984 and its resolution dated September 21, 1984. Let the case be remanded to the respondent court for further proceedings. With Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The Court’s judgment at bar makes clear that all persons, be they public officers or employees, or members of the military or police force or private individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeat, violate or in any manner impede or impair the constitutional rights and civil liberties of another person, stand liable and may be sued in court for damages as provided in Art. 32 of the Civil Code.

The case at bar specifically upholds and reinstates the civil action for damages filed in the court below by petitioners-plaintiffs for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of their constitutional rights and liberties. At the same time it rejects the automatic application of the principle of respondent superior or command responsibility that would hold a superior officer jointly and severally accountable for damages, including moral and exemplary, with his subordinates who

committed such transgressions. However, the judgment gives the caveat that a superior officer must not abdicate is duty to properly supervise his subordinates for he runs the risk of being held responsible for gross negligence and of being held under the cited provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable with the tortfeasor.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

The rationale for this rule of law was best expressed by Brandeis in this wise: "In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes the law breaker, it breeds contempt for the law, it invites every man to become a law unto himself, it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of criminal law the end justifies the means . . . . would bring terrible retribution." 1 

As the writer stressed in Hildawa v. Enrile 2 which was an action to enjoin the operations of the dreaded secret marshals during the past regime, "In a democratic state, you don’t stop to the level of criminals. If we stoop to what they do, then we’re no better than they . . . there would be no difference.." . . The Supreme Court stands as the guarantor of the Constitutional and human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction and cannot abdicate its basic role under the Constitution that these rights be respected and enforced. The spirit and letter of the Constitution negates as contrary to the basic precepts of human rights and freedom that a person’s life be snuffed out without due process in a split second even if he is caught in flagrante delicto — unless it was called for as an act of self-defense by the law agents using reasonable means to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased."cralaw virtua1aw library

Needless to say, the criminal acts of the "Sparrow Units" or death squads of the NPA which have infiltrated the cities and suburbs and performed their despicable killings of innocent civilians and military and police officers constitute an equally perverse violation of the sanctity of human life and must be severely condemned by all who adhere to the Rule of Law.

It need only be pointed out that one of the first acts of the present government under President Corazon C. Aquino after her assumption of office in February, 1986 was to file our government’s ratification and access to all human rights instruments adopted under the auspices of the United Nations, declaring thereby the government’s commitment to observe the precepts of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. More than this, pursuant to our Constitution which the people decisively ratified on February 2, 1987, the independent office of the Commission on Human Rights has been created and organized with ample powers to investigate human rights violations and take remedial measures against all such violations by the military as well as by the civilian groups.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

G.R. No. L-40486 August 29, 1975

PAULINO PADUA and LUCENA BEBIN PADUA, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.GREGORIO N. ROBLES and BAY TAXI CAB, defendants-appellees.

Alberto R. de Joya for plaintiffs-appellants.

CASTRO, J.:

Resolving this appeal by the spouses Paulino and Lucena Bebin Padua, we set aside the order dated October 25, 1972 of the Court of First Instance of Zambales dismissing their complaint, in civil case 1079-O, and remand this case for further proceedings.

In the early morning of New Year's Day of 1969 a taxicab (bearing 1968 plate no. TX-9395 and driven by Romeo N. Punzalan but operated by the Bay Taxi Cab owned by Gregorio N. Robles) struck ten-year old Normandy Padua on the national road in barrio Barretto, Olongapo City. The impact hurled Normandy about forty meters away from the point where the taxicab struck him, as a result of which he died.

Subsequently, Normandy's parents (Paulino and Lucena Bebin Padua), by complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Zambales (civil case 427-O), sought damages from Punzalan and the Bay Taxi Cab; likewise, the city Fiscal of Olongapo, by information filed with the same court (criminal case 1158-O), charged Punzalan with homicide through reckless imprudence.

On October 27, 1969 the court a quo, in civil case 427-O, adjudged for the Paduas as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant Romeo Punzalan to pay the plaintiffs the sums of P12,000.00 as actual damages, P5,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and dismissing the complaint insofar as the Bay Taxicab Company is concerned. With costs against the defendant Romeo Punzalan. (Emphasis supplied)

Almost a year later, on October 5, 1970, the court a quo, in criminal case 1158-O, convicted Punzalan, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Romeo Punzalan y Narciso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence, as defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)

MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the cost. The civil liability of the accused has already been determined and assessed in Civil Case No. 427-O, entitled Paulino Padua, et al. vs. Romeo Punzalan, et al.' (Emphasis supplied)

After the judgment in civil case 427-O became final, the Paduas sought execution thereof. This proved futile; the corresponding court officer returned the writ of execution unsatisfied.

Unable to collect the amount of P27,000 awarded in their favor, the Paduas instituted action in the same court against Gregorio N. Robles to enforce the latter's subsidiary responsibility under the provisions of article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Robles filed a motion to dismiss based on (1) bar of the cause of action by a prior judgment and (2) failure of the complaint to state a cause of action.

Thereafter, the court a quo, in an order dated October 25, 1972, granted Robles' motion to dismiss on the ground that the Paduas' complaint states no cause of action. This order the Paduas questioned in the Court of Appeals which, by resolution dated March 5, 1975, certified the case to this Court for the reason that the appeal involves only questions of law.

The Paduas predicate their appeal on eighteen errors allegedly committed by the court a quo. These assigned errors, however, raise only one substantial issue: whether the judgment dated October 5, 1970 in criminal case 1158-O includes a determination and adjudication of Punzalan's civil liability arising from his criminal act upon which Robles' subsidiary civil responsibility may be based.

The sufficiency and efficacy of a judgment must be tested by its substance rather than its form. In construing a judgment, its legal effects including such effects that necessarily follow because of legal implications, rather than the language used govern. Also, its meaning, operation, and consequences must be ascertained like any other written instrument. Thus, a judgment rests on the intention of the court as gathered from every part thereof, including the situation to which it applies and the attendant circumstances.

It would appear that a plain reading, on its face, of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O, particularly its decretal portion, easily results in the same conclusion reached by the court a quo: that the said judgment no civil liability arising from the offense charged against Punzalan. However, a careful study of the judgment in question, the situation to which it applies, and the attendant circumstances, would yield the conclusion that the court a quo, on the contrary, recognized the enforceable right of the Paduas to the civil liability arising from the offense committed by Punzalan and awarded the corresponding indemnity therefor.

Civil liability coexists with criminal responsibility. In negligence cases the offended party (or his heirs) has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action

for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court deems simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for a separate application by the offended party. Article 2177 of the Civil Code, however, precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission.

In the case at bar, the Court finds it immaterial that the Paduas chose, in the first instance, an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under articles 2176, 2177, and 2180 of the Civil Code, which action proved ineffectual. The Court also takes note of the absence of any inconsistency between the aforementioned action priorly availed of by the Paduas and their subsequent application for enforcement of civil liability arising from the offense committed by Punzalan and consequently, for exaction of Robles' subsidiary responsibility. Allowance of the latter application involves no violation of the proscription against double recovery of damages for the same negligent act or omission. For, as hereinbefore stated, the corresponding officer of the court a quo returned unsatisfied the writ of execution issued against Punzalan to satisfy the amount of indemnity awarded to the Paduas in civil case 427-O. Article 2177 of the Civil Code forbids actual double recovery of damages for the same negligent act or omission. Finally, the Court notes that the same judge * tried, heard, and determined both civil case 427-O and criminal case 115-O. Knowledge of an familiarity with all the facts and circumstances relevant and relative to the civil liability of Punzalan may thus be readily attributed to the judge when he rendered judgment in the criminal action.

In view of the above considerations, it cannot reasonably be contended that the court a quo intended, in its judgment in criminal case 1158-O, to omit recognition of the right of the Paduas to the civil liability arising from the offense of which Punzalan was adjudged guilty and the corollary award of the corresponding indemnity therefor. Surely, it cannot be said that the court intended the statement in the decretal portion of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O referring to the determination and assessment of Punzalan's civil liability in civil case 427-O to be pure jargon or "gobbledygook" and to be absolutely of no meaning and effect whatever. The substance of such statement, taken in the light of the situation to which it applies and the attendant circumstances, makes unmistakably clear the intention of the court to accord affirmation to the Paduas' right to the civil liability arising from the judgment against Punzalan in criminal case 1158-O. Indeed, by including such statement in the decretal portion of the said judgment, the court intended to adopt the same adjudication and award it made in civil case 427-O as Punzalan's civil liability in criminal case 1158-O.

There is indeed much to be desired in the formulation by Judge Amores of that part of the decretal portion of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O referring to the civil liability of Punzalan resulting from his criminal conviction. The judge could have been forthright and direct instead of circuitous and ambiguous. But, as we have explained, the statement on the civil liability of Punzalan must surely have a meaning and even if the statement were reasonably susceptible of two or more interpretations, that which achieves moral justice should be adopted, eschewing the other interpretations which in effect would negate moral justice.

It is not amiss at this juncture to emphasize to all magistrates in all levels of the judicial hierarchy that extreme degree of care should be exercise in the formulation of the dispositive portion of a decision, because it is this portion that is to be executed once the decision becomes final. The adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties, and the dispositions made as well as the directions and instructions given by the court in the premises in conformity with the body of the decision, must all be spelled out clearly, distinctly and unequivocally, leaving absolutely no room for dispute, debate or interpretation.

We therefore hold that the Paduas' complaint in civil case 1079-O states a cause of action against Robles whose concommitant subsidiary responsibility, per the judgment in criminal case 1158-O, subsists.

ACCORDINGLY, the order a quo dated October 25, 1972 dismissing the complaint in civil case 1079-O is set aside, and this case is hereby remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings conformably with this decision and with law. No pronouncement as to costs.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

The clarity and lucidity with which Justice Castro spelled out the decisive issue and how to resolve it to achieve the desirable goal of moral justice in adjudication compels concurrence. I do so. What is more, there is to my mind a distinct advance in the juridical frontiers in the mode in which the novel question raised was settled. If the trend manifest in the view taken by the Court would thereafter be followed, then the protective ramparts the law throws ground victims of vehicular accidents, unfortunately of rather frequent occurrence here, will be further strengthened. That dissipates whatever doubts I may have originally felt in view of certain traditional procedural concepts about the correctness of the decision reached. It is true this is one of those hard cases which, if an old law is to be believed, may result in bad law. It need not be so, of course, as pointed out with great persuasiveness in the 1971 inaugural lecture at Oxford given by Professor Ronald Dworkin, the successor in the chair of jurisprudence to one of the most eminent men in the field H.L.A. Hart. 1 The more accurate way of viewing the matter is that whenever there is an apparent gap in the law and settled principles of adjudication may not clearly indicate the answer, then a judge may rely either on an argument of policy or an argument of principle, the former having kinship with the sociological school of jurisprudence and the latter with the analytical. As I hope I may be able to indicate in this brief concurrence, the decision reached by us is in consonance with either approach. With the natural law thinking manifest in the opinion of the Court, witness its stress on moral justice, I am comforted by the reflection that the procedural barrier is not insurmountable, the decision reached deriving support from the viewpoint of law as logic, justice, or social control.

1. Dworkin identifies a matter of principle from the standpoint of a right either granted or recognized by law. As was so clearly pointed out in the opinion of Justice Castro: "It would appear that a plain reading, on its face, of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O, particularly its decretal portion, easily results in the same conclusion reached

by the court a quo: that the said judgment assessed no civil liability arising from the offense charged against Punzalan. However, a careful study of the judgment in question, the situation to which it applies, and the attendant circumstances, would yield the conclusion that the court a quo, on the contrary, recognized the enforceable right of the Paduas to the civil liability arising from the offense committed by Punzalan and awarded the corresponding indemnity therefor." 2 There is much to be said therefor for the view expressed therein that "it cannot reasonably be contended that the court a quo intended, in its judgment in criminal case 1158-O, to omit recognition of the right of the Paduas to the civil liability arising from the offense of which Punzalan was adjudged guilty and the corollary award of the corresponding indemnity therefor. Surely, it cannot be said that the court intended the statement in the decretal portion of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O referring to the determination and assessment of Punzalan's civil liability in civil case 427-O to be pure jargon or 'gobbledygook' and to be absolutely of no meaning and effect whatsoever. The substance of such statement, taken in the light of the situation to which it applies and the attendant circumstances, makes unmistakably clear the intention of the court to accord affirmation to the Padua's right to the civil liability arising from the judgment against Punzalan in criminal case 1158-O." 3 Whatever misgivings therefore may be felt because in the civil case No. 427-O the complaint against Bay Taxi Cab Co. is dismissed, do not suffice, to my mind, to render nugatory the admitted subsidiary liability arising from a decision in criminal case No. 1158-O which is necessarily attendant upon the conviction of the driver, Romeo N. Punzalan. Such a difficulty could have been avoided had greater care been exercised by the lower court, but precisely recourse may be had to our corrective powers to avoid a right granted in law from being rendered illusory in fact.

2. There is thus the strongest policy consideration that buttresses the conclusion reached by us. It would conduce to less respect for the law as an agency of social control if there be recognition in the codes of the right of next kin to damages arising from the tragic occurrence of young lives being snuffed out due to reckless driving on the part of what had been accurately described as dealers of death on the road and then by lack of care on the part of a judge assure that it is nothing more than a barren form of words. This is what Dean Pound referred to as law in books as distinguished from law in action. To recall an expression from Justice Jackson, it is comparable to a munificent bequest in a pauper's will. It is less than realistic to assert that anyway the guilty driver can be made to pay. The obvious answer is:' With what?"

This is not to deny that a previous judgment that certainly lends itself to ambiguity considering the facts disclosed and found by the trial court does interpose juristic difficulty to the imposition of liability on the offending taxicab company. There can be no blinking the fact though that if it did not place such vehicles on the road driven in such a reckless and culpable manner resulting in a ten-year old boy being hurled about forty meters away from the point of impact, this tragedy could have been avoided. To say now that doubts engendered by the previous ruling in the culpa aquiliana suit could nullify what the law decrees as to the subsidiary liability of the employer in the criminal case finding the accused guilty would be fraught with pernicious consequences. The party just as much responsible for the mishap, with his operation of the transportation service, would be absolved from liability. It need not be so, but certainly for entrepreneurs more enterprising than careful, not excessively concerned with the safety of the traveling public, it could be a green light for less vigilance over the conduct of their drivers. The resulting injury to public safety is not

hard to imagine. Moreover, from the standpoint of the feelings of the bereaved parents, and this is just as important a policy consideration, I feel that no avenue should be left unexplored to mitigate the harshness of fate. To paraphrase Justice Malcolm, there is not enough money in the entire world to compensate the parents for the loss of their child. 4 To repeat, the decision reached has my full concurrence.

BARREDO, J., concurring:

On strictly legal considerations, it would seem possible to dismiss the petition for review in this case. But there are certain considerations of equity and substantial justice obviously underlying the cause of petitioners which I find difficult to ignore. It would be unfair and unjust to deprive said petitioners of their right to damages for the death of their child unquestionably caused by the fault of respondent's employee merely because the dispositive portion of the decision of Judge Amores in the criminal case appears to be rather equivocal on its face as to respondent's liability therefor, albeit under the incontrovertible facts extant in the record such liability is indisputable in law and the language of Judge Amores' judgment does not anyway exonerate either respondent's driver or private respondent, and what is more, does not exclude the idea that, as explained in the able main opinion of Mr. Justice Castro, the judge intended to merely adopt and incorporate in said judgment the assessment of amount of damages which said judge himself had already made in the civil case he had previously decided. It is on these fundamental considerations that I base my concurrence in the judgment in this case.

As I have already indicated, from the standpoint of strict adjective law, the petition should be dismissed because in truth, there is yet no showing that any attempt has been made by petitioners to have the judgment in the criminal cases, assuming it includes an imposition of civil liability upon the accused driver, Romeo N. Punzalan, executed. What appears in the record is that it was the writ of execution issued against said Punzalan in the previous civil case that was returned unsatisfied. Of course, this point is highly technical, because all that has to be done is for petitioners to have another execution in the criminal case, which it can even now be forseen will have exactly the same result. I am therefore agreeable as a matter of equity that the Court hold that for all legal intents and purposes, We may consider the return of insolvency of Punzalan in the civil case as in effect the return in the criminal case, since equity considers as done what ought to have been done when otherwise injustice would result. And so, the paramount question arises, was there any civil liability to impose in the criminal judgment of Judge Amores? As related in the main opinion, the judgment of October 27, 1969 in the civil case ordered Punzalan "to pay plaintiffs (herein petitioners) the sums of P12,000.00 as actual damages P5,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees," although absolving at the same time the herein private respondent, and then, on October 5, 1970, the judgment in the criminal case was as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Romeo Punzalan y Narciso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence, as defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)

MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs. The civil liability of the accused has already been determined and assessed in Civil Case No. 427-O, entitled 'Paulino Padua, et al. vs. Romeo Punzalan, et al. (Emphasis supplied)

Succintly, the decisive issue presented to Us now is whether this judgment just transcribed imposes upon Punzalan a civil liability by adoption by reference of the civil liability already a judged in the civil case or it exonerates him from any civil liability arising from the offense of which he has been found guilty inasmuch as he was already found civilly liable in the civil case. It must be admitted in candor that both constructions are literally tenable, with the particularity, however, that the first interpretation, if adopted could not involve the assumption that the judge committed a grievous and palpable error of law whereas the second would necessarily mean that he did.

It is by now settled beyond all cavil as to dispense with the citation of jurisprudence, that a negligent act such as that committed by Punzalan gives rise to at least two separate and independent kinds of liabilities, (1) the civil liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liability arising from civil negligence or the so-called culpa aquiliana. These two concepts of fault are so distinct from each other that exoneration from one does not result in exoneration from the other. Adjectively and substantively, they can be prosecuted separately and independently of each other, although Article 2177 of the Civil Code precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission, which means that should there be varying amounts awarded in two separate cases, the plaintiff may recover, in effect, only the bigger amount. That is to say, if the plaintiff has already been ordered paid an amount in one case and in the other case the amount adjudged is bigger, he shall be entitled in the second case only to the excess over the one fixed in the first case, but if he has already been paid a bigger amount in the first case, he may not recover anymore in the second case. Thus, in the case at bar, inasmuch as Punzalan had already been sentenced to pay the herein petitioners the amounts above-stated, in the subsequent criminal case, he could not be adjudged to pay a higher amount.

Now, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, a person criminally liable is also civilly liable, hence, the judgment in the criminal case is supposed to include the imposition of civil liability, unless the basis therefor has been shown not to exist, which is not the case here. And since the judgment in question says that "the civil liability of the accused has already been determined and assessed in Civil Case No. 427-O entitled Paulino Padua et al. vs. Romeo Punzalan et al.," it is but logical to conclude that the meaning of such statement is that the same amounts of damages fixed in the previous case were being awarded to the offended party in the criminal case. Otherwise, We would have to indulge in the assumption that Judge Amores committed the grievous and palpable error of law of exonerating Punzalan of all civil liabilities in the criminal case just because he had already been sentenced to pay damages in the civil case. I am not ready to accept such assumption. The law and jurisprudence on the matter are so clear and well-settled that I refuse to believe that a judge of the experience of Judge Amores would not be cognizant thereof. Besides, Judge Amores knew or ought to have known that having absolved herein respondent in the civil case, the only possible recourse has left to petitioners to recover from said

respondent damages for the death of their child caused by the indisputable negligence of his employee Punzalan is in the form of the subsidiary liability of the employer under the Penal Code. Indeed, I cannot believe that Judge Amores intended to allow respondent to escape liability altogether, it being evident under the circumstances which he himself has found in both cases, civil and criminal, that Punzalan, their employee, had cause the death of the ten-year-old child of petitioners thru reckless imprudence and that in such a situation in the law exacts liability from both the employee and the employer. What is more, I consider it but equitable to hold that the rather equivocal phraseology of the decision of Judge Amores should be read in the sense it was understood by the petitioners, who in the faith and reliance that the law had been complied with by Judge Amores and that he had accordingly awarded them in the criminal case the civil liability that by law goes with it, did not anymore move for clarification or reconsideration nor appeal from said decision. My understanding is that the filing of the subject civil action by petitioners proceeded from that assumption, namely, that Punzalan has been found civilly liable for the same amounts adjudged in the civil case and, therefore, respondent is subsidiarily liable therefor in the face of Punzalan's insolvency.

Accordingly, I concur in that the order of dismissal of respondent judge should be set aside and that petitioners' action should be tried on the merits.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

The clarity and lucidity with which Justice Castro spelled out the decisive issue and how to resolve it to achieve the desirable goal of moral justice in adjudication compels concurrence. I do so. What is more, there is to my mind a distinct advance in the juridical frontiers in the mode in which the novel question raised was settled. If the trend manifest in the view taken by the Court would thereafter be followed, then the protective ramparts the law throws ground victims of vehicular accidents, unfortunately of rather frequent occurrence here, will be further strengthened. That dissipates whatever doubts I may have originally felt in view of certain traditional procedural concepts about the correctness of the decision reached. It is true this is one of those hard cases which, if an old law is to be believed, may result in bad law. It need not be so, of course, as pointed out with great persuasiveness in the 1971 inaugural lecture at Oxford given by Professor Ronald Dworkin, the successor in the chair of jurisprudence to one of the most eminent men in the field H.L.A. Hart. 1 The more accurate way of viewing the matter is that whenever there is an apparent gap in the law and settled principles of adjudication may not clearly indicate the answer, then a judge may rely either on an argument of policy or an argument of principle, the former having kinship with the sociological school of jurisprudence and the latter with the analytical. As I hope I may be able to indicate in this brief concurrence, the decision reached by us is in consonance with either approach. With the natural law thinking manifest in the opinion of the Court, witness its stress on moral justice, I am comforted by the reflection that the procedural barrier is not insurmountable, the decision reached deriving support from the viewpoint of law as logic, justice, or social control.

1. Dworkin identifies a matter of principle from the standpoint of a right either granted or recognized by law. As was so clearly pointed out in the opinion of Justice Castro: "It would appear that a plain reading, on its face, of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O, particularly its decretal portion, easily results in the same conclusion reached by the court a quo: that the said judgment assessed no civil liability arising from the offense charged against Punzalan. However, a careful study of the judgment in question, the situation to which it applies, and the attendant circumstances, would yield the conclusion that the court a quo, on the contrary, recognized the enforceable right of the Paduas to the civil liability arising from the offense committed by Punzalan and awarded the corresponding indemnity therefor." 2 There is much to be said therefor for the view expressed therein that "it cannot reasonably be contended that the court a quo intended, in its judgment in criminal case 1158-O, to omit recognition of the right of the Paduas to the civil liability arising from the offense of which Punzalan was adjudged guilty and the corollary award of the corresponding indemnity therefor. Surely, it cannot be said that the court intended the statement in the decretal portion of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O referring to the determination and assessment of Punzalan's civil liability in civil case 427-O to be pure jargon or 'gobbledygook' and to be absolutely of no meaning and effect whatsoever. The substance of such statement, taken in the light of the situation to which it applies and the attendant circumstances, makes unmistakably clear the intention of the court to accord affirmation to the Padua's right to the civil liability arising from the judgment against Punzalan in criminal case 1158-O." 3 Whatever misgivings therefore may be felt because in the civil case No. 427-O the complaint against Bay Taxi Cab Co. is dismissed, do not suffice, to my mind, to render nugatory the admitted subsidiary liability arising from a decision in criminal case No. 1158-O which is necessarily attendant upon the conviction of the driver, Romeo N. Punzalan. Such a difficulty could have been avoided had greater care been exercised by the lower court, but precisely recourse may be had to our corrective powers to avoid a right granted in law from being rendered illusory in fact.

2. There is thus the strongest policy consideration that buttresses the conclusion reached by us. It would conduce to less respect for the law as an agency of social control if there be recognition in the codes of the right of next kin to damages arising from the tragic occurrence of young lives being snuffed out due to reckless driving on the part of what had been accurately described as dealers of death on the road and then by lack of care on the part of a judge assure that it is nothing more than a barren form of words. This is what Dean Pound referred to as law in books as distinguished from law in action. To recall an expression from Justice Jackson, it is comparable to a munificent bequest in a pauper's will. It is less than realistic to assert that anyway the guilty driver can be made to pay. The obvious answer is:' With what?"

This is not to deny that a previous judgment that certainly lends itself to ambiguity considering the facts disclosed and found by the trial court does interpose juristic difficulty to the imposition of liability on the offending taxicab company. There can be no blinking the fact though that if it did not place such vehicles on the road driven in such a reckless and culpable manner resulting in a ten-year old boy being hurled about forty meters away from the point of impact, this tragedy could have been avoided. To say now that doubts engendered by the previous ruling in the culpa aquiliana suit could nullify what the law decrees as to the subsidiary liability of the employer in the criminal case finding the accused guilty would be fraught with pernicious consequences. The party just as much responsible for the mishap, with his

operation of the transportation service, would be absolved from liability. It need not be so, but certainly for entrepreneurs more enterprising than careful, not excessively concerned with the safety of the traveling public, it could be a green light for less vigilance over the conduct of their drivers. The resulting injury to public safety is not hard to imagine. Moreover, from the standpoint of the feelings of the bereaved parents, and this is just as important a policy consideration, I feel that no avenue should be left unexplored to mitigate the harshness of fate. To paraphrase Justice Malcolm, there is not enough money in the entire world to compensate the parents for the loss of their child. 4 To repeat, the decision reached has my full concurrence.

BARREDO, J., concurring:

On strictly legal considerations, it would seem possible to dismiss the petition for review in this case. But there are certain considerations of equity and substantial justice obviously underlying the cause of petitioners which I find difficult to ignore. It would be unfair and unjust to deprive said petitioners of their right to damages for the death of their child unquestionably caused by the fault of respondent's employee merely because the dispositive portion of the decision of Judge Amores in the criminal case appears to be rather equivocal on its face as to respondent's liability therefor, albeit under the incontrovertible facts extant in the record such liability is indisputable in law and the language of Judge Amores' judgment does not anyway exonerate either respondent's driver or private respondent, and what is more, does not exclude the idea that, as explained in the able main opinion of Mr. Justice Castro, the judge intended to merely adopt and incorporate in said judgment the assessment of amount of damages which said judge himself had already made in the civil case he had previously decided. It is on these fundamental considerations that I base my concurrence in the judgment in this case.

As I have already indicated, from the standpoint of strict adjective law, the petition should be dismissed because in truth, there is yet no showing that any attempt has been made by petitioners to have the judgment in the criminal cases, assuming it includes an imposition of civil liability upon the accused driver, Romeo N. Punzalan, executed. What appears in the record is that it was the writ of execution issued against said Punzalan in the previous civil case that was returned unsatisfied. Of course, this point is highly technical, because all that has to be done is for petitioners to have another execution in the criminal case, which it can even now be forseen will have exactly the same result. I am therefore agreeable as a matter of equity that the Court hold that for all legal intents and purposes, We may consider the return of insolvency of Punzalan in the civil case as in effect the return in the criminal case, since equity considers as done what ought to have been done when otherwise injustice would result. And so, the paramount question arises, was there any civil liability to impose in the criminal judgment of Judge Amores? As related in the main opinion, the judgment of October 27, 1969 in the civil case ordered Punzalan "to pay plaintiffs (herein petitioners) the sums of P12,000.00 as actual damages P5,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees," although absolving at the same time the herein private respondent, and then, on October 5, 1970, the judgment in the criminal case was as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Romeo Punzalan y Narciso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide

through reckless imprudence, as defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs. The civil liability of the accused has already been determined and assessed in Civil Case No. 427-O, entitled 'Paulino Padua, et al. vs. Romeo Punzalan, et al. (Emphasis supplied)

Succintly, the decisive issue presented to Us now is whether this judgment just transcribed imposes upon Punzalan a civil liability by adoption by reference of the civil liability already a judged in the civil case or it exonerates him from any civil liability arising from the offense of which he has been found guilty inasmuch as he was already found civilly liable in the civil case. It must be admitted in candor that both constructions are literally tenable, with the particularity, however, that the first interpretation, if adopted could not involve the assumption that the judge committed a grievous and palpable error of law whereas the second would necessarily mean that he did.

It is by now settled beyond all cavil as to dispense with the citation of jurisprudence, that a negligent act such as that committed by Punzalan gives rise to at least two separate and independent kinds of liabilities, (1) the civil liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liability arising from civil negligence or the so-called culpa aquiliana. These two concepts of fault are so distinct from each other that exoneration from one does not result in exoneration from the other. Adjectively and substantively, they can be prosecuted separately and independently of each other, although Article 2177 of the Civil Code precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission, which means that should there be varying amounts awarded in two separate cases, the plaintiff may recover, in effect, only the bigger amount. That is to say, if the plaintiff has already been ordered paid an amount in one case and in the other case the amount adjudged is bigger, he shall be entitled in the second case only to the excess over the one fixed in the first case, but if he has already been paid a bigger amount in the first case, he may not recover anymore in the second case. Thus, in the case at bar, inasmuch as Punzalan had already been sentenced to pay the herein petitioners the amounts above-stated, in the subsequent criminal case, he could not be adjudged to pay a higher amount.

Now, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, a person criminally liable is also civilly liable, hence, the judgment in the criminal case is supposed to include the imposition of civil liability, unless the basis therefor has been shown not to exist, which is not the case here. And since the judgment in question says that "the civil liability of the accused has already been determined and assessed in Civil Case No. 427-O entitled Paulino Padua et al. vs. Romeo Punzalan et al.," it is but logical to conclude that the meaning of such statement is that the same amounts of damages fixed in the previous case were being awarded to the offended party in the criminal case. Otherwise, We would have to indulge in the assumption that Judge Amores committed the grievous and palpable error of law of exonerating Punzalan of all civil liabilities in the criminal case just because he had already been sentenced to pay damages in the civil case. I am not ready to accept such assumption. The law and

jurisprudence on the matter are so clear and well-settled that I refuse to believe that a judge of the experience of Judge Amores would not be cognizant thereof. Besides, Judge Amores knew or ought to have known that having absolved herein respondent in the civil case, the only possible recourse has left to petitioners to recover from said respondent damages for the death of their child caused by the indisputable negligence of his employee Punzalan is in the form of the subsidiary liability of the employer under the Penal Code. Indeed, I cannot believe that Judge Amores intended to allow respondent to escape liability altogether, it being evident under the circumstances which he himself has found in both cases, civil and criminal, that Punzalan, their employee, had cause the death of the ten-year-old child of petitioners thru reckless imprudence and that in such a situation in the law exacts liability from both the employee and the employer. What is more, I consider it but equitable to hold that the rather equivocal phraseology of the decision of Judge Amores should be read in the sense it was understood by the petitioners, who in the faith and reliance that the law had been complied with by Judge Amores and that he had accordingly awarded them in the criminal case the civil liability that by law goes with it, did not anymore move for clarification or reconsideration nor appeal from said decision. My understanding is that the filing of the subject civil action by petitioners proceeded from that assumption, namely, that Punzalan has been found civilly liable for the same amounts adjudged in the civil case and, therefore, respondent is subsidiarily liable therefor in the face of Punzalan's insolvency.

Accordingly, I concur in that the order of dismissal of respondent judge should be set aside and that petitioners' action should be tried on the merits.

G.R. No. L-14534             February 28, 1962

MERARDO L. ZAPANTA, petitioner, vs.THE HON. AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

Pedro M. Santos and Jorge C. Salonga for petitioner.Office of the Solicitor General, Romulo L. Chua and Dewey G. Soriano for respondents.

DIZON, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition filed by Merardo L. Zapanta against the Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fernando A. Cruz, Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, and Olimpia A. Yco, to enjoin the former from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 3405 pending the final determination of Civil Case No. 1446 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.

Upon complaint filed by respondent Olimpia A. Yco on May 20, 1958, an information for Bigamy was filed by respondent Provincial Fiscal against petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Criminal Case No. 3405), alleging that the latter, having previously married one Estrella Guarin, and without said marriage having been dissolved, contracted a second marriage with said complainant.

On June 16, 1958, petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga Civil Case No. 1446 against respondent Olimpia A. Yco for the annulment of their marriage on the ground of duress, force and intimidation. On the 30th of the same month respondent Yco, as defendant in said case, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that it stated no cause of action, but the same was denied on July 7 of the same year. 1äwphï1.ñët

On September 2, 1958, petitioner, in turn, filed a motion in Criminal Case No. 3405 to suspend proceedings therein, on the ground that the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. 1446 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga was a prejudicial question. Respondent judge denied the motion on September 20, 1958 as well as petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and ordered his arraignment. After entering a plea of not guilty, petitioner filed the present action.

We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal (People vs. Aragon, G.R. No. L-5930, February 17, 1954). The prejudicial question — we further said — must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court (People vs. Aragon, supra). These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that, according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus, the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy. On the other hand, there can be no question that the annulment of petitioner's marriage with respondent Yco on the grounds relied upon in the complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga is within the jurisdiction of said court.

In the Aragon case already mentioned (supra) we held that if the defendant in a case for bigamy claims that the first marriage is void and the right to decide such validity is vested in another court, the civil action for annulment must first be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed. There is no reason not to apply the same rule when the contention of the accused is that the second marriage is void on the ground that he entered into it because of duress, force and intimidation.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in the petition is hereby granted. Without costs.

G.R. No. L-22579             February 23, 1968

ROLANDO LANDICHO, petitioner, vs.HON. LORENZO RELOVA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Jose W. Diokno for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

          In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question before the Court is whether or not the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the instance of the second wife against petitioner, with the latter in turn filing a third party complaint against the first spouse for the annulment of the first marriage, constitutes a prejudicial question in a pending suit for bigamy against him. Respondent, Judge Relova answered in the negative. We sustain him.

          The pertinent facts as set forth in the petition follow. On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense, of bigamy. It was alleged in the information that petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of First Instance ofBatangas, likewise presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.

          Thereafter, on October 7, 1963, petitioner moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case pending the decision on the question of the validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil suit. Respondent Judge on November 19, 1963 denied the motion for lack of merit. Then came a motion for reconsideration to set aside the above order, which was likewise denied on March 2, 1964. Hence this petition, filed on March 13, 1964.

          In a resolution of this Court of March 17, 1964, respondent Judge was required to answer within ten (10) days, with a preliminary injunction being issued to restrain him from further proceeding with the prosecution of the bigamy case. In the

meanwhile, before the answer was filed there was an amended petition for certiorari, the amendment consisting solely in the inclusion of the People of the Philippines as another respondent. This Court admitted such amended petition in a resolution of April 3, 1964.

          Then came the answer to the amended petition on May 14 of that year where the statement of facts as above detailed was admitted, with the qualifications that the bigamy charge was filed upon the complaint of the first spouse Elvira Makatangay. It alleged as one of its special and affirmative defenses that the mere fact that "there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that 'prejudicial questions are automatically raised in said civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case for bigamy." 1 The answer stressed that even on the assumption that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. It continued, referring to Viada, that "parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, according to Viada, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage incurs the penalty provided for in this Article. . . ." 2

          This defense is in accordance with the principle implicit in authoritative decisions of this Court. In Merced v. Diez, 3 what was in issue was the validity of the second marriage, "which must be determined before hand in the civil action before the criminal action can proceed." According to the opinion of Justice Labrador: "We have a situation where the issue of the validity of the second marriage can be determined or must first be determined in the civil action before the criminal action for bigamy can be prosecuted. The question of the validity of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial question because determination of the validity of the second marriage is determinable in the civil action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy." It was the conclusion of this Court then that for petitioner Merced to be found guilty of bigamy, the second marriage which he contracted "must first be declared valid." Its validity having been questioned in the civil action, there must be a decision in such a case "before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed."

          To the same effect is the doctrine announced in Zapanta v. Mendoza. 4 As explained in the opinion of Justice Dizon: "We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. . . . The prejudicial question — we further said — must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court. . . . These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that, according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy. . . ."

          The situation in this case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. Then on March 15, 1963, it was the second spouse, not petitioner who filed an action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. It was sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be precise, when petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. As was correctly stressed in the answer of respondent Judge relying on Viada, parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

          Such was the situation of petitioner. There is no occasion to indulge in the probability that the third-party complaint against the first wife brought almost five months after the prosecution for bigamy was started could have been inspired by the thought that he could thus give color to a defense based on an alleged prejudicial question. The above judicial decisions as well as the opinion of Viada preclude a finding that respondent Judge abused, much less gravely abused, his discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.

          WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied and the writ of preliminary injunction issued dissolved. With costs.1äwphï1.ñët