Cases for Torts

8/17/2019 Cases for Torts

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1.

ST. MARY’S ACADEMY VS. WILLIAMCARPITANOS AND LUCIA S. CARPITANOS,GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES

DANIEL, SR., AND VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA,G.R. NO. 143363, FEBRUARY 6, 2002

(Mentions and discusses: [1] Liability of schools

exercising special parental authority under Articles 218 and 219 of the a!ily "ode# [2]re!ote cause $is%&%$is proxi!ate cause# [']death inde!nity# !oral da!ages# attorney sfees# and [)] the liability of the registeredo*ners of $ehicles for in+uries caused to third

persons *hile the $ehicle *as being dri$en inthe streets and high*ays,

F !"#$

St. Mary’s Academy, a High School of Dipolog City, conducted an enrollmentcampaign and visited schools where prospectiveenrollees were studying. As a student of St.Mary’s, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of thecampaigning group. They headed out for

arayan !lementary School, Dapitan City, in aMitsu"ishi #eep owned "y $ivencio $illanueva,and driven at the time "y his grandson Ched$illanueva. Ched allowed %ames Daniel &&, one of Sherwin’s classmates, to drive the #eep. The

#eep turned turtle, causing the death of Sherwin. Sherwin’s parents then 'led a suit fordamages against %ames Daniel &&, his parentsthe Daniel spouses, $ivencio $illanueva, and St.Mary’s Academy. &n ma(ing St. Mary’s primarilylia"le, the Carpitanos’ "ases were Articles )*+and )* of the Civil Code-

Article )*+. The school, its administratorsand teachers, or the individual, entity orinstitution engaged in child care shall havespecial parental authority and responsi"ilityover the minor child while under theirsupervision, instruction or custody.

Authority and responsi"ility shall applyto all authori ed activities whether inside or

outside the premises of the school, entity orinstitution.

Article )* . Those given the authority andresponsi"ility under the preceding Articleshall "e principally and solidarily lia"le fordamages caused "y the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents,

#udicial guardians or the persons e/ercisingsu"stitute parental authority over said minorshall "e su"sidiarily lia"le.

The Carpitanos argued that "ecause the

enrollment campaign was an authori ed schoolactivity, then St. Mary’s e/ercised specialparental authority when the incident happened.

They asserted that St. Mary’s was primarilylia"le for their son’s death "ecause it allowed

%ames Daniel &&, a minor, to drive the #eep, and

in not having a teacher accompany the minorstudents inside the #eep. The 0egional TrialCourt 10TC2 of Dipolog City ruled in favor of theCarpitanos, and ordered St. Mary’s Academy asprimarily lia"le to pay to the Carpitanos- 1*2345,555 death indemnity for the loss of Sherwin’s life, 1)2 365,555 actual damagesincurred "y the Carpitanos for the "urial andrelated e/penses, 172 3*5,555 attorney’s fees,

162 3455,555 moral damages, and to pay thecosts of the suit. The Daniel spouses were madesu"sidiarily lia"le in the event that St. Mary’swas insolvent, and their son %ames Daniel && wasa"solved from paying damages "ecause he wasa minor at the time. The owner of the vehicle,$ivencio $illanueva, was li(ewise a"solved.

8n appeal, the Court of Appeals 1CA2reduced the actual damages to 3)4,555, "utotherwise a9rming the decision a -uo# in toto.Hence, this appeal "y certiorari.

I##%$&.

:hether or not petitioner St. Mary’s was lia"lefor the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

&&.:hether or not the CA erred in a9rming the

award of moral damages against petitioner St.Mary’s.

R%'()*$

Associate %ustice 3ardo, writing for theSupreme Court, disposed of the issues asfollows-

&.;o, petitioner St. Mary’s Academy is not

lia"le for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. &norder for there to "e lia"ility under Article )*of the


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Daniel && drove negligently and caused theaccident. They were also not a"le to presentany evidence that St. Mary’s allowed %amesDaniel && to drive the #eep, nor of any evidenceof St. Mary’s negligence. &t was Ched $illanuevawho was in possession and control of the #eep atthe time, and it was he who allowed %amesDaniel && to drive. So the Carpitanos’ reliance onArticle )* of the that those

given the authority and responsi"ility underArticle )*+ shall "e principally and solidarilylia"le for damages caused "y acts or omissionsof the unemancipated minor > was unfounded.

The Court therefore holds that thelia"ility for the accident, whether caused "y thenegligence of the minor driver %ames Daniel && orthe detachment of the steering wheel guide of the #eep, should "e pinned primarily on theDaniel spouses. The negligence of St. Mary’sAcademy is only a remote cause- and "etweenthe remote cause and the in#ury, thereintervened the negligence of the Daniel spousesor the detachment of the steering wheel guideof the #eep. &ncidentally, the registered owner of the vehicle was $ivencio $illanueva, and headmitted to this during trial. The Court has heldin the past that the registered owner of anyvehicle, even if not used for pu"lic service,would primarily "e responsi"le to the pu"lic orto third persons for in#uries caused to the latterwhile the vehicle was "eing driven on thehighways or streets (Aguilar# /r. $s. "o!!ercial/a$ings 0an # .3. 4o. 128567# une 29# 2661

re;o $s. epte# 162


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within the scope of his assigned tas( evenoutside o9ce hours "ecause he was using avehicle issued to him "y petitioner.8n the other hand, respondents Spouses$as=ue argue that their son s death wascaused "y the negligence of petitioner semployee who was driving a vehicle issued "ypetitioner and who was on his way home fromovertime wor( for petitioner and that petitioner

is thus lia"le for the resulting in#ury andsu"se=uent death of their son on the "asis of the 'fth paragraph of Article )*+5. !ven if thefourth paragraph of Article )*+5 were applied,petitioner cannot escape lia"ility therefor.3etitioner contends that the 'fth paragraph of Article )*+5 of the Civil Code should only applyto instances where the employer is not engagedin "usiness or industry. Since it is engaged inthe "usiness of manufacturing and sellingfurniture it is therefore not covered "y saidprovision. &nstead, the fourth paragraph shouldapply.

Art. )*+5 162 The owners and managersof an esta"lishment or enterprise areli(ewise responsi"le for damages caused"y their employees in the service of the"ranches in which the latter areemployed or on the occasion of theirfunctions.142 !mployers shall "e lia"le for thedamages caused "y their employees andhousehold helpers acting within thescope of their assigned tas(s, eventhough the former are not engaged inany "usiness or industry.

ISSUE$*. :8; the Court of Appeals erred in

applying to the case the 'fth paragraphof Article )*+5 of the Civil Code, insteadof the fourth paragraph thereof

). :8; the Court of Appeals erred in rulingthat petitioner had the "urden to provethat the employee was not acting withinthe scope of his assigned tas(

7. :8; Castile/ may "e held vicariouslylia"le for the death resulting from the

negligent operation "y A"ad of acompany issued vehicle.

RULING$*. ;o.

3etitioner s interpretation of the 'fth paragraphis not accurate. The phrase Geven though theformer are not engaged in any "usiness orindustryG found in the 'fth paragraph should "einterpreted to mean that it is not necessary forthe employer to "e engaged in any "usiness orindustry to "e lia"le for the negligence of hisemployee who is acting within the scope of his

assigned tas(.A distinction must "e made "etween the twoprovisions to determine what is applica"le. Eothprovisions apply to employers- the fourthparagraph, to owners and managers of anesta"lishment or enterprise and the 'fth

paragraph, to employers in general, whether ornot engaged in any "usiness or industry. Thefourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the "ranches or on the occasion of theirfunctions, while the 'fth paragraphencompasses negligent acts of employeesacting within the scope of their assigned tas(.

The latter is an e/pansion of the former in "oth

employer coverage and acts included. ;egligentacts of employees, whether or not the employeris engaged in a "usiness or industry, arecovered so long as they were acting within thescope of their assigned tas(, even thoughcommitted neither in the service of the"ranches nor on the occasion of their functions.


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was leaving the restaurant that the incident in=uestion occurred. That same witness for theprivate respondents testi'ed that at the time of the vehicular accident, AEAD was with a womanin his car, who then shouted- GDaddy,DaddyKG This woman could not have "eenAEAD s daughter, for AEAD was only ) yearsold at the time.

To the mind of the Court, AEAD was engaged in

aIairs of his own or was carrying out a personalpurpose not in line with his duties at the timehe 'gured in a vehicular accident. &t was thena"out )-55 a.m. way "eyond the normalwor(ing hours. AEAD s wor(ing day had endedhis overtime wor( had already "een completed.His "eing at a place which, as petitioner put it,was (nown as a Ghaven for prostitutes, pimps,and drug pushers and addicts,G had noconnection to petitioner s "usiness neither hadit any relation to his duties as a manager.0ather, using his service vehicle even forpersonal purposes was a form of a fringe "ene'tor one of the per(s attached to his position.Since there is paucity of evidence that AEADwas acting within the scope of the functionsentrusted to him, petitioner CAST& !F had noduty to show that it e/ercised the diligence of agood father of a family in providing AEAD with aservice vehicle. Thus, #ustice and e=uity re=uirethat petitioner "e relieved of vicarious lia"ilityfor the conse=uences of the negligence of AEADin driving its vehicle.3etitioner Castile/ &ndustrial Corporation isa"solved of any lia"ility for the damages caused"y its employee, %ose Een#amin A"ad.

3. G.R. N/. L 2 142 M ! 2 , 1 5

P ILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. )7FELI+ PANGALANGAN, plaintiIs appellants,

vs.P IL AMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC.,

ARC IMEDES J. BALINGIT )7 FERNANDOPINEDA, defendants appellees.

Angel A. /ison for plainti=s%appellants.

idel >osi!o ?. "anilao for defendants%appellees.

S?;83S&S

As a result of a vehicular accident, complaint fordamages "ased on culpa a=uitiana was 'ledagainst the 3hil American


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Among the defenses interposed "y thedefendants in their answer was that Ealingitwas not 3ineda s employer.

Ealingit moved that the complaint against him"e dismissed on the ground that the "us

company and the "us driver had no cause of action against him. As already stated, the lowercourt dismissed the action as to Ealingit. The"us company and its driver appealed.

The Civil Code provides-

A3@. 215 . Bhoe$er by act or o!issioncauses da!age to another# there beingfault or negligence# is obliged to pay for the da!age done. /uch fault or negligence# if there is no pre%existingcontractual relation bet*een the

parties# is called a -uasi%delict and isgo$erned by the pro$isions of this"hapter.

A3@. 2186. @he obligation i!posed by article 215 is de!andable not only for oneCs o*n acts or o!issions# but alsofor those of persons for *ho! one isresponsible.

xxx xxx xxx

@he o*ners and !anagers of anestablish!ent or enterprise areli e*ise responsible for da!agescaused by their e!ployees in theser$ice of the branches in *hich thelatter are e!ployed or on the occasionof their functions.

!ployers shall be liable for theda!ages caused by their e!ployeesand household helpers acting *ithinthe scope of their assigned tas s# e$enthough the for!er are not engaged inany business or industry.

xxx xxx xxx

@he responsibility treated of in thisarticle shall cease *hen the personsherein !entioned pro$e that they obser$ed all the diligence of a goodfather of a fa!ily to pre$ent da!age.(196'a,

ISSUE$

whether the terms GemployersG and Gownersand managers of an esta"lishment orenterpriseG 1 dueDos o directores de unestablici!iento o e!presa 2 used in article )*+5

of the Civil Code, formerly article * 57 of theold Code, em"race the manager of acorporation owning a truc(, the rec(lessoperation of which allegedly resulted in thevehicular accident from which the damagearose.

ELD$

;8.

:e are of the opinion that those terms do notinclude the manager of a corporation. &t may "egathered from the conte/t of article )*+5 thatthe term GmanagerG 1GdirectorG in the Spanishversion2 is used in the sense of GemployerG.

&)!&, %)7& " & ''&* "(/)# /8 " &!/9:' ()", )/ "/ "(/%# / ;% #( 7&'(!"% ''( (" " & & (!%'

!!(7&)" ' & 7= 9&)"(/)&7


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That argument implies that the veil of corporate'ction should "e pierced and that 3hil American


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alleged employer of ;estor Martin, thedriver of the car at the time of the accident.;estor Martin was not impleaded. The actionwas "ased on tort under Article )*+5 of theCivil Code, providing in part that-

!ployers shall be liable for the da!agescaused by their e!ployees and household

helpers acting *ithin the scope of their assigned tas s# e$en though the for!er arenot engaged in any business or industry.

The defendant moved to dismiss thecomplaint on the ground that no evidencehad "een adduced to show that ;estorMartin was his employee. The motion wasdenied. The 0TC held in favor of the plaintiI.

The CA a9rmed it in toto .

ISSUE$ :8; !rnesto is lia"le for the

damage caused "y ;estor.

ELD$ NO.

:hether or not engaged in any "usiness orindustry, the employer under Article )*+5 islia"le for the torts committed "y hisemployees within the scope of theirassigned tas(. Eut it is necessary 'rst toesta"lish the employment relationship. 8ncethis is done, the plaintiI must show, to holdthe employer lia"le, that the employee wasacting within the scope of his assigned tas(when the tort complained of was committed.&t is only then that the defendant, asemployer, may 'nd it necessary to interposethe defense of due diligence in the selectionand supervision of the employee as allowedin that article.

&n the case at "ar, no evidence whatsoeverwas adduced "y the plaintiI to show thatthe defendant was the employer of ;estor

Martin at the time of the accident. The trialcourt merely presu!ed the e/istence of theemployer employee relationship and heldthat the petitioner had not refuted thatpresumption. &t noted that although thedefendant alleged that he was not ;estorMartin s employer, Ghe did not present anyproof to su"stantiate his allegation.G

A PRESUMPTION is de'ned as aninference as to the e/istence of a factnot actually (nown, arising from its usual

connection with another which is (nown,or a con#ecture "ased on paste/perience as to what course humanaIairs ordinarily ta(e. &t is either a

: %9:"(/) juris , / /8 ' >, or a: %9:"(/) hominis , / /8 8 !" .

There is no law directing the deductionmade "y the courts "elow from theparticular facts presented to them "y theparties. Such deduction is not among theconclusive presumptions under Section )

or the disputa"le presumptions underSection 7 of 0ule *7* of the 0ules of Court. &n other words, it is not apresumption +uris .

;either is it a presumption ho!inis ,which is a reasona"le deduction from thefacts proved without an e/press directionof law to that eIect. The facts proved, ornot denied, $i; ., the ownership of the carand the circumstances of the accident,are not enough "ases for the inference

that the petitioner is the employer of ;estor Martin.

&n the present case, the plausi"leassumption is that ;estor Martin is a closerelative of !rnesto Martin and on the date in=uestion "orrowed the car for some privatepurpose. ;estor would pro"a"ly not have"een accommodated if he were a mereemployee for employees do not usuallyen#oy the use of their employer s car at twoo cloc( in the morning.

As the employment relationship "etween!rnesto Martin and ;estor Martin could not"e presumed, it was necessary for theplaintiI to esta"lish it "y evidence. Meralcohad the "urden of proof, or the duty Gtopresent evidence on the fact in issuenecessary to esta"lish his claimG as re=uired"y 0ule *7*, Section * of the 0evised 0ulesof Court.


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diligence on the part of the petitioner in theselection and supervision of his employee.

These =uestions have not arisen "ecausethe employment relationship has not "eenesta"lished.

Heirs of Dia eus vs. Court of Appeals, J.0.;o. *L,


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&n the meantime %udge Tomas $. Tadeo, %r.replaced %udge Ser=uina as presiding #udgeof Eranch *54.

the respondent court issued an orderre#ecting the appearance of Atty. ;icolito .Eustos as private prosecutor on the groundthat the charge is for the violation of Eatas

3am"ansa Elg. )) which does not providefor any civil lia"ility or indemnity and hence,Git is not a crime against property "ut pu"licorder.G

The petitioner, through counsel 'led amotion for reconsideration of the orderdated + %anuary * + on March *5, * + .0espondent Claudio 'led her opposition tothe motion for reconsideration on March )4,* + . &n an order dated 7* March * + , therespondent court denied petitioner s motionfor reconsideration.

Hence, this petition =uestioning the ordersof the respondent Court.

ISSUE$:hether or not the respondent Court actedwith grave a"use of discretion or in e/cessof its #urisdiction in re#ecting the appearanceof a private prosecutor.

ELD$

The respondents ma(e capital of the factthat Eatas 3am"ansa Elg. )) punishes theact of (nowingly issuing worthless chec(s asan oIense against pu"lic order. As such, it isargued that it is the State and the pu"licthat are the principal complainants and,therefore, no civil indemnity is provided for"y Eatas 3am"ansa Elg. )) for which aprivate party or prosecutor may intervene.

8n the other hand, the petitioner, relying onthe legal a/iom that G!very man criminallylia"le is also civilly lia"le,G contends that

indemnity may "e recovered from theoIender regardless of whether or not Eatas3am"ansa Elg. )) so provides.

A careful study of the concept of civillia"ility allows a solution to the issue in thecase at "ar.

enerally# the basis of ci$il liability arising fro! cri!e is the funda!ental

postulate of our la* that E $ery !ancri!inally liable is also ci$illy liableE(Art. 166# @he 3e$ised ,>('8%''= / )&*'(*&)"'= ! %# 7 9 *&"/ )/" & , # '' ()7&9)(8= " & ' ""&8/ " & # 9&.

0egardless, therefore, of whether or not a

special law so provides, indemni'cation of the oIended party may "e had on accountof the damage, loss or in#ury directlysuIered as a conse=uence of the wrongfulact of another. The indemnity which aperson is sentenced to pay forms an integral


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part of the penalty imposed "y law for thecommission of a crime 1Nuemel v. Court of Appeals, )) SC0A 66, citing Eagtas v.Director of 3risons, +6 3hil. L )2. !verycrime gives rise to a penal or criminal actionfor the punishment of the guilty party, andalso to civil action for the restitution of thething, repair of the damage, andindemni'cation for the losses. 1 nited

States v. Eernardo, * 3hil. )L42.

&ndeed one cannot disregard the privateparty in the case at "ar who suIered theoIenses committed against her. ;ot onlythe State "ut the petitioner too is entitled torelief as a mem"er of the pu"lic which thelaw see(s to protect . She was assured thatthe chec(s were good when she parted withmoney, property or services. She suIeredwith the State when the chec(s "ounced.

&n o ano v. Hon. Martine 1J.0. ;o. L76* ,Decem"er *+, * +L2 and the casesconsolidated therewith, we held that GTheeIects of a worthless chec( transcend theprivate interests of the parties directlyinvolved in the transaction and touch theinterests of the community at large.G ?et, wetoo recogni ed the wrong done to theprivate party defrauded when we statedtherein that G T & 9(#! (&8 (" ! & " (#)/" /)'= > /)* "/ " & : =&& / " &

/'7& , # (##%&7. ()*


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Conse=uently, respondents commenced anaction for damages against petitioners"efore the 0egional Trial Court of EatangasCity, alleging that driver %uan Jon ales wasguilty of negligence and lac( of care andthat the Hernande spouses were guilty of negligence in the selection and supervisionof their employees. 3etitioners counteredthat the pro/imate cause of the death andin#uries sustained "y the passengers of "othvehicles was the rec(lessness of EoyetDolor, the driver of the owner type #eepney,who was driving in a ig agging mannerunder the inBuence of alcohol. 3etitionersalso alleged that Jon ales was not thedriver employee of the Hernande spousesas the former only leased the passenger

#eepney on a daily "asis 1"oundary systemlessor lessee relationship2. The Hernandespouses further claimed that even if an

employer employee relationship is found toe/ist "etween them, they cannot "e heldlia"le "ecause as employers they e/erciseddue care in the selection and supervision of their employee.

During the trial of the case, it wasesta"lished that the drivers of the twovehicles were duly licensed to drive and thatthe road where the collision occurred wasasphalted and in fairly good condition. &t wasfurther esta"lished that the owner type #eep

was moderately moving and had #ust passeda road "end when its passengers, privaterespondents %oseph Sandoval and 0eneCastillo, saw the passenger #eepney at adistance of three meters away. Thepassenger #eepney was traveling fast whenit "umped the owner type #eep. Moreover,the evidence presented "y respondents"efore the trial court showed that petitioner

%uan Jon ales o"tained his professionaldriver’s license only three months "efore theaccident. 3rior to this, he was holder of a

student drivers permit.

RTC %'()*$ 0endered a decision in favor of respondents.


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@he /tate is responsible in li e !anner *hen it acts through a special agent but not *hen the da!age has been caused by the o cial to *ho! the tas done properly

pertains# in *hich case *hat is pro$ided inarticle 215 shall be applicable.Lastly# teachers or heads of establish!entsof arts and trades shall be liable for da!ages caused by their pupils andstudents or apprentices# so long as they re!ain in their custody.@he responsibility treated of in this articleshall cease *hen the persons herein!entioned pro$e that they obser$ed all thediligence of a good father of a fa!ily to

pre$ent da!age. (?nderscoring supplied,

8n the other hand, Article )* L provides

A3@G"L 215 . Bhoe$er by act or o!ission

causes da!age to another# there being fault or negligence# is obliged to pay for theda!age done. /uch fault or negligence# if there is no pre%existing contractual relationbet*een the parties# is called a -uasi%delict and is go$erned by the pro$isions of this"hapter.

:hile the a"ove provisions of law do note/pressly provide for solidary lia"ility, thesame can "e inferred from the wordings of the 'rst paragraph of Article )*+5 which

states that the o#ligation imposed #y article -.(4 is demanda#le not only !or one5s o1n acts or omissions, #ut also!or those o! persons !or 1hom one isresponsi#le+Moreover, Article )*+5 should "e read withArticle )* 6 of the same Code, whichcategorically states that the responsi#ility o! t1o or more persons 1ho are lia#le!or 6uasi7delict is solidary+ &n otherwords, the lia"ility of #oint tortfeasors issolidary. $erily, under Article )*+5 of theCivil Code, ) &9:'/=& 9 = &&) " && ) )7& #:/%# )7 J%'( )

G/) '.&ndeed to e/empt from lia"ility the owner of a pu"lic vehicle who operates it under the"oundary system on the ground that he is amere lessor would "e not only to a"etBagrant violations of the 3u"lic Service aw,

"ut also to place the riding pu"lic at themercy of rec(less and irresponsi"le driversrec(less "ecause the measure of theirearnings depends largely upon the num"erof trips they ma(e and, hence, the speed atwhich they drive and irresponsi"le "ecausemost if not all of them are in no position topay the damages they might cause.

1)2 YES. The Court holds that the appellatecourt committed no reversi"le error inawarding temperate damages to therespondents.T&9:& "& / 9/7& "& 7 9 * aredamages which are more than nominal "utless than compensatory which may "erecovered when the court 'nds that somepecuniary loss has "een suIered "ut itsamount cannot, from the nature of the case,"e proved with certainty. Temperatedamages are awarded for those caseswhere, from the nature of the case, de'niteproof of pecuniary loss cannot "e oIered,although the court is convinced that therehas "een such loss. A #udge should "eempowered to calculate moderate damagesin such cases, rather than the plaintiI should suIer, without redress, from thedefendants wrongful act. The assessment of temperate damages is left to the sounddiscretion of the court provided that such anaward is reasona"le under the

circumstances.&n the case at "ar, the Court 'nds thatrespondents #% & &7 '/## > (!! ))/"


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inBicted. The intensity of the paine/perienced "y the relatives of the victim isproportionate to the intensity of aIection forhim and "ears no relation whatsoever withthe wealth or means of the oIender.

Moral damages are emphatically notintended to enrich a plaintiI at the e/pense

of the defendant. They are awarded to allowthe former to o"tain means, diversion oramusements that will serve to alleviate themoral suIering he has undergone due to thedefendants culpa"le action and must,perforce, "e proportional to the suIeringinBicted. Truly, the pain of the sudden loss of one’s oIspring, especially of a son who wasin the prime of his youth, and who holds somuch promise waiting to "e ful'lled isindeed a wellspring of intense pain which noparent should "e made to suIer. :hile it is

true that there can "e no e/act or uniformrule for measuring the value of a human lifeand the measure of damages cannot "earrived at "y a precise mathematicalcalculation, R)* we hold that the Court of Appeals award of moral damages of 3*55,555.55 each to the Spouses Dolor andSpouses $almocina for the death of theirrespective sons, Eoyet Dolor and 8scar$almocina, is in full accord with prevailing

#urisprudence.

162 NO. The Court 'nds no su9cient "asiswas esta"lished for the grant thereof.&t is well settled that attorney’s fees shouldnot "e awarded in the a"sence of stipulatione/cept under the instances enumerated inArticle ))5+ of the Civil Code. As heldin 3i;al /urety and Gnsurance "o!pany $."ourt of Appeals -

Article ))5+ of the Civil Code allowsattorney’s fees to "e awarded "y a courtwhen its claimant is compelled to litigate

with third persons or to incur e/penses toprotect his interest "y reason of anun#usti'ed act or omission of the party fromwhom it is sought. W ('& %7(!( '7(#! &"(/) (# & & & " )", ) > 7" & &/8 7&9 )7#, )& & " &'#, 8 !"% ', '&* ' / &;%("


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Sa"layan. He had testi'ed "efore the trialcourt that "efore he hired Sa"layan, here=uired him to su"mit a police clearance inorder to determine if he was ever involvedin any vehicular accident. He also re=uiredSa"layan to undergo a driving testconducted "y his mechanic, !ste"an %aca.Sy(i claimed that he, in fact, accompaniedSa"layan during the driving test and that

during the test, Sa"layan was taught to readand understand tra9c signs li(e Do ;ot!nter, 8ne :ay, eft Turn and 0ight Turn.Sy(i’s mechanic !ste"an %aca, on the otherhand, testi'ed that Sa"layan passed thedriving test and never 'gured in anyvehicular accident e/cept the one in=uestion. He also testi'ed that hemaintained in good condition all the truc(sof Sy(i "y chec(ing the "ra(es, horns andtires thereof "efore providing haulingservices. According to Sy(i, all these weresu9cient evidence to prove that heo"served the diligence of a good father of afamily in selecting and supervising hisemployee Sa"layan. Therefore, the CA erredin holding him lia"le via Article )*+5 of theCivil Code as a negligent employer.

astly, Sy(i contends that his truc( driverSa"layan was caught unaware when thepassenger #eepney hailed "y Eegasasuddenly stopped at the intersection of anational highway. Had Eegasa Bagged downthe #eepney at a proper place, then theaccident could’ve "een avoided. Sy(i assertsthat, even if he was found guilty as anegligent employer, then the award fordamages against him should "e mitigated"ecause Eegasa himself was guilty of contri"utory negligence.

I##%$

&.:hether or not Sy(i was a"le to present

su9cient evidence that he e/ercised thediligence of a good father of a family in the

selection and supervision of his employeeSa"layan.&&.

&f Sy(i is found to "e a negligentemployer, then whether or not Eegasa wasguilty of contri"utory negligence so as tomitigate the award of damages against Sy(i.

R%'()*$


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testimonial evidence to prove that heo"served the diligence of a good father of afamily in the selection and supervision of hisemployee, "ut he must also support suchtestimonial evidence with concrete ordocumentary evidence. The reason for thisis to o"viate the "iased nature of theemployer’s testimony or that of hiswitnesses. &n the case at "ench, petitioner

Sy(i’s evidence consisted entirely of testimonial evidence. He never presentedthe police clearance that was allegedlygiven to him "y Sa"layan, nor the results of Sa"layan’s driving test. Also, he did notpresent records of the regular inspectionsthat his mechanic !ste"an %aca allegedlyconducted. The unsu"stantiated and selfserving testimonies of Sy(i and hismechanic were, without dou"t, insu9cientto overcome the legal presumption that hewas negligent in the selection andsupervision of his driver. The Courtemphasi es that the legal o"ligation of employers to o"serve due diligence in theselection and supervision of their employeesprovided in Article )*+5 of the Civil Code isnot an empty provision or a mere formalism,since the non o"servance thereof actually"ecomes the "asis of the employer’svicarious lia"ility. !mployers shouldseriously o"serve such a degree of diligence1and prove it in court "y su9cient andconcrete evidence2 that would e/culpatethem from lia"ility. Therefore, the SupremeCourt a9rms the ruling of the Court of Appeals that petitioner Sy(i is lia"le for thein#uries suIered "y respondent Eegasa.

&&.;o, Salvador Eegasa was not guilty of

contri"utory negligence so as to mitigatethe award of damages against !rnesto Sy(i.Article )* of the Civil Code provides-

:hen the plaintiI’s own negligence wasthe immediate and pro/imate cause of hisin#ury, he cannot recover damages. Eut if hisnegligence was only contri"utory, theimmediate and pro/imate cause of the

in#ury "eing the defendant’s lac( of duecare, the plaintiI may recover damages, "utthe courts shall mitigate the damages to "eawarded.U

The underlying precept of the a"ove articleon contri"utory negligence is that a plaintiI who is partly responsi"le for his own in#uryshould not "e entitled to recover damagesin full, "ut must "ear the conse=uences of his own negligence. The defendant mustthus "e held lia"le only for the damagesactually caused "y his negligence.&n the case at "ench, there was no evidence

that respondent Salvador Eegasa and histhree companions Bagged down thepassenger #eepney in a prohi"ited area. ;ocity resolution, tra9c regulation or D3:Hmemorandum was presented to show thatthe passenger #eepney pic(ed up Eegasa

and his three companions in a prohi"itedarea.

&n sum, the sole and pro/imate cause of theaccident was the negligence of Sy(i’s driverwho, as found "y the lower courts, did notslow down even when he was alreadyapproaching a "usy intersection within thecity proper. The passenger #eepney had long

stopped to pic( up Eegasa and his threecompanions and, in fact, Eegasa wasalready partly inside the #eepney when truc(driver Sa"layan rear ended it. The impactwas so strong that Eegasa fell and fracturedhis left thigh "one 1femur2, and suIeredsevere wounds in his left (nee and leg. ;odou"t Sy(i’s driver was rec(less. Since thenegligence of Sy(i’s employee was the soleand pro/imate cause of the accident, thenas the employer, Sy(i is lia"le under Article)*+5 of the Civil Code, to pay damages torespondent Eegasa for the in#uries sustained"y him.

10. C (#"()/ #. C/% " /8 A::& '#, G.R.N/. 116100, F&< % = , 1 6

SPOUSES CUSTODIO )7 SPOUSESSANTOS #. COURT OF APPEALS,

EIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA

F !"#$

A civil case for the grant of an easement of right of way was 'led "y 3aci'co Ma"asaagainst the Custodios and Santoses. Theoriginal plaintiI 3aci'co Ma"asa died duringthe pendency of this case and wassu"stituted "y 8felia Ma"asa, his survivingspouse and children.

Ma"asa owns a parcel of land with a twodoor apartment erected thereon. Saidproperty may "e descri"ed to "e surrounded"y other immova"les pertaining to theCustodios and Santoses. :hen said propertywas purchased "y Ma"asa, there weretenants occupying the premises and who

were ac(nowledged "y Ma"asa astenants. However, one of said tenantsvacated the apartment and when Ma"asawent to see the premises, he saw that therehad "een "uilt an ado"e fence constructed"y Santos in the 'rst passageway ma(ing itnarrower in width.

RTC: 8rdered the Custodios and Santoses togive Ma"asa permanent access to the pu"licstreet ordered Ma"asa to pay Custodios andSantoses as indemnity for the permanentuse of the passageway.

Ma"asa, represented "y his heirs, went tothe Court of Appeals raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred in notawarding damages in their favor "ased onthe fact of loss in the form of unreali ed


18/33

rentals on the property due to the ado"ewall restricting access.

CA: The appealed decision is a9rmed to allrespects :&TH M8D&


19/33

11.MARITER MENDO A,P&"("(/)& , #.ADRIANO CASUMPANG,

JENNIFER ADRIANE )7 JO N ANDRE,'' #% ) 9&7 CASUMPANG,

R:/)7&)"#.G.R. N/. 1 5 ?5 2012 03 1

FACTS -

8n


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indemnity under Article ))5L of the CivilCode should "e given to respondents asheirs. The amount of 345,555.55 is '/ed "yprevailing #urisprudence for this (ind.

The Court also deems it #ust and e=uita"leunder Article ))5+ of the Civil Code toincrease the award of attorney’s fees from3)5,555.55 to 345,555.55.

:H!0!


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ISSUE$

:8; petitioners are lia"le to respondentsfor damages incurred as a result of thevehicular accident.

ELD$

NO.

oreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To "e negligent, a defendantmust have acted or failed to act in such away that an ordinary reasona"le man wouldhave reali ed that certain interests of certain persons were unreasona"lysu"#ected to a general "ut de'nite class of ris(s.

The acts of negligence of Arnulfo 0amos andEenigno $alde were contemporaneouswhen 0amos continued to drive a wigglingvehicle on the highway despite (nowledgeof its mechanical defect, while $alde didnot immediately veer to the rightmost side

of the road upon seeing the wiggling vehicleof 0amos X perhaps "ecause it still (ept toits lane and $alde did not (now the e/tentof its mechanical defect. However, when theowner type #eep encroached on the lane of the passenger #eep, $alde reali ed the perilat hand and steered the passenger #eeptoward the western shoulder of the road toavoid a collision. &t was at this point that itwas perceiva"le that 0amos must have lostcontrol of his vehicle, and that it was $aldewho had the last opportunity to avoid the

collision "y swerving the passenger #eeptowards the right shoulder of the road.

The doctrine of last clear chance applies to asituation where the plaintiI was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, "ut thedefendant X who had the last fair chance toavoid the impending harm and failed to doso X is made lia"le for all the conse=uencesof the accident, notwithstanding the priornegligence of the plaintiI. However, thedoctrine does not apply where the partycharged is re=uired to act instantaneously,and the in#ury cannot "e avoided "y the

application of all means at hand after theperil is or should have "een discovered.

The doctrine of last clear chance does notapply to this case, "ecause even if it can "esaid that it was Eenigno $alde who had the

last chance to avoid the mishap when theowner type #eep encroached on the westernlane of the passenger #eep, $alde no longerhad the opportunity to avoid the collision.

The Answer of petitioners stated that whenthe owner type #eep encroached on the laneof the passenger #eep, Eenigno $aldemaneuvered his vehicle towards the westernshoulder of the road to avoid a collision, "utthe owner type #eep driven "y 0amoscontinued to move to the western lane and"umped the left side of the passenger #eep.

Thus, petitioners assert in their 3etition thatconsidering that the time the owner type

#eep encroached on the lane of $alde to thetime of impact was only a matter of seconds, he no longer had the opportunityto avoid the collision. Although the recordsare "ereft of evidence showing the e/actdistance "etween the two vehicles when theowner type #eep encroached on the lane of the passenger #eep, it must have "een nearenough, "ecause the passenger #eep driven"y $alde was una"le to avoid the collision.

Hence, the doctrine of last clear chancedoes not apply to this case.

Article -.(/ o! the Ci3il Code provides-

Bhen the plainti= s o*n negligence *as thei!!ediate and proxi!ate cause of hisin+ury# he cannot reco$er da!ages. 0ut if his negligence *as only contributory# the

i!!ediate and proxi!ate cause of thein+ury being the defendant s lac of duecare# the plainti= !ay reco$er da!ages# but the courts shall !itigate the da!ages to bea*arded.

&n this case, "oth Arnulfo 0amos andEenigno $alde failed to e/ercise reasona"lecare and caution that an ordinarily prudentman would have ta(en to prevent thevehicular accident. Since the grossnegligence of Arnulfo 0amos and the

ine/cusa"le negligence of Eenigno $aldewere the pro/imate cause of the vehicularaccident, respondents cannot recoverdamages pursuant to Article )* of theCivil Code.


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13.FLORES VS. PINEDA, G.R. NO.1 ? 6, NOVEMBER 14, 200?

FACTS$

Teresita 3ineda 1 @eresita 2 was a 4* yearold unmarried woman living in Sto.Domingo, ;ueva !ci#a. She consulted Dr.


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hyperglycemia presented a far greater ris(than her on and oI vaginal "leeding. Thepresence of hyperglycemia in a surgicalpatient is associated with poor clinicaloutcomes, and aggressive glycemic controlpositively impacts on mor"idity andmortality. !lective surgery in people withuncontrolled dia"etes should prefera"ly "escheduled after accepta"le glycemic

control

has "een achieved.

According to Dr.Mercado, this is done "y administeringinsulin on the patient. &n this case, there wasno evidence that insulin was administeredon Teresita prior to or during the DYCoperation. &nsulin was only administered twodays after the operation. The a"ove facts,point only to one conclusion that thepetitioner spouses failed, as medicalprofessionals, to comply with their duty too"serve the standard of care to "e given tohyperglycemicVdia"etic patients undergoingsurgery.

Injury and Causation

The decision to proceed with the DYCoperation notwithstanding Teresita’shyperglycemia and without ade=uatelypreparing her for the procedure, wascontrary to the standards o"served "y themedical profession. Deviation from thisstandard amounted to a "reach of dutywhich resulted in the patient’s death. Due tothis negligent conduct, lia"ility must attachto the petitioner spouses.:e similarly a9rm the grant of e/emplarydamages. !/emplary damages are imposed"y way of e/ample or correction for thepu"lic good. Eecause of the petitionerspouses negligence in su"#ecting Teresita toan operation without 'rst recogni ing andaddressing her dia"etic condition, theappellate court awarded & &9:' =7 9 * to the respondents in the amountof 3*55,555.55. 3u"lic policy re=uires suchimposition to suppress the wanton acts of an

oIender.14.B ) /8 A9& (! #. P ('(::()&

R !()* C'%<G.R. 1 022? J%'= 30, 200

%onente: 8eonardo7De Castro, 9:

F !"#$

3laintiI 30C& is a domestic corporationwhich maintains a current account withpetitioner Ean( of America. &ts authori edsignatories are the company 3resident and

$ice 3resident. Ey virtue of a travel a"roadfor these o9cers, they pre signed chec(s toaccommodate any e/penses that may comeup while they were a"road for a "usinesstrip. The said pre signed chec(s were left for

safe(eeping "y 30Cs accounting o9cer.nfortunately, the two 1)2 of said chec(s

came into the hands of one of its employeeswho managed to encash it with petitioner"an(. The said chec( was 'lled in with theuse of a chec( writer, wherein in the "lan(for the 3ayee , the amount in words waswritten, with the word Cash written a"oveit.

Clearly there was an irregularity with the'lling up of the "lan( chec(s as "othshowed similar in'rmities and irregularitiesand yet, the petitioner "an( did not try toverify with the corporation and proceeded toencash the chec(s.

30C 'led an action for damages against the"an(. The lower court awarded actual ande/emplary damages. 8n appeal, the CAa9rmed the lower court s decision and heldthat the "an( was negligent. Hence thisappeal. 3etitioner contends that it wasmerely doing its o"ligation under the lawand contract in encashing the chec(s, sincethe signatures in the chec(s are genuine.

I##%&$:hether or not the petitioner can "e heldlia"le for negligence and thus should paydamages to 30C

&'7$Eoth parties are held to "e at fault "ut the"an( has the last clear chance to preventthe fraudulent encashment hence it is theone foremost lia"le.

There was no dispute that the signatures inthe chec(s are genuine "ut the presence of irregularities on the face of the chec( shouldhave alerted the "an( to e/ercise caution"efore encashing them. &t is well settled that"an(s are in the "usiness impressed withpu"lic interest that they are duty "ound to

protect their clients and their deposits at alltimes. They must treat the accounts of these clients with meticulousness and ahighest degree of care considering the'duciary nature of their relationship. Thediligence re=uired of "an(s are more thanthat of a good father of a family.

&n the case at "ar, petitioner cannot evaderesponsi"ility for the loss "y attri"utingnegligence on the part of respondent"ecause, even if we concur that the latterwas indeed negligent in pre signing "lan(

chec(s, the former had the last clear chanceto avoid the loss. To reiterate, petitionersown operations manager admitted that theycould have called up the client forveri'cation or con'rmation "efore honoringthe du"ious chec(s. $erily, petitioner had


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the 'nal opportunity to avert the in#ury that"efell the respondent.


25/33

land of the Tan#angos "y + s=uare meters.&t, however, ruled that the Cuasos were"uilders in good faith, and gave the

Tan#angcos the option to sell and the Cuasosthe option to "uy the encroaching portion of the land, at a price to "e agreed upon "y theparties. &n the event that the Cuasos wereuna"le and unwilling to purchase the saidportion, the perimeter wall should "e

demolished at the latter s e/pense. The 0TCalso ordered the Cuasos to pay monthlyrentals of 3),555.55 commencing from thetime of the 'ling of the complaint. The 0TCli(ewise held that C.E. 3ara was grosslynegligent in not ta(ing into account thecorrect "oundaries of Cuasos lot when itconstructed the house. &t, thus, ordered C.E.3ara to pay moral and e/emplary damagesas well as attorney s fees to the Tan#angcosand the Cuasos. The third party complaintagainst Corinthian and !ngr. De Dios, on theother hand, was dismissed for lac( of causeof action.

CA RULING$ CA reversed and set aside the0TC Decision. &t held that the Cuasos actedin "ad faith in land gra""ing the + s=uaremeter portion of ot L as of April 4, * + .Correlatively, the CA allowed the Tan#angcosto e/ercise the rights granted under Articles66 , 645, 64* and 46 of the ;ew CivilCode, which include the right to demand thedemolition of the oIending perimeter wallafter reim"ursing the Cuasos the necessarye/penses for the preservation of theencroached area. The Cuasos were orderedto pay monthly rentals of 3*5,555.55 for theuse, en#oyment and occupancy of the lot upto the time they vacate the propertyconsidering the location and category of thesame. They were, li(ewise, ordered to paythe Tan#angcos moral, e/emplary damages,and attorney s fees. The CA also imposed si/percent 1L[2 interest per annum on all theawards.

The Cuasos appeal against the Tan#angcos,

on the other hand, was dismissed for lac( of merit. 8n the third party complaints,Corinthian, C.E. 3ara and !ngr. De Dioswere all found negligent in performing theirrespective duties and so they were orderedto contri"ute 've percent 14[2 each, or atotal of 'fteen percent 1*4[2 to all #udgmentsums and amounts that the Cuasos shalleventually pay under the decision, also withinterest of si/ percent 1L[2 per annum.

8nly Corinthian 'led a Motion for0econsideration. ;o motion for

reconsideration was 'led "y the Cuasos,C.E. 3ara andVor !ngr. De Dios. The CAdenied Corinthian s Motion for0econsideration. Hence, Corinthian 'led theinstant 3etition for 0eview on Certiorariassailing the CA Decision and 0esolution,

and impleading the Cuasos as one of therespondents "eing the third party plaintiIsin the 0TC.

The Tan#angcos moved for partial entry of #udgment of the CA Decision which wasgranted "y the CA. The Tan#angcos thenmoved for the e/ecution of the #udgmentagainst the Cuasos, speci'cally thedemolition of the perimeter fence. The

Cuasos prayed for the issuance of atemporary restraining order 1T082 andVorpreliminary in#unction "efore this Court toen#oin the demolition of the perimeter fence.

The Tan#angcos opposed the Cuasosapplication for T08.

ISSUE$

:hether Corinthian was negligent under thecircumstances and, if so, whether suchnegligence contri"uted to the in#ury suIered"y the Tan#angcos.

ELD$ Y.A negligent act is an inadvertent act it may"e merely carelessly done from a lac( of ordinary prudence and may "e one whichcreates a situation involving anunreasona"le ris( to another "ecause of thee/pecta"le action of the other, a thirdperson, an animal, or a force of nature. Anegligent act is one from which an ordinaryprudent person in the actor s position, in thesame or similar circumstances, wouldforesee such an apprecia"le ris( of harm toothers as to cause him not to do the act orto do it in a more careful manner.

The test to determine the e/istence of negligence in a particular case may "estated as follows- Did the defendant incommitting the alleged negligent act usethat reasona"le care and caution which anordinary person would have used in thesame situationW &f not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law, in eIect, adopts the

standard supplied "y the imaginary conductof the discreet paterfamilias in 0oman law. The e/istence of negligence in a given caseis not determined "y reference to thepersonal #udgment of the actor in thesituation "efore him. The law considers whatwould "e rec(less, "lameworthy, ornegligent in a man of ordinary intelligenceand prudence, and determines lia"ilityaccording to that standard.

B= " (# "", >& H)7 C/ ()" ( ))&*'(*&)".

:hile the issue of Corinthian s allegednegligence is factual in character, a review"y this Court is proper "ecause the CA sfactual 'ndings diIer from those of the0TC s.R7 Thus, after a meticulous review of the evidence on record, we hold that the CA


26/33

committed no reversi"le error when itdeviated from the 'ndings of fact of the 0TC.

The CA s 'ndings and conclusions aresu"stantiated "y the evidence on record andare more in accord with law and reason.&ndeed, it is clear that Corinthian failed toe/ercise the re=uisite diligence in insuringthat the Cuasos a"ide "y its Manual of 0ulesand 0egulations, there"y resulting in the

encroachment on the Tan#angcos property.

&t goes without saying that this Manual of 0ules and 0egulations applies to all or itdoes not apply at all.

To "orrow a popular e/pression, what issauce for the gander is sauce for the goose or ought to "e. To put it matter of factly and"luntly, thus, its so called Gta"le inspectionGapproval of the Cuasos "uilding plans is noless of an approval, as approvals come andgo. And since it is an approval tainted withnegligence, the necessary and inevita"leconse=uences which law and #ustice attachto such negligence must, as a matter of lawand #ustice, also necessarily attach toCorinthian.

&n sum, Corinthian s failure to prevent theencroachment of the Cuasos perimeter wallinto Tan#angcos property despite theinspection conducted constitutesnegligence and, at the very least,contri"uted to the in#ury suIered "y the

Tan#angcos.

16.LIG T RAIL TRANSIT AUT ORITY RODOLFO ROMAN, :&"("(/)& #, #.

MARJORIE NAVIDAD, &( # /8 " & L "&NICANOR NAVIDAD

PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY, :/)7&)"#.G.R. N/. 14 ?04 F&< % = 6, 2003

FACTS$

;icanor ;avidad, then drun(, entered the!DSA 0T station after purchasing a to(en1representing payment of the fare2. :hile;avidad was standing on the platform near the

0T trac(s, %unelito !scartin, the security guardassigned to the area approached ;avidad. Amisunderstanding or an altercation "etween thetwo apparently ensued that led to a 'st'ght. ;o evidence, however, was adduced toindicate how the 'ght started or who, "etweenthe two, delivered the 'rst "low or how ;avidad

later fell on the 0T trac(s. At the e/actmoment that ;avidad fell, an 0T train,operated "y petitioner 0odolfo 0oman, wascoming in. ;avidad was struc( "y the movingtrain, and he was (illed instantaneously.

The widow of ;icanor, herein respondentMar#orie ;avidad, along with her children, 'leda complaint for damages against %unelito!scartin, 0odolfo 0oman, the 0TA, the Metro

Transit 8rgani ation, &nc. 1Metro Transit2, and3rudent Security Agency 13rudent2 for the deathof her hus"and. 0TA and 0oman 'led acounterclaim against ;avidad and a cross claimagainst !scartin and 3rudent. 3rudent, in itsanswer, denied lia"ility and averred that it hade/ercised due diligence in the selection andsupervision of its security guards.

The 0TA and 0oman presented theirevidence while 3rudent and !scartin, instead of presenting evidence, 'led a demurrercontending that ;avidad had failed to provethat !scartin was negligent in his assigned tas(.

RTC %'()*$

BF 3 J3 # +udg!ent is hereby rendered infa$or of the plainti=s and against thedefendants


27/33

1)2 :hether or not 0odolfo 0oman is lia"le forthe death of ;icanor ;avidad, %r.172 :hether or not nominal damages can coe/ist with compensatory damages.

RULING$1*2 NO.

The premise for the employers lia"ility isnegligence or fault on the part of theemployee. 8nce such fault is esta"lished, theemployer can then "e made lia"le on the "asisof the presumption +uris tantu! 1re"utta"lepresumption2 that the employer failed toe/ercise diligentissi!i patris fa!ilies 1diligenceof a good father of a family2 in the selection andsupervision of its employees. The lia"ility isprimary and can only "e negated "y showingdue diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not"een shown. A"sent such a showing, thelia"ility of a common carrier and anindependent contractor would "e solidary. A!/)" !"% ' /&'' ::'=. &n 'ne, '(


28/33


29/33

7. The in#ury suIered must not have "een dueto any voluntary action or contri"ution on thepart of the person in#ured.

&n the case at "ench, all of the a"ove re=uisitesare present.


30/33

Eontilao 1Sherlina2, to "ring Allen "ac( for retightening of the cast not later than %une *4,* ).

Allen, however, was "rought "ac( to thehospital only on %une )), * ). Ey then,"ecause the cast had not "een re tightened, arotational deformity had developed in Allen sarm so it was agreed that an open reduction

surgery will "e conducted on %une )6, * ) "yrespondent, again with Dr. %a"agat as theanesthesiologist.

8n the said date, Dr. %a"agat failed tointu"ate the patient so anesthesia wasadministered through a gas mas(. 0espondentas(ed Dr. %a"agat if the operation should "epostponed given the failure to intu"ate, "ut Dr.

%a"agat said that it was alright to proceed.0espondent veri'ed that Allen was "reathingproperly "efore proceeding with the surgery.

ater, Sherlina was informed that her son haddied on the operating ta"le. The cause of deathwas Gasphy/ia due to congestion and edema of the epiglottis.G3etitioners 'led a complaint for damagesagainst "oth respondent and Dr. %a"agat in the0TC of Ce"u City alleging negligence andincompetence on the part of the doctors.

RTC - decided in favor of the petitioners it heldthat the doctrine of res ipsa lo=uitur wasapplica"le in esta"lishing respondent s lia"ilityasphy/ia or cardiac arrest does not normallyoccur in an operation on a fractured "one in thea"sence of negligence in the administration of anesthesia and the use of an endotrachealtu"e held that respondent and Dr. %a"agat weresolidarily lia"le for they failed to prove that theywere not negligent.

CA: held that the doctrine of res ipsa lo=uiturdoes not apply the trial court erred in applyingthe Ecaptain of the shipE doctrine to ma(erespondent lia"le even though he was the leadsurgeon D&SM&SS!D TH! C8M3 A&;T &; S8


31/33

controls the instrument causing the in#ury,provided that the following re=uisites concur-

1*2 The accident is of a (ind whichordinarily does not occur in the a"sence of someone s negligence

1)2 &t is caused "y an instrumentalitywithin the e/clusive control of the defendant ordefendants and

172 The possi"ility of contri"uting

conduct which would ma(e the plaintiI responsi"le is eliminated.

Here, the respondent could only supervise Dr. %a"agat to ma(e sure that he was performinghis duties. Eut respondent could not dictateupon Dr. %a"agat the particular anesthesia toadminister, the dosage thereof, or that it "eadministered in any particular way not deemedappropriate "y Dr. %a"agat. 0espondent sspeciali ation not "eing in the 'eld of anesthesiology, it would "e dangerous for himto su"stitute his #udgment for Dr. %a"agat sdecisions in matters that fall appropriatelywithin the scope of Dr. %a"agat s e/pertise.

The Court cannot properly declare thatrespondent failed to e/ercise the re=uiredstandard of care as lead surgeon as to hold himlia"le for damages for Allen s death.

&n civil cases, the "urden of proof to "eesta"lished "y preponderance of evidence is onthe plaintiI who is asserting the a r!ati$e of an issue. nless the party asserting thea9rmative of an issue sustains the "urden of proof, his or her cause will not succeed.

1 .BENJAMIN SALVOSA )7 BAGUIOCOLLEGES FOUNDATION,

:&"("(/)& #, #.

T E INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,EDUARDO B. CASTRO, DIOMEDES B.CASTRO, VIRGINIA B. CASTRO )7

RODOLFO B. CASTRO., :/)7&)"#.G.R. N/. 504 ? O!"/


32/33

temperate damages, and increasing theindemnity for the death of ;apoleon Castrofrom 3*),555.55 to 375,555.55.Hence, this petition.

ISSUE$

:hether or not petitioners Salvosa and EC< can"e held solidarity lia"le with %immy E. A"on fordamages under Article )*+5 of the Civil Code.

RULING$ NO.

nder the penultimate paragraph of Art. )*+5of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of esta"lishments of arts and trades are lia"le for

7 9 * ! %#&7 &)

& # /" N :/'&/) C #" /. ogically,therefore, :&"("(/)& # ! ))/" %)7& A ".21?0 /8 " & C( (' C/7&


33/33

Complaint against Jala/y Development andManagement Corporation, the agencycontracted "y respondent

ISSUES$*. :hether or not the school is lia"le for

"reach of contract). :hether or not

the security guards assigned to them actuallypossess the =uali'cations re=uired in theSecurity Service Agreement. Conse=uently,respondents defense of

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