G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGOand JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA, petitioners, vs.O!R" OF APPEALS, respondent. G!"IERREZ, JR., J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals'decision which reversed the trial court's judgment of convictionand acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion onthe ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittalordered themto pay jointly and severally the amount ofP,!!!.!! to the complainants as actual damages.The petitioners were charged under the following information"The undersigned #iscal accused $%& PA'())A, #()%*+,%-A)'%,+., P+P(T%/+'+,(A, &%))&$(C%, 'A0('/+$*1,'%,0())A,%AC, $%/+$T%$%.A)+., 0())A,(A, $%*+%-A$$('%,2%.+ %$T+-A, 2$., $(CA$'% C+)+.T(,%, $+A)(,-% alias34A*)%,3, 2%5, '%+ alias TAT%, and #%1$T++, 6789 $(CA$'%'%+. of the crime of -$A0+ C%+$C(%,, committed as follows"That on or about #ebruary :, 7;8 at around "!! o'cloc< in themorning, inthemunicipalityof 2osePanganiban, provinceofCamarines ,orte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this5onorable Court, the above= named accused, $oy Padilla,#ilomeno -aldones, Pepito /edenia, &olly $ico, 'avid /ermundo,0illanoac, $oberto $osales, 0illania, $omeo -arrido, 2ose %rtega,2r., $icardo Celestino, $ealingo alias 4amlon, 2ohn 'oe alias Tato,and #ourteen $ichard 'oes, by confederating and mutuallyhelping one another, and acting without any authority of law, didthen and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means ofthreats, force and violence prevent Antonio 0ergara and hisfamily to close their stall located at the Public *ar, 2ose Panganiban, Camarines ,orte, and by subsequentlyforciblyopeningthedoor of saidstall andthereafter brutallydemolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures thereinby a?es and other massive instruments, and carrying away thegoods, wares and merchandise, to the damage and prejudice ofthe said Antonio 0ergara and his family in the amount ofP>!,!!!.!!inconcept of actual or compensatoryandmoraldamages, and further the sumof P@!,!!!.!! as e?emplarydamages.That in committing the oAense, the accused too< advantage oftheir public positions" $oy Padilla, being the incumbent municipalmayor, andtherest of theaccusedbeingpolicemen, e?cept$icardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of 2ose Panganiban,Camarines ,orte, and that it was committed with evidentpremeditation.TheCourt of #irst (nstanceof Camarines,orte, Tenth2udicial'istrict renderedadecision, thedispositiveportionof whichstates that"(, 0(+B%#T5+ #%$+-%(,-, theCourtCndstheaccused $oyPadilla, #ilomeno -aldoneD, (smael -onDalgo and 2ose Parley/edeniaguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtof thecrimeof gravecoercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suAer animprisonment of #(0+ 6E9 months and %ne 679 dayF to pay a Cneof PE!!.!!eachF topayactual andcompensatorydamagesintheamount of P7!,!!!.!!F moral damages intheamount ofP>!,!!!.!!F andanother P7!,!!!.!!for e?emplarydamages,jointly and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided forby lawF and to pay the proportionate costs of this proceedings.The accused #ederico $ealingo alias '4amlon', 'avid /ermundo,Christopher 0illanoac, -odofredo 0illania, $omeo -arrido,$oberto $osales, $icardo Celestino and 2ose %rtega, are herebyordered acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for theircriminal participation in the crime charged.The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Courtof Appeals. They contended that the trial court's Cnding of gravecoercionwasnotsupportedbytheevidence. Accordingtothepetitioners, the town mayor had the power to order the clearanceofmar 6c9 of $ule 777 speciCcally provides that".ec. >.Other civil actions arising from ofenses. J (n all casesnot included in the preceding section the following rules shall beobserved"??? ??? ?????? ??? ???6c9 +?tinction of the penal action does not carry with it e?tinctionof the civil, unless the e?tinction proceeds from a declaration in aCnal judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise didnot e?ist. (n other cases, the person entitled to the civil actionmay institute it in the 2urisdiction and in the manner provided bylaw against the person who may be liable for restitution of thething and reparation or indemnity for the damage suAered.The judgment of acquittal e?tinguishes the liability of theaccused for damages only when it includes a declaration that thefacts from which the civil might arise did not e?ist. Thus, the civilliabilityisnote?tinguishedbyacquittal wheretheacquittal isbased on reasonable doubt 6P,/ v. Catipon, : Phil. @:;9 as onlypreponderance of evidence is required in civil casesF where thecourt e?pressly declares that the liability of the accused is notcriminal but only civil in nature 6'e -uDman v. Alvia, ; Phil. EE:FPeople v. Pantig, supra9 as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa,theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives whotherebyincur onlycivil liability6.eeArt. >>@, $evisedPenalCode9F and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is notbased upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted6Castro v. Collector of (nternal $evenue, 8 .C$A 7!>F .ee$egalado, $emedial )aw Compendium, 7:> ed., p. ;@>9. Article@ of the Civil Code also provides that"Bhen the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on thegroundthat hisguilthasnot beenprovedbeyondreasonabledoubt, a civilaction for damages for the same act or omissionmay be instituted. .uch action requires only a preponderance ofevidence. 1pon motion of the defendant, the court may requiretheplaintiAtoCleabondtoanswerfordamagesincasethecomplaint should be found to be malicious.(f inacriminal casethejudgment of acquittal isbaseduponreasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. (n the absence ofany declaration to that eAect, it may be inferred from the te?t ofthe decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.*ore recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in thecriminal case would not constitute an obstacle to the Cling of acivil casebasedonthesameacts whichledtothecriminalprosecution"... The Cnding by the respondent court that he spent said sum forand in the interest of the CapiD Agricultural and #ishery .choolandforhispersonal beneCtisnotadeclarationthatthefactupon which Civil Case ,o. 0=>>> is based does not e?ist. Thecivil actionbarredby suchadeclarationis thecivil liabilityarisingfromtheoAensecharged, whichis theoneimpliedlyinstituted with the criminal action. 6.ection 7, $ule (((, $ules ofCourt.9 .uchadeclarationwouldnot bar acivil actionCledagainst an accused who had been acquitted in the criminal caseif the criminal action is predicated on factual or legalconsiderations other than the commission of the oAensecharged. A person may be acquitted of malversation where, as inthe case at bar, he could show that he did not misappropriate thepublic funds in his possession, but he could be rendered liable torestore saidfunds or at least to ma9There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civilaction to still be Cled considering that the facts to be proved inthecivil casehavealreadybeenestablishedinthecriminalproceedings where the accused was acquitted. 'ue process hasbeen accorded the accused. 5e was, in fact, e?onerated of thecriminal charged. Theconstitutional presumptionof innocencecalled for more vigilant eAorts on the part of prosecutingattorneys and defense counsel, a . All other claims are denied. #The decision is anchored on the trial court's Cndings andconclusions that 6a9 petitioner and private respondent werelovers, 6b9 private respondent is not a woman of loose morals orquestionable virtue who readily submits to se?ual advances, 6c9petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses,promised to marry private respondent, d9 because of hispersuasive promise to marry her, she allowedherself to bedeLowered by him, 6e9 by reasonof that deceitful promise,private respondent and her parents J in accordance with #ilipinocustoms and traditions Jmade some preparations for theweddingthat wastobeheldat theendof %ctober 7:Gbyloo .C$A ;@@ Q7G!RF.acayv..andiganbayan,78@.C$AE>Q7:;R9F6:9BhentheCndings of fact are conclusions without citation of speciCcevidence on which they are based 6+&id.,9F 69 Bhen the facts setforth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and replybriefs are not disputed by the respondents 6+&id.,9F and 67!9 TheCnding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on thesupposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by theevidence on record 6.alaDar v. -utierreD, >> .C$A @8@ Q7G!R9.Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to 1s the e?istence ofany of the above quoted e?ceptions in this case. Consequently,thefactual Cndingsof thetrial andappellatecourtsmust berespected.And now to the legal issue.The e?isting rule is that a breach of promise to marry"er se isnot anactionablewrong.1(Congress deliberatelyeliminatedfrom the draft of the ,ew CivilCode the provisions that wouldhave made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report ofthe .enate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from whichBe quote"The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach ofpromise to marry is not actionable has been deCnitely decided inthecaseof 'e2esus vs. .yquia.18Thehistoryof breachofpromise suits in the 1nited .tates and in +ngland has shown thatno other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designingwomen and unscrupulous men. (t is this e?perience which has ledtotheabolitionofrightsofactionintheso=called5eart/almsuits in many of the American states. . . . 19This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article@7, which is designed to e?pand the concept of torts orquasi-delictin this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy forthe untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible forhumanforesight tospeciCcallyenumerateandpunishinthestatute boo;9yearsofage, andashighlyenlightenedasaformerhighschool teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be Jwhen she became intimate with petitioner, then a mereapprenticepilot, but, also, becausethecourt of Crst instancefound that, complainant 3surrendered herself3 to petitionerbecause, 3overwhelmedbyher love3for him, she3antedto&ind3 him &y having a fruit of their engagement even &efore theyhad the &ene/t of clergy.(n-an0ancovs.%ourt of #""eals,'#whilethis Court li and 7GEE.33Article7GE. Commoncarriersareliablefor thedeathof orinjuries to passengersthrough the negligence or willfulacts oftheformerTs employees, althoughsuchemployees mayhaveacted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of theorders of the common carriers.3This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proofthat they e?ercised all the diligence of a good father of a familyin the selection and supervision of their employees.33Article 7G;>. A common carrier is responsible for injuriessuAered by a passenger on account of the willful acts ornegligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the commoncarrierTsemployeesthroughthee?erciseof thediligenceof agood father of a family could have prevented or stopped the actor omission.3Thelawrequirescommoncarrierstocarrypassengerssafelyusingtheutmost diligenceof verycautiouspersonswithdueregard for all circumstances.E.uch duty of a common carrier toprovide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only duringthe course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are withinitspremisesandwheretheyoughttobeinpursuancetothecontract of carriage.;The statutory provisions render a commoncarrier liable for death of or injury to passengers 6a9 through thenegligenceorwilful actsof itsemployeesorb9onaccountofwilful acts or negligenceofother passengersorofstrangersifthecommoncarrierTsemployeesthroughthee?erciseof duediligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.G(ncaseofsuchdeathorinjury, acarrierispresumedtohavebeen at fault or been negligent, and:by simple proof of injury,the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault ornegligenceof thecarrier or of itsemployeesandtheburdenshifts uponthecarrier toprovethat theinjuryis duetoanunforeseen event or to force majeure.

(n the absence ofsatisfactory e?planation by the carrier on howthe accidentoccurred, whichpetitioners, accordingtotheappellatecourt,have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has beenat fault,7!ane?ceptionfromthegeneral rulethat negligencemust be proved.77The foundation of )$TATs liability is the contract of carriage andits obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach ofthat contract by reason of its failure to e?ercise the highdiligence required of the common carrier. (n the discharge of itscommitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier maychoose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services ofanoutsider or anindependent Crmtounderta;, 'umaguete City,and awarding damages instead to private respondent +liDa2ujeurche .unga as plaintiA in an action for breach of contract ofcarriage.The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows"At 7! o'cloc< in the morning of August @>, 7:, privaterespondent +liDa2ujeurche-. .unga, thenacollegefreshmanmajoring in Physical +ducation at the .iliman 1niversity, too< apassenger jeepneyownedandoperatedbypetitioner 0icenteCalalas. As the jeepney was Clled to capacity of about @8passengers, .ungawasgivenbytheconductor an3e?tensionseat,3 a wooden stool at the bac< of the door at the rear end ofthe vehicle.%n the way to Poblacion .ibulan, ,egros %ccidental, the jeepneystopped to let a passenger oA. As she was seated at the rear ofthe vehicle, .unga gave way to the outgoing passenger. 2ust asshe was doing so, an (suDu truc< driven by (glecerio 0erena andownedby#rancisco.alvabumpedtheleftrearportionof thejeepney. As a result, .unga was injured. .he sustained a fractureof the 3distal third of the left tibia=Cbula with severe necrosis ofthe underlying s to.eptember G, 7:. 5er attending physician, 'r. 'anilo 0.%ligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certiCed she would remain on acast for a period of three months and would have to ambulate incrutches during said period.%n %ctober , 7:, .unga Cled a complaint for damages againstCalalas, allegingviolationof thecontract of carriageby theformerinfailing to e?ercise the diligencerequired of himasacommoncarrier. Calalas, ontheotherhand, Cledathird=partycomplaint against #rancisco .alva, the owner of the (suDu truc8!9, Cled by Calalas against .alva and 0erena, for quasi=delict,in which /ranch >G of the same court held .alva and his driver0erena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.%n appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower courtwasreversedonthegroundthat.unga'scauseof actionwasbasedonacontractof carriage, notquasi=delict, andthatthecommoncarrierfailedtoe?ercisethediligencerequiredundertheCivil Code. Theappellatecourt dismissedthethird=partycomplaint against .alva and adjudged Calalas liable for damagesto .unga. The dispositive portion of its decision reads"B5+$+#%$+, thedecisionappealedfromishereby$+0+$.+'and .+T A.('+, and another one is entered ordering defendant=appellee 0icente Calalas to pay plaintiA=appellant"679 PE!,!!!.!! as actual and compensatory damagesF6@9 PE!,!!!.!! as moral damagesF6>9 P7!,!!!.!! as attorney's feesF and689 P7,!!!.!! as e?penses of litigationF and6E9 to pay the costs..% %$'+$+'.5ence, thispetition.Petitioner contends that the ruling in CivilCase ,o. >8! that the negligence of 0erena was the pro?imatecause of the accident negates his liability and that to ruleotherwise would be to ma8!Cndingthedriver andtheowner of thetruc8! and in the present casethe same. The issue in Civil Case ,o. >8! was whether .alvaand his driver 0erena were liable for quasi=delict for the damagecaused to petitioner's jeepney. %n the other hand, the issue inthis case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract ofcarriage. The /rst, quasi=delict, also ,brought an action in the Court of #irst (nstance of *anila against#austo /arredo as the sole proprietor of the *alate Ta?icab andemployer of Pedro #ontanilla. %n 2uly :, 7>, the Court of #irst(nstance of *anila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiAs forP@,!!! plus legalinterest from the date of the complaint.Thisdecision was modiCed by the Court of Appeals by reducing thedamages to P7,!!! with legal interest from the time the actionwas instituted. (t is undisputed that #ontanilla 's negligence wasthe cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side ofthe road, and at high speed. As to /arredo's responsibility, theCourt of Appeals found"... (t is admitted that defendant is #ontanilla's employer. There isproof that he e?ercised the diligence of a good father of a familytopreventdamage. 6.eep. @@, appellant'sbrief.9 (nfact itisshownhewascarelessinemploying#ontanillawhohadbeencaught several timesfor violationof theAutomobile)awandspeeding 6+?hibit A9 J violation which appeared in the records ofthe /ureau of Public Bor of the Civil Code.Themaintheoryof thedefenseisthat theliabilityof #austo/arredo is governed by the $evised Penal CodeF hence, hisliability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil actionagainst Pedro#ontanilla, thepersoncriminallyliable, /arredocannot beheldresponsibleinthecase. Thepetitioner'sbriefstates on page 7!"... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued forhis failure to e?ercise all the diligence of a good father of a familyintheselectionandsupervisionof Pedro#ontanillatopreventdamages suAered by the respondents. (n other words, The Courtof Appeals insists on applying in the case article 7!> of the CivilCode. Article 7!> of the Civil Code is found in Chapter ((, Title7;, /oo< (0 of the CivilCode. This fact ma of the Civil Code itself, is applicableonlyto3those6obligations9 arisingfromwrongful or negligentacts or commission not "unisha&le &y la.The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is e?pressed thus"... Be cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liabilitysought tobeimposeduponhiminthis actionis not acivilobligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor 6the crime ofPedro #ontanilla,9,but an obligationimposed in article 7!>oftheCivil Codebyreasonof hisnegligenceintheselectionorsupervision of his servant or employee.Thepivotal questioninthiscaseiswhethertheplaintiAsmaybring this separate civil action against #austo /arredo, thusmaof the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro #ontanilla. Thedefendant maintains that #ontanilla's negligence beingpunishablebythePenal Code, his6defendant's9 liabilityasanemployerisonlysubsidiary, accordingtosaidPenal code, but#ontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property hasnot beene?hausted. Todecidethemainissue, wemust cutthrough the tangle that has, in the minds of many confused andjumbled togetherdelitosand cuasi delitos, or crimes under thePenal Code and fault or negligence under articles 7!@=77! ofthe Civil Code. This should be done, because justice may be lostin a labyrinth, unless principles and remedies are distinctlyenvisaged. #ortunately, we are aided in our inquiry by theluminous presentation of the perple?ing subject by renown juristsandweareli.$u&sidiary civil lia&ility of other "ersons. JThesubsidiary liability established in the ne?t preceding article shallalsoapplytoemployers, teachers, persons, andcorporationsengaged in any provides that this porlasaccionesuomisionesdeaquellaspersonasporlasquesedeberesponder, essubsidiariaIesprincipalIParacontestar aestapreguntaesnecesariosaber, enprimerlugar, enquesefunda el precepto legal. +s que realmente se impone unaresponsabilidad por una falta ajenaI Asi parece a primera vistaFperosemejanteaCrmacionseriacontrariaalajusticiayalama?ima universal, segun la que las faltas son personales, y cadauno responde de aquellas que le son imputables. )aresponsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion de undelitooculpa, perono"orcausadeellos, sinoporcausadelcausi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o de la negligencia delpadre, del tutor, del dueNoodirectordel establecimiento, delmaestro, etc. Cuando cualquiera de las personas que enumera elarticulo citado 6menores de edad, incapacitados, dependientes,aprendices9 causanundaNo, laleypresumequeel padre, eltutor, el maestro, etc., hancometidounafaltadenegligenciapara prevenir o evitar el daNo. +sta falta es la que la ley castiga.,ohay, pues, responsabilidadpor unhechoajeno, sinoenlaaparienciaF en realidad la responsabilidad se e?ige por un hechopropio. )a idea de que esa responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, porlo tanto, completamente inadmisible.Huestion ,o. 7. (s the responsibility declared in article 7!> forthe acts or omissions of those persons for who one isresponsible, subsidiary or principalI (n order to answer thisquestion it is necessary to , ha deentenderse directa, por el tenor del articulo que impone laresponsabilidad precisamente 3por los actos de aquellaspersonas de quienes se deba responder.3That istosay, oneisnot responsiblefor theactsof others,becauseoneis liableonlyfor his ownfaults, this beingthedoctrine of article 7!@F but, by e?ception, one is liable for theactsofthosepersonswithwhomthereisabondortiewhichgives risetotheresponsibility. (s this responsibilitydirect orsubsidiaryI (n the order of the penal law, the Penal Codedistinguishes between minors and incapacitated persons on theonehand, andotherpersonsontheother, declaringthattheresponsibilityfor theformer isdirect 6article79, andfor thelatter, subsidiary 6articles @! and @79F but in the scheme of thecivil law, in the case of article 7!>, the responsibility should beunderstood as direct, according to the tenor of that articles, forprecisely it imposes responsibility 3for the acts of those personsfor whom one should be responsible.3Coming now to the sentences of the .upreme Tribunal of .pain,that court has upheld the principles above set forth" that a quasi-delictorcul"a e'tra-contractualis a separate and distinct legalinstitution, independent from the civil responsibility arising fromcriminal liability, and that an employer is, under article 7!> ofthe Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for thenegligent acts of his employee.%ne of the most important of those .panish decisions is that of%ctober @7, 77!. (nthat case, $amon)afuentediedastheresult of havingbeenrunoverbyastreet car ownedbythe3compaNia+lectric*adrileNadeTraccion.3Theconductor wasprosecuted in a criminal case but he was acquitted. Thereupon,thewidowCledacivil actionagainst thestreet carcompany,paying for damages in the amount of 7E,!!! pesetas. The lowercourt awarded damagesF so the company appealed to the.upreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 7!@ and 7!> oftheCivil Codebecauseby Cnal judgmentthenon=e?istenceoffault or negligencehadbeendeclared. The.upremeCourt of.pain dismissed the appeal, saying"Considerandoqueelprimermotivodel recurso se funda en elequivocado supuesto de que el Tribunala quo, al condonar a lacompaNia +lectrica *adrileNa al pagodeldaNo causadocon lamuertede$amon)afuente(Dquierdo, desconoceel valor yefectos juridicos de la sentencia absolutoria deictada en la causacriminal que se siguio por el mismo hecho, cuando es lo ciertoque de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentesas pectos, y como la de lo criminal declrao dentro de los limitesde su competencia que el hecho de que se trata no eraconstitutivo de delito por no haber mediado descuido onegligencia graves, lo que no e?cluye, siendo este el unicofundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa onegligencia no califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segunel articulo 7!@ del Codigo, y que alcanDan, segun el 7!>, netreotras perosnas, a los 'irectores de establecimientos o empresaspor los daNos causados por sus dependientes en determinadascondiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil, al conocer del mismohehcobahoesteultimoaspectoyal condenaralacompaNiarecurrente a la indemniDacion del daNo causado por uno de susempleados, lejos de infringer los mencionados te?tos, en relacioncon elarticulo77;de la )ey de +njuciamientoCriminal, sehaatenido estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a sujurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaidoen la causa.Considering that the Crst ground of the appeal is based on themista.The plaintiAs were free to choose which course to taG7 del Codigo deComercio, en que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido, sinoqueselimitaapedir lareparactiondelosdaNosyperjuiciosproducidos en el patrimonio del actor por la injustiCcada y dolosanegativadel porteador alaentregadelas mercancias asunombreconsignadas, segunloreconocelasentencia, ycuyaresponsabilidad esta claramente sancionada en el articulo 7!@del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a laCompaNiademandada como ligada con el causante de aquellos porrelaciones de caracter economico y de jurarquia administrativa.Considering that the sentence, in question recogniDes, in virtueof the facts which it declares, in relation to the evidence in thecase" 679 that the invoice issued by the railroad company in favorof the plaintiA contemplated that the empty receptacles referredtointhecomplaintshouldbereturnedtotheconsignorswithwines and liquorsF 6@9 that when the said merchandise reachedtheir destination, their delivery to the consignee was refused bythe station agent without justiCcation and with fraudulent intent,and 6>9 that the lac< of delivery of these goods when they weredemandedbytheplaintiAcausedhimlossesanddamagesofconsiderable importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of winesandliquors andhefailedtorealiDetheproCts whenhewasunabletoCll theorderssenttohimbytheconsignorsof thereceptacles"Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding thefour assignments of error, as the original complaint didnotcontainanycauseof actionarisingfromnon=fulCllment of acontract of transportation, because the action was not based onthe delay of the goods nor on any contractual relation betweenthepartieslitigant and, therefore, article>G7of theCodeofCommerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is notapplicableF butitlimitstoas!9. The latter case was an action for damages broughtbyCuisonforthedeathof hisseven=year=oldson*oises. Thelittle boy was on his way to school with his sister *arciana. .omelargepiecesof lumber fell fromatruc!9 the plaintiA brought an action for damagesfor thedemolitionof itswharf, whichhadbeenstruc of the Civil Code.(n other words, the Penal Code aKrms its jurisdiction while theCivil Codenegativesitsjurisdiction. Thisisacaseof criminalnegligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civilnegligence.? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?%urdeduction, therefore, isthatthecaserelatestothePenalCode and nottotheCivil Code.(ndeed,aspointed out by thetrial judge, any diAerent ruling would permit the master toescape scot=free by simply alleging and proving that the masterhade?ercisedall diligenceintheselectionandtrainingof itsservants to prevent the damage. That would be a good defenseto a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil actioneitherasapart of orpredicatedonconvictionforacrimeormisdemeanor. 6/y way of parenthesis, it may be said further thatthestatementsheremadeareoAeredtomeet theargumentadvanced during our deliberations to the eAect that article !!@of the Civil Code should be disregarded and codal articles 7!>and 7!> applied.9(t is not clear how the above case could support the defendant'sproposition, because the Court of Appeals based its decision inthe present case on the defendant's primary responsibility underarticle 7!> of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liabilityarising from #ontanilla's criminal negligence. (n other words, thecase of City of *anila vs. *anila +lectric Co., supra, is predicatedon an entirely diAerent theory, which is the subsidiary liability ofan employer arising from a criminal act of his employee, whereasthefoundationof thedecisionof theCourt of Appealsinthepresent caseis theemployer's primaryliabilityunder article7!> of the Civil Code. Be have already seen that this is a properand independent remedy.#ram&ulovs. )anila2lectric %o.6EE Phil., GE9, is anothercaseinvoEF -lencoe)and P -ravel Co. vs. 5udson /ros. Com. Co., 7>: *o., 8>.9(t should be observed in this connection that, according to the+nglish and American authorities, no question can be made as tothe liability to one who interferes with a contract e?istingbetweenothersbymeanswhich, under ! Phil. $ep., 8G7.9 As observed by this court in *anila$ailroadCo.vs.CompaNiaTransatlantica, $. -. ,o. 77>7:6>:Phil. $ep., :GE9, a contract, when eAectually entered intobetween certain parties, determines not only the character ande?tent of theliabilityof thecontractingparties but alsothepersonorentityby whomtheobligationise?igible. The sameidea should apparently be applicable with respect to the personagainst whom the obligation of the contract may be enforcedF forit is evident that there must be a certain mutuality in theobligation, and if the stranger to a contract is not permitted tosue to enforce it, he cannot consistently be held liable upon it.(f thetwoantagonisticideaswhichwehavejust brought intoju?taposition are capable of reconciliation, the process must beaccomplished by distinguishing clearly between the right ofaction arising from theimproperinterference with thecontractby a stranger thereto, considered as an independent actgenerateof civil liability, andtheright of actione'contractuagainst a party to the contract resulting from the breach thereof.5owever, we do not propose here to pursue the matter further,inasmuch as, for reasons presently to be stated, we are of theopinion that neither the doctrine of )umley vs.-ye Qsu"raR northe application made of it by this court in -ilchrist vs. Cuddy 6@Phil. $ep., E8@9, aAords any basis for the recovery of thedamageswhichtheplaintiAissupposedtohavesuAeredbyreason of his inability to comply with the terms of the Bacyc., 7;>!F @8Cyc., 7!E@.edgewic< on 'amages, ,inth ed., sec. 7:E.9 Jalmost aswellsettled, indeed, as the rule that the measure of damages forthe wrongful detention of money is to be found in the interest.Be recogniDe the possibility that more e?tensive damages maybe recovered where, at the time of the creation of thecontractual obligation, the vendor, or lessor, is aware of the usetowhichthepurchaser or lesseedesirestoput thepropertywhichisthe subjectofthecontract, andthe contractismadewith the eyes of the vendor or lessor open to the possibility ofthe damage which may resultto theother party from his ownfailure to give possession. The case before us is not thischaracter, inasmuch as at the time when the rights of the partiesunder the contract were determined, nothing was GF *apa vs. Chaves, @! Phil. $ep., 78GF *ans vs. -arry, @! Phil.$ep., 7>8.9 (t is true that some of the more recent of these casesma8>,@G8.E@.(n this suit started in #ebruary, 78, ,AC%C% see8>,@G8.E@fromgeneral manager andboardchairman*a?imo*. 4alaw, anddirectors 2uan/ocar,Casimiro -arcia and )eonor *oll. (t charges 4alaw withnegligence under Article 7!@ of the old Civil Code 6now Article@7G;, new Civil Code9F and defendant board members, including4alaw, with bad faith andMor breach of trust for having approvedthe contracts. The Cfth amended complaint, on which this casewastried, wasCledon2uly@, 7E. 'efendantsresistedtheaction upon defenses hereinafter in this opinion to be discussed.The lower court came out with a judgment dismissing thecomplaint without costsaswell asdefendants' counterclaims,e?cept that plaintiAwasorderedtopaytheheirsof *a?imo4alaw the sum of P@,;!7.8 for unpaid salaries and cash depositdue the deceased 4alaw from ,AC%C%.PlaintiA appealed direct to this Court.PlaintiA's brief did not, question the judgment on 4alaw'scounterclaim for the sum of P@,;!7.8.$ight at the outset, two preliminary questions raised before, butadversely decided by, the court below, arrest our attention. %nappeal, defendants renew their bid. Andthis, upon establishedjurisprudencethatanappellatecourtmaybaseitsdecisionofaKrmance of the judgment below on a point or points ignored bythe trial court or in which said court was in error.;7. #irst of the threshold questions is that advanced by defendantsthat plaintiA /oard of )iquidators has lost its legal personality tocontinue with this suit.Accepted in this jurisdiction are three methods by which acorporationmaywindupitsaAairs" 679 under.ection>, $ule7!8, of the $ules of Court Qwhich superseded .ection ;; of theCorporation )awRGwhereby, upon voluntary dissolution of acorporation, the court may direct 3such disposition of its assetsas justice requires, andmay appoint a receiver tocollect suchassets and pay the debts of the corporationF3 6@9 under .ectionGG of the Corporation )aw, whereby a corporation whosecorporate e?istence is terminated, 3shall nevertheless becontinuedasabodycorporatefor threeyearsafter thetimewhen it would have been so dissolved, for the purpose ofprosecuting and defending suits by or against it and of enablingit graduallytosettleandcloseits aAairs, todisposeof andconvey its property and to divide its capital stoc9under.ectionG:of theCorporation)aw, byvirtueofwhich the corporation, within the three year period justmentioned, 3isauthoriDedandempoweredtoconveyall of itspropertytotrusteesforthebeneCtof members, stocG@, the government, the sole stoc. PlaintiA levelled amajorattac!The language of one case ise?pressive" 3The adoption or ratiCcation of a contract by acorporation is nothing more or less than the ma@, 78:=78, >E). ed. ;;@, ;;, quoteswithapprovalfrom2udge.harswood6in .pering'sApp., G7Pa.779, the following" 31pon a close e?amination of all the reportedcases, although there are many dicta not easily reconcilable, yet( have found no judgment or decree which has held directors toaccount, e?cept whentheyhavethemselves beenpersonallyguiltyof somefraudonthecorporation, or haveGThe directors are not liable.3 >:;. To what then may we trace the damage suAered by ,AC%C%.The facts yield the answer. #our typhoons wrea> of the Civil Code, recoveryof e?emplary damages is not a matter of right but depends uponthe discretion of the court. 1nder Article @@!: of the Civil Code,attorney's fees and e?penses of litigation must always bereasonable. (n view of these provisions of the law, and since theaward of temperate damages is only P7!!,!!!.!!, the amount ofe?emplary damages may not be at par as temperate damages.Anawardof PE!,!!!.!!, ase?emplarydamagesmayalreadyservethepurpose,i.e., as ane?amplefor thepublic good.)i, said cargo truc< driven by defendant 'omingo 0illa was onits way to 0alenDuela, /ulacan from Pangasinan. Petitioner, withacargoof livestoc..ubsequently, two chec:>infavor of /. *. -lass.ervicedatedApril 7;, 7;>andbearing,o. C=8@8:E@, andchec< ,o. C=>8; for the amount of P7!! in favor of the )egaCorporation, and drawn against the said /an!, record9 and on 'ecember @,7:, said .heriA reported to this Court that the attachedvehicleswereta7, t.s.n., ,atividad C./abaran, proceedings on 'ecember 7!, 7!9.:%n2une;, 7@, thetrial courtrenderedajointdecision, thedispositive portion of which reads as follows"B5+$+#%$+, in view of the foregoing considerations judgment ishereby rendered"7. #inding the accused $omeo 'unca y de Tumol guilty beyondreasonable doubt of the crime of 'ouble 5omicide through$ec;9, and appreciating in his favor the mitigatingcircumstanceof voluntary surrender without any aggravatingcircumstance to oAset the same, the Court hereby sentences himto suAer two 6@9 indeterminate penalties of four months and oneday of arresto mayor as minimum to three years, si? months andtwenty days as ma?imumF to indemnify the 5eirs of #rancisco 'y.2r. intheamountofP>,!!!,!!!.!!ascompensatorydamages,P7,!!!,!!!.!! as moral damages, and P7,!>!,!!!.!! as funerale?pensesF@. %rdering the plaintiA in Civil Case ,o. /r. 7=8@8 to pay thedefendant therein actual damages in the amount of P:8,!!!.!!Fand>. %rdering the dismissalof the complaint in Civil Case ,o. /r.7=8@8.,o pronouncement as to costs..% %$'+$+'.Cauayan, (sabela, 2une ;, 7@.6.gd.9 A$T+*(% $. A)(0(A$egional Trial 2udge

%n .eptember >, 7@, petitioner and the accused Cled a noticeof appeal from the joint decision. 7!%n the other hand, private respondents moved for amendment ofthe dispositive portion of the joint decision so as to holdpetitioner subsidiarilyliablefor thedamages awardedtotheprivate respondents in the event of insolvency of the accused. 77%n%ctober@;, 7@, thetrial courtrenderedasupplementaldecision amending the dispositive portion by inserting anadditional paragraph reading as follows"@"A J%rdering the defendant $eyes Truc, 7:, the Court granted leave to petitioner to Cle areply and noted the reply it Cled on *arch 77, 7:. @7Be now resolve to give due course to the petition and decide thecase.Petitioner raises three 6>9 grounds for allowance of the petition,which, however, boil down to two 6@9 basic issues, namely"7. *ay petitioner as owner of the truc< involved in the accidentbe held subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to theoAendedpartiesinthe criminal actionagainstthe truc< driverdespite the Clingof a separatecivil actionby theoAendedparties against the employer of the truc< driverI@. *ay the Court award damages to the oAended parties in thecriminal casedespite theClingof a civil actionagainst theemployer of thetrucGParenthetically, the trial court found the accused 3guilty beyondreasonable doubt of the crime of 'ouble 5omicide Through$ec;93. There is no suchnomenclature of anoAense under the $evised Penal Code. Thus, the trial court wasmisled to sentence the accused 3to suAer two 6@9 indeterminatepenalties of four 689 months and one 679 day of arresto mayor, asminimum, to three 6>9 years, si? 6;9 months and twenty 6@!9 daysof "rision correccional, as ma?imum.3 This is erroneous becauseinrec:1nfortunately, wecannolongercorrectthisjudgmenteveniferroneous, as it is, because it has become Cnal and e?ecutory.1nder Article >;E of the $evised Penal Code, criminal negligence3istreatedasamerequasi oAense, anddealtwithseparatelyfromwillful oAenses. (t is not aquestionof classiCcationorterminology.(n intentionalcrimes, the actitself is punishedF innegligenceor imprudence, what isprincipallypenaliDedisthemental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerousrec;, as amended9, and sentences him to suAer two 6@9indeterminatepenaltiesoffour689monthsandone679dayofarresto mayor, as minimum,to three 6>9 years, si? 6;9 monthsandtwenty6@!9 daysof"risioncorreccional, asma?imum,8!without indemnity, and to pay the costs, and6@9(nCivil Case,o. /r. 7=8@8, theCourtordersthecasere=opened to determine the liability of the defendant $afael $eyesTruc