3.5 - Parsons, Nicholas T. - Foucault and the Problem of Kant (en)

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Foucault and the Problem of Kant

Foucault and the Problem of Kant

by Nicholas T. Parsons

Source:

PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 3 / 1988, pages: 317-328, on www.ceeol.com.
http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.dibido.eu/bookdetails.aspx?bookID=81e7094f-4b22-4aa4-8124-0e322953a745http://www.ceeol.com/


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ARTICLES: FOUCAULT, KANT, HABERMAS AND SCIENCE

S. Parsons

The last two hundred years have witnessed repeated claims to have overcome theproblematic established by Kant in the Critique ofPureReason. From the perspective of the social sciences, the consequences of any distancing of investigationsfrom the Kantian problematic are potentially fruitful. Kant claimed that his writingswere concerned, ultimately, with one question - what is man?' With this, anysuperseding of Kant ought thus to enable the investigation of man to proceed ina novel way.One of the most recent writers claiming to have superseded the Kantian problematicis Foucault. In this paper I shall 1) outline the problems Foucault encounters inhis "archaeological" investigations, 2) reveal how these problems result fromFoucault's uncritical adoption of the Kantian problematic, 3) argue that Foucault'slater writings merely replicate the identified problematic. In short, the paper willargue that, contrary to many suggestions, Foucault's theories do not allow for anynovel understanding of man.The Age of Man

For Foucault, Kant's writings are a product of a definite historical period, termedby Foucault the "Age ofMan. " This characterisation reflects Foucault's argumentthat, prior to the arrival of the "Age ofMan" at the end of the Eighteenth Century,man as he is conceived today did not exist. Thus, for the Classical Age whichimmediately preceded the Age of Man, " . . . man, as a primary reality with hisown density, as the difficult object and sovereign subject of all possible knowledge,has no place."? However, with the ending of the Classical Age, man arrives onthe scene in an ambiguous position: man is both that which knows and that whichis known, both the subject and object of knowledge. The ambiguous position ofman is reflected through the four 'motifs' which, for Foucault, characterise theAge of Man. The motifs are:1) Finitude: man is limited in both what he knows and how he knows.2) The empirical and transcendental: man appears empirically, yet cannot bereduced to the merely empirical.3) The cogito and the unthought: man is within the world, yet is apart fromit. 4) The retreat and return of the origin: man seeks to uncover and completethat which he has lost.As these four motifs define the understanding ofman embodied in the Age ofMan,


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318 Praxis Internationalthis age if he avoids replicating these four motifs in his analysis. This is indeedthe claim Foucault makes for his archaeologial analysis, the aim of which is to:

. . . free the history of thought from its subjection to transcendence . . . My aim wasto analyse this history . . . to map it in a dispersion that no pre-established horizonwould embrace: to allow it to be deployed in an anonymity on which no transcendentalconstitution would impose the form of a subject; to open it up to a temporality thatwould not promise the return of any dawn. 3

If Foucault's analysis does transcend these four motifs, then the Age of Man iseffectively at an end. Given this, one strategy for analysing Foucault's claimsconsists in investigating the extent to which his own theory replicates these motifs.This framework is adopted by Rabinow and Sullivan, who reveal that Foucault'sarchaeological investigations do not escape from these motifs. 4However, this strategy adopted by Rabinow and Sullivan is of dubious validity.If Foucault has mischaracterised the Age ofMan, then his own analysis may remainlocked within the concerns of this Age, even if the four identified motifs are notreplicated. I shall thus argue that this is indeed the case: that Foucault misconstruesthe nature of the argument advanced by Kant - identified with the Age of Man- and is thus unaware of the extent that he adopts the Kantian problematic.

Archaeological InvestigationsIn describing his form of historical analysis as 'archaeology', Foucault seeksto distinguish such an analysis from what he terms the 'history of ideas' approach,where the object of analysis is identified from the start as a continuous and unifiedfield. For Foucault it is discontinuity, not continuity, which defines the area ofinvestigation. To this end, archaeology is concerned with the investigation of theappearance of particular statements - it seeks to discover " . . .how it is that oneparticular statement appeared rather than another . . . ?"5 This investigation of theappearances of statements is conceived, from the start, as a "pure inquiry" whichseeks to identify unity between and amongst statements. Unity is not presupposed,but is to be searched for: "One is led therefore to the project of a pure descriptionof discursive events as the horizon for the search for the unities that form withinit. "6 As the search for unities takes the form of discovering how anyone statement appeared, the analysis is not merely concerned with describing the appearanceof statements, but also seeks to offer an explanation of these appearances. Foucault'sanalysis is thus concerned with identifying specific rules relating to the appearanceof statements - a statement is analysed in order to grasp " . . . its existence andthe rules that govern its appearance."? These rules governing the appearance ofstatements are grouped into a 'system of formation' , defined as a " . . . complexgroup of formations that functions as a rule. " 8As Foucault has defined the search for unity in terms of discovering rules relatingto statements, then clearly the relevance of such rules must be carefully explored.What is the status of the rules of formation in explaining how one statement appearedrather than another? As already indicated, rules govern the appearance of statements- they are costrong' or determining rules. Can this characterisation of rules be more


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Praxis International 319existence (but also of co-existence, maintenance, modification, and disappearance)in a given discursive division."9 Rules for Foucault are thus analogous toSearle's 'constitutive rules'. Searle differentiates between constitutive and regulativerules thus:

Regulative rules regulate a pre-existing activity, an activity whose existence islogically independent of the rules. Constitutive rules constitute (and also regulate)an activity the existence of which is logically dependent on the rules. 10As Foucault defines rules as conditions of existence, then clearly any statementcannot exist in the absence of the relevant rule: the existence of any statementis dependent upon the relevant rules of formation. Indeed, Foucault does characterizerules as constitutive when explaining the relationship between the rules of formationand objects of discourse. However, the nature of this relationship requires anintroduction.Foucault argues that the system of formation is composed of four different, 'formations' '. That is, each system of formation is composed of rules referringto the formation of objects, enunciative modalities, concepts and strategies. Asthe formation of objects provides the clearest illustration of Foucault's understandingof "rules", the analysis can be confined to this specific formation. In speakingof the formation of objects, Foucault again wishes to distance his own analysisfrom standard "history of ideas" approaches. Whilst such approaches assume thatany unity between statements occurs because such statements refer to the sameobject, which thus occurs independently of the statements, Foucault advances acontrary argument. Statements do not refer to the same object, but activelyconstitutethe object: "Each of these discourses in turn constituted its object and worked it tothe point of transforming it altogether." 11 As discourse constitutes the relevantobject and thus allows it to exist, Foucault speaks of a discourse/object: the objectcannotexist independently of discourse. The rules of formation are thus constitutive:theyallow objects to exist at specific historical periods. Rules of formation constituteobjects - they are: " . . . the body of rules that enable them to form as objects ofdiscourse and thus constitute the conditions of their historical appearance. "12 Thisconstitutive understanding of rules is maintained when introducing the idea of the'referential' of the statement. Here: "A statement is linked to the 'referential' thatis made up . . . of laws of possibility, rules of existence for the objects that arenamed. "13 Clearly, any object can only exist, is only possible, through specificrules. Objects can only appear in discourse if the relevant rules of existence areoperative. Discursive rules allow objects to exist: "Discursive relations . . . are . . . atthe limits of discourse. . .they determine the group of relations that discourse mustestablish in order to speak of this or that object." 14Accounting for Historical Change

Having identified this understanding of rules as constitutive in Foucault's work,it is puzzling to be confronted by another, much weaker, understanding of rulesof formation. Thus, we find that: "We must not forget that a rule of formationis (not) the determination of an object . . . but their principle of multiplicity and


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320 Praxis Internationalexistence, but with multiplicity and dispersion: " This discursive formation . . . isthe principle of dispersion and redistribution. . .of statements. ' '16 This descriptionof rules bears more of a relationship to Searle 's account of regulative rules.Statements and discourse/objects are not dependent upon rules for their existence,but for their dispersion and redistribution. Why are the rules of formation nowdescribed in such a way that their original status as constitutive of existence isdirectly contradicted? The answer to this ambivalence in the status of rules canbe discovered if the original intention ofFoucault's analysis is recalled. Foucaultis concerned with historical change - the Age ofMan signified a radical departurefrom the Classical Age, yet one which, Foucault claims, is i tself now coming toan end. The transition from one age to another, from one discursive formationto another, is described by Foucault thus:

To say that one discursive formation is substituted for another is not to say that awhole world of absolutely new objects emerges . . . it is to say that a generaltransformation of relations has occurred that statements are governed by new rulesof formation. 17However if rules are rules of formation of objects - i.e. constitutive rules - thendiscourse/objects must be radically transformed when the corresponding rules offormation are changed. If rules are rules of existence, then the same object cannotappear when a different rule of formation is operative. However, Foucault wishesto state that the same configurations can reappear under different rules: "One can,on the basis of these new rules, describe and analyse phenomena of continuity,return and repetition.":" New rules thus allow continuities to be identified, eventhough the original rules of existence have been replaced. Foucault offers twocontradictory accounts of rules of formation. On the one hand, such rules are rulesof formation, conditions of existence; they are constitutive. On the other hand,when the question of historical transformation is being addressed, such rules aremerely principles of dispersion and redistribution: they are regulative.What is the relevance of these two apparently contradictory accounts of thefunction of rules? In order to answer this, it is necessary to probe deeper intoFoucault's archaeological analysis. As the account offered of historical changehas already been identified as a problematic area, then Foucault's account oftemporal relations would appear to offer a significant area for investigation.The Time of the Statement

In developing his analysis, Foucault moves from investigating the discursiveformation governing statements to a concern with the statement itself. Foucaultargues that this change in the subject of investigation permits greater accuracy:"What we have called 'discursive practice' can now be defined more precisely . . .itis a body of anonymous, historical rules . . . the conditions of operation of theenunciative function.":" The analysis centred around the enunciative function isintended to complement the original analysis of the discursive formation: "Thetwo approaches are equally justifiable and reversible. The analysis of the statement


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Praxis International 321modalities, concepts and strategies)are retained in a modifiedform. Thus, restrictingthe analysis, as before, to the rule of formation of objects, Foucault introducesthe "referential of the statement" (rules of existence of objects named), nowgoverned by the "enunciative function". Archaeological analysis can thus bedescribed as the uncovering of a discursive system, where the enunciative systemmore accurately reflects the subject of analysis: "To describe statements . . . is touncover what might be called the discursive formation . . . the discursive formationis the general enunciative system that governs a group of verbal performances. ' '21The enunciative function operates in what Foucault terms an "enunciative field":as the enunciative function "governs" verbal performances, it is to be expectedthat this function "assigns" a position to the statement. This is indeed the case,as is made clear when Foucault offers an account of the relationship between thestatement and time:

At the very outset, from the very root, the statement is divided up into an enunciativefield in which it has its place and status, which arranges for its possible relationshipwith the past, and which opens up for it a possible future. 22The temporal relationship of the statement - the relationshipbetween the particularstatement and past and possible future statements - is arranged by the enunciativefield. In line with the initial exploration of the discursive formation, we find herethat the statement's temporal positioning is determined, although determinationnow comes from the enunciative field. However, again, when the subject ofhistorical change is addressed, the relevant relationship is profoundly modified:

Enunciative analysis presupposes that one takes the phenomena of recurrence intoaccount. Every statement involves a field of antecedent elements in relation to whichit is situated, but which it is able to reorganise and redistribute according to newrelations. It constitutes its own past, defines, in what precedes it, its on filiation,redefines what makes it possible or necessary, excludes what cannot be compatiblewith it.23Here, the.statement is not assigned its temporal relationship; rather, the statementdefines its own temporal relationship. It is the statement, not the field, which definesrelationships to the past and future. Again, it is precisely when the phenomenaof historical change is included in the analysis that references to recurrences,redistribution and reorganisation appear, all as the responsibility of the statement.The Possibility of Archaeology

The ambivalence initially unearthed in the case of rules of formation, and nowalso identified when the enunciative function is introduced, does not, however,merely indicate a difficulty with Foucault's theory in explaining historical change.Rather, this ambivalence is essential to the very possibility of the archaeologicalproject itself, for the following reasons.As noted earlier, Foucault wishes to signal the end of the Age of Man. However,as each specific Age is governed by different systems of formation, then the Ageof Archaeology is itself not immune from governance by a system of formation.Foucault recognises this when introducing the 'archive' of the archaeologist, wherean 'archive' refers to the system of formation of statementswithin each Age: "It is


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322 Praxis Internationalnot possible for us to describe our own archive, since it is from within these rulesthat we speak.' '2 4 The archaeologist is himself governed by the rules of his ownhistorical archive. However, this admission raises problems for the earlier claimthat archaeology was offering a "pure description of discursive events". Howcan the description offered by the archaeologist be pure if it is also determinedby the historical situation of the archaeologist? It can now be appreciated howthe ambivalance in the account offered of the relationship between the statementand temporality allows the status of archaeology to be securely maintained. Onthe one hand, as the statement can assign its own temporal position, then archaeological statements can themselves determine relationships to the past and future.The end of the "Age ofMan" can thus be deemed to have arrived at any time.The overcoming of the Age is decided by the statement determining the necessarytime-relations. On the other hand, as the temporal position of the statement is alsoclaimed by the enunciative field, it is the time-relations determining the statementwhich dictates the passing or otherwise of the Age of Man.According to the first formulation, the archaeologist can abstract himself fromany notion of objective time-relations and the statements define relationships topast and future: archaeology is "pure" . According to the second formulation, thearchaeologist is embedded within objective time-relations conferred by the enunciative field within which he works: archaeology is a historical product. The firstformulation allows the archaeologist, through appealing to the temporal autonomyof the statement, to claim freedom for himself. The second recognises that thearchaeologist has no autonomy: if the Age ofMan has not already been surpassed,thenany statements produced are a productof the time ofMan. Thus the conundrum:the end of the Age of Man can be decreed at any time, in so far as statementscan assign their own temporal relations, yet the end of the Age ofMan is a productof history, in so far as the temporal relations of the statement are assigned to it.The contradictions in the accounts offered concerning the relationship betweenthe statement and temporality thus allows Foucault to claim both that the Age ofMan has ended (a different archive is governing statements) and yet be able toclaim that this is so at any time (statements can determine past relationships). Theambivalence identified in the temporal positioning of the statement is thus necessaryfor the possibility of archaeological analysis itself.This ambivalence explains, I suggest, a position Foucault takes within the analysiswhich other commentators have found mysterious, given the apparent dismissalof consciousness within the analysis. Foucault writes: "In the analysis proposedhere, the rules of formation operate not only in the mind or consciousness ofindividuals, but in discourse itself.' '2 5 If the argument advanced here is correct,Foucault's claim that rules operate, not merely in discourse, but in the consciousnessof individuals, becomes explicable: ultimately, the whole legitimacy of an archaeological analysis is predicated upon the idea that the statements of the archaeologistcan consciously determine the ending of the "Age of Man" .Foucault and the Kantian ProblematicAs Foucault recognises, Kant was concerned with the question of human finitude.


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Praxis International 323thus essentially replicating its framework. Kant speaks of finitude in order to differentiate the capacities ofman from those of non-human beings (specifically, God).Thus, Kant speaks of a divine understanding: " . . . which should not representto itself given objects, but through whose representations the objects shouldthemselves be given or produced.' '2 6 Whereas a non-human understanding canproduce objects, a finite understanding cannot, but is dependent upon objects beinggiven. As a fmite understanding cannot product objects, the Critique ofPure Reasonis concerned with how judgements can be made about objects which are" given' ,to a finite mind. Kant explores the a priori judgements actually made in a sectionentitled Analogies ofExperience. Here, the impossibility of constructing the objectsof experience leads Kant to confer a regulative status to the Analogies. "For sinceexistence cannot be constructed, the principles (of pure understanding) can applyonly to the relations of existence, and can yield only regulative principles. "27Kant is quite explicit that, as existence cannot be constructed, judgements ofexperience cannot be constitutive: "An analogy of experience . . . is not a principleconstitutive of the objects, but only regulative.' '2 8 As judgements can only bemade concerning already existing objects, Kant must face the problem as to howthe finite mind can orient i tself to such objects. How can man make judgementsconcerning an existence which confronts him? Kant argues that any orientationis only possible if man is receptive to objects, and such receptivity is possible throughsensibility: "The capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through themode in which we are affected by objects, is entitled sensibility. Objects are givento use by nreans of sensibility . . . "29 As sensibility allows receptivity towardsobjects, sensibility cannot itself arise from objects. That is, sensibility is a priori,not empirical: "The pure form of sensible intuitions . . . must be found in the minda priori. This pure form of sensibility may itself be called pure intuition. "30 Bypure intuition, Kant signifies space and time: a finite mind is receptive to objectsonly in so far as such objects are structured a priori in space and time. As all"representations" are temporal (only those from extemalobjects being also spatial),then time assumes a crucial role in the exploration of the possibility of knowledgeof objects: "Whatever the origin of our representations . . . they must all, asmodifications of the mind, belong to inner sense. All our knowledge is thus finallysubject to time, the formal condition of inner sense. ' '31 Given the importance oftime to Kant's account of knowledge of given objects, it is not surprising to findthat time is also crucial to the argument advanced in the Analogies:

The three modes of time are duration, succession and co-existence. There will,therefore, be three rules of all relations of appearances in time, and these rules willbe prior to all experience, and indeed make it possible. 32For Kant, the rules governing the relations of experience are provided by thecategories. Thus, in the Analogies, Kant argues that experience is only possiblein so far as the rules provided by the categories are brought into relationship withtime, both the categories and time maintaining an a priori status. With this introduction of categories as rules, it is now possible to illustrate how the problems alreadyidentified with Foucault's analysis can be t raced back to Kant.

Whereas Kant conferred a regulative status upon the rules of relations, in acknow


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324 Praxis Internationalrole on the rules of formation - thus, for example, rules are conditions of existence.The problems already identified with Foucault's analysis can be traced directlyback to this modification of the basic Kantian framework. In introducing rulesas constitutive, Foucault, in effect, defines rules in terms of Kant's definition ofGod: rules are constitutive, they create existence.However, such a move precludes any possibility of the relevant phenomena beingintroduced independently of the specific rules. Consequently, when Foucault speaksof historical change, rules now become defined in line with Kant's account ofregulative rules: rules redistribute and disperse. Yet whereas Kant argued thatjudgements of experience could only be explained if the crucial importance of timewas acknowledged, Foucault neglects the quest ion of time. In not appreciatingthe true relationship between his own analysis and that offered by Kant, Foucaultwas unable to recognise that time presented a fundamental problem for his analysiswhich had to be addressed.However, although the problems that Foucault confronts in accounting forhistorical change can be traced back to a misreading of the Kantian project, canhis problematic analysis of time also be traced back to Kant? To be sure, Foucault'smisreading indicates why time appears as a problem: Foucault does not explorethe question of time. However, this neglect does not necessarily suggest that thespecific problems encountered by Foucault can be traced back to Kant. In orderto reveal how derivative Foucault's analysis is upon the framework establishedby Kant, it must be shown how Foucault's account of temporality replicates aproblematic already established by Kant. Such an argument can now be advanced.Freedom and Temporality

In defining all possible objects of experience as temporal, Kant was forced toacknowledge the problem of freedom. In the second Analogy, through elaboratingupon the relationship between rules and time,Kant had argued that all appearanceswere subject to the law of causality. However, if all appearances were subjectto causal laws, then freedom was impossible within nature, as Kant acknowledged:

By freedom . . . I understand the power of beginning a state spontaneously. Suchcausalitywill not, therefore, itself stand under another causedetermining it in time, asrequired by the law of nature. Freedom, in this sense, is a pure transcendental idea. ' ,33As this makes clear, the central problem for relating freedom and causality laywith the question of time: freedom must be removed from "determination in time".In removing freedom from time, Kant could argue that t ~ e act of freedom was notsubject to the law of causality. However, whatever the merits of introducing freedomas a "transcendental idea", not subject to time, the advocated solution sufferedfrom one crucial problem. For Kant, t ime consisted in successive 'moments', andevents in time were thus themselves successive (if causally determined). However,although the initiation of events could, as a production of freedom, be removedfrom time, such events could only be apprehended by any observer as continuinga causal series:

No action begins in this active being itself, but we may yetquite correctly say that the


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Praxis International 325not be asserting that the effect in this sensible world can begin of themselves; theyare always predetermined through antecedent empirical conditions, though solelythrough their empirical character . . . . 34

Although the introduction of freedom as a "transcendent idea" allowed Kant toclaim that free acts were those begun spontaneously, without reference to antecedent"causes", this was not the case for the observation of the acts of freedom. Asall appearances are temporal, and as the second analogy had established theapplicability of causality to all appearances, then the effects of "freedom" couldonly be perceived, by an observer, as continuing an already determined series:

If, for instance, I at this moment arise from my chair, in complete freedom . . . anew series . . . has its absolute beginning in this event, although as regards time thisevent is only the continuation of a preceding series. 35Why should the problem of reconciling the spontaneous freedom of the act oforigination with the perception of the same act as the continuation of a time-seriesarise? In the second analogy, Kant indicates the fundamental problem:

. . . It is . . . an indispensable law of the empirical representation of the time-seriesthat the appearances of the past time determine all the succeeding time, and thatthese latter, as events, can take place only in so far as the appearances of past timedetermine their existence in time, that is, determine them according to a rule. Foronly in appearances can we empirically apprehend this continuity in the connectionof times."

Unless acts of freedom were apprehended as a continuation of a preceding series,then time itself could not be perceived as a continuum. As time, for Kant, wasa series ofmoments, the empirical apprehension of time - the perception of timethrough objects in time - must itself be serial. If any act of freedom could notbe apprehended as continuing an already existent series, then each individual actwould initiate a new time-series. The impossibility of apprehending acts of freedomas anything other than continuations of series was forced upon Kant because ofthe demands of the unity of time.With Foucault, this recognition of the need for unified time is lost. The requirementof historical change - indeed, the need to allow for the possibility of archaeologicalanalysis itself - leads Foucault to transgress the principle of the unity of time.In neglecting the problem Kant had already identified - that introducing differingseries necessarily implies differing time series - Foucault is forced to accept differentunderstandings of temporality into his analysis. Thus time assigns the statement,but the statement assigns time. These two different perspectives on temporalityare, as Kant recognised, fundamentally incompatible.This investigation of the Kantian problematic thus sheds the following light uponFoucault's archaeological investigations:

1) Foucault's archaeological analysis is predicated upon an understanding ofrules - rules as constitutive - which Kant had specifically rejected as not applicableto man.2) However, Foucault cannot maintain consistency in his account of rules. Whenthe subject of historical change is introduced, rules take on the appearance of


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326 Praxis International3) However, throughout his account of rules, Foucault neglects the question

of time which Kant had already identified as crucial. Such neglect leads Foucaultto introduce two different perspectives on temporality, depending upon whetherquestions of existence or historical change are being addressed.4) These two different perspective on temporality, in turn, replicate a problematic which Kant had already identified and attempted to resolve. This problematicis uncritically adopted by Foucault, resulting in two different understandings ofa unified temporal series.5) As with Kant, the problem of temporality is raised when the question ofautonomy, or freedom, appears. In accounting for historical change, Foucaultseeks to grant statements autonomy from specific enunciative functions. However, in granting autonomy, Foucault is left with two distinct understandings oftemporality.6) Foucault is thus unable to reconcile the autonomy required for repetitionacross historical change with the account offered of rules as constitutive. Foucaultblurs the nature of the regularity of the statement, and is subsequently blind tothe problem of temporality thus encountered.7) The archaeologist is rule governed, yet seeks freedom. He appears withintwo distinct temporal series.

On the End of ManTowards the end of The Order of Things, Foucault poses the following question:

Ought we not rather to give up thinking of man, or, to be more strict, to think ofthis disappearance of man - and the ground of possibility of all the sciences ofman- as closely as possible in correlation with our concern with language. 37In this paper, I have argued that the central thrust of Foucault's archaeologicalanalysis can be centrally located within a Kantian problematic. To this extent,speaking of the possibility of the end of the sciences of man is somewhat premature.However, does Foucault escape the Kantian problematic in his later writings?I shall indicate that this question is to be answered in the negative. Foucaultremains within the same problematic in his later writings, a state of affairsthat can be indicated through examining the contortions some of his defendersare led to.The 'radicalness' or otherwise of Foucault' s writings have formed the focus ofa number of recent studies. In a spirited defense of the radicalness embedded in

Foucault's position, Ross has advanced the following argument:What makes a discourse radical is less what is said than how - but how here refersto the multiplicity of force relations that constitute the discourse. In other words,a discourse is radical in virtue of its conditions and achievements. 38

What are the conditions in virtue ofwhich a discourse is radical? Ross elaborates: "Iam speaking here of discourse that is constituted by and within historical conditions. "39 Ross's defence of Foucault's position reveals how the ambivalence in theposition of the archaeologist is retained throughout Foucault's work. On the one hand,


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Praxis International 327responsibility to Foucault: it matters that Foucault is seen as radical. On the otherhand, if, as Ross suggests, Foucault's discourse is a product of the historicalconditions, and the description "radical" is merely a virtue of these conditions,then it is immaterial whether Foucault is radical or not. That is, Foucault maybe radical, he may' not be: any responsibility attaches to the historical conditionsof production, not Foucault himself. Ross thus seeks to defend Foucault as"radical", but the very defence absolves Foucault of any responsibility for being"radical". Foucault creates the time for his own work, yet time determines thestatus of this work.However, Foucault 's later work does not merely replicate the ambivalence inthe position of the author: it also remains undecided as to the relationship betweenconstituting and constituted. Again, another defence of Foucault - this time byConnolly - indicates why this is so. Connolly is concerned with Foucault's morerecent pronouncements on power, and writes: "The subject, on Foucault's reading,is not 'dead'; it is very much alive and very much the effect ofmodern disciplinaryinstitutions. "4 0 The subject is the 'effect' ofmodem institutions: it is (without toogreat a travesty) constituted by institutions. However, Connolly proceeds to offera different account of the position of the subject:

But if power produces the subject, in what way does power constrain or limit theself? . . Power produces and constrains, then, but the target of constraint is not theself as agent, but that in selves which resists agentification."

Now, the constitutive abilities of power are seriously curtailed: we have a selfwhich "resists" such power. Indeed, power also "constrains": but what isconstrained? The "self ' which resists agentification, the "self ' which power cannotproduce. Power produces the subject, but the self is independent of this productivepower: the subject is still alive and well.However, it would appear that Foucault would be unwilling to accept Connolly'scharacterisation. Rather than placing the ' 'self" which resists power as externalto such power, Foucault argues the opposite: "Where there is power, there isresistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a positionof exteriority to power." 42 So has Foucault, contrary to Connolly's exegesis,overcome the ambivalences and contradictions identified in his archaeologicalperiod? Unfortunately not, as his later account of the relationship between discourseand power indicates:

Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines andexposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it . . . discourse is bothan instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance."Discourse produces and is produced by power: power is produced by and yetproduces discourse. The ambivalences, so essential to the analysis, and so indicative

of moving uncritically within the orbit of Kant's thought, remain.NOTES

1. In the Logic Kant writes - 'At bottom all this could be reckoned to be anthropology", 1.Kant Logic, trans. R. Hartman & W. Schwarz (New York, 1974),29.2. M. Foucault TheOrderofThings: AnArchaeology ofthe HumanSciences,trans. A. M. Sheridan


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328 Praxis International3. M. Foucault The Archaeology o fKnowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith, (London, 1972),203.4. H. L. Dreyfus & S. Rabinow Michael Foucault: beyond structuralism and hermeneutics,(Brighton, 1982).5. M. Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge, 27.6. M. Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge, 27.7. M. Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge, 30.8. M. Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge, 74.9. M. Foucault The Archaeology o f Knowledge, 38.10. J. R. Searle Speech Acts: an essay in the philosophy of language, (Cambridge, 1973), 34.11. M. Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge, 32.12. M. Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge, 48.13. M. Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge, 91.14. M. Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge, 46.

15. M. Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge, 173.16. M. Foucault The Archaeology o f Knowledge, 107.17. M. Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge, 173.18. M. Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge, 173.19. M. Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge, 117.20. M. Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge, 116.21. M. Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge, 116.22. M. Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge, 99.23. M. Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge, 124.24. M. Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge, 130.25. M. Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge, 63.26. 1. Kant Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. K. Smith (London, 1929), B 145.27. 1. Kant Critique of Pure Reason, A 179/B 22228. 1. Kant Critique of Pure Reason, A 180/B 222.29. 1. Kant Critique of Pure Reason, A 19/B 33.30. 1. Kant Critique of Pure Reason, A 20/B 34.31. 1. Kant Critique of Pure Reason, A 98-99.32. 1. Kant Critique of Pure Reason, A 177/B 219.33. I. Kant Critique of Pure Reason, A 533/B 561.34. 1. Kant Critique of Pure Reason, A 541/B 569.35. 1. Kant Critique of Pure Reason, A 451/B 479.36. 1. Kant Critique of Pure Reason, A 199/B 244.37. M. Foucault The Order of Things, 386.38. S. D. Ross 'Foucault's Radical Politics', Praxis International, 5, 2(1985), 131-144, 143.39. S. D. Ross 'Foucault's Radical Politics', 142.40. W. E. Connolly 'Taylor, Foucault, and Otherness', Political Theory, 13, 3 (1985), 365-376,371.41. W. E. Connolly 'Taylor, Foucault, and Otherness', 371.42. M. Foucault The History of Sexuality: Volume 1: An introduction (London, 1979), 95.43. M. Foucault The History of Sexuality, 101.

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3.5 - Parsons, Nicholas T. - Foucault and the Problem of Kant (en)

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