48268432 Libel Case Digests

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CASE DIGESTS ON LIBEL

CM 217 Mass Media Law

CASE DIGEST

CHRISTINA FERMIN, petitioner vs.People of the Philippines, respondents

28 March 2008

Issue:

Whether or not Cristy Fermin hadactual knowledge and participation isguilty of libel?

Facts of the Case:

Cristy Fermin is the publisher and

Bogs Tugas is the editor-in-chief ofGossip Tabloid

The June 14, 1995 headline and lead

story of the tabloid says that it isimprobable for Annabelle Rama to go

to the US should it be true that she isevading her conviction in an estafacase here in the Philippines for sheand husband Eddie have moreproblems/cases to confront there.This was said to be due to their,especially Annabelle's, using fellowFilipinos money, failure to remitproceeds to the manufacturing

company of the cookware they wereselling and not being on good termswith the latter.

Annabelle Rama and Eddie Gutierrez

filed libel cases against Fermin andTugas before RTC of QC, Br. 218.

RTC: Fermin and Tugas found guilty

of libel.

CA: Tugas was acquitted on account

of non-participation but Fermin'sconviction was affirmed.

Fermin's motion for reconsideration

was denied. She argues that she hadno knowledge and participation in the

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publication of the article, that thearticle is not libelous and is covered

by the freedom of the press.

Ruling of the Case:

HELD: YES.

Proof of knowledge of and

participation in the publication is notrequired, since Fermin has beenspecifically identified as author,editor, or proprietor or printer/publisher of the publicationbut also the president andchairperson. Thus, petitionerscriminal guilt should be affirmed,

The elements of libel were present.

o Evident imputation of the

crime of malversation

(converting money forpersonal use), of vices ordefects for being fugitivesfrom the law (evadingprosecution in America)and of being a wastrel

o Attribution made publicly.

Gossip Tabloid had a

nationwide circulation.

o The victims were identified

and identifiable.

o The article reeks ofmalice, as it

tends to cause the dishonor,

discredit, or contempt of thecomplainants.

Malice in law - the articlewas malicious in itself; theimputations were false.

Malice in fact - there wasmotive to talk ill against

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complainants during theelectoral campaign as

Fermin is a close friend ofEddie's opponent in theCongressional race

While complainants are considered

public figures for being personalitiesin the entertainment business,

journalists do not have the unbridledlicense to malign their honor anddignity by indiscriminately airingfabricated and malicious comments,whether in broadcast media or inprint, about their personal lives.

G.R. No. L-6465

January 31, 1955

NORBERTO QUISUMBING, petitioner-appellant,

vs.EUGENIO LOPEZ, ET AL., respondents-

appellees

ISSUE:

Whether or not The ManilaChronicles published article with a

malicious headline is liable of libel?

FACTS:

1. The respondents Eugenio Lopez,Ernesto del Rosario and RobertoVillanueva are the publisher, editor-in-chief, and general manager

respectively ofThe Manila Chronicle,a daily newspaper published andcirculated in English in the City ofManila. On July 15, 1949, thepetitioner, Norberto Quisumbing, fileda complaint against said respondents

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in the Court of First Instance ofManila for the recovery of damages in

the sum of P50,000 as a result of thefollowing alleged libelous publicationin The Manila Chronicle of November7, 1947.

NBI MEN RAID OFFICES OF 3CITY USURERS"

2. After answer and trial the Court ofFirst Instance of Manila rendered ajudgment dismissing the complaintfrom which the petitioner appealed tothe Court of Appeals. The latterCourt, in its decision promulgated onJanuary 19, 1953, affirmed the

judgment of the court of origin; andthe case is now before us on petitionfor review on certiorari filed by thepetitioner.

3. The Court of Appeals found "that thecontext of the article in question, is a

fair, impartial and true report ofofficial or public proceedingauthorized by law. The news itemwas the result of a press release inconnection with an officialinvestigation of the Anti-UsuryDivision, N.B.I., and was a

substantial, if not a faithfulreproduction of the said press releasewhich was, in turn, an accurate reportof the official proceedings taken bythe Anti-Usury Division. The articlemerely reported a raid on the'business offices of three allegedmoney lenders'; and related the steps

actually taken or to be taken by theproper officials relative to theinvestigation. It did not go beyond theactual report of official actuations.

RULING OF THE CASE:

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HELD

1) NO. The elements of libel are NOTpresent.

i) Headlines which are voluntarilydefamatory statements of thepublisher are not privileged eventhough they head a privilegedreport of a judicial or other public

proceedings. It is not necessary toreiterate the rule that the headlineof an article might be libelous whilethe body of the article is privileged.The whole libel might be includedin the headlines.

A publication claimed to bedefamatory must be read andconstrued in the sense in whichthe readers to whom it isaddressed would ordinarilyunderstand it. So, the wholeitem, including display lines,

should be read and construedtogether, and its meaning and

signification thus determined.

ii) The headline of an article orparagraph, being so conspicuousas to attract the attention ofpersons who look casually over apaper without carefully reading allits contents, may in itself inflict veryserious injury upon a person, bothbecause it may be the only part ofthe article which is read, andbecause it may cast a graverimputation than all the other wordsfollowing it. There is no doubt thatin publications concerning private

persons, as well as in all otherpublications which are claimed tobe libelous, the headlinesdirecting the attention to thepublication may be consideredas a part of it and may evenjustify a court in regarding the

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publication as libelous when thebody of the article is not

necessarily so.

iii)If so, the petitioner's positionswould be untenable, since byreading merely the headline inquestion nobody would even

suspect that the petitioner wasreferred to; and "libel cannot becommitted except againstsomebody and that somebodymust be properly identified". Itmay be insisted that the identity ofthe petitioner is revealed in the

body of the news item, but weshould remember that nowhere inthe context is the petitionerportrayed as one charged with orconvicted of the crime of usury.

Third Element: The Personlibeled must be identified.

(Identity of victim)

This means the complainant orplaintiff must prove he is theperson subject of the libelousmatter, that it his reputationwhich was targeted.

This element is established bythe testimony of witnesses if thecomplainant was not directlymentioned by name. They mustbe the public or third personswho can identify the complainantas the person subject of the libel.

If third persons cannot say it isthe plaintiff or complainant whois the subject, then it cannot besaid that plaintiffs name hasbeen tarnished.

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2) The Court of Appeals found as a factthat "there is no evidence in the

record to prove that the publicationof the news item under considerationwas prompted by personal ill will orspite, or that there was intention todo harm," and that on the other handthere was "an honest and high senseof duty to serve the best interests of

the public, without self-seekingmotive and with malice towardsnone."

Matters Considered PrivilegedBy Jurisprudence

Fair Comments on Matters of

Public Interest

(a) In Borjal vs. Ct. of Appeals,(301 SCRA 1, Jan. 14, 1999) itwas held that the enumeration inArticle 354 is not an exclusive

list of qualifiedly privilegedcommunications because fair

comments on matters of publicinterest are privileged andconstitute a valid defense in anaction for libel or slander

(b). They refer to events,developments, or matters in

which the public as a whole hasa legitimate interest.

Truth And Good Motives orJustifiable Ends.

A. It is not enough that what was

publicized about another is true.The accused must also provegood motives or intentions andjustifiable ends, in order todisprove malice.

B. This defense is available only

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if: (a) What is imputed to anotheris a crime regardless if the victim

is a private or public person or(ii) if the victim is a public officerregardless of whether a crime isimputed, so long as it relates tothe discharge of their officialduties

G.R. No. L-16027

May 30, 1962

LUMEN POLICARPIO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs. THE MANILA TIMES PUB. CO., INC.,CONSTANTE C. ROLDAN, MANUEL V.VILLA-REAL, E. AGUILAR CRUZ and

CONSORCIO BORJE, defendant-appellees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant is guiltyof having published

libelous/defamatory articles?

FACTS:

Policarpio was executive secretary of

UNESCO Natl Commission. As such,she had filed charges againstHerminia Reyes, one of hersubordinates in the Commission, &

caused the latter to be separatedfrom the service. Reyes, in turn, filedcounter-charges which were referredfor investigation. Pending completion,Reyes filed a complaint againstPolicarpio for alleged malversation of

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public funds & another complaint forestafa thru falsification of public

documents.

Policarpio filed a libel suit to Manila

Times Publishing Co. for publishingtwo defamatory, libelous and falsearticles/news items in Saturday Mirror

of August 11, 1956 and in the DailyMirror of August 13, 1956.

Saturday Mirror (Aug 11, 1956):

WOMAN OFFICIAL SUED

PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO

ON FRAUDS

Unesco Official Head Accused

on Supplies, Funds Use by

Colleague

Daily Mirror (Aug 13, 1956):

PALACE OPENSINVESTIGATION OF RAPS

AGAINST POLICARPIO

Alba Probes Administrative

Phase of Fraud Charges Against

Unesco Woman Official; Fiscal

Sets Prelim Quiz of Criminal Suiton Aug 22

The articles contain news on Reyes

charges against Policarpio for havingmalversed public property and of

having fraudulently soughtreimbursement of supposed officialexpenses. It was said that Policarpioused several sheets of governmentstencils for her private and personaluse. The other charge refers to the

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supposed reimbursements she hadmade for a trip to Quezon and

Pangasinan. Reyes complaint

alleged that Policarpio had asked for

refund of expenses for use of her car

when she had actually made the trip

aboard an army plane. Policarpio was

said to be absent from theBayambang conference for which she

also sought a refund of expenses.

CFI dismissed the complaint on the

ground that the plaintiff had notproven that defendants had actedmaliciously in publishing the articles,although portions thereof wereinaccurate or false.

RULING OF THE CASE:

The headline of the Aug 11 article

was given prominence with a 6-column (about 11 inches) bannerheadline of 1-inch types. Its sub-title PCAC raps Policarpio on fraud printed in bold 1 cm type is not true.

Also, the statement in the 1st

paragraph of the article, to the effectthat plaintiff was charged withmalversation & estafa by the PreslComplaint & Action Commission(PCAC) is not true, the complaintsfor said offenses having been filed by

Reyes. Neither is it true that saidcriminal action was initiated as aresult of current administrativeinvestigation.

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PLAINTIFF maintains that the effect

of these false statements was to givethe general impression that saidinvestigation by Col. Alba had shownthat plaintiff was guilty and that, as aconsequence, PCAC had filed thecorresponding complaints w/ thefiscals office. She also said that thearticle did not mention that fact that

the number of stencils involved in thecharge was only 18 or 20; that thesum allegedly misappropriated by herwas only P54, and that thefalsification imputed to her was saidto have been committed by claimingthat certain expenses for which shehad sought reimbursement were

incurred in trips during the periodfrom July 1 Sept 30 1955, althoughthe trips actually were made from Jul8-Aug 31, 1955. By omitting thesedetails, plaintiff avers that the Aug 11article had the effect of conveying the

idea that the offenses imputed to herwere more serious than they really

were.

DEFENDANTS contend that though

the complaints were filed, not by thePCAC but by Reyes, this inaccuracyis insignificant & immaterial to thecase for the fact is that saidcomplaints were filed. As regards thenumber of sheets & the nature of thefalsification charged, they argue thatthese details do not affect thetruthfulness of the article as a whole.Besides, defendants had no means of

knowing such details.SC: Prior to Aug 11, Col. Alba had

already taken the testimony of

witnesses; hence, defendants could

have ascertained the details had

they wanted to. The number of stencil

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sheets used was actually mentioned

in the Aug 13 article.

Moreover, the penalty for

estafa/embezzlement depends partlyupon the amount of the damagecaused to the offended party. Hence,the amount or value of the propertyembezzled is material to said offense.

It is obvious that the filing of criminal

complaints by another agency of theGovt, like the PCAC, particularly afteran investigation conducted by thesame, imparts the ideal that theprobability of guilt is greater than

when the complaints are filed by aprivate individual, wspecially whenthe latter is a former subordinate ofthe alleged offender, who wasresponsible for the dismissal of thecomplainant from her employment.

Newspapers must enjoy a certaindegrees of discretion in determiningthe manner in which a given eventshould be presented to the public,and the importance to be attachedthereto, as a news item, and that itspresentation in a sensational manneris not per se illegal. Newspapers maypublish news items relative to judicial,legislative or other officialproceedings, which are not ofconfidential nature, because thepublic is entitled to know the truth withrespect to such proceedings. But, toenjoy immunity, a publication

containing derogatory informationmust be not only true, but, also,fair, and it must be made in goodfaith and without any comments orremarks.

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Art. 354, RPC provides:Every defamatory imputation is

presumed to be malicious even if it be

true, if no good intention & justifiable

motive for making it is shown, except,

A fair and true report, made in

good faith, w/o any comments or

remarks.

In the case at bar, aside from

containing information derogatory tothe plaintiff, the Aug 11 articlepresented her in a worse predicamentthan that in which she, in fact was.Said article was not a fair and truereport of the proceedings thereinalluded to. What is more, its sub-titlePCAC raps Policarpio on fraud is acomment or remark, besides being

false. Accordingly, the defamatoryimputations contained in said article

are presumed to be malicious

In falsely stating that the complaints

were filed by PCAC, either defendants knew the truth or they didnot. If they did, then the publicationwould actually be malicious. I f theydid not, or if they acted under amisapprehension of the facts, theywere guilty of negligence in makingsaid statement.

We note that the Aug 13 article

rectified a major inaccuracy in the 1st

article, by stating that neither Col.

Alba nor the PCAC had filed the

complaints. It likewise indicated the

number of stencil sheets involved.

But, this rectification or clarification

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does not wipe out the responsibility

arising from the publication of the Aug

11 article, although it should mitigate

it.

HELD: Decision reversed. Defendants

ordered to pay plaintiff moral damages,

attys fees plus cost.

G.R. No. 133575.

December 15, 2000

JUDGE MARTIN A. OCAMPO, Petitioner,v.SUN-STAR PUBLISHING, INC.,

Respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not on the basis of thefacts admitted in the pleadings and

Respondents affidavits submitted tothe Court a quo Petitioner is entitled

to a judgment for civil libel as a matterof law considering that only apreponderance of evidence isrequired to prove Respondentsliability?

FACTS:

1. Before this Court is a Petition forReview on Certiorariseeking to setaside the April 20, 1998 Decision[1 ofthe Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,Branch 57, which dismissedpetitioners Complaint for Libel.

2. Petitioner is the presiding judge of the

Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,Branch 7. He filed a Complaint[2 forLibel on account of two articles whichappeared in the August 28, 1997 andAugust 30, 1997 issues of Sun-StarDaily, a provincial newspaper

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http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2000/dec2000/133575.php#_edn2http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2000/dec2000/133575.php#_edn2


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published and circulated byrespondent in Cebu.

The August 28, 1997 article, whichappeared on pages two (2) andtwenty two (22) of the aforesaidnewspaper, reads in full as follows

Judge Ocampo facing graft raps at Ombud chanrobles virtuallaw library

3. BRANCH 7 Judge Martin Ocampo ofthe Regional Trial Court (RTC) facesgraft charges before the Office of theOmbudsman for theVisayas.Ocampo, in an interviewyesterday, down-played the filing ofthe case saying it is natural for thelosing party to hate the judge. Heconsiders the case as pureharassment.

4. Instead, Tan said, Judge Ocampoadjudged counsel Tagra guilty ofdirect contempt on May 9, 1997 for

filing a motion for reconsideration tothe order granting the relief.

5. The August 30, 1997 article,appearing on pages two (2) andtwenty six (26) of the paper, reads

No jurisdiction, says Judge on Ombudsman

6. Judge Ocampo, in a letter to Sun-Star

Daily, complained that the newsreport was libelous and damaging tohis reputation. He said the papershould have known better that theOmbudsman has no jurisdiction toinvestigate the case, only theSupreme Court.

7. Sun-Star Daily delayed publication forone day to get the judges comment.He was quoted in the report asdescribing the case as pureharassment and part of theprofessional hazards of a judge.

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RULING OF THE CASE:

1. While the law presumes everydefamatory imputation to bemalicious, there are exceptions to thisgeneral rule, set forth inArticle 354of the Revised Penal Code,

ART. 354. Requirement ofpublicity. Every defamatory

imputation is presumed to bemalicious, even if it be true, if nogood intention and justifiablemotive for making it is shown,except in the following cases:

1. A private communicationmade by any person to anotherin the performance of any legal,moral or social duty;

2. A fair and true report, made ingood faith, without anycomments or remarks, of any

judicial, legislative or otherofficial proceedings which are

not of confidential nature, or ofany statement, report or speechdelivered in said proceedings, orof any other act performed bypublic officers in the exercise oftheir functions.

2. First, the articles complained of arefair and true reports of ajudicial/administrative proceeding,which is not confidential in nature.They quote directly from the affidavit-complaint filed before theOmbudsman. Indeed, a perusal of thefirst article would readily show that it

merely reported the filing of graftcharges against petitioner before theOffice of the Ombudsman for theVisayas. In so reporting, the articlequoted from the affidavit-complaintfiled by the complainant lawyer, EliasTan, and narrated the antecedent

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facts leading to the filing of the graftcharges. On the other hand, the

second article presented petitionersown reactions against the graftcharges filed against him; withexplanatory statements from Office ofthe Ombudsman Director VirginiaSantiago refuting petitioners claimsthat the said office had no jurisdiction

over graft charges against judges foralleged violations of judicial canons.

Second, there were no comments orremarks made by the reporter ofprivate respondent in both instances.The articles were pure reports of thegraft charges filed against petitioner.

Third, they were both fair reports. Thefairness and balance exercised byprivate respondent is evident in thefact that petitioner was given achance to air his side on the graftcharges filed against him. In fact,

before the first article was published,private respondents reporter took

pains to interview petitioner on thematter; and his reactions were equallypublished in both articles.

Finally, the reports were also trueaccounts of a newsworthy event, thefiling of graft charges against a localjudge. It cannot be denied thatpetitioner did face graft raps at theOmbudsman as the complaint filedagainst him was for violation ofSection 3(e) of the Anti-Graft andCorrupt Practices Act. Neither canthe narration in the articles be deniedas these were merely culled from the

subject affidavit-complaint.

3. Petitioner cannot insist that the caseagainst him is confidential in naturebecause it has already been ruledthat complaints are public recordswhich may be published as such

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unless the Court directs otherwise inthe interest of morality or decency.

Neither should the case of In Re:Abistado, relied upon by petitioner,be applied to the instant case since,unlike In Re: Abistado where theproceedings were on charges ofmalpractice against a lawyer whichare confidential in nature, the charge

filed before the Ombudsman againstpetitioner is not administrative innature, such as to fall under theconfidentiality rule of the Rules ofCourt, but criminal in nature, being agraft charge under Republic Act No.3019. Unlike the proceedings in thisCourt, which expressly mandates that

its disciplinary proceedings forlawyers and judges are confidential innature, the Office of the Ombudsmanhas no such confidentiality rule.

4. While the administrative nature ofproceedings before us allows the

protection of the personal andprofessional reputation of our

colleagues in the profession of lawand justice against baseless chargesof disgruntled, vindictive andirresponsible clients and litigants, thecriminal nature of the Anti-Graft andCorrupt Practices Act does not allowthe same protection to our brethren in

the judiciary, who are placed on thesame level, without distinction, asother government employees.Violations of this law partake of aninfinitely more serious nature,touching as it does on what has beenperceived to be an endemic socialcancer eroding our system of

government. It cannot be denied thatthis is a matter in which the public hasa legitimate interest and as such,media must be free to report thereon.

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G.R. No. 164437

May 15, 2009

HECTOR C. VILLANUEVA,

petitioner, vs.

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC., LETTYJIMENEZ MAGSANOC, ROSAURO G.ACOSTA, JOSE MARIA NOLASCO,

ARTEMIO T. ENGRACIA, JR., RAFAELCHEEKEE, and MANILA DAILY BULLETINPUBLISHING CORPORATION, NAPOLEONG. RAMA, BEN F. RODRIGUEZ, ARTHUR

S. SALES, CRIS J. ICBAN, JR.,

respondents.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioner isrequired to prove malice to beentitled to damages?

2. Whether or not the respondentsare liable for malicious andimputing statements to the

petitioner?

FACTS:

1. Petitioner was one of the mayoralty

candidates in Bais, Negros Oriental

during the May 11, 1992 elections.

2. Two days before the elections, or on

May 9, 1992, respondent Manila Daily

Bulletin Publishing Corporation

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(Manila Bulletin) published the

following story:

The Comelec hasdisqualified HectorG. Villanueva asLakas-NUCDcandidate for mayorof Bais City forhaving been convictedin three administrativecases for grave abuseof authority andharassment in 1987,while he was officer-in-charge of the

mayors office of BaisCity.

A day before the elections or on

May 10, 1992, respondent

Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc.

(PDI) also came out with asimilar story, to wit:

The Commission onElectionsdisqualified HectorG. Villanueva as

Lakas-NUCDcandidate for mayorof Bais City for having beenconvicted in threeadministrative casesfor grave abuse ofauthority andharassment in 1987,while he was theofficer-in-charge ofthe mayors office inthe city.

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3. On May 11, 1992, the national and

local elections were held asscheduled. When results came out, it

turned out that petitioner failed in his

mayoralty bid.

4. Believing that his defeat was caused

by the publication of the above-quoted stories, petitioner sued

respondents PDI and Manila Bulletin

as well as their publishers and editors

for damages before the RTC of Bais

City. He alleged that the articles weremaliciously timed to defeat him. He

claimed he should have won by

landslide, but his supporters

reportedly believed the news items

distributed by his rivals and voted for

other candidates. He asked for actualdamages of P270,000 for the amount

he spent for the campaign, moral

damages of P10,000,000, an

unspecified amount of exemplary

damages, attorneys fees of P300,000and costs of suit.

5. Respondents disclaimed liability.

They asserted that no malice can be

attributed to them as they did not

know petitioner and had no interest inthe outcome of the election, stressing

that the stories were privileged in

nature.

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6. On April 18, 1996, the trial court

rendered a decision in favor ofpetitioner that the defendants

Philippine Daily Inquirer, [Inc.] and

Manila [Daily] Bulletin Publishing

Corporation with their respective

officers are liable [for] damages toplaintiff:

1. As moral damages,the Philippine DailyInquirer, [Inc.] and theManila [Daily] Bulletin

PublishingCorporation areordered to pay P1,000,000.00 eachto plaintiff; 2. Bothdefendants arelikewise ordered to

pay an exemplarydamage in the amount

of P500,000.00 each;3. To pay plaintiffsattorneys fees in theamount of P100,000.00 4. And topay the costs.

7. This petition for review on certiorari

assails the Amended Decision dated

May 25, 2004 of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. CV No. 54134, reversing

the Decision of the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental,

Dumaguete City, Branch 44 in Civil

Case No. 206-B, which had awarded

damages to petitioner for respondents

false reporting.

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RULING OF THE CASE:

1.YES. The news items derogatory and

injurious to petitioners reputation and

candidacy. It faulted respondents for

failing to verify the truth of the news

tips they published and held

respondents liable for negligence,

citing Policarpio v. Manila Times Pub.

Co., Inc. the news items lacked truth

and fairness, they were not privileged

communications.

2. Although the stories were false and

not privileged, as there is no proof

they were obtained from a press

conference or release, respondents

were not impelled by malice or

improper motive. There was also noproof that petitioners supporters

junked him due to the reports. Neither

was there any proof he would win,

making his action unfounded.

3.YES. Petitioner argues that his causeof action is based on quasi-delict

which only requires proof of fault or

negligence, not proof of malice

beyond reasonable doubt as required

in a criminal prosecution for libel. He

argues that the case is entirely

different and separate from an

independent civil action arising from

libel under Article 100 of the Revised

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Penal Code. He claims he proffered

proofs sustaining his claim fordamages under quasi-delict, not

under the law on libel, as malice is

hard to prove. He stresses that

nowhere in the complaint did he

mention libel, and nothing in hiscomplaint shows that his cause of

action had some shade of libel as

defined in the Revised Penal Code.

He also did not hint a resort to a

criminal proceeding for libel.

4. PDI and its officers argue that

petitioners complaint clearly lays a

cause of action arising from libel as it

highlights malice underlying the

publications. And as malice is an

element of libel, the appellate courtcommitted no error in characterizing

the case as one arising from libel.

G.R. No. 126466 January 14, 1999

ARTURO BORJAL a.k.a. ART BORJALand MAXIMO SOLIVEN, petitioners,

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COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCOWENCESLAO, respondents.

Facts:

1. A civil action for damages based

on libel was filed before the court

against Borjal and Soliven for

writing and publishing articlesthat are allegedly derogatory and

offensive against Francisco

Wenceslao, attacking among

others the solicitation letters he

send to support a conference to

be launch concerning resolving

matters on transportation crisis

that is tainted with anomalous

activities.

2. Wenceslao however was never

named in any of the articles nor

was the conference he was

organizing. The lower court

ordered petitioners to indemnify

the private respondent for

damages which was affirmed by

the Court of Appeals. A petition

for review was filed before the

SC contending that private

respondent was not sufficientlyidentified to be the subject of the

published articles.

Issue:

Whether or not there are sufficient

grounds to constitute guilt of

petitioners for libel?

Ruling of the Case:

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1. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is

essential that the victim be identifiable

although it is not necessary that he be

named. It is also not sufficient that the

offended party recognized himself as

the person attacked or defamed, but it

must be shown that at least a third

person could identify him as the

object of the libelouspublication.These requisites have not

been complied with in the case at bar.

The element of identifiability was not

met since it was Wenceslaso who

revealed he was the organizer of said

conference and had he not done so

the public would not have known.

2. The concept of privileged

communications is implicit in the

freedom of the press and that

privileged communications must be

protective of public opinion. Fair

commentaries on matters of public

interest are privileged and constitute

a valid defense in an action for libel or

slander.

The doctrine of fair comment

means that while in general

every discreditable imputation

publicly made is deemed false,

because every man is presumed

innocent until his guilt is judicially

proved, and every false

imputation is deemed malicious,

nevertheless, when the

discreditable imputation isdirected against a public person

in his public capacity, it is not

necessarily actionable. In order

that such discreditable

imputation to a public official

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may be actionable, it must either

be a false allegation of fact or a

comment based on a false

supposition. If the comment is an

expression of opinion, based on

established facts, then it is

immaterial that the opinion

happens to be mistaken, as long

as it might reasonably beinferred from the facts.

3. The questioned article dealt with

matters of public interest as the

declared objective of the conference,

the composition of its members andparticipants, and the manner by which

it was intended to be funded no doubt

lend to its activities as being

genuinely imbued with public interest.

Respondent is also deemed to be a

public figure and even otherwise is

involved in a public issue. The court

held that freedom of expression is

constitutionally guaranteed and

protected with the reminder among

media members to practice highest

ethical standards in the exercise

thereof.

---------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------

A privileged communication may be

either:

1. Absolutely privileged communication

those which are not actionable even if

the author has acted in bad faith. An

example is found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the

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1987 Constitution which exempts a

member of Congress from liability for any

speech or debate in the Congress or in any

Committee thereof.

2. Qualifiedly privileged

communications those containing

defamatory imputations are not actionableunless found to have been made without

good intention justifiable motive. To this

genre belong "private communications"

and "fair and true report without any

comments or remarks."

G.R. No. 135306

January 28, 2003

MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C.LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA and

AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., petitioners,

vs.

ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE

PHILIPPINES, INC., ABDULRAHMAN

R.T. LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA,

ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-

FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM B.A.

JUNIO, respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an existenceof the elements of libel in the Bulgararticle.

FACTS:

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1. ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OFTHE PHILIPPINES, INC., a local

federation of more than seventy (70)Muslim religious organizations, andsome individual Muslims field in theRTC of Manila a complaint fordamages in their own behalf and as aclass suit in behalf of the Muslimmembers nationwide against MVRSPUBLICATIONS, INC and some itsstaff arising from an article publishedin the 1 August 1992 issue ofBulgar,a daily tabloid.

2. The complaint:

a) The statement was insulting and

damaging to the Muslims;

b) that these words alluding to thepig as the God of the Muslimswas not only published out ofsheer ignorance but with intentto hurt the feelings, cast insult

and disparage the Muslims andIslam, as a religion in this

country, in violation of law,public policy, good morals andhuman relations;

c) that on account of these libelouswords Bulgar insulted not onlythe Muslims in the Philippinesbut the entire Muslim world,

especially every Muslimindividual in non-Muslimcountries.

3. MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC. andBINEGAS, JR., in their defense,contended that the article did notmention respondents as the object of

the article and therefore were notentitled to damages; and, that thearticle was merely an expression ofbelief or opinion and was publishedwithout malice nor intention to causedamage, prejudice or injury toMuslims.

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4. The RTC dismissed the complaintholding that Islamic Dawah et al.

failed to establish their cause ofaction since the persons allegedlydefamed by the article were notspecifically identified. The allegedlibelous article refers to the largercollectivity of Muslims for which thereaders of the libel could not readilyidentify the personalities of thepersons defamed. Hence, it isdifficult for an individual Muslimmember to prove that the defamatoryremarks apply to him.

5. The Court of Appeals reversed thedecision of the RTC. It opined that itwas "clear from the disputed articlethat the defamation was directed to alladherents of the Islamic faith. Thislibelous imputation undeniablyapplied to the plaintiff-appellants whoare Muslims sharing the samereligious beliefs." It added that the

suit for damages was a "class suit"and that ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL

OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.'sreligious status as a Muslim umbrellaorganization gave it the requisitepersonality to sue and protect theinterests of all Muslims.

6. MVRS brought the issue to the SC.

RULING OF THE CASE:

HELD

The article was not libelous. PetitionGRANTED. The assailed Decision of theCourt of Appeals was REVERSED andSET ASIDE and the decision of the RTC

was reinstated.1. There was no fairly identifiable

person who was allegedly injuredby the Bulgar article. Anindividual Muslim has areputation that is personal,

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separate and distinct in thecommunity. Each has a varying

interest and a divergent politicaland religious view. There is noinjury to the reputation of theindividual Muslims who constitutethis community that can give riseto an action for group libel. Eachreputation is personal incharacter to every person.Together, the Muslims do nothave a single common reputationthat will give them a common orgeneral interest in the subjectmatter of the controversy.

2. Defamation, which includes libel(in general, written) and slander(in general, oral), means theoffense of injuring a person'scharacter, fame or reputationthrough false and maliciousstatements. It is that which tendsto injure reputation or to diminish

the esteem, respect, good will orconfidence in the plaintiff or to

excite derogatory feelings oropinions about the plaintiff.

3. Defamation is an invasion of arelational interestsince it involvesthe opinion which others in thecommunity may have, or tend tohave, of the plaintiff. Words which

are merely insulting are notactionable as libel or slanderperse, and mere words of generalabuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whetherwritten or spoken, do notconstitute a basis for an action fordefamation in the absence of anallegation for special damages.

4. Declarations made about a largeclass of people cannot beinterpreted to advert to anidentified or identifiable individual.Absent circumstances specifically

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pointing or alluding to a particularmember of a class, no member of

such class has a right of actionwithout at all impairing theequally demanding right of freespeech and expression, as wellas of the press, under the Bill ofRights.

5. The SC used the reasoning in

Newsweek v IAC: where thedefamation is alleged to havebeen directed at a group or class,it is essential that the statementmust be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to everyindividual in that group or class,or sufficiently specific so thateach individual in the class orgroup can prove that thedefamatory statement specificallypointed to him, so that he canbring the action separately.

6. The SC cited some US cases

wherein the rule on libel has beenrestrictive. It was held that there

could be no libel against anextensive community in commonlaw. With regard to the largestsectors in society, includingreligious groups, it may begenerally concluded that nocriminal action at the behest ofthe state, or civil action on behalfof the individual, will lie.

7. "Emotional distress" tort actionhas no application in this casebecause no particular individualwas identified in the Bulgararticle. "Emotional distress"means any highly unpleasantmental reaction such as extremegrief, shame, humiliation,embarrassment, anger,disappointment, worry, nausea,mental suffering and anguish,shock, fright, horror, and chagrin.

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This kind of tort action is personalin nature, i.e., it is a civil action

filed by an individual to assuagethe injuries to his emotionaltranquility due to personal attackson his character. Under theSecond Restatement of the Law,to recover for the intentionalinfliction of emotional distress theplaintiff must show that:

(a) The conduct of thedefendant was intentionalor in reckless disregard ofthe plaintiff;

(b) The conduct was extremeand outrageous;

(c) There was a causalconnection between thedefendant's conduct andthe plaintiff's mentaldistress;

(d) The plaintiff's mental

distress was extreme andsevere.

8. "Extreme and outrageousconduct" means conduct that isso outrageous in character, andso extreme in degree, as to gobeyond all possible bounds ofdecency. The actions must havebeen so terrifying as naturally to

humiliate, embarrass or frightenthe plaintiff.

9. Any party seeking recovery formental anguish must prove morethan mere worry, anxiety,vexation, embarrassment, oranger. Liability does not arise

from mere insults, indignities,threats, annoyances, pettyexpressions, or other trivialities.Intentional tort causing emotionaldistress must necessarily giveway to the fundamental right tofree speech.

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10. Respondents' lack of cause ofaction cannot be cured by the

filing of a class suit. An elementof a class suit is the adequacy ofrepresentation. In determiningthe question of fair and adequaterepresentation of members of aclass, the court must consider:

(a) whether the interest of the

named party iscoextensive with theinterest of the othermembers of the class;

(b) the proportion of thosemade parties as it sobears to the total

membership of the class;and,

(c) any other factor bearingon the ability of thenamed party to speak forthe rest of the class.

Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines,

Inc., seeks in effect to assert the interests

not only of the Muslims in the Philippines

but of the whole Muslim world as well.

Private respondents obviously lack the

sufficiency of numbers to represent such a

global group; neither have they been able

to demonstrate the identity.

Richard Gutierrez,petitionervs. Jo-AnnMaglipon, editor in chief of PEP,

respondent

ISSUE:

Whether or not Maglipon is liable ofmalicious published articles on PEPwebsite?

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Whether or not PEPs apologyconstitutes and or mitigate the libel

suit from Guttierrez?

FACTS:

1. Actor Richard Gutierrez filed onMonday a P25-million libel complaintat the Makati City Prosecutor's Officeagainst the editor-in-chief of a

showbiz website.2. The lead actor of GMA-7's "Zorro,"

who arrived past 2 p.m. with hisfamily, claimed that Jo-Ann Maglipon,editor in chief of PhilippineEntertainment Portal, and two others,maliciously published an article onMarch 29 that accused him of beingin a gun-toting incident with actorMichael Flores.

3. Gutierrez said that as an endorser ofseveral brands, the article discreditedhim by portraying him as a

"troublemaker" when "no suchincident took place."

4. Also named as respondents in thefive-page complaint were KarenPagsolingan, PEP managing editorand Ferdinand Godinez, staff writer.

5. PEP earlier posted an apology on itswebsite, acknowledging its mistake ofposting the story on the alleged gun-toting incident without getting thestatements of Gutierrez and Flores.

6. Maglipon said that Gutierrezs motherand manager, Annabelle Rama, hadagreed not to press charges againstPEP if they would issue an apologizeon the website.

7. Actor Richard Gutierrez has lost his

legal battle with PhilippineEntertainment Portal (PEP) after theDepartment of Justice (DOJ)dismissed the libel suit he filedagainst the entertainment Web site.

RULING OF THE CASE:Page 35 of44
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/entertainment/04/13/09/update-richard-gutierrez-files-p25-m-libel-case-vs-pephttp://www.abs-cbnnews.com/entertainment/04/13/09/update-richard-gutierrez-files-p25-m-libel-case-vs-pephttp://www.abs-cbnnews.com/entertainment/04/13/09/update-richard-gutierrez-files-p25-m-libel-case-vs-pep


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1. The Associate Prosecutor Mary JaneSytat, cited "lack of probable cause"

in dismissing Gutierrezs libelcomplaint against editor-in-chief Jo-Ann Maglipon, managing editor KarenPagsolingan and writer Ferdinand"Bong" Godinez.

2. The resolution acknowledged thatPEP committed a lapse when itpublished a story on the gun-totingincident allegedly involving Gutierrezand fellow actor Michael Flores inMarch. The article, Gutierrezcomplained, gave an impression thathe was a troublemaker.

3. The resolution, however, opposed the

actor's argument, maintaining thatPEP's "lapse" did not constitute animputation of a discreditable act orcondition to another.

No evidence was presentedwhich would prove that a

reasonable mind, in this casethat of the public or the readers,

would believe that complainantwas a troublemaker based onthe statements in the questionedarticle, the resolution said.

4. The resolution also pointed out thatthe complainant failed to prove thatthe publication of the PEP article was

attended with malice.

Malice in Fact or Malice as aFact. -. It is the malice whichmust be proven by the plaintiff.He must prove the purpose ofthe accused is to malign or harmor injure his reputation. Thisarises either because:

(i) the article is not defamatoryon its face or if libelous it isambiguous

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(ii) the accused was able toovercome the presumption of

malice.

5.YES. It cited Maglipons apology andorder to immediately pullout thearticle and PEPs attempt to getFlores side of the story as sufficientevidence to show that therespondents have no desire to

deliberately injure the reputation ofthe complainant.

CASE DIGEST

GR Nos. 161032 and 161176

Attorney Ding So of the Bureau of

Customs,petitioner vs. Erwin Tulfo,

respondent

16 September 2008

Facts:

1. In the column entitled Direct Hit

published in the daily tabloidRemate, the said column was

accusing Atty. Ding So of the

Bureau of Customs of

corruption. On the published

article Atty. So was portrayed as

an extortionist and a smuggler.

2. Atty. Ding So of the Bureau of

Customs filed a libel suit in four

separate information against

Erwin Tulfo, Susan Cambri, Rey

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Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo, and

Philip Pichay ofRemate.

3. After trial, the Regional Trial

Court found Tulfo guilty of libel.

The CA affirmed the decision.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Tulfo is guilty of false

and malicious imputations in his

column in Remate.

2. Whether or not the assailed articles

are privileged.

3. Whether or not the assailed articles

are fair commentaries.

Ruling of the Case:

1.YES, For the ruling in Borjal case

was not applied to this libel case:

a. The case was based on a

criminal case.

b. There was sufficient

identification of the

complainant.

c. The subject was not a private

citizen, in this case, the subject

is a public official.

d. In this case it is not in the scope

of fair commentaries on

matters of public interest.

2. NO. The columns were meretrivialized and editorialized, the

columns dont have evidences to

substantiate the claims and attacks to

Atty. So. The articles cannot be

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privileged simply because the target

was a public official.

a. Tulfo made no effort to verify

the information given by his

source or even to ascertain the

identity of the person he was

accusing.

b. Tulfo abandoned the

consistent with good faith

and reasonable care when he

wrote the subject articles. This is

no case of mere error or honest

mistake, but a case of ajournalist abdicating his

responsibility to verify his story

and instead misinforming the

public.

c. Tulfo had written and published

the articles with reckless

disregard of whether the same

were false or not.

d. Evidence of malice: The fact that

Tulfo continuously published

articles lambasting Atty. So after

the commencement of an action.

This is a clear indication of his

intent to malign Atty. So, no

matter the cost, and is proof of

malice.

3. NO. Tulfo failed to substantiate oreven attempt to verify his story before

publication. Moreover he added facts

based on his standards of veracity.

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a. The absence of details of the

acts committed by the subject.

These are plain and simple and

mere gossip accusations,

backed up by the word of one

unnamed source.

Journalists do not rely on fictionsinstead on truth. There must be

some foundation to their reports;these reports must be warrantedby facts.

b. The columns of Tulfo are not

fair and true. Tulfo failed to do

research before making his

allegations, and it has been

shown that these allegations

were baseless.

Velasco, Jr., J:

Elements of fair commentary (to be

considered privileged):

a. That it is a fair and true report of

a judicial, legislative, or other

official proceedings which are

not of confidential nature, or of a

statement, report, or speech

delivered in said proceedings, or

of any other act performed by apublic officer in the exercise of

his functions;

b. That it is made in good faith;

c. That it is without any comments

or remarks.

Joseph Ejercito Estrada, petitioner vs.

Philippine Daily Inquirer and Alfonso

Yuchengco,

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ISSUES:

Whether or not Yuchengco is liable ofimputations and allegations

detrimental to Estrada?

Whether or not the Philippine Daily

Inquirer is liable of false and

malicious statements against

Estrada?

FACTS:

1. Former President Joseph Estradafiled yesterday a libel suit againstbusiness tycoon Alfonso Yuchengcoand the Philippine Daily Inquirerover

allegations that he coerced thebusinessman to sell his shares in thePhilippine Long Distance TelephoneCo. (PLDT), the countrys largesttelecommunications firm.

2. In his six-page complaint Estrada alsonamed as respondents Philippine

Daily Inquirer (PDI) publisher IsaganiYambot, editor-in-chief Letty Jimenez-Magsanoc and reporters DaximLucas, Christine Avendano and DorisDumlao.

PDI published the story entitledErap bullied me, says

Yuchengco-Taipan confirmscoercion in PLDT deal, whichwas based on a privilege speechdelivered by Senator PanfiloLacson last Monday.

3. In filing the complaint, Estrada deniedYuchengcos allegation and said thenews report was based on false andmalicious statements.

4. The former president said in hiscomplaint. Respondent Yuchengcosstatements imputing to me thecommission of serious crimes are

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mere fabrications. I vehemently denyhaving committed any unlawful or

criminal act against respondentYuchengco or the members of hisfamily in relation to the sale made bythe respondent of his PhilippineTelecommunications InvestmentCorp. (PTIC)/PLDT shares in favor ofFirst Pacific (First Pacific Co. Ltd),

5. As to the liability of the Inquirer,Estrada said the respondents causedthe printing, publication andcirculation of false and maliciousstatements without first validatingthem.

6. Estrada asked P10 million to P20million worth of damages.

7. February 22, 2010 the CA dismissedthe libel suit to PDI.

RULING OF THE CASE:

1. In dismissing the libel case, theJustice department pointed that

Yuchengco never said that Estradaintimated and threatened him tosell his PLDT shares.

The questioned statement can beinterpreted in no other way thanthat Yuchengcos shareholdings inPTIC were taken from him throughintimidation and threats to himself,his family and his businesses.

2. Yuchengco did not cast anyaspersion on complainantEstradas or any other personscharacter, integrity and reputation,the ruling said.

The resolution further said thatYuchengco statement wasprivileged in nature because itconstitutes fair comment onmatters of public interest.

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Matters Considered PrivilegedBy Jurisprudence

1. Fair Comments on Mattersof Public Interest

(a) In Borjal vs. Ct. of Appeals,(301 SCRA 1, Jan. 14, 1999) itwas held that the enumeration in

Article 354 is not an exclusivelist of qualifiedly privilegedcommunications because faircomments on matters of publicinterest are privileged andconstitute a valid defense in anaction for libel or slander

(b). They refer to events,developments, or matters inwhich the public as a whole hasa legitimate interest.

3. Since the privileged character of acommunication destroys the

presumption of malice, the onus ofproving actual malice lies oncomplainant Estrada [but] nomalice can be presumed from thequestioned statement becausecomplainant is a public figure, theJustice department said.

Doctrine of PrivilegeCommunication

Qualifiedly/ConditionallyPrivileged Communication: thisrefers to communications inwhich the law presumes theabsence of malice, thus they areinitially not actionable. Theburden therefore is on theplaintiff to prove the existence ofactual malice.

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4. It added that Estrada failed toprove that Yuchengco was

prompted by personal ill-will toinflict harm on the lattersreputation in circulating thequestioned statement.

5. In the same resolution, the Justice

department also dismissed thecharges against the PDI editorsand reporters, saying that Estradahas not shown the falsity of thecontents of the news report or thatrespondents were aware that theywere false or that there wasreckless disregard as to whetherthe statements were false or not.

Page 44 of44

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