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Commentary on Emotions: Neuro-Psychoanalytic Views 49

Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1988), The Computer and the Mind:An Introduction to Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press.

Kihlstrom, J. F. (1987), The cognitive unconscious. Science,237: 1445-1452.

Kosslyn, S. M., & Koenig, O. (1992), Wet Mind: The NewCognitive Neuroscience. New York: Macmillan.

LeDoux, J. E. (1996), The Emotional Brain: The MysteriousUnderpinnings of Emotional Life. New York: Simon &Schuster.

McEwen, B. S., & Sapolsky, R. M. (1995), Stress and cog-nitive function. Curro Opinion in Neurobiol., 5:205-216.

Milner, B., Squire, L. R., & Kandel, E. R. (1998), Cognitiveneuroscience and the study of memory. Neuron,20:445-468.

Commentary by Allan N. Schore (Los Angeles)

Over the last two decades, Freud's seminal model ofa dynamic, continuously active unconscious mind hasundergone a major transformation. Yet most disci-plines that border psychoanalysis, "the science of un-conscious processes," are unaware of these importantadvances. A rapidly evolving trend within contempo-rary psychoanalysis, at both the levels of theory andpractice, is an increasing appreciation of the centralityof affective phenomena. Freud first delineated hisideas about affect in 1895 in the "Project for a Scien-tific Psychology," an attempt to create a systematicmodel of the functioning of the human mind in termsof its underlying neurobiological mechanisms (Schore,1997a). Although he subsequently contended that thework of psychotherapy is always concerned with af-fect (1915), it is only recently that an increased em-phasis on affect is impacting clinical models.

In this same time frame, after a long period ofneglect, the other biological sciences have begun toearnestly explore the problem of emotion. As the firstissue of this important journal demonstrates, affectand its regulation are a potential convergence point ofpsychoanalysis and neuroscience. In the following Iwill briefly comment upon Solms and Nersessian'sand Panksepp's essays, and then, utilizing an interdis-ciplinary perspective, offer some ideas about affectand its development. Throughout my commentaries, I

Allan N. Schore, Ph.D., is Assistant Clinical Professor, University ofCalifornia at Los Angeles School of Medicine; and Faculty, Institute ofContemporary Psychoanalysis, Los Angeles.

Morgan, M. A., Romanski, L. M., & LeDoux, J. E. (1993),Extinction of emotional learning: Contribution of medialprefrontal cortex. Neurosc. Letters, 163: 109-113.

Squire, L. R., Knowlton, B., & Musen, G. (1993), The struc-ture and organization of memory. Ann. Rev. PsychoI. ,44:453-495.

Thorndike, E. L. (1913), The Psychology ofLearning. NewYork: Teachers College Press.

Joseph LeDouxCenter for Neural ScienceNew York University4 Washington PlaceNew York, NY 10003e-mail: ledoux@cns.nyu.edu

will argue that a common ground of both psychoanaly-sis and neuroscience lies in a more detailed chartingof the unique structure-function relationships of theright brain, which Ornstein (1997) calls "the rightmind." Psychoanalysis has been interested in the righthemisphere since the split brain studies of the 1970s,when a number of psychoanalytic investigators beganto map out its preeminent role in unconscious pro-cesses (Galin, 1974; Hoppe, 1977). I will suggest thatFreud's affect theory describes a structural system, as-sociated with unconscious primary process affect-laden cognition and regulated by the pleasure-unplea-sure principle, that is organized in the right brain.

A Perspective from Classical Psychoanalysis

In their concise presentation of Freud's theory of af-fect Solms and Nersessian underscore his ideas that"basic emotions" are forged in early development,and that in later life they represent "reproductions ofvery early experiences of vital importance" to notonly the "individual but of the species" (Freud1916-1917). There is now an intense interest in "bio-logically primitive emotions" which are evolution-arily very old, appear early in development, and arefacially expressed. The early maturing right hemi-sphere is dominant for the first three years of life(Chiron, Jambaque, Nabbout, Lounes, Syrota, and Du-lac, 1997), and it contains a basic primitive affect sys-tem (Gazzaniga, 1985) that is involved in the

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modulation of "primary emotions" (Ross, Hohman,and Buck, 1994).

In discussing the "perceptual" aspect of Freud'saffect theory, Solms and Nersessian describe the im-portance of affective appraisals of the personal sig-nificance of external stimuli to the generation of valueand meaning. Current emotion researchers are alsohighlighting the appraisal or evaluative function of af-fects. Emotions involve rapid appraisals of events thatare important to the individual (Frijda, 1988) and rep-resent reactions to fundamental relational meaningsthat have adaptive significance (Lazarus, 1991). Froma neurobiological perspective, LeDoux (1989) assertsthat "the core of the emotional system" is a mecha-nism for computing the affective significance of stim-uli. In a recent volume, I offer a chapter on thematuration of an evaluative system in the right cortex(Schore, 1998). This lateralized system performs a"valence tagging" function (Watt, 1998), in whichperceptions receive a positive or negative affectivecharge, in accord with a calibration of degrees of plea-sure-unpleasure. The essential roles of the right hemi-sphere in emotional perception (Borod et aI., 1998)and in the allocation of attention (Mesulam, 1990) arewell documented.

In addition to a perceptual dimension, Freud alsointuited the "expressive" aspect of emotions. Currentinterdisciplinary research is demonstrating the domi-nance of the right hemisphere for facial displays ofemotion (Borod, Haywood, and Koff, 1997) and spon-taneous gestures (Blonder, Burns, Bowers, Moore,and Heilman, 1995). In regard to Freud's ideas on thecommunication functions of affects, neuropsychologi-cal studies now report the preeminent role of the righthemisphere in emotional (Blonder, Bowers, and Heil-man, 1991), spontaneous (Buck, 1994), and nonverbal(Benowitz, Bear, Rosenthal, Mesulan, Zaidel, andSperry, 1983) communication. And with respect to hisspeculations on the memorial aspects of affect, thereis now evidence for a right cerebral representation ofaffect-laden autobiographical information (Fink, Mar-kowitsch, Reinkemeier, Bruckbauer, Kessler, andHeiss, 1996).

Solms and Nersessian correctly emphasizeFreud's characterization of the adaptive function ofaffects: "According to Freud, the mental apparatus asa whole serves the biological purpose of meeting theimperative internal needs of the subject in a chang-ing ... environment." This essential psychobiologicalfunction is echoed by Damasio (1994) who concludes:"the overall function of the brain is to be well in-formed about what goes on in the rest of the body,

Allan N. Schore

the body proper; about what goes on in itself; andabout the environment surrounding the organism, sothat suitable survivable accommodations can beachieved between the organism and the environment"(p. 90). But the two brain hemispheres have differentpatterns of cortical-subcortical connections, andtherefore do not play an equal role in this function.The right hemisphere contains the most comprehen-sive and integrated map of the body state available tothe brain (Damasio, 1994), and is central to the controlof vital functions supporting survival and enabling theorganism to cope with stresses and challenges (Witt-ling and Schweiger, 1993).

The characterization, in the neuroscience litera-ture, of these adoptive right brain functions, performedat levels beneath awareness, is consistent with Win-son's description, in current psychoanalytic writings,of revised models of the unconscious. Winson (1990)concludes, "Rather than being a cauldron of untamedpassions and destructive wishes, I propose that theunconscious is a cohesive, continually active mentalstructure that takes note of life's experiences and re-acts according to its schema of interpretation" (p. 96).

A Perspective from Affective Neuroscience

Panksepp's excellent critique covers numerous areasof overlap of psychoanalysis and neuroscience. I willtherefore focus on only a few of the important themeshe traces. Panksepp emphasizes the importance ofneurobiologically characterizing the extensively rami-fying subcortical emotional circuits that synchronizeemotional behaviors and bodily state changes, whathe calls the "arousal axis."

There is extensive evidence for a right hemi-spheric lateralization of the catecholaminergic systemswhich are the neurochemical substrates of arousal(Tucker and Williamson, 1984). Bioamines regulatethe brain microvasculature (Schore, 1994; Krimer,Mully, Williams, and Goldman-Rakic, 1998), andtherefore directly affect blood flow, an indicator ofregional oxidative metabolism that correlates withchanges in arousal. These neuromodulators, producedby neurons in the reticular formation, are centrallyinvolved in not only affective processes but also corti-cal development (Schore, 1994). Their critical func-tion in normal and pathological processes,development, and bodily states supports Panksepp'sdirective that an affective perspective necessitates amove beyond neuroscience's current corticocentric fo-cus to subcortical systems.

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Commentary on Emotions: Neuro-Psychoanalytic Views 51

This move to "lower" centers of the brain isrequired for neuroscience (and psychoanalysis) toovercome the myopia of ' 'Descartes' error," "the sep-aration of the most refined operations of mind fromthe structure and operation of a biological organism"(Damasio, 1994, p. 250). The absolute necessity ofcombining central and peripheral measures in brainresearch is now being stressed (Kutas and Federmeier,1998). Panksepp states, "Mind is a bodily function ofthe brain," a principle that is clearly demonstratedby the somatic aspects of emotional states. The righthemisphere is more deeply connected into both thesympathetic and parasympathetic branches of the pe-ripheral autonomic nervous system (ANS) than the left(Spence, Shapiro, and Zaidel, 1996), and thus it isdominant for "the metacontrol of fundamental physio-logical and endocrinological functions whose primarycontrol centers are located in subcortical regions ofthe brain" (Wittling and Pfluger, 1990, p. 260).

As Panksepp notes, the ventromedial prefrontalareas of the cortex' 'regulate affective processes" and"may be more influential in the complex regulationsof emotions and the abundant emotion~ognition in-teractions." Due to its extensive reciprocal connec-tions with bioaminergic nuclei in the reticularformation and neuroendocrine nuclei in the hypothala-mus, the orbitofrontal cortex acts as a "Senior Execu-tive" of limbic arousal (Joseph, 1996). Thisfrontolimbic cortex, the hierarchical apex of the limbicsystem, is expanded in the right hemisphere (Falk,Hildebolt, Cheverud, Vannier, Helmkamp, and Konigs-berg, 1990), and it has direct connections with theamygdala, temporal pole, cingulate, and ventral stria-tum (Carmichael and Price, 1995). The right cortex,more so than the left, is densely reciprocally intercon-nected with limbic regions (Tucker, 1992), and it con-tains the major circuitry of emotion regulation (Porges,Doussard-Roosevelt, and Maiti, 1994). The orbito-frontal system matures at the end of a right hemispheregrowth spurt in late infancy (Schore, 1994, 1996). Pank-sepp points out that these same ventromedial areas areinvolved in playfulness, maternal behavior, separa-tion, and attachment.

A Developmental, Dynamic Systems TheoryPerspective

In a continuation of Freud's principle of the primacyof early experience, recent developmental studies onthe centrality of the attachment relationship have beena major contributor to the current emphasis on affect

within psychoanalysis. Attachment theory, the domi-nant theoretical paradigm of contemporary develop-mental psychology, was first advanced some 30 yearsago by John Bowlby's (1969) integration of psycho-analysis and behavioral biology. In a departure fromthe classical Freudian developmental model, psycho-analysis now views these' 'vital" attachment experi-ences of the first two years as more central topersonality formation than the later occurring oedipalevents of the third and fourth years. Various authors,including Panksepp, are now investigating the psycho-biology of attachment.

My own work in this area (Schore, 1994, 1996,1997b, 1998) has focused on the effects of emotionalinteractions in early life on the organization of brainsystems that process affect; that is, the developmentalneurobiology of attachment. I have proposed that thevitally important attachment experiences of infancyare stored in the early maturing right hemisphere, andthat for the rest of the lifespan unconscious workingmodels of the attachment relationship encode strate-gies of affect regulation for coping with stress, espe-cially interpersonal stress. These internalrepresentations are accessed as guides for future inter-actions, and the term working refers to the individual'sunconscious use of them to interpret and act on newexperiences.

A major focus of current developmental interdis-ciplinary studies has been on the reciprocal affectivetransactions within the mother-infant dyadic system.In these face-to-face emotional communications themother is essentially regulating the infant's psychobio-logical states. The attachment relationship is thus aregulator of arousal, and attachment is, in essence, thedyadic regulation of emotion (Sroufe, 1996). But evenmore, these interactive affect regulating events act as amechanism for the' 'social construction of the humanbrain" (Eisenberg, 1995). Trevarthen (1993) con-cludes that' 'the affective regulations of brain growth"are embedded in the context of an intimate relation-ship, and that they promote the development of cere-bral circuits. This interactive mechanism requiresolder brains to engage with mental states of awareness,emotion, and interest in younger brains, and involvesa coordination between the motivations of the infantand the subjective feelings of adults. In this manner,"the self-organization of the developing brain occursin the context of a relationship with another self, an-other brain" (Schore, 1996, p. 60).

In fact, attachment transactions represent righthemisphere to right hemisphere affective transactionsbetween mother and infant (Schore, 1994). These af-

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fective communications of facial expressions, pros-ody, and gestures are central to the experience-dependent maturation of the infant's early maturingright brain. I have proposed that a secure attachmentrelationship facilitates the emergence, at the end ofthe second year, of what Bowlby termed a controlsystem in the cortex. I identify this as the orbitofrontalsystem, which, via its control of the ANS (Neafsey,1990), mediates the highest level of control of emo-tional behavior (Price, Carmichael, and Drevets,1996), that is, affect regulation. This frontolimbic sys-tem appraises facial information (Scalaidhe, Wilson,and Goldman-Rakic, 1997), operates by implicit pro-cessing (Rolls, 1996), and generates nonconscious bi-ases that guide behavior before conscious knowledgedoes (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, and Anderson,1997).

These data have implications for clinical psycho-analysis. The direct relevance of developmental stud-ies to the psychotherapeutic process derives from thecommonality of interactive emotion-transacting mech-anisms in the caregiver~infant relationship and in thetherapist-patient relationship. In the current neurobio-logical literature, the right hemisphere is dominant for"subjective emotional experiences" (Wittling andRoschmann, 1993). The interactive "transfer of af-fect" between the right brains of the members of themother-infant and therapeutic dyads is thus best de-scribed as "intersubjectivity," a finding consonantwith recent psychoanalytic "intersubjective" modelsof the mind. Current studies of the right hemisphereare thus detailing the neurobiology of subjectivity.

The contribution of neurobiology to psychoanal-ysis is thus more than the use of pharmacologicalagents that Panksepp suggests. Transference--counter-transference interactions, occurring at levels beneathawareness in both patient and therapist, representrapid right hemisphere to right hemisphere nonverbalaffective transactions (Schore, 1994, 1997c). Theseexpressions of what Panksepp describes as the' 'emo-tionally deeper and more sincere right hemisphere"may underlie his assertion that small movements offacial muscles, spontaneous gestures, and gaze aver-sions may be a better reflection of a person's affectivestate than his verbalizations. I suggest that just as theleft brain communicates its states to other left brainsvia conscious linguistic behaviors, so the right nonver-bally communicates its unconscious states to the rightbrains that are tuned to receive these communications.

Integrated psychoanalytic-neurobiological con-ceptualizations of emotional development can gener-ate clinically relevant, heuristic models of treatment.

Allan N. Schore

The right hemisphere is centrally involved in "implicitlearning" (Hugdahl, 1995), and "implicit relationalknowledge" stored in the nonverbal domain, is nowproposed to be at the core of therapeutic change (Sternet aI., 1998). Affect dysregulation, a central mecha-nism of the right hemispheric (Cutting, 1992) dysfunc-tions of all psychiatric disorders (Schore, 1997b;Taylor, Bagby, and Parker, 1997), is now a primaryclinical focus. The developmental data clearly suggestthat the primary role of the psychotherapist is to actas an affect regulator of the patient's dysregulatedstates and to provide a growth-facilitating environ-ment for the patient's immature affect regulating struc-tures (Schore, 1994, 1997c). The recent findings thatthe prefrontal limbic cortex, more than any other partof the cerebral cortex, retains the plastic capacities ofearly development (Barbas, 1995), and that the righthemisphere cycles into growth phases throughout thelifespan (Thatcher, 1994) allows for the possibility ofchanges in "mind and brain" (Gabbard, 1994) in psy-chotherapy. Updated, psychobiologically orientedpsychoanalytic treatment models may potentiate whatKandel (1998), in a clarion call for a paradigm shiftin psychiatry, describes as "biology and the possibil-ity of a renaissance of psychoanalytic thought."

In closing, I would like to suggest that the psy-chobiological realm of affective phenomena repre-sents not only a convergence point of psychoanalysiswith neuroscience, but also with the trans-scientificperspective of nonlinear dynamic systems theory (e.g.,Prigogine and Stengers, 1984; Gleik, 1987; Kauf-mann, 1993). The causal variables involved in affectand its regulation are notoriously dynamic; they maychange rapidly over time in intensity and frequency ina nonlinear pattern. In an upcoming volume, Emotion,Development, and Self-Organization, Panksepp, Free-man, Tucker, myself, and others are applying this per-spective to an understanding of affective phenomena.

Nonlinear dynamic systems theory models themechanism of self-organization, of how complex sys-tems that undergo discontinuous changes come to pro-duce both emergent new forms yet retain continuity.A central assumption of this theory is that energy flowsare required for self-organizing processes. These in-clude the bioenergetic transmissions in the rightbrain-mind psychobiological system that processesemotional information at levels beneath awareness.Such state transitions result from the activation of syn-chronized bioenergetic processes in central nervoussystem (CNS) limbic circuits that are associated withconcomitant homeostatic adjustments in the auto-nomic nervous system's (ANS's) energy-expending

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Commentary on Emotions: Neuro-Psychoanalytic Views 53

sympathetic and energy-conserving parasympatheticbranches. Emotional states thus reflect the nonlinearpulsing of energy flows between the components of aself-organizing, dynamic, right-Iateralized mind-bodysystem. Freud's energy models, long considered obso-lete, need to be modernized and reintegrated into psy-choanalysis (Schore, 1994; Solms, 1996; Shevrin,1997).

I have recently argued that as opposed to the ver-balleft hemisphere's' 'linear" consecutive analysis ofinformation, the processing style of the visuospatialright hemisphere is best described as "nonlinear,"based on multiple converging determinants rather thanon a single causal chain (Schore, 1997b). Accordingto Ramachandran and colleagues (1996), the cognitivestyle of the right hemisphere shows a highly sensitivedependence to initial conditions and perturbations, afundamental property of chaotic systems. The minor(!) hemisphere utilizes image thinking, a holistic, syn-thetic strategy that is adaptive when information is"complex, internally contradictory and basically irre-ducible to an unambiguous context" (Rotenberg,1994, p. 489). These characterizations also apply toprimary process cognition, a right hemispheric func-tion (Galin, 1974; Joseph, 1996) of the unconsciousmind.

Solms (1996, p. 347) notes that the right hemi-sphere also encodes representations "on the basis ofperception derived initially from the bodily ego,"clearly implying its dominant role in emotional states.Current neurobiological studies are revealing greaterright hemispheric involvement in the unconscious pro-cessing of emotion-evoking stimuli (Wexler, War-renburg, Schwartz, and Janer, 1992) and conditionedautonomic responses after subliminal presentations offaces to the right and not left cortex (Johnsen andHugdahl, 1991). Most intriguingly, a very recent posi-tion-emission tomography (PET) study demonstratesthat unconscious processing of emotional stimuli isspecifically associated with activation of the right andnot the left hemisphere (Morris, Ohman, and Dolan,1998), supporting the idea that "the left side is in-volved with conscious response and the right with theunconscious mind" (Mlot, 1998, p. 1006). These andthe aforementioned studies strongly suggest that theemotion processing right mind (Ornstein, 1997) is theneurobiological substrate of Freud's dynamic uncon-scious.

Twenty-five years after the "Project," Freud(1920) described the unconscious as "a special realm,with its own desires and modes of expression and pe-culiar mental mechanisms not elsewhere operative."

Further studies of this right brain, unconscious, af-fectively charged, dynamic mind-body system arenow called for.

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Commentary by Howard Shevrin (Ann Arbor)

Bridge building between psychoanalysis and neurosci-ence, disciplines that on their face appear to be worldsapart, has been deemed by some foolhardy and byothers premature, yet as the Solms and Nersessiansummary of Freud's affect theory and Panksepp's po-sition paper attest, the time may be ripe and the enter-prise fruitful. Most gratifying from a psychoanalyst'sstandpoint is the call made by Panksepp for drawing,not only on psychoanalytic insights, but for integrating

Howard Shevrin, Ph.D., is Professor of Psychology, Department ofPsychiatry, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

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Allan N. Schore9817 Sylvia AvenueNorthridge, CA 91324e-mail: anschore@aol.com

the psychoanalytic method with psychological andneuroscience research approaches. As someone whohas been committed to this integration in my own re-search (Shevrin, Bond, Brakel, Hertel, and Williams,1996), I welcome these exciting efforts to advanceinterchange between psychoanalysis and neuro-science.

In my commentary I will be limiting my observa-tions to some of the issues raised concerning the rela-tionship of affect to consciousness, motivation, andaction. Insofar as the Panksepp paper is in part a de-tailed response to the Solms and Nersessian summary

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